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Able but not motivated? Therelative effects of happy andsad mood on persuasive messageprocessingMonique M. Mitchell aa Assistant Professor in the Department of CommunicationStudies , University of Texas , Austin, TXPublished online: 02 Jun 2009.

To cite this article: Monique M. Mitchell (2000) Able but not motivated? The relative effectsof happy and sad mood on persuasive message processing, Communication Monographs, 67:2,215-226, DOI: 10.1080/03637750009376505

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Able but not Motivated?The Relative Effects of Happy and Sad Mood

on Persuasive Message ProcessingMonique M. Mitchell

The effects of happy and sad moods on systematic processing are examined in the present study.Research has indicated that positive mood leads to less systematic processing, and negative moodheightens systematic processing. Debate has ensued as to whether persons in a positive mood lackthe cognitive ability to process messages systematically (e.g., Worth & Mackie, 1987), or lackthe motivation to process systematically (e.g., Bohner et al., 1992). In the present study, it wasposited that, consistent with Cialdini's Negative State Relief Model (1973), persons in apositive mood lack the motivation to process, but do not lack the cognitive ability to do so. Anexperiment was designed to test this motivational hypothesis by varying outcome involvement,message strength, and mood. Contrary to the cognitive inability hypothesis, results indicatedthat persons in a positive mood do have the cognitive capacity to process systematically, but thatmessage strength is the major predictor of attitude.

One of the most obvious effects in the persuasion literature is that persons aremore persuaded by strong persuasive messages than by weak persuasive

messages.1 The effect, however, can be moderated. One such moderator is the moodexperienced by the message receiver. Message strength has a weak effect on peoplein a happy mood, whereas message strength has a strong effect on those in a sad orneutral mood (Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992; Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi, 1994;Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993).

The goal of the present study was to compare two competing explanations of thesemood dependent effects: the lack of ability hypothesis (e.g. Mackie & Worth, 1989)and the lack of motivation hypothesis (e.g., Bohner, Crow, Erb, & Schwarz, 1992). Itis proposed that persons in a positive mood may lack the motivation to processsystematically. Specifically, it is proposed that under high motivation conditions,participants in a positive mood process persuasive messages systematically andtherefore distinguish weak persuasive messages from strong persuasive messages.

Rationale

Hypotheses regarding the relationship between message irrelevant mood andattitudes toward a topic can be drawn from the Heuristic Systematic Model (HSM),(Eagly & Chaiken, 1983) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty &Cacioppo, 1981). The HSM, much like the ELM posits that receivers engage ineither heuristic processing or systematic message processing. The systematic route topersuasion is marked by message scrutinization, and predicts that attitude change isa function of message content and elaboration. This kind of processing is indicatedby careful and effortful evaluation of the message (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, forreview). The heuristic, or peripheral route to persuasion involves the association ofmessage recommendations with heuristic cues in the environment (Petty & Ca-cioppo, 1981). Heuristic processing occurs when receivers use mental shortcuts in

Monique M. Mitchell (Ph.D., Michigan State University, 1999) is an Assistant Professor in the Department ofCommunication Studies at the University of Texas, Austin, TX.

Communication Monographs, Vol. 67, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 215-226Copyright 2000, National Communication Association

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216 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS

lieu of engaging in issue relevant thinking to determine their attitude. Eagly andChaiken purport that this type of reasoning is a limited mode of informationprocessing requiring little cognitive effort and few cognitive resources (1993).Attitudes formed via heuristic processing are less stable, less resistant to counterargu-ments, and less predictive of subsequent behavior than those attitudes formed viasystematic processing. Whether people process a message heuristically or systemati-cally, however, is moderated by the motivation and the ability to do so (Eagly &Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). If a person lacks ability or motivation, thelikelihood of heuristic processing increases. If both motivation and ability are high,the probability of systematic processing increases (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 327).Using this theoretical framework, Worth and Mackie (1987) demonstrated thatpersons in a negative mood engage in systematic processing and are more persuadedby strong persuasive messages than by weak messages. In contrast, Worth andMackie argue that persons in a positive mood exhibit heuristic processing areequally persuaded by strong and weak messages, and are more persuaded by expertsources than by non-experts regardless of message strength.2

Lack of Ability Hypothesis

Mackie and Worth (1989) maintain that people in a positive mood lack the ability,or cognitive capacity to process persuasive messages systematically, claiming thatmood might serve as a distraction interfering with the ability to process a messagecentrally. In addition, Mackie and Worth assert that positive mood activates otherconcepts to which people have attached positive meaning (such as sunshine, kittens,etc.) making it difficult to process other kinds of information. This finding has beenexplained through the Semantic Network Hypothesis (see Bower, 1981, for review).Cognitive capacity required to concentrate on other material is limited due to thesethoughts. Mackie and Worth (1989) reasoned that participants in past research weregiven limited exposure to persuasive messages, therefore, participants in a positivemood were not given adequate time for message processing. They hypothesized thatparticipants in a positive mood would engage in less systematic processing in limitedexposure conditions, but engage in more systematic processing in unlimited expo-sure. Although the hypotheses were consistent with their data, their methodologyhas been the subject of debate (Bohner, Crow, Erb & Schwarz, 1992). Bohner and hiscolleagues argued that by telling the participants that they have " . . . as much time asneeded to read a persuasive message" Mackie and Worth may have cued partici-pants that " . . . the experimenter expects a careful analysis of message content..."(p. 514). Hence, they have induced motivation to process systematically rather thaninduced the ability to process systematically, as proposed. Bohner et al. proffer thatpersons in a happy mood are able to process messages, but rather are not motivatedto do so.

Lack of Motivation Hypothesis

Bohner et al. (1992) asserted that persons in a positive mood have the ability toprocess persuasive messages systematically, however, they lack the motivation to doso. Smith and Shaffer (1991) experimentally varied mood, message strength, andoutcome involvement to test Bohner et al.'s hypothesis. Their data were partiallyconsistent with the lack of motivation hypothesis. Under low outcome involvementconditions, neutral mood participants generated more message elaborations thandid positive mood participants. This difference vanished, however, under conditions

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MOOD AND PERSUASIVE MESSAGE PROCESSING 217

of high outcome involvement. These findings are consistent with Cialdini's NegativeState Relief Model (Cialdini et al., 1973).

Negative State Relief Model. According to the Negative State Relief Model (NSR)(Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973) a negative mood is accompanied by an intrinsicdrive to alleviate the bad feelings (Carlson & Miller, 1987). Because people do notenjoy negative moods, they work toward moving back to their baseline mood.Moreover, individuals are motivated to distract themselves from unpleasant thoughts,and engage in other activities, such as reading a persuasive message, that divert theirattention from the unpleasant affect (Isen & Simmonds, 1978). In addition, partici-pants may be likely to ignore any stimulus that prolongs the negative affect. Thus,they scrutinize a persuasive message and elaborate its message content. In suchconditions it is likely that negative affect would lead persons to distinguish betweenweak and strong persuasive messages, and attitude change would occur via thesystematic route.

On the other hand, those in a positive mood are less likely to engage in messageelaboration because they process stimuli that maintains positive affect. Criticalanalysis of the persuasive message content and attitude change is unlikely becausethey are concentrating on other stimuli in an attempt to maintain their positivemood. Therefore, those in positive moods are less likely to distinguish between weakand strong persuasive messages because they are not motivated to scrutinize themessage. Observations that people in positive moods selectively expose themselvesto positively toned material and avoid negatively toned material are consistent withthis hypothesis (Isen & Simmonds, 1978; Mischel, Ebbessen, & Zeiss, 1973).

Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, and Strack's (1990) study was consistent with thisargument that positive mood does not interfere with systematic processing ability. Inthat study, participants read a counterattitudinal message about a tuition increaseafter a good or bad mood had been induced. In one condition participants wereinstructed to pay attention to the arguments in the message, while in a secondcondition the participants were instructed to pay close attention to the language inthe message. Bless et al.'s results indicated that when participants in a good mood areinstructed to pay attention to arguments, they process the persuasive messagesystematically, indicating that happy persons have the ability to process a messagebut not necessarily the motivation to always do so. One way to induce motivation inresearch participants is to involve them in the outcome of the persuasive messagetopic because they perceive they will be affected by the outcome (Chaiken, 1980).

It is hypothesized that under low involvement conditions the results of pastresearch will be replicated. Specifically, message strength will have no effect on persons in ahappy mood, but message strength will have an effect on those in a sad mood. Sad moodparticipants will be motivated to process systematically and therefore will be capable ofdistinguishing between weak and strong persuasive messages. Happy mood participants, on theother hand, will not be motivated to process systematically under low involvement conditions,and thus will be equally persuaded by weak and strong persuasive messages.

In high involvement conditions; however, message effects will be evident. Partici-pants in a happy mood will be motivated to process the persuasive messagesystematically and thus will rate weak messages as weak and strong messages asstrong. Sad mood participants will also be motivated to process systematically.Moreover, attitude change will be a function of message strength and involvement.In order to measure systematic processing thought listing procedures were em-

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218 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS

ployed. Specifically, (1) the number of negative and positive thoughts were mea-sured, (2) the number of recalled message arguments and number of errors inrecalling message arguments will be counted, and (3) the amount of time taken toread the persuasive message will be timed as a measure of systematic processing.Persons who process the persuasive message systematically will have more negative thoughtsabout the weak message, and more positive thoughts about the strong message. According tothe ELM and the HSM, if people engage in issue relevant thinking, and systemati-cally process the persuasive message the lack of clear logic in the weak message willbe evident. This will lead to negative thoughts about the message on behalf of theparticipants. If the lack of ability hypothesis is correct, in the low involvement conditionspersons in a positive mood will have equal numbers of negative and positive thoughts for bothweak and strong messages. However, in the high motivation conditions persons in a positivemood will have more positive thoughts about the strong persuasive message, and less positivethoughts about the weak persuasive message. Similarly, persons who systematically process willrecall more of the message arguments, take more time to read the message, and make fewererrors in recalling the message. Similar patterns in the means should emerge for all of thedependent variables if the lack of motivation hypothesis is correct.

Method

Participants

Participants (n = 211) were lower level communication undergraduates recruitedfrom a freshman level undergraduate communication course at a large midwesternuniversity. Participants received course credit. They participated in groups of four toeight. Fifty-eight percent of the sample was female, and the mean age was 23 years.Seventy-four percent of the sample was Caucasian.

Procedure and Design

A 2 (high involvement or low involvement) X 2 (strong message or weak mes-sage) X 2 (sad or happy mood) independent groups design was employed. Partici-pants were given instructions indicating they would be completing several indepen-dent tasks for various researchers in their department. Each participant was assignedrandomly to either high/low involvement, happy/sad mood, and weak/strongpersuasive message via coin flipping.

First, participants received the mood induction and subsequently completed thefirst mood induction check and some demographic items to help disguise the truenature of the induction check. Second, the participants were given the motivationinduction. Specifically, they were informed that comprehensive exams were man-dated at their university in the fall (high motivation) or comprehensive exams weremandated in Canada in 2007 (low motivation). Third, each participant receivedeither a weak or strong counterattitudinal message about comprehensive exams.Participants were then told to read the message and complete the questionnaire thatcontained the attitude measure, the thought listing task, the recall task, and allinduction checks. The participants were timed by research assistants who stoodbehind a one-way mirror. Finally, participants were fully debriefed.3

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MOOD AND PERSUASIVE MESSAGE PROCESSING 219

Instrumentation

Mood induction. Subjects were given 15 minutes to write a vivid and detailedparagraph either describing the happiest time of their life or the saddest time in theirlife, purportedly to help with the construction of the Michigan Life Events Survey(MLES). Previous research (Bless et al., 1992; Bless & Fiedler, 1995) has shown thatwriting about the happiest or saddest time of your life is an effective mood induction.Subjects were then asked to fill out eight short Iikert type items ranging from one tofive (1 = very sad, 5 = very happy) purportedly as a part of a different study.Embedded in these questions was a induction check tapping into the effectiveness oftheir induced mood. For example, "At the current time I feel happy." Participantsfilled out the mood induction at the beginning and at the end of the study in order toassess the longevity of the mood induction.

Message strength. A strong persuasive message was denned as a message containingeight logical pieces of persuasive evidence about comprehensive exams for seniors.The strong arguments were adopted from Petty, Harkins, and Williams (1980, p. 87;see Appendix A). A weak persuasive message is defined as a message containingeight weak pieces (containing weak logic) of persuasive evidence about comprehen-sive exams for seniors (see Appendix B). The messages were equal in length(approximately 342 words each). These arguments were adopted from Petty et al.(1980, p. 87). Subjects were also asked to fill out five short Likert type items rangingfrom one to five (1 = not persuasive, 5 = very persuasive) as an induction check formessage strength.

Motivation. High motivation was induced by instructing the participants thatcomprehensive exams for seniors would be required at their university the followingfall semester. Hence, they would be required to take the exam prior to graduation.Low motivation was induced by instructing the students that comprehensive examswill be required at a university in Canada in 2007. Hence, they would not have totake the exams. Subjects were asked to fill out four short Likert type items rangingfrom one to five (1 = not involved, 5 = very involved) as an induction check.

Attitude. Attitude was measured via five Likert type questions tapping into theperson's feelings about taking comprehensive exams (1 = exams are a bad idea;5 = exams are a good idea).

Recall. As one measure of systematic processing, correct recall was measured bycounting the amount of persuasive arguments the participant correctly recalled.Number of omissions and comissions were also considered. Omissions are definedas the number of arguments the participant did not recall, or omitted, in the recalltask. Comissions were defined as the number of arguments the participants recalled,but did not actually exist in the persuasive message. Two trained coders separatelycoded 10% of the recall tasks together in order to calculate inter-coder reliability.Inter-coder reliabilities were r = .94 for correct recall, r = .94 for omissions, and r =.86 for comissions. All disagreements were resolved via discussion.

Valence of thoughts. After recalling messages from the persuasive message partici-pants were asked to code each of their thoughts as positive (positive thought aboutcomprehensive exams), negative (negative thought about comprehensive exams) or

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220 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS

neutral (thought was not about the message). Each positive, negative and neutralthought was counted.

Time to read the persuasive message. Each participant was also covertly timed whilethey read the persuasive message. It was posited that persons who process systemati-cally would take more time to read the message.

Results

Confirmatory factor analysis procedures were performed on the attitude scale andeach of the induction checks: outcome involvement, message strength, mood at timeone, and mood at time two. The data were consistent with the proposed five factormodel, in which internal consistency and parallelism yielded small errors. A fiveitem unidimensional solution was observed for the attitude scale (M= 12.53,sd= 5.4) which was highly reliable (Cronbach's a = .96). A five item unidimen-sional solution was obtained for message strength (M = 14.28, sd= 4.6). This scalewas also reliable (Cronbach's a = .87). A four item unidimensional solution wasdetermined for outcome involvement (M = 13.24, sd= 4.6, Cronbach's a = .89). Afour item unidimensional solution was observed for the first mood induction check(M = 17.9, sd = 4.45, Cronbach's a = .90). A four item unidimensional solution wasalso found for the second mood induction check (M = 14.17, sd = 3.2, Cronbach'sa = .86).4

Each of the induction checks was effective. Subjects' ratings of message strength(1 = very weak, 5 = very strong) were analyzed in a 2 X 2 X 2 (Mood XInvolvement X Message Strength) ANOVA. Subjects perceived the strong mes-sages to contain stronger arguments (M= 3.18, sd = .84) than the weak messages{M= 2.53, sd= .86, F{1, 201) = 31.9, p< .000, r = .36). An ANOVA was per-formed on participants' ratings of outcome involvement. Subjects perceived the highinvolvement induction (M = 3.78, sd = 1.09) as more involving than the low involve-ment induction (M= 2.77, sd = .97,^(1,203) = 50.91,/) < .000, r= .44).AnANOVAwas performed on participants' ratings of the first mood induction check. Subjectsperceived the happy mood induction [M = 3.60, sd = .84) as producing happiermoods than the sad mood induction [M = 3.29, sd = .78, F[\, 191) = 7.67, p < .006,r = -.18).

It was expected that in low involvement conditions attitude would not be afunction of message quality for those in a happy mood, as consistent with pastresearch. In high involvement conditions, however, attitude would be a function ofthe quality of the persuasive message. These data are not consistent with thathypothesis. An ANOVA on participants' attitude toward comprehensive examsindicated a main effect for involvement {F[\, 203) = 5.9, p < .007, r = .18) and amain effect for message s t rength^ 1,203) = 10.41,/) < .001, r = .21). This indicatesthat participants showed more positive attitudes in response to strong persuasivemessages than to weak persuasive messages with positive scores indicating move-ment toward the advocated position. In addition, their attitudes were more positiveoverall, in the low involvement condition than in the high involvement condition(see Table 1). There was no main effect for mood, and no significant interactioneffects. These data indicate that message strength is a major factor in determiningattitude even in low involvement conditions. This provides evidence for the lack ofmotivation hypothesis, and tends to disconfirm the notion that persons in a positivemood lack the cognitive capacity to process persuasive messages systematically.

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MOOD AND PERSUASIVE MESSAGE PROCESSING

TABLE 1

MEAN SCORES OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES AS A FUNCTION OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION

221

Positive thoughtsNegative thoughtsTimeAttitudePerceived message

strength

Happy Mood

LowInvolvement

WeakMessage

.882.76

122.502.42

2.66

StrongMessage

1.521.84

124.713.09

3.42

HighInvolvement

WeakMessage

.343.86

108.892.00

2.31

StrongMessage

1.002.77

120.032.48

2.87

Sad Mood

LowInvolvement

WeakMessage

.632.71

124.712.61

2.65

StrongMessage

1.002.21

141.132.74

3.38

HighInvolvement

WeakMessage

.694.42

115.602.12

2.52

StrongMessage

1.303.30

137.272.69

3.15

It was proposed that the amount of negative thoughts, amount of positivethoughts, number of omissions, number of comissions, and time taken to read thepersuasive message could be used as measures of systematic processing. An ANOVAindicated that for the number of negative thoughts, a significant main effect emergedfor involvement (i*(l, 203) = 14.85, p < .000, r = .25) as well as a significant maineffect for message strength [F[l, 203) = 8.4, p < .004, r = .19). Participants had morenegative thoughts when the message was weak than when it was strong. They alsohad more negative thoughts in the high involvement condition than in the lowinvolvement condition. Mood, however, had no bearing on the amount of negativethoughts (see Table 1). These data indicate that persons systematically processedunder both low and high involvement conditions. These data also provide evidencefor the lack of motivation hypothesis. In the high involvement conditions theparticipants were more motivated to produce counter arguments (negative thoughts),however, people in both happy and sad moods were cognitively able to do so.

For number of positive thoughts there was a significant main effect for messagestrength {F{1, 203) = 14.3, p < .000, r = .24). Participants had significantly morepositive thoughts when the message was strong than when it was weak, indicatingthat the participants were engaging in systematic processing. Moreover, there was asignificant mood by involvement interaction {F[\, 203) = 5.45, p< .02, r = .15).These data indicate that persons in a positive mood had more positive thoughtswhen involvement was high than when involvement was low. Persons in a sadmood, however, had more positive thoughts when involvement was low than wheninvolvement was high (see Table 1).

For time taken to read the persuasive message, a significant main effect for mood{F[l, 197) = 5.1, p< .02, r = .14) emerged. Persons in a sad mood took longer toread the persuasive message than persons in a happy mood. There was also asignificant main effect for message strength [JF{1, 197) = 5.3, p<.02, r=.14).Participants took a longer amount of time to read the strong persuasive message thanthey did to read the weak persuasive message. No other significant effects emergedfor any other of these dependent variables. These findings are opposite those ofMackie and Worth (1989). The participants in this experiment were given as long asthey desired to read the persuasive message, as they were in Mackie and Worth.They argued that because positive mood participants took longer to read themessage in their study, it provided evidence that such participants needed more time

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222 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS

TABLE 2

CORRELATIONS AMONG THE VARIABLES

123456789

MoodInduction

1.00- . 1 9 "-.02-.01-.00

.07

.03-.00

.07

PerceivedMood

1.00.00.06

-.05.17*.16*.16*

-.10

Involvement

1.00.44**.01

-.17*- . 1 8 "-.08

.25**

PerceivedInvolvement

1.00.19.07

-.04.00.10

MessageStrength

1.00.37.21.25

-.19

PerceivedMessageStrength

1.00.54.41

-.34

Attitude

1.00.41

- . 4 4 "

PositiveThoughts

1.00-.20**

NegativeThoughts

1.00

Note: *p < .05, " p < .01.

to cognitively process since they lacked cognitive ability. These data, however, areconsistent with happy mood participants taking less time to read the message thansad mood participants, and they were still able to differentiate between weak andstrong persuasive messages. Therefore, these data provide evidence that persons in ahappy mood do not lack the ability to process messages systematically. There wereno significant effects for correct recall, the number of omissions, or the number ofcomissions. All of the correlations between these variables are presented in Table 2.

The most potent independent variable in this experiment was message strength.Message strength had a substantial effect on most of the dependent variables.Therefore, this variable was further assessed for its importance in determining thepositivity of one's attitude (see Table 1). Happy mood participants perceived thestrong messages as stronger in the low involvement condition, and the weakmessages as weaker in the high involvement condition. These data clearly indicatethat message strength is the major predictor of systematic processing, not mood. Inorder to further assess this effect, multiple regression analyses were performed.These analyses indicated that message strength had a major effect on attitude(R = .54) while the other two independent variables had nonsignificant effects. Toprovide a more rigorous test of the effect of message strength on attitude a pathmodel was tested (see Figure 1).

The fit of this model was supported by two observations. First, the size of the pathcoefficients were substantial (see Figure 1). Second, the difference between thepredicted and the obtained correlations were insubstantial, and the path model isconsistent with the data (x2(3) = 2.18, p> .05).5

Discussion

The goal of the present study was to compare the lack of motivation hypothesiswith the lack of cognitive ability hypothesis. High and low outcome involvementwere varied to test the motivational hypothesis. The lack of ability hypothesis did notfare well in this study. Interestingly, both happy and sad mood participants wereable to differentiate between weak and strong persuasive messages in both high andlow involvement conditions. In fact, mood had little or no bearing on the number ofmessages one accurately recalled, or the number of positive or negative thoughts.Rather, the most potent independent variable was message strength. The stronger

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MOOD AND PERSUASIVE MESSAGE PROCESSING 223

.37 .54 -.44Message Strength •• Perceived Message •• Attitude • Negative Thoughts

Strength

FIGURE 1.

the message, the more likely relevant thinking during attitude formation will occur.Strong persuasive messages fared better than weak ones in all conditions, regardlessof mood. Researchers need to carefully explore the factors that aid in participants'perceptions of strong persuasive messages. Hence, there is no evidence provided bythis research that persons in a happy mood are cognitive misers, unable to processmessages systematically or are lazy.

The contrast in findings to past research is interesting considering the materialsused were similar to those used by past scholars. The mood induction used in thisstudy was the same used by Bohner et al. (1992), the weak and strong persuasivemessages are those used and developed by Petty and Cacioppo (see Eagly &Chaiken, 1993, p. 310), and the involvement induction is similar to those used byPetty and Cacioppo. However, while the number of participants (n = 211) is notsmall, it is not large enough to reject the assertion that the findings are due tosampling error.6 Moreover, statistics indicate that each of the inductions utilized inthe present study were effective in inducing what they predicted to induce.

One limitation to this study is that the mood induction was weak. While statisticsdid indicate that the happy mood participants felt more happy than the sad moodparticipants, the means suggested that they were not ecstatically happy. Similarly,the sad mood participants were not seriously depressed. This may have affected thefindings. Future research should employ strong mood inductions. Other researchhas used comedy clips to induce happy moods (Smith & Shaffer, 1991) or had theparticipants win a lottery (Mackie & Worth, 1989). Therefore, further research isneeded employing stronger mood inductions before the lack of ability hypothesiscan be dismissed.

A second limitation to the present study, and to research employing the ELM ingeneral, is the tautological definition of strong and weak persuasive messages. Stiffand Boster (1987) addressed this issue at length, yet it is still a pertinent concern incurrent research. While this study did conduct a message quality pre-test, and amessage quality induction check, it is still inherent in the induction that a strongmessage is "one that is perceived as strong." The present study was an attempt toreplicate past research, therefore, past definitions were utilized. However, futureresearchers need to continue to investigate the definition of message strength andtest such perceptions.

Appendix A

The Strong Persuasive Message

It is important for all universities and colleges to remain at the forefront of qualityeducation. One component of being a part of an excellent educational opportunitymeans the requirement of comprehensive exams. The utility and benefits of compre-hensive exams are numerous. To begin with, several prestigious universities such asHarvard and Tulane already mandate comprehensive exams, in an attempt toimprove and maintain academic excellence. For example, institution of the exams

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has led to a reversal in the declining scores on standardized achievement tests atthose universities. Before mandating the comprehensive exam, average total scoreson the GRE were 1650. Since mandating the exam, however, GRE scores have skyrocketed to an average total score of 1800, a national high.

While these results are certainly impressive, it is also true that graduate andprofessional schools show a strong preference for undergraduates who have passedthe exam. For instance, Berkeley and Cornell are two prestigious universities thatrequire their graduate students pass comprehensive exams before entering theirgraduate programs. Moreover, universities that mandate the exams attract largerand more well known corporations to recruit students for jobs. General MotorsCorporation, as well as DOW mentioned their preference for recruiting studentswhom have passed comprehensive exams. That is not to mention that the quality ofundergraduate teaching has improved at schools with comprehensive exams. Class-room attendance, student satisfaction with assignments and overall ratings ofsatisfaction with the college experience have increased by an average of 25 points foruniversities requiring the exam. One professor is quoted stating "Since my univer-sity began mandating comprehensive exams, students seem more interested inlectures, and participation is at an all time high. I truly love teaching now that compsare required."

University alumni have also indicated that they will increase financial support ifthe exams are instituted, allowing a tuition increase to be avoided. Finally, the"National Accrediting Board of Higher Education" would give the Universities itshighest rating if the exams are instituted. Given these arguments it is clear whycomprehensive exams should be mandatory for all graduating seniors.

Appendix B

The Weak Persuasive Message

It is important for all universities and colleges to remain at the forefront of aquality education. One component of being a part of an educational opportunitymeans the requirement of comprehensive exams. The utility and benefits of compre-hensive exams are numerous. To begin with, parents have written to administratorsin support of the plan to mandate comprehensive exams. One parent stated "I thinkthat comprehensive exams are necessary. Maybe they would encourage my son togo to classes."

In addition, the exams would increase student fear, therefore promoting morestudying. In fact, one student at Mississippi State said "I would be totally scared if Ihad to take comprehensive exams. What if I failed? I guess they would motivate meto study all the time!" While these arguments are certainly compelling, it is also truethat the difficulty of the exam will prepare students for later competitions in life. Onestudent who did not have to take comprehensive exams stated in an interview "Lifeafter college was much more difficult than I imagined. I guess I wasn't prepared forthe cut-throat corporate world. Everybody at my job is stabbing someone else in theback. Maybe if I had been faced with more competition in college, I would havebeen ready for it."

That is not to mention that requiring graduate students, but not undergraduatestudents to take the exams is similar to racial discrimination. Clearly, it is unfair thatgraduate students are mandated to pass comprehensive exams before being awarded

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MOOD AND PERSUASIVE MESSAGE PROCESSING 225

their degree, while undergraduates do not have to face such stress. Moreover, therisk of failing comprehensive exams is a challenge most students will welcome andstudents' job prospects might be improved if they take a comprehensive exam priorto graduation. Further, by not administering the exam, a tradition dating back to theancient Greeks is being violated. Finally, the Educational Testing Service would notmarket the exams unless they had great educational value. Given these arguments itis clear why comprehensive exams should be mandatory for all graduating seniors.

Notes

1 Petty and Cacioppo (1980) define strong messages as those that elicit predominantly favorable thoughtsabout the message's advocated position, and weak messages as those that elicit primarily unfavorable thoughts.However, several researchers have criticized research of this ilk for its inherently tautological definition ofmessage strength (see Stiff & Boster, 1987, for example). All messages in this study were pre-tested.

2 Argument strength and argument quality, message strength and message quality are viewed as synonymousin this paper and are used as such.

3 During the debriefing participants were asked if the experimental inductions induced the predictedemotions. Although no qualitative data was collected, participants indicated that the MLES did induce thepredicted emotion, as the induction checks suggest. Moreover, participants were fully debriefed in terms of thefalsity of the persuasive topic, and the exact intent of the study.

4 It is important to note that the second mood induction check provides information on how ephemeral thehappiness and sadness inductions were. At the beginning of the study the participants were significantly happy(M = 17.9). At the end of the study (second mood induction check) the participants' happiness had decreased,but, they were still relatively happy (M= 14.17, range = 4 — 20). Therefore, the induction was seen as lasting.

5 A path model predicting negative thoughts as antecedent to one's attitude failed, a path model predictingpositive thoughts as antecedent to one's attitude failed, and a path model predicting attitude as antecedent toone's positive thoughts failed.

6 A post-hoc power analysis was conducted to examine if the sample size was large enough to detect the effectsizes. Setting alpha and beta at their conventional standards of .01 and .80 respectively (one-tailed) approxi-mately 600 participants would have been needed for this study.

References

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Bohner, G., Crow, K., Erb, H., & Schwarz, N. (1992). Affect and persuasion: Mood effects on the processing ofmessage content and context cues and on subsequent behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22,511-530.

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Stiff, J.B., & Boster, F.J. (1987). Cognitive processing: Additional thoughts and a reply to Petty, Kasmer,Haugtvedt, and Cacioppo. Communication Monographs, 54, 250-256.

Worth, L.T., & Mackie, D.M. (1987). Cognitive mediation of positive affect in persuasion. Social Cognition, 5,76-94.

Received: July 1, 1999Accepted: February 7, 2000

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