abortion needs or abortion rights? claiming state accountability for women’s reproductive welfare

Case note

RUTH FLETCHER

ABORTION NEEDS OR ABORTION RIGHTS? CLAIMING

STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WOMEN’S

REPRODUCTIVE WELFARE

Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland v. Minister forHealth, Social Services and Public Safety

ABSTRACT. The Family Planning Association Northern Ireland (F.P.A.N.I.) hasrecently been successful in holding the state accountable for its duty to safeguard

women’s reproductive health and welfare, and clarify the circumstances in whichabortion is lawful. By demanding that the Minister for Health investigate abortionprovision and produce abortion guidance, F.P.A.N.I. hope to improve the quality of

abortion services and alleviate the situation of those women who are legally entitledto abortion in Northern Ireland but cannot access it there. This action has challengeda public failure which impacts most negatively on those women who cannot easily

escape its effects. Although the case succeeded in shaming the state for such a failure,the judicial review strategy could not challenge the legal ethos which denies women asay over their reproductive lives. This case commentary argues that pro-choicestrategic litigation needs to positively and generally assert women’s reproductive

rights at the same time as it seeks to accommodate the needs of the most vulnerable.

KEY WORDS: abortion, duties, needs, rights, state, welfare

INTRODUCTION

In October 2004 the Family Planning Association Northern Ireland(F.P.A.N.I.) succeeded on appeal in getting a declaration that theDepartment of Health had failed in its duties. These duties were toinvestigate whether women were receiving satisfactory abortion ser-vices and to provide guidance as to the availability of abortion ser-vices in Northern Ireland. This case is significant for four mainreasons. First, it acknowledges the state’s duties to its women citizensand to the health care professionals serving their needs. In doing so itrows against the increasingly strong ideology of individual respon-sibility for welfare, and goes some way towards overcoming thesuspicion and distrust that have hindered the path towards stateaccountability in Northern Ireland. Second, it represents a strategic

Feminist Legal Studies (2005) 13:123–134DOI 10.1007/s10691-005-1459-0 � Springer 2005

success for the F.P.A.N.I. who are fighting a lonely struggle forwomen’s abortion rights in Northern Ireland. Although feministshave made significant progress in getting women’s issues on thepolitical table (Roulston & Davies 2000), there is still considerablediscomfort about explicitly supporting women’s reproductive rights,especially the right to abortion. Third, it identifies accommodation ofwomen’s abortion needs as an aspect of the rule of law and itscommitment to equality, fairness and clarity. Fourth, it demonstratesthat there is still a way to go before women are legally recognised asthe rightful bearers of sexual and reproductive autonomy, including aright to abortion (Smyth 2002). And there is potential for EuropeanConvention1 rights to assist pro-choice activism in strategicallycombining a victim discourse of needs with an agency discourse ofrights.

The litigation developed in a context where the failure to extendthe UK Abortion Act 19672 to Northern Ireland means that mostNorthern Irish women travel to Britain in order to access fee-payingabortion services. Anti-abortion sentiment is commonly representedas one of the few issues which unites the politicians of NorthernIreland. One of the first actions of the Northern Irish Assembly in2000 was to adopt a motion that the Abortion Act should not beextended to Northern Ireland. Although the people of NorthernIreland are regularly represented as being overwhelmingly anti-abortion, there is some evidence that they do not follow their poli-ticians. A Belfast Telegraph poll in July 2003 reported that 58 per centof respondents thought that abortion on demand should be legalised(Fegan & Rebouche 2003, p. 233). But public endorsement of a pro-

1 The European Convention of Human Rights (E.C.H.R.).2 The 1967 Act did not repeal Sections 58 & 59 of the Offences Against the Person

Act 1861 which made procuring a miscarriage a criminal offence. Rather the 1967Act, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, provided adefence to doctors by saying that termination of pregnancy was lawful when two

doctors agreed in good faith (a) that the pregnancy had not exceeded its 24th weekand that it posed a risk to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman orany existing children; or (b) that termination was necessary to prevent grave per-

manent injury to the physical or mental health of the woman; or (c) that the preg-nancy posed a risk to the woman’s life; or (d) that there was a substantial risk thatthe resulting child would suffer such physical or mental abnormalities as to be

seriously handicapped. In this way, as Sheldon has argued, British abortion law gavethe medical profession the power to determine whether particular women could optout of pregnancy or not (Sheldon 1997; see further Lee 1998).

RUTH FLETCHER124

choice position is still rare. For example, the Northern Irish HumanRights Commission was quick to deny that recognition of a right toreproductive healthcare could include abortion (see further: NIHRC2004). Yet the abortion practice of Northern Irish women shows thatthey do actively refuse motherhood in particular moments for avariety of reasons.

At least 2,000 Northern Irish citizens cross the Irish Sea each yearto terminate their pregnancies at British clinics. In so doing, theyshare a pattern of abortion travel with Southern Irish women buttheir situation has not been subjected to international attention andcritique in the same way. Indeed, the irony that the British state isfailing the Northern Irish women it claims to represent has not beenlost on abortion-seeking women. One Northern Irish mother of threecommented:

I went to my G.P.3 thinking I would get every bit of support I needed in getting

referred for an abortion. After all, the G.P. knew of my situation and the terriblestrain I am under... He just sat there as cool as a breeze and said he understood mypredicament but that the law tied his hand... I ended up paying out a small fortune. If

anyone is entitled to a free abortion, it’s me. And I am supposed to be a Britishcitizen... . (Rossiter & Sexton 2001, p. 11)

Having to travel and pay for abortion compromises women’s health,equality and autonomy by contributing to later abortions and poorerafter-care; by disadvantaging marginalised women who cannot traveleasily; and by equating womanhood and motherhood.

Against this backdrop, F.P.A.N.I. finally took the Minister ofHealth to court in an effort to get the government to take responsibilityfor abortion guidance and provision. F.P.A.N.I.’s strategy was not tochange the law, but simply to clarify it. They did not try and rely onConvention rights in order to liberalise abortion law, but conceded thatthey were not victims of alleged rights breaches and did not have suf-ficient interest under the Human Rights Act 1998 to enforce the Con-vention. On the one hand, this was a relatively conservative strategywhichdid not seek to challenge the legal status quobut simply sought toshow that the relevant government department was not measuring upto its legal duties (Hewson 2004).AsFegan andRebouche have argued,the cultural ethos against abortion in Northern Ireland will not be

3 General practitioner, i.e., family doctor.

ABORTION NEEDS OR ABORTION RIGHTS? 125

successfully challenged until women’s agency is taken seriously (2003).This strategy did not take advantage of the opportunity to makearguments challenging antiabortion policy on the grounds that itinfringes women’s autonomy and in particular Article 8, E.C.H.R.,entailing a right to respect for privacy and family life. On the otherhand, the strategy was daring because, as Audrey Simpson noted, itmeant that the F.P.A.N.I. was taking its chief funder to court.4 Fur-thermore, in a political context which has seen conflict and suspensionof the rule of law, appeal to the ideals of state fairness and justice hasstrong resonance. To invoke the rule of law on behalf of abortion-seeking women is innovative in claiming the familiar Northern Irishdiscourse of failed state responsibility on behalf of feminist goals.

THE LITIGATION

As the only service provider in Northern Ireland which addresseswomen’s abortion needs, the F.P.A.N.I. had been lobbying for sometime for improved abortion access (Furedi 1995). They have cam-paigned for a change in the law by extending the Abortion Act 1967 toNorthern Ireland and have worked within the law to improve abortionsupport services. As part of the latter activities, they asked both theChief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland and theMinister to updateguidance on abortion. F.P.A.N.I has long argued that those womenwho were legally entitled to abortion in Northern Ireland (on R. v.Bourne grounds of grave risk to physical or mental health) were notgetting it because doctors were confused about the legal criteria orassumed that abortion was unlawful. Officials referred them to therelevant case law and said that authoritative guidance could only beprovided by a court of law. Finally, F.P.A.N.I. went to court inNovember 2001 to seek by way of judicial review a declaration that theMinister for Health had acted unlawfully in failing to:

• issue advice and guidance to women of child-bearing age and toclinicians in Northern Ireland on the availability and provision oftermination of pregnancy services in Northern Ireland;

4 Interview with Audrey Simpson (Director, FPANI) 20th April 2004, as part ofan E.S.R.C.-funded research project, ‘‘Constituting Markets and TransnationalSocial Networks in Abortion Services’’ 2003–2005.

RUTH FLETCHER126

• investigate whether women are receiving satisfactory services inrespect of actual or potential terminations of pregnancy inNorthern Ireland;

• make the arrangements necessary to ensure that women inNorthern Ireland receive satisfactory services in respect of actualor potential terminations or pregnancy in Northern Ireland

F.P.A.N.I. also sought at first instance an order of mandamusrequiring the Minister to cure such unlawfulness.

The applicant’s arguments5 had three main points. First, therespondent had a statutory duty under the Health and PersonalSocial Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (hereinafter the 1972Order) to provide guidance on lawful abortion and to address thesocial welfare and healthcare needs of women requiring lawfulabortions as part of its target duties, and to exercise that duty inaccordance with the principles of legality, legal certainty, rationalityand proportionality. Second, the respondent had a common law dutyto ensure that like cases were treated alike and that guidance beprovided on the application of common law to termination of preg-nancy given that guidance in relation to the provision of other healthservices had been issued in the past. Third, the respondent had a dutyunder Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to interpret legislationin light of Convention rights and therefore a duty to consider dedi-cating resources to address the needs of protecting vulnerable womenin need of counselling or aftercare under Article 8, not to interferewith Article 2’s right to life, and not to impose excessive burdens onvulnerable and under-privileged women contrary to Article 14’sprinciple of non-discrimination. Both at first instance and at appeal,the judges focused on the parameters of the statutory duty owedunder the 1972 Order and the clarity of Northern Irish abortion law.Four interventions were permitted, all of whom came from anti-choice perspectives: Archbishop Brady and the Roman CatholicBishops of Northern Ireland, S.P.U.C.N.I.6, Precious Life, and Life(N.I.) (summarised by Nicholson L.J.).

5 Nicholson L.J.’s judgement lays out in some detail the numerous arguments

made by the parties and intervenors.6 Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (Northern Ireland).


Decision at First Instance

Kerr J.’s (now Lord Chief Justice) decision was finally handed down18 months after the hearing, on 7th July 2003.7 Interestingly, this wasduring Northern Ireland’s marching season and the July fortnightthat most people take holidays. Mr. Justice Kerr rejected theF.P.A.N.I.’s argument and found that there was no obligation on theDepartment of Health to issue guidelines clarifying the circumstancesin which abortion is available. F.P.A.N.I. appealed, their appeal washeard the week of the 24th May 2004 and the decision granting theappeal was issued on the 8th October. The appeal was heard by Sheil,Campbell and Nicholson L.J.J., each of whom gave an opinionagainst the Minister in respect of the alleged failure to dischargecertain statutory duties, duties which became the responsibility of theSecretary of State for Northern Ireland after the suspension of theAssembly and re-imposition of direct rule from Westminster.

Kerr J. denied the request for a declaration for three reasons. He didnot accept that Northern Ireland’s abortion law was unclear, nor thatthere was significant uncertainty about the law among medical pro-fessionals, nor that there was evidence that Northern Irish women whopaid for abortions in Britain were entitled to those abortions on theN.H.S.8 because they were lawful. Since there was no significantuncertainty, there was no duty on the Minister to provide guidance asdemanded by the F.P.A.N.I. Kerr J. accepted the principles thatMr. Hanna outlined on behalf of the Minister as a sufficiently clearstatement of the law:

• Operations in Northern Ireland for the termination of pregnancies are unlawful

unless performed in good faith for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother;

• The ‘life’ of the mother in this context has been interpreted by the courts asincluding her physical and mental health;

• A termination will therefore be lawful when the continuance of the pregnancy

threatens the life of the mother, or would adversely affect her mental or physicalhealth;

7 Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland, Re an Application for JudicialReview [2003] N.I.Q.B 48 (07 July 2003) available at: http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2003/OB/2003/48.html, also published in 2 Northern Ireland Legal

Quarterly (2003). See further ‘‘F.P.A. appeals against result of judicial review ofabortion services in Northern Ireland’’ http://www.fpa.org.uk/news/press/030728.htm (accessed 09/03/04).

8 (British) National Health Service (a state-provided, comprehensive healthcareservice).

RUTH FLETCHER128

• The adverse effect on her mental or physical health must be a ‘real and serious’one, and must also be ‘permanent or long term’;

• In most cases the risk of the adverse effect occurring would need to be a proba-bility, but a possibility might be regarded as sufficient if the imminent death of themother was the potentially adverse effect.

• It will always be a question of fact and degree whether the perceived effect of anon-termination is sufficiently grave to warrant terminating the pregnancy in aparticular case (para. 37).

Kerr J. felt that any difficulties of interpretation, which might arise,were to do with issues of clinical judgement in determining whetheractual cases fell within the legal principles, and not to do with theprinciples themselves. Suchdifficulties could be curedby a change in thelegislation but not by the provision of guidance in his view.Kerr J, heldfurther that the substantive law ofNorthern Ireland equated to Section1(1) (b) and (c) of the 1967 Act, which rendered termination of preg-nancy lawful where it was necessary to prevent grave permanent injuryto the health, or risk to the life, of the woman, Since official statisticsshowed that only four terminations were carried out onNorthern Irishwomen in Britain under these grounds, very few women who couldlawfully have had abortion in Northern Ireland were having to go toBritain. Therefore, there was no evidence that Northern Irish womenentitled to abortion under the law were not accessing it.

Decision on Appeal

In the Northern Irish Court of Appeal all three judges found theDepartment to be in breach of its duty under Article 4 of the 1972Order. There was evidence of confusion among health care profes-sionals as to the legal rules on abortion and the Department had notdone what it might reasonably be expected to do in investigatingabortion practice. It was likely that some women were not accessingabortion to which they were lawfully entitled in Northern Ireland asdoctors weremore likely to register grounds for abortion under Section1(1) (a) even if the criteria for grounds (b) and (c) were met. Sheil andCampbell L.J.J. accepted Mr. Hanna’s principles as a good startingpoint for guidelines, andnoted that the right to conscientiousobjection,which is not currently legally endorsed, should also be added.

Nicholson L.J. was of the view that the principles were not asufficiently clear statement of the law. This was especially the case assuch legal principles needed to be formulated for a criminal context


given the possibility of prosecution for illegal abortion. He went on toprovide a statement which he thought appropriate:

Procurement of a miscarriage (or abortion) is a criminal offence punishable by amaximum sentence of life imprisonment if the prosecution proves beyond any rea-sonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury:

• that the person who procured the miscarriage did not believe that there was a riskthat the mother might die if the pregnancy was continued; or

• did not believe that the mother would probably suffer serious long term harm toher physical or mental health; or

• did not believe that the mother would probably suffer serious long term harm toher physical or mental health if she gave birth to an abnormal child. But I considerthat the jury needs assistance with the meaning of the word ‘longterm’.

A person who is a secondary party to the commission of the criminal offence referredto above is liable on conviction to the same penalty as the principal. It follows thatan abortion will be lawful if a jury considers that the continuance of a pregnancy

would have created a risk to the life of the mother or would have caused serious andlong-term harm to her physical or mental health. (para. 75)

The lawonwhich this statement andMr.Hanna’s principleswere basedwas governed by Sections 58 and 59 of theOffences Against the PersonAct 1861 and Section 21(1) of the Criminal Justice Act (NorthernIreland) 1945 (the equivalent of the 1929Actwhich applies in the rest ofthe U.K.) and the common law. The main precedent was R. v. Bourne[1939] 1 K.B. 687 which held that abortion was permissible whereprocured in good faith for the purpose of preserving the life of thewoman, which included avoiding her becoming a physical or mentalwreck. This rulewas considered, applied anddeveloped in two reportedNorthern Irish cases in the 1990s and in four unreported cases, two ofwhich were identified by Nicholson L.J.9 All of the post-Bourne casesare instances where permissionwas sought and granted for an abortionin relation to incompetent women. In the course of the judgements, thecriteria developed to hold that the adverse effect to a woman’s physicalormental healthmust be ‘real and serious’ (ReA.M.N.H.), ‘permanent

9 Northern Health and Social Services Board v. F. and G. [1993] N.I.268 (otherwiseknown as In re K.); Northern Ireland Health and Services Board v. A. and Others[1994] N.I.J.B. 1 (otherwise known as In Re A.M.N.H.); Western Health and Social

Services Board v. C.M.B. and the Official Solicitor [1995] (otherwise known as In reS.J.B.); In Re C.H. (18 October 1995); In Re Y.H. [2003]; and South and East BelfastHealth and Social Services Trust v. N.T. and G.T. and the Official Solicitor [2003]

(otherwise known as In re N.T.).10 British Medical Association.

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or long-term’ rather than ‘short-term’, and ‘probable’ rather than‘possible’ (Re S.J.B. as affirmed by Re C.H.).

The evidence that there was uncertainty in themedical profession asto the legal rules included the decision inRe K. Here Sheil J. (as he thenwas) held that the proposed termination was lawful but that ‘‘no sur-geon can be found in this jurisdiction who is prepared to carry out theoperation’’ because of the perceived uncertainty. A draft B.M.A.10

paper on the ‘‘Law and Ethics of Abortion’’ in 1996 commented thatthe situation was unclear in Northern Ireland. The 19th report by theStanding Advisory Commission on Human Rights noted that amajority of those who responded to a public consultation mistakenlybelieved that abortion was illegal in Northern Ireland. Campbell L.J.argued that it was significant that the Director of Foetal Medicine andcolleagues at the Royal Jubilee Maternity. Service were relying onadvice, according to a letter of 31st August 2001, which did not accordwith the current legal view of the Department. The Royal College ofMidwives supported the F.P.A.N.I.’s request. Sheil L.J. argued furtherthat guidelineswould remove concerns about liability to prosecution astheywould provide evidence of good faith. Theywould also clarify thattermination solely on the grounds of foetal abnormality is not lawful,contrary to the belief of many. Nicholson L.J. noted that pregnantwomen could not give informed consent to abortion if they did notknow what the law was.

Nicholson L.J.’s judgement was particularly critical of theDepartment. He noted that they did not appear to have a system inplace to make them aware of the developing case law and thereforeprobably could not, as claimed, refer practitioners to the relevantauthorities. The Department failed to investigate whether there wasany change in practice as a result of themid-1990s decisions. And therehad been no investigation into ‘amateur abortion’ in spite of the factthat Colin Francome’s research provided some independent evidenceof it. He also held that the failure to provide aftercare to women whohad abortions in England was a breach of Article 7 of the 1972 Order.

On the public law points, Sheil L.J. noted that the remedies werediscretionary and quoted Woolf L.J.’s statement in R. v. Inner Lon-don Education Authority, ex parte Ali [1990] 2 Admin L.R. 822 thatthe remedy of a declaration in cases of breach of statutory duty byinactivity could be appropriate when mandamus as a remedy on thesame facts was not. The Department had initiated a process to assess

10 British Medical Association.


the need for abortion guidelines since the action began and thereforethe appellants were no longer looking for mandamus. Article 4 of the1972 order created a target duty and failure to achieve the target initself was not sufficient grounds for judicial intervention. Actingunlawfully in performing a statutory duty or deciding not to performthe duty would clearly be grounds for the court to intervene. Thecourt held that the department was not doing all that it sensibly couldto meet its unqualified statutory obligations and therefore the remedyof a declaration that was sought was appropriate.

The human rights arguments were poorly developed in the judge-ments with the judges simply dismissing the possibility that Conven-tion rights assisted the applicant’s case when they acknowledged themat all. This was partly because the F.P.A.N.I. did not pursue a strongrights argument. The organisation ceded that it was not a victim underSection 7(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 as it did not have a ‘‘suf-ficient interest’’ in relation to any alleged unlawful act, but argued thatConvention lawwas relevant to the construction of the 1972Order andshould make the judicial review more intense. But the underdevelop-ment of the human rights arguments was also because the judiciarysimply did not take the possibility of rights infringements seriously.This aspect of the judgement shows the potential for a more sub-stantive effort to challenge the legal restriction of abortion access as anaffront to women’s Convention rights. While their lordships wereprepared to find that the Department had failed in its statutory dutiesto address healthcare needs, they were not prepared to positively assertConvention rights against the Department in this instance.

Shiel L.J. did not engage substantively with the Conventionarguments and Campbell L.J. implied that they were not persuasive.Nicholson L.J. agreed with Lord Lester’s concession that F.P.A.N.I.were not victims entitled to enforce Convention rights and noted thatunder Knudsen v. Norway11 it was necessary to show that the law hadbeen applied to the applicant’s detriment. However, it should bepossible to argue that abortion law was being applied to the appli-cant’s detriment given the resources F.P.A.N.I had to put intoadvising women and health care professionals in the absence of stateguidance, given that it could not accommodate women’ s exercise oftheir privacy rights, and given that its employees had been subjected topicketing, verbal abuse and public criticism because of its stance.Nicholson L.J. was of the view that the Convention rights did not

11 [1986] 42 D.R. 247.

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assist the applicant’s case and simply dismissed the possibility thatArticle 2 was engaged in favour of any pregnant woman with anunwanted pregnancy. But a woman’s life could conceivably beendangered by pregnancy, so that a failure to provide abortion couldbe a breach of her Article 2 rights. He thought that Article 8 did notimpose any positive duty on the respondent to dedicate resources toaccommodating women’s health care needs beyond that alreadyimposed by the 1972 Order, but did not engage with the idea that suchrestricted access to abortion infringed a woman’s privacy. He felt thatthere was no infringement of Article 14 because there was no evidenceof discrimination in the provision of lawful abortion services inNorthern Ireland. Here he failed to acknowledge that discriminationmay be established if the effect, and not just the intention, of a measureis to put individuals at a particular disadvantage.

ASSESSING THE AFTERMATH

Although the judgements make clear that their lordships have anegative view of abortion and identify it as a medical matter ratherthan a woman’s decision, the case has had a number of positiveoutcomes beyond the declaration against the Minister. A group cametogether to support the F.P.A.N.I. through the litigation and itsmembers include such pro-choice politicians as Davy Irvine of theProgressive Unionist Party, and longstanding feminist academics andactivists such as Margaret Ward of Democratic Dialogue. Throughsuch activities, a more explicit political space for reproductive rightsis being carved. The case itself clarified that abortion is legal inparticular circumstances and offered a number of legal statementswhich will be useful to pro-choice campaigners in future. By airingwomen’s abortion stories in court and in the media, the negativeeffects of abortion restriction on women’s lives have become morepublicly obvious. And before the appeal was won the Ministerresponded to the pressure of the case by setting up a working groupto develop and issue guidance on abortion law. This momentum willcontinue through an impact assessment of abortion policies under theDepartment’s Equality Scheme (June 2002), which fulfils its statutoryduty to promote equality of opportunity and good relations undersection 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Although abortion-seeking women are still waiting for a legal and political campaignwhich claims their reproductive autonomy as a right, the F.P.A.N.I.’s


strategy has successfully pushed the state into taking a measure ofresponsibility for women’s reproductive welfare.

REFERENCES

Fegan, E. & Rebouche, R., ‘‘Northern Ireland’s Abortion Law: The Morality ofSilence and the Censure of Agency’’, Feminist Legal Studies, 11 (2003), 221–254.

Furedi, A., (ed.)., The Abortion Law in Northern Ireland: Human Rights andReproductive Choice (Belfast: Family Planning Association Northern Ireland,

1995).Hewson, B., ‘‘The Law of Abortion in Northern Ireland’’. Public Law (2004

Summer), 234–245.

Lee, E., (ed.), Abortion Law and Politics Today (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).Northern Irish Human Rights Commission, Progressing a Bill of Rights for Northern

Ireland (Belfast: April 2004) available at: http://www.nihrc.org/documents/pubs/

bor/BOR Progress Report Apr04.pdf.Rossiter, A. & Sexton, M., The Other Irish Journey: A Survey Update of Northern

Irish Women attending British Abortion Clinics 2000/2001 (London: Voice for

Choice and M.S.I., 2001) http://www.mariestopes.org.uk/pdf/the-other-Irish-journey.pdf.

Roulston, C. & Davies, C., (eds.), Gender, Democracy and Inclusion in NorthernIreland (Houndsmill: Palgrave, 2000).

Sheldon, S., Beyond Control: Abortion Law and Medical Power (London: Pluto,1997).

Smyth, L., ‘‘Feminism and Abortion Politics: Choice, Rights and Reproductive

Freedom’’, Women’s Studies International Forum 25 (2002), 335–345.

Department of LawKeele University ST5 5BGStaffordshireUKE-mail: [email protected]

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abortion needs or abortion rights? claiming state accountability for women’s reproductive welfare

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