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SUB-COMMITTEE ON SHIP SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 4th session Agenda item 19

SSE 4/19

3 April 2017 Original: ENGLISH

REPORT TO THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

1 GENERAL 4

2 DECISIONS OF OTHER IMO BODIES 4

3 SAFETY OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE GUIDELINES ON ALTERNATIVE DESIGN AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOLAS CHAPTERS II-1 AND III

5

4 MAKING THE PROVISIONS OF MSC.1/CIRC.1206/REV.1 MANDATORY

8

5 UNIFORM IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6.1.1.3 OF THE LSA CODE

11

6 REVIEW THE MODU CODE, LSA CODE AND MSC.1/CIRC.1206/REV.1

12

7 AMENDMENTS TO THE FSS CODE FOR CO2 PIPELINES IN UNDER-DECK PASSAGEWAYS

13

8 REQUIREMENTS FOR ONBOARD LIFTING APPLIANCES AND WINCHES

15

9 AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES FOR VESSELS WITH DYNAMIC POSITIONING (DP) SYSTEMS (MSC/CIRC.645)

21

10 REVISION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ESCAPE ROUTE SIGNS AND EQUIPMENT LOCATION MARKINGS IN SOLAS AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS

23

11 REVISED SOLAS REGULATIONS II-1/13 AND II-1/13-1 AND OTHER

RELATED REGULATIONS FOR NEW SHIPS 24

12 UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF IMO SAFETY,

SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENT RELATED CONVENTIONS

26

SSE 4/19 Page 2


Section Page

13 REVIEW SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 AND ASSOCIATED CODES TO

MINIMIZE THE INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF FIRES ON RO-RO SPACES AND SPECIAL CATEGORY SPACES OF NEW AND EXISTING RO-RO PASSENGER SHIPS

35

14 DEVELOP NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR VENTILATION OF SURVIVAL CRAFTS

38

15 CONSEQUENTIAL WORK RELATED TO THE NEW POLAR CODE 40 16 BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT AND PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR

SSE 5 43

17 ELECTION OF CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIR FOR 2018 45

18 ANY OTHER BUSINESS 45

19 ACTION REQUESTED OF THE COMMITTEE 48

LIST OF ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 DRAFT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTED PERFORMANCE FOR SOLAS CHAPTER III

ANNEX 2 EXPERIENCE GAINED ON THE APPLICATION OF

MSC.1/CIRC.1394/REV.1 ANNEX 3 DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR ON GUIDELINES ON SAFETY DURING

ABANDON SHIP DRILLS USING LIFEBOATS ANNEX 4 DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR ON AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES FOR

DEVELOPING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE MANUALS FOR LIFEBOAT SYSTEMS (MSC.1/CIRC.1205)

ANNEX 5 DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO PARAGRAPH 6.1.1.3 OF THE LSA CODE ANNEX 6 DRAFT MSC RESOLUTION ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE FOR THE

CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT OF MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNITS, 2009 (2009 MODU CODE)

ANNEX 7 DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR ON GUIDELINES FOR VESSELS AND UNITS

WITH DYNAMIC POSITIONING (DP) SYSTEMS ANNEX 8 DRAFT ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON ESCAPE ROUTE SIGNS AND

EQUIPMENT LOCATION MARKINGS ANNEX 9 DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR ON UNIFIED INTERPRETATIONS OF SOLAS

CHAPTER II-2 ANNEX 10 DRAFT CORRIGENDUM TO THE UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF SOLAS

CHAPTER II-2 ON THE NUMBER AND ARRANGEMENT OF PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS ON BOARD SHIPS (MSC.1/CIRC.1275)

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ANNEX 11 DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR ON UNIFIED INTERPRETATIONS OF

CHAPTER 15 OF THE FSS CODE ANNEX 12 DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR ON AMENDMENT TO THE UNIFIED

INTERPRETATION OF SOLAS REGULATION II-1/29 (MSC.1/CIRC.1398) ANNEX 13 DRAFT SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE REVIEW OF SOLAS CHAPTER II-2

AND ASSOCIATED CODES REGARDING RO-RO SPACES AND SPECIAL CATEGORY SPACES OF NEW AND EXISTING RO-RO PASSENGER SHIPS

ANNEX 14 DRAFT WORK PLAN FOR THE REVIEW OF SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 AND

ASSOCIATED CODES REGARDING RO-RO SPACES AND SPECIAL CATEGORY SPACES OF NEW AND EXISTING RO-RO PASSENGER SHIPS

ANNEX 15 BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT AND OUTPUTS ON THE COMMITTEE'S

POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA THAT FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

ANNEX 16 PROPOSED BIENNIAL AGENDA OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE FOR THE

2018-2019 BIENNIUM ANNEX 17 PROPOSED PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR SSE 5 ANNEX 18 DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR ON AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES FOR

EVALUATION AND REPLACEMENT OF LIFEBOAT RELEASE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS (MSC.1/CIRC.1392)

SSE 4/19 Page 4


1 GENERAL 1.1 The Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE), chaired by Dr. S. Ota (Japan), held its fourth session from 20 to 24 March 2017. The Vice-Chair, Mr. U. Senturk (Turkey), was also present. 1.2 The session was attended by delegations from Member Governments, an Associate Member of IMO and by observers from intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations in consultative status, as listed in document SSE 4/INF.1. Opening address 1.3 The Secretary-General welcomed participants and delivered the opening address, the full text of which can be downloaded from the IMO website at the following link: http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings Chair's remarks 1.4 In responding, the Chair thanked the Secretary-General for his words of guidance and encouragement and assured him that his advice and requests would be given every consideration in the deliberations of the Sub-Committee. Adoption of the agenda and related matters 1.5 The Sub-Committee adopted the agenda (SSE 4/1/Rev.1) and agreed to be guided in its work, in general, by the annotations contained in document SSE 4/1/1/Rev.1 (Secretariat) and the arrangements in document SSE 4/1/2 (Secretariat). 2 DECISIONS OF OTHER IMO BODIES 2.1 The Sub-Committee noted the decisions and comments pertaining to its work made by MSC 96, C 116, MEPC 70 and MSC 97 as reported in documents SSE 4/2 and SSE 4/2/1 (Secretariat), and took them into account in its deliberations when dealing with the relevant agenda items. 2.2 The Sub-Committee also noted that MSC 96, taking into account the availability of a new GISIS module on "Development of amendments", had instructed its subsidiary bodies and the Secretariat to keep the records updated in GISIS during the preparation of draft amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention and related mandatory instruments. 2.3 It was further noted by the Sub-Committee that MSC 97, having agreed to the draft amendments to the Committees' Guidelines in relation to the use of gender-neutral terms, as approved by MEPC 70, concurrently approved MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5 on Organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies with immediate effect. 2.4 Moreover, the Sub-Committee noted that MSC 97 had agreed that all sub-committees (under the purview of the MSC) meeting before the spring session of the Committee in an Assembly year should submit their full report to the Committee, when deemed practicable by the Secretariat.

http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/SecretaryGeneral/Secretary-GeneralsSpeechesToMeetings

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3 SAFETY OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE GUIDELINES ON ALTERNATIVE DESIGN AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOLAS CHAPTERS II-1 AND III

General

3.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that MSC 95 had agreed, as part of a work plan on the development of functional requirements for SOLAS chapter III, that SSE 4 would finalize the functional requirements for SOLAS chapter III for submission to MSC 98 for approval (MSC 95/22, paragraph 12.7.3).

3.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that, as part of the above work plan, MSC 98 should review the outcome of the Sub-Committee on the development of functional requirements for SOLAS chapter III and the progress made at MSC 96 and MSC 97, and take a decision on the future direction of the Safety Level Approach (SLA) (MSC 95/22, paragraph 5.18.3).

3.3 The Sub-Committee further recalled that SSE 3 had established the Correspondence Group on the Development of Functional Requirements for SOLAS chapter III, with terms of reference as set out in paragraph 3.16 of document SSE 3/16, and had instructed the Group to submit a report to this session.

3.4 In this context, the Sub-Committee noted that MSC 96 had instructed the Correspondence Group to further consider the structure of functional requirements with respect to completeness, hierarchy, categorization and ordering and to develop the expected performance for each functional requirement, taking into account document MSC 96/5/3 (Germany, Sweden, Netherlands).

3.5 It was also noted by the Sub-Committee that MSC 96 had endorsed the SDC Sub-Committee's decision to refer the Revised Guidelines on evacuation analysis for new and existing passenger ships (MSC.1/Circ.1533) to SSE 4 for information, as the definitions contained in section 2 of annex 1 to the draft Revised Guidelines may be of interest in the development of the functional requirements for SOLAS chapter III.

Report of the Correspondence Group and related document

3.6 The Sub-Committee considered the report of the Correspondence Group on the Development of Functional Requirements for SOLAS chapter III (SSE 4/3) and, having approved it in general, noted that further work on the review of the draft functional requirements, in order to fully consider the provisions of the Generic guidelines for developing IMO goal-based standards (MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1), was necessary.

3.7 In the context of the above, the Sub-Committee also considered document SSE 4/3/2 (United States), providing comments on the report of the Correspondence Group, as contained in document SSE 4/3, in particular, proposing the priorities for the LSA Working Group, taking into account the proposal made by the Correspondence Group.

3.8 In considering the report of the Correspondence Group and document SSE 4/3/2, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 further review and consideration of the functional requirements is necessary and this work should focus on improving the wording and structure of the list of functional requirements prepared by the Correspondence Group, rather than adding new requirements to the list;

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.2 the finalization of the draft functional requirements and associated expected performance for SOLAS chapter III should be prioritized based on the report of the Correspondence Group;

.3 the expected performance of functional requirements should be clearly

described from a quantitative and qualitative point of view; .4 the verification of completeness of the functional requirements, i.e. complete

linkage between regulations and functional requirements, should be one of the priorities at this session and the functional requirements should thoroughly cover all risks;

.5 the work on connecting regulations and functional requirements is linked with

the development of a draft framework for a future SOLAS chapter III and, therefore, the draft framework should be prepared at this session, which would contribute to the future development of the GBS-SLA as a tool for innovation and the application of new solutions; and

.6 the development of a draft framework for SOLAS chapter III based on the

Generic guidelines for developing IMO goal-based standards (MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1) is outside the scope of this output.

3.9 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed that the following matters required further consideration by a working group (see paragraph 3.15):

.1 the functional requirements set out in annex 1 to document SSE 4/3 and the verification of their full linkage with the existing regulations;

.2 the development of definitions once the functional requirements are finalized

and that the definitions should be part of the functional requirements; and .3 the detailed phrasing for the expected performance of functional

requirements should be addressed when there is consensus in regard to the intentions of the regulations.

3.10 In light of the above, the Sub-Committee decided to:

.1 establish the Working Group on Life-Saving Appliances to further consider the above matters (see paragraph 3.9) and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly; and

.2 invite interested Member States and international organizations to submit

comments and proposals to MSC 98 regarding a new draft framework for a future SOLAS chapter III.

Verification of completeness of functional requirements and feedback on the use of MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1 3.11 The Sub-Committee considered document SSE 4/3/1 (China), proposing the preparation of a guidance on procedures for the development and verification of completeness of functional requirements, i.e. that the functional requirements cover all areas of the goals, within the Generic guidelines for developing IMO goal-based standards (MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1), based on risk identification and risk analysis.

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3.12 In considering document SSE 4/3/1, the following views were expressed: .1 the proposals in this document could lay the groundwork for reporting on the

experience gained and collected on the application of MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1;

.2 the proposals provide a valuable contribution to further amend MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1 regarding how functional requirements may be developed;

.3 amendments to MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1 cannot be prepared without a justification for a new output in accordance with MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5;

.4 functional requirements should be developed by means of risk-based methods by identifying hazards; and

.5 event tree and fault tree analysis are useful methodologies to verify the completeness of functional requirements.

3.13 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed that the Working Group on Life-Saving Appliances should further consider this matter and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly.

Establishment of the Working Group on Life-Saving Appliances (LSA)

3.14 In light of the above decisions, the Sub-Committee established the Working Group on Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) and instructed it, taking into account the comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to:

.1 finalize the functional requirements for SOLAS chapter III and the expected performance, based on annex 1 to document SSE 4/3, taking into account document SSE 4/3/2; and

.2 report the experience gained on the application of MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1 throughout this process to the Sub-Committee for submission to the Committee, taking into account document SSE 4/3/1.

Report of the LSA Working Group

3.15 Having considered the part of the report of the LSA Working Group (SSE 4/WP.3) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 3.16 to 3.22 below.

Functional requirements and associated expected performance for SOLAS chapter III

3.16 The Sub-Committee noted that, in considering any regulatory gaps in the list of functional requirements, in particular regarding those regulations more generic in nature, the Group had agreed that an introductory section containing general conditions ahead of the functional requirements would be necessary at a future stage.

3.17 It was also noted by the Sub-Committee that the Group had agreed that, at this stage of the development, it was not possible to deliver quantifiable expected performances, although in the course of the ongoing development, a move to a more quantifiable set of associated expected performances was necessary.

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3.18 The Sub-Committee further noted that definitions and technical background for functional requirements and associated expected performance needed to be developed as part of future activities. 3.19 Additionally, the Sub-Committee noted that, considering the far-reaching nature of the goal-based standards, a high-level coordination approach might be necessary within the Organization with regard to the development of comprehensive goal-based standards, for example SOLAS or even one chapter such as SOLAS chapter III. 3.20 In order to support the decision-making of the Committee, the Sub-Committee invited the Committee to note the related background information as contained in annexes 2 to 5 to document SSE 4/3 in the context of the development of a goal-based SOLAS chapter III. 3.21 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft functional requirements and the expected performance for SOLAS chapter III, as set out in annex 1, for submission to MSC 98 for consideration, with a view to proceeding with the development of functional requirements and expected performance for SOLAS chapter III, aiming for a more quantifiable version. Experience gained on the application of MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1 3.22 The Sub-Committee endorsed the Experience gained on the application of MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1, as set out in annex 2, and invited the Committee to consider the same and take action as appropriate. Extension of the target completion year 3.23 In light of the above decisions, the Committee was invited to extend the target completion year for this output to 2019. 4 MAKING THE PROVISIONS OF MSC.1/CIRC.1206/REV.1 MANDATORY General 4.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that MSC 95 had reinstated the original output on "Making the provisions of MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 mandatory" on the biennial agenda for the 2016-2017 biennium and the provisional agenda for SSE 3 and that MSC 96 had extended its target completion year to 2017. 4.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that SSE 3 had endorsed a draft MSC resolution and the draft amendments to SOLAS regulations III/3 and III/20 and that MSC 96 had adopted the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) and amendments to SOLAS regulations III/3 and III/20. 4.3 The Sub-Committee further recalled that MSC 96 had noted that SSE 3 had not been in a position to conduct the detailed review of either the draft MSC circular on Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats or the Guidelines for developing operation and maintenance manuals for lifeboat systems (MSC.1/Circ.1205), thus MSC 96 had instructed the Sub-Committee to review the aforementioned guidelines in order to capture possible inconsistencies emanating from the adoption of the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)).

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4.4 Within this context, the Sub-Committee noted that MSC 97, following consideration of documents MSC 97/19/4 and MSC 97/INF.3 (Marshall Islands, et al.), had instructed the Sub-Committee to include consideration of the industry "Draft amended guidelines for simulated launching of free fall lifeboats" when conducting a detailed review of the draft MSC circular on Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats. Draft Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats 4.5 With regard to the review of the draft MSC circular on Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats, the Sub-Committee considered the following documents related to the draft Guidelines for simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats contained as an appendix to the aforementioned draft Guidelines:

.1 SSE 4/4 (Liberia, et al.), proposing a definition of simulated launching, as contained in the draft Guidelines for simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats, intended to differentiate between simulated launching in the context of drills and testing and applying such concept throughout the draft Guidelines; and

.2 SSE 4/4/1 (ILAMA) providing comments on the "Draft amended guidelines

for simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats" developed by the Industry Lifeboat Group (ILG) and, in particular, suggesting a new scope for the definition of simulated launching, the exclusion of any maintenance, examination or testing provisions from the draft Guidelines for simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats and the inclusion of the definitions of the draft amended guidelines developed by the Industry Lifeboat Group (ILG).

4.6 In the ensuing discussion, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 drills and testing are different concepts and therefore, the release mechanism of free-fall lifeboats should not be activated when abandon ship drills are conducted in accordance with SOLAS regulation III/19, in order to reduce risks;

.2 tests of the free-fall system should not be limited to the release mechanism

function, but the whole system should be tested; .3 a reduced scope of drills may lead to a lack of training; .4 measures to reduce the risk of accidents when conducting drills should be

limited not only to the application of operational procedures but also to technical provisions established by the manufacturer of the equipment; and

.5 complete alignment between the draft Guidelines, SOLAS regulation III/20

and resolution MSC.402(96), in particular its paragraph 6.2.7 (Operational test of the free-fall lifeboat release function), is necessary.

4.7 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee decided to further instruct the LSA Working Group to finalize the work resulting from the adoption of resolution MSC.402(96).

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Instructions to the LSA Working Group 4.8 The Sub-Committee further instructed the LSA Working Group, established under agenda item 3, taking into account comments made and decisions taken in plenary, and in order to capture possible inconsistencies emanating from the adoption of resolution MSC.402(96), to review and finalize:

.1 the draft MSC circular on Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats, using annex 4 to document SSE 3/WP.3 and document SSE 4/4 as a base, and taking into account documents SSE 4/4/1, MSC 97/19/4 and MSC 97/INF.3; and

.2 any necessary draft amendments to the Guidelines for developing operation

and maintenance manuals for lifeboat systems (MSC.1/Circ.1205), taking into account annex 5 to document SSE 3/WP.3.

Report of the LSA Working Group 4.9 Having considered the part of the report of the LSA Working Group (SSE 4/WP.3) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 below. Draft MSC circular on Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats 4.10 The Sub-Committee, having noted:

.1 the concerns expressed by the delegation of France, supported by the delegation of Spain, that the draft Guidelines contain inconsistencies with SOLAS regulation III/19.3.3.4 because the draft text creates a loophole in the training of the crew due to the lack of activation of the release mechanism when conducting simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats during drills; and

.2 that that references to testing should be deleted in the draft Guidelines,

endorsed the draft Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 3, invited the Committee to approve them. Draft amendments to the Guidelines for developing operation and maintenance manuals for lifeboat systems (MSC.1/Circ.1205) 4.11 In considering the draft amendments to the Guidelines for developing operation and maintenance manuals for lifeboat systems (MSC.1/Circ.1205), the Sub-Committee noted the intervention from the delegation of the United States that the adoption of the new draft Assembly resolution on Escape route signs and equipment location markings, as endorsed at this session (see paragraph 10.10), may impact the above mentioned Guidelines, which might need to be amended in order to align both instruments. 4.12 Notwithstanding the above, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft Amendments to the Guidelines for developing operation and maintenance manuals for lifeboat systems (MSC.1/Circ.1205) and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 4, and invited the Committee to approve them.

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Completion of the work on the output 4.13 The Sub-Committee invited the Committee to note that the work on the output had been completed. 5 UNIFORM IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6.1.1.3 OF THE LSA CODE General 5.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that MSC 96, following consideration of document MSC 96/23/6 (Republic of Korea, IACS), had agreed to include a new output on "Uniform implementation of paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code" in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub-Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4, with a target completion year of 2017 (MSC 96/25, paragraphs 23.29 to 23.31). 5.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that this output is aimed at developing amendments to paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code, in order to facilitate its uniform implementation and, in particular, to allow the use of hand-operated mechanisms for launching rescue boats, which are not one of the ship's survival craft. Draft amendments to the LSA Code 5.3 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/5 (Republic of Korea) proposing draft amendments to paragraphs 6.1.1.3 and 6.1.2.2 of the LSA Code, in order that manual means for the launching of rescue boats, which are not one of the ship's survival craft, are accepted, as well as adjusting the provisions related to the arrangements for the mechanism actuation, taking into account the possible limitations to actuate a manual launching mechanism from a position within the rescue boat, based on the requirements of the LSA Code. 5.4 During the discussion, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 even if hand-operated mechanisms are used for hoisting and turning a rescue boat from the stowed position, SOLAS regulations III/14.1 and III/17.1 should still be complied with;

.2 hand-operated mechanisms for launching rescue boats are currently allowed

by a number of Administrations and these mechanisms simplify the davit construction while also improving reliability;

.3 test and performance criteria, restrictions and limitations should be

established for hand-operated mechanisms for launching rescue boats; .4 a risk assessment should be conducted before hand-operated mechanisms

for launching rescue boats are included in the LSA Code to discard any negative impact on safety;

.5 it should be clarified whether the process of launching begins when the

rescue boat is moved out from its stowage position and whether the crew should be on board at the commencement of the launching, rather than after the boat has been swung outboard;

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.6 part 1 of the Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)) should be amended in order to incorporate the amendments to the LSA Code;

.7 amendments to paragraph 6.1.2.2 of the LSA Code are unnecessary, as the

provision for the actuation of the launching mechanism is self-explanatory; and

.8 the terms "launching mechanism" and "launching appliance" should be

harmonized. Instructions to the LSA Working Group 5.5 Consequently, the Sub-Committee further instructed the LSA Working Group, established under agenda item 3, taking into account comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to consider the draft amendments to paragraphs 6.1.1.3 and 6.1.2.2 of the LSA Code, as contained in annex 2 to document MSC 96/23/6 and document SSE 4/5. Report of the LSA Working Group 5.6 Having considered the part of the report of the LSA Working Group (SSE 4/WP.3) dealing with the agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 5.7 to 5.9 below. 5.7 In considering whether the draft amendments to paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code, prepared by the Group, should apply to cargo ships only or to cargo and passenger ships, the Sub-Committee agreed that the draft amendments should only apply to cargo ships taking into account the view expressed that the application of these amendments to passenger ships might be in conflict with SOLAS regulation III/23.2. 5.8 The Sub-Committee noted the concern expressed by the delegation of the Bahamas, supported by the delegations of Italy, Malta and Norway, that the phrase "without the crew" had been retained in the draft amendment when considering the launching method and the mass criterion, which could lead to the unsafe situation that the operating crew board the rescue boat after it had been turned outboard. 5.9 After some discussion, the Sub-Committee endorsed draft amendments to paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code, as set out in annex 5, and invited the Committee to approve them with a view to subsequent adoption. Completion of the work on the output 5.10 The Sub-Committee invited the Committee to note that the work on the output had been completed. 6 REVIEW THE MODU CODE, LSA CODE AND MSC.1/CIRC.1206/REV.1 General 6.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that SSE 3 had advised that no amendments to MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 were necessary, but the introduction of draft amendments into the 2009 MODU Code was more suitable and had endorsed the draft amendments to chapters 1, 6, 9, 10 and 14, as set out in annex 2 to document SSE 3/WP.4 and annex 6 to document SSE 3/WP.3.

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6.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that SSE 3 had decided not to re-establish the Correspondence Group on Review of the MODU and LSA Codes and MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 and that, in this connection, the delegation of the Marshall Islands had volunteered to submit a consolidated text of the draft amendments to the 2009 MODU Code at this session. Consolidated draft amendments to the 2009 MODU Code 6.3 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/6 (Marshall Islands, et al.),

containing the consolidated draft amendments to the 2009 MODU Code, including an associated draft MSC resolution, based on the outcome of SSE 3. 6.4 During the consideration of document SSE 4/6, the Sub-Committee noted that the references made in the 2009 MODU Code to the Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats (MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1) should be replaced with the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) when this resolution enters into force. 6.5 The Sub-Committee, having noted the concerns expressed by the delegation of China regarding the possible impact of the draft amendments on recognized designs of the offshore industry lifeboats, the references to national and industry standards and the location of the definition of the term "vital machinery and equipment", endorsed the draft amendments to the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2009 (2009 MODU Code), together with the associated draft MSC resolution, as set out in annex 6, and invited the Committee to adopt them. Completion of the work on the output 6.6 The Sub-Committee invited the Committee to note that the work on the output had been completed. 7 AMENDMENTS TO THE FSS CODE FOR CO2 PIPELINES IN UNDER-DECK

PASSAGEWAYS General 7.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that MSC 96, following consideration of documents MSC 96/23/4 and MSC 96/23/4/Add.1 (China), had agreed to include a new output in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub-Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4 on "Amendments to the FSS Code for CO2 pipelines in under-deck passageways", with a view to amending the existing paragraph 2.1.3.1 of chapter 5 of the FSS Code, with a target completion year of 2017 (MSC 96/25, paragraphs 23.26 to 23.28). 7.2 It was also recalled that MSC 96 had agreed that the Sub-Committee should not narrow the discussions to only CO2 pipelines, but take into account other pipelines for conveying fire-extinguishing medium, as necessary. Draft amendments to the FSS Code 7.3 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/7 (China) providing a proposal for an additional requirement for CO2 pipes in under-deck passageways under paragraph 2.1.3.1 (Engineering specifications) of chapter 5 (Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems) of the FSS Code, which would also be applicable to other fire-extinguishing mediums.

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The document also included an analysis of the need, feasibility and potential adverse consequences of the application of welding connections and the restriction of drains or other openings on such pipes. 7.4 In the ensuing discussion, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 amendments to existing requirements are not adequately justified, as safety related incidents concerning flange gasketed joints of CO2 pipes in under-deck passageways have not been reported;

.2 due to the location where the pipe joints would be welded, i.e. in limited

working spaces, there is a real possibility of pipe joints not being properly welded with the consequent inaccessible location for the necessary examination and maintenance;

.3 the high cost and complexity of connecting pipes by welding in confined

spaces may not contribute to justifying amendments to the FSS Code; .4 fire-extinguishing medium pipelines joined by welding in under-deck

passageways should be subject to pressure-tests and non-destructive testing, as appropriate;

.5 the term "under-deck passageway" should be clearly defined; .6 spaces such as storage rooms for CO2 bottles located in under-deck

passageways where the crew can normally access should be excluded from the application of the proposed amendments, taking into account that valves and flexible hoses are fitted in those spaces and welding cannot be used in such components; and

.7 extending the requirement of welded joints to long pipeline systems in

under-deck passageways is not practicable due to environmental and external loads placed on those systems.

Establishment of the Working Group on Fire Protection 7.5 In light of the above and following discussion, the Sub-Committee established the Working Group on Fire Protection and instructed it, taking into account the comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to consider safety measures for fire-extinguishing medium pipes in under-deck passageways, taking into account document SSE 4/7, and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly. Report of the Working Group on Fire Protection 7.6 Having considered the part of the report of the Working Group on Fire Protection (SSE 4/WP.5) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 7.7 and 7.8 below. 7.7 The Sub-Committee noted that the Group, having recalled the concerns expressed in plenary regarding the practicality of the proposed amendments, had noted the absence of any submitted information about casualty incidents and costs of welded joints.

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7.8 In this context, the Sub-Committee agreed that there was no need to further proceed with amendments to the FSS Code for fire-extinguishing medium pipes in under-deck passageways at this stage and noted that interested delegations may submit information regarding incidents, practical experience in using welded pipes on board large cargo ships and cost analysis of welded connections, for consideration at SSE 5. Extension of the target completion year 7.9 The Sub-Committee requested the Committee to extend the target completion year for this output to 2018. 8 REQUIREMENTS FOR ONBOARD LIFTING APPLIANCES AND WINCHES General 8.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that SSE 3, based on the views expressed and recommendations made with regard to the next steps in the development of measures for the safety of Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches (OLAW), had noted that:

.1 if the draft functional requirements are properly addressed in the draft goals, there will be no need for additional guidelines to a goal- and function-based SOLAS regulation; and

.2 even if a goal- and function-based SOLAS regulation is developed,

guidelines may still be needed to address maintenance and operation, and most Administrations will welcome the availability of guidelines, particularly if the eventual SOLAS regulation includes the phrase "to the satisfaction of the Administration",

and had invited interested Member States and international organizations to submit proposals to SSE 4 on which chapter of SOLAS should be amended. 8.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that SSE 3 had re-established the Correspondence Group on Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches, with terms of reference set out in paragraph 8.17 of document SSE 3/16, and had instructed the Group to submit a report to this session. 8.3 The Sub-Committee further recalled that, based on the instructions of MSC 95 to the Sub-Committee (MSC 95/22, paragraph 12.26), the determination of which SOLAS chapter should be amended should be resolved as soon as possible. Report (part 2) of the OLAW Working Group established at SSE 3 8.4 The Sub-Committee considered part 2 of the report of the OLAW Working Group (SSE 4/8), approved it in general and having noted that it included consideration of sources and structure of functional requirements for the safety of OLAW, as well as considerations that may help to determine which SOLAS chapter should be amended, noted that the matters identified in the group's report had been considered by the Correspondence Group (SSE 4/8/1) established at SSE 3. 8.5 Taking into account that part 2 of the report of the OLAW Working Group mentions that the ILO Occupational Safety and Health (Dock Work) Convention, 1979 (ILO C152) could be a source of functional requirements for onboard lifting appliances and winches, together with the relevant classification society rules and relevant national requirements,

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the Sub-Committee noted the oral statement by the Secretariat on behalf of the International Labour Organization emphasizing that the provisions on lifting appliances and loose gear are found in the said Convention and informing the Sub-Committee that a revised version of the ILO Code of Practice on safety and health in ports was adopted in 2016, containing extensive guidance on lifting appliances and loose gear. Report of the Correspondence Group and related documents 8.6 The Sub-Committee considered document SSE 4/8/1, containing the report of the Correspondence Group on Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches, and having approved it in general, noted that:

.1 the goals and high-level generic functional requirements where unresolved

issues, such as the need for a functional requirement addressing a design life of OLAW comparable to the design life of the ship where the OLAW is installed, and the inclusion of a functional requirement for inspection and testing were highlighted;

.2 the draft Guidelines for the safety of onboard lifting appliances and winches,

where the definition and inclusion of anchor handling winches, as well as the scope of application and definitions of the Guidelines, needed further consideration;

.3 the list of available maritime related industry codes and/or standards that

should be contained in the draft Guidelines; and .4 draft amendments to SOLAS were included, with the priority to determine the

appropriate chapter of SOLAS to hold these new provisions, as well as establishing a definition for OLAW and the scope of application of the new provisions.

8.7 In the context of the above, the Sub-Committee also considered the following documents:

.1 SSE 4/8/2 (Antigua and Barbuda, New Zealand, ICHCA, IHMA), proposing amendments, including which chapter of SOLAS should be amended, to implement requirements for OLAW and addressing the issue of "out of order" or "out of service" OLAW while maintaining the validity of the SOLAS certification;

.2 SSE 4/8/3 (China, Hong Kong, China), proposing amendments to SOLAS

chapter XI-1 for the application by port State control regimes after the implementation of the new requirements for Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches (if included in SOLAS chapter II-1) aimed to avoid any misapplication of such new requirements that could lead to invalidate the safety certificates;

.3 SSE 4/8/4 (China), providing comments on the report of the Correspondence

Group on Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches, in particular, highlighting that it would be more appropriate if the scope of application of the new draft SOLAS regulation was established based on the Safe Working Load (SWL) of the equipment rather than on the ship's gross tonnage, as well as the need for training and education of "competent persons" who take on the responsibilities of the operation or maintenance of OLAW; and

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.4 SSE 4/8/5 (Japan), providing comments on the report of the Correspondence Group on Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches, in particular thatrather than the design life of the equipment, appropriate inspection and maintenance of OLAW should be required based on the operational conditions; highlighting the relevance of the types of equipment to any design life functional requirement; and emphasizing the need for a uniform implementation of the provision "operated by competent persons".

8.8 In considering which chapter of SOLAS should be amended, the Sub-Committee noted the following views:

.1 the new requirements for OLAW should be included in SOLAS chapter II-1 and additional requirements to avoid the invalidation of ship safety certificates should be included in SOLAS chapter XI-1;

.2 OLAW failures may have serious consequences to the ship's structure; .3 a new SOLAS chapter should be developed to hold OLAW requirements

which should, in turn, avoid any impacts on the ship safety certificates; and .4 as OLAW are not related to the ship's construction and structure, the new

provisions should not be included in SOLAS chapter II-1. 8.9 After some discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed that the new provisions for OLAW should be included in SOLAS chapter II-1. 8.10 Having considered the issue of "out of order" or "out of service" OLAW and the validity of the SOLAS certification of the ship and, taking into account the provisions of SOLAS regulation I/11(a), the Sub-Committee agreed that, if the equipment conforms with the provisions of the regulations to be developed and the ship remains fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board, the ship should not be unduly delayed and the ship's safety certificate should remain valid. 8.11 In this connection, the Sub-Committee noted that SOLAS regulation I/11(a) may provide the necessary principles to support the port State control inspections concerning the application of the new provisions for OLAW. 8.12 In regard to the scope of application of the new SOLAS requirements to new and existing ships or new and existing installations, the Sub-Committee agreed that:

.1 the scope of application should be based on the installation date of the equipment; and

.2 newly installed OLAW should be in conformity with all functional

requirements, whereas existing OLAW should be in conformity with functional requirements for matters such as operation and maintenance. In this context, it was also agreed that a working group should further consider a wider conformity of existing OLAW with functional requirements in order to address the risk posed by these installations.

8.13 In this connection, the Sub-Committee also considered whether the application of the new draft SOLAS regulation should be based on the Safe Working Load (SWL) of the appliance or the ship's gross tonnage and agreed that the SWL should be the basis to establish the boundaries for the application of the new provisions for OLAW. In doing so, the

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Sub-Committee emphasized that this approach would address the risk of accident of small appliances, as well as avoiding any gaps with existing regulations in chapter II-1 relevant to OLAW, the application of which is based on the ship's gross tonnage. 8.14 Regarding the inclusion of definitions in the new SOLAS requirements, the Sub-Committee decided that relevant definitions should be included in the new SOLAS regulation with the exception of manually operated and temporary appliances. 8.15 In considering the remaining issues in the report of the Correspondence Group (SSE 4/8/1), the Sub-Committee:

.1 agreed that a functional requirement addressing a design life of the OLAW

comparable to that of the ship on which it is installed should not be included; .2 agreed that a draft functional requirement for inspection and testing should

be included; .3 agreed that the definition and inclusion of anchor handling winches in the

draft Guidelines should be included; .4 agreed to further develop draft Guidelines, including the scope of application

and definitions; and .5 having noted that ISO is developing standards for marine appliances, the

Sub-Committee did not endorse the inclusion of the list of available industry codes and/or standards in the draft Guidelines, as the codes and standards of the list do not only address marine equipment.

"Competent persons" who take responsibilities of operation and maintenance of onboard lifting appliances and winches 8.16 The Sub-Committee considered the need for training and education of "competent persons" who take on the responsibilities of the operation or maintenance of OLAW, as discussed in documents SSE 4/8/4 and SSE 4/8/5, and noted the following views expressed:

.1 as SOLAS chapter II-1 is addressed to maritime Administrations and not to port or coastal States, the inclusion of the functional requirement "operated by competent persons" may not be appropriate considering that OLAW are operated in port by shore-side personnel whose competences are the responsibility of the port State;

.2 OLAW are used by off-shore supply vessels and in heavy lift deep water

operations and, therefore, the training and education of "competent persons" who take responsibility for the operation should be addressed; and

.3 the STCW Convention and Code may not address the training and education

of "competent persons" in all cases. 8.17 Following a lengthy discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed that the training and education of "competent persons" who take responsibility for the operation of OLAW should be further discussed by a working group.

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Establishment of the Working Group 8.18 In light of the above, the Sub-Committee established the Working Group on Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches and instructed it, taking into account the comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to:

.1 further develop and finalize, if possible, the draft SOLAS regulations for onboard lifting appliances and winches, including the goals and functional requirements, the necessary definitions, the scope of application to new and existing installations and the issue of validity of the SOLAS certification of the ship, taking into account documents SSE 4/8, SSE 4/8/1, SSE 4/8/2, SSE 4/8/3, SSE 4/8/4 and SSE 4/8/5;

.2 further develop and finalize, if possible, the draft Guidelines for the safety of

onboard lifting appliances and winches, based on the draft text set out in annex 3 to document SSE 4/8/1, taking into account the comments provided in documents SSE 4/8/4 and SSE 4/8/5; and

.3 consider whether it is necessary to re-establish a correspondence group and,

if so, prepare terms of reference for consideration by the Sub-Committee. Report of the Working Group 8.19 Having considered the report of the Working Group on Onboard Lifting Appliances and Winches (SSE 4/WP.4), the Sub-Committee approved the report in general and took action as outlined in paragraphs 8.20 to 8.27 below. 8.20 With regard to the issue of "out of order" or "out of service" OLAW and the validity of the SOLAS certification of the ship, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 further consideration is necessary to provide clarity to both flag States and port States in order to ensure the safety of the ship or persons on board;

.2 this linkage with the ship's certificates is an overarching principle affecting all

equipment and systems, not only OLAW, which is aimed to ensure that if the equipment conforms with the corresponding regulations and the ship remains fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board, the ship should not be unduly delayed; and

.3 as this matter goes beyond the OLAW technical scope, it should be

considered at the Sub-Committee or Committee's level rather than by a correspondence group.

8.21 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee invited MSC 98 to note the discussion on the issue of "out of order" or "out of service" OLAW and the validity of the SOLAS certification of the ship and that this matter will be further considered at SSE 5. 8.22 Having confirmed the inclusion of anchor handling winches within the scope of the work, the Sub-Committee noted the progress made by the Group on the development of the draft SOLAS regulation for onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches and, in light of the scope of the draft regulation, invited the Committee to endorse the change of the existing title of output 5.2.1.22, i.e. "Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and winches", to "Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches".

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8.23 In this context, the Sub-Committee endorsed, in principle:

.1 the definitions (SSE 4/WP.4, annex) for:

.1 onboard lifting appliance;

.2 anchor handling winch; and

.3 loose gear; and

.2 the goal of the draft SOLAS regulation II-1/3-13 (SSE 4/WP.4, annex).

8.24 The Sub-Committee also noted the discussion of the Group regarding:

.1 the Safe Working Load, in particular that a minimum SWL threshold for the scope of application has not yet been agreed;

.2 the functional requirements applicable to existing installations;

.3 exclusions of certain types of appliances;

.4 the provider of the operation and maintenance manuals;

.5 "competent persons", in particular whether the term "competent persons" should apply to the operation of the equipment and what would be the appropriate framework to address the training and management of seafarers operating and maintaining onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches; and

.6 the appropriateness of inclusion of an operational functional requirement in SOLAS chapter II-1.

8.25 In the context of the appropriateness of inclusion of an operational functional requirement in SOLAS chapter II-1, the Sub-Committee noted the view expressed that any new requirements should not be in conflict with existing regulations, in particular with SOLAS regulation II-1/3-1.

8.26 The Sub-Committee further noted that, owing to time constraints, the Group was unable to further develop the draft Guidelines.

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Re-establishment of the Onboard Lifting Appliances and Anchor Handling Winches Correspondence Group

8.27 Having considered the above matters and in order to progress the work intersessionally, the Sub-Committee re-established the Onboard Lifting Appliances and Anchor Handling Winches Correspondence Group, under the coordination of Japan1, and instructed it, taking into account document SSE 4/WP.4 and MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1, to:

.1 further develop the draft goal- and function-based SOLAS regulations for onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches, including consideration of tier IV requirements and additional definitions if needed, based on the annex to document SSE 4/WP.4, with a view to finalization at the next session of the Sub-Committee;

.2 further develop the draft Guidelines supporting the goals and functional requirements, based on annex 3 to document SSE 4/8/1, with a view to finalization at the next session of the Sub-Committee;

.3 initiate the check/monitoring sheet and the record format as contained in

annexes 2 and 3 to the Guidance on drafting of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention and related mandatory instruments (MSC.1/Circ.1500); and

.4 submit a report to SSE 5.

Extension of the target completion year 8.28 The Sub-Committee requested the Committee to extend the target completion year for this output to 2019. 9 AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES FOR VESSELS WITH DYNAMIC

POSITIONING (DP) SYSTEMS (MSC/CIRC.645) General 9.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that SSE 3 had re-established the Correspondence Group on Amendments to the Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (MSC/Circ.645), with terms of reference as set out in paragraph 9.6 of document SSE 3/16, and had instructed it, with a view to finalizing the draft Guidelines, to resolve the remaining issues in square brackets (SSE 3/9, annex), to consider the proposed amendments to the draft Guidelines (SSE 3/9/1, annex) and submit a report to this session.

1 Coordinator:

Mr. Hironori Eguro Japan Ship Technology Research Association (JSTRA) Round Cross AKASAKA. 10-9, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku Tokyo 107-0052 Japan Phone: +81-3-5575-6427 Email: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

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Outcome of HTW 4 9.2 The Sub-Committee noted that HTW 4 had concurred with the decision of SSE 3 to include a section on training in the draft Guidelines and had instructed the Secretariat to inform SSE 4 to take into account the outcome of the HTW Sub-Committee's consideration of document HTW 4/15/1 (IMCA) proposing amendments to MSC.1/Circ.738/Rev.1, subject to approval by MSC 98, when preparing amendments to the Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (MSC/Circ.645). Report of the Correspondence Group and related document 9.3 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration the following documents:

.1 SSE 4/9 (Norway), providing the report of the Correspondence Group on Amendments to the Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (MSC/Circ.645) and in particular, the draft MSC circular on Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning systems; and

.2 SSE 4/9/1 (Vanuatu, IADC, IMCA), providing comments on the report of the

Correspondence Group (SSE 4/9), in particular, proposing the inclusion of a footnote in section 5 of the draft Guidelines that, if the annual survey dates were to be based on the anniversary dates of the Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document (DPVAD), the annual survey date should alternatively remain linked to the date of the initial survey for those cases where the DPVAD has not been issued.

9.4 Following consideration of the report of the Correspondence Group and document SSE 4/9/1, the Sub-Committee approved the report in general and, in particular:

.1 endorsed the recommendation that the application should be provided in the preamble of the draft Guidelines, including the recommendation to apply the operational part of the Guidelines to all vessels and units;

.2 endorsed the recommendation to include the amendments related to the

deletion of the term "reliability", as set out in annex 2 to document SSE 4/9, in the draft Guidelines;

.3 agreed that the annual survey dates should be based on the anniversary

dates of the DPVAD or, should this document not be issued, the annual survey date should remain linked to the date of the initial survey for those cases where the DPVAD has not been issued; and

.4 agreed that the Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems

(MSC/Circ.645) should still be in effect for existing vessels and units to which they apply.

9.5 In this context, the Sub-Committee endorsed the decision taken at SSE 3 that the Guidelines should be issued as a new set of guidelines and not as amendments to MSC/Circ.645 (SSE 3/16, paragraph 9.4.4) as well as the draft Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 7, and invited the Committee to approve them.

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Completion of the work on the output 9.6 The Sub-Committee invited the Committee to note that the work on the output had been completed. 10 REVISION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ESCAPE ROUTE SIGNS AND EQUIPMENT

LOCATION MARKINGS IN SOLAS AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS General 10.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that SSE 3 had requested the Secretariat, in cooperation with the ISO Central Secretariat, to prepare a draft resolution containing the graphical symbols from standard ISO 24409-2:2014 for consideration at this session, and that said resolution should not be adopted until MSC 97 had considered the course of action proposed at SSE 3 and the views of the ISO Central Secretariat on this matter. 10.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that SSE 3 (SSE 3/16, paragraphs 10.6 and 10.7) had required cooperation between IMO and the ISO for consistency in actions and copyright purposes. In this regard, the Sub-Committee noted that the Secretariat had contacted the ISO and had received confirmation that there are no copyright issues. 10.3 The Sub-Committee further recalled that MSC 97 had approved the Shipboard escape route signs and emergency equipment location markings (MSC.1/Circ.1553), as an interim measure, and had instructed the Secretariat, in cooperation with the ISO Central Secretariat, to prepare a draft resolution containing the graphical symbols from standard ISO 24409-2:2014, for consideration at this session. Outcome of HTW 4 10.4 The Sub-Committee noted that HTW 4, having considered document HTW 4/11 (China), proposing that the design of the escape route signs and equipment location markings used on board ships should include explanatory texts, as set out in the annex to the document, to facilitate the clear identification and understanding of the signs and markings by seafarers, passengers and other personnel involved. HTW 4 had agreed to forward the above document to SSE 4 for further consideration. 10.5 In this regard, the Sub-Committee also noted that the symbols included in part 2 of standard ISO 24409 do not include explanatory text. Draft escape route signs and equipment location markings 10.6 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/10 (Secretariat) providing a draft Assembly resolution on Escape route signs and equipment location markings, which was prepared in cooperation with the ISO Central Secretariat. 10.7 In this connection, the Sub-Committee noted that, taking into account that the existing symbols are contained in relevant Assembly and MSC resolutions, the Secretariat had prepared a draft Assembly resolution on Escape route signs and equipment location markings which, if adopted, will be a substantial replacement of existing resolutions. 10.8 In this regard, having noted that standard ISO 24409-2:2014 does not include a sign for embarkation stations, the Sub-Committee agreed that such symbol should not be included in the draft Assembly resolution, in order to avoid possible misunderstandings with the symbol identifying muster stations.

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10.9 Having noted that the standard ISO 24409:2014 had not been developed for the particular purpose of preparing shipboard fire control plans, the Sub-Committee recognized that not all of the symbols in the Graphical symbols for shipboard fire control plans (resolution A.952(23)) were included in standard ISO 24409-2 and, therefore, agreed that resolution A.952(23) should continue to be used in combination with the new Assembly resolution, once adopted, for the preparation of the shipboard fire control plans required by SOLAS regulation II-2/15.2.4. 10.10 In light of the foregoing, the Sub-Committee, having:

.1 agreed that the draft Assembly resolution on Escape route signs and equipment location markings should apply to ships constructed on or after 1 January 2018 or ships which undergo repairs, alterations, modifications and outfitting within the scope of SOLAS chapters II-2 and/or III, as applicable, on or after 1 January 2018; and

.2 decided that signs and equipment location markings should not include explanatory text,

endorsed the draft Escape route signs and equipment location markings together with the associated draft Assembly resolution, as set out in annex 8, and invited the Committee to approve them with a view to subsequent adoption by A 30. Completion of the work on the output 10.11 The Sub-Committee invited the Committee to note that the work on the output had been completed. 11 REVISED SOLAS REGULATIONS II-1/13 AND II-1/13-1 AND OTHER RELATED

REGULATIONS FOR NEW SHIPS General 11.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that SSE 3, having considered the recommendations provided in the EMSA 3 study related to watertight doors, had concluded that such recommendations were not within the remit of the Sub-Committee. 11.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that, in order to progress the work intersessionally, SSE 3 had established the Correspondence Group on Anti-crushing Protection to Watertight Doors, with terms of reference as set out in paragraph 11.5 of document SSE 3/16, and instructed the Group to submit a report to this session. Report of the Correspondence Group and related document 11.3 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/11 (EC), providing the report of the Correspondence Group on Anti-crushing Protection (ACP) to Watertight Doors regarding the following issues:

.1 the identification of relevant elements of industry standards that might be suitable for application to watertight doors on ships;

.2 discussion on the nature (i.e. mandatory or non-mandatory) of any guidelines

associated to any developed SOLAS requirements due to the impact that ACP may have on personnel and ship safety;

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.3 discussion on the potential for ACP to create risky behaviours and failures to follow existing operational procedures; and

.4 the need for the provision of safety override, the application of a fail-safe

principle, how to avoid accidental opening of watertight doors (WTD), robustness of ACP and different options to reconcile the protection of persons and the primary safety goal of WTDs.

11.4 In this connection, the Sub-Committee also considered document SSE 4/11/1 (Japan, Marshall Islands, ICS, CLIA), providing comments on the report of the Correspondence Group and highlighting matters of significance that are considered necessary to further progress the work on this output, in particular the possibility of conducting a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for the quantification of the current level of risk and the potential risk reduction, the impact derived from the application of ACP to watertight doors on the societal risk and the consequences for the watertight integrity of new ships. 11.5 In the ensuing discussion, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 the installation of ACP in watertight doors would increase the complexity of watertight doors;

.2 ACP should neither impair the primary safety functions of the watertight

doors nor the ship's watertight integrity and survivability; .3 the human element is fundamental in terms of risks of operation of watertight

doors; however, education and operational procedures have not proven to be sufficiently effective;

.4 the present lack of consensus on matters such as availability, practicability

and cost of ACP technical solutions suitable to watertight doors can only be resolved by continuing the work undertaken;

.5 objective information about risks and their impact on personnel and safety

should be provided by means of a risk assessment or an FSA; and .6 a risk assessment should be sufficient to provide the necessary information

in order to make well-informed decisions on the necessary requirements to be developed.

11.6 After a lengthy discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed that:

.1 consideration of this output should be continued; and .2 objective information and results of risk assessments are necessary in order

to consider feasible safety solutions and to avoid any adverse effects on the primary safety functions of watertight doors, as well as the ship's watertight integrity and survivability.

11.7 Subsequently, the Sub-Committee invited interested delegations and international organizations to provide objective information, results of risk assessments, if available, and possible safety solutions compatible with the functions of watertight doors for consideration at SSE 5.

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Extension of the target completion year 11.8 The Sub-Committee requested the Committee to extend the target completion year for this output to 2019. 12 UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF IMO SAFETY, SECURITY, AND

ENVIRONMENT RELATED CONVENTIONS General 12.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that this is a continuous item on the Sub-Committee's biennial agenda and that the Assembly, at its twenty-eighth session, had expanded the output to include all proposed unified interpretations (UIs) to provisions of IMO safety, security, and environment related Conventions, so that any newly developed or updated draft unified interpretation could be submitted for the consideration of the Sub-Committee, with a view to developing an appropriate IMO interpretation. Unified interpretations on matters related to life-saving appliances Draft unified interpretation on single fall and hook system used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat 12.2 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/12/9 (IACS), providing an IACS unified interpretation on single fall and hook systems used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat in order to clarify that "off-load" release mechanisms should only be subject to tests that are applicable to such mechanisms, taking into account the exemption provided in paragraph 4.4.7.6.17 of the LSA Code for single fall and hook "off-load" systems, as amended by resolution MSC.320(89). 12.3 In considering the above document, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed during the discussion:

.1 the document, based on paragraph 4.4.7.6.17 of the LSA Code, proposes that single fall and hook systems used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat be exempted from complying with the requirement to avoid the accidental release during recovery, as provided in paragraph 4.4.7.6.8 of the Code, which remains relevant;

.2 in order to justify the proposal, reference is made to the Standardized

life-saving appliance evaluation and test report forms (MSC/Circ.980) which contains discrepancies with the Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)), therefore, the decision should be differed until a decision on the status of MSC/Circ.980 is reached; and

.3 paragraph 6.9.4.3 of resolution MSC.81(70), as amended by

resolution MSC.321(89), refers to off-load release mechanisms that use the weight of the boat to close the hook and, therefore, the test provided in that paragraph, as specifically described for these mechanisms, might be applicable.

12.4 In light of the above, the Sub-Committee instructed the LSA Working Group to further consider the matter and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly (see paragraph 12.7).

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Draft unified interpretation of the LSA Code with regard to the specification of hardwood for steps of embarkation ladders 12.5 The Sub-Committee considered documents SSE 4/12/11 and SSE 4/INF.3 (Japan), providing a draft unified interpretation of the LSA Code with regard to the specification of hardwood for steps of embarkation ladders and information about strength tests of steps in order to clarify the expression "free from knots" within the properties of the hardwood for steps. 12.6 Having noted that NCSR 4 had considered a similar proposal on pilot transfer arrangements (SOLAS regulation V/23) with regard to the specification of hardwood for steps of pilot ladders and had decided that there was no need for a unified interpretation on this issue, the Sub-Committee confirmed the decision of NCSR 4 and took no action on this matter. Instructions to the LSA Working Group 12.7 In light of the above decisions, the Sub-Committee instructed the LSA Working Group, established under agenda item 3, taking into account comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to finalize the draft unified interpretation on single fall and hook system used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat, and the associated draft MSC circular, using the annex to document SSE 4/12/9 as a basis. Report of the LSA Working Group 12.8 Having considered the part of the report of the LSA Working Group (SSE 4/WP.3) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 12.9 and 12.10 below. 12.9 During the consideration of the draft unified interpretation on single fall and hook systems used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat and the associated draft MSC circular (SSE 4/WP.3, annex 6), the Sub-Committee noted:

.1 that the Group had agreed that the release mechanism test in paragraphs 6.9.3 and 6.9.4.3 of part 1 of the Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)), needed to be applied to off-load type release mechanisms only on the basis of the exemption provided in paragraph 4.4.7.6.17 of the LSA Code, as amended by resolution MSC.320(89); and

.2 the following views expressed:

.1 as some of the tests included in the draft unified interpretation for

"off-load" release mechanisms used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat are exempted in the Standardized life-saving appliance evaluation and test report forms (MSC/Circ.980) the approval of the draft unified interpretation under consideration may cause confusion; and

.2 the approval of any interpretations or adoption of amendments to

the LSA Code or the Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)) without considering the impact on MSC/Circ.980 does not resolve inconsistencies or facilitate the clarification of provisions.

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12.10 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee:

.1 agreed to hold the draft unified interpretation on single fall and hook system used for launching a lifeboat or rescue boat in abeyance with a view to conducting a careful review of the content and its consequences for consideration at SSE 5;

.2 invited interested Member States and international organizations to submit proposals for amendments to the Standardized life-saving appliance evaluation and test report forms (MSC/Circ.980) that are consequential to this unified interpretation, under the output on "Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, and environment related conventions"; and

.3 agreed that a full review of MSC/Circ.980 would require a proposal for a new output to the Committee in accordance with the Organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5).

Unified interpretations on matters related to fire safety Draft unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-2/13.4.2 relating to the means of escape from the steering gear space on cargo ships 12.11 In considering document SSE 4/12/2 (IACS), providing an IACS unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-2/13.4.2 relating to the means of escape from the steering gear space in cargo ships, the Sub-Committee noted that the original version of this unified interpretation was considered at SSE 3 and based on the comments raised at that session, IACS had developed this revised version proposing that:

.1 if direct access to the open deck is provided from a steering gear space

containing the emergency steering position, then a second means of escape is not needed; and

.2 escape routes that pass only through stairways and/or corridors that have fire integrity protection equivalent to steering gear spaces are considered as providing a "direct access to the open deck" if the fire integrity of the escape route is at least equivalent to the space through which it travels or to the steering gear space, whichever is more stringent.

12.12 Having noted the view that escape routes that pass through stairways and/or corridors do not provide direct access to the open deck, the Sub-Committee did not endorse the draft unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-2/13.4.2 and invited IACS to note the comments made and take action, accordingly. Draft unified interpretations of provisions relating to inert gas systems on tankers 12.13 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/12/3/Rev.1 (IACS), providing four draft unified interpretations intended to clarify the following requirements of chapter 15 of the FSS Code related to inert gas systems on tankers (all references below are to chapter 15 of the FSS Code):

.1 which systems and components should be involved in the automatic shutdown of the inert gas system to avoid including all those systems provided with indicators and alarms (paragraph 15.2.2.2.2);

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.2 how to meet the requirement to provide information of the operational status of stop valves of branch piping for inert gas by means of position indicators (paragraph 15.2.2.3.2.2);

.3 how the requirement to indicate the operation status of the inert gas system

can be met based on the operational status of the gas regulating valve and on the pressure or flow of inert gas mains to the cargo tanks (paragraph 15.2.2.4.1); and

.4 the arrangements of a second independent pressure sensor for very low

pressure of the system, interpreting that it should be "independent" of other sensors serving alarms, or alternatively, in systems fitted with automatic shutdown of cargo pumps, the shutdown should not prevent the operation of ballast pumps or pumps used for bilge drainage of a cargo pump room (paragraph 15.2.2.4.5).

12.14 Recognizing the high specificity of the proposal, the Sub-Committee instructed the Working Group on Fire Protection, established under agenda item 7, to further consider the matter and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly (see paragraph 12.35.1). Draft unified interpretation on the minimum width of external escape routes on cargo ships 12.15 Following consideration at SSE 3 of document SSE 3/12/2 (IACS), the Sub-Committee considered documents SSE 4/12/4 and Corr.1 (IACS), providing a draft unified interpretation on the minimum width of external escape routes on cargo ships, with a view to facilitating the safe and timely evacuation of crews, as well as resolving the differences of interpretations among the Administrations and PSCOs on this matter. 12.16 In the context of the above, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 the minimum width of external escape routes on cargo ships should be determined by flag Administrations at their discretion;

.2 a unified interpretation would not resolve the different interpretations among

PSCOs on this matter and any attempt to provide clarity would consist of amending the requirements in SOLAS chapter II-2; and

.3 a technical unified interpretation on this issue would facilitate the global and

consistent implementation of SOLAS regulation II-2/13.1, in particular the vague expression therein "…provide means of escape so that persons on board can safely and swiftly escape to the lifeboat and liferaft embarkation deck…".

12.17 In light of the above, the Sub-Committee agreed to invite the Committee to note the discussion at this session, and instruct the III Sub-Committee to consider how to address the differing interpretations among the Administrations and PSCOs.

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Draft unified interpretation on the fire integrity of the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and the navigation lockers inside the wheelhouse 12.18 The Sub-Committee, following consideration at SSE 3 of document SSE 3/12/1 (IACS), considered document SSE 4/12/5 (IACS), providing a draft unified interpretation intended to clarify that a navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse should not be regarded as a part of wheelhouse but as an independent control station, and that the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and such navigation locker should have "B-0" fire rating on the basis of the "Notes" relevant to bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room of tables 9.3, 9.5 and 9.7 of SOLAS regulation II-2/9. 12.19 Having noted that the proposal had generally been supported, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft Unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2 relating to the fire integrity of the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and a navigation locker inside the wheelhouse and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 9, and invited the Committee to approve them. Draft unified interpretation on suitable means for the calibration of portable atmosphere testing instruments as referred to in SOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.7.1

12.20 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/12/6 (IACS), proposing a draft unified interpretation intended to also apply the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation XI-1/7 (MSC.1/Circ.1561) to the suitable means for the calibration of portable atmosphere testing instruments as required by SOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.7.1 (Cargo areas of tankers), as adopted by resolution MSC.291(87).

12.21 Following consideration of this document, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft Unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2 relating to the provision of suitable means for the calibration of portable instruments for measuring oxygen or flammable vapour concentrations and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 9, and invited the Committee to approve them.

Draft unified interpretations on the fire test requirements for damping materials for reducing noise and vibration level

12.22 The Sub-Committee considered document SSE 4/12/8 (China), proposing a number of interpretations intended to clarify the fire test requirements for damping materials, along with the fire tests for "A" and "B" class divisions provided with a damping layer, with a view to facilitating the consistent application of SOLAS requirements, the 2010 FTP Code and the Code on noise levels on board ships in terms of flammability, smoke and toxicity properties of such materials, as well as ensuring the fire integrity of divisions.

12.23 During the discussion, the Sub-Committee noted the following views:

.1 the proposed unified interpretations seem to deviate from the current provisions in SOLAS chapter II-2 and the 2010 FTP Code, which require that thermal and acoustic insulating materials shall be non-combustible and that "A" and "B" class divisions shall be constructed from non-combustible materials; and

.2 fire components in fire class divisions should be of the same fire integrity.

12.24 Consequently, the Sub-Committee did not endorse the draft unified interpretations for damping materials and invited China to note the comments made and take action, accordingly.

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Draft unified interpretation on the application of SOLAS regulation II-2/9 to the spaces in the cargo area of tankers

12.25 Following consideration at SSE 3 of document SSE 3/12/6 (IACS), the Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/12/13 (IACS), providing a draft unified interpretation on the application of SOLAS regulation II-2/9 to the spaces in the cargo area of tankers, in particular, noting that there is no provision relating to the fire integrity standards and categories for the spaces within the cargo area of tankers, other than cargo pump-rooms. In this context, this matter was addressed based on the understanding that SOLAS regulation II-2/9.2.4 is applicable to all the individual spaces within the cargo area of tankers.

12.26 Having agreed that the correlation between the spaces in the cargo area and the categories proposed for such spaces needed further consideration, the Sub-Committee instructed the Working Group on Fire Protection to consider the matter and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly (see paragraph 12.35.2).

Matters to be clarified (Fire safety) Testing of fire monitors and foam applicators with foam concentrate 12.27 The Sub-Committee considered document SSE 4/12/1 (IACS) discussing two possible interpretations on the prototype testing requirements provided in paragraph 2.2.2 of chapter 14 of the FSS Code, for the monitors and foam applicators of fixed deck foam systems required by SOLAS regulation II-2/10.8. 12.28 Taking into account that the document sought advice on the type of foam to be used in the prototype tests and based on the differing views expressed during the discussion, the Sub-Committee instructed the Working Group on Fire Protection to consider the matter and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly (see paragraph 12.35.3). Installation of manually operated call points (MOCPs) on cargo ships 12.29 Following consideration at SSE 3 of document SSE 3/12/16 (IACS), the Sub-Committee considered document SSE 4/12/7 (IACS), providing IACS' understanding of SOLAS regulation II-2/7.7 on manually operated call points, taking into account the issues raised at SSE 3, in particular, the interpretation of:

.1 "each exit";

.2 the requirement that no part of a corridor is more than 20 m from a manually operated call point within the accommodation block;

.3 the requirement of manually operated call points in spaces located away from the accommodation block; and

.4 the requirement of manually operated call points at the exits of navigation bridges provided with panels fitted with the manually operated call point functionality,

with a view to submitting an appropriate draft unified interpretation on the installation of MOCPs to a subsequent session of the Sub-Committee.

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12.30 In the context of the above and based on the views expressed, the Sub-Committee agreed that:

.1 "each exit" does not mean "all the doors of the spaces within the

accommodation block", but means "the doors leading to the outside of the accommodation block";

.2 the Working Group on Fire Protection should further consider the

understanding that one manually operated call point (MOCP) can serve several exits to open decks within 20 m from the MOCP on the same deck, and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly (see paragraph 12.35.4);

.3 the understanding that a MOCP is not required for service spaces and store

rooms that are located away from the accommodation block would deviate from SOLAS regulation II-2/7.7; and

.4 the understanding that MOCPs are not required at the exits of the navigation

bridge, provided that the functionality of a MOCP is fitted into the control panel installed on the navigation bridge and that the exits are within 20 m from such a control panel, would deviate from SOLAS regulation II-2/7.7.

12.31 Consequently, the Sub-Committee invited IACS to consider the comments made and decisions taken at this session (see paragraphs 12.30 and 12.41), and take action, accordingly. 12.32 Subsequently, the Sub-Committee noted the information provided by the observer from IACS that, in the meantime, IACS members would continue to apply the existing IACS unified interpretation SC 241, unless written instructions to apply a different interpretation are provided by the Administration on whose behalf they are authorized to act as a recognized organization. Application of SOLAS regulation II-2/20.6.2 and MSC.1/Circ.1275 regarding the arrangement of portable fire extinguishers for ro-ro spaces and vehicle spaces 12.33 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/12/12 (Republic of Korea, IACS), proposing to amend the Unified interpretation of SOLAS chapter II-2 on the number and arrangement of portable fire extinguishers on board ships (MSC.1/Circ.1275) in order to rectify an inconsistency between SOLAS regulation II-2/20.6.2.1 and MSC.1/Circ.1275 on the arrangement of portable fire extinguishers in ro-ro spaces and vehicle spaces. 12.34 Having agreed that the mandatory SOLAS requirement prevails over the non-mandatory interpretation in the MSC circular, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft corrigendum to the Unified interpretation of SOLAS chapter II-2 on the number and arrangement of portable fire extinguishers on board ships (MSC.1/Circ.1275), set out in annex 10, and noted that the Secretariat would issue it as MSC.1/Circ.1275/Corr.1. Instructions to the Working Group on Fire Protection 12.35 In light of the above decisions, the Sub-Committee instructed the Working Group on Fire Protection, established under agenda item 7, taking into account comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to consider:

.1 the interpretations provided in annexes 1 to 4 to document

SSE 4/12/3/Rev.1;

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.2 the interpretation on the application of SOLAS regulation II-2/9 to the spaces in the cargo area of tankers, as provided in document SSE 4/12/13;

.3 possible interpretations on prototype testing requirements provided in

paragraph 2.2.2 of chapter 14 of the FSS Code, taking into account document SSE 4/12/1; and

.4 the understanding that one manually operated call point (MOCP) can serve

several exits to open decks within 20 m from the MOCP on the same deck, taking into account document SSE 4/12/7 (paragraph 13.2),

and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly. Report of the Working Group on Fire Protection 12.36 Having considered the part of the report of the Working Group on Fire Protection (SSE 4/WP.5) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 12.37 to 12.41 below. Provisions relating to inert gas systems on tankers 12.37 Having noted that the Group had agreed to the interpretations provided in annexes 1 to 4 to document SSE 4/12/3/Rev.1, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft Unified interpretations of chapter 15 of the FSS Code relating to inert gas systems on tankers and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 11, and invited the Committee to approve them. Application of SOLAS regulation II-2/9 to the spaces in the cargo area of tankers 12.38 The Sub-Committee noted that the Group, having confirmed the agreement with the first paragraph of the interpretation provided in the annex to document SSE 4/12/13, had also agreed that the second paragraph of this interpretation, which relates to the categories for the spaces within the cargo area of tankers, other than cargo pump-rooms, should not be accepted based on the following views expressed:

.1 the proposed categorization is unnecessary. Instead, the existing definitions in SOLAS chapter II-2, such as "service space" and "machinery space", should be used;

.2 different categories of ship spaces (i.e. service spaces and machinery

spaces) should be separated by appropriate fire divisions;

.3 the decision regarding dry chemical storage rooms and ballast water treatment system rooms should be considered on a case-by-case base, it being appreciated that the nature of the materials or equipment contained within the space could affect the categorization of that space; and

.4 possible chemical reactions must be considered in addition to the presence

of chemicals in assessing the hazards of ballast water treatment systems. 12.39 In light of the above, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft Unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2 relating to fire integrity of the spaces in the cargo area of tankers and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 9, and invited the Committee to approve them.

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Testing requirements for fire monitors with foam concentrate 12.40 Having noted IACS' intention to reconsider the following two proposed options:

.1 the tests shall be done using the specific type (make) of foam concentrate that is intended to be used on board; and

.2 the tests shall be done using a type A or type B foam mentioned in

paragraph 2.2.1.4 of chapter 14 of the FSS Code, but describing which boundaries could be utilized,

with a view to submitting a proposal for consideration at SSE 5, the Sub-Committee agreed that no further action should be taken at this stage.

Installation of manually operated call points

12.41 With regard to the understanding of paragraph 13.2 of document SSE 4/12/7, the Sub-Committee, having noted:

.1 the Group's views on the existing practice; and

.2 that the Group had noted the view expressed by a number of delegations that such understanding contradicts SOLAS regulation II-2/7.7,

endorsed the decision of the Group that no unified interpretation should be developed in this regard.

Unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-1

Draft amendments to the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1398) on mechanical, hydraulic and electrical independency of steering gear control systems

12.42 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/12 (IACS), proposing that the Sub-Committee should consider amending the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1398) based on latest revised IACS unified interpretation SC94, which, compared with the previous revision, lacks those interpretations relating to failure detection and response of control systems (section 4 of the unified interpretation), which have been incorporated into a new IACS Unified Requirement (IACS UR E25).


.1 as SOLAS regulations II-1/29 and II-1/30 include control and failure provisions for steering gears, section 4 of the unified interpretation cannot be considered as related only to the rules of classification societies and, therefore, such section should not be removed from the IMO provisions;

.2 the provisions included in the new IACS UR E25 should be in line with the requirements included in SOLAS regulations II-1/29 and II-1/30;

.3 if the provisions of the new IACS unified interpretation and the new unified requirement are the same as the ones in the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1398), the latter should not be amended; and

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.4 the reference to the IEC Publication 60092-204 – Electrical installations in ships. Part 204: System design – Electric and electrohydraulic steering gear should be deleted from the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1398) due to its withdrawal by the International Electrotechnical Commission in 2013.

12.44 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed to take no action on section 4, but deleted the reference to the IEC Publication 60092-204 – Electrical installations in ships. Part 204: System design – Electric and electrohydraulic steering gear and endorsed the draft Amendment to the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1398), and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 12, and invited the Committee to approve them.

Draft amendments to the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulations II-1/28 and II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1416) on arrangements for steering capability and function on ships fitted with propulsion and steering systems other than traditional arrangements for a ship's directional control 12.45 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration the following documents:

.1 SSE 4/12/10 (IACS), providing updates to the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulations II-1/28 and II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1416) regarding the arrangements for steering capability and function on ships fitted with propulsion and steering systems other than traditional arrangements for a ship's directional control, based on the experience gained and the feedback from the industry; and

.2 SSE 4/12/14 (Norway), providing comments on document SSE 4/12/10, in

particular, requesting clarification in relation to the level of redundancy provided in the interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/29.6.1.

12.46 Having agreed that the concerns raised in document SSE 4/12/14 needed further consideration and that the existing interpretations for SOLAS regulations II-1/29.1 and II-1/29.6 better address the purpose of the interpretation, the Sub-Committee did not endorse the draft revised unified interpretation of SOLAS regulations II-1/28 and II-1/29 and invited IACS to note the comments made and take action, accordingly. 13 REVIEW SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 AND ASSOCIATED CODES TO MINIMIZE THE

INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF FIRES ON RO-RO SPACES AND SPECIAL CATEGORY SPACES OF NEW AND EXISTING RO-RO PASSENGER SHIPS

General 13.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that MSC 97, following consideration of documents MSC 97/19/3 (Austria, et al.) and MSC 97/19/13 (Japan), had agreed to include a new output in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub-Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4 on "Review SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes to minimize the incidence and consequences of fires on ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships", with a target completion year of 2019 (MSC 97/22, paragraphs 19.19 and 19.20). 13.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that, taking into account the high number of areas to be considered in the analysis included in the original proposal (MSC 97/19/3, paragraph 25), the Committee had instructed SSE 4 to consider the scope and the work plan, and to advise MSC 98 accordingly.

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FIRESAFE study 13.3 The Sub-Committee noted the information provided in document SSE 4/INF.6 (EC) regarding the FIRESAFE study, commissioned by EMSA, on fires on ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of ro-ro passenger ships. The study, stated to have been done in accordance with the Revised guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.1), in particular considering steps 2, 3 and parts of 4, focused on the risk of electrical fire ignition and the risk of suppression failures of drencher systems on both new buildings and existing ro-ro passenger ships. 13.4 In the ensuing discussion, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 in order to properly address this output, it is essential to identify the hazards

and causes of recent fire-related casualties based on the analysis of casualty investigation reports;

.2 the instruction of the Committee was to consider the scope and the work

plan, with a focus on the identification of necessary outputs to complete the work;

.3 the following factors crucial for fires on ro-ro spaces and special category

spaces should be taken into account when preparing the scope and work plan under this output:

.1 effective and early fire detection;

.2 fast and efficient firefighting;

.3 training of crew; and

.4 innovative and user-friendly design of fire detection and firefighting

systems; and .4 in order to generate a realistic work plan, the task should focus on risk control

options stemming from FSAs or be identified by means of marine casualty investigation reports.

13.5 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed to instruct the Working Group on Fire Protection to further consider this matter based on the instructions provided by MSC 97, and advise the Sub-Committee on how best to proceed.

Instructions to the Working Group on Fire Protection

13.6 The Sub-Committee instructed the Working Group on Fire Protection, established under agenda item 7, taking into account comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to consider the scope and the work plan on the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes, taking into account documents SSE 2/INF.3 (Germany), MSC 96/16/1 (Austria et al.), MSC 96/INF.3 (Germany), MSC 97/19/3 (Austria et al.), MSC 97/19/13 (Japan) and SSE 4/INF.6 (EC), and advise the Sub-Committee accordingly.

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Report of the Working Group on Fire Protection

13.7 Having considered the part of the report of the Working Group on Fire Protection (SSE 4/WP.5) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 13.8 to 13.12 below.

General

13.8 With regard to the work to be done on the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes, the Sub-Committee endorsed the following two-step approach:

.1 the development of the Interim Guidelines; and

.2 the development of amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and the associated codes.

Scope of work for the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes 13.9 Taking into account the Group's discussion that:

.1 the work is intended to address the present and future risks arising from the inherent fire load of a ro-ro/special category space on a ro-ro passenger ship and the potential impact of an uncontrolled fire in such spaces; and

.2 the indications that the incidence of fire incidents is constant or potentially

increasing should be born in mind, the Sub-Committee endorsed the following five main tasks to be addressed under the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes:

.1 prevention/ignition;

.2 detection and decision;

.3 extinguishment;

.4 containment; and .5 integrity of LSA and evacuation.

13.10 In this context, the Sub-Committee also endorsed:

.1 the Group's view that the method of work should generally follow risk-based methodology, such as Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), or, where relevant, similar but simplified techniques, or by adoption of the existing best practice; and

.2 that the work on review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes could

potentially lead to the development of amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, the FSS and 2010 FTP Codes, the STCW Convention and Code, and relevant guidelines, and invited the Committee to agree with this view.

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13.11 In light of the above, the Sub-Committee endorsed:

.1 the draft scope of work for the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes regarding ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships, as set out in annex 13; and

.2 the draft work plan on the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated

codes regarding ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships, as set out in annex 14,

and invited the Committee to approve them. 13.12 Subsequently, the Sub-Committee invited Members States and international organizations to submit proposals regarding the draft Interim Guidelines and draft amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes, for consideration at SSE 5. 14 DEVELOP NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR VENTILATION OF SURVIVAL CRAFTS General 14.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that MSC 97, following consideration of documents MSC 97/19/8 and MSC 97/INF.11 (Bahamas, Japan), had agreed to include a new output in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub-Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4 on "Develop new requirements for ventilation of survival crafts", with a target completion year of 2018 (MSC 97/22, paragraphs 19.21 to 19.24). 14.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that, taking into account that the proposal originally addressed totally enclosed lifeboats only and that the compelling need had been demonstrated for such equipment, the MSC 97 had agreed that SSE 4 should develop the requirements related to the ventilation of totally enclosed lifeboats as the highest priority, and thereafter consider requirements for other survival craft. Requirements for ventilation of survival crafts 14.3 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration the following documents:

.1 SSE 4/14 (Bahamas, Japan), proposing draft amendments to the LSA Code and the Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)), as amended, regarding the ventilation of totally enclosed lifeboats and focusing on power ventilation systems; and urging caution regarding the date of entry into force of the amendments; and

.2 SSE 4/14/1 (Germany), providing comments on the proposed draft

amendments contained in document SSE 4/14 and, in particular:

.1 based on additional research, providing a ventilation rate lower than the one proposed in document SSE 4/14; and

.2 including the new draft provisions for ventilation in the general

requirements sections of the LSA Code for lifeboats and liferafts in order to make such provisions generally applicable and not only applicable to totally enclosed lifeboats.

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.1 goal-based provisions should be developed, rather than prescriptive regulations, in order to address the ventilation systems for survival craft;

.2 if the Sub-Committee proceeds to only develop provisions for power

ventilation systems, several consequential amendments to IMO instruments may be necessary, therefore, passive ventilation systems which meet the established performance criteria should also be considered;

.3 power ventilation systems should be able to be controlled in order to prevent

hypo- or hyperthermia of the persons on board; .4 the only objective evidence provided to the Sub-Committee based on trials

is the need for the installation of power ventilation systems supplying at least 20 m3/h of air per person;

.5 a ventilation flow of 20 m3/h per person could be excessively conservative

and may have an impact on the fuel consumption and other safety parameters of the craft;

.6 the safety of survival craft should not be compromised by equipment that

may not provide the minimum safety level that is required under all environmental circumstances; and

.7 the work under this output is linked to the work on development of test and

performance standards for life-saving appliances and arrangements on board ships operating in polar waters being considered under agenda item 15.

Instructions to the LSA Working Group 14.5 Having considered the above views, the Sub-Committee instructed the LSA Working Group, established under agenda item 3, taking into account comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to:

.1 consider the methods for improving the microclimate inside totally enclosed lifeboats;

.2 consider, subject to the decision on such methods, draft amendments to the

LSA Code and the Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)), as amended, taking into account documents SSE 4/14 and SSE 4/14/1; and

.3 consider whether it is necessary to establish a correspondence group and, if

so, prepare terms of reference for consideration by the Sub-Committee. Report of the LSA Working Group 14.6 Having considered the part of the report of the LSA Working Group (SSE 4/WP.3) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 14.7 to 14.9 below.

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14.7 Regarding the methods of ventilation of survival craft, i.e. active versus passive ventilation, the Sub-Committee noted that the Group had agreed not to exclude passive ventilation, provided that such passive ventilation meets the required performance. 14.8 The Sub-Committee also noted that the Group had agreed that additional research and experience data related to microclimate inside totally enclosed lifeboats would be helpful to reach a conclusion with regard to the ventilation flow to be included in the draft amendments. Re-establishment of the LSA Correspondence Group 14.9 Having considered the above matters and in order to progress the work intersessionally, the Sub-Committee re-established the LSA Correspondence Group, under the coordination of the United States2, and instructed it, taking into account the comments made and decisions taken at this session, to (see also paragraph 15.9):

.1 gather and review data on microclimate in totally enclosed lifeboats, as available from research or academic documents referenced in documents MSC 97/19/8, MSC 97/INF.11, SSE 4/14, SSE 4/14/1, SSE 4/15 and SSE 4/15/2, or from other sources deemed reliable and relevant;

.2 based on that review, identify the possible criteria on which the new

ventilation requirements for totally enclosed lifeboats should be based (e.g. humidity, temperature, threshold levels of O2, of CO2, ventilation rates, air changes);

.3 recommend the criteria to be used for the draft amendments to

paragraph 4.6.6.1 of chapter IV of the LSA Code, on the ventilation requirements for totally enclosed lifeboats and draft amendments to resolution MSC.81(70), considering the proposal in annex 1 to document SSE 4/14; and

.4 submit a report to SSE 5.

15 CONSEQUENTIAL WORK RELATED TO THE NEW POLAR CODE General 15.1 The Sub-Committee recalled that MSC 97, following consideration of documents MSC 97/21/3 (Argentina, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Norway, Vanuatu) and MSC 97/21/12 (ICS, CLIA), had decided that additional performance and test standards for the equipment and systems on board ships operating in polar waters should be developed in order to support the implementation of the Polar Code and had agreed to reinstate output 5.2.1.15 (Consequential work related to the new Polar Code) in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub-Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4, with a target completion year of 2017 (MSC 97/22, paragraph 21.7).

2 Coordinator:

Mr. George Grills Office of Design and Engineering Standards Lifesaving & Fire Safety Division US Coast Guard 2703 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave SE Washington DC 20593-7509 United States Phone: +1 (202) 372 1385 Email: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

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15.2 It was also recalled by the Sub-Committee that MSC 97 had instructed the Sub-Committee to:

.1 review the LSA Code and the relevant IMO resolutions to adapt current testing and performance standards to the Polar Code provisions or develop additional requirements, if necessary. In this regard, the application should only address life-saving appliances in polar waters when requested by the relevant application requirements in the Polar Code (all ships, ships intended to operate in low air temperature, ship ice classes in accordance with chapter 3, etc.); and

.2 develop guidance on extinguishing media at polar service temperatures and

consider any necessary amendments to current standards for firefighters' outfits.

15.3 The Sub-Committee recalled further that MSC 97 had endorsed the view that the Sub-Committee should have flexibility to determine if any additional tests or performance standards should be developed as "add-on" parts to the relevant instruments, in order to ensure that additional test and performance requirements for equipment on board ships certified to operate in polar waters do not unintentionally affect current equipment requirements and/or test regimes. Testing and performance standards of life-saving appliances 15.4 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration the following documents:

.1 SSE 4/15 (Norway), reporting on the main findings from SARex, an exercise that took place in Woodfjord, Spitzbergen, with the aim to identify any gaps between the standard provided by SOLAS for life-saving appliances and the functional requirements defined in section 8.2.3 (Survival) of part I-A of the Polar Code;

.2 SSE 4/15/1 and Corr.1 (Norway), outlining performance criteria for life-saving

appliances based on the polar waters service conditions with the aim to prepare the corresponding amendments to some of the test standards, including consideration of how any additional requirements should be included in the existing instruments, e.g. a new chapter in the LSA Code and a new section in resolution MSC.81(70);

.3 SSE 4/15/2 (Canada), proposing that the LSA Code be amended in order to

provide a habitable environment in liferafts and lifeboats in polar conditions, based on the key factors worked out from the research projects conducted by Canada; and

.4 SSE 4/INF.4 (Japan), providing information about the outlines stemming

from the consideration by ISO/TC8/SC1 of the development of ISO standards on specifications of life-saving appliances and fire safety systems on board ships under the Polar Code.

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15.5 In considering the above, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 test and performance standards based on the polar service temperature and the maximum expected time of rescue should be developed as a new chapter to the LSA Code and a new section to part 1 of resolution MSC.81(70), as amended, and in the meantime interim guidelines should be developed;

.2 the LSA Code does not include thermal efficiency or ventilation criteria; .3 the documents considered at this session report on findings and provide

general comments on the LSA Code applicable to any regions; .4 the application of reduced capacity provisions in accordance with SOLAS

regulation III/21 may not be in line with the objective of the Polar Code; .5 the current design of equipment and systems that provide survival support

does not guarantee such support for a minimum of five days, as provided in the Polar Code;

.6 the Safety Management System may be used to hold procedures on training

and maintenance to address some necessary requirements for life-saving appliances in polar waters;

.7 the development of provisions under this output should not overlook any

related outcome under other agenda items; and .8 as the Polar Code is in force, the establishment of standards to be satisfied

by life-saving appliances on board ships operating in polar waters is urgent. Instructions to the LSA Working Group 15.6 Having considered the above views, the Sub-Committee instructed the LSA Working Group, established under agenda item 3, taking into account comments made and decisions taken in plenary, to:

.1 prepare a work plan to address any additional testing and performance standards related to life-saving appliances and arrangements on board ships operating in polar waters, taking into account how they should be added to the existing instruments, e.g. a new chapter in the LSA Code and a new section in resolution MSC.81(70), including any interim solution;

.2 if time permits, identify performance criteria and prepare provisions for

life-saving appliances and arrangements, such as survival craft, containers carrying group survival equipment and survivability of persons on board ships operating in polar waters, taking into account documents SSE 4/15, SSE 4/15/1 and Corr.1, SSE 4/15/2 and SSE 4/INF.4;

.3 consider whether it is necessary to establish a correspondence group and, if

so, prepare terms of reference for consideration by the Sub-Committee; and .4 submit a written report (part 1), continue working through the week and

submit part 2 of the report to SSE 5, as soon as possible after the current session, so that it can be taken into account by the correspondence group, if established.

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Report of the LSA Working Group 15.7 Having considered the part of the report of the LSA Working Group (SSE 4/WP.3) dealing with this agenda item, the Sub-Committee took action as outlined in paragraphs 15.8 and 15.9 below. 15.8 The Sub-Committee endorsed the draft work plan to address additional requirements related to life-saving appliances and arrangements on board ships operating in polar waters, as prepared by the Group (SSE 4/WP.3, paragraph 35) and invited interested delegations and international organizations to submit proposals regarding the development of guidance on extinguishing media at polar service temperatures and the consideration of any necessary amendments to current standards for firefighters' outfits in line with the original instruction of MSC 97. Instruction to the LSA Correspondence Group 15.9 Having considered the above matters and in order to progress the work intersessionally, the Sub-Committee instructed the LSA Correspondence Group established under agenda item 14 (see paragraph 14.9), taking into account the comments made and decisions take in plenary, to:

.1 include the evaluation of specific conditions, as required, to consider when approving life-saving equipment to be used when in polar waters;

.2 identify test and performance criteria for life-saving appliances and

arrangements, such as survival craft, containers carrying group survival equipment and survivability of persons on board ships operating in polar waters; and prepare draft proposals for an interim solution, taking into account documents SSE 4/15, SSE 4/15/1 and Corr.1, SSE 4/15/2 and SSE 4/INF.4;

.3 consider alternative ways to address the work, such as the development of

a separate consolidated performance standard, development of add-ons to existing performance standards, or a resolution; and

.4 take into account any outcome of discussions at MSC 98, as appropriate.

Extension of the target completion year 15.10 The Sub-Committee requested the Committee to extend the target completion year for this output to 2019.

16 BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT AND PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR SSE 5

General 16.1 The Sub-Committee noted that MSC 96 had agreed to include, in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4, the following two new outputs on:

.1 "Amendments to the FSS Code for CO2 pipelines in under-deck passageways", with a target completion year of 2017; and

.2 "Uniform implementation of paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code", with a target

completion year of 2017.

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16.2 It was also noted by the Sub-Committee that MSC 97 had agreed to include, in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4, the following two new outputs on:

.1 "Review SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes to minimize the incidence and consequences of fires on ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships", with a target completion year of 2019; and

.2 "Develop new requirements for ventilation of survival crafts", with a target

completion year of 2018, as well as the reinstatement of the output 5.2.1.15, "Consequential work related to the new Polar Code", with a target completion year of 2017. Biennial status report and proposed biennial agenda for the 2018-2019 biennium 16.3 Taking into account the progress made at the session, the Sub-Committee prepared the biennial status report (SSE 4/WP.2, annex 1) and the proposed biennial agenda for the 2018-2019 biennium (SSE 4/WP.2, annex 2), as set out in annexes 15 and 16, respectively, for consideration by MSC 98. 16.4 The Sub-Committee noted that SDC 4, having reviewed the outputs on the Committee's post-biennial agenda that fell under the purview of the SDC Sub-Committee (SDC 4/WP.2, annex 1), had invited MSC 98 to endorse the replacement of the references to "SDC" as the associated organ for output 9 and the coordinating organ for output 42 with "SSE" (SSE 4/WP.2, annex 1). 16.5 In connection to the above, the Sub-Committee also noted that, to ensure an alignment of the existing outputs with the new strategic directions agreed by C 117, the outputs currently presented in the usual format in annex 16 will be further renumbered and reorganized for the 2018-2019 biennium in due course (SSE 4/WP.2, paragraphs 4 to 10). Proposed provisional agenda for SSE 5 16.6 Taking into account the progress made at the session, the Sub-Committee prepared the proposed provisional agenda for SSE 5 (SSE 4/WP.2, annex 3), as set out in annex 17, for consideration by MSC 98. Correspondence groups established at the session 16.7 The Sub-Committee established correspondence groups on the following subjects, due to report to SSE 5:

.1 onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches (see paragraph 8.27); and

.2 life-saving appliances (see paragraphs 14.9 and 15.9)

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Arrangements for the next session 16.8 The Sub-Committee agreed to establish, at its next session, working and drafting groups on the following subjects:

.1 life-saving appliances (agenda items 4 and 5)3; .2 fire protection (agenda items 5, 6 and 7)3; .3 onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches (agenda item 8)3 and .4 anti-crushing protection devices for watertight doors (agenda item 9)3,

whereby the Chair, taking into account the submissions received on the respective subjects, would advise the Sub-Committee before SSE 5 on the final selection of such groups. Date of the next session 16.9 The Sub-Committee noted that the fifth session of the Sub-Committee has been tentatively scheduled to take place from 12 to 16 March 2018. 17 ELECTION OF CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIR FOR 2018 In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Maritime Safety Committee, the Sub-Committee unanimously re-elected Dr. S. Ota (Japan) as Chair and Mr. U. Senturk (Turkey) as Vice-Chair, both for 2018. 18 ANY OTHER BUSINESS List of recognized test laboratories which are able to conduct fire tests in accordance with the provisions of the 2010 FTP Code 18.1 The Sub-Committee considered document SSE 4/18 (Secretariat), containing the draft list of recognized test laboratories which are able to conduct fire tests in accordance with the provisions of the 2010 FTP Code, and the associated draft SSE circular, excluding the list of laboratories which are able to conduct fire tests in accordance with the provisions of the FTP Code, as adopted by resolution MSC.61(67), based on the provision contained in paragraph 8.2 of section 8 of the 2010 FTP Code (Period of grace for type approvals in accordance with the previous FTP Code). 18.2 In considering the aforementioned document, the Sub-Committee noted the following views:

.1 the contact details of the Secretariat should be included in the SSE circular; and

.2 a new GISIS module should be created for the inclusion of testing

laboratories recognized by the Administrations concerned. 18.3 In light of the above, the Secretariat confirmed that the contact details of the Secretariat focal point would be included in the SSE circular and that a new GISIS module for this purpose was already under consideration.

3 Refer to annex 17.

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18.4 After some discussion, the Sub-Committee:

.1 approved and instructed the Secretariat to issue SSE.1/Circ.3 on the List of recognized test laboratories which are able to conduct fire tests in accordance with the provisions of the 2010 FTP Code; and

.2 invited Member States to provide the Secretariat with updated information

related to test laboratories recognized by Administrations, which are able to conduct fire tests in accordance with the provisions of the 2010 FTP Code, for inclusion in the SSE circular.

Replacement of non-corrosion resistant components fitted outside a lifeboat 18.5 Following discussion on matters related to the replacement of non-corrosion resistant components fitted outside a lifeboat at SSE 2 and SSE 3, the Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/18/1 (IACS), proposing revised amendments to paragraph 21 of the Guidelines for evaluation and replacement of lifeboat release and retrieval systems (MSC.1/Circ.1392), with a view to including a method of assessment for backing plates and bolts to confirm that they are in "good condition", bearing in mind that the above-mentioned Guidelines foresee that hook fixed structural connections of the release mechanism and supporting structure not made of material resistant to corrosion in the marine environment may be allowed, as opposed to the provision in paragraph 4.4.7.6.9 of the LSA Code. 18.6 During the ensuing discussion, the Sub-Committee noted the following views expressed:

.1 the term "fixed structural connections of the release mechanism" should be

consistently used in the draft amendments; .2 the proposed amendments are aimed at avoiding unnecessary replacements

of backing plates and bolts installed outside the lifeboat when they are in good condition, taking into account that the LSA Code does not contain provisions in this regard; and

.3 these amendments should not impact those lifeboat release and retrieval

systems which have already been evaluated. 18.7 Subsequently, the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft Amendments to the Guidelines for evaluation and replacement of lifeboat release and retrieval systems (MSC.1/Circ.1392) and the associated draft MSC circular, as set out in annex 18, and invited the Committee to approve them. Proposal to review the liferaft requirements of SOLAS chapter III 18.8 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/18/2 (China), inviting the Sub-Committee to consider and to preliminarily discuss the review of the liferaft requirements of SOLAS chapter III in order to require that all passenger and cargo ships be equipped with automatically self-righting or canopied reversible liferafts (with a capacity of more than 6 persons), as opposed to the current limited scope of such requirement, which only applies to ro-ro passenger ships (SOLAS regulation III/26).

SSE 4/19 Page 47



.1 a justification for a new output, in accordance with the document on Organization and method of work (MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5) would be welcomed;

.2 the current requirements in SOLAS regulation III/21 providing that liferafts in

passenger ships shall be served by launching appliances may be impacted if the liferafts required are self-righting or canopied reversible;

.3 the proposal may imply that the liferaft righting test of the Revised

recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (MSC.81(70)) is no longer feasible and evidence has not been provided; and

.4 it is uncertain if the proposed new carriage requirements would deliver the

safety benefits anticipated. 18.10 Following discussion, the Sub-Committee invited the delegation of China and interested Member States and international organizations to consider the discussion, if submitting a proposal for a new output to the Committee in accordance with the Organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.5). Minor corrections to the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)) 18.11 The Sub-Committee had for its consideration document SSE 4/18/3 (ILAMA), proposing minor corrections to resolution MSC.402(96) intended to adequately place and address the precautions included in the existing footnote related to the five-year operational test of the winches of launching appliances. In this context, the Sub-Committee noted that the corrections were proposed in accordance with the understanding, as reflected in the summary of decisions of the Council, at its twenty-seventh extraordinary session (C/ES.27/D, paragraph 3.2(vi)), that minor corrections/issues could continue to be considered by the committees under the agenda item "Any other business" without requiring a new output. 18.12 Following consideration of this matter and having agreed to the placement and amendment to the footnote, the Sub-Committee instructed the Secretariat to prepare the corresponding corrigendum and invited the Committee to note that it will be issued as document MSC 96/25/Add.1/Corr.1. Publication of standard ISO 15364:2016 (third edition), Ships and marine technology – Pressure/Vacuum valves for cargo tanks 18.13 The Sub-Committee considered document SSE 4/18/4 (ISO), providing information about the finalization of the 2016 revision of standard ISO 15364 for ship pressure-vacuum relief valve design and test requirements and suggesting that this standard should be referenced in the Revised standards for the design, testing and locating of devices to prevent the passage of flame into cargo tanks in tankers (MSC/Circ.677), as amended, taking into account that pressure-vacuum relief valves often work in tandem with "devices to prevent the passage of flame" (DPPF), and high-velocity relief valves serve a dual function of pressure relief and prevention of flame passage.

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18.14 In considering the above-mentioned document, the Sub-Committee noted the view that the above standards ought to be reviewed in order to appropriately reflect the latest developments in terms of design and testing of devices to prevent the passage of flame. 18.15 Following some discussion and having noted the information provided by the observer from the ISO that, having received comments regarding the 2016 update of standard ISO 15364, the standard will be reconsidered in order to address such comments and to add provisions related to devices to prevent the passage of flame, the Sub-Committee agreed to take no action in this regard. Information on the technological development of the "Escape guiding system" for passenger ships 18.16 The Sub-Committee noted the information provided in document SSE 4/INF.2 (Republic of Korea) concerning the "Escape guiding system" for passenger ships developed in order to make available accurate maritime safety information, thereby minimizing the loss of human lives and damage to passenger ships in case of maritime disasters and emergency caused by lack of information or human error.

Review of the Guidelines for the approval of fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing systems for the protection of ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk (MSC.1/Circ.1315)

18.17 The Sub-Committee noted the information provided in document SSE 4/INF.5 (Republic of Korea) about the intention to submit a proposal for a new output to MSC 98 in order to address the lack of guidance on test procedures and on the definition of dry chemical powder in the Guidelines for the approval of fixed dry chemical powder fire-extinguishing systems for the protection of ships carrying liquefied gases in bulk (MSC.1/Circ.1315). Expressions of appreciation 18.18 The Sub-Committee expressed appreciation to the delegates and members of the Secretariat, who had recently relinquished their duties, retired or been transferred to other duties, or were about to do so, for their invaluable contribution to its work and wished them a long and happy retirement or, as the case might be, every success in their new duties. Expressions of condolences 18.19 The Secretary-General expressed his condolences and sympathy to the victims of the terrorist attack near the Palace of Westminster on 22 March 2017, in which four people were killed and some 40 others were injured, and to their families; and appreciated the work of the United Kingdom authorities and first responders, as well as their continued efforts to keep the public safe.

19 ACTION REQUESTED OF THE COMMITTEE

The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-eighth session, is invited to:

.1 note the related background information as contained in annexes 2 to 5 to document SSE 4/3 in the context of the development of a goal-based SOLAS chapter III (paragraph 3.20);

.2 consider the draft functional requirements and the expected performance for SOLAS chapter III with a view to proceeding with their development for achieving a more quantifiable version that can contribute to the future development of the GBS-SLA (paragraph 3.21 and annex 1);

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.3 consider the experience gained on the application of MSC.1/Circ.1394/Rev.1 in the context of the development of the draft functional requirements and the expected performance for SOLAS chapter III and take action, as appropriate (paragraph 3.22 and annex 2);

.4 approve the draft Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using

lifeboats and the associated draft MSC circular (paragraph 4.10 and annex 3);

.5 approve the draft amendments to the Guidelines for developing operation

and maintenance manuals for lifeboat systems (MSC.1/Circ.1205) and the associated draft MSC circular (paragraph 4.12 and annex 4);

.6 approve the draft amendments to paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code, with a

view to adoption at MSC 99, taking into account the check/monitoring sheet and records for regulatory development prepared by the Secretariat (paragraph 5.9 and annex 5);

.7 adopt the draft amendments to the Code for the Construction and Equipment

of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2009 (2009 MODU Code) (paragraph 6.5 and annex 6);

.8 note the Sub-Committee's agreement that the new provisions for Onboard

Lifting Appliances and Winches (OLAW) should be included in SOLAS chapter II-1 (paragraph 8.9);

.9 note the discussion on the issue of "out of order" or "out of service" OLAW

and the validity of the SOLAS certification of the ship and that this matter will be considered at SSE 5 (paragraphs 8.10, 8.11, 8.20 and 8.21);

.10 noting the inclusion of anchor handling winches within the scope of the draft

SOLAS regulation, endorse the change of the existing title of output 5.2.1.22, i.e. "Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and winches", to "Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches" (paragraph 8.22);

.11 approve the draft Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic

positioning (DP) systems and the associated draft MSC circular (paragraph 9.5 and annex 7);

.12 approve the draft Escape route signs and equipment location markings

together with the associated draft Assembly resolution, with a view to subsequent adoption by A 30 (paragraph 10.10 and annex 8);

.13 note the progress made with regard to the matters related to

SOLAS regulations II-1/13 and II-1/13-1 and related regulations for new ships (paragraphs 11.3 to 11.8);

.14 noting the discussion on the minimum width of external escape routes on

cargo ships, instruct the III Sub-Committee to consider how to address the differing interpretations among the Administrations and PSCOs on this matter (paragraphs 12.15 to 12.17);

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.15 approve the draft Unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2 and the associated draft MSC circular (paragraphs 12.19, 12.21 and 12.39 and annex 9);

.16 note that the Sub-Committee endorsed the draft corrigendum to the Unified

interpretation of SOLAS chapter II-2 on the number and arrangement of portable fire extinguishers on board ships (MSC.1/Circ.1275) and that the Secretariat would issue it as MSC.1/Circ.1275/Corr.1 (paragraph 12.34 and annex 10);

.17 approve the draft Unified interpretations of chapter 15 of the FSS Code and

the associated draft MSC circular (paragraph 12.37 and annex 11); .18 approve the draft Amendment to the Unified interpretation of SOLAS

regulation II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1398) and the associated draft MSC circular (paragraph 12.44 and annex 12);

.19 agree that the work on review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes could consequentially lead to the development of amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, the FSS and 2010 FTP Codes, the STCW Convention and Code, and relevant guidelines (paragraph 13.10.2).

.20 approve the draft scope of work for the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes regarding ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships (paragraph 13.11.1 and annex 13);

.21 approve the draft work plan on the review of SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes regarding ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships (paragraphs 13.10.2 and 13.11.2; and annex 14);

.22 note the progress made with regard to the consequential wok related to the Polar Code (paragraphs 15.4 to 15.10);

.23 note the biennial status report of the Sub-Committee (paragraph 16.3 and annex 15);

.24 approve the proposed biennial agenda of the Sub-Committee for the 2018-2019 biennium (paragraph 16.3 and annex 16);

.25 approve the proposed provisional agenda for SSE 5 (paragraph 16.6 and annex 17);

.26 approve the draft Amendments to the Guidelines for evaluation and

replacement of lifeboat release and retrieval systems (MSC.1/Circ.1392) and the associated draft MSC circular (paragraph 18.7 and annex 18);

.27 note that the Sub-Committee instructed the Secretariat to prepare a corrigendum to the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)), which will be issued as document MSC 96/25/Add.1/Corr.1 (paragraph 18.12); and

.28 approve the report in general.

***

SSE 4/19 Annex 1, page 1


ANNEX 1

DRAFT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTED PERFORMANCE FOR SOLAS CHAPTER III

Functional requirement Expected performance Applicable SOLAS regulations

1 All life-saving appliances shall be in a state of readiness

• easily accessible (e.g. not obstructed and not locked)

• safe operation • operable independently of ship's power

supplies • ensure reliability of appliances for the specified

service cycle (explanation: all means necessary to keep the reliability as required, i.e. designed and arranged to permit necessary inspection, maintenance and functional test, as far as practicable, or inspection and maintenance free)

• withstand environmental exposure of the ship by: - sunlight; - seawater (wash, heavy seas); - icing; - wind; - humidity; - oil; and - temperature

• usable/operable under adverse weather conditions

• usable/operational under adverse vessel damage conditions (i.e. affecting trim, list/heel, roll)

regulation III/13.1.3 - Stowage of survival craft regulation III/14.1 - Stowage of rescue boats regulation III/20 - Operational readiness, maintenance and inspection regulation III/36 - Instructions for on-board maintenance

2 Provide familiarization with equipment and emergency procedures

• training and familiarization to instruct efficient and reliable handling of equipment and emergencies

regulation III/19.2 - Familiarity with safety installations and practice musters regulation III/19.3 - Drills




• drills to practise handling of equipment and emergencies

• substitutes for key persons are assigned

regulation III/19.4 - On-board training and instructions regulation III/30 - Drills (passenger ships) regulation III/35 - Training manual and on-board training aids

3 Provide information and instructions to all persons on board depending on their assignment to life-saving equipment

• presented in a way that makes it likely to be understood and implemented

• distributed and displayed in appropriate conspicuous places

• regarding emergency procedures, location and use of equipment, at least: - directions to muster stations; - assignment to appliances; - roles and responsibilities; - location of life-saving appliances and

equipment; and - operation/use of appliances

• instructions for LSA accessible under all conditions (e.g. bad weather and emergency lighting)

• stowage locations for LSA high-lighted

regulation III/8 - Muster list and emergency instructions regulation III/9 - Operating instructions regulation III/19.2.3 - Emergency training and drills regulation III/20.10 - Marking of stowage locations regulation III/37 - Muster list and emergency instructions

4 Ensure readily available information is provided to personnel to enable effective management of an emergency

• roles and responsibilities • appropriate decision support system to be

provided, including procedures for escape, evacuation and rescue operations for emergencies: - fire; - structural damage to the ship; - flooding; - pollution; - unlawful acts threatening the safety of the

ship and the security of its passengers and crew;

regulation III/8 - Muster list and emergency instructions regulation III/9 - Operating instructions regulation III/10.5 - List of the survival craft crew regulation III/17-1 - Recovery of persons from the water regulation III/27 - Information on passengers (passenger ships) regulation III/29 - Decision support system for masters of passenger ships (passenger ships) regulation III/37 - Muster list and emergency instructions




- personnel accidents; - cargo related accidents; - emergency assistance to other ships; and - retrieval and rescue

• procedures considering the physical characteristics and capabilities of the embarked persons

• information on persons on board • presented in a way that makes it likely to be

understood and implemented • displayed in appropriately conspicuous places

regulation III/19.2 - Familiarity with safety installations and practice musters regulation III/19.3 - Drills regulation III/19.4 - On-board training and instructions regulation III/30 - Drills (passenger ships)

5 Provide means of external communications suitable to alert and guide ships and aircraft

Means should be: - readily available - one-way alert - two-way (between originator and

responder) - self-activating - manually activated - location indicating - detectable

regulation III/6.2.2 - Search and rescue locating devices regulation III/6.3 - Distress flares regulation III/6.2.1 - Two-way VHF radiotelephone apparatus

6 Provide means for internal communication during the emergency

• two-way to all locations used during an emergency

• broadcast systems to be audible by all persons on board appropriate to their location on ship

• capable of continuous operation

regulation III/6.4.1 - On-board communications and alarm systems regulation III/6.4.4 - Marine evacuation system communication regulation III/6.5 - Public address systems on passenger ships

7 Provide means for alerting all persons on board as to the emergency

• to be received and understood by all persons on board regardless of location on ship

regulation III/6.4 - On-board communications and alarm systems regulation III/6.5 - Public address systems on passenger ships

8 Provide means for safe abandonment for all embarking persons

• alternative ways of boarding to the waterline/survival craft

regulation III/8 - Muster list and emergency instructions regulation III/9 - Operating instructions




• alternative ways for persons to be evacuated from ship

• safe unobstructed launching of survival unit (avoid interference with structures as propeller, etc.)

• stable positioning of the survival unit • reflecting the characteristics and capabilities of

the embarked persons • safe launching during manoeuvring of the

parent vessel • float free capability for particular survival unit • adequate space to muster all persons on

board in the vicinity of embarkation stations • timely abandonment

regulation III/10 - Manning of survival craft and supervision regulation III/11 - Survival craft muster and embarkation arrangements regulation III/12 - Launching stations regulation III/13 - Stowage of survival craft regulation III/14 - Stowage of rescue boats regulation III/15 - Stowage of marine evacuation systems regulation III/16 - Survival craft launching and recovery arrangements regulation III/21 - Survival craft and rescue boats (passenger ships) regulation III/23 - Survival craft and rescue boat embarkation arrangements (passenger ships) regulation III/24 - Stowage of survival craft (passenger ships) regulation III/25 - Muster stations (passenger ships) regulation III/26 - Additional requirements for ro-ro passenger ships regulation III/28 - Helicopter landing and pick-up areas (passenger ships)

9 Provide means for the safety and survivability of all persons after abandonment for the time until expected rescue

• habitable environment for all persons • usable/adequate for the operating area,

i.e. anticipated weather and sea water conditions, radiation and dangerous marine species

• independent of parent vessel condition • stability and sea keeping for survival unit • the ability of powered craft to marshal passive

units

regulation III/7 - Personal life-saving appliances regulation III/22 - Personal life-saving appliances (passenger ships) regulation III/32 - Personal life-saving appliances (cargo ships) regulation III/31 - Survival craft and rescue boats (cargo ships) regulation III/21 - Survival craft and rescue boats (passenger ships)




• the ability to reach to a safe distance in a timely manner

• first aids supplies and anti-seasickness medication

• supply of food and water for all persons • protection against hypothermia (death from

hypothermia) • protection against hyperthermia (death from

hyperthermia) • reflecting the characteristics and capabilities of

the embarked persons • high-visibility features to facilitate locating

persons in the water • handhold arrangements designed to facilitate

lifting/pulling persons from the water

10 Provide ready access to survival systems for all persons

• quantity, distribution and arrangement of life-saving appliances on board

• spare capacity • signage for life-saving appliances • reflect the physical characteristics and

capabilities of the embarked persons

regulation III/11 - Survival craft muster and embarkation arrangements (passenger ships) regulation III/23 - Survival craft and rescue boat embarkation arrangements (passenger ships) regulation III/24 - Stowage of survival craft (passenger ships) regulation III/25 - Muster stations (passenger ships) regulation III/33 -Survival craft embarkation and launching arrangements (cargo ships)

11 Provide means to enable survival in water until rescue

• depending on operational area of ship • prevent drowning • protection against hypothermia (death from

hypothermia)

regulation III/7 - Personal life-saving appliances regulation III/22 - Personal life-saving appliances (passenger ships) regulation III/32 - Personal life-saving appliances (cargo ships) regulation III/31 - Survival craft and rescue boats (cargo ships)




12 Provide active and passive means for detection of survival units and persons in the water by survival units and by rescue units

• passive and active • visual • audible • radio • appropriate range

regulation III/6 - Communications regulation III/7.1.3 - Personal life-saving appliances, Lifebuoys regulation III/22.3 - Personal life-saving appliances, lifejacket lights (passenger ships) regulation III/26.5.2 - Additional requirements for ro-ro passenger ships, lifejackets regulation III/32.2 - Personal life-saving appliances, lifejacket lights (cargo ships)

13 Provide means for search and rescue and assistance to other vessels

• timely deployment and recovery of rescue unit • enable towing of survival unit • enable pick-up and transfer from rescue unit • assist rescue efforts by SAR units/other

vessels • retrieval from parent vessel (e.g. other ship,

helicopter landing and pick-up areas) • retrieval from water (e.g. other ship, survival

unit, rescue boat, helicopter)

regulation III/7 - Personal life-saving appliances regulation III/17 - Rescue boat embarkation, launching and recovery arrangements regulation III/17-1 - Recovery of persons from the water regulation III/18 - Line-throwing appliances regulation III/21.2 - Rescue boats (passenger ships) regulation III/26.3 - Fast Rescue boats (ro-ro passenger ships) regulation III/31.2 - Rescue boats (cargo ships) regulation III/3.18 - Definitions, "Recovery time" regulation III/14 - Stowage of rescue boats regulation III/26.4 - Additional requirements for ro-ro passenger ships, Means of rescue regulation III/28 - Helicopter landing and pick-up areas

***



ANNEX 2

EXPERIENCE GAINED ON THE APPLICATION OF MSC.1/CIRC.1394/REV.1 1 Developing functional requirements is challenging when starting from existing regulations and identifying/estimating underlying hazards addressed. Starting from a hazard is regarded as more appropriate. Methods for hazard identification are provided by FSA Guidelines. 2 A clear guidance for the formulation procedures of functional requirements should be considered. 3 The development and usage of expected performance is still unclear. Therefore, uncertainty exists on how expected performance should be specified in quantitative terms. For the time being, expected performances could not be specified in quantitative terms for all functional requirements. 4 The proposed format of functional requirements specifying the function, rationale and expected performance is regarded as very helpful in developing functional requirements. 5 Verification of completeness should be carried out in a structured way and well documented, i.e. developing correlation between hazards/risks and functions addressing these, e.g. means of two-way and two and multi-dimensional risk comparisons. 6 A full understanding of functional requirements cannot be achieved without proper definitions of terms used in functional requirements and its associated expected performance. The definition of the terms can be considered once the functional requirements are finalized. The finalization of definitions, however, should await the finalization of both functional requirements and expected performance, taking into account the intention of the requirements. The definitions should be part of the functional requirements. 7 In the preparation of functional requirements, the Working Group on Life-saving Appliances, established at SSE 4, has found that multiple functional requirements, as well as their expected performance, assume that a number of general conditions are at hand, or may be presumed. It is therefore suggested that functional requirements are accompanied or preceded by general conditions under which functionality is assumed to be achieved. This can be done in different ways, i.e. by a chapeau preceding one or more functional requirements or as an independent matrix.

***



ANNEX 3

DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR

GUIDELINES ON SAFETY DURING ABANDON SHIP DRILLS USING LIFEBOATS 1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eighty-first session (10 to 19 May 2006), recalled that, at its seventy-ninth session (1 to 10 December 2004), it had endorsed the intention of the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, in cooperation with the Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping, to develop further guidance as envisioned in the Accidents with lifeboats (MSC/Circ.1049) and, accordingly, approved the Guidance on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats (MSC/Circ.1136). 2 The Committee also recalled that the guidance developed for lifeboats has relevance, in general, for emergency drills with other life-saving systems and should be taken into account when such drills are conducted. In connection with MSC/Circ.1136, and recognizing the need to provide a basic outline of essential steps to safely carry out simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats in accordance with SOLAS regulation III/19.3.3.4, and having considered the proposals made by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, at its forty-seventh session, the Committee also approved the Guidelines for simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats (MSC/Circ.1137). 3 Having considered the need to update the above guidance and Guidelines, and having considered the proposals made by the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, at its fiftieth session, to consolidate the numerous circulars on the subject of measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats in order to better serve the mariner, the Committee, at its eighty-first session, approved the Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats, as set out in annex 2 to the Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats (MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1). 4 The Committee, at its [ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017)], approved the Guidelines on safety during abandon ship drills using lifeboats, following the amalgamation of annex 1 to the Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats (MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1) and the Interim Recommendation on conditions for authorization of service providers for lifeboats, launching appliances and on-load release gear (MSC.1/Circ.1277) in the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96)), which revoked annex 1 to MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1. 5 Member States are invited to give effect to the annexed Guidelines and to bring them to the attention of shipowners, ship operators, ship-vetting organizations, ship personnel, surveyors, manufacturers and all other parties concerned. 6 This circular supersedes annex 2 to MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1.



ANNEX DRAFT GUIDELINES ON SAFETY DURING ABANDON SHIP DRILLS USING LIFEBOATS 1 GENERAL 1.1 Introduction 1.1.1 It is essential that seafarers are familiar with the life-saving appliances on board their ships and that they have confidence that the appliances provided for their safety will work and will be effective in an emergency. Frequent periodic shipboard drills are necessary to achieve this. 1.1.2 Crew training is an important component of drills. As a supplement to initial shore-based training, onboard drills and training will familiarize crew members with the ships' appliances and the associated procedures. The objective of drill and training is to develop appropriate crew competencies, enabling effective and safe utilization of the equipment required by the 1974 SOLAS Convention (SOLAS). The time limits set out in SOLAS for ship abandonment should be considered as a secondary objective when conducting drills. 1.2 Drill frequency Experience has shown that holding frequent drills makes the crew more familiar with the life-saving appliances on board their ships and increases their confidence that the appliances will work and will be effective in an emergency. Drills give the opportunity to gain experience in the use of the safety equipment in cooperation. The ability to cope with an emergency and handle the situation is improved by frequent drills. However, frequent crew changes sometimes make it difficult to ensure that all on board have the opportunity to participate in drills when the minimum required drills are conducted only. Therefore, consideration needs to be given to scheduling drills as necessary to ensure all on board have an early opportunity to become familiar with the appliances and systems on board. 1.3 Drills must be safe 1.3.1 Abandon ship drills should be planned, organized and performed so that the recognized risks are minimized and in accordance with relevant shipboard requirements of occupational safety and health. 1.3.2 Drills provide an opportunity to verify that the life-saving appliances are working and that all associated equipment is in place and in good working order, ready for use. 1.3.3 Before conducting drills, it should be checked that the lifeboat and its equipment have been maintained in accordance with the ship's maintenance manuals and any associated technical documentation, as well as noting all the precautionary measures necessary. Abnormal conditions of wear and tear or corrosion should be reported to the responsible officer immediately. 1.4 Emphasis on learning Drills should be conducted with an emphasis on learning and be viewed as a learning experience, not just as a task to meet a regulatory requirement to conduct drills. Whether they are emergency drills required by SOLAS or additional special drills conducted to enhance the competence of the crew members, they should be carried out at safe speed. During drills,



care should be taken to ensure that persons on board familiarize themselves with their duties and with the equipment. If necessary, pauses should be made during the drills to explain especially difficult elements. The experience of the crew is an important factor in determining how fast a drill or certain drill elements should be carried out. 1.5 Planning and organizing drills 1.5.1 SOLAS requires that drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there was an actual emergency.1 This means that the entire drill should, as far as possible, be carried out. The point is that, at the same time, it should be ensured that the drill can be carried out in such a way that it is safe in every respect. Consequently, elements of the drill that may involve unnecessary risks need special attention or may be excluded from the drill. 1.5.2 In preparing for a drill, those responsible should review the manufacturer's instruction manual to ensure that a planned drill is conducted properly. Those responsible for the drill should ensure that the crew is familiar with the guidance provided in the life-saving appliances instruction manuals. 1.5.3 Lessons learned in the course of a drill should be documented and made a part of follow-up shipboard training discussions and planning the next drill session. 1.5.4 The lowering of a boat with its full complement of persons is an example of an element of a drill that may, depending on the circumstances, involve an unnecessary risk. Such drills should only be carried out if special precautions are observed. 2 ABANDON SHIP DRILLS 2.1 Introduction It is important that the crew who operate safety equipment on board is familiar with the functioning and operation of such equipment. SOLAS requires that sufficiently detailed manufacturers' training manuals and instructions be carried on board, which should be easily understood by the crew. Such manufacturers' manuals and instructions should be accessible for everyone on board and observed and followed closely when preparing and conducting drills. 2.2 Guidance to the shipowner 2.2.1 The shipowner should ensure that new safety equipment on board the company's ships has been approved and installed in accordance with the provisions of SOLAS and the International Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) Code. 2.2.2 Procedures for holding safe drills should be included in the Safety Management System (SMS) of the shipping companies. Detailed procedures for elements of drills that involve a special risk should be evident from workplace assessments adjusted to the relevant life-saving appliance. 2.2.3 Personnel carrying out maintenance and repair work on lifeboats should be qualified accordingly.2

1 Refer to SOLAS regulation III/19.3.1.

2 Refer to the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair

of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear, adopted by resolution MSC.402(96).



2.3 Lifeboats lowered by means of falls 2.3.1 During drills, everyone participating should be alert for potentially dangerous conditions or situations and should bring them to the attention of the responsible person for appropriate action. Feedback and recommendations to the shipowner, the Administration and the system manufacturer are important elements of the marine safety system. 2.3.2 When drills are to be performed with persons on board the lifeboat, it is recommended that the boat be lowered and recovered without any persons on board first to ascertain that the arrangement functions correctly. In this case, the boat should then be lowered into the water with only the number of persons on board necessary to operate the boat3. 2.3.3 To prevent lashings or gripes from getting entangled, proper release should be checked before swinging out the davit. 2.4 Free-fall lifeboats 2.4.1 The monthly drills with free-fall lifeboats should be carried out according to the manufacturer's instructions, so that the persons who are to enter the boat in an emergency are trained to embark the boat, to take their seats in a correct way and to use the safety belts; and also are instructed on how to act during launching into the sea. 2.4.2 When the lifeboat is free-fall launched as part of a drill, this should be carried out with the minimum personnel required to manoeuvre the boat in the water and to recover it. The recovery operation should be carried out with special attention, bearing in mind the high-risk level of this operation. Where permitted by SOLAS4, simulated launching should be carried out in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, taking due note of the Guidelines for simulated launching of free-fall lifeboats, as set out in the appendix.

3 Refer to the Clarification of SOLAS regulation III/19 (MSC.1/Circ.1326 and Corr.1).

4 Refer to SOLAS regulation III/20.11.2.



APPENDIX

GUIDELINES FOR SIMULATED LAUNCHING OF FREE-FALL LIFEBOATS DURING DRILLS

1 Definition Simulated launching carried out during drills, in accordance with SOLAS regulation III/19, is a means of training the crew in the free-fall release procedure of free-fall lifeboats without the physical activation of the release mechanism. 2 Purpose and scope The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide a basic outline of essential steps to safely carry out simulated launching. These Guidelines are general; the lifeboat manufacturer's instruction manual should always be consulted before conducting simulated launching. Simulated launching should only be carried out with lifeboats and launching appliances designed to accommodate it, and for which the manufacturer has provided instructions. Simulated launching should be carried out under the supervision of a responsible person who should be an officer experienced in such procedures and be conducted without the physical activation of the free-fall release system. Testing of release system should be separate to and not carried out during simulated launching drills.

3 Conduct of drills – typical simulated launching sequence (SOLAS regulation III/19)

3.1 Check equipment and documentation to ensure that all components of the lifeboat and launching appliance are in good operational condition. 3.2 Ensure that the restraining device(s) provided by the manufacturer for simulated launching are installed and secure and that the free-fall release mechanism is fully and correctly engaged. 3.3 Establish and maintain good communication between the assigned operating crew and the responsible person. 3.4 Disengage lashings, gripes, etc. installed to secure the lifeboat for sea or for maintenance, except those required for simulated free-fall. 3.5 Participating crew board the lifeboat and fasten their seatbelts under the supervision of the responsible person. 3.6 All crew disembark the lifeboat. 3.7 Return the lifeboat to the condition it was in prior to step 3.4. Ensure that the lifeboat is returned to its normal stowed condition. Remove any restraining and/or recovery devices used only for the simulated launch procedure.

***



ANNEX 4

DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR AMENDMENTS TO GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

MANUALS FOR LIFEBOAT SYSTEMS (MSC.1/CIRC.1205) 1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its [ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017)], approved amendments to the Guidelines for developing operation and maintenance manuals for lifeboat systems (MSC.1/Circ.1205), as prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its fourth session (20 to 24 March 2017), as set out in the annex. 2 Member States are invited to use the annexed amendments to MSC.1/Circ.1205 and to bring them to the attention of all parties concerned.



ANNEX

DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE MANUALS FOR LIFEBOAT SYSTEMS (MSC.1/CIRC.1205)

1 In paragraph 1, the last sentence is replaced by the following:

"Detailed maintenance/repair work should be conducted in accordance with Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear (resolution MSC.402(96))."

2 The text of paragraph 3.1.4 is replaced by the following:

"weekly and monthly inspection and routine maintenance of the lifeboat system."

APPENDIX

EXAMPLE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL FOR A LIFEBOAT SYSTEM 3 In paragraph 6.1, the third sentence is deleted. 4 In the last sentence of paragraph 6.1, the words "direct supervision" are replaced with the word "direction".

***



ANNEX 51

DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO PARAGRAPH 6.1.1.3 OF THE LSA CODE

CHAPTER VI LAUNCHING AND EMBARKATION APPLIANCES

1 Paragraph 6.1.1.3 is amended as follows:

"6.1.1.3 A launching appliance shall not depend on any means other than gravity or stored mechanical power which is independent of the ship's power supplies to launch the survival craft or rescue boat it serves in the fully loaded and equipped condition and also in the light condition. On cargo ships equipped with a rescue boat which is not one of the ship's survival craft, having a mass not more than 700 kg in fully equipped condition, with engine, but without the crew, the launching appliance of the boat does not need to be fitted with stored mechanical power. Manual hoisting from the stowed position and turning out to the embarkation position shall be possible by one person. The force on the crank handle shall not exceed 160 N at the maximum crank radius of 350 mm."

1 Tracked changes are created using "strikeout" for deleted text and "grey shading" to highlight all

modifications and new insertions, including deleted text.



APPENDIX 12

CHECK/MONITORING SHEET FOR THE PROCESSING OF AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION AND RELATED MANDATORY INSTRUMENTS

(PROPOSAL/DEVELOPMENT)

Part III – Process monitoring to be completed during the work process at the sub-committee and checked as part of the final approval process by the Committee (Refer to section 3.2.1.3)3

1 The sub-committee, at an initial engagement, has allocated sufficient time for technical research and discussion before the target completion date, especially on issues needing to be addressed by more than one sub-committee and for which the timing of relevant sub-committees meetings and exchanges of the result of consideration needed to be carefully examined.

yes

2 The scope of application agreed at the proposal stage was not changed without the approval of the Committee.

no

3 The technical base document/draft amendment addresses the proposal's issue(s) through the suggested instrument(s); where it does not, the sub-committee offers the Committee an alternative method of addressing the problem raised by the proposal.

yes

4 Due attention has been paid to the Interim guidelines for the systematic application of the grandfather clauses (MSC/Circ.765-MEPC/Circ.315).

yes

5 All references have been examined against the text that will be valid if the proposed amendment enters into force.

n/a

6 The location of the insertion or modified text is correct for the text that will be valid when the proposed text enters into force on a four-year cycle of entry into force, as other relevant amendments adopted might enter into force on the same date.

yes

7 There are no inconsistencies in respect of scope of application between the technical regulation and the application statement contained in regulation 1 or 2 of the relevant chapter, and application is specifically addressed for existing and/or new ships, as necessary.

yes

8 Where a new term has been introduced into a regulation and a clear definition is necessary, the definition is given in the article of the Convention or at the beginning of the chapter.

n/a

9 Where any of the terms "fitted", "provided", "installed" or "installation" are used, consideration has been given to clarifying the intended meaning of the term.

yes

2 This appendix is reproduced in English only.

3 Part III should be completed by the drafting/working group that prepared the draft text using "yes", "no" or

"not applicable".



10 All necessary related and consequential amendments to other existing instruments, including non-mandatory instruments, in particular to the forms of certificates and records of equipment required in the instrument being amended, have been examined and included as part of the proposed amendment(s).

yes

11 The forms of certificates and records of equipment have been harmonized, where appropriate, between the Convention and its Protocols.

n/a

12 It is confirmed that the amendment is being made to a currently valid text and that no other bodies are concurrently proposing changes to the same text.

yes

13 All entry-into-force criteria (building contract, keel laying and delivery) have been considered and addressed.

yes

14 Other impacts of the implementation of the proposed/approved amendment have been fully analysed, including consequential amendments to the "application" and "definition" regulations of the chapter.

yes

15 The amendments presented for adoption clearly indicate changes made with respect to the original text, so as to facilitate their consideration.

yes

16 For amendments to mandatory instruments, the relationship between the Convention and the related instrument has been observed and addressed, as appropriate.

n/a

17 The related record format has been completed or updated, as appropriate. yes



APPENDIX 2

RECORDS FOR REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT

The following records should be created and kept updated for each regulatory development. The records can be completed by providing references to paragraphs of related documents containing the relevant information, proposals, discussions and decisions.

1 Title (number and title of regulation(s))

Paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code (Launching and embarkation appliances).

2 Origin of the requirement (original proposal document)

MSC 96/23/6 (Republic of Korea and IACS).

3 Main reason for the development (extract from the proposal document)

"The use of a hand-operated mechanism simplifies davit construction and improves the reliability substantially despite that the use of hand-operated mechanism is not in compliance with the existing paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code." "Moreover, there is also inconsistency related to the recognition of a hand-operated mechanism of launching appliance within the LSA Code, as a hand-operated mechanism is recognized as one of the acceptable means for launching liferafts (see paragraph 6.1.5 of the LSA Code) and as a secondary launching appliance for free-fall lifeboats (see paragraph 6.1.4.7 of the LSA Code)." "… the acceptance of a hand-operated mechanism would ensure an effective mean to facilitate rescuing and recovering people from the water or survival craft by simplifying the davit construction and improving the reliability of rescue boats' launching appliances in case of an emergency."

4 Related output

Uniform implementation of paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code (5.2.1.28).

5 History of the discussion (approval of work programmes, sessions of sub-committees, including CG/DG/WG arrangements)

MSC 96, following consideration of document MSC 96/23/6 (Republic of Korea and IACS), had agreed to include a new output on "Uniform implementation of paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code" in the 2016-2017 biennial agenda of the Sub-Committee and the provisional agenda for SSE 4, with a target completion year of 2017 (MSC 96/25, paragraphs 23.29 to 23.31). SSE 4 had for its consideration document SSE 4/5 (Republic of Korea) proposing draft amendments to paragraphs 6.1.1.3 and 6.1.2.2 of the LSA Code, in order that manual means for the launching of rescue boats, which are not one of the ship's survival craft, are accepted, as well as adjusting the provisions related to the arrangements for the mechanism actuation. SSE 4 agreed that the draft amendments should only apply to cargo ships taking into account the view expressed that the application of these amendments to passenger ships might be in conflict with SOLAS regulation III/23.2 and that amendments to paragraph 6.1.2.2 of the LSA Code were unnecessary.



SSE 4 also noted the concern expressed by the delegation of the Bahamas, supported by the delegations of Italy, Malta and Norway, that the phrase "without the crew" had been retained in the draft amendment when considering the launching method and the mass criterion, which could lead to the unsafe situation that the operating crew board the rescue boat after it had been turned outboard.

6 Impact on other instruments (e.g. codes, performance standards, guidance circulars, certificates/records format, etc.)

N/A

7 Technical background

7.1 Scope and objective (to cross check with items 4 and 5 in part II of the checklist)

This output is aimed at developing amendments to paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code, which will be applicable to cargo ships, in order to facilitate the uniform implementation of the related provisions of the Code and in particular, to allow the use of hand-operated mechanisms for launching rescue boats, which are not one of the ship's survival craft.

7.2 Technical/operational background and rationale (summary of FSA study, etc., if available or, engineering challenge posed, etc.)

Some rescue boats' launching mechanisms have been designed to use hand-operating for lifting the rescue boat from a fixed cradle before the slewing process, or even for slewing the rescue boat to an outboard position before lowering the boat into the water by gravity. However, the proposal for a new output emphasized that the use of a hand-operated mechanism for launching a rescue boat is not in compliance with the existing paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code, which can be confirmed by the increased number of cases where launching appliances for rescue boats have been identified by port State control (PSC) as non-compliant with paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code due to the use of a hand-operated mechanism.

7.3 Source/derivation of requirement (non-mandatory instrument, industry standard, national/regional requirement)

Paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code.

7.4 Short summary of requirement (what is the new requirement – in short and lay terms)

See section 7.1 above.

7.5 Points of discussions (controversial points and conclusion)

.1 The draft amendment should only apply to cargo ships taking into account the view expressed that the application of these amendments to passenger ships might be in conflict with SOLAS regulation III/23.2.

.2 The concern expressed by the delegation of the Bahamas, supported by the

delegations of Italy, Malta and Norway, that the phrase "without the crew" had been retained in the draft amendment when considering the launching method and the mass criterion, which could lead to the unsafe situation that the operating crew board the rescue boat after it had been turned outboard.

***



ANNEX 61

DRAFT RESOLUTION MSC.[…]([98]) (adopted on […])

AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT

OF MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNITS, 2009 (2009 MODU CODE)

THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE, RECALLING Article 28(b) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Committee, RECALLING ALSO that the Assembly, when adopting resolution A.1023(26) on the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2009 (2009 MODU Code), authorized the Committee to amend the 2009 MODU Code, as appropriate, taking into consideration developments in design and technology, in consultation with appropriate organizations, RECOGNIZING that these requirements and provisions are very similar to the SOLAS requirements and that some of them, being applied to mobile offshore units, may lead to potentially hazardous situations, due to the fact that they have been developed on the basis of typical operations for conventional ships, RECOGNIZING FURTHER the tragic loss of life and lessons learned from the explosion, fire, and sinking of the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, which occurred from 20 to 22 April 2010, HAVING CONSIDERED, at its [ninety-eighth] session, the recommendation made by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its fourth session, 1 ADOPTS, the amendments to the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2009 (2009 MODU Code), as set out in the annex to the present resolution, for mobile offshore drilling units, the keels of which are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or after [date in which the amendments will take effect]; 2 INVITES Member States concerned to take appropriate action to give effect to these amendments.

1 Tracked changes are created using "strikeout" for deleted text and "grey shading" to highlight all

modifications and new insertions, including deleted text.



ANNEX

DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE FOR CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT

OF MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNITS, 2009 (2009 MODU CODE)

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1.3 Definitions

1 The following new paragraph 1.3.26, and the associated footnote, are

inserted after existing 1.3.25:

"1.3.26 'H' class divisions are those divisions which meet the same

requirements as "A" class divisions, as defined in SOLAS regulation II-2/3,

except that, when tested according to the Fire Test Procedures Code, the

furnace control temperature curve is replaced with the furnace control

temperature curve for hydrocarbon fires defined in national or international

standards.1

1 Refer to national standards such as: BS EN 1363-2:1999 Fire resistance tests.

Alternative and additional procedures; or ASTM 1529-14a Standard Test Methods for Determining Effects of Large Hydrocarbon Pool Fires on Structural Members and Assemblies; or ISO/DIS 20902-1 Fire test procedures for divisional elements that are typically used in oil, gas and petrochemical industries – Part 1: General requirements."

2 Existing paragraphs 1.3.26 to 1.3.59 are renumbered accordingly.

CHAPTER 6

MACHINERY AND ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS IN HAZARDOUS

AREAS FOR ALL TYPES OF UNITS 6.5 Emergency conditions due to drilling operations 3 The text of existing paragraph 6.5.2 is amended to read as follows:

"6.5.2 In the case of units using dynamic positioning systems as a sole means of position keeping, special consideration may be given to the selective disconnection or shutdown of machinery and equipment necessary for maintaining the operability of the dynamic positioning system should be

based on a shutdown logic systemdesigned in order to preserve the

capability to maintain operational control over theintegrity of the well and

station keeping capability. Shutdown of generators and related power supply equipment needed for the operation of the dynamic positioning system should be divided into independent groups to allow response to gas detection alarms while maintaining position keeping."



6.6 Electrical installations in hazardous areas

4 In paragraph 6.6.3, the following sentences, and the associated footnote,

areadded after the existing table 6-1 and its footnote:

"Repairs, maintenance and overhaul of hazardous area certified equipment should be performed by suitably qualified personnel in accordance with appropriate international standards.27

There should be maintained a register of electrical equipment installed in the designated hazardous areas, including a description of the equipment, applicable degree of protection and ratings. 27 Refer to the following International Electrotechnical Commission publications or

equivalent for reference to appropriate personnel qualification criteria:

IEC 60079-14:2007 Explosive atmospheres − Part 14: Electrical installations design, selection and erection.

IEC 60079-17:2007 Explosive atmospheres − Part 17: Electrical installations

inspection and maintenance. IEC 60079-19: 2006 Explosive atmospheres − Part 19: Equipment repair, overhaul and

reclamation."

CHAPTER 8

PERIODICALLY UNATTENDED MACHINERY SPACES FOR ALL TYPES OF UNITS

8.3 Fire protection

5 In paragraph 8.3.8, the reference to section "9.8" is replaced with "9.9".

CHAPTER 9

FIRE SAFETY

6 In the second sentence of existing paragraph 9.2.4, the reference to "A-60" is replaced with "H-60".

7 The text of existing footnote (e) to tables 9-1 and 9-2 is amended to read:

"(e) Additional provisions for fire boundaries should be assessed An

engineering evaluation should be conducted in accordance with paragraph 9.3.1. In no case should the bulkhead or deck rating be less than the value indicated in the tables. Where it is shown that normally manned spaces may be exposed to a radiant heat flux in excess of 100 kw/m2 , the bulkhead or deck should be constructed to at least an "H-60" standard. Normally manned spaces are those that are expected to be manned for some or all of the duration of a tour."



8 The text of existing paragraph 9.3.1 is amended to read:

"9.3.1 In general, accommodation spaces, service spaces, and control stations and spaces containing vital machinery and equipment30 should not be located adjacent to hazardous areas. However, where this is not practicable, an engineering evaluation should be performed in accordance with national or international standards31 to ensure that the level of fire protection and blast resistance of the bulkheads and decks separating these spaces from the hazardous areas are adequate for the likely hazard. Where it is shown that these spaces may be exposed to a radiant heat flux in excess of 100 kw/m2, the bulkhead or deck should be constructed to at least an "H-60" standard.

30 Vital machinery and equipment are those that are essential to the safety of the MODU

and all personnel on board. They include, but are not limited to, fire pumps, emergency sources of power, dynamic positioning systems, remote blowout preventer activation controls, and other operational or safety systems the sudden failure of which may result in hazardous situations. This does not include spaces (e.g. the driller's cabin) located on the drill floor.

31 Refer to standards such as: ISO 13702:2015, or API RP 2 FB."

9 The text of existing paragraph 9.4.5 is amended to read:

"9.4.5 Consideration should be given by the Administration to the siting of sSuperstructures and deckhouses should be sited such that, in the event of fire at the drill floor, at least one escape route to the embarkation position and survival craft is protected against radiant heat flux levels in excess of 2.5 kW/m2 emanating from the drill floor radiation effects of that fire as far as practicable."

10 The following new section 9.8 is inserted after existing section 9.7:

"9.8 Fire-extinguishing arrangements for the drill floor

9.8.1 The drill floor should be protected by a fixed pressure water-spraying system designed to provide a minimum water application rate of 20 l/m2/min to the drill floor and related equipment, including emergency shutdown equipment, critical structural components, and enclosure fire barriers. Alternatively, multiple fixed monitors discharging at a minimum flow rate and pressure 1,900 l/min at 1 N/mm2 may be provided and arranged such that all areas and equipment can be reached by at least two monitors which are widely separated.

9.8.2 The system should be designed for manual release from release stations located outside the protected area. Any section valves necessary for the operation of the system should be located outside the protected area. Automatic release may be accepted by the Administration.

9.8.3 Nozzles, piping, fittings and related components should be designed to withstand exposure to temperatures up to 925°C.

9.8.4 The main fire pumps may be used to supply the fixed pressure water-spraying system if they have sufficient capacity to simultaneously supply the fire main at the required flow and pressure."



11 Existing sections 9.8 to 9.19 are renumbered accordingly. 12 In the renumbered subparagraph 9.9.2.1, the reference to subparagraph "9.8.1.1" is replaced with "9.9.1.1". 13 In the renumbered paragraph 9.9.4, the reference to paragraphs "9.8.1 to 9.8.3" is replaced with "9.9.1 to 9.9.3". 14 In the renumbered paragraph 9.10.1, the reference to paragraph "9.9.2" is replaced with "9.10.2". 15 In table 9-3, references to sections "9.16" and "9.8" are replaced with "9.17" and "9.9", respectively. 16 In the renumbered subparagraph 9.17.4.6, the reference to subparagraphs "9.16.4.3 to 9.16.4.5" is replaced with "9.17.4.3 to 9.17.4.5". 17 In the renumbered subparagraph 9.17.4.7, the reference to section "9.13" is replaced with "9.14". 18 In the renumbered paragraph 9.20.2, the reference to paragraph "9.19.1" is replaced with "9.20.1".

CHAPTER 10

LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES AND EQUIPMENT

10.3 Survival craft

19 Add a new chapeau and new paragraphs 10.3.7 and 10.3.8 following existing paragraph 10.3.6:

"Accounting for anthropomorphic differences in average body mass

10.3.7 Except as provided in 10.3.8, in applying the provisions of paragraph 4.4.2.2 of the LSA Code and paragraph 6.7.1 of resolution MSC.81(70), part 1, the average body mass of the lifeboat occupant should be assumed to be 95 kg, with a corresponding seat radius of 265 mm.

10.3.8 Where it can be demonstrated that the average body mass of the lifeboat occupants differs from 95 kg, the provisions of paragraph 4.4.2.2 of the LSA Code and paragraph 6.7.1 of resolution MSC.81(70), part 1, may be increased or decreased accordingly. The seat width should be adjusted by 4 mm for each 1 kg difference in average body mass."

10.8 Rescue boats

20 The text of existing section 10.8 is amended to read:

"Each unit should carry at least one rescue boat complying with the requirements of the LSA Code. A lifeboat may not be accepted as a rescue boat, provided that it and its launching and recovery arrangements also comply with the requirements for a rescue boat."



10.9 Stowage of rescue boats

21 The existing paragraph 10.9.5 is deleted and the semicolon at the end of subparagraph 10.9.4 is replaced with period.

10.10 Rescue boat embarkation, launching and recovery arrangements

22 In paragraph 10.10.3, the second sentence is deleted.

CHAPTER 13

HELICOPTER FACILITIES

13.4 Arrangements

23 In paragraph 13.4.4, the reference to paragraph "9.16.5" is replaced with "9.17.5".

CHAPTER 14

OPERATIONS

14.10 Emergency procedures

24 The following new paragraph 14.10.3 is inserted after existing paragraph 14.10.2:

"14.10.3 For units where a master is assigned, the master should be designated as the person in charge at all times."

25 Renumber existing paragraphs 14.10.3 to 14.10.16 accordingly.

14.13 Practice musters and drills

26 In paragraph 14.13.1, the following new sentence is inserted after the existing first sentence:

"A man overboard drill should be conducted at least quarterly."

27 The text of the existing footnote associated to paragraph 14.13.2 and to the title of section 14.15 are replaced with the following:

"Refer to the Recommendations for the training and certification of personnel on mobile offshore units (MOUs) (resolution A.1079(28))."

28 The following new paragraph 14.13.5 is inserted after existing paragraph 14.13.4:

"14.13.5 Davit-launched liferafts for MODUs

.1 a liferaft should be lowered at least quarterly during abandon unit drills. Whenever practicable this may include the inflation of a liferaft. This liferaft may be a special liferaft intended for training purposes only and should not be boarded;



.2 the dedicated training liferaft should be identical in size, shape and mass to the actual liferaft cases used on board the unit, but of a different colour and prominently marked 'training aid – not for use in emergency'; and

.3 during such drills, emphasis should be placed on ensuring the crew's familiarity with handling all necessary lashings, painters, connecting the training liferaft to the davit, swinging out the davit and lowering the liferaft."

29 Renumber existing paragraphs 14.13.5 to 14.13.7 accordingly.

30 The text of renumbered paragraph 14.13.6 is amended to read as follows:

"14.13.6 As far as is reasonably practicable, rescue boats, including lifeboats which are also rescue boats, should be launched each month with the assigned crew aboard and manoeuvred in the water. In all cases these provisions should be complied with at least once every three months during a man overboard drill to simulate the recovery of a person from the water."

31 The text of renumbered paragraph 14.13.7 is amended to read as follows:

"14.13.7 For lifeboats, except for lifeboats that are also rescue boats, the provisions of SOLAS regulation III/19.3.34.3 should be applied.64 64 Refer to the Guidelines on alternative methods for lifeboat drills on MODUs

(MSC.1/Circ.1486)." 14.16 Records

32 In subparagraph 14.16.2.5, the reference to paragraph "9.19.4" is replaced with "9.20.4".

33 In paragraph 14.16.2, the following new subparagraphs .10 and .11 are inserted after the existing subparagraph .9, the word "and" at the end of subparagraph 8 is deleted and the period at the end of subparagraph 9 is replaced with a semicolon:

".10 the electrical equipment register under paragraph 6.6.3.

.11 maintenance and repair of all electrical equipment in hazardous areas for continued certification in accordance with the international standards referred to in paragraph 6.6.1."

34 The following new section 14.17 is inserted after existing section 14.16:

"14.17 Hazardous areas

14.17.1 Portable and transportable electrical equipment or spark-producing equipment should not be introduced into, or remain in, any area classified as hazardous area zone 0, zone 1 or zone 2 in accordance with section 6.2 unless it has been determined that:

.1 the equipment is certified as suitable for use in the

area in question; or



.2 the area is free of ignitable concentrations of

flammable vapours and appropriate controls have been put in place to prevent the introduction of flammable vapours into the area.

14.17.2 Repairs, maintenance and overhaul of certified electrical equipment in hazardous areas should be performed by suitably qualified personnel in accordance with appropriate international standards."

35 All existing footnotes of the Code are renumbered accordingly.

***



ANNEX 7

DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR

GUIDELINES FOR VESSELS AND UNITS WITH DYNAMIC POSITIONING (DP) SYSTEMS

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its [ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017)], approved the Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems, as set out in the annex, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its fourth session (20 to 24 March 2017). 2 Member States are invited to bring the annexed Guidelines to the attention of DP manufacturers, ship designers, shipyards, shipowners and other parties concerned. 3 Member States are also invited to apply the annexed Guidelines to vessels and units with dynamic positioning systems. 3 Furthermore, Member States are invited to use the model form of Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document (DPVAD), as set out in the appendix to the Guidelines.



ANNEX

DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR VESSELS AND UNITS WITH DYNAMIC POSITIONING (DP) SYSTEMS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREAMBLE…………... ...................................................................................................... 3

1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................ 4

1.1 Purpose .............................................................................................. 4

1.2 Definitions .......................................................................................... 4

2 EQUIPMENT CLASSES .......................................................................................... 6

3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................. 8

3.1 General ............................................................................................... 8

3.2 Power system .................................................................................... 9

3.3 Thruster system ................................................................................. 9

3.4 DP control system ........................................................................... 10

3.5 Cables and piping systems ............................................................ 13

3.6 Requirements for essential non-DP systems ............................... 13

3.7 Independent joystick system ......................................................... 13

4 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................... 14

5 SURVEYS, TESTING AND DYNAMIC POSITIONING VERIFICATION ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT (DPVAD) .......................................................................................... 15

5.1 Surveys and testing ........................................................................ 15

5.2 Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document (DPVAD) ............................................................................................ 16

6 TRAINING .......................................................................................................... 16

APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………………………….17



PREAMBLE 1 The Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (MSC/Circ.645) were approved by MSC 63 in May 1994 to provide the industry with an international standard for dynamic positioning systems on all types of vessels. These Guidelines for new vessels and units with dynamic positioning systems have been developed to provide an amended standard reflecting the development in DP operation since 1994, current industry practice and DP technologies. 2 It is recommended that the present Guidelines be applied to vessels and units constructed on or after [date of approval]. For vessels and units constructed on or after 1 July 1994 but before [date of approval], the previous version of the Guidelines (MSC/Circ.645) may continue to be applied, however it is recommended that section 4 of the present Guidelines be applied to all, new and existing vessels and units, as appropriate. 3 Taking into account that dynamically positioned vessels are moved and operated internationally and recognizing that the design and operating criteria require special consideration, these Guidelines have been developed to facilitate international operation without having to document the dynamic positioning system in detail for every new area of operation. 4 Compliance with the Guidelines should be documented by means of a Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document (DPVAD) for the dynamic positioning system. 5 If the Administration exempts any vessel or unit which embodies features of a novel kind from any provisions of these Guidelines, the exemptions should be listed in the DPVAD. 6 If the Administration approves alternative design and arrangements for any particular provision of these Guidelines, pertinent technical information about the approval should be summarized and annexed to the DPVAD.



1 GENERAL 1.1 Purpose The purpose of these Guidelines is to recommend design criteria, equipment, operating provisions and testing, and a documentation regime for dynamic positioning systems to reduce the risk to the personnel, the vessel, other vessels or structures, sub-sea installations and the environment, while performing operations under dynamic positioning control. 1.2 Definitions For the purpose of these Guidelines, unless expressly provided otherwise, the terms used herein are defined hereunder: 1.2.1 Activity-Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG) means guidelines on the operational, environmental and equipment performance limits for the location and specific activity. (For drilling operations, the ASOG may be known as the Well-Specific Operating Guidelines (WSOG)). 1.2.2 Bus-tie breaker means a device connecting/disconnecting switchboard sections ("closed bus-tie(s)" means connected). 1.2.3 Company means the owner of the ship or any other organization or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the owner of the ship and who on assuming such responsibility has agreed to take over all duties and responsibilities imposed by the International Safety Management Code. 1.2.4 Computer system means a system consisting of one or more computers and associated hardware, software and their interfaces. 1.2.5 Consequence analysis means a software function continuously verifying that the vessel will remain in position even if the worst-case failure occurs. 1.2.6 Dynamic Positioning control station (DP control station) means a workstation designated for DP operations, where necessary information sources, such as indicators, displays, alarm panels, control panels and internal communication systems are installed (this includes: DP control and independent joystick control operator stations, required position reference systems' Human Machine Interface (HMI), manual thruster levers, mode change systems, thruster emergency stops, internal communications). 1.2.7 Dynamic Positioning operation (DP operation) means using the DP system to control at least two degrees of freedom in the horizontal plane automatically. 1.2.8 Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document (DPVAD) means the document issued by the Administration or its Recognized Organization to a DP vessel complying with these Guidelines. (See appendix for model form.) 1.2.9 Dynamically positioned vessel (DP vessel) means a unit or a vessel which automatically maintains its position and/or heading (fixed location, relative location or predetermined track) by means of thruster force.



1.2.10 Dynamic Positioning control system (DP control system) means all control components and systems, hardware and software necessary to dynamically position the vessel. The DP control system consists of the following:

.1 computer system/joystick system; .2 sensor system(s); .3 control stations and display system (operator panels); .4 position reference system(s); .5 associated cabling and cable routeing; and .6 networks.

1.2.11 Dynamic Positioning system (DP system) means the complete installation necessary for dynamically positioning a vessel comprising, but not limited to, the following sub-systems:

.1 power system; .2 thruster system; and .3 DP control system.

1.2.12 Failure means an occurrence in a component or system that causes one or both of the following effects: .1 loss of component or system function; and/or

.2 deterioration of functional capability to such an extent that the safety of the vessel, personnel or environment protection is significantly reduced.

1.2.13 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) means a systematic analysis of systems and sub-systems to a level of detail that identifies all potential failure modes down to the appropriate sub-system level and their consequences. 1.2.14 FMEA proving trials means the test program for verifying the FMEA. 1.2.15 Hidden failure means a failure that is not immediately evident to operations or maintenance personnel and has the potential for failure of equipment to perform an on-demand function, such as protective functions in power plants and switchboards, standby equipment, backup power supplies or lack of capacity or performance. 1.2.16 Joystick system means a system with centralized manual position control and manual or automatic heading control. 1.2.17 Loss of position and/or heading means that the vessel's position and/or heading is outside the limits set for carrying out the DP activity in progress. 1.2.18 Position keeping means maintaining a desired position and/or heading or track within the normal excursions of the control system and the defined environmental conditions (e.g. wind, waves, current, etc.).



1.2.19 Power management system means a system that ensures continuity of electrical supply under all operating conditions. 1.2.20 Power system means all components and systems necessary to supply the DP system with power. The power system includes but is not limited to: .1 prime movers with necessary auxiliary systems including piping, fuel,

cooling, pre-lubrication and lubrication, hydraulic, pre-heating, and pneumatic systems;

.2 generators; .3 switchboards; .4 distribution systems (cabling and cable routeing); .5 power supplies, including uninterruptible power supplies (UPS); and .6 power management system(s) (as appropriate).

1.2.21 Redundancy means the ability of a component or system to maintain or restore its function, when a single failure has occurred. Redundancy can be achieved for instance by installation of multiple components, systems or alternative means of performing a function. 1.2.22 Time to safely terminate (operations) means the amount of time required in an emergency to safely cease operations of the DP vessel. 1.2.23 Thruster system means all components and systems necessary to supply the DP system with thrust force and direction. The thruster system includes:

.1 thrusters with drive units and necessary auxiliary systems including piping, cooling, hydraulic, and lubrication systems, etc.;

.2 main propellers and rudders if these are under the control of the DP system; .3 thruster control system(s); .4 manual thruster controls; and .5 associated cabling and cable routeing.

1.2.24 Worst-Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI) means the specified minimum DP system capabilities to be maintained following the worst-case failure. The worst-case failure design intent is used as the basis of the design. This usually relates to the number of thrusters and generators that can simultaneously fail. 1.2.25 Worst-Case Failure (WCF) means the identified single fault in the DP system resulting in maximum detrimental effect on DP capability as determined through the FMEA. 2 EQUIPMENT CLASSES 2.1 A DP system consists of components and systems acting together to achieve sufficiently reliable position keeping capability. The necessary redundancy level for components and systems is determined by the consequence of a loss of position and/or



heading keeping capability. To achieve this philosophy the requirements have been grouped into three equipment classes. For each equipment class, the associated worst-case failure should be defined as in paragraph 2.2 below. The equipment class of the vessel required for a particular operation should be agreed between the company and the customer based on a risk analysis of the consequence of a loss of position and/or heading. Otherwise, the Administration or coastal State may decide the equipment class for the particular operation. 2.2 The equipment classes are defined by their worst-case failure modes as follows:

.1 For equipment class 1, a loss of position and/or heading may occur in the event of a single fault.

.2 For equipment class 2, a loss of position and/or heading will not occur in the

event of a single fault in any active component or system. Common static components may be accepted in systems which will not immediately affect position keeping capabilities upon failure (e.g. ventilation and seawater systems not directly cooling running machinery). Normally such static components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Administration. Single failure criteria include, but are not limited to:

.1 any active component or system (generators, thrusters,

switchboards, communication networks, remote-controlled valves, etc.); and

.2 any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.)

which may immediately affect position keeping capabilities upon failure or is not properly documented with respect to protection.

.3 For equipment class 3, a loss of position and/or heading will not occur in the

event of a single fault or failure. A single failure includes:

.1 items listed above for class 2, and any normally static component assumed to fail;

.2 all components in any one watertight compartment, from fire or

flooding; and .3 all components in any one fire sub-division, from fire or flooding (for

cables, see also paragraph 3.5.1).

2.3 For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be considered as a single fault if such an act is reasonably probable. 2.4 Based on the single failure criteria in paragraph 2.2, the worst-case failure should be determined and used as the criterion for the consequence analysis (see paragraph 3.4.2.4). 2.5 The Administration should assign the relevant equipment class to a DP vessel based on the criteria in paragraph 2.2 and state it in the DPVAD (see paragraph 5.2). 2.6 When a DP vessel is assigned an equipment class this means that the DP vessel is suitable for DP operations within the assigned and lower equipment classes.



2.7 It is a provision of the Guidelines that the DP vessel is operated in such a way that the worst-case failure, as determined in paragraph 2.2, can occur at any time without causing a breach of acceptable excursion criteria set for loss of position and/or heading for equipment classes 2 and 3. 3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 3.1 General 3.1.1 Insofar as is practicable, all components in a DP system should be designed, constructed and tested in accordance with international standards recognized by the Administration. 3.1.2 If external forces from mission-related systems (cable lay, pipe lay, mooring, etc.) have a direct impact on DP performance, the influence of these systems should be considered and factored into the DP system design. Where available from the DP system or equipment manufacturer, such data inputs should be provided automatically to the DP control system. Additionally, provisions should be made to provide such data inputs into the DP control system manually. These systems and the associated automatic inputs should be subject to surveys, testing and analysis specified in paragraph 5.1. 3.1.3 In order to meet the single failure criteria given in paragraph 2.2, redundancy of components will normally be necessary as follows:

.1 for equipment class 2, redundancy of all active components; and .2 for equipment class 3, redundancy of all components and A-60 physical

separation of the components.

3.1.4 For equipment class 3, full redundancy of the control systems may not be possible. (i.e. there may be a need for a single changeover system from the main computer system to the backup computer system). Such connections between otherwise redundant and separated systems may be accepted when these are operated so that they do not represent a possible failure propagation path during DP operations. Failure in one system should in no case be transferred to the other redundant system. 3.1.5 For equipment classes 2 and 3, connections between otherwise redundant and separated systems should be kept to a minimum and made to fail to the safest condition. Failure in one system should in no case be transferred to the other redundant system. 3.1.6 Redundant components and systems should be immediately available without needing manual intervention from the operators and with such capacity that the DP operation can be continued for such a period that the work in progress can be terminated safely. The transfer of control should be smooth and within acceptable limitations of the DP operation(s) for which the vessel is designed. 3.1.7 For equipment classes 2 and 3, hidden failure monitoring should be provided on all devices where the FMEA shows that a hidden failure will result in a loss of redundancy. 3.1.8 The DP control station should be arranged where the operator has a good view of the vessel's exterior limits and the surrounding area. Equipment that should be located at the DP control station includes, but is not limited to:

.1 DP control and independent joystick control operator stations;



.2 manual thruster levers;

.3 mode change systems;

.4 thruster emergency stops;

.5 internal communications; and

.6 position reference systems' HMI, when considered necessary. 3.2 Power system 3.2.1 The power system should have an adequate response time to changes in power demand. 3.2.2 For equipment class 1, the power system need not be redundant.

3.2.3 For equipment class 2, the power system should be divisible into two or more systems so that, in the event of failure of one sub-system, at least one other system will remain in operation and provide sufficient power for station keeping. The power system(s) may be run as one system during operation, but should be arranged by bus-tie breaker(s) to separate the systems automatically upon failures which could be transferred from one system to another, including, but not limited to, overloading and short circuits. 3.2.4 For equipment class 3, the power system should be divisible into two or more systems so that, in the event of failure of one system, at least one other system will remain in operation and provide sufficient power for station keeping. The divided power system should be located in different spaces separated by A-60 class divisions. Where the power systems are located below the operational waterline, the separation should also be watertight. Bus-tie breakers should be open during equipment class 3 operations unless equivalent integrity of power operation can be accepted according to paragraph 3.1.4. 3.2.5 For equipment classes 2 and 3, the power available for position keeping should be sufficient to maintain the vessel in position after worst-case failure according to paragraph 2.2. 3.2.6 For equipment classes 2 and 3, at least one automatic power management system (PMS) should be provided and should have redundancy according to the equipment class and a blackout prevention function. 3.2.7 Alternative energy storage (e.g. batteries and fly-wheels) may be used as sources of power to thrusters as long as all relevant redundancy, independency and separation requirements for the relevant notation are complied with. For equipment classes 2 and 3, the available energy from such sources may be included in the consequence analysis function required in paragraph 3.4.2.4 when reliable energy measurements can be provided for the calculations.

3.2.8 Sudden load changes resulting from single faults or equipment failures should not create a blackout. 3.3 Thruster system 3.3.1 Each thruster on a DP system should be capable of being remote-controlled individually, independently of the DP control system.



3.3.2 The thruster system should provide adequate thrust in longitudinal and lateral directions, and provide yawing moment for heading control. 3.3.3 For equipment classes 2 and 3, the thruster system should be connected to the power system in such a way that paragraph 3.3.2 can be complied with even after failure of one of the constituent power systems and the thrusters connected to that system. 3.3.4 The values of thruster force used in the consequence analysis (see paragraph 3.4.2.4) should be corrected for interference between thrusters and other effects which would reduce the effective force. 3.3.5 Failure of a thruster system including pitch, azimuth and/or speed control, should not cause an increase in thrust magnitude or change in thrust direction. 3.3.6 Individual thruster emergency stop systems should be arranged in the DP control station. For equipment classes 2 and 3, the thruster emergency stop system should have loop monitoring. For equipment class 3, the effects of fire and flooding should be considered. 3.4 DP control system 3.4.1 General

.1 In general, the DP control system should be arranged in a DP control station

where the operator has a good view of the vessel's exterior limits and the surrounding area.

.2 The DP control station should display information from the power system,

thruster system and DP control system to ensure that these systems are functioning correctly. Information necessary to safely operate the DP system should be visible at all times. Other information should be available upon operator's request.

.3 Display systems and the DP control station in particular should be based on

sound ergonomic principles which promote proper operation of the system. The DP control system should provide for easy accessibility of the control mode, i.e. manual joystick, or automatic DP control of thrusters, propellers and rudders, if part of the thruster system. The active control mode should be clearly displayed.

.4 For equipment classes 2 and 3, operator controls should be designed so that

no single inadvertent act on the operator's panel can lead to a loss of position and/or heading.

.5 Alarms and warnings for failures in all systems interfaced to and/or controlled

by the DP control system should be audible and visual. A record of their occurrence and of status changes should be provided together with any necessary explanations.

.6 The DP control system should prevent failures being transferred from one

system to another. The redundant components should be so arranged that any failed component or components may be easily isolated so that the other component(s) can take over smoothly with no loss of position and/or heading.



.7 It should be possible to control the thrusters manually, by individual levers and by an independent joystick, in the event of failure of the DP control system. If an independent joystick is provided with sensor inputs, failure of the main DP control system should not affect the integrity of the inputs to the independent joystick.

.8 A dedicated UPS should be provided for each DP control system (i.e. minimum one UPS for equipment class 1, two UPSs for equipment class 2 and three UPSs for equipment class 3) to ensure that any power failure will not affect more than one computer system and its associated components. The reference systems and sensors should be distributed on the UPSs in the same manner as the control systems they serve, so that any power failure will not cause loss of position keeping ability. An alarm should be initiated in case of loss of charge power. UPS battery capacity should provide a minimum of 30 minutes operation following a main supply failure. For equipment classes 2 and 3, the charge power for the UPSs supplying the main control system should originate from different power systems.

.9 The software should be produced in accordance with an appropriate international quality standard recognized by the Administration.

3.4.2 Computers

.1 For equipment class 1, the DP control system need not be redundant.

.2 For equipment class 2, the DP control system should consist of at least two computer systems so that, in case of any single failure, automatic position keeping ability will be maintained. Common facilities such as self-checking routines, alignment facilities, data transfer arrangements and plant interfaces should not be capable of causing failure of more than one computer system. An alarm should be initiated if any computer fails or is not ready to take control.

.3 For equipment class 3, the main DP control system should consist of at least two computer systems arranged so that, in case of any single failure, automatic position keeping ability will be maintained. Common facilities such as self-checking routines, alignment facilities, data transfer arrangements and plant interfaces should not be capable of causing failure of more than one computer system. The two or more computer systems mentioned above do not include the backup computer system; thus, in addition, one separate backup DP control system should be arranged, see paragraph 3.4.2.6. An alarm should be initiated if any computer fails or is not ready to take control.

.4 For equipment classes 2 and 3, the DP control system should include a software function, normally known as "consequence analysis", which continuously verifies that the vessel will remain in position even if the worst-case failure occurs. This analysis should verify that the thrusters, propellers and rudders (if included under DP control) that remain in operation after the worst-case failure can generate the same resultant thruster force and moment as required before the failure. The consequence analysis should provide an alarm if the occurrence of a worst-case failure would lead to a loss of position and/or heading due to insufficient thrust for the prevailing environmental conditions (e.g. wind, waves, current, etc.). For operations which will take a long time to safely terminate, the consequence analysis should include a function which simulates the remaining thrust and power after the worst-case failure, based on input of the environmental conditions.



.5 Redundant computer systems should be arranged with automatic transfer of control after a detected failure in one of the computer systems. The automatic transfer of control from one computer system to another should be smooth with no loss of position and/or heading.

.6 For equipment class 3, the backup DP control system should be in a room

separated by an A-60 class division from the main DP control station. During DP operation, this backup control system should be continuously updated by input from at least one of the required sets of sensors, position reference system, thruster feedback, etc. and be ready to take over control. The switchover of control to the backup system should be manual, situated on the backup computer, and should not be affected by a failure of the main DP control system. Main and backup DP control systems should be so arranged that at least one system will be able to perform automatic position keeping after any single failure.

.7 Each DP computer system should be isolated from other on-board computer

systems and communications systems to ensure the integrity of the DP system and command interfaces. This isolation may be effected via hardware and/or software systems and physical separation of cabling and communication lines. Robustness of the isolation should be verified by analysis and proven by testing. Specific safeguards should be implemented to ensure the integrity of the DP computer system and prevent the connection of unauthorized or unapproved devices or systems.

3.4.3 Position reference systems

.1 Position reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements, both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situations.

.2 For equipment class 1, at least two independent position reference systems

should be installed and simultaneously available to the DP control system during operation.

.3 For equipment classes 2 and 3, at least three independent position reference

systems should be installed and simultaneously available to the DP control system during operation.

.4 When two or more position reference systems are required, they should not

all be of the same type, but based on different principles and suitable for the operating conditions.

.5 The position reference systems should produce data with adequate accuracy

and repeatability for the intended DP operation. .6 The performance of position reference systems should be monitored and

warnings should be provided when the signals from the position reference systems are either incorrect or substantially degraded.

.7 For equipment class 3, at least one of the position reference systems should

be connected directly to the backup control system and separated by an A-60 class division from the other position reference systems.



3.4.4 Vessel sensors

.1 Vessel sensors should at least measure vessel heading, vessel motions and wind speed and direction.

.2 When an equipment class 2 or 3 DP control system is fully dependent on

correct signals from vessel sensors, these signals should be based on three systems serving the same purpose (i.e. this will result in at least three heading reference sensors being installed).

.3 Sensors for the same purpose which are connected to redundant systems

should be arranged independently so that failure of one will not affect the others.

.4 For equipment class 3, one of each type of sensor should be connected

directly to the backup DP control system, and should be separated by an A-60 class division from the other sensors. If the data from these sensors is passed to the main DP control system for their use, this system should be arranged so that a failure in the main DP control system cannot affect the integrity of the signals to the backup DP control system.

3.5 Cables and piping systems 3.5.1 For equipment class 3, cables for redundant equipment or systems should not be routed together through the same compartments. Where this is unavoidable, such cables may run together in cable ducts of A-60 class, the termination of the ducts included, which are effectively protected from all fire hazards except that represented by the cables themselves. Cable connection boxes may not be provided within such ducts. 3.5.2 For equipment class 2, piping systems for fuel, lubrication, hydraulic oil, cooling water and cables should be located with due regard to fire hazards and mechanical damage.

3.5.3 For equipment class 3, redundant piping systems (e.g. piping for fuel, cooling water, lubrication oil, hydraulic oil, etc.) should not be routed together through the same compartments. Where this is unavoidable, such pipes may run together in ducts of A-60 class, the termination of the ducts included, which are effectively protected from all fire hazards except that represented by the pipes themselves. 3.6 Requirements for essential non-DP systems For equipment classes 2 and 3, systems not directly part of the DP system, but which in the event of failure could cause failure of the DP system (e.g. common fire suppression systems, engine ventilation, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, shutdown systems, etc.), should also comply with relevant requirements of these Guidelines. 3.7 Independent joystick system 3.7.1 A joystick system independent of the automatic DP control system should be arranged. The power supply for the independent joystick system (IJS) is to be independent of the DP control system UPSs. An alarm should be initiated upon failure of the IJS. 3.7.2 The IJS should have automatic heading control.



4 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 4.1 Before every DP operation, the DP system should be checked according to applicable vessel specific location checklist(s) and other decision support tools such as ASOG to make sure that the DP system is functioning correctly and that the system has been set up for the appropriate mode of operation. 4.2 During DP operations, the system should be checked at regular intervals according to the applicable vessel-specific watchkeeping checklist. 4.3 DP operations necessitating equipment class 2 or 3 should be terminated when the environmental conditions (e.g. wind, waves, current, etc.) are such that the DP vessel will no longer be able to keep position if the single failure criterion applicable to the equipment class should occur. In this context, deterioration of environmental conditions and the necessary time to safely terminate the operation should also be taken into consideration. This should be checked by way of environmental envelopes if operating in equipment class 1 and by way of an automatic means (e.g. consequence analysis) if operating in equipment class 2 or 3. 4.4 The necessary operating instructions should be kept on board. 4.5 DP capability polar plots should be produced to demonstrate position keeping capacity for fully operational and post worst-case single failure conditions. The capability plots should represent the environmental conditions in the area of operation and the mission-specific operational condition of the vessel. 4.6 The following checklists, test procedures, trials and instructions should be incorporated into the vessel-specific DP operations manuals:

.1 location checklist (see paragraph 4.1); .2 watchkeeping checklist (see paragraph 4.2); .3 DP operating instructions (see paragraph 4.4); .4 annual tests and procedures (see paragraph 5.1.1.3); .5 initial and periodical (5-year) tests and procedures (see paragraphs 5.1.1.1

and 5.1.1.2); .6 examples of tests and procedures after modifications and non-conformities

(see paragraph 5.1.1.4); .7 blackout recovery procedure; .8 list of critical components; .9 examples of operating modes; .10 decision support tools such as ASOG; and .11 capability plots (see paragraph 4.5).



5 SURVEYS, TESTING AND DYNAMIC POSITIONING VERIFICATION ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENT (DPVAD)

5.1 Surveys and testing 5.1.1 Each DP vessel to which the Guidelines apply should be subject to the surveys and testing specified below:

.1 an initial survey which should include a complete survey of the DP system

and FMEA proving trials for DP classes 2 and 3 to ensure full compliance with the applicable parts of the Guidelines. Furthermore it should include a complete test of all systems and components and the ability to keep position after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class. The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board;

.2 a periodical testing at intervals not exceeding five years to ensure full

compliance with the applicable parts of the Guidelines. A complete test should be carried out as required in paragraph 5.1.1.1. The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board;

.3 an annual survey should be carried out within three months before or after

each anniversary date of the Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document1. The annual survey should ensure that the DP system has been maintained in accordance with applicable parts of the Guidelines and is in good working order. The annual test of all important systems and components should be carried out to document the ability of the DP vessel to keep position after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class and validate the FMEA and operations manual. The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board; and

.4 a survey, either general or partial according to circumstances, should be

carried out every time a defect is discovered and corrected or an accident occurs which affects the safety of the DP vessel, or whenever any significant repairs or alterations are made. After such a survey, necessary tests should be carried out to demonstrate full compliance with the applicable provisions of the Guidelines. The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board.

5.1.2 For equipment classes 2 and 3, an FMEA should be carried out. This is a systematic analysis of the systems to the level of detail required to demonstrate that no single failure will cause a loss of position or heading and should verify worst-case failure design intent. This analysis should then be confirmed by FMEA proving trials. The FMEA and FMEA proving trials result should be kept on board and the FMEA should be kept updated so that it remains current. 5.1.3 These surveys and tests should be witnessed by officers of the Administration. The Administration may, however, entrust the surveys and testing either to surveyors nominated for the purpose or to organizations recognized by it. In every case, the Administration concerned should guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the surveys and testing. The Administration may entrust the company of the vessel to carry out annual and minor repair surveys according to a test programme accepted by the Administration.

1 If a Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document is not available, the anniversary date of the

initial survey should be used to determine the date of the annual survey.



5.1.4 After any survey and testing has been completed, no significant change should be made to the DP system without the sanction of the Administration, except the direct replacement of equipment and fittings for the purpose of repair or maintenance. 5.2 Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document (DPVAD) 5.2.1 Compliance with these Guidelines should be verified by a DPVAD issued by or on behalf of the Administration. 5.2.2 A DPVAD should be issued, after survey and testing in accordance with these Guidelines, by the Administration or an organization recognized by it. 5.2.3 The DPVAD should be drawn up in the official language of the issuing country and in the form given in the appendix to the Guidelines. If the language used is neither English nor French, the text should include a translation into one of these languages. 5.2.4 The DPVAD is issued for a period not exceeding five years, or for a period specified by the Administration. 5.2.5 The DPVAD should cease to be valid if significant alterations have been made in the DP system equipment, fittings, arrangements, etc. specified in the Guidelines without the sanction of the Administration, except the direct replacement of such equipment or fittings for the purpose of repair or maintenance. 5.2.6 The DPVAD issued to a DP vessel should cease to be valid upon transfer of such a vessel to the flag of another country. 5.2.7 The privileges of the DPVAD may not be claimed in favour of any DP vessel unless the DPVAD is valid. 5.2.8 Results of the DPVAD tests should be readily available on board for reference. 6 TRAINING Personnel engaged in operating a DP system should have received relevant training and practical experience in accordance with the provisions of the 1978 STCW Convention, as amended, the STCW Code, as amended, and the Guidelines for Dynamic Positioning System (DP) Operator Training (MSC/Circ.738, as amended).



APPENDIX

Model Form of Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document

Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document

(Official seal) (State)

Issued under the provisions of the

Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems

(MSC.1/Circ.[…])

under the authority of the Government of

_________________________________________ (full designation of the State)

by ______________________________________________________________ (full official designation of the competent person or organization authorized by the

Administration)

Distinctive identification (Name or number)

Type Port of registry

IMO number

Date on which keel was laid or vessel was at similar stage of construction or on which major conversion was commenced* ........................................................................ THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the above-mentioned vessel has been duly documented, surveyed and tested in accordance with the Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (MSC.1/Circ.[…]) and found to comply with the Guidelines. The vessel is allowed to operate in DP Equipment Class ...................................... and in lower equipment classes. This document is valid until ..................................................................................... unless terminated by the Administration, provided that the vessel is operated, tested and surveyed according to the provisions in the Guidelines and the results are properly recorded. Issued at ................................................................................................................ (Place of issue of document) ……………….. ………………………………………………………………….. (Date of issue) (Signature of authorized official issuing the certificate) ………………………………………………………………. (Seal or stamp of the issuing authority, as appropriate)

* Delete as appropriate.



LIST OF EXEMPTIONS AND EQUIVALENTS

(refer to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the preamble of the Guidelines)

- - - -



LIST OF MAIN SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS COVERED BY DPVAD2 - - - - - - - -

2 All main systems and components comprising the dynamic positioning system should be recorded to account

for overall system composition and design. Such records should readily facilitate cross-referencing to drawings, schematics, and/or other system diagrams. System and component updates introduced after the date of DPVAD issuance should be recorded only after proper testing/validation has been verified and found acceptable to the designated authority.



Record of annual survey reports, and periodic (5-year) testing reports

Date Test type Remarks Report Reference Date/Number3

Sign. of appointed surveyor (if required)4

Sign. of Master/ Unit Manager

***

3 All reports should be filed together with this DPVAD for use during later testing and inspections by nominated

surveyors, flag State surveyors, etc.

4 Ref. item 5.1.3.



ANNEX 8

DRAFT ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

ESCAPE ROUTE SIGNS AND EQUIPMENT LOCATION MARKINGS

THE ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING Article 15(j) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations and guidelines concerning maritime safety and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,

BEARING IN MIND the requirements of regulations II-2/15.2.4 (Fire control plans), II-2/13.3.2.5.1 (Marking of escape routes), II-2/13.7 (Additional requirements for ro-ro passenger ships), III/9 (Operating instructions), III/11 (Survival craft muster and embarkation arrangements) and III/20.10 (Marking of stowage locations) of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended,

RECALLING resolutions A.760(18) on Symbols related to life-saving appliances and arrangements, as amended by resolution MSC.82(70), and A.952 (23) on Graphical symbols for shipboard fire control plans,

RECOGNIZING the need for uniform international symbols to indicate the location of emergency equipment as well as muster stations and that the Assembly had urged Contracting Governments to ensure that the symbols annexed to the aforementioned Assembly resolutions were used, where appropriate,

HAVING NOTED that, through the Shipboard escape route signs and emergency equipment location markings (MSC.1/Circ.1553), Contracting Governments had been invited to bring standard ISO 24409-2:2014, which generally conforms to the corresponding symbols set out in the annex to resolution A.760(18) on Symbols related to life-saving appliances and arrangements, as amended, and in the annex to resolution A.952(23) on Graphical symbols for fire control plans, to the attention of ship designers, shipbuilders, shipowners, ship operators, ship masters, shore-based firefighting personnel and other parties concerned, so that they might use it, on a voluntary basis, for shipboard signage, in compliance with the relevant requirements of SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, pending the adoption of the revised resolution,

1 ADOPTS the Escape route signs and equipment location markings, set out in the annex to the present resolution;

2 URGES Contracting Governments to bring the aforementioned escape route signs and equipment location markings to the attention of shipbuilders, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters, shore-based fire-fighting personnel and other parties concerned with the safety of life at sea for their use within the framework of SOLAS chapters II-2 and III;

3 REQUESTS the Maritime Safety Committee to keep this resolution under review and to amend it as necessary;

4 INVITES Contracting Governments to note that these escape route signs and equipment location markings should take effect on ships constructed on or after [1 January 2018] or ships which undergo repairs, alterations, modifications and outfitting within the scope of SOLAS chapters II-2 and/or III, as applicable, on or after [1 January 2018] and that they should be used, as appropriate, in combination with resolution A.952(23) for the preparation of the shipboard fire control plans required by SOLAS regulation II-2/15.2.4.



ANNEX1

DRAFT ESCAPE ROUTE SIGNS AND EQUIPMENT LOCATION MARKINGS IMPORTANT – The colours represented in this annex can be neither viewed on screen nor printed as true representations. Although the signs and symbols in this annex have been reproduced to correspond (with an acceptable tolerance as judged by the naked eye) to the requirements of standard ISO 3864-4, it is not intended that the signs and symbols shown in this annex be used for colour matching.

For a definitive version of all safety symbols in this annex, please consult standard ISO 7010 and the ISO Online Browsing Platform (http://www.iso.org/obp/ui/). For a definitive version of all fire control symbols in this annex, please consult standard ISO 17631. These are the source documents from which to create safety and fire control plans signs.

1 Normative references The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. ISO 3864 (all parts), Graphical symbols – Safety colours and safety signs

ISO 7010, Graphical symbols – Safety colours and safety signs – Registered safety signs

ISO 17631, Ships and marine technology – Shipboard plans for fire protection, life-saving appliances and means of escape

ISO 17724, Graphical symbols – Vocabulary

ISO 24409-1, Ships and marine technology – Design, location, and use of shipboard safety signs, safety-related signs, safety notices and safety markings – Part 1: Design principles 2 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in standards ISO 17724, ISO 24409-1, and the following apply. 2.1 Fire control signs Signs for specialists, used to identify and locate fire control equipment, not designed according the rules for safety signs. Note 1 to entry: These signs are related to the symbols in standard ISO 17631; see 3.1 h) below.

1 This annex is based on the standard ISO 24409-2:2014.

http://www.iso.org/obp/ui/



2.2 Image content

Written description of the elements of a graphical symbol or safety sign and their relative disposition.

[ISO 17724:2003, 38] 2.3 Referent

Idea or object that a graphical symbol is intended to represent.

[ISO 17724: 2003, 61] 2.4 Safety sign

Sign giving a general safety message, obtained by a combination of a colour and geometric shape and which, by the addition of a graphical symbol, gives a particular safety message. 3 Categorization of shipboard signs 3.1 Signs in this standard are categorized according to their function as follows:

a) MES – means of escape signs which provide escape route identification.

b) EES – emergency equipment signs which provide use and location of first aid facilities and portable safety equipment.

c) LSS – life-saving systems and appliances signs which provide use and location of life-saving systems and appliances.

d) FES – fire-fighting equipment signs which provide use and location of fire-fighting equipment.

e) PSS – prohibition signs which provide prohibited actions.

f) WSS – hazard warning signs which provide identification of hazards to avoid.

g) MSS – mandatory action signs which provide mandatory notices and instructions.

NOTE The PSS, WSS and MSS categories are based on the P, W and M categories of standard ISO 7010.

h) SIS – safety and operating instructions for trained personnel.

3.2 Table 1 summarizes the standardized shipboard safety signs used in workplaces and public areas in terms of functional category, referent number, referent, graphical symbol as well as geometric shape and colour.



Table 1 — Summary of safety signs for shipboard use

CATEGORY

MES EES LSS FES PSS WSS MSS

Means of Escape Signs

Emergency Equipment

Signs

Lifesaving Signs

Fire-fighting Equipment

Signs

Prohibition Signs

Warning Signs

Mandatory Signs

MES001

(ISO 7010- E032)

Shipboard assembly

station

EES001

(ISO 7010-E003)

First Aid

LSS001

(ISO 7010- E036)

Lifeboat

FES001

(ISO 7010-F001) Fire

extinguisher

PSS001

(ISO 7010-

P001) General

prohibition

WSS001

(ISO 7010-W001)

General warning

MSS001

(ISO 7010-M001)

General Mandatory

action

MES002

(ISO 7010-E001)

Emergency exit (left hand)

EES002 (ISO 7010-

E004) Emergency telephone

LSS002

(ISO 7010- E037)

Rescue boat

FES002

(ISO 7010-F002)

Fire hose reel

PSS002

(ISO 7010-P002)

No smoking

WSS002

(ISO 7010-W002)

Warning; Explosive material

MSS002

(ISO 7010-M002)

Refer to instruction manual or

booklet

MES003

(ISO 7010-E002)

Emergency exit (right

hand)

EES003

(ISO 7010-E011)

Eyewash station

LSS003

(ISO 7010- E038) Liferaft

FES003

(ISO 7010-F004)

Collection of firefighting equipment

PSS003

(ISO 7010-P003)

No open flame; fire,

open ignition

source and smoking

prohibited

WSS003

(ISO 7010-W003)

Warning; Radioactive material or

ionizing radiation

MSS003

(ISO 7010-M003)

Wear ear protection



CATEGORY


MES004

(ISO 7010- E033)

Door slides right to open

EES004

(ISO 7010-E012) Safety shower

LSS004

(ISO 7010- E039) Davit-

launched liferaft

FES004

(ISO 7010-F005)

Fire alarm call point

PSS004

(ISO 7010-P004)

No thoroughfar

e

WSS004

(ISO 7010-W004)

Warning; Laser beam

MSS004

(ISO 7010-M004)

Wear eye protection

MES005

(ISO 7010- E034)

Door slides left to open

EES005

(ISO 7010-E013)

Stretcher

LSS005

(ISO 7010- E040)

Lifebuoy

FES005

(ISO 7010- F008)

Fixed fire extinguishing

battery

PSS005

(ISO 7010-P005)

Not drinking water

WSS005

(ISO 7010-W005)

Warning; Non-ionizing

radiation

MSS005

(ISO 7010-M005)

Connect an earth

terminal to the ground

MES 006

(ISO 7010-E018)

Turn anti-clockwise to

open

EES006

(ISO 7010- E027)

Medical grab bag

LSS006

(ISO 7010- E041)

Lifebuoy with line

FES006

(ISO 7010- F009)

Wheeled fire extinguisher

PSS006

(ISO 7010-P006)

No access for fork lift trucks and

other industrial vehicles

WSS006

(ISO 7010-W006)

Warning; Magnetic field

MSS006

(ISO 7010-M006)

Disconnect mains plug

from electrical

outlet



CATEGORY


MES007

(ISO 7010-E019) Turn

clockwise to open

EES007

(ISO 7010- E028)

Oxygen resuscitator

LSS007

(ISO 7010- E042)

Lifebuoy with light

FES007

(ISO 7010- F010)

Portable foam

applicator unit

PSS007

(ISO 7010-P007)

No access for people with active implanted cardiac devices

WSS007

(ISO 7010-W007)

Warning; Floor level obstacle

MSS007

(ISO 7010-M007)

Opaque eye protection must be

worn

MES008

(ISO 7010- E057)

Door opens by pulling on

left-hand side

EES008

(ISO 7010- E029)

Emergency escape

breathing device

LSS008

(ISO 7010- E043)

Lifebuoy with line &

light

FES008

(ISO 7010- F011)

Water fog applicator

PSS008

(ISO 7010-P008)

No metallic articles or watches

WSS008

(ISO 7010-W008)

Warning; Drop (fall)

MSS008

(ISO 7010-M008)

Wear safety footwear

MES009

(ISO 7010- E058)

Door opens by pulling on

the right-hand side

EES009

(ISO 7010-E009) Doctor

LSS008.1 Lifebuoy with light

and smoke

FES009

(ISO 7010- F012)


installation

PSS009

(ISO 7010-P010) Do not touch

WSS009

(ISO 7010-W009)

Warning; Biological

hazard

MSS009

(ISO 7010-M009) Wear

protective gloves



CATEGORY


MES 010

(ISO 7010-E023)

Push door on the right-hand side to

open

EES010

(ISO 7010-E010)

Automated external

heart defibrillator

LSS009

(ISO 7010- E044)

Lifejacket

FES010

(ISO 7010- F013)


bottle

PSS010

(ISO 7010-P011) Do not

extinguish with water

WSS010

(ISO 7010-W010)

Warning; Low temperature

MSS010


protective clothing

EES011 Safety

Equipment

LSS010

(ISO 7010- E045) Child's

lifejacket

FES011

(ISO 7010- F014)

Remote release station

PSS011

(ISO 7010-P013)

No activated mobile phones

WSS011

(ISO 7010-W011)

Warning; Slippery surface

MSS011

(ISO 7010-M011)

Wash your hands

EES012

(ISO 7010-E031)

Shipboard general alarm

LSS011

(ISO 7010- E046) Infant's

lifejacket

FES012

(ISO 7010- F015)

Fire monitor

PSS012

(ISO 7010-P014)

No access for people

with metallic implants

WSS012

(ISO 7010-W012)

Warning; Electricity

MSS012

(ISO 7010-M012)

Use handrail

EES013

(ISO 7010-E008)

Break to obtain access

LSS012

(ISO 7010- E047)

Search and rescue

transponder

PSS013

(ISO 7010-P015)

No reaching in

WSS013

(ISO 7010-W013)

Warning; Guard dog

MSS013

(ISO 7010-M013)

Wear a face shield



CATEGORY


LSS013

(ISO 7010- E048)

Survival craft distress

signal

PSS014

(ISO 7010-P017)

No pushing

WSS014

(ISO 7010-W014)

Warning; Forklift trucks

and other industrial vehicles

MSS014

(ISO 7010-M014)

Wear head protection

LSS014

(ISO 7010- E049) Rocket

parachute flare

PSS015

(ISO 7010-P018)

No sitting

WSS015

(ISO 7010-W015)

Warning; Overhead

load

MSS015

(ISO 7010-M015)

Wear high visibility clothing

LSS015

(ISO 7010- E050) Line-

throwing appliance

PSS016

(ISO 7010-P019)

No stepping on surface

WSS016

(ISO 7010-W016)

Warning; Toxic material

MSS016

(ISO 7010-M016) Wear a mask

LSS016

(ISO 7010- E051)

Two-way VHF radio-telephone apparatus

PSS017

(ISO 7010-P020)

Do not use lift in the

event of fire

WSS017

(ISO 7010-W017)

Warning; Hot surface

MSS017


respiratory protection



CATEGORY


LSS017

(ISO 7010- E052)

Emergency position

indicating radio

beacon

PSS018

(ISO 7010-P021)

No dogs

WSS018

(ISO 7010-W018)

Warning; Automatic start-up

MSS018

(ISO 7010-M018) Wear a safety

harness

LSS018

(ISO 7010-E053)

Embarkation ladder

PSS019

(ISO 7010-P022)

No eating or drinking

WSS019

(ISO 7010-W019)

Warning; Crushing

MSS019

(ISO 7010-M019) Wear a welding mask

LSS019

(ISO 7010-E054) Marine

evacuation slide

PSS020

(ISO 7010-P023) Do not

obstruct

WSS020

(ISO 7010-W020)

Warning; Overhead obstacle

LSS020

(ISO 7010-E055) Marine

evacuation chute

PSS021

(ISO 7010-P024)

Do not walk or stand

here



CATEGORY


LSS021

(ISO 7010-E056)

Survival clothing

WSS021

(ISO 7010-W021)

Warning; Flammable

material

LSS022

(ISO 7010-E035)

Liferaft Knife

WSS022

(ISO 7010-W022)

Warning; Sharp

element

3.3 Signs in table 2 may be displayed together to form a sequence of critical mandatory actions to safely launch a lifeboat, rescue boat, or liferaft.

Table 2 — Summary of mandatory action signs for launching lifesaving equipment

MSS022

(ISO 7010-M020) Fasten safety

belts

MSS023

(ISO 7010-M037) Close and secure hatches in launch

sequence

MSS024

(ISO 7010-M038) Start engine in

launch sequence

MSS025

(ISO 7010-M039) Lower lifeboat to

the water in launch sequence

MSS026

(ISO 7010- M040)

Lower liferaft to the water in

launch sequence

MSS027

(ISO 7010- M041) Lower rescue

boat to the water in launch sequence

MSS028

(ISO 7010- M042) Release falls in

launch sequence

MSS029

(ISO 7010- M043) Start water spray

in launch sequence

MSS030

(ISO 7010- M044) Start air supply in launch sequence

MSS031

(ISO 7010- M045)

Release lifeboat gripes in launch

sequence



3.4 Table 3 summarizes the SIS catalogue primarily adapted from resolution A.952(23) and standard ISO 17631 with the exception of the SIS signs listed in paragraph 3.1. Table 3 summarizes the standardized shipboard fire control plan signs used in workplaces and public areas to assist trained persons in the operation and management of shipboard fire control systems. The standardized symbols used in these signs are in accordance with the symbols found in the standard ISO 17631.

Table 3 — Summary of shipboard fire control plan signs (SIS) for shipboard use

SIS001

Fire control plan

SIS009

Remote control for fire doors

SIS017

Closing device for ventilation inlet or outlet (machinery)

SIS025 Emergency fire

pump

SIS033

International shore

connection

SIS041 Inert gas

installation

SIS049 Emergency source of

electrical power (battery)

SIS002

Safety plan

SIS010

Fire damper (accommodation

and service spaces)

SIS018

Closing device for ventilation inlet or outlet

(cargo spaces)

SIS026

Fuel pump(s) remote shut-off

SIS034 Fire hydrant

SIS042

Space or group of spaces

protected by a water fire-

extinguishing system

SIS050 Emergency switchboard

SIS003

Fire and safety plan

SIS011

Fire damper (machinery

space)

SIS019

Remote control for closing device for

ventilation inlet and outlet (accomm)

SIS027 Lube oil

pump(s) remote shut-off

SIS035

Main section valve

SIS043


protected by a foam fire-


SIS051

Air compressor for breathing

devices

SIS004

Ventilation remote control

or shut-off (accommodation

and service spaces)

SIS012

Fire damper (cargo space)

SIS020


ventilation inlet and outlet

(machinery)

SIS028

Remote control for bilge pump(s)

SIS036 Sprinkler-

section valve

SIS044


protected by a gas other than

CO2 fire-extinguishing

system

SIS052

Control panel for fire

detection and alarm system

N



SIS005


or shut-off (machinery

spaces)

SIS013

Remote control for fire damper

(accommodation or service spaces)

SIS021


ventilation inlet and outlet

(cargo)

SIS029 Remote control for emergency

bilge pump

SIS037

Powder-section valve

SIS045


protected by a powder fire-extinguishing

system

SIS006


or shut-off (cargo)

SIS014

Remote control for fire damper

(machinery)

SIS022

Remote control for fire pump

SIS030

Remote control for fuel oil

valves

SIS038

Foam-section valve

SIS046 Space or group

of spaces protected by a

CO2 fire-extinguishing

system

SIS007

Remote control for skylight

SIS015

Remote control for fire damper (cargo space)

SIS023

Fire pump

SIS031 Remote control

for lube oil valves

SIS039 High expansion

foam supply trunk (outlet)

SIS047


protected by a sprinkler or

high-pressure water fire-


SIS008

Remote control for watertight

doors

SIS016

Closing device for ventilation inlet or outlet

(accommodation and service

spaces)

SIS024

emergency fire pump Remote control or fire

pump supplied by the

emergency source of

power

SIS032

Remote control for fire pump

valves

SIS040 Water spray

system valves 2.24

SIS048 Emergency generator

***



ANNEX 9

DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR

UNIFIED INTERPRETATIONS OF SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its [ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017)], with a view to providing more specific guidance on suitable means for the calibration of portable atmosphere testing instruments for cargo areas of tankers; fire integrity of the boundaries of spaces within the cargo area of tankers; and fire integrity of the bulkheads between the wheelhouse and the navigation lockers inside the wheelhouse, approved unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its fourth session (20 to 24 March 2017), as set out in the annex. 2 Member States are invited to use the annexed unified interpretations as guidance when applying the provisions of SOLAS regulations II-2/4 and II-2/9, and to bring the unified interpretations to the attention of all parties concerned.



ANNEX

DRAFT UNIFIED INTERPRETATIONS OF SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 REGULATION 4.5.7 – GAS MEASUREMENT AND DETECTION Regulation 4.5.7.1 – Portable instrument Compliance with the provision "suitable means shall be provided for the calibration of such instruments" in SOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.7.1, as adopted by resolution MSC.291(87), may be achieved by portable atmosphere testing instruments being calibrated on board or ashore in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. For the avoidance of any doubt, the above consideration refers to the calibration of portable instruments for measuring oxygen or flammable vapour concentrations, as required by SOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.7.1, and not to any pre-operational accuracy tests as recommended by the manufacturer. REGULATION 9.2 – THERMAL AND STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES Regulation 9.2.4 – Tankers Regulation 9.2.4.2 – Fire integrity of bulkheads and decks Individual compartments of tankers, including those permitted to be located in the cargo area, should be categorized as per regulation 9.2.4, and thus the fire integrity standards stipulated in the relevant regulations should be applied to the boundaries of each space, except a cargo machinery space or a turret compartment on tankers certified under the IGC Code. Regulation 9.2.2 – Passenger ships Regulation 9.2.2.4.2 Regulation 9.2.3 – Cargo ships except tankers Regulation 9.2.3.3.2 Regulation 9.2.4 – Tankers Regulation 9.2.4.2.2 A navigation locker that can only be accessed from the wheelhouse should be considered as a control station with respect to the requirements in tables 9.3, 9.5 and 9.7 of regulation 9, and the bulkhead separating the wheelhouse and such a locker should have fire integrity at least "B-0" class.

***



ANNEX 10

DRAFT CORRIGENDUM TO THE UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 ON THE NUMBER AND ARRANGEMENT OF PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS ON

BOARD SHIPS (MSC.1/CIRC.1275)

Corrigendum In the table of the annex, the words "No point if space is more than 20 m walking distance from an extinguisher at each deck level" are replaced with the words "Spaced not more than 20 m apart on both sides of the space at each deck level in each hold or compartment where vehicles are carried".

***



ANNEX 11

DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR

UNIFIED INTERPRETATIONS OF CHAPTER 15 OF THE FSS CODE 1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its [ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017)], with a view to providing more specific guidance on requirements related to inert gas systems on tankers, approved a unified interpretation of chapter 15 of the FSS Code, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its fourth session (20 to 24 March 2017), as set out in the annex. 2 Member States are invited to use the annexed unified interpretation as guidance when applying paragraphs 15.2.2.2.2, 15.2.2.3.2.2, 15.2.2.4.1 and 15.2.2.4.5 of chapter 15 of the FSS Code, and to bring the unified interpretations to the attention of all parties concerned.



ANNEX

DRAFT UNIFIED INTERPRETATIONS OF CHAPTER 15 OF THE FSS CODE CHAPTER 15 – INERT GAS SYSTEMS Paragraph 15.2.2.2.2 The automatic shutdown of the inert gas system and its components should involve the following:

.1 shutdown of fans and closing of regulating valve for the following:

.1 high water level in scrubber (not applicable for N2); .2 low pressure/flow to scrubber (not applicable for N2); or .3 high-high temperature of inert gas supply.

.2 closing of regulating valve in the event of:

.1 high oxygen content (in excess of 5% by volume); or .2 failure of blowers/fans or N2 compressors.

.3 activation of double-block and bleed arrangement upon:

.1 loss of inert gas supply (for ships with double block and bleed

replacing water seal); or .2 loss of power.

Paragraph 15.2.2.3.2.2 Unambiguous information of the operational status of stop valves in branch piping leading from the inert gas main to cargo tanks means position indicators providing open/intermediate/closed status information in the control panel required in paragraph 15.2.2.4. Limit switches should be used to positively indicate both open and closed positions. Intermediate position status should be indicated when the valve is in neither open nor closed position. Paragraph 15.2.2.4.1 The operational status of the inert gas system should be based on indication that inert gas is being supplied downstream of the gas regulating valve and on the pressure or flow of the inert gas mains upstream of the non-return devices. However, the operational status of the inert gas system as required in paragraph 15.2.2.4.1 should not be considered to require additional indicators and alarms other than those specified in paragraphs 15.2.2.4 and 15.2.3.2 or 15.2.4.2, as appropriate.



Paragraph 15.2.2.4.5.3 The term "alarm system independent" means that a second pressure sensor, independent of the sensor serving the alarms for low pressure, high pressure and pressure indicator/recorder should be provided. Notwithstanding the above, a common programmable logic controller (PLC) should, however, be accepted for the alarms in the control system. The independent sensor should not be required if the system is arranged for the shutdown of cargo pumps. If a system for shutdown of cargo pumps is arranged, an automatic system shutting down all cargo pumps should be provided. The shutdown should be alarmed at the control station. The shutdown should not prevent the operation of ballast pumps or pumps used for bilge drainage of a cargo pump room.

***



ANNEX 12

DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR

AMENDMENT TO THE UNIFIED INTERPRETATION OF SOLAS REGULATION II-1/29 (MSC.1/CIRC.1398)

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its [ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017)], with a view to keeping the references provided in the unified interpretation up to date, approved the amendment to the Unified interpretation of SOLAS regulation II-1/29 (MSC.1/Circ.1398), prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its fourth session (20 to 24 March 2017), as set out in the annex. 2 Member States are invited to use the annexed amendment as guidance when applying SOLAS regulation II-1/29, and to bring the amendment to the unified interpretation to the attention of all parties concerned.



ANNEX

DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE MECHANICAL, HYDRAULIC AND ELECTRICAL INDEPENDENCY AND FAILURE DETECTION AND RESPONSE OF STEERING

CONTROL SYSTEMS The reference "; and IEC Publication 60092-204 Electrical installations in ships. Part 204: System design – Electric and electrohydraulic steering gear (1987)" in section 1 is deleted.

***



ANNEX 13

DRAFT SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE REVIEW OF SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 AND ASSOCIATED CODES REGARDING RO-RO SPACES AND SPECIAL CATEGORY

SPACES OF NEW AND EXISTING RO-RO PASSENGER SHIPS

Task Actions Sources of actions

proposed

Prevention/Ignition

Investigate and review:

.1 causes of fire ignition in vehicles including temperature-controlled units;

.2 electrical supply and connections

to vehicles including temperature-controlled units;

.3 risks arising from alternatively

powered vehicles; and .4 best practice in operational

procedures and training.

Assess possible risk control options (RCOs), develop guidelines and consider amendments to instruments.

MSC 97/19/3, paragraphs 25.1, 25.9, 25.10 and 25.13

Detection and Decision


.1 fire growth mechanisms such as slow and fast growth;

.2 fire detection, including in-vehicle

fires and the effect of vehicle stowage density, wind and ventilation;

.3 detection systems for leakages

from alternative fuel vehicles; and .4 best practice in operational


Assess possible RCOs, develop guidelines and consider amendments to instruments.

MSC 97/19/3 paragraphs 25.2, 25.3, 25.10 and 25.13; MSC 97/19/13, paragraph 6




proposed

Extinguishment


.1 fire suppression systems, capabilities and reliability, and the effect of vehicle stowage density, wind and ventilation;

.2 fire extinguishing systems,

capabilities and reliability, and the effect of vehicle stowage density, wind and ventilation;

.3 speedy activation of systems in

the correct location; .4 design criteria for user friendliness

in fire suppression and extinguishing systems to be easy and readily understandable to operate;

.5 techniques for tackling fires

involving alternatively powered vehicles; and

.6 best practice in operational



MSC 97/19/3, paragraphs 25.4, 25.5, 25.6, 25.14, 25.10 and 25.13; MSC 97/19/13, paragraphs 6 and 7

Containment


.1 fire containment longitudinally, within the ro-ro deck, by passive and/or active measures;

.2 the efficacy of boundary fire and

smoke containment; .3 techniques for containment of fires

involving alternatively powered vehicles; and

.4 best practice in operational



MSC 97/19/3, paragraphs 25.7, 25.8, 25.10 and 25.13




proposed

Integrity of LSA and Evacuation


.1 location of embarkation and launching areas of LSA;

.2 casualty threshold (SRTP) and

safe area concepts; and .3 best practice in operational



MSC 97/19/3, paragraphs 25.11, 25.12 and 25.13

NOTE: Documents SSE 2/INF.3, MSC 96/INF.3 and SSE 4/INF.6 can be taken into account, in particular, when assessing possible RCOs.

***



ANNEX 14 DRAFT WORK PLAN FOR THE REVIEW OF SOLAS CHAPTER II-2 AND ASSOCIATED CODES REGARDING RO-RO SPACES AND SPECIAL CATEGORY SPACES OF NEW

AND EXISTING RO-RO PASSENGER SHIPS

Year IMO Body Actions

2017 SSE 4 Develop the scope and work plan for review of SOLAS and associated codes. Invite Members States and international organizations to submit proposals regarding the draft Interim Guidelines and draft amendments to SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes, for consideration at SSE 5. Agree that consequential amendments to SOLAS chapter III and the STCW Convention and Code may be necessary.

2017 MSC 98 Approve the scope and the work plan on review of SOLAS and associated codes. Agree that consequential amendments to SOLAS chapter III may be developed under this output.

2018 SSE 5 Continue the development of the draft Interim Guidelines. Consider draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, and associated codes. Establish a correspondence group, with a view to finalizing the draft Interim Guidelines and further development of draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, and associated codes. Decide on what actions, if any, should be taken by HTW 5 with regard to training issues to be included in the draft Interim Guidelines and consequential amendments to the STCW Convention and Code, and request HTW 5 accordingly.

[2018 HTW 5 Consider related training issues to be included in the draft Interim Guidelines and consequential amendments to the STCW Convention and Code, and advise SSE 6 accordingly.]

2019 SSE 6 Finalize the draft Interim Guidelines and draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, and associated codes.

2019 MSC 101 Approve the Interim Guidelines. Approve draft amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, and associated codes.

2020 MSC 102 Adopt amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, and associated codes.

2024 – Entry into force of amendments to SOLAS chapters II-2 and III, and associated codes.

***



ANNEX 15

BIENNIAL STATUS REPORT AND OUTPUTS ON THE COMMITTEE'S POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA THAT FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON SHIP SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT (SSE)

Output number

Description Target completion

year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)

Coordinating organ(s)

Status of output for

Year 1


Year 2

References

1.1.2.3 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, and environment-related Conventions

Continuous MSC / MEPC III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR

Ongoing Completed MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; SSE 4/19, section 12

Notes: The Assembly, at its twenty-eighth session, had expanded the output to include all proposed unified interpretations to provisions of IMO safety, security, and environment-related Conventions.

2.0.1.5 (New)

Amendments to SOLAS regulations II-2/20.2 and II-2/20-1 to clarify the fire safety requirements for cargo spaces containing vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own propulsion

2017 MSC SSE CCC No work requested

No work requested

MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.6; MSC 97/22, paragraphs 10.4 and 10.5

5.1.1.2 Clarification of the requirements in SOLAS chapter II-2 for fire integrity of windows on passenger ships carrying not more than 36 passengers and special purpose ships with more than 60 (but no more than 240) persons on board

2017 MSC SSE Completed MSC 95/22, paragraph 19.30; MSC 97/22, paragraphs 8.6 and 8.7




Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

5.1.1.4 Development of life safety performance criteria for alternative design and arrangements for fire safety (MSC.1/Circ.1002)

2016 MSC SSE Completed MSC 90/28, paragraph 25.12; MSC 97/22, paragraph 8.2

5.1.2.1 Making the provisions of MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 mandatory

2017 MSC SSE Extended Completed MSC 95/22, paragraphs 12.36 and 19.29; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 3.82 and 3.86; SSE 4/19, section 4

Notes: Target completion year extended to 2017 (MSC 96/25, paragraphs 8.15 and 23.34).

5.1.2.4 Revision of requirements for escape route signs and equipment location markings in SOLAS and related instruments

2016 MSC HTW SSE Extended Completed MSC 94/21, paragraph 18.24; SSE 4/19, section 10

Notes: Target completion year extended to 2017 (MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.34).

5.1.2.5 (New)

Develop new requirements for ventilation of survival crafts (2018)

2017 MSC SSE No work requested

Postponed MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.22; SSE 4/19, section 14

Notes: Pending endorsement by C 118




Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

5.2.1.1 Revised SOLAS regulation II-1/3-8 and associated guidelines (MSC.1/Circ.1175) and new guidelines for safe mooring operations for all ships

2017 MSC HTW / SSE SDC No work requested

No work requested

MSC 95/22, paragraph 19.22;

Notes: Target completion year extended to 2019 (SDC 4/16, paragraph 11.10)

5.2.1.2 Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for low-flashpoint fuels

2016 MSC HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE

CCC No work requested

No work requested

MSC 94/21, paragraphs 18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3

Notes: MSC 97 approved the request of CCC 3 to extend the target completion year to 2017 (MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.2)

5.2.1.5 Revised SOLAS regulations II-1/13 and II-1/13-1 and other related regulations for new ships

2017 MSC SDC SSE In progress Extended MSC 95/22, paragraphs 19.20 and 19.32; SSE 4/19, section 11

5.2.1.10 Safety objectives and functional requirements of the Guidelines on alternative design and arrangements for SOLAS chapters II-1 and III

2017 MSC SSE In progress Extended

MSC 82/24, paragraph 3.92; SSE 4/19, section 3




Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

5.2.1.11 Amendments to the Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning (DP) systems (MSC/Circ.645)

2016 MSC SSE Extended Completed MSC 90/28, paragraph 25.35; SSE 4/19, section 9


5.2.1.14 Review of the MODU Code, LSA Code and MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1



5.2.1.15 Consequential work related to the new Code for ships operating in polar waters

2017 MSC / MEPC NCSR / PPR / SSE

SDC No work requested

Extended MSC 93/22, paragraphs 10.44, 10.50 and 20.12; MSC 96/25, paragraph 3.77; MSC 97/22, paragraphs 8.32 and 19.25; SSE 4/19, section 15




Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

5.2.1.22 Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and winches

2017 MSC SSE In progress Extended


Notes: Based on the scope of the draft SOLAS regulation, the Committee has been requested to approve the change of the existing title of the output to "Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches".

5.2.1.27 (New)

Amendments to the FSS Code for CO2 pipelines in under-deck passageways


Extended MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.26; SSE 4/19, section 7

5.2.1.28 (New)

Uniform implementation of paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code


Completed MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.28; SSE 4/19, section 5

5.2.1.29 (New)

Review SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes to minimize the incidence and consequences of fires on ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships (2019)

2017 MSC HTW / SDC SSE No work requested

Postponed MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.19; SSE 4/19, section 13





Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

7.1.2.3 Code for the transport and handling of limited amounts of hazardous and noxious liquid substances in bulk on offshore support vessels

2017 MSC / MEPC SDC / SSE PPR No work requested

No work requested

14.0.1.1 Analysis and consideration of recommendations to reduce administrative burdens in IMO instruments including those identified by the SG-RAR

2017 Council III / HTW / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE /

NCSR

MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG

No work requested

No work requested

MSC 96/25, paragraphs 19.4.5, 19.4.9 and 19.4.10



OUTPUTS ON THE COMMITTEE'S POST-BIENNIAL AGENDA THAT FALL UNDER THE PURVIEW OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE


ACCEPTED POST-BIENNIAL OUTPUTS

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)

Coordinating organs(s)

Timescale (sessions)

References Number Biennium1

Reference to High-

level Actions

Description

9 2012-2013 2.0.1 Revision of the provisions for helicopter facilities in SOLAS and the MODU Code

MSC [SDC] [SSE]

2 MSC 86/26, paragraph 23.39

Notes: The associated organ should be SSE (SDC 4/16, paragraph 13.11.1)2.

42 2012-2013 5.2.1 Review of the 2009 Code on Alerts and Indicators

MSC NCSR [SDC] [SSE]

2 MSC 89/25, paragraph 22.25

Notes: The coordinating organ should be SSE (SDC 4/16, paragraph 13.11.1)2.

90 2014-2015 5.2.1 Amendments to the LSA Code for thermal performance of immersion suits

MSC SSE 2

***

1 Biennium when the output was placed on the post-biennial agenda. 2 Pending endorsement by MSC 98.



ANNEX 16

PROPOSED BIENNIAL AGENDA OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE FOR THE 2018-2019 BIENNIUM


Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

1.1.2.3 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, and environment-related Conventions

Continuous MSC / MEPC III / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE / NCSR

Ongoing Completed MSC 78/26, paragraph 22.12; SSE 4/19, section 12

Notes: The Assembly, at its twenty-eighth session, had expanded the output to include all proposed unified interpretations to provisions of IMO safety, security, and environment-related Conventions.

2.0.1.5 (New)

Amendments to SOLAS regulations II-2/20.2 and II-2/20-1 to clarify the fire safety requirements for cargo spaces containing vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own propulsion

2017 MSC SSE CCC No work requested

No work requested

MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.6; MSC 97/22, paragraphs 10.4 and 10.5

5.1.1.2 Clarification of the requirements in SOLAS chapter II-2 for fire integrity of windows on passenger ships carrying not more than 36 passengers and special purpose ships with more than 60 (but no more than 240) persons on board

2017 MSC SSE Completed MSC 95/22, paragraph 19.30; MSC 97/22, paragraphs 8.6 and 8.7




Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

5.1.1.4 Development of life safety performance criteria for alternative design and arrangements for fire safety (MSC.1/Circ.1002)

2016 MSC SSE Completed MSC 90/28, paragraph 25.12; MSC 97/22, paragraph 8.2.

5.1.2.1 Making the provisions of MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1 mandatory

2017 MSC SSE Extended Completed MSC 95/22, paragraphs 12.36 and 19.29; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 3.82 and 3.86; SSE 4/19, section 4

Notes: Target completion year extended to 2017 (MSC 96/25, paragraphs 8.15 and 23.34).

5.1.2.4 Revision of requirements for escape route signs and equipment location markings in SOLAS and related instruments



5.1.2.5 (New)

Develop new requirements for ventilation of survival crafts (2018)

2017 2018

MSC SSE No work requested

Postponed MSC 97/22 paragraph 19.22; SSE 4/19, section 14





Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

5.2.1.1 Revised SOLAS regulation II-1/3-8 and associated guidelines (MSC.1/Circ.1175) and new guidelines for safe mooring operations for all ships

2017 2019

MSC HTW / SSE SDC No work requested

No work requested

MSC 95/22, paragraph 19.22; SDC 4/16, section 11

Notes Target completion year extended to 2019 (SDC 4/16, paragraph 11.10)

5.2.1.2 Amendments to the IGF Code and development of guidelines for low-flashpoint fuels

2016 [2019]

MSC HTW / PPR / SDC / SSE

CCC No work requested

No work requested

MSC 94/21, paragraphs 18.5 and 18.6; MSC 96/25, paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3

Notes: MSC 97 approved the request of CCC 3 to extend the target completion year to 2017 (MSC 97/22, paragraph 19.2)

5.2.1.5 Revised SOLAS regulations II-1/13 and II-1/13-1 and other related regulations for new ships

2017 2019

MSC SDC SSE In progress Extended MSC 95/22, paragraphs 19.20 and 19.32; SSE 4/19, section 11

5.2.1.10 Safety objectives and functional requirements of the Guidelines on alternative design and arrangements for SOLAS chapters II-1 and III

2017 2019

MSC SSE In progress Extended


5.2.1.11 Amendments to the Guidelines for vessels with dynamic

2016 MSC SSE Extended Completed MSC 90/28, paragraph 25.35;




Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

positioning (DP) systems (MSC/Circ.645)

SSE 4/19, section 9


5.2.1.14 Review of the MODU Code, LSA Code and MSC.1/Circ.1206/Rev.1



5.2.1.15 Consequential work related to the new Code for ships operating in polar waters

2017 2019

MSC / MEPC NCSR / PPR / SSE

SDC No work requested

Extended MSC 93/22, paragraphs 10.44, 10.50 and 20.12; MSC 96/25, paragraph 3.77; MSC 97/22, paragraphs 8.32 and 19.25; SSE 4/19, section 15

5.2.1.22 Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and anchor handling winches

2017 2019

MSC SSE In progress Extended


5.2.1.27 (New)

Amendments to the FSS Code for CO2 pipelines in under-deck passageways

2017 2018


Extended MSC 96/25, paragraph 23.26; SSE 4/19, section 7




Output number


year

Parent organ(s)

Associated organ(s)



Year 1


Year 2

References

5.2.1.28 (New)

Uniform implementation of paragraph 6.1.1.3 of the LSA Code

2017



5.2.1.29 (New)

Review SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes to minimize the incidence and consequences of fires on ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships (2019)

2017 2019

MSC HTW / SDC SSE No work requested



7.1.2.3 Code for the transport and handling of limited amounts of hazardous and noxious liquid substances in bulk on offshore support vessels

2017 MSC / MEPC SDC / SSE PPR No work requested

No work requested

14.0.1.1 Analysis and consideration of recommendations to reduce administrative burdens in IMO instruments including those identified by the SG-RAR

2017 Council III / HTW / PPR / CCC / SDC / SSE /

NCSR

MSC / MEPC / FAL / LEG

No work requested

No work requested

MSC 96/25, paragraphs 19.4.5, 19.4.9 and 19.4.10

***



ANNEX 17

PROPOSED PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR SSE 5

Opening of the session 1 Adoption of the agenda 2 Decisions of other IMO bodies 3 Safety objectives and functional requirements of the Guidelines on alternative design

and arrangements for SOLAS chapters II-1 and III (5.2.1.10)

4 Develop new requirements for ventilation of survival crafts (5.1.2.5)

5 Consequential work related to the new Code for ships operating in polar waters

(5.2.1.15) 6 Review SOLAS chapter II-2 and associated codes to minimize the incidence and

consequences of fires on ro-ro spaces and special category spaces of new and existing ro-ro passenger ships (5.2.1.29)

7 Amendments to the FSS Code for CO2 pipelines in under-deck passageways

(5.2.1.27) 8 Requirements for onboard lifting appliances and [anchor handling] winches (5.2.1.22) 9 Revised SOLAS regulations II 1/13 and II-1/13-1 and other related regulations for new

ships (5.2.1.5) 10 Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security, and environment-related

Conventions (1.1.2.3) 11 Biennial status report and provisional agenda for SSE 6 12 Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for 2019 13 Any other business 14 Report to the Maritime Safety Committee

***



ANNEX 18

DRAFT MSC CIRCULAR

AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATION AND REPLACEMENT OF LIFEBOAT RELEASE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS (MSC.1/CIRC.1392)

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its [ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017)], with a view to including a method of assessment for backing plates and bolts not made of material resistant to corrosion in the marine environment to confirm their condition, approved amendments to the Guidelines for evaluation and replacement of lifeboat release and retrieval systems (MSC.1/Circ.1392), prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its fourth session (20 to 24 March 2017), as set out in the annex. 2 Member States are invited to use the annexed amendments as guidance when applying SOLAS regulation III/1.5, as adopted by resolution MSC.317(89), and to bring the amendments to the attention of all parties concerned.



ANNEX

DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATION AND REPLACEMENT OF LIFEBOAT RELEASE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS (MSC.1/CIRC.1392)

Paragraph 21 is replaced with the following:

"21 The Administration, or a recognized organization acting on its behalf, may allow that hook fixed structural connections of the release mechanism and supporting structure which are not made of material resistant to corrosion in the marine environment, as required by paragraph 4.4.7.6.9 of the LSA Code, need not be replaced if they are in a good condition and installed in a sheltered position inside the lifeboat. The assessment for verifying that fixed structural connections and supporting structures are in 'good condition' should be carried out by the manufacturer or by one of its representatives in accordance with paragraph 23 below. The assessment for verification is not required if the materials of the foundation, bolts and supporting structure, internally and externally, are made of materials resistant to corrosion in the marine environment. .1 Method of assessment:

The assessment of fixed structural connections of the release mechanism and supporting structures should be carried out according to the manual developed by the manufacturer. However, if such a manual does not exist or the original equipment manufacturer or any entity which has taken legal and legitimate responsibilities for equipment when the original equipment manufacturer no longer exists or supports the equipment, this assessment should be carried out according to the following method:

.1 100% visual examination of all components within clear sight in

order to assess the general condition and look for signs of corrosion. No dismantling or removal of components is required at this stage.

.2 At least 25% of bolts for each hook fixation should be removed for

visual examination1. Additionally, a non-destructive testing (NDT) technique, such as magnetic particle inspection (MPI), where suitable, may be applied. If any of the removed bolts of the hook fixation shows signs of corrosion or are deemed to be in "bad condition", then the rest of the bolts for the same hook fixation should be removed and examined. As a general rule, any bolt that has lost material to corrosion of 2% from the original dimensions should be deemed to be "in bad condition" and replaced. Replacement bolts are to be made of material corrosion resistant in the marine environment based on a like for like principle.

1 In most types of lifeboats, the arrangement of keel shoe fixation allows for access and removal of

bolts for inspection. When this is not the case, e.g. where bolts are solidly embedded or built in to the fiber reinforced plastic (FRP) structure, the Adminstration, or recognized organization acting on its behalf, should handle it on a case-by-case basis.



.3 If fixed structural connections of the release mechanism or supporting structures show signs of corrosion, then ultrasonic thickness measurement and corrosion mapping should be performed. For this non-destructive examination (NDE) to be possible, the probes need to have adequate access and the surface needs to be smooth and appropriate for ultrasonic scanning. As a general rule, a backing plate that has suffered corrosion wastage of 10% or more from the original plate thickness should be deemed to be "in bad condition" and replaced. Replacement of structural connections, backing plates, etc. are to be made of materials resistant to corrosion in the marine environment and based on a like for like principle.

.4 If after the assessment, the bolts, backing plates, keel shoes, etc.

are in good condition, then all parts are to be cleaned and recoated, if necessary.

.2 Backing plates and bolts installed outside the lifeboat and deemed to be in

"good condition" after the assessment, need not be replaced even when not made of material resistant to corrosion in the marine environment."

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