aa sanjian...the formulation of the baghdad pact

8/6/2019 Aa Sanjian...the Formulation of the Baghdad Pact

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The Formulation of the Baghdad PactAuthor(s): Ara SanjianSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 226-266Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283868

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The Formulationof the BaghdadPactARA SANJIAN

The formulation of the 1955 Turkish-IraqiPact of Mutual Co-operation,which metamorphosed soon afterwards into the short-lived five-powerBaghdad Pact, is nowadays usually seen as the direct result of the initiativetakenby the United States Secretaryof State, John Foster Dulles, after thelatter's historictrip acrosseleven Middle Easterncapitalsin May 1953. Thisfamous tour- the first-ever to the areaby an American head of diplomacy- is now generally considered as a watershed in Middle East politics,burying plans for the long-cherished Middle East Defence Organisation(MEDO), designated to create a regional bulwark against any possibleSoviet penetration, and replacing it with plans to set up the so-called'Northern Tier' collective defence project, based on the voluntaryparticipationof pro-WesternMiddle Easterncountrieslying on the southernborders of the USSR.

In light of the documentary evidence now available, however, thisassertioncan be held as true only in its broadest sense. Dulles was indeedconvinced duringthe said tour that the continuing controversybetween theBritish and Iranian governments over the fate of the recently nationalizedAnglo-IranianOil Company, the conflict between Egypt and Britain overBritish militarypresence in the Suez Canal base zone, and the continuingArab-Israelidispute over Palestine clearly made MEDO a future rather hanan immediate possibility. He also deduced that MEDO had not workedbecause of Western predominance. Instead, Dulles concluded that theprospectof an anti-Soviet collective defence alliance was more encouragingin Turkey,Pakistan, Iraq and Syria, where political leaders seemed to bemore aware of the Communist threat. His new approach envisaged anassociation of local forces under an indigenous command.Outside powerscould not present a blueprintand expect it to be accepted automatically.Theirabsence could even encourage otherMiddle Easterncountries to join.As the pact developed, however, Westernadvisers could become involvedin the matters of planning and organization. The 'Northern Tier' schemewould, furthermore, separate the issues of regional defence from theintricacies of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli politics.' Dulles understood,however, that, ultimately, for a really viable defence concept to developfully, the participation,or at least the co-operation, of most Arab states inMiddleEasternStudies, Vol.33, No.2, April 1997, pp.226-266PUBLISHEDBY FRANK CASS, LONDON


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THE FORMULATIONOF THE BAGHDAD PACT 227the regionwould be necessary.The latter,however,becauseof theirpastcolonialexperienceswithFranceand the UnitedKingdom,heiremergentnationalism ndpastAmerican ndBritish upportorIsrael,didnotseemreadyto join any such scheme in the immediate uture.Basedon theseobservations,Washingtondecided to follow a more independentandresponsiblepolicy in the area vis-a-vis Britain; drop the previousmultilateralpproach nd work insteadon individual tates like IraqandPakistan,and possibly Syria.Nevertheless, he 'NorthernTier' projectshouldnot be viewed still as a radicalbre,akwithpast plans.Indeed,noneof the countries reviouslynvolved n theextensiveconsultationso setupMEDO,BritainandTurkeyncluded, aw it as such.Rather,Dulles'stripwassimplya new and mportanttage ntheevolution f thegeneralMiddleEastdefenceplan,which was beingdeliberatedn Western apitalseversince the ColdWarpressureshadbegunto be felt in the area in the late1940s.AyeshaJalalrightlypointsout thatmuchof Dulles'sso-callednewideas had been implicitin the policiespursuedby formerUS PresidentHarryS. Truman ndhis administration.2ulles'spredecessors Secretaryof State, DeanAcheson,for example,hadsuggested,as earlyas August1950, thatby linkingTurkey, ranandIraq,a formidable hieldagainst heSovietsmightbe raised at no real cost to Washington therthana fewdriblets f military ndeconomicaid.3Therehad ndeedbeensomefriction,in thepast,betweenBritainandtheUnitedStatesonhowtheregionshouldbedefended.Throughout952,however,bothsides haddrawn loser nallareasof defenceco-operation,with Britain rriving t theconclusionhat twas necessary o co-ordinate efenceeffortswithTurkeyandplan a newdefencestrategybased on rapidand mobile forcesstationed n Cyprus,LibyaandJordan.Thisscheme, heBritishhoped,wouldeventually eplacetheiroldplansof havinga staticandexpensivedefence ine with a locus atthe SuezCanalbase.Hence,Britainhadbegunto makefriendlyrelationswithIraq andJordana priority o thatshe couldretainher strategicallyimportant ositions n both statesandstockpile hereadditionalmilitarysupplies.4 fewweeksafter heDullestour,Britaininallyagreed,ntheoryatleast,that hecollectiveMEDOapproachhouldbe shelved or thetimebeing,andthat hebestcourse o achievea collectivesecurityorganizationwouldbe to work ndividuallywithcertainMiddleEastern tates.5Thisarticlestrivesto showthattheindividual oncernsof theoriginalsignatories f theBaghdadPact,Turkey ndIraq,wereequally,f not more,significant n according he 'NorthernTier' schemeits eventualshapecomparedwiththeabove-mentionedelatively agueproposals f Dulles.Turkeyhadfearedany Soviet advance n the MiddleEastever sinceMoscowhadmade,in 1945, the automatic enewalof its 1925TreatyofFriendship ndNeutralitywithTurkey onditionaln thelatter urrendering


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228 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESthe eastern egionsof KarsandArdahan ndacceptingSovietparticipationin thedefenceof the straitsof theBosphorus nd the Dardanelles.Hence,the vast majorityof TurksrejectedCommunismas a form of Russianimperial deology,and accorded he class- and value-orienteddeologicalaspects of the Cold War ess, thoughnot entirelynegligible, mportance.Even after Moscow's relinquishmentn 1953 of all its above-mentionedclaims, ts expressedwish to establish loserco-operationwithTurkey nditsrepeated ffersof economichelpdid not ease Turkishuspicions.Ankarabelieved thatMoscow'spolicywas to make such attractive roposalsandlater withdraw hem in an attempt o influence the courseof Turkey'sforeignpolicy.Therefore,while othernationalismsn thedevelopingworldwere looking to Moscowfor sympathyandsupportagainst he West,theperceivedSoviet hreat roughtTurkey loser o theWestandmaderelianceon the latterto preventSoviet/Russianxpansionism pillarof Turkishforeignpolicy.The Turkishgovernment onsideredTurkey'sdefenceinterests o beidenticalwiththoseof the Westandofficiallyendorsed he American iewthatglobal peacewas indivisibleand thattroublen any partof theworldcontainedheseedsof a general onflagration.6urkey'swomainpoliticalparties, heRepublican eople'sParty RPP)andtheDemocratParty DP),supportedTurkey'smembership f NATOin 1952, and accusationsof'pursuinga neutralistpolicy' reportedlybecame 'a powerfulinsult inTurkey'!. Turkeywas thereforeafraidof taking any steps whichmightjeopardize ts relationswith Washington nd told Moscow on variousoccasions hatany mprovementnbilateral elations ouldonlyresult romthe developmentof general relations between NATO countries andMoscow. The Turks were even concerned that the apparentlymoreconciliatorySoviet line in the post-Stalinera might confuse Westernopinion already ickandtiredof the Cold War andundermineNATO'sresolve to buildup its defences,as well as openthe way to negotiationswhich might involve concessions to the Soviets.8 Moreover, Turkeyassumed hatAmericanaid to Turkeyand the latter'srole in the foreignpolicy calculations f the West wereintimatelyinked.AdnanMenderes,Turkey'sPrimeMinister rom 1950 to 1960,used to tell visiting foreigndignitarieshathis countrywas the bulwark f defenceof theMiddleEastand had, up to that point, saved the Middle East from Communistaggression. f it was to continue o play that vital role, however, hen itwould be necessary o increase ts economicstrength.9 urkey oined inefforts to extendthe networkof anti-Sovietalliancesin its immediatevicinity. In the Balkans, n the early 1950s, Turkeymade the BalkanDefence PactwithGreeceandYugoslavia, heoretically inding he threecountries n a mutualdefence accord or twentyyears.'"Ankarahad also


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THE FORMULATIONOF THE BAGHDAD PACT 229expressedwillingness o participaten a MiddleEastern efencesystemasearlyas February 949,andthe DP government adlaterplayedanactiverole in all MEDOdeliberations."heoppositionRPP'sdisagreements iththegovernmentn this issue wereusuallyonpointsof applicationf policyandnot onfundamentalrinciples.tonly expressed ertainmisgivings hatTurkey might overreach itself by undertakingadditional militarycommitmentso fellow MiddleEastern ountries, r that he latter ouldtryto make use of the new arrangementsn order o claimTurkey's upportagainstheirownregional dversaries.12YetTurkey adbeen ncluded s a destinationnDulles's ouronlyat thelast minute,and thatonly at the expressed nsistence of Menderes.InAnkara,he Americanheadof diplomacyheldmeetingswith bothTurkishPresidentCelalBayarandMenderes, utfailed oconvert hem oacceptinghis new 'Northern ier'planand henecessityof bringingnthe Arab tatesinsomecapacitynordero make heenvisagedorganizationoliticallyandstrategically iable. Rather han wait any longerfor the Arabstates,theTurkisheaders aid that hey preferredo see thefourWestern owers, heUnitedStates, he UnitedKingdom,FranceandTurkey,who hadformallyinitiatedthe Middle East collective defence scheme in 1951, proceedimmediatelyoward ettingupa formalorganizationndstateclearly hat twould be open to accession by all countries n the region, includingPakistan.MenderesassuredDulles thatTurkey emained nxious o workwith the Arab states. The latter,however, were still not ready for co-operation.'3Hence, Turkey'sofficial, thoughnot publicized,reaction oDulles's1 Junetelevisionspeech,outlining he new 'Northern ier' plan,was 'rathernegative'.The US ambassadorn Ankara,GeorgeMcGhee,reported hat the Turkish eadershipfelt that the Americans,despiterecognizinghat theestablishment f MEDOwithArabparticipation adnow become only a remotepossibility,were failing to draw what theyconsidered he logicalandnecessaryconclusionof going aheadwith theplanneddefenceorganization ithout heArabs.'4ThisTurkish eluctanceo workwiththeArabsat this uncture ertainlyneedselaboration. hroughouthe 1920s and 1930s, Turkeyhadgenerallyshunned rom close relationswith its Arab neighbours, he short-livedSa'dabadPact(1937),which ncludedbothTurkey ndIraq,being thesoleexception.Turkish ntellectualsof the periodthought of the Arabsasbackward,who couldonly progressby adoptingRepublican urkey's athof westernization,ecularizationndcollaboration iththe West.Thepost-SecondWorldWarSovietthreat,however,hadmadeTurkey ealizehowisolated t hadbecome rom tsneighbours.thad,therefore, urriedlyriedto ameliorate elationswiththe newly emerging overeignArabstatesbysigning riendshipreatieswiththeHashemiteKingdomsnIraq 1946) and


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 231had shown little inclination to respond to Turkish overtures for closerrelations; and as months had gone by, Turkey had become steadily moredisillusioned by their behaviour.'7Finally, Menderes had ordered thesuspension of the initiative at the end of April 1953, i.e. a month or sobefore the Dulles visit.'8Instead,in the monthsfollowing the Dulles tour,Turkeymoved closer toPakistan.The latterhopedthat, by aligning herself with the West, she wouldreceive militaryaid to enlargeand re-equipher armedforces and thus be ina stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis her neighbours, India andAfghanistan, with both of whom she had territorialdisputes. The UnitedStates showed interest in associating Pakistan with the chain of localdefensive arrangements,but was unwilling to do this directly. It thereforesecretlyencouragedTurkeyto approachPakistan tself. The Turkish eaderswent along with this American plan. A flexible Turkish-Pakistaniagreement on bilateral defence co-operation was signed in Karachi on 2April 1954, and Washington followed by committing itself to providemilitary equipmentand trainingto the Pakistaniarmed forces on conditionthat Pakistanwould not undertakeany act of aggression against any othernation and that the assistance received would be used exclusively tomaintain the country's security, or to permit it to participate in UN-sponsoredor regional collective defence arrangementsand measures.'9The staunchTurkishattitudeas regardsfuture defence co-operationwiththe Arabworld soon underwentsufficient change, however, to make a newdemarcheto Iraqto join Turkey's projectedalliance with Pakistanpossibleeven before the signing of any formalagreement. On 16 February1954, theTurkishambassador n Baghdad unofficially invited the Iraqi Premier, DrFadil al-Jamali, to join the projected Turkish-Pakistani treaty.20Then,simultaneously with the publication of the joint Turkish-Pakistanicommuniqueof intent a few days later,Turkey's ForeignMinister,ProfessorFuat Kopriilu, declared thatthe proposed agreementwould be open to anyfriendly power that wished to join,2' and, a few days later, expressed thehope that 'the Arab countries would also one day show interest in thepact' 22Turkey'sfull reversal to its old strategyof tryingto bring Iraq,followedby other like-minded Arab states, into a Western-inspired Middle Eastcollective defence arrangementwas formalized during a special conferenceof Turkish diplomats held in Ankara and Istanbul on 12-17 July 1954,chaired by Bayar and Menderes, and attended by other ministers, seniorforeign ministry officials, as well as the Turkishheads of mission in SaudiArabia,Lebanon, Jordan,Egypt, Iraq and Syria. A consensus was reachedthat the Turkish-Pakistani agreement had stimulated some rather moreconstructive political thinking amongst the Arabs. The latter would


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232 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESprobably become further mpressed by friendly gestures from Turkey,likecultural contacts, invitations and exchange of visits with leaders. Thesemeasures would help erase the negative memories of past Ottomandomination in Arab lands. The conference also decided that, after havingbeen rebuffed so many times in the past, an exception should be made forEgypt in Turkey's generalpolicy of goodwill, and this decision explainedtootherArab states. It forecast thatSyria,Lebanon and Jordanwould continuetheir 'wait and see' policy, while Iraq,although willing to join, was simplylacking the courage to do so. The proposed rapprochementwith the Arabworld must not involve, however, any change in Turkey's policy offriendshipwith Israel. Arab countries should acknowledge the realityof theexistence of Israel and thata solution should be found to the Arab-Israeliconflict accordingto the existing realities.23The Turkisharchivesbeing inaccessible, it is difficult to find out exactlywhy the Turkish eadershipchanged its attitudeas regardsthe Arabs. It maybe that the views expressed to Dulles in 1953 had simply been amanifestation of one of the occasional troughsin Turkishenthusiasm to co-operatewith the Arab world on defence matters because of repeatedArabcold-shouldering. Some contemporary observers, followed by a notnegligible group of laterhistorians,on the other hand, tried to find at leastpart of the answer in the fast deteriorating economic prospects withinTurkeyof the mid-1950s.24The Turkishgovernment saw additionalWesternaid as one of the few ways available to ease the economic hardships,and amore determinedTurkishforeign policy in pursuanceof Westerngoals wasprobably deemed very importantto create the right atmosphere to gainaccess to foreign, especially American,aid.The choice of Iraq as the first Arab country to be approached wasperhaps predictable.Of all the Arabcountries,the Iraqileadership felt mostthat the Soviet Union was a real threatto the country'sindependenceanditsestablishedpolitical order.It believed thatIraq's rich oil reserves could lurethe Soviet regime to try to extend its influence there either throughdirectaggression, or, more probably, through members of the banned localCommunist Party and its sympathizers,or throughmanipulatingKurdishnationalist sentiment in NorthernIraq. In the early 1950s Iraq was still arelatively poor country, and the establishment feared that widespreaddiscontentamongthe lower strataof society could be easily manipulatedbypropagandacoming out of Moscow and, even more skilfully, by its localsympathizers.These fearshadcrystallizedespecially after the confrontationin Iran in the summer of 1953 between the conservative forces loyal to theShah and their radical-nationalist and left-wing opponents. The Iraqiestablishmenthadbeen shocked in seeing the Shahbeing forcedto leave hiscountry temporarilyand had feared, for a while, that the coming to power


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 233in Iran of the radical-leftist Tudeh Masses) Party might have seriousconsequences in Iraq,as well as other Arab states. Soon afterwards, t hadseriously begun to look for ways to make the repetitionof such events, thistime in Iraq,impossible.25Iraq's main source of revenue, the oil royalties received from theforeign-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), were, according to thecountry's leaders, not enough both to keep their development programmegoingandto equipandmaintain strongarmyagainstany possibleoutsidethreat.They had, therefore, hown stronginterest n maintaining loserelationswith the formermandatoryower,Britain.British-Iraqielationshadbeengoverned, incethe terminationf theLeagueof Nationsmandatein 1932, by the 1930Treatyof Preferential lliance.Under ts provisions,Iraqwasbound o co-operate loselywiththe UK on foreignanddefencepolicy matters,o accord heBritishambassadorn Baghdad precedence'in relation o thediplomaticepresentativesf otherstates,and to resort oBritishmilitary ndcivilianadvisers,wheneveroreign echnical ssistancewas needed. Britain could also use local facilities to transport roopsthrough Iraqiterritoryand had retainedcontrol of the al-Shu'aybahand al-Habbaniyyahairbases.26The 25-year treaty,due to expire in 1957, had longbeen unpopular with large segments of educated Iraqis, and bothgovernmentshad come to recognize thatnew arrangementshad to be made,if the alliance was to survive. Many radical pan-Arab nationalist andreform-mindedleft-wing Iraqis,however, wanted to see the treaty simplyscrapped unilaterally. Under their pressure, the Treaty of Portsmouth,Britain and Iraq had negotiated in January1948 to replace the said 1930treaty,had been repudiatedby the Iraqiestablishmentwithin a few days ofits signature.The Iraqigovernment,however, was still keen to sign arevised agreement because it considered the alliance with Britain to be afactorof stabilityfor themonarchicorder.It firstsuggested to the British theidea of terminating the existing treaty and replacing it with newarrangementsunder the guise of a regional defence co-operation schemestipulatedby Article 51 of the UN Charter mmediately after the events inIran of August 1953.27Membersof the Iraqielite, had realised, n themeantime,hatAmericannfluence n the MiddleEastwas growingveryrapidlyand hadthereforebegun to shift some of theirfriendship andloyaltyto Washington.In March 1953, Iraqmade clear that, in order to strengthenits armed orces, t would ike in thefuture o receivesome of its militaryequipment free from the United States, because the high cost of itsdevelopment programmeant that it could not afford to continue to buy allits military needs from Britain.28 he requestwas repeated during Dulles'svisit in May. Moreover, Iraq had, for a long time, had almost trouble-freebilateral relations with both Turkey and Pakistan. Finally, and as far as


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234 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESmilitary/strategic hinking was concerned, for the Turkish-Pakistaniagreementohaveanyeffect,thesignatorieswouldhaveto fill theterritorialgap betweenthem soonerrather han later. The defenceof the Iranianprovinceof Azerbaijan,f thepassesthroughheZagrosmountains ndofthe Tigris-Euphratesalleyin IraqandSyriawereessential orprotectingthe region and especially Turkey'seastern flank. Beyond the Zagros therewere no natural geographical obstacles to southern Iraq and theMediterranean.raq'sadherencewould give the agreementmentionedastrategicpositionin depth,air bases, and lines of communicationromTurkey o the Persian/ArabGulf, which could be used to supportvitaldefensivepositionsat the saidpasses.9Al-Jamaliwasanxious o improve raq's elationswithTurkey.30edidnot rush,however,nto anearlyacceptance f theproposed greement,ndevendeniedpublicly hat raqhadbeen nvited ojointheagreementr hadbeen acquaintedwith its clauses.3'He probably eared violent internalopposition, or althoughhe influentialanded lasses nthecountrywere nfavourof both acceptanceof US militaryaid and associationwith theTurkish-Pakistaniact, he radicalnationalistnd eft-wingoppositionwasnot negligible.32 furthercomplicationwas that the Turkish-Pakistaniapproachcoincided with the last stages of the State Department'sdeliberationswhetherto approveof the March 1953 Iraqi requestformilitaryaid or not.The twoquestionsbecameobjectivelynterlinked. heStateDepartmentinallyauthorized,nApril, hesignature f a $10millionannualmilitaryassistanceagreementwith Iraq,on conditionthat Iraqshould at least declare publicly its supportfor regional defence co-operation.33ulles also warnedal-Jamali hat if Iraq'sfirst move aftersigning the aid agreementwas against Israel throughaccomplishingapoliticalunionwithSyria, atherhan oward he 'Northern ier', heUnitedStatescouldstill revokethesigned agreement.34heIraqi-Americanealwas officiallycalledan 'understanding',ot an 'agreement',n view of thespecial internal egal position in Iraq. Tryingto avoid criticism andoppositionby all meanspossible, heIraqigovernment referred ot to berequiredo submit he agreemento theChamberf Deputies or approval.Al-Jamaliwasofficially old,however,hat he UnitedStatesconsideredheexchangeof notes to constitutean international greementand wouldeventually egisterhemwiththeUN.35Al-Jamali oon hadto resignon mattersunrelated o US aid and theTurkish-Pakistaniact,and the questionof Iraqiadherence o the latteragreementhadto be put on hold pendingnew parliamentarylections.36ThisdelaymadeTurkey estlessaboutpossibleIraqinon-adherenceo theTurkish-Pakistanireaty.It questionedWashington'sactics of grantingseeminglyunconditionalmilitaryaid to Iraq, earing hatthe latterwould


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 235nowhave ittle ncentive ojointhe above-mentionedreaty.37enderes ndthe Pakistaniprimeminister,MuhammadAli, agreed n Junethat 'Iraq'srecent behaviourhad been unsatisfactory;ince she appeared o saydifferent hings o thePakistanis,heTurks,he Americans ndtheBritish,withtheobvious ntentionof drawing hemaximumadvantage ut of thepresentsituation,whilstavoidingany commitments.'38hey also agreedthat the strongestpressureshouldbe broughtupon Iraqand that 'themomentmustshortlycome whenIraqshouldbe askedto say definitelywhethert proposedo accedeornot'.3Menderes pined hat Iraqndulgedmerely n expressionof goodwillandputforwardheexcuse of its publicopinionnotbeingready ornot oining nthedefencearrangements.edidnot consider hisargumentalid.Publicopinion n Iraq,he thought,wouldbe only too happy o see IraqassociateherselfwithPakistan ndTurkey.One-thirdf thepopulation f IraqwasTurkishsic!), and he knewthatamajorportionof the populationwas in fact already n favourof thesearrangements'. n 11JuneMenderes old theIraqiambassadorn AnkarathatIraq was not 'sufficiently onscious' of the Communistdangerandwamedhim that 'if Turkey ollapsed ountriesdownto theCapeof GoodHopewouldcollapsetoo'4 A month ater,the General-Secretaryf theTurkishForeignMinistry,Muharrem uriBirgi,toldBritishAmbassadorSirJamesBowker hat he Turkish overnmentwas 'anxious o put an endto disingenuous mbiguities f Iraq'sattitude; ven if Iraqgave negativereplyto Turkishapproach hatwould at leastenable us to see where westood'4Strong raqi nterest o adhereo theprojected Northern ier'collectivedefence scheme resurfaced n earnestlate that summerwith the re-appointmentf the veteran raqipolitician,Nurial-Said, o thepremiership.The new IraqiChamber lected in June 1954 had some very difficultproblems o tackle,especiallythe termination f the 1930treatyandthenegotiation f new defencearrangementsor Iraq.PrinceAbdul-Ilah,heCrownPrinceof Iraqand themostpowerful igure n theroyalhousehold,becameconvinced hatonly Nurihadthe influenceand the experience omanage his trickytask.Nuri,however,was extremelyunhappywith theresultsof the recentelections,for his own ConstitutionalUnionParty'snumericaltrength adbeenreduced n theChamber ndmanyprominentleftistpoliticians,withwhom he didnotwish to work,had beenreturned.To secureNuri'sreturno thepremiership,herefore,Abdul-Ilahwas leftwith little choice but to promisenew electionseven beforethe recentlyelectedChamber adofficiallyconvened.42Nuri hadlong advocated lose co-operationwith the West,and withBritainnparticular. enow sawin thenewAmericaneadiness oprovidearms o individualMiddleEasterntates, n return ortheirco-operationn


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236 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESthe 'NorthernTier'project,a goldenopportunityor Iraqand otherArabcountries o improve heirdefencecapabilityand to influence he West toagreeto someof the Arabdemands n theirquest for a lastingsolution othe Arab-Israeli onflict.Nuri contended hatthe Arab League PoliticalCommitteehadagreedback n 1949thatthe Arabcountries ould not co-operate with the Communiststates without themselves becomingCommunist ndsubmittingo the dictatesof Moscow,or remainneutralbetweenEastandWestbecause heydid not havethemeans o do so. Theycould,however, o-operatewith he WesternBlocprovidedhequestions fthe Suez Canalbase andPalestinewere settled.43 e hadhencegreeted heTurkish-Pakistanigreement s an inadequate, ut nevertheless ositive,step towards eventual Arab co-operationwith the West." Upon hisappointment,Nuri formallyasked King Faysal II of Iraqto call newelectionsto give thepopulation nopportunityo vote on hisprogramme,whichstood as follows:(a) termination f theAnglo-Iraqi reatyof 1930 andcooperationetweenIraqandother oreign tates nconformitywiththe provisions f Article51 of the UnitedNationsCharter;(b) the strengthening f relationsbetweenthe Arab countriesand theremovalof frictionandtensionbetween hem;(c) strengtheningf relationswithneighbouringtatesand mprovementfcooperationbetweenthem and the Arab states to repel the Zionistdanger.45He thenembarked na chainof measureso silence all hispotential riticsbefore proceedingwith the new generalelection plannedto returnaChamberntirely ubserviento his politicalwhim.Included mong hosemeasureswere the suspensionof all existing political parties(includingNuri's own) and the closing down of certainoppositionnewspapers.'Duringthe elections of 12 Septemberalmost all successful candidateslackedanyrecordof recentoppositiono the incumbent egime.47hedefacto breaking-offof Iraq'sdiplomaticrelationswith the Soviet Unionformed he finalchaptern Nuri'santi-leftist rive.48Nurithenmadefinding ome sortof newdefencearrangementiththeUnitedKingdomand the United States his top priority.Soon after hisabove-described eal with PrinceAbdul-Ilahn Paris,and even beforereturningo Baghdado takeup formally hepostof premier,Nuripaidaprivatevisit to Londonandhadinformalmeetingswith BritishForeignOffice civil servants.At this stage his preferencewas 'not to join theTurkish-Pakistanigreement, utrather o form a separate roupingwithPakistann whichhehopedHerMajesty'sGovernment ouldplayapart'.4He did notobjectto IraqbeingassociatedwithTurkeyn a largeregional


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 237groupingbut disliked the idea of signing a smallerpact withTurkey,arguingthat the Turkswere unpopular n Iraqand other Arab states, and were stillsuspectedof harbouringrredentistdesigns in NorthernIraq.The assurancesNuri received later from Menderes personally,thatTurkeydid not entertainany territorialambitions outside those stated in the 1920 TurkishNationalPact, did nothing to allay his fears, for the terminology of the said pact asregards the previously disputed regions of Mosul and Kirkuk was toovague.'?Nuri told the Foreign Office staff that it had been agreed, duringaprivate visit he had paid to Karachi in April, that, under a treatylimited toIraq and Pakistan, 'Iraqwould not undertakeany obligationto go to the aidof Pakistan, but if Israel were to attack Iraq or her neighbours, Pakistanwould undertake to come to their aid, provided the United States saw noobjection, because the Pakistanis reasoned that the success of the schemedepended on American military aid.'51 Nuri said that the projectedIraq-Pakistanpact 'would be open to accession by any countryinterested nthe peace of the area' - except France, whom Nuri disliked for its policiesin Arabic-speakingNorthAfrica andthoughtthatit hadnothing practicaltooffer - and clarified that 'the purposeof this would be to enable the UnitedKingdom to join at a later stage'. British participation 'would provide ameans', he said, by which Iraq and Britain 'could broach the question ofrevising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty'. For Nuri, 'a pact of this kind could be apreliminary to either of two alternative broader solutions': a regionaldefence organizationbased on the ArabLeague with Egyptianparticipation;or a more limited sub-regional set-up, whereby Syria and Lebanon wouldjoin the projected Iraq-Pakistan treaty and thus ensure Iraq's lines ofcommunication with the Mediterranean.Nuri said he had already spokeninformallyabout his plans to Americanand,on mattersrelating to Syria andLebanon, French officials. He went on to raise the possibility, perhaps toimpress uponhis Britishhosts his determination o forge a new alliance, thatIraq might even have to leave the ArabLeague if Egypt refused to join theprojected grouping.52Thus, by August 1954, the situation in the Middle East as regards apossible breakthrough n collective defence negotiations seemed to havebecome more favourablethan it hadeverbeen. Besides the renewed Turkishdetermination o courtIraq and other Arabstates, and the mandateNuri hadgiven himself to revise the treaty arrangementswith Britain, a solution tothe long Anglo-Egyptian dispute on the Suez Canal base had also becomevisible on the horizonwith the initialling in July of a broadAnglo-Egyptianunderstanding,whereby the British agreed to evacuate the base within twoyears. Egypt, in return,conceded the right of British troopsto return o thebase in case any member-stateof the Arab League Collective Security Pact(ALCSP) - signed in 1950 and including all independentArab states except


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238 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESLibya - or Turkey were attacked from outside."3This agreement finallychanged British strategic thinking. With the air bases Britainpossessed inIraq suddenly acquiring additional strategic importance, she realized thatNuri's proposal of a 'NorthernTier' arrangement ould provide the political'umbrella', under which she could secure the revision of the 1930 treatyand, hence, finally decided to go by a scheme that excluded Egypt.54TheBritish government hoped that the new arrangement proposed by Nuriwould satisfy Iraqi nationalist opinion, while preserving the spirit of theabortivePortsmouthTreaty.55For Nuri, however, the Anglo-Egyptianagreementunexpectedly openedup other prospects as well, which, for a while at least, seemed to usher aradical shift in his plans for defence co-operation with the West. On 14August the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Major Salah Salim,arrived in Sarsank, northern Iraq,56explaining that previous Egyptianoppositionto all kindsof defence arrangementswith non-Arabstates,mediaattacks on Iraq, and her indignant reaction to the news of theTurkish-Pakistaniagreement had been made because of Egypt's fear ofisolation, but, since agreement had now been reached on the future of thebase, all those had become past history.57 alim said that although Egyptcontinued to oppose the Turkish-Pakistani pact and all defencearrangementswith non-Arabcountries, she saw merit in co-operation withthe West and was ready to work towards it. He claimed to have beenaccorded full powers to reach with Iraq an understanding, written orotherwise, on the 'formulationof a generalpolicy covering the relations ofthe ArabStates with the Westincludingthe defence aspects of this policy'. 58Nuri, therefore,suggested to Salim an idea which had always appealedto him personally: modifying the ALCSP to meet the requirements ofArticle 51 of the UN Charter and permit membership of regional andWestern non-Arab states. Salim seemed to like it. Although no draftagreement was drawn up in the end, both sides agreed in principle toapproach ndividually both Britain and the United States to seek theirviewson the modifications required n the ALCSP text in order to expand it intoan effective regional defence organization.59Nuri was delighted with this preliminary agreement. He used with theUS ambassadorevery argumenthe could think of to make Washingtonagree to the proposal.He suggested that, in the expandedpact, with US andBritish participation,the Arab members should pledge troops and militarysupportto each other against aggression, from whatever source, as well asprovide general support to its non-Arab members. There would be noquestion of Arab troops being sent abroad, but, he said, he was quietlyconfident that, in those circumstances, Egypt would agree to thereactivation of the Suez Canal base in the event of an external attack even


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 239on Iran. Britain and the United States could provide militaryand technicalaid to the Arab members in peace-time, as well as promise to send armedforces in case hostilities broke out. Nuri told the ambassador that 'theproposed pact had the merit of concentratingattention of Arab States onSoviet menace and divertingit from Israel', and one of its functions wouldbe to prepare for peace with Israel in accordance with the spirit of the1947-49 UN resolutionscalling for the partitionof Palestine between two,Jewish andArab, states, the internationalizationof Jerusalemand the returnof Arab refugees to their homes. In short, Nuri supported this plan, theambassadorreported,because(i) objectives of Turkey-Pakistan Pact would be achieved more quicklyand Arab world brought into Middle East defence;(ii) plan would accomplish objective of M.E.D.O. but would have theadvantageof being put forwardby Arabs;(iii) Israelreactionhad been considered.UK accession to the amendedpact, said Nuri, would renderthe 1930 treatyobsolete. New arrangements could be negotiated under which the al-Shu'aybah and al-Habbaniyyah air bases would revert to Iraq, butagreements draftedby technicalexpertswould regulatetheir use by Britain,as well as all other signatories. As regards French participation, Nuripreferrednot to invite them,because, he said, 'French nfluence in SyriaandNorth Africa [were]distastefulto all Arabs', and also because France,as helater told British ambassador Sir John Troutbeck, 'could make nocontributionto Middle East defence'. Nuri's proposal seemed to have thegeneral consent of Prince Abdul-Ilah. The latter, however, was moreflexible on the issue of French adherence. He thought there would be nodifficulty about including France if Britaininsisted.60Dulles, however, wasreportedly'greatlydisturbed'at this apparentmoving away by IraqfromtheTurkish-Pakistanipact and even entertained the idea of remindingIraq ofthe provisions of the above-describedmilitary aid agreement.6"In orderto continue to build on the understandingreached in Sarsank,Nuri visited Cairo and had a meeting on 14 Septemberwith the Egyptianprime minister,GamalAbdul Nasser. By then, it should have been apparentto him thatSalim's enthusiasm n Sarsankwas not sharedby his superiors.62The Nuri-Abdul Nasser meeting turned out to be crucial. No verbatimrecord of this encounter has been published, and both parties seem to haveleft the meeting with differing perceptions of each other's position.However, the accounts of some of the junior participantsin this meetingindicate thatNuri did most of the talking. Abdul Nasser, in the end, told thelatterthathe was free to do whateverhe wished.63What he really meant isstill a matter for speculation, although its importance, for the purpose of


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240 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESunderstandingand evaluating future Egyptian foreign policy, cannot beunderestimated.Nuri himself understood it to be a green light, albeit asomewhat reluctant one. He told Sir Ralph Stevenson, the Britishambassador n Cairo, that the line he had taken with Abdul Nasser hadbeenthat Egypt, having reached an agreement with Britainover the Suez Canalbase, which affected all the signatoriesof the ALCSP,should now work forthe modification of that pact so as to improve the general defence of theMiddle East with Western assistance. Egypt would thus be able tocounteract the criticism among the Arab states that she had gone andconcluded with Britain an agreement concerning them with no priorconsultation. However, Nuri continued, if Egypt decided that the momentwas yet inopportunefor such a move, Iraq would feel obliged to go aheadwith her separate arrangements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Heunderstoodthat Abdul Nasser was cautious because of his worries that theinternal situation in Egypt was not yet ripe for any advance towardsorganized Middle East defence and because of his belief that anIraq-Pakistan pact would lead to the complete side-trackingof Egypt andother Arab states.' 'The Egyptians for domestic reasonswere unwilling forthe next two years or so to consider his ideas for a regional pact,' said Nuri.He felt, however, that he would be left free to work for some form ofregional grouping,which would allow Egypt to join later, if it so desired.65Nuri's optimism was probably not groundless, for, in an off-the-recordinterview with a representativeof the Arab News Agency on 16 December1954, the British embassy in Cairo reported,Abdul Nasser had admitted tohave told Nuri that Egypt had no alternative but to be on the side of theWest, but was unable to accept his arguments that Iraq should join theTurkish-Pakistani pact. He further confessed that 'he had, however,indicated that if Iraq insisted on going ahead, Egypt would raise noobjection. He had promised that there would be no attacks on Iraq in theEgyptianpress but had made it clear that Egypt would not be able to supportsuch a move by Iraq in the Arab League' [emphases added]. He alsoadmitted that he had favoured the idea of including Iran in the base-reactivationclause of any revised Anglo-Iraqi treaty.'With the amended ALCSP option having reached a dead end, Nurireturned o some of his previous options. Immediatelyafterleaving Egypt,he paid a lengthy visit to London, where he told Foreign Office LevantDepartment officials that he was now thinking of various possiblearrangements: ne, including Iraq,Turkey,Syria, Iranand Britain;a second,embracing Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Britain; and a third, limited to Iraq,Pakistan and Britain.67He thought that the third option was the mostpractical,and hadeven prepareda draft of an agreement with Pakistanwithits Article 1 stating that 'Pakistanwould come to the assistance of Iraq by


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 241all possible means if Iraq or any of its neighbours was the victim ofaggression'. Whilst in London, Nuri also had talks with the PakistaniPremieron this topic.68It is evident that throughouthis negotiations Nuri emphasized differentaspects of his projected pact to different parties. To the Americans, hestressed the Communist threat and tried to show the projected pact as ameans to overcome the Arab conflict with Israel;with Turks andPakistanis,he sought their supportagainst Israel;with Britain,he pushed forward theidea of revising the 1930 treaty. The US charge d'affaires in Baghdad,Phillip W. Ireland,reportedon 2 November that Nuri was 'adept [to] anytailoring [of] his argument to fit [the] listener on hand'.69 Futuredevelopments unmistakablyshow, however, that,besides the strengtheningof his regime's standingat home, the treatyrevision and the improvementof the general Arabposition vis-ai-vis Israelwere primarilywhat concernedhim.70Nuri could have, afterall, simply allowed the 1930 treatyto lapse in1957. He understood well, however, that the continuation of the Britishconnection was essential for the survival of the Hashemite monarchy andthe correspondingstatus quo in Iraq. By claiming to have terminated theunpopular reaty,he could presentit as a majornationalachievement,but itwas extremely improbable that he would be able to get any converts fromthe ranks of his opponents. Even after having forced the oppositionunderground,he was anxious, like al-Jamalibefore him, not to be obligedto pass the new arrangementswith BritainthroughParliament,probably toprevent the repetition of the 1948 PortsmouthTreatyfiasco. Nuri told theBritish that 'his plan was to get the IraqiParliament to ratify the [initial]agreement[preferablywith Pakistan]and thereafter o obtain the adherenceof other Powers, including the UK. Once the UK had joined, he woulddeclare the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.The military facilitieswhich we [i.e. Britain] requirein Iraqcould be negotiatedbetween generalstaffs ... and would not need to come up for political ratification at anystage.' Nuri told the BritishChief of the ImperialGeneral Staff and Chief ofAir Staff that he envisaged the futurefacilities British forces would enjoy inIraq to be on the lines of the Portsmouth treaty.7' Furthermore, acomparativeanalysis of his actions and various proposals show that Nuri,thus far,was consistentlyunwilling to enteran agreement imited regionallyto Iraqand Turkey,as well as against the inclusion of France in any finalarrangement.The absence of IranfromNuri's informalsoundingsshould be explainedonly in terms of timing. Nuri made no secret of his desire to involve theIranians in Middle East defence.72 ndeed, after the 1953 western-inspiredmilitary coup against the nationalist Iranian Premier, MuhammadMusaddiq, the Shah had reasserted effective control over Iranianforeign


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242 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESpolicy; resumed diplomatic relations with Britain, and was negotiating anew oil agreementwith a consortium of eight western companies. He hadalso expressed a wish to join the 'Northern Tier'. Both Britain and theUnited States, however, thought that Iran,weakened economically becauseof the internationaloil boycott against Musaddiq's regime, could not yetsupporta large army,and hence could not contributeeffectively to MiddleEast defence.73Although Nuri undeniably preferred to conclude the initial deal withPakistan,he had overlooked the fact that, among all his candidates to enterthe regional treatyhe envisaged, only Turkey sharedhis determinationtoconclude an early agreement.Menderes had already sensed that Nuri wasnot only reluctant to join the Turkish-Pakistanipact outright,but 'seemedanxious to set up a rival grouping' to the latter, thus 'making a not verypositive contributionto Middle East defence'7 When Prince Abdul-Ilahvisited Istanbul privately to enquire about the health of his first cousin,Talal, the ex-King of Jordan,Menderes insisted that he should stay as aguest of the Turkishgovernment and took the opportunity o engage him insome political discussions.75Menderes emphasized that it was absurd tothink that the Arab states could constitute among themselves the basis of adefence system for the Middle East. No such system could be effectivewithout Turkeyand Britain. Finally, both agreed that if Nuri continued torefuse not to adhereto the Turkish-Pakistanipact, IraqandTurkeyshould,instead, explore the possibilities of entering into a separate bilateralarrangementwhich could laterbe combined with the saidTurkish-Pakistanipact.76Nuri visited Istanbulhimself on his way home from Londonin Octoberand extended his visit to ten days, reportedlyto be present at the arrivalofa Pakistanimilitary delegation.77Menderes was determined not to miss thisopportunity, and his series of meetings with the visiting Iraqi Premierproved decisive. According to Turkish sources, it took several days ofbruising exchanges to make Nuri retreat from his preoccupationwith theIsraeli threat to regional security.78Finally, both sides agreed that theysharedthe same objectives to establish 'a grouping to include all Arabstatesplus Persia and Pakistan,preferablywith, but if necessary withoutSyria ...in close associationwith the U.K. and the U.S.' Menderesdid not press Iraqto join the Turkish-Pakistaniagreement and made it plain that 'Turkey wasquite ready to modify it, or incorporate t in something else'. He also 'fullyaccepted' the principle 'that Iraqi forces should not be employed outsideIraq'.7 Menderes suggested that Turkey and Iraq should sign a pactengaging each countryto come to the assistance of the other in the event ofbeing attacked.This proposal did not immediately please Nuri because ofhis suspicion of Turkish rredentistdesigns on Mosul.80He agreed,however,


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 243that contactsshouldcontinueandthat both sides shouldpursuecontactswith otherArab countriesas well. Menderesacceptedan invitation oBaghdad, ater fixed for 6 January.He encouragedNuri that any newregional agreement hould allow Britain to continueenjoyingdefencefacilities n Iraq,andsaidthatTurkey,oo,was mostconcernedhatBritainshould not withdraw rom the MiddleEast. 'In presentcircumstances,'continuedMenderes, if therewere a choice betweenCyprus emainingnBritishhandsor being returnedo Turkeyhe wouldprefer hat it shouldremain n Britishhands' for 'he regardedBritain'soccupation f Cyprusessential or herparticipationnMiddleEastdefence'.Inreturn,Nuriaskedthat Turkey supportthe principle of the fulfilmentby Israel of UNresolutions n Palestine.Accordingo Turkishminister f stateFatinRusstuZorlu, 'generallyspeaking he talks had been very useful in dissipatingsuspicions and misapprehensionsntertainedby Nuri about Turkey'spositionandaims,and nestablishingwithhim abasisof commonapproachto theproblem f MiddleEastdefence'."8TheBritish mbassyn Baghdad,however, houghtthis appraisalwas over-optimistic.Troutbeck eportedthat,evenafter he visit,Nuricontinuedo besuspicious f Turkish ims nnorthernraqandattributed urkishpposition o anyfuture raqi-Pakistanipactto 'a certainealousy'.8 Menderes, owever,was not a politicianwhomissedwhat he thought o be even the slightestopportunityo further isaims. His sheer determination, s well as the lack of any practicalalternativesor Nuri,proveddecisivefor the conclusionof the BaghdadPactearly n the followingyear.Afterthis breakthrough ith Nuri, Mendereshad good reasonto feelrelatively onfident.He told Bowkeron 11Decemberhat

the atmospheren the MiddleEast was improving.Untilrecently thadbeen a case of trying o urgethe ArabStatesalong a roadwhichthey were reluctant o take. Now they themselveswere showingwillingness to follow it on their own free will ... The TurkishGovernmentonsidered hatprogressn organisingegionaldefence,by increasinghe confidenceof the ArabStates,wouldreduce heirfearof aggressionromIsraelandso to engender readinesso acceptthe fact of Israel'spermanentxistenceand the ideaof a settlementwith her.83However, venwhenMenderes aught he planefor Baghdad n 6 January1955, nobody,not eventhe TurkishPremier imself,was expectinghim tosign an agreementduringhis visit, nor did he take with him any draft.Besideshis above-mentionedegotiationswith Nuri,Mendereshad beenencouraged y the recentapparenthaw n Turkish-Egyptianelationsandhadproposedo have a meetingwith AbdulNasser'at any timeandplace


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244 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIEShe might choose' to tryto get from him some sort of statementto the effectthat a bilateralagreementbetweenTurkeyandIraqwould not be at variancewith the Arab League.84The delays over his projected meeting, however,and the unlikelihood of any rapid progress being made as regardspersuading the majority of Arab states to join any defence arrangementagainst Egyptian wishes had convinced him by now that he should firstfocus on signing with Iraqa bilateralpact similar to the Turkish-Pakistaniagreement.85He hopedthat the Baghdadvisit would enable him to capitaliseon his achievements in the past few months, clarify Nuri's currentintentions,encouragethe latterto makeup his mind and thus inevitablytakea furtherstep towards his much desiredagreement.86Nuri, too, did not have any immediate plan to sign an agreement withTurkey during Menderes's visit. He did not underestimatethe difficultiesposed by the sceptical state of opinion in other Arab countries and furtherthought that he was not yet sufficiently informed about the commitmentswhich the US and UK governments were preparedto accept.87Nuri stillthoughtthat Marchor April would be ideal to sign a new regionalpact andthereafter erminatethe 1930 Anglo-Iraqitreaty.88Nevertheless, the Iraqigovernmenthadarrangeda strenuousprogrammeof visits, banquetsandreceptions for theirguests.89No actualpolitical talkstook place until 9 January.Menderes,however, was immediately impressedby the influence of those Iraqis who were preoccupied with Israel to theexclusion of every otherinternationalproblem.So, he changed his cautiousplan, thinking that the time had come to press the Iraqigovemment morestrongly. Menderes, the first foreign statesmanever invited to address theIraqiChamberof Deputies, now refused to fulfil this engagementuntilNunagreed to publish a communique to the effect that a pact would be signedsoon, while the assembled deputies were waiting.90Were the signing of a regional pact delayed until just before theexpiration of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty,Menderes now believed, the formerwould look suspiciously like a cover for the latter,9' nd its appeal for otherfuture potential Arab adherents would certainly diminish. Moreover,Turkish eadershadbegun to suspect thatIsraelwas increasinglytrying,byindirectmethods,to obstructTurkey'sattemptsto improve its relationswithArabstates.They fearedthatthe effects of these effortsmightbecome moreserious if some definite progress was not made immediately.9-Indeed,Israel, which had been delightedat Turkey'sinvolvement in the Balkans in1953, was showing serious misgivings about the Turkishdetermination oimprove its ties with Iraq and Pakistan. Israeli diplomats had tried toconvince Turkeythatany alliance with Iraqwould be worthless because ofthe latter'smilitaryweakness. It would be safer and cheaperto occupy Iraqin the event of a Soviet aggression, rather han armthe countryand expect


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 245it to defend itself. Furthermore,any alliance with Iraqand Pakistanmightadversely affect Turkey'ssecular and pro-Europeancharacter,embroil it inconfrontationwith India and Israel; and, finally, weapons delivered to Iraqcould fall into the hands of Kurdishinsurgents in Turkey.93 urkey,whichhad always hoped that good relations with Israel would ensure it, throughthe internationalZionist lobby, a good press in the West andparticularly heUnited States, now suspected that the same lobby was behind articles,published in the Western press, which were critical of the Turkishgovernment'sdomestic economic policies.Nuri had previously envisaged proposing to the Turks the eventualconclusion of a limited agreement covering exchange of informationbetween the two armystaffs aboutprogressmade by the two sides in theirrespective defence arrangements,and free transitthroughboth countries ofdefence material for the other for a five-year period, with their possibleextension to the United Kingdom,United States and otherfriendly powers.94UnderpressurefromMenderes,however, he finally succumbedandput hissignatureundera statementmuch broader in scope. What also made Nuriacquiesce was the warningsounded by his Ministerof the Interior,Said al-Qazzaz, that from the security point of view, the best period to settle alloutstandingexternal affairs would be the first few monthsof 1955, becausethe radical nternalopponentsof the Iraqiregimehad not yet recoveredfromNuri's recent harshmeasures.9'On 13 January1955 a communique was published in Baghdad statingthat Turkey and Iraq had decided to conclude in the immediate future abroad treaty of co-operation, based on Article 51 of the UN Charter,tosafeguard the stability and security of the Middle East and to repel anyaggression committed against them either from within the region or fromoutside. The communique expressed hope that other states 'which havegiven proof of their determination o serve the objectives mentionedabove,and arein a position to do so by virtue of their geographicalposition andtheforces at their disposal' might sign the treaty concerned at the same timewith themselves. Otherwise, the communique made clear, Turkey and Iraqwould go on and sign a bilateral treaty 'as rapidly as possible' and wouldonly then continue their efforts to persuade the powers with the above-described criteria to join the treaty at a later date.96On 18 JanuaryIraqissued a separatecommuniquereaffirming ts loyalty to the UN Charterandthe ALCSP and stating that the proposed Turkish-Iraqi treaty would notconflict with eitherof them.97BritishandAmericanforeignpolicy-makers were pleasantly surprisedatthis unexpected announcement. Both, however, did not wish to appearoverjoyed, despite the fact that, on the day of the publication of thecommunique, Menderes had requested the French, British and US


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246 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESambassadors in Baghdad to suggest that their respective governmentsshould issue some form of public endorsementof its supposed constructivespirit.98 he Westernpowers understoodthat some of theirotherfriendsandallies in the Middle East would not share their optimism toward theprojectedTurkish-Iraqialliance.99Indeed Egypt confronted the said communiquewith fury.It appears hatEgyptian leaders had been convinced, since Nuri's Cairo visit the previousSeptember,that Iraqwould not go alone in signing a defence pact with theWest."' They had anticipatedIraq'snext move to be a treaty with Britain,bringing in Turkeyin the same way as the latter had been broughtinto theAnglo-Egyptian agreement,andnow said they would have had no objectioneven to Iraqbringingin Iran in the same way."0'CairoprotestedthatNuri'slatest move had gone counter to the normalsequence of events, for AbdulNasser had expected to be given time to build an Arab regionalorganization, 'not linked openly with the West but so constructed that itcould quickly fall in line with Western plans should a common dangerarise'.102 It also probably felt let down by Turkey, for the Egyptianambassador n Ankara had seen Birgi before the Turkishdelegation's flightto Baghdad and, after waming him against any attempt to deal with Iraqapartfrom the rest of the ArabLeague, had received the assurance that thedelegation would keep in close touch with the Egyptian embassy inBaghdad.'03Hence, an editorial of the Egyptian newspaper al-Akhbar hadwelcomed Menderes's visit to Baghdad as a further sign of increasingfriendship between Turkeyand the Arab states.'04The Turks,however, sawEgyptianembassy officials in Baghdad only once, and thatonly an hour ortwo before the publication of the joint communique."' The prospect of aTurkish-Iraqi alliance left Egypt in a mood of isolation and weakened itsbargaining power vis-ai-vis the West. It feared that it could not now countupon Iraqiassistance in any futureArab-Israeli conflict. There was also adistinct apprehensionthat the proposed treaty might be the prelude to aneventual partition of Syria between the two signatories, and hencesignificantly increaseIraq'sstandingandinfluence within the Arabworld."'"6Egypt embarked, therefore, on a campaign to force Iraq to retreatfromcommitments it hadmade in the 13 Januarycommuniqueor, failing that, toisolate it from the rest of the Arab world. Abdul Nasser called for animmediate meeting of Arab prime ministers in Cairo to discuss futurecommon Arab defence policy following the Turkish-Iraqicommunique.'07Nuri feared that the projected Cairo meeting would resemble a courtsession with Egypt sitting at the prosecutor's chair. His fortuitous illnessprovided him with a timely excuse not to attend. Under pressure fromLondon- which hadnot entirelydiscountedyet thepossibility of eventuallybringing Egypt into a regionaldefence arrangementand thought thatCairo


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 247might only be contesting the timeliness, and not the strategic aims of theTurkish-Iraqicommunique- and some Arab capitals, Nuri later agreed tosend al-Jamali to Cairo, but gave him no authority at all to negotiate acompromise deal. Al-Jamali was asked to keep Syria, Lebanonand Jordanaway from bowing to Egyptian pressure, ratherthan make explanations tothe latter.If Egypt became more co-operative, Nuri planned, he would bewilling to take a little time to help it forward,but if it persistedin opposingor remaining aloof, he would move on very quickly.108 l-Jamali told theCairomeeting thatthe proposedTurkish-Iraqiagreementwas nothingmorethan a practicalprojectionof the traditionalIraqipolicy and of its existingtreaty relationship with Turkey. The draft agreement, which Iraq wouldpropose to the Turks, contained only two innovations: exchange ofinformationon defence dispositions and preparations,and free passage ofmilitary supplies througheitherparty's territoryto the other.'09The Arab delegations in Cairo failed to reach a consensus and sent avery high-level four-man delegation to Baghdad as a last attempt to bridgethe existing differences."0No furtherprogress was made, however, and thedelegationreturnedempty-handed o Cairo."'Nuri made clearthat he wouldproceed with the proposed pact and firmly declined all suggestions forpostponement."'The Cairo Conferencethus ended inconclusively on 6 February.Despiteits failure to produce a resolutionor even a final communique,however, itproved significant in shaping the balance of power in the Arab world.Smaller states like Syria, Jordan and Lebanon were left in no doubt on thestrength of Egyptian (and Saudi) feeling against the projected pact. Themood in Cairo also convinced Nuri that it would serve absolutely nopurpose to postpone negotiations and the conclusion of the proposed pactwith Turkey,thusbringinghim in line with Menderes'sthinking.From thenon, Turkeyand Iraq proceeded at full speed towards the conclusion of thepromised pact.Menderes wished to see the treatyconcludedby mid-February."3 e wasnow convinced, based on his past experience, that the best way to deal withNuriwas to maintainconstantpressure.Therefore,he reportedly ent Nuri anaverageof two messages a day insistingon the necessity for utmost speed."'In the meantime, the Turkishambassador in Cairo, Rifki Zorlu, was veryactive on the fringes of the Arab Premiers'Conference trying to recruit asmany Arab states as possible to adhere to the proposed treatyor at least takea position independentof Egypt.Both IraqandTurkey wanted to extend theprovisions of the futuretreatyas soon as possible to the United States andBritain,as well as to other Middle Eastem countries such as Iran, Pakistanandpossibly Syria.Bothpreferredo have the two Westernpowersas originalsignatories,although they would not object to them joining a little later.


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 249Article 2The high contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities andassistance for the passage of arms, militaryequipment, supplies andother material used for defensive purposes pertaining to theirrespective armies, through the territoryof the other party withoutbeing subject to customs and any otherduties.

Article 3 stipulated that the treaty should be open for accession to anymember state of the ArabLeague or any otherstate concerned with securityand peace in the region, while Article 4 set the period during which thetreaty would remain in force as five years, automatically renewable tosuccessive five-year periodsunless one of the signatoriesnotified its desireto terminate t six monthsbefore the date of expiration.The last articledealtwith the conditions for ratificationand exchange of ratified documents."18Nuri later told Wright that one of his reasons for proposing a five-yearperiodwas his desire to see the first renewal of the projectedpact before theAnglo-Egyptianagreementexpired in 1961 so as to set a pattern or renewalbefore the future of the latteragreement came into question."'9This draft (NI) was unsatisfactory to the Turks. They had alwayscontemplated a treatyvery much on the lines of the 1954 Turkish-Pakistanipact and perhapseven more precise, owing to the existence of a commonfrontier between the contracting parties.120They, therefore, produced anamended, stronger and more specific text (MI) and dispatched it, on 6February, o Baghdad,as well as to the BritishandAmericangovernments.The Foreign Office had, meanwhile, brought into the attention of thenegotiating sides that the draft (NI) did not provide the 'umbrella',underwhich Nuri had promisedto revise the 1930 Anglo-Iraqitreaty.'2'

The amended Turkishdraft (MI) omitted in its preamblethe referenceto the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and completely redrafted Article 1,insertingtwo additional new articlesto give it the following appearance:Article 1.The contractingpartiesundertake o cooperatein accordancewith theprovisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations inconfronting any armed aggression against one of them inside oroutside the Middle East region.Article2.In order to ensureeffective realizationand applicationof cooperationenvisaged in Article 1 above the competent authorities of thecontracting parties shall establish military plans and determine therequisite measures immediately after entry into force of the presenttreaty. These plans and measures shall be operative as soon as they


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250 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIEShave been approved by the Governments of the contracting partiesand may moreover be the subject of special agreements.Article3.Exchange of views and information shall be carried out between therespective competent military authoritiesof the contractingparties forthe purpose of benefiting from the technical experience and progressachieved by either of the parties in the field of defensive armament.The contracting; arties shall consult and cooperate together in orderto satisfy, as far as possible, the needs of each of them in theproduction of arms and munitions as well as in military trainingandeducation.

Article 2 of the Iraqi draft (NI) was kept as the new Article 4. Article 5stipulated that the provisions of the treaty did not contradict their pastinternationalengagements and that the contractingpartieswould undertakenot to conclude any future nternationalengagements incompatiblewith theproposed treaty, while Article 6 added the new provision that any newaccession should take place after agreementbetween the contractingpartiesand the state applying for accession.122Both the British and American governments preferredthe Turkishtext(MI). The Foreign Office was especially satisfied because it did provide thenecessary 'umbrella'."3It was also at this stage that the UK definitelyinformed the two negotiating parties that she 'would prefer to accede to theproposed treaty at a later date,' after the completion of the revision of thetreaty with Iraq.'24Nuri did not consider this amended draft (Ml) proper for a bilateraltreatywith Turkey. He considered it very important o have a reference, in

the preamble, to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, because he could thusconvince all doubters that his policies did not differ in essence from thosepursued by Egypt. He could not accept Article 1 in its amended form,because, he thought, the clause 'in confronting any armed aggressionagainst one of them from inside or outside the Middle East region' was aclear reference to Israel, which could not, according to Nuri, be a matterofbilateralconcern between Iraq and Turkey. Article 2 of the Turkish draft(M1) was far beyond whatNuri was prepared o concede to the Turks.Alsounacceptable was the newly-added provision in Article 6. With all theseobjections in mind, Nuri put to Menderes a clear choice: either to give moretime for bilateral negotiations to continue or to agree to the original Iraqidraft(NI).'25Menderes was upset. The original Iraqi draft (NI) had been quiteunacceptable to his government. To sign it now would mean a retreat forTurkey from the provisions of the 13 Januarycommunique. Furthermore,


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THE FORMULATIONOF THE BAGHDAD PACT 251Nuri's draft did not contain the 'umbrella'clause insisted upon by London.With Britain and America concurring that Turkey should be preparedtogive more time to Iraq rather than sacrifice the chance of a workableagreement for the desirabilityof a quick conclusion, the Turksasked themboth to instruct their representativesin Baghdad to try to soften Nuri'sattitude.126In this, Wrightsucceeded. Nuri backed down a little. Late on the nightof 9 Februaryhe presentedto his cabinet for approvala new compromisedraft (N2) he had worked out with Wright that afternoon, as well as analternativetext somewhat like the compromisedraft (N2) but nearerto theTurkishwording. Discussion in the cabinet was not detailed, but a generalagreement was reached to send both texts to Ankara the following day.'27The compromise draft(N2) restoredthe reference to the Anglo-Egyptianagreementin the preamble.New Articles 1 and 2 were insertedto replaceArticles 1 and2 of the Turkishdraft(MI). They readas follows:

Article1.The high contracting parties will cooperate for their defence andsecurity in accordancewith Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperationmay form the subjectof special agreementwith each other.Article 2.The measures which will be taken between Turkeyand Iraq will be-thosecontained in Articles 3 and4 below.

The Articles 3 and 4 mentioned above were the Articles 1 and 2 of theoriginal Iraqi draft (NI) calling only for consultations and discussionsbetween the military authorities and free passage of military equipment.Article 5 was the same Article 5 of the Turkishdraft (MI) stipulating thatthe treaty did not contradict the past internationalengagements of thecontracting parties and that the latter would not conclude any future treatyincompatible with the one being negotiated. Article 6 kept only the firstsentence of the corresponding article of the Turkish draft (MI), thuseliminating the provision that any new accession should first be agreed bythe membersof the pact.'28It was this compromise text (N2) thatwas communicatedeventually byNuri to the Turkish government. He ultimately decided to keep thealternativedraft in reserve.'29The Turkish government received the newproposalsby telephonefrom theirambassador n Baghdad in the morning of10 February.'30uri hoped that, provided the Turksagreed, signature couldtake place in Baghdad within the next few days.'31 It was not to be.Menderes, Birgi andtheir assistantsfoundArticles 2, 3 and 4 discriminatoryagainstTurkey,since they imposed a severe limitation on the scope of future


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252 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESdefence co-operationbetween Turkeyand Iraq,while grantingthe latter,atthe same time, a free hand to negotiatebroaderagreements with otherfuturemembers under the 'umbrella'providedin Article 1. Birgi told Bowker thatMenderes realized thatNuri's reason for insertingArticle 2 was his morbidsuspicions of Turkish designs on northern Iraq. Menderes was ready,continued Birgi, to give Iraq a fresh categorical guarantee of respect ofterritorialintegrity, although, according to the Turkish government, thatwould in fact be a repetitionof Article 1 of the 1946 Turkish-Iraqi reaty.132It seemed for a moment that the negotiations had reached a deadlock.The only concession Nuri was preparedto make at that stage was to omitArticles 2, 3 and 4 of the draft (N2) from the pact itself and embody thesubstance of its Articles 3 and 4 in a protocol or annex, but even thatproposal he wanted to be made to the Turks ndirectlythroughthe British.'33By now, the British governmenthad remained the only potential mediator.Washington ndicated that while strongly supporting hepact, it did not wishto be an original signatoryto or join the pact at an early date because thatmight be interpretedas suggesting that the pact had been imposed fromoutside the area." The Foreign Office preferrednot to interfere to try topatch up this latestdisagreementbetween Turkey andIraq,except to informboth sides that the new Article 1 proposed in Nuri's latest draft (N2) wassatisfactoryfrom its point of view.'35And in order not to complicate mattersfurther, t did not even inform the Britishembassies in AnkaraandBaghdadthatduringsecret UK-US-Turkish staff talks that had begun in London on18 January he Turkishdelegation had put forwarda plan whereby Turkishforces would enterIraqon or before the outbreakof a generalwar with theCommunist Bloc to take over responsibility for the defence of theRowanduz and Penjwin passes in the Zagros mountains.'36

Menderes made a fresh attemptto break the deadlock. He sent his Iraqicounterpartwhat he called a friendly message, asking whether it was reallyNuri's intention that their work together over the last weeks and monthsshould culminate in a treatyon the lines of the revised draft(N2). If it wasso, Menderes continued, then there must be some thought in Nuri's mindwhich the latter had not expressed. Menderes said that the Turkishgovernmentwould look ridiculous if it signed such an agreement, and wenton to point out that 'Articles 3 and 4, though inessential, were acceptablewhen following after the Turkish Article 2 [of the draft (Ml)]'. In Nuri'srevised draft (N2), however, they had fixed the limit to which defence co-operation etweenTurkey ndIraq hould o. 31Nuri was unmoved. He was reportedly in a mood of suspicion of theTurks,nervousthat the latter were tryingto inveigle him into some wordingwhich could subsequently be interpreted as permitting entry of Turkishforces into Iraqin wartime. He even spoke of abandoningthe idea of a pact


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THE FORMULATIONOF THE BAGHDAD PACT 253with Turkey altogether. Prince Abdul-Ilah, who was in all probabilitylesssuspicious of Turks than Nuri, and the Turkish ambassador, MuzafferGoksenin, appealed to Wright to try and calm Nuri. Accordingly, Wrighthad a long talk with Nuri on 15 February.Nuri reaffirmedthat he wouldnever agree to any clause which could be interpretedas permitting entry ofTurkishforces in Iraqin any situation.He even proposedat one stage in thesaid meeting to write in the pact itself a provision that neither countryshould send forces into the opposite countryin time of war.Wrighttried topersuade Nuri that Turkey's main preoccupation was to avoid a wordingthat appeared discriminatory against or derogatory to herself. In the end,Nuri promised to propose to Goikseninthe following day a revised draft(N3) which omitted Articles 2, 3 and 4 of his previous draft (N2), thusleaving to both sides freedom to conclude a special agreement betweenthem derived from Article 1 of the pact in the same way as any futureagreement between Iraq and Britain. He stated that if Turkey could notaccept his latest proposal (N3), he would have to give up the idea of abilateralpact altogetherand seek instead a pact with Britain and Pakistan.'38The acting Iraqiforeign minister,Burhanal-Din Bash A'yan, handedthenew proposal (N3) to Goksenin in the morning of 16 February.'39he nextday, the TurkishForeign Ministry informed their ambassadorthat Nuri'slatest draft was acceptable to them, subject to minor points which could besettled when Menderes revisited Baghdadto sign the treaty.The points theTurks had in mind were the references in the preamble to the Anglo-Egyptian agreementand the ALCSP.They thought t would be inappropriatethat an agreementbetween Turkey and Iraq should refer to agreements towhich Turkey was not a party or to Iraq's obligations under the ALCSPunder Article 4 of Nuri's latest draft (N3). They also claimed that anyreference to theAnglo-Egyptian agreementwould almost certainlybe seizedby Egypt 'to cause further rouble'."'The Britishhad also been worried bythe reference to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and had previouslyunsuccessfully tried to persuade Nuri to omit it.'4'Foreign Minister Kopruiluassured Bowker that Menderes, once in Baghdad, would do his best toinduce Nuri to drop these points, but he preferred not to refer to themspecifically before departing or Baghdad lest it might cause furtherdelay.'42Nuri, however, had another major surpriseto pull out of his hat. On 18February, he Iraqi governmentpassed to Goksenin two furtheramendmentsto the proposedtext of the pact. The first was an alternativewording of theparagraph4 of the preamble, referringto the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. Itread as follows:

And whereas the Agreement concluded between Her BritannicMajesty's Government and the Egyptian Government has considered


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254 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESthat any armed attack or a threat on Turkey or any member State ofthe Treatyof Joint Defence between the Arab League States shouldnecessitate the affording by Egypt to the United Kingdom of suchfacilities as may be necessaryin orderto place the Suez Canalbase ona war footing to operateit effectively.

The second proposedamendmentwas an additionat the end of Article 5 ofthe draft(N3) specifying thatany state 'concernedwith security andpeacein this region' that wanted to accede to the treatymust be 'fully recognisedby both of the High Contracting Parties', a clear indication that Israel(which was not recognized by Iraq) could not accede to the treaty. Inaddition, Nuri proposed drafts of two letters to be exchanged betweenMenderes and himself in connection with the pact. In the first letter (LI),addressedby Nuri to Menderes,the IraqiPremier statedhe had 'the honourto place on record that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace andsecurityin the Middle East region, and to eliminate the causes of frictioninthe said region, we have agreedto work in close cooperation for effectingthe carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.'The second proposed letter was to be addressed by Menderes to Nuriacknowledging the receiptof the first letterand confirming its content.143The Turkish government was not surprised. On 19 February ittelegraphed Baghdad expressing agreementwith Nuri's new proposals andinforming him that they too had a few amendments on some 'technicalpoints', which Menderes would be glad to discuss in Baghdad. It also askedin particular hat the visit should be kept secret and not announced beforeMenderes's arrival."44The reference in the 13Januarycommunique to resisting any aggressionfrom inside the Middle East region had given rise to some disquiet inIsrael.'" Israeli diplomats did not agree with the theory that anyTurkish-Arab rapprochementwould bring benefits to their country. On thecontrary,they feared (rightly as it turned out eventually) that Arabs wouldinfluence Turkey away from friendship with Israel. Israeli leaders believedthat the references concerned were undoubtedly inserted in the 13 Januarycommunique on Nuri's insistence in order to reinstate himself with otherArab states. They feared, however, that in the future, countries like Syria,Lebanon and Jordan, which were quite unconcerned about Sovietaggression and were obsessed by Israel, would do their best to see that thesaid references were given more significance than was originallyintended.'"When the Israeli minister in Ankarahad communicatedhis fearsto Menderes - before the final negotiations had got under way - and askedhim if it was intendedto incorporate hese references in the future pact, thelatter had replied that it was not his wish that they should be incorporated,


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THE FORMULATIONOF THE BAGHDAD PACT 255but had only given a 90 per cent assurancethat in the event of Iraq askingthat they should, he would refuse.'47Londonand Washingtonwere worriedtoo aboutthe futurerepercussionsof any reference to Palestine in the pact. The Foreign Office thought thatNuri's proposal would prejudice the prospects of their ongoing efforts tosecure a settlement to the Palestine question,'48which were based onsupporting the armistice regime established in 1948-49, as well as onputting forward, when possible, practical suggestions designed to reducefrontiertension, in the hope that a prolongedperiodof calm on the frontiersmightcreate an atmosphere avourableto a settlement.'49 ulles, in turn,hadtold Abba Eban, the Israeli ambassador n Washington,that he consideredthe Turkish-Iraqi pact would tend to weaken the solidarity of the ArabLeague against Israel and was confident that, as things developed, Israelwould realise that this trend was to herbenefit.'50Now, the StateDepartmentinstructed American embassies in Baghdad and Ankara to inform theirrespective governmentsthat, in the US view, the text of the pact should bewithoutany referenceto Palestine;andthat,if there must be some reference,it should be in a separateinstrumentquite distinct and without reference tothe pact.'5'A Foreign Office telegram to the British embassy in Ankaraunderlinedthat the 'main value of pact, from the point of view of buildingup under defence arrangements, is that it turns Arab eyes away fromPalestine towards the outside danger '52Mendereshad expected Nuri to propose insertingsome provision on thePalestine question all along and was convinced that this would be areasonable price to pay in return or the gains to be made by establishing aregional anti-Communist defence pact. He thought the letters wereimportant to boost Nuri's position.'53The acting Secretary-Generalof theTurkishForeignMinistry,Melih Esenbel, argued to Bowker that the letterswere not part of the pact; that they went no further than the Baghdadcommunique and merely repeated previous statements by the Turkishgovernment of general support for the 1947-49 UN resolutions onPalestine.54Once the Turkishgovernmenthad agreed to the proposed exchange ofletters,however, the Iraqis began to ask that they should be included as anannex to the pact. This latest proposal made the Turksunhappybecause ofall its complications both for their futurebilateralrelations with Israel andfor the prospects of UK and US accession to the pact. The Foreign Office,too, felt obliged at thisjuncture to remind the negotiating parties that if theexchange of letters in theirpresentform should form an annex or part of thepact Britain could not accede to the pact itself in the future.'55Underpressure, Nuri retreated o his old idea of exchanged lettersreferringto thepact, but quite separate and distinct from it.'16


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256 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESMenderes ssuredBowker, hedaybeforehis visitto Baghdad,hathewould first try to deferthe questionof an exchangeof lettersfor laterconsideration,utfailingto do this,he would then put forwarda revised

draft etter L2) suggestedby Bowkerhimself,whichclearlywatereddownthe concealedanti-Israeliwordingof Nuri's extby statingonlythat:Sir, I have the honour o place on recordmy understandinghat thetreaty signed between us today will enableour two countriestocooperaten resistingany aggressiondirectedagainsteither of ourcountrieswhether romoutsideor inside the MiddleEastarea, andthat heTreatywill serveto establish tabilityn the MiddleEast n amannernconformitywith theprinciples f the Charterf the UnitedNationsandthedecisionsbasedon thoseprinciples.'57

The ForeignOfficeLevantDepartment ivil servants onsideredhat therevised extwas 'as innocuousas we canhope for', but still wanted o tryto further mit the words'andthedecisionsbasedon thoseprinciples'. nthat case, they reasoned, although the Israeli government wouldundoubtedly till see what was behind those assertions, t might takecomfort rom he factthat herewas no direct eference o the resolutions nPalestineand not therefore eact oo violently.'58Nuri,however, emained damant.He told Wright hathe had receivedtheunanimous upport f his cabinetandthe elderstatesmenn Iraqon 21Februaryor thefinaltext of thepact,so he wouldrisklosinghis backingin Parliament by consenting to substantial alterations or to thepostponementf theexchangeof letters.Furthermore,e said,he believedthat heexchangeof lettersmightbe decisive n inducing he Soviet Unionand heArabcountriesorefrainromattackinghepact,andperhapsn oneortwocases,induce hem ojoin it.'59On23 FebruaryMenderes eturnedo Baghdad, ccompanied y Zorlu,Koprulu ndEsenbel.'1Theysucceeded nly in convincing he Iraqi ide todrop inally hereference o theAnglo-Egyptiangreementn thepreamble.Nurirefused o makeany furthermajor oncessions.Hence, he discussionswere mainly imited o sortingout some still unresolved technicalities'nthe text.Nurialsorefused ategoricallyo consider he new version L2) ofthe letters obeexchanged without, f course,knowing hat ts drafter adbeenBowker.TheTurkish elegation amefinally o the conclusion hat opostpone heexchangewouldmeanpostponing he pact itself, andperhapseven losing it altogether.They were only able to make Iraq agree on awording,which he Turkish ide considered o be 'a slight mprovement ntheoriginal ext'. The finalversionreadas follows:

Sir,in connexionwith the Pactsignedby us today, have the honour


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258 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESobligationshe member-stateslreadyhad, andthatthe contracting artieshadundertakenot to enter ntoanyfutureobligationsncompatiblewiththe pact.Article5 left the pact open for accessionto anymemberof theArabLeagueoranyother tateactivelynvolvedwiththesecurity ndpeacein the regionandwhichwas ully recognized y bothcontracting arties.APermanentMinisterialCouncil wouldbe set up as soon as at least fourpowersbecamemembers f the Pact.Thepactwas to remain n force for afive-yearperiod,renewableorother ive-yearperiods.Any member-statethatwishedto withdraw ad to notifythe othermembers n writingof herdesireto do so six monthsbeforethepactwas dueto expire.In thatcase,thepactwouldremainvalid for the othermember-states.helast article,Article8, specified heproceduref ratifyinghetr.eatyndtheexchangeofratifications.'"Bothgovernments ereanxious o ratify hepactas soon aspossible,soratificationook placeon 26 February, nly two days afterthe signature.Both, however, had to overcome criticism from their respectiveparliamentaryritics hat heprovisionsof thepact dealingwith theextentof co-operationwereambiguous.In the TurkishGrandNationalAssembly,the vote of approvalwasunanimous.167Menderes, owever,hadto assuremembers f theoppositionRPP hat hepactdid notmeanadditionalbligationsorTurkey eyondherfrontiers.Therewasnoautomaticbligationunder he wording f the treatytogive military idtoIraqnthe eventof an attack n the atter,he said.Thepact was an alliance for defence and, once it had been ratified,thegovernmentwould have the powerto negotiateand concludenecessarymeasures.Onthe issueof the exchanged etters, he opposition ontendedthattheywerebindingonly to the governmentn power,while Menderesarguedhat hey mpliednochangen Turkish olicy towardssrael.Turkey,he said,hadalwayssupported,s a matter f principle, he UnitedNations,including,by implication,ts resolutions nPalestine.'68InIraq,Nuritried o avoid anopen debateas muchas possible,despitethefactthathe hadto dealonlywith a Chamber f Deputieshe hadalmost'appointed' he previousautumn.He askedthat the bill to ratifythe pactshould irstbe discussed n theForeignAffairsCommittee,whichsubmitteda unanimous ecommendationf approval.Later,n theplenary ession,hestressedthat the pact did not contradict raq'straditional olicy of co-operationwiththeotherArabstates.Iraqwas undertaking o obligationsbeyondher frontiers nd would be solely responsible orher defence.Nostates could dictateupon Iraqthe conditionsor extent of defence co-operationas Article 1providedthatseparate agreements may and not 'must'be concludedbetween hemember-states. eexpressed he hope thatIran,the UnitedStatesandBritain thelatter,after he termination f the 1930


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THE FORMULATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT 259treaty wouldaccede o thenewpact n thenear uture. n theevent of anyor all Arabstatesacceding o thepact, co-operation etween hemwoulddifferas it hadalready eendefinedn the ALCSP.Turkey's olicy,hesaid,was not contradictoryo the interestsof the Arabstates andTurkeywassincere andhonestin pursuing his direction.Only threedeputiesspokeagainstratification, xpressing earsthatIraqwasdistancingherselffromthe ArabLeague.Still,theChamber oted n favourof ratificationy 112votes againstonlyfour.The sameevening, hepactwas also debatedn theSenate,the upperhouse,and received an affirmative ote of 25 againstone."69nstrumentsf ratificationwereexchangedn Ankaraon 15 April1955between he TurkishForeignMinister nd heIraqiambassador.'70Meanwhile,Nurihadalready mbarked n thesecondstageof hispre-conceivedplan, i.e. the negotiationwith the UK of a new militaryco-operation greemento replace he unpopular 930treaty.The agreementwas signedon 30 Marchandcame nto effecton 5 April, hedayof officialUK accession t

aa sanjian...the formulation of the baghdad pact

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