aaron weaver - owasp foundation

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Page 1: Aaron Weaver - OWASP Foundation
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Aaron Weaver

Principal Security Analyst, Pearson eCollege

OWASP Philadelphia Chapter Leader

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R-Link

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Patrick Hoffstetter, Renault’s Chief Digital

Officer

The car is becoming a new

platform,” said Mr. Hoffstetter. He

said the seven-inch device can be

controlled by voice recognition or by

buttons on the steering wheel. “We

need help now,” he said. “We

need developers to work on

apps.”

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100 MB of binary code spread

across 50–70

independent computers

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Can Bus

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Ethernet for Cars

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ABS

Seat Position

Engine

Control

Transmission

Suspension

Outside Mirror

Air Conditioner

Instrument Panel

CAN

BUS

Battery

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OBD-II

• On-Board Diagnostics

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-Automotive Industry Professional

Most of the information in this

field is proprietary and you

are sworn by the car

companies to not disclose it.

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CAN Security Challenges

• Broadcast Nature • Fragility to DoS • No Authenticator Fields • Weak Access Control

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Android Torque

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Programming Header

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Arduino + CanBus

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WHAT’S POSSIBLE?

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Firewall for my car?

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Tire Pressure Monitoring System [TPMS]

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What is it?

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http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/ea/fccid/

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[Automotive Persistent Threat]

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Source: Comprehensive Experimental Analyses

of Automotive Attack Surfaces

This progression mirrors the

evolution of desktop computer

compromises: from individual

attacks, to mass exploitation

via worms and viruses, to third-

party markets selling

compromised hosts as a service.

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Guy Disables More Than 100 Cars Remotely

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Automotive Industry Professional

…CAN bus security was

very much on my mind.

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Ford’s Security

• A successful attack should require physical access to the internals of the module

• A successful attack of one device should not be transferrable to immediately hack all devices

• A general perimeter security architecture including hardware should be used to protect the most sensitive components

• External non-hardwired or user accessible interfaces should be hardened as much as possible with multiple levels of protection

Source: Michael Westra, Sync Lead Ford

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Ford’s Security

• Protect the vehicle interface at all cost

• …or to the same level as physical interfaces for serviceability currently mandated by law

• Anyone’s failure gives everyone a black-eye

Source: Michael Westra, Sync Lead Ford

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BMW AppCenter

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Jam the laser?

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References

• http://autosec.org

• Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile

• Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces