A crisis of confidence: an assessment of REDD+ stakeholder experiences in Indonesia

Abstract:

Identifying challenges and opportunities for REDD+ will help to inform future

policy and implementation of the program in Indonesia and other countries. The aim of

this research is to identify and elucidate challenges and opportunities for REDD+, and

other environmental governance initiatives, through perspectives of people working with

REDD+ in Indonesia. This paper presents the perceptions of stakeholders and

practitioners involved in REDD+ in Indonesia at multiple scales varying from global to

local. Our research demonstrates stakeholders are struggling with problems of corruption,

bureaucracy, and a lack of confidence in REDD+. Ultimately, our respondents and

supporting documents indicate the cultural and governance contexts in Indonesia are

particularly complex. Furthermore, there are problems surrounding funding, logistics of

implementation, corruption, stakeholder engagement and buy-in. Despite challenges,

REDD+ may have increased attention to these issues and acted as a catalyst for change.

Effectiveness for REDD+ in Indonesia will require both nuanced understanding of the

local and cultural context as well as long-term perspectives.

Keywords: REDD+; Forest Management; Payment for Ecosystem Services; Environmental Governance; Indonesia; Stakeholders; Ethnography

1 Introduction

While Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+)

has been introduced in over 65 countries (UN-REDD Programme 2018), yet there is still

uncertainty about its’ future. Indonesia provides an important example for understanding

challenges for REDD+. It is one of the most biodiverse places on the planet (Convention

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on Biological Diversity n.d.), experiences significant deforestation and degradation

(Margono et al. 2014), leading to high levels of carbon emissions (Carlson et al. 2012).

Thus REDD+ presents widespread opportunities for Indonesia to benefit financially from

their forest reserves and minimize environmental and social consequences of large-scale

deforestation. Despite the promises REDD+ offers for Indonesia’s forests (Busch et al.

2015), its implementation has been complicated as a result of the political climate in

Indonesia (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; Brockhaus et al. 2012), high demand for forest land

for palm oil production (Abood et al. 2014) , and a history of questionable forest

management practices (Transparency International 2011; HRW 2013).

As REDD+ projects globally demonstrate varying levels of success, understanding

challenges and opportunities for successful implementation will be crucial to help shape

approaches and future policy. While implementation has been ongoing in Indonesia since

2007, long-term outcomes are unclear and more information about how projects are

working on the ground is needed. This paper provides such insight by relating results of

in-depth research with stakeholders of REDD+ in Indonesia.

2 Background: REDD+ & Indonesia’s forests

With the third largest extent of tropical forest, Indonesia had the highest rate of

deforestation on the planet in 2013 (Margono et al. 2014) and is known for its

complicated forest governance context (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005; Indrarto et al.

2012). Because of this combination of factors, REDD+ implementation in Indonesia has

received much attention – Indonesia’s government has publicly committed to REDD+,

created REDD+ agencies, and these efforts have been encouraged by funding pledges

from Norway, Germany and the UK (Government of Norway et al. 2015). Yet,

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deforestation rates in Indonesia remain high (WRI 2016), and based on results from this

research the majority of REDD+ stakeholders feel it remains uncertain how successful

REDD+ has been, or will be.

Stakeholder groups in Indonesia are involved in REDD+ implementation at

national, provincial, and local levels with a diverse range of interests in program

outcomes. REDD+ demonstration sites in Indonesia display a wide variety of structures

and goals (Global Canopy Programme 2013; REDD Net 2013). No single established

source of funding exists for REDD+ projects: many report receiving funding from

international aid agencies or multilateral development banks, some projects are working

to secure funding from carbon markets, and other projects are funded and facilitated by

NGOs. Many projects are still searching for secure, long-term funding.

Projects can also vary in how they are implemented (see Table 1). Some have

obtained licenses from Indonesia’s government to operate Ecosystem Restoration

Concessions (ERC). Projects can also be established as official customary forest, also

known as hutan adat, a status that potentially gives forest communities legally

recognized tenure over their forest territories. Or, as in the case of the Carbon Fund, some

projects may approach REDD+ at a larger scale by engaging entire regions (kabupaten)

in REDD+ activities (World Bank Group 2013).

Table 1

Type of REDD+ Project

Locational basis of Project

Funding sourceFocal point for conservation

activities

Examples

Ecosystem Ecosystem- Private entity Concession Harapan

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Restoration Concession

based license in production

forest

holds the ERC – donors, carbon

fund, NTFPs, etc.

based on ecosystem and restoration of

ecosystem

Rainforest; Rimba Raya; Rimba

Makmur

Community Based Project

Centered around hutan

adat (community

forest)

Usually funded by an NGO or Development organization

Empowering forest

communities and improving

tenure

WWF’s Kutai Barat; GIZ’s Kapuas Hulu

National level institution Sponsored

Centered around a district or

region

National level institution such as the carbon Fund or the

United Nations

Engaging region or districts,

including local governments,

NGOs and forest communities in

forest conservation

activities

Indonesia District Level

REDD+ ER Program;

The United Nations REDD+

Pilot Project

Regardless of differences among manifestations of REDD+ projects in Indonesia,

they all share Indonesia’s complex governance system of inherent tensions between

devolution of authority to provinces and districts and an inherent tendency towards

centralization and state control. Forest governance in Indonesia is particularly complex

(Enrici and Hubacek 2016) and, as indicated by some of our respondents, requires a

nuanced understanding and long-term perspective. While this paper addresses research

specific to REDD+, the results are also broadly applicable to environmental governance

challenges in Indonesia more broadly.

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3 Methods and case study

Data collection was undertaken from 2012 to 2014 including participant

observation, interviews, and a review of relevant forest policies. This ethnographic

research was supplemented by a range of other sources including research publications,

grey literature, newspapers and other media reports, as well as policy documents in order

to understand the context of REDD+ stakeholder experiences and potential disconnects

between the literature and what was happening on the ground. Triangulating data by

including a full spectrum of sources from national to local scales – and combining

multiple sources, such as literature and forest policy, with interviews among stakeholder

groups, provides insight into how international and national initiatives manifest, increases

validity of data and helps to bridge gaps between literature, policy and reality.

All participants were stakeholders of REDD+, and are defined as someone who is

currently, or has previously been, involved directly in the REDD+ program, working on a

project, collaborating on a project, or living in or adjacent to a project, as in the case of

forest communities. A chain referral and preferential sampling method was used, and

interviews were conducted with key stakeholders with an effort to include REDD+

participants from a broad and representative range of stakeholder groups. Interviews

were conducted with 71 stakeholders, including 45 Indonesian and 26 foreign

respondents, from a variety of stakeholder groups: donors, project managers, employees

and heads of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government officials,

policymakers, members of civil society organizations, academic researchers, and local

forest communities. While some respondents work at multiple scales, others operate

exclusively at the national, provincial or local scales.

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Interviews in Indonesia were conducted in English and Bahasa Indonesia, or with

assistance from a local translator. Data collection took place in Jakarta and Bogor, as well

as in a variety of locations in provinces and districts where REDD+ is being

implemented. A small number of interviews were also conducted in Washington, DC

where some REDD+ stakeholder groups have headquarters. Informal semi-structured

interviews with informants from key stakeholder groups were primary tools for data

collection. Interviews consisted of approximately five to seven standardized questions

developed based on relevant literature and preliminary scoping fieldwork. Interviews

began with broad questions aimed at getting a general understanding of respondent’s

experiences with REDD+, and when topics relating to challenges, successes, or

perceptions of REDD+ were mentioned those were explored in more depth.  In addition,

18 meetings were attended in total, including nine at national and provincial levels

relevant to REDD+ policy and strategy as well as nine local meetings relevant to REDD+

implementation and stakeholder engagement. Meetings selected for inclusion in the study

included any meeting directly or indirectly related to REDD+ implementation at any

scale, and open to the public, or to which an invitation was extended. At these meetings

special attention was paid when stakeholders mentioned successes, opportunities,

challenges, and perceptions of REDD+. 

When possible interviews were recorded, with permission of respondents, and

transcribed. Grounded theory and inductive methods were used for data analysis, for

forming frameworks and research conclusions (Charmaz 2011). Interviews were

transcribed and entered into a TAMS Analyzer database in order to apply this grounded

theory approach to analyzing data (Charmaz 2006). Following an inductive coding

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method interview transcripts, and meeting notes and transcripts, were reviewed at various

stages of data collection to develop a list of coding categories based on recurring themes

and issues mentioned by respondents. All interview transcripts were coded using these

categories. Themes that emerged from interviews were used in conjunction with literature

and policy review to identify major challenges and opportunities as discussed in

following sections.

4.0Results and discussion

The themes presented by stakeholders can be grouped into five categories: (1)

Complicated and often confusing governance, regulations and policy; (2) Securing

sufficient funding; (3) Corruption and resulting inability to enforce project boundaries;

(4) Cultural complexity (5) Stakeholder doubts and fatigue; and (6) REDD+ as a catalyst

for change and new opportunities. All of these challenges can compound and create a

situation in which it is often difficult for project organizers to move forward with a

REDD+ project. Each of these topics is discussed in further detail below.

4.1 Complex and confusing regulations

Indonesian governance is known for being complex and characterized by sometimes confusing laws (Bell 2003; Bakker and Moniaga 2010), something which extends to the forestry sector (Indrarto et al. 2012; Galudra et al. 2011). Sometimes regulations and tenure overlap and conflict with each other (Beckert et al 2014; Fauzi and Anna 2013), leading to a challenging context for REDD+ projects. Local stakeholders working from within Indonesian institutions as well as foreign stakeholders expressed frustration with complexities surrounding forest governance. One national level foreign informant described it like this, “It’s an interesting sector to be in...you could spend 10 years here and still not understand...a lot of very experienced colleagues, who’ve worked all over the world, have said to me they’ve never worked in a more complicated system than here.” –RespondentID-10369. Another national level foreign stakeholder, said, “It just makes it really, hard…the whole regulatory process....at some point, they had three non-aligned, sometimes contradictory regulations on REDD1 and they were in the process of

1 In some quotes respondents use the term REDD interchangeably with REDD+. While sometimes the use of the term REDD is in reference to an earlier iteration of REDD+, for the purposes of this paper all

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developing a 4th one…so then they try to start over and try and fit it together, and you wind up with this impossible framework.” – RespondentID-10371. All of this manifests in complexity of institutional arrangements (Fauzi and Anna 2013) and a multiplicity of interpretations and perspectives regarding resource use and conservation (Galudra et al. 2011).

Many foreign stakeholders operating at national or international levels felt unable to find

pathways to move forward with REDD+ projects as well as other aspects of the forestry sector,

which in some cases have led to withdrawal from Indonesia or REDD+ projects. One stakeholder

reported this kind of situation with a partner-organization,“…I was working with someone from

[an international] Development Agency, and she was in Indonesia specifically for the purpose of

closing down all of [their country’s] development activities. They are completely pulling out

because they find it too difficult to work here and have any positive effect, and they think their

dollars are much better used [elsewhere].”—RespondentID-10377. While the complicated

forestry context creates a challenge for actual implementation of forest conservation projects

(Enrici and Hubacek 2018), it can also provide a daunting environment for stakeholder groups

establishing and maintaining long-term working relationships. Furthermore, without sufficient

understanding of Indonesia’s context, some foreign stakeholders may not be able or willing to

persevere with projects -- another foreign informant said, “There’s no kind of clear information

pathway on any of this…you can’t quite [go by] what’s written down. You’ve got to meet the

right people and do the kind of social appraisal of asking something and then asking them to

introduce you to other people and then try and collate your information and get back to the

truth. So it’s a completely labor intensive process. I think there’s a lot of donors that just won’t

have time or resources to do that. They don’t want to have relationships that intensive.” –

RespondentID-10376.

references to REDD should be considered to be referring to REDD+.

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Stakeholders working within Indonesian institutions also expressed frustration

with complex governance and regulations. Governance in Indonesia often overlaps

between different scales, particularly in a conflict of interest and control between national

and local governments (Stevens et al. 2014; Brockhaus et al. 2012). One Indonesian

stakeholder working at the national level put it like this, “Now there are too many

regulations, too many institutions...managing REDD+.”-- RespondentID-10395.

Throughout Indonesia overlapping authority among different agencies, or various scales

of government, can also contribute to confusion and challenges for those working in

forestry (Indrarto et al. 2012; Bakker and Moniaga 2010; Resosudarmo 2004).

Overlapping authority presents a challenge for forest governance in Indonesia, and can

also generate doubt and confusion among those involved in REDD+, or similar

conservation initiatives (Galudra et al. 2011; Fauzi and Anna 2013), something expressed

by foreign and Indonesian informants alike.

There is a disconnect between what happens at national and local levels in

Indonesia, highlighted in the following quote by a foreign NGO worker “Coming in, the

Ministry of Forestry was the leader on REDD in Indonesia…but the problem is…if you

talk to the Ministry of Forestry and look at regulations, it actually largely is under

district control. So those gray areas people talk about today…that's how you know where

you have a huge number of problems.” -- RespondentID-10380. At one meeting among

Indonesian government officials and foreign researchers, an Indonesian representative

said this, “The state wants to implement [this], but the district doesn't have the same

awareness level"—RespondentID-10402. Another national level Indonesian stakeholder

said, “And as you probably know already, in Indonesia it's the Bupati [district

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government head] that basically make decisions about land allocation. So they have a

very important role in deforestation, they give the license.” --RespondentID-10404.

Sometimes those locally issued licenses contradict official land use categories designated

by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry at the national level (Barr et al. 2006;

Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005). A recent law, ‘‘Law Number 23 about Local

Government,’’ UU/23/2014, intended to rectify some problems resulting from extreme

decentralization (Prasetyia 2012; Ewing-Chow and Losari 2015) attempts to shift

authority from districts to provinces. While Indonesia has over 500 districts, it only has

34 provinces, so the new law has potential to strengthen connections between central and

regional governments by shifting power from many district governments to provincial

governments. However, this shift has not yet materialized.

Overlap in authority and confusing governance have been particularly

problematic as they manifest with licensing and tenure in Indonesia, as parcels of land

may have conflicting licenses for different uses (Resosudarmo et al. 2011; Contreras-

Hermosilla et al. 2005). Confusion or conflict over tenure can pose problems for REDD+

projects (Resosudarmo et al. 2014), or areas designated as protected forest by Indonesia’s

government. Some members of forest communities involved in our fieldwork were not

aware that palm oil concessions overlapped with their customary forest (hutan adat).

Many community customary forests in Indonesia are vulnerable because of challenges

associated with establishing community forest rights despite a 2012 court ruling that

established rights of communities to have tenure rights to customary forests

(Natahadibrata 2013), so far very few claims of community forest rights have been

established, presumably because of complicated and challenging processes reported by

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our informants and supported by the literature (Sahide et al. 2016).

There is no single authority or database for land-use permits, and different

government agencies and sectors have different maps (Sills et al. 2014). The introduction

of REDD+ and attention it has brought to forestry in Indonesia has increased awareness

of these issues and as a result, one solution was proposed in which a single database

would be established in order to sort out conflicting licenses and overlapping tenure.

However, this project, called “One Map”, has not yet been completed (WRI 2018),

potentially as a result of the enormity of the task. One Indonesian stakeholder who had

been involved in development of One Map said this, “We are engaging into an MoU with

the governor of [the province]…so the governor requested companies there provide them

with all of the licensing...and administrative data...We gathered all of them…it was…a

lot because we received like ten boxes of documents each day, and it keeps on going and

going and going. And that’s only from [three districts], not the whole [province]”

RespondentID-10394. Indonesia has over 500 districts which, in consideration of the

overwhelming documentation described here, may partially explain why One Map has

not yet materialized. The stakeholder then goes on to describe problems with

documentation, something indicative of tenure issues found throughout Indonesia

(Sunderlin et al. 2014), …there are some licenses that are not there. It’s a really huge

problem. We’ve asked the government, but they said they don’t have them but then they

will [speak to] the company. But the company said they don’t have them.”

RespondentID-10394. This scenario, while described by someone working for the central

government, is indicative of what was reported by many stakeholders at both national and

local levels from both Indonesian and foreign agencies. Confusion and a lack of

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transparency, as described above, are linked to higher levels of corruption (Kolstad and

Wiig 2009). Complex and confusing governance thus not only frustrates efforts to

implement REDD+ in Indonesia, but has the potential to directly fuel corruption,

nepotism and collusion systemic throughout Indonesia’s forest governance system.

Setting up a REDD+ project as an Ecosystem Restoration Concession may come

with even further complications. Stakeholders who have approached REDD+ as an ERC,

have described difficulty in navigating processes for obtaining a license(Walsh et al.

2012). One project level foreign stakeholder described frustration working with

Indonesia’s central government to establish an ERC and the impact it had on obtaining

funding , “We kept getting money from investors...but then we couldn't get more because

we never had any progress to show, there was no good news.”RespondentID-10382.

Some already established ERC based REDD+ projects have reported procedures for

obtaining an ERC as long and daunting. Rimba Makmur and Rimba Raya, projects in

Central Kalimantan, both report the licensing process years and even then they were also

only granted partial licenses (Indriatmoko et al. 2014). As obtaining an ERC license will

be essential for development of many REDD+ projects, difficulties in obtaining licenses

has potential to greatly affect overall progress of REDD+ in Indonesia.

4.2 Issues with funding

Difficulty finding sufficient funding was frequently reported as another major

challenge towards project implementation. While lack of funding has been discussed in

the literature (Phelps et al. 2011; Dixon and Challies 2015), it is still important to discuss

financing for REDD+ in Indonesia because of the contrast between perceptions of

funding available, and the reality of a shortage of available funds at the local level. While

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some international stakeholders seemed to think there was plenty of funding for projects,

local level stakeholders emphasized that securing funding was one of the greatest

challenges to ensuring REDD+ long-term effectiveness and there is evidence to support

this (Diana and Jong 2018; Enrici and Hubacek 2018; UN-REDD Programme 2013).

When national and international level stakeholders are not in touch with challenges faced

by those working on REDD+ projects at local levels it may contribute to logistical

problems for project implementation. Results of this research suggest knowledge about

lack of funding is prevalent among many stakeholders working on REDD+ at project and

local levels, which undermines confidence and buy-in.

Despite widespread reports of substantial funding for REDD+, many projects are

lacking basic funds to support on-the-ground efforts. Norway’s government reports

approximately 8% of the USD1billion promised to Indonesia have either been released or

“committed’ and distribution of funds will be results based (Royal Norwegian Embassy

Jakarta 2016). While many REDD+ projects were initiated with assumptions that

funding, or carbon markets would be easily accessible for project financing, that has not

been the case for many REDD+ stakeholders. Lack of sufficient funding can also impact

stakeholder perceptions of REDD+ and belief in possibilities for achieving successful

outcomes, especially given competing income opportunities from resource extraction:

“One of our economists...saw the scale of the coal mining and scale of money coming in

formally and informally to the local district government. And his feedback to me was

REDD’s got a tough job to do here if it can even try and compete with the level of money

flowing in. And he became a skeptic overnight.” -- RespondentID-10377. Such

sentiments of doubt were prevalent across stakeholder groups, as discussed in greater

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detail in section 4.5 below.

From inception, REDD+ has been envisioned as a market based mechanism

(Holloway and Giandomenico 2009). Though early pilot projects and readiness efforts

have largely been funded by donor grants (Streck 2012), intentions were for a carbon

trading mechanism to sustain long-term viability of projects and incentivize expansion.

Despite these intentions, results from this research and evidence from available

documentation demonstrate the carbon market has not provided a viable funding option.

Many forest conservation activities including REDD+ are excluded from some carbon

market mechanisms including the compliance market (Carbon Market Watch 2016;

Butler, Koh, and Ghazoul 2009) and furthermore, carbon markets are still insufficiently

developed to support climate change mitigation efforts (Johannsdottir and McInerney

2016).

Some at the local level reported that it did not seem they would be able to secure

sufficient funding to maintain projects over the long-term. One such individual said, “We

need more support, [people are] always thinking about the money. We need more cash

from outside, from donors. There's not enough money to scale up.”-- RespondentID-

10392. This speaks to the fact that REDD+ finances may not be sufficient to effectively

compete with other land uses, such as palm oil (Butler et al. 2009). Stakeholders are

aware how this imbalance of economic incentives may impact REDD+, and it may also

create doubts for long-term success. One foreign NGO worker said, “The other issue is

that REDD money is not unlimited. It's going to be a drop in the bucket compared to the

revenue that palm oil brings in…So how do you address the real drivers of

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deforestation? How can you use REDD to really do that? I don't know.”-RespondentID-

10379. The inability of REDD+ to compete with mining and palm oil may continue to be

problematic for a number of reasons. For example, globally REDD+ has created new

opportunities for securing local tenure rights (Larson et al. 2013). However, while

securing community rights can lead to more successful forest management in some

situations (Stevens et al. 2014), it may not in cases where other activities can offer

communities more financial compensation for their community forest (Resosudarmo et

al. 2014). Ultimately, the lack of funding reported by some of our respondents is

problematic as exemplified by the end of the UN REDD+ Pilot Project, which closed due

to a lack of funding (UN-REDD Programme 2013) and is an issue which continues to

threaten other REDD+ projects in Indonesia (Diana and Jong 2018) and elsewhere

(Sunderlin et al. 2015).

4.3 Corruption and inability to enforce project boundaries

Both foreign and Indonesian stakeholders operating at all scales of REDD+

implementation expressed concerns about corruption and how it impacts REDD+

projects, an issue also documented in the literature (Luttrell et al. 2014 Indrarto et al.

2012). At one time the Ministry of Forestry was ranked the lowest ministry in Indonesia

on an integrity survey done by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)

and was furthermore found responsible for inaccurately mapping forest cover, land use,

concessions and unfairly allocating land rights ( HRW 2013). While such high level

corruption is problematic for forest management, corruption in forestry also occurs at

local levels (Prasetyia 2012; Kuncoro et al. 2013) and both can be problematic for

REDD+ projects.

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–For example, stakeholders working at local or project levels reported instances

where authorities expect bribes or payments in order to enforce project boundaries and

stop encroachment, a phenomena also documented elsewhere (Dermawan et al. 2011;

Butt 2011). While some projects seem to have enjoyed support from local officials, other

stakeholders reported that they often cannot get approval for projects, even after a project

has been approved by the central government. A number of stakeholders reported a lack

of enforcement of current regulations, something evidenced by encroachment onto

protected areas (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; WWF 2013; Yuliani et al. 2010) and the lack

of sufficient sanctions (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005; Faure and Wibisana 2013;

Indrarto et al. 2012), and which can also lead to a sense of general frustration and fatigue

with REDD+. One informant who works at both the international and project level,

referring to a visit to one of the provinces where REDD+ is being implemented, said: “It

was really staggering, the amount of...complete lack of enforcement of any rules or

regulations about destruction of [the forest]…”. RespondentID-10375.

Corruption has been reported in the literature to lead to higher rates of

deforestation in general (Galinato and Galinato 2013, 2012), and based on the results of

this research, appears to facilitate encroachment into protected areas. This is evidenced

by the same phenomena occurring across protected forest areas in Indonesia (Gaveau et

al. 2013; Margono et al. 2012; Broich et al. 2011; Indonesia Ministry of Forestry 2014).

Such corruption extends to REDD+ efforts, affects stakeholder authority over project

areas and reduces their ability to enforce project boundaries. Without proper governance

over REDD+ project territories, it makes it difficult to achieve goals for carbon

sequestration and biodiversity preservation. Other stakeholders also reported local

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authorities failed to respond to encroachment within project boundaries, something

widely reported as a problem in Indonesia’s protected forest areas (Murdiyarso et al.

2011; Gaveau et al. 2013; Sloan et al. 2012). For some stakeholders, having to pay bribes

in order to get local support was both expected and necessary. As a foreign stakeholder

working at the local level stated, “…to make it work we have to make tribute payments to

local authorities…we’ve got to find ways to get support from local authorities.”-

RespondentID-10387. Some stakeholders expressed concern about how local law

enforcement failed to protect their rights. Some stakeholders described experiences with

local police and authorities who were allegedly involved in encroachment activities,

something which has also been documented elsewhere (Smith et al. 2003; Butt 2011).

Sometimes encroachment is done by other entities, such as agricultural companies

or smallholders (WWF 2013; Krishna et al. 2014), but without local governmental

support there is very little project organizers, or even local communities within those

projects, can do about it. In other scenarios, sometimes outside entities encourage

encroachment by local villagers, which can make it more difficult for project organizers

to stop encroachment – without local government support it is nearly impossible. One

stakeholder said, “We have villagers planting palm oil inside our concession. The [palm

oil company] pays them to plant it there.” – RespondentID-10383. Project organizers

turned to local authorities for support, but were expected to make payments, which their

international-aid-agency-funded budget did not allow for. Complaints of this kind were

common. One stakeholder involved in a REDD+ project working at local levels stated,

“Illegal oil palm from [our REDD site] is sold to agents or a local mill, owned by the

government of Indonesia.“ – RespondentID-10422. Stakeholders’ experiences with

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corruption can make REDD+ project management challenging, as extensive

encroachment can lead to forest cover and biodiversity loss. Corruption such as

mentioned by our respondents can also lead to stakeholder fatigue and doubt, discussed

further below.

4.4 Cultural barriers: Complexity and insufficient open discussion about REDD+

Many stakeholders, both foreign and Indonesian, expressed sentiments regarding

a lack of clarity and openness surrounding REDD+ in Indonesia. Collaboration among

stakeholder groups has been identified as an important component of long-term

successful ecosystem and natural resource management schemes (Vacik et al. 2014;

Blumenthal and Jannink 2016). While inclusion and collaboration of stakeholders at

multiple scales has been acknowledged in many REDD+ documents (CIF 2013; UN

REDD Programme 2015), many of our respondents reported feelings of frustration at

cultural disconnect and misunderstandings.

Indonesia has a complex and rich cultural context, reflected by the over 700

languages spoken there. This cultural diversity has contributed to a complicated context

some describe as chaotic (Parry 2007; Forrester 1999) or confusing (Gallemore and

Moeliono 2014; Ewing-Chow and Losari 2015; Galudra et al. 2011) and which may be

challenging for foreign, or even local, stakeholders to navigate. One stakeholder from

Indonesia working at the national level put it like this, “This issue is really challenging…

the system in Indonesia is very complex.” RespondentID-10404, another foreign

stakeholder put it simply, “Operating here is difficult” RespondentID-10368. These

perceptions of unnecessary institutional complexity are supported by evidence that

sometimes the government’s priorities conflict (McFarland et al. 2015; Simamora 2011),

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laws are sometimes confusing and conflicting (Indrarto et al. 2012; Galudra et al. 2011;

Gallemore and Moeliono 2014) and there is evidence of insufficient communication

among governance actors at varying scales (Moeliono et al. 2014). Both foreign and

Indonesian stakeholders reported feelings of frustration and sometimes even confusion

when working on REDD+ efforts, particularly at national or international levels.

Many stakeholders seemed concerned about how the complexity of Indonesia’s

context was impacting outcomes for REDD+. One Indonesian stakeholder working at the

national level described frustrations in regard to overlapping authority (Ministry of

Forestry 2009; Brockhaus et al. 2012) and lack of reference levels (Virah-Sawmy et al.

2015), “REDD cannot work here, we don't have the reference levels. And Indonesia is

too diverse and vast. The national government cannot control the subnational, provincial

or kabupaten [district].”—RespondentID-10367. Confusion can happen when well-

meaning foreign donors or project organizers approach situations with less knowledge

about cultural context than may be necessary and some stakeholders seemed to lack the

understanding necessary to navigate Indonesia’s cultural context in a way that would

allow them to be successful over the long term. Other foreign stakeholders expressed

confusion and uncertainty about how to deal with problems in a culturally appropriate

way. Some who had been working in the country for a long time had a better sense of

how to approach issues, yet still expressed frustration at having to adapt to the cultural

context. One stakeholder working at the national level for many years said, “It’s difficult

because you can never say anything directly”- RespondentID-10381. And another

working at national scales, emphasizing the frustration felt as a result of the cultural

disconnect, and expressing concerns about how this has led to challenges for REDD+,

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“The Ministry of Forestry's definition of degradation and deforestation [differs] from

[others]…And it's the same data, it's the definitions and what they're calling

deforestation. So, getting those definitions in place like we agreed to is going to be a bit

of a challenge”—RespondentID-10370. Such differing interpretations and definitions

have in fact lead to conflicts over forest cover assessment (Romijn et al. 2013).

Comments such as these were common and furthermore connect to lack of buy-in and

stakeholder fatigue.

4.5 Stakeholder fatigue -- stakeholders doubt possibilities for success of REDD+

Sentiments of doubt, stakeholder fatigue, and lack of buy-in are representative of

feelings of the majority of our respondent, and such doubts have also been expressed in

the literature (Fletcher et al. 2016; Redford et al. 2013) . In 2015 President Jokowi

disbanded the National REDD+ Agency (BP REDD+), an act which may both have

reflected and added to doubts about the future of REDD+ (Jong 2015). Stakeholders

from all groups and scales expressed some doubt and disenchantment with REDD+, and

these were some of the most emphasized and salient themes presented by respondents.

Disappointment with achievements of REDD+ in Indonesia were also expressed publicly

by government officials from Norway, one of the major donor countries (Parlina and

Nicholas 2016). At the national level, this stakeholder fatigue is often expressed as a

doubt REDD+ would endure and be able to achieve long-term success. This is how it was

noted by one informant, “There are so many problems we are dealing with to overcome

these REDD+ issues like local conflicts, either vertical conflict or horizontal conflict, or

law enforcement, corruption, licensing, there’s [so much].”—RespondentID-10396.

While many of these feelings about REDD+ were often specific to Indonesia’s context,

20

but also extended to the global perspective, “This is all incredibly difficult work. So to

not have made the progress anyone hopes, or even 10%, is not surprising…So, when I

say we all have failed, it's not really a criticism...it's just the way it is....it's certainly an

issue globally too.”—RespondentID-10374. While globally successful forest

management is a major challenge, some stakeholders seem to recognize that it is

particularly so in Indonesia’s context, “It's been really painful to watch actually, I feel

really bad for [Indonesia’s government]. You know, people underestimate how hard it is

to do certain things well. It's a ridiculously hard problem. Especially in a country like

Indonesia, where it's so resource dependent and corrupt.” RespondentID-10411.

At the community level stakeholder fatigue manifests as doubts promises would be met. Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) was developed as a way to make sure communities were fairly and ethically being involved in the process (Colchester 2010). In some cases well-meaning stakeholders, some of whom may have been doing their best to offer communities FPIC, may have approached communities years ago. However, when licenses take many years to obtain, or financing turned out to be difficult to find, communities may feel they have been made false promises and lose faith – a sentiment expressed by several of the communities included in our research. One village head said this, “I do not believe the benefits from [this project] will happen…How can I turn down the benefits offered by [the palm oil company] even if I know they’re bad? I think this [REDD+ project] will just be like every other group that’s come here with promises that have not been met.” RespondentID-10414.

Some stakeholders were even starting to suggest that their organizations were

moving away from REDD+ even if they were still interested in achieving outcomes. This

can be described as doubt in REDD+’s label, and in some cases stakeholders

disassociated their forest governance projects with the REDD+ label (William D.

Sunderlin, Ekaputri, et al. 2014; Enrici and Hubacek 2018). One respondent operating

within the Indonesian government directly stated that individuals from the former

Ministry of Forestry were not interested in being involved in REDD+, “REDD now is

forestry, but then the Ministry of Forestry says we don't want REDD. Because REDD is

21

now being managed by [other agencies]. For a long time I've always been saying...we

still have to have REDD. But, they don't want to use the term REDD.”-RespondentID-

10393. Other stakeholders had doubted REDD+ would be successful because similar

programs had not achieved what they set out to do, something that has also been

expressed in the literature (Redford et al. 2013).

Some stakeholders felt although there was much attention given to REDD+

nationally, this was not the case on the ground, “There's projects...but really if you look

at what's happening on the ground, it's not that much…some of them are also making

more noise than anything. -- RespondentID-10367. And another said, “REDD+ isn’t

happening yet…”—RespondentID-10405. Other stakeholders felt attention to REDD+ at

National and provincial levels, combined with a lack of action at project levels was part

of what caused stakeholder fatigue, “I get a lot of impressions from people and it seems

like Central Kalimantan has had so much focus on it...there is a bit of, a kind of REDD

fatigue there,...and frustration with all the things...happening.” — RespondentID-10370.

Related to stakeholder fatigue, lack of buy-in is stakeholders’ lack of belief that

REDD+ will be effective, and subsequent lack of interest in supporting projects and other

efforts. Analysis of Indonesia’s political context demonstrates REDD+ lacks support at

national and local government levels as well as among the public (Luttrell et al. 2014).

Respondents from our research expressed frustration at lack of buy-in by government

agencies at both national and local levels, but also many other stakeholders expressed a

lack of buy-in. Buy-in was discussed by respondents in two different capacities – first

their own lack of buy-in, and second their perception of a lack of buy-in from other

22

stakeholder groups. While these two aspects of buy-in were often mentioned separately,

there is a relationship between the two. Often informants would explain their own doubts

about REDD+ as being influenced by seeing a lack of buy-in from other stakeholder

groups. This is characterized in the following quote, by a stakeholder working at both

national and project levels,“ On one hand, [Indonesia’s Government] make[s] all these

public announcements about climate change, and they support this and they support that.

And then over here, it’s one concession after another for conversion to oil, and then they

don’t do anything about all the small-scale conversion….”.RespondentID-10419.

Frequently, comments such as above, about buy-in and concerns about how much

buy-in other stakeholder groups had were directed towards Indonesia’s Government at

both national and local scales. Concern about a lack of buy-in was voiced frequently

regarding local governments, as one stakeholder stated rather bluntly, “…buy-in from the

government [in that district] is still pretty weak.”RespondentID-10407. Other accounts

support these sentiments, include reports of a lack of enforcement experienced in national

parks and by some REDD+ projects at the local level (Yuliani et al. 2010; WWF 2013).

A variety of stakeholders expressed concern that plans for REDD+ in Indonesia had not

included ways to create buy-in or incentives for local governments, which ultimately

impacts how much local governments support REDD+. One national-level government

official explained it like this, ”There is no reason for these subnational governments to

buy-in, there is no buy-in at all.  Why should they be interested in REDD? What is it

doing for them?  Bupati [district heads] are only around for 5 years, they want some

kind of reward that'll happen when they're there.” – RespondentID-10413

23

Some stakeholders involved in running REDD+ projects were not even certain

their own projects would be successful. Such doubt has potential to undermine longevity

and commitment to achieving REDD+ outcomes. As one stakeholder stated, “ Not that

there's any success stories. You know, I think the stuff we're doing [at our REDD+

project], you know we really don't have it figured out there.”—RespondentID-10380.

Members of forest communities, extensively involved in some REDD+ projects also

expressed doubts about REDD+’s ultimate utility, “All I think we can really hope for is

ownership over our forest. These projects are only helping us a little.” – RespondentID-

10416. Other stakeholders felt challenges discussed above compounded the fact many

stakeholders failed to see, or believe, how REDD+ could benefit them, “There are so

many issues going on here…we have to find what the source of issues is first.”–

RespondentID-10385. Getting support and buy-in for REDD+ at all scales will be

necessary if REDD+ is to have any hope for success in the long run.

4.6 Hope for the future: REDD+ as a catalyst for change

While many REDD+ sentiments expressed by stakeholders were negative, there

were also positive reflections expressed by respondents. While many stakeholders have

doubts about the future of REDD+, many at least acknowledge some good has come

about as a result of REDD+ activities. Despite evidence REDD+ has not yet achieved the

ambitious goals of reducing Indonesia’s deforestation rate (WRI GFW 2016), some

actions towards forest governance reform have resulted from REDD+’s introduction and

the international attention it has drawn to Indonesia’s forests. These actions include the

presidential moratorium on new licenses (Busch et al. 2015), intensified discourse

24

regarding Indonesia’s sometimes problematic forest classifications (Enrici and Hubacek

2016), as well as continued international support for REDD+ efforts (Government of

Norway, Government of the United Kingdom, and Government of Germany 2015).

One Indonesian stakeholder working at the national level framed the positive side

of REDD+ as increased interaction among the Indonesian government and other

stakeholder groups, “But in terms of the REDD process itself…I think a lot of good

things [are] happening when they engage various stakeholders. And I think that never

happened before”—RespondentID-10396. Another similar perspective is REDD+,

although different than its original design, is acting as a catalyst which will drive change

and help encourage policy reform and better forest management, shared by an Indonesian

stakeholder working at national and local levels, “ I really like the perspective, the idea

REDD is going to drive change.” – RespondentID-10499. Other stakeholders felt by

entering into projects for the long-term, there was a possibility for positive change. As

has been mentioned by many of the stakeholders interviewed for this study, working in

the Indonesian context requires perseverance and understanding. One foreign stakeholder

working at the national scale said, “ It’s almost a kind of a test of stamina here. A lot of

donors have decided to withdraw because they’ve just had enough…and for some

reason, we’ve stayed. So it’s almost like we have a good relationship because we’ve been

around the longest.”—RespondentID-10376. If REDD+ is to succeed it will be important

for NGOs and stakeholders to recognize both positive outcomes as well as shortcomings,

and for stakeholders to remain committed and work towards their goals in REDD+, even

in the face of challenges.

25

5 Conclusions

One of the most prominent themes of this research is that REDD+ is undergoing a

crisis of confidence in Indonesia. Few stakeholders at local, regional, national and

international levels have much faith REDD+ will be successfully realized in Indonesia in

the near future. This lack of confidence is likely compounded by the rest of our findings

that regulations are complex and sometimes confusing; there is a lack of funding;

corruption and enforcement are problematic; and a complicated cultural situation is

exacerbated by a need for more nuanced understanding by foreign stakeholders. Many

respondents working directly on REDD+ felt a serious lack of pathways for moving

forward and project implementation, something which likely added to delays in REDD+

development and may have exacerbated feelings of doubt.

At all levels, frustrations exist with corruption, governance, land tenure, slow

progress and bureaucracy. Furthermore, this research shows a widespread loss of faith in

REDD+’s central mission. Most stakeholders no longer believe the REDD+ mechanism

can compete with alternative land uses and that REDD+ can be a successful mechanism

using carbon markets to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation. While

some actors are turning their backs on the REDD+ altogether, many actors are content to

use REDD+, and the recognition and funds it makes available, to achieve other long-term

goals such as biodiversity conservation and community rights.

However, despite all these challenges, there are some positive outcomes from

REDD+ and opportunities for the future. The introduction of REDD+ has arguably

increased attention to forestry challenges in Indonesia, and the program is potentially

26

acting as a catalyst for change. Furthermore, stakeholders who are able and willing to

persevere for the long-term may have better opportunities for future action. Despite all of

the challenges, two major conclusions can be drawn that would warrant future research

and may help efforts towards REDD+ and other conservation initiatives throughout

Indonesia: 1) Environmental governance work in Indonesia will require a long-term

perspective, stakeholders must adjust their expectations for how long implementation will

take and when they will see results; and (2) working on REDD+, and any kind of

environmental initiative, in Indonesia is going to require nuanced approaches within

Indonesia’s diverse contexts.

Compliance with Ethical Standards:Funding: This study was funded by the Fulbright Commission and a Dean’s Dissertation Fellowship from the University of Maryland. The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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