This newsletter is published by the A319/320 Fleet and Pilot Standards Teams. It is intended to provide additional detail surrounding operational policies and procedures and aircraft technical information for the line pilots. The discussion of flight procedures herein is not intended to override or replace official guidance in the flight manuals. Where a conflict exists, the current flight manual governs. The opinions expressed are those of the Chief Line Check Pilot, Fleet Captain and/or the Fleet Technical Manager.

In this issue…

A321 Start of Service 2

Barometric Altimetry 2

Hot Aircraft Cabins 4

Loss of Crew Oxygen in Flight 5

Post Flight Walk Arounds 6

Erroneous Radio Altimeter Indications 7

New Reno Procedures 7

Less is Better 8

From the other Side of the Mic 9

Hail Encounters 13

A321 Multiscan Weather Radar Computer Based Training 15

Unheeded Windshear Warnings 15

APU (Bleed On) Takeoffs 17

ASAP Lessons Learned 18

Flight Crew Incidents 19

Flaps 3 Landings 24

June 2016

Thank You for Filing ASAP Reports 25

Topic of Interest: Windshear 26

A319/320 Fleet Newsletter

Captain Rich Kaynor Fleet Captain

404-715-0333

Captain Bruce Graham Chief Line Check Pilot

404 715-1956

1

A321 Start of Service

In May, the fleet welcomed the first A321s. June will bring three additional aircraft to the fleet with two more in both July and August. By year end, 15 A321s will be flying in Delta colors.

Although flying the A321 is very similar to the A319/320, there are differences you should be aware of before you step into your first A321. The fleet has created a one stop shop call the A321 Reference Guide containing all the training references below. The guide can be found on the fleet DeltaNet site under Reference Materials and will be available with in Tablet soon.

A321 Flight Notification Pop-up Message: The fleet has set up a DBMS pop-up to inform A320 pilots when a A321 leg is approaching. When you receive the pop up, please take the time to review the follow training aids:

• Fleet Bulletin 16-06, Introduction of the A321 [DeltaNet & SCL/Tablet] • Fleet Bulletin 16-07, A321 Mid-Cabin Doors [DeltaNet & SCL/Tablet] • Differences Chapter Volume I [DeltaNet & SCL/Tablet] • A321 Mid-Cabin Doors Video [A320 Fleet page] • A321 Differences Training Module [A320 Fleet page] • A321 Preview Presentation [A320 Fleet page] • Topics of Interest (TOI) articles about the A321 [DeltaNet & SCL/Tablet]

Mid Cabin Doors Self Certification: Prior to flying an A321, every pilot must view the Mid Cabin Door instructional video (a paid event!) and review Fleet Bulletins 16-06 and 16-07. Upon completion, you’ll be asked to self-certify qualification in DBMS.

Barometric Altimetry What could be simpler, right? Well, not so fast. There are several unique characteristics of the Airbus that are worth discussing and several common problem areas as well.

PERF APPR

Looking at the PERF page example at right, the first thing you may notice is that the QNH is entered in millibars. To enter a MB setting, the value must be within an Airbus considered “normal” range and is entered without a decimal place. Not something we normally do, but it is a capability of our FMS.

Q: What is the PERF APPR QNH value used for?

A: Actually, quite a bit. As follows:

1. First, it’s used to “locate” the arrival airport’s runway in space. You might think this is done using only GPS/IRS position reference, but the QNH setting is used as well. Once the QNH is entered, the FMS is able to build an accurate vertical path from the runway back to the aircraft’s current altitude. If the QNH is inaccurate, the vertical path will be inaccurate as well (one inch HG. equals 1,000 feet).

2. It’s also used to set the destination airport cabin altitude. An inaccurate setting will result in a cabin altitude discrepancy of 1,000 feet per inch HG. Pilots have inadvertently transposed numbers when

entering the QNH value resulting in the cabin depressurizing several thousand feet above airport elevation.

3. It’s also used to define the ‘TRANS FL’. The transition level is where the FMS plans on the pilot switching from STD altimeter to the local QNH value. TRANS FL is initially set by the database. In this European example the database level is FL60, in the US and Canada FL185, and in Mexico FL195. However, the TRANS FL is also variable, based on the QNH setting. With a low (less than 29.92 setting) the TRANS FL shifts upwards in 500-foot intervals. This works well in a European environment, where the transition level and altitude vary. It doesn’t work so well in the US, where the two are the same and ATC makes the adjustment for low altimeter settings (i.e. lowest useable Flight Level). An error in entering the QNH can result in the TRANS FL shifting upward, causing the PFD ‘STD’ indication to flash prematurely. This can also result in a missed altitude constraint, as the FMS is planning on the pilot changing to the entered BARO value when passing through the TRANS FL.

Q: That’s a lot more complicated than I thought, what’s the pilot’s takeaway from this?

A: We enter the QNH value on every flight and the other pilot doesn’t usually check it afterwards. Take a moment to verify all your PERF page entries after making them.

Q: Why does Airbus use FL185 as the TRANS FL in the US? If I’m level at FL180 in the descent the PFD ‘STD’ flashes continuously. Is there any way to stop this?

A: We’ve asked the same question of Airbus and have explained the difficulty the database value poses for us in the good old US. So far they haven’t agreed to a change. What you can do when cleared to FL180 is to overwrite the TRANS FL value with ‘179’. This prevents the ‘STD’ from flashing until descending below the actual transition level and also allows for accurate descent predictions.

Note: Descent predictions affected by the TRANS FL are usually only those within a few thousand feet of the changeover point.

FCU BARO Setting

What could possibly go wrong here, right? Almost every week, an ASAP is received with a crew reporting a missed changeover (usually in the climb phase) or an incorrect BARO setting (usually in the descent phase), both resulting in altitude deviations.

The missed changeover to STD during climb is usually the result of the distraction of a radio frequency change around the transition altitude. Another factor is the natural “let-down” we all experience after the busy preflight, taxi, and takeoff phases. We have to be on guard to prevent this letdown from leading to complacency. Checklist discipline is the best way to combat complacency, both in calling for the Climb Checklist in this case and in really looking at the altimeter settings (all three) before saying, “crosschecked”. Remember, it doesn’t matter what your FCU BARO setting is when the other pilot’s AP is the one that’s engaged.

Another climb issue is in pre-setting the landing ATIS baro setting and not going back to ‘STD’ afterwards. I’m sure we’ve all either done this, or have seen it done (sometimes on a 4-hour flight!). If you change something that’s covered by a checklist after the checklist has been completed, you really should redo the checklist. Otherwise it has no meaning. Nuff said.

A descent issue that’s also easily fixable is misreading a written-down baro setting on the ATIS printout. If you’re going to write out the baro setting to make it more readable, ensure it’s written out correctly and in a readable fashion. Otherwise, don’t do it!

International

There aren’t many places we (currently) fly to that use a non-standard transition level/altitude. Mexico is one with a transition altitude (climbing) of 18,500 feet and a transition level (descending) of FL195. Generally, this doesn’t cause many problems as most Mexican arrivals and departures don’t include constraints close to the transition. But it is non-standard and should be included in the WARTS and NATS brief.

San Salvador is another destination with a non-standard transition altitude of 19,500 and transition level of FL200.

Q: When I flew to SAL last week the FMS showed a TRANS FL of FL205. Why would it display this if the transition level is FL200?

A: By definition, the transition level is less than 500 feet above the transition altitude. Because of this, aircraft are not normally assigned to fly at the transition level, as this does not guarantee separation from other traffic flying (using QNH) at the transition altitude; the lowest usable flight level is the transition level plus 500 feet. The FMS is doing this math for you. If you are assigned a descent to FL200 inbound to SAL, confirm the clearance and ‘199’ can be entered for the TRANS FL to prevent the PFD ‘STD’ from flashing early.

Warm Weather Effects

We all know about cold weather altimeter errors, what about warm weather? Generally, warm weather works to your advantage as the aircraft is higher above the ground for a given altimeter height. However, this can be an issue as well, as we’ll examine next.

Let’s say you’re descending into KSLC on the ILS 16L on a hot summer day. Cleared for the approach, you push the APPR pb and descend on the ILS G/S just as you’ve done all winter long. This time though, ATC calls saying you’re low crossing TOOME and would you “please contact them at the following phone number…” You look at your PFD and see you’re 400 feet lower than the designated TOOME crossing altitude.

What happened? When flying on a glideslope, you’re flying a fixed angle from the runway. However, the crossing altitude at TOOME is barometric and thus is higher above the ground in warm weather.

How to avoid this situation? “Managed descent to the feather”; it’s even more important in warm weather.

Hot Aircraft Cabins

With the arrival of Summer comes the hot cabin issues. Keeping the cabin comfortable for our passengers is a very high priority. Here are a few things to keep in mind this Summer:

Monitor the cabin temperature throughout the boarding process.

Upon arriving at the aircraft, ensure external air is connected. If the cabin temperature is above 90 degrees, coordinate with the gate agent to

delay boarding. If external air is connected but the cabin temperature rises above 76 degrees, go

ahead and start the APU. Reconfigured aircraft: it’s been reported that the cabin temperature sensors are

masked by the new larger bins. Reports indicate a temperature reading in the cockpit of 68-70F will keep the cabin around 72F.

Plan ahead.

• Ensure both air conditioning packs are used (open the cross bleed) during taxi. • During the FA brief, ask the Flight Attendants to make a PA asking the passengers

to open all the gasper vents and close the window shades. • As you start your descent from cruise altitude, pre-cool the cabin.

Report Cooling Problems Via ACARS. Delta has an active program to monitor cooling issues: failure to connect conditioned air in a timely manner; inadequate cooling from ground carts or jetway conditioned air and inadequate APU cooling capacity. Here is how you report the problem:

• Flt Progress Reports • Pink Sheet • GND OPS • Ground Equipment • Type a texted massage describing the problem.

What Not TO DO - Use low pressure ground conditioned air simultaneously with air from the air conditioning packs. [Vol. 1 Limitations L.10.7] Doing so can damage the aircraft.

Loss of Crew Oxygen in Flight ASAP: Departed MSP for SNA and flight proceeded normally. I was the PM and performed the routine position checking enroute referencing the computer flight plan. Some time ago I had read a recommendation from the Fleet to add a routine check of the DOORS page for OXY pressure at each Company reporting point (the FWC doesn't monitor Crew Oxygen press.), so I try to always do that at those points. The first reporting point was OTG (Schep 8 SID MSP) and a check of the DOORS page showed normal OXY press (I believe it was around 1400psi). Our next point was to be EKR VOR and I just happened to check the doors page some time (early) between BFF and EKR and discovered the Crew Oxygen system was totally depleted. (Amber : " OXY XXX REGUL LO PRESS "). At first the "XXX"'s made me think that it was an sensor failure (thought it should read "0psi") but a quick check of both of our Oxy masks revealed no flow to them. I referenced the QRH 1.7 page and had FO call our Lead FA to bring two portable Oxy bottles to cockpit. After briefing her of the situation and giving her an approx. time for a diversion to the closest airport (DEN) I asked the FO to advise DEN Center of our situation while I attempted to contact ATL radio to talk to Dispatch and Maintenance. Establishing and maintaining communication was slow and (particularly) difficult as we began a descent and turn towards DEN (especially below FL 250). Managed to agree with Dispatch on a divert to DEN and landed without incident. Preventive Measures: Not sure what I would do differently. I'm glad that our Fleet publishes incidents like this so that we all know the potential system abnormalities; that is the reason I really try to check the Oxygen system pressure on a regular basis enroute and the only reason it was detected. Our preflight of our respective masks in MSP were normal and we had good oxygen pressure prior to push.

O.E. Guide:

Q: What monitoring of the oxygen system is required during flight? A: Oxygen system pressure is not monitored through the Flight Warning Computer. Therefore, Airbus requires the crew to “regularly check the crew oxygen pressure on the DOOR/OXY System Display (SD) page.” Loss of oxygen quantity will require a diversion, as the aircraft is no longer capable of protecting the crew from smoke on the flight deck. Note: Airbus has changed this design on new aircraft; Delta’s A321 aircraft will be equipped with the ability to automatically monitor oxygen system pressure. However, for commonality crews should regularly check the oxygen pressure. Note: For an explanation of the “how and why” of the O2 mask preflight, see fleet Topics of Interest article ‘Crew Oxygen Operation’. Best Practice: Verify the oxygen system pressure on the DOOR/OXY page with each waypoint fuel/time check. While some (100-200 psi) decrease in pressure is normal due to tank cooling on a long flight, any significant pressure loss should be investigated further.

Post Flight Walk Arounds Of all departure delays, the first flight of the day generates the biggest problems. That’s because “first flight delays” cascades through the remainder of that aircraft’s flying. That’s the reason Delta asks crewmembers to call MCC with any maintenance items prior to leaving the aircraft to overnight and why crews are asked to assess the aircraft, via a walk around, before leave the plane for overnight at non- maintenance bases.

ASAP: Failed to notice bird strike by not accomplishing post flight walk-around at layover airport. I received a phone call from the MSP Chief Pilots office on 5/xx/16 informing me that the aircraft that I flew in the previous night took a delay that morning because a bird strike was discovered on the radome during the pre-flight walk-around. The previous night, we flew from SLC to OAK, and the aircraft remained over night at OAK. Our flight attendants were on a stand up layover so everyone was anxious to get to the layover hotel as quickly as possible. During the haste to get to the hotel, I failed to notice/ask my FO if he had accomplished a post flight walk-around. Had he done so we would have discovered the bird strike and could have diverted a maintenance delay the following morning. During the flight, I had no indication that we were hit by a bird. Had I heard or felt any indications of a bird strike, I would have most certainly gone outside and examined the aircraft myself. Thinking that nothing was wrong with the aircraft and an eagerness to help the flight attendants get to the hotel as quickly as possible lead to some complacency on my part to comply with the post flight procedures. Preventive Measures: I will make it a point during all end of the day post flight procedures to insure that a post flight walk around is accomplished.

O.E. Guide:

After Shutdown Activities After shutdown reminders (Refer to Vol. 1, NP.20, Secure Procedure):

• Enter appropriate ACARS information. • Check oxygen, engine oil, and hydraulic quantities. • Check status messages (a flashing 'STS” indicates a Class II STS Message). • Make appropriate logbook entries. If at a non-Delta maintenance station and the aircraft will

overnight, contact MCC to arrange for maintenance or crew deferral guidance. • IRS Drift Error Recording: If inbound flight operated in Class II airspace for more than one hour,

check IRS parameters per Vol. 1, SP.11. • At non-Delta maintenance stations a post-flight exterior walk around is required when aircraft

overnights. • Shutdown the APU, unless required for environmental reasons.

From the Secure Procedure in Vol 1:

When operating the last flight of any day into a limited or non-maintenance station, accomplish the following:

• If a maintenance discrepancy is noted and entered in the logbook, the MCC

must be contacted through the dispatcher as soon as possible to facilitate corrective action and avoid delays. If a flight crew placard is applicable, it should be installed prior to departing the aircraft.

• Perform a complete exterior inspection, in accordance with the Exterior

Inspection - Captain or First Officer.

Erroneous Radio Altimeter Indications The fleet has experienced two erroneous RA abnormals in the past month. So although we’ve made excellent progress reducing the RA false indications, the problem remains a threat and crews must remain vigilant.

The guidance for Erroneous RA Indications has been retired from the Fleet Bulletin and can now be found in the FCTM.

ASAP:We were on the ILS 3R in DTW when we had an RA anomaly with a 50 ft callout by the automated system followed by a false land mode and a retard call out. The captain disconnected the AP and we commenced with a GO AROUND. We were vectored back for RNAV approach to 3R and landed without further incident. On the ground and after landing, NAV RA DEGRADED was displayed on the ECAM. We notified MX and entered the discrepancy into the logbook. (CA ) On ILS Rwy 03 in KDTW had been cleared for approach at flaps 3 gear up and captured glideslope at 3000ft and began descent. At 2600ft msl had 50ft and Retard auto callouts. Saw RA fluctuations and LAND mode on FMA as a/c began to pitch over. Disconnected Autopilot and executed Go-Around and set up for RNAV GPS Approach to Rwy 03. Landed uneventfully and had NAV RA DEGRADED ECAM caution during taxi to gate. Preventive Measures: It is a known anomaly for this aircraft. …… It is a good idea for pilots to be familiar with this procedure.

New Reno Approach Procedures

In May RNO runway 16R became the proud owner of four new approach procedures. The Silver ILS 16R and the ILS 16R were retired. The new approaches provide several advantages:

• There is no temperature restriction for any of the 16R approaches.

• Like all approach procedures, Delta crews use the lowest approach minimums on the approach plate: the missed approach climb restrictions do not apply unless noted in the Company Pages or Flight Plan Remarks.

Which Approach will ATC assign? It’s assumed the ILS X or Y will normally be used. The fleet recommends that crews request the planned/briefed procedure on initial contact with NorCal.

The following Flight Plan Remark and Procedure will be found in RNO flight paperwork.

ILS X or LOC X 16 R and ILS Z or LOC Z 16R replace the Silver ILS KRNO ATIS will advertise ILS and visual approaches for 16R. Pilots that desire the ILS X OR LOC X 16R or ILS Z OR LOC Z 16R must request these approaches upon check- in with NORCAL TRACON. MD88/90 NOT Authorized

Note: Company Pages are being redrafted. Until the Company Page revision is published, look for flight plan remarks.

Less is Better

Have you been on a Delta flight either commuting, deadheading or non-revving and right at the good part of the movie, the Captain or First Officer comes on and makes a lengthy announcement only to interrupt your movie? That is the world we now live in as the IFE’s (InFlight Entertainment) begins to migrate on to our Fleet.

Delta Air Lines takes pride in their branding and pilot interaction is a very important piece in marketing our product over other Airlines. Pilot announcements are an integral piece of the branding. As Crews you are responsible for the safety of the passengers and to keep them informed of flight conditions, delays and safety concerns.

The video system has a lot of flight information on the display. The enroute map tells the passenger where you are at, how much fight time remains, when you are going to arrive at your destination, how fast and high you are flying, and the weather on arrival at your destination. The passenger know as much as we do about our flight.

So how do you balance the pieces between branding, safety and video interruptions? Here are some tips that may help you minimize the video interruptions:

• Grease the skids - During your “Welcome Aboard” announcement let the passengers know you are going to try to minimize the announcements so you don’t interrupt their video. However assure them you will keep them aware of any delays or safety concerns.

• Short taxi’s – Let the Flight Leader know you have a short taxi so they can promptly start the Safety Demo video to ensure they will be ready when you call “prepare for departure”. The audio of the Safety Demo can be monitored with the PA button on the RMP, but don’t let this monitoring become a distraction.

• Seat Belt Sign – As required by FAA Regulations, when the seatbelt sign is turned off for the first time, the CA should ensure a PA is made advising passengers to keep the seatbelt fastened while seated. At other times, if you turn the seat belt sign on, a brief announcement “seat belts please” is always good management of the signage. Should the ride conditions warrant more of an explanation of the turbulence, then by all means keep the passengers informed.

• Top of Climb – a picture is worth a thousand words. Remember the moving map on the IFE tells the passenger everything we usually include in our announcement. You already welcomed them on board before you left, so really nothing needs to be said.

• Top of Descent – again the moving map tells all. A short update of the arrival weather, gate information and a quick “thank you” in conjunction with your requirement to give the Flight Attendants their “Initial” is warranted.

Remember, in regards to managing video interruptions……Less is Better.

From the Other Side of the Mic . . .

By: Dawne Barrett, Air Traffic Operations Supervisor, Minneapolis TRACON, CMEL, CFI/CFII, President, WAI Stars of the North Chapter

Heather McNevin, Air Traffic Control Specialist, Minneapolis Center, CFI/CFII/MEI, NAFI Master, FAA Safety Team Representative MSP FSDO

Spring and summer are always interesting times when it comes to convective weather in the national airspace system. Many of us on the ground and in the air have a very healthy respect for the power of Mother Nature. What does this weather mean to air traffic? What does it mean to you, the pilot? Over the years we have realized the answers can be very different.

What you see verses what we see We have heard many assumptions both by pilots and controllers about what the other side of the mic sees and knows. Some controllers believe that the pilots always have better radar than we do. Likewise, some pilots believe that controllers are weather specialists and can give detailed reports about what is going on—the majority of us are not. Truth be told, it takes both sides of the mic to safely navigate through our airspace system.

Weather is depicted on all of the radar scopes for Centers, TRACONs, and Towers. However, it is important to understand that all controllers are not all looking at the same picture.

The Centers receive their weather from multiple radar sites sending data through a system known as “WARP.” At best, on bad weather days the weather displayed on the controller’s scope is at least six minutes old. On days with less weather, it can be as old as 24 minutes. Due to the composite view of the weather displayed, it is not subject to the shadows that can be displayed on the aircraft’s radar. The weather is displayed on the controller’s scope as three different “levels of weather.” Level 1 and 2 cells are referred to as moderate precipitation; Level 3 and 4 cells are heavy precipitation; and Level 5 and 6 cells are extreme precipitation.

TRACON weather depiction In most TRACONs and Towers, the weather is much more accurately displayed on the radar due to the difference in system processing. It is typically less than one minute old. On the scope in the TRACONs and Towers, the weather is depicted in six different levels that correspond with the levels of intensity that pilots are familiar with. TRACON and Tower controllers refer to Level 1 cells as light precipitation, Level 2 cells as moderate precipitation; Level 3 and 4 cells as heavy precipitation; and Level 5 and 6 cells as extreme precipitation. There is a difference in how the controllers at the different facilities handle the traffic in regard to weather deviations. Let’s start with the small picture and work to the big picture.

Towers: Most towers, if they have a radar scope, are usually only looking about 15 nm from the airport. Their airspace is often only about 5 to 7 miles from the airport. Therefore, the controllers in the tower are looking out the windows more than the radar. They will see what you see as you are lining up on the runway. However, they will not always see the weather on the radar that you may be seeing on your aircraft’s radar and/or NEXRAD on your surface tablet.

TRACON: The TRACON controllers are usually looking at weather up to about 60 nm from the airport. The weather displayed is fairly accurate and timely. Due to the relative confines of the airspace and trying to vector aircraft both into and out of the airports, controllers in the terminal environment need to make the most use of the airspace available. This sometimes means vectoring an aircraft closer to depicted cells on the scope in order to get aircraft in position for an instrument approach or to vector you through a gap between cells so that you can exit the TRACON airspace in the most expeditious manner. TRACON controllers rely heavily on PIREPs when there is convective activity in the area.

Center: The Center controllers are looking at a much larger picture. A couple of things you might want to keep in mind when talking to the Center regarding eviations and routes

Center Weather Depiction

• They are able to see the line of weather that is on the other side of the line of weather that you may be looking at on your aircraft’s weather radar. What

• initially may look like the better way to deviate around a specific cell may have you looking at a solid wall on the other side.

• Controllers (in all cases) are seeing precipitation; we do not see clouds. The anvil area of a thunderstorm is composed of ice crystals, and therefore does not show up on our weather radar.

Again, the weather radar in the Center environment can be old and different from what you are seeing. There have been days when cumulous clouds are building fast that pilots are requesting to deviate around several minutes before anything will show up on the controller’s radar.

In all cases, how and what you ask for when requesting to deviate is important. Communication is key! The use of standard phraseology is important and even more so in busy situations involving weather. While the use of certain phraseology is stressed on the controller end of things, it is given less weight on the pilot side of the mic. We encourage you to try to use standard phraseology whenever possible as it is usually the quickest way to say something with the least possible probability of confusion. During convective events, the frequency is usually quite busy and brevity is important.

One pilot’s view vs. another pilot’s view

If you are likely going to need to deviate, let the controller know which direction and an estimate of how much deviation. It is important to know if the flight crew is talking about a 15 degree deviation or a 90 turn to avoid weather. Most of the time you all do a great job about letting ATC know what you need from us.

• The deviation clearance you can most likely

expect has several important elements.

o “DAL123 deviations up to 30 degrees left of course are approved, cleared direct MLP when able and advise.”

This lets you know how much

deviating you can do;

What fix to navigate to next; and

To tell the controller when you are direct that fix—this does a couple important things. It lets the controller update the flight plan route so that the computer can aid in tracking your flight path once again. It also lets the controller know exactly what you are doing in relation to other aircraft that may also be deviating in the area.

• Sometimes, the controller may use alternate phraseology “DAL123, deviations left of

course approved, advise when able direct MLP”

This lets you deviate and you can expect MLP when done, but tell the controller before turning there. This is usually given when there are other aircraft in the area and the controller wants to “control” when you turn on course to ensure separation is maintained.

Typically, with convective weather, inappropriate altitude for direction of flight is difficult to accommodate. This is especially true when the weather stretches from one end of the country to the other and everyone in the country is trying to fly around the end of the line, or when there is only one small gap in a line and all the planes are trying to get through it.

Convective activity and turbulence go hand in hand. While it is already a required report to notify ATC of speed changes of 10 knots or 5 percent, it bears reminding that notification of this change is extremely helpful. We will take your speed change into consideration for traffic and sequencing needs. This plays a very large part when the controllers have multiple aircraft in-trail and the lead aircraft slows 30 knots for turbulence without advising. This is also true when climbing out of an airport and you are not planning on increasing your speed above 250 kts as you climb out of 10,000 ft. Things can get real busy real quick when controllers are surprised. Let us know what you are doing if it is something other than normal.

• With convective activity and generally widespread crummy rides, usually the controller gives overall rides instead of just specific reports.

o DAL123 continuous light occasional moderate chop from FL280 to FL370

NOTE: With turbulence, there is a lot of extra conversation on the frequency. Often if you listen to the frequency after you check in, you will develop an understanding of the ride conditions as the conversations progress. If there is a smooth ride, the controller will more than likely tell you. If you aren’t able to get a good picture, ask the controller. We understand that you are just trying to keep the folks in the back happy.

When there is convective weather anywhere in the national airspace system, a group of traffic management specialists at the Command Center in Virginia try to expedite flow around the storms by providing certain routes for aircraft to fly. This is a massive coordination effort that begins hours before your flight is scheduled to push back from the gate. There are telcons that occur at least every two hours that include traffic management units from ATC facilities throughout the country, airlines, and meteorologists. The delays in the systems as well as alternate routes to fly are a coordinated effort by all of those involved.

We hope that this may have answered some of the questions you might have had or has given you a different perspective on what is going on in our system.

Hail Encounters The fleet experienced several significant hail events last summer. In this article we’ll review two of the encounters and will discuss some takeaways.

First Event: MSP-YYC

ASAP: (CA) I called the lead flight attendant to set up a bathroom break. The flight condition was continuous light chop as I left the cockpit. By the time that I was ready to come back to the cockpit, the flight conditions deteriorated to continuous moderate turbulence and I could hear precipitation on the fuselage. I called the

cockpit to return and the FO did not answer. After approximately 30 seconds from my initial call, the FA that was in the cockpit opened the door and I rushed in as she rushed out. As I entered the cockpit, I saw why the FO did not answer the phone. I saw that his windshield was shattered, the autopilot had disconnected, and although we were in green radar returns, he had the airplane in a left bank turning to avoid yellow and red radar returns approximately 20 miles in front of us. He had also gotten clearance to descend to FL280. After I got in my seat, he briefed me on the clearances and I took over the PF duties. We asked for and received a clearance to descend to FL200 as ATC said it may be smoother at that altitude. After we leveled off at FL200 and exited the precipitation, I gave the aircraft and radios to the FO and performed the QRH procedures for "Windshield Cracked" and "Anti Ice R Windshield". When it was determined that the outer pane was cracked, we climbed up to FL280 and proceeded to CYYC uneventfully. We wrote up the cracked windshield in the logbook en route and sent an en route maintenance write up via ACARS. During the post flight walk-around in CYYC, we discovered that the radome looked like it had been sandblasted so we wrote it up also. I called MCC from CYYC and informed them of the write-ups. There were no reports of FA or passenger injuries. Preventive Measures: (CA) This heavy precipitation event caught me by surprise. We were in and out of the clouds and we heard no discussions about convective activity on the radios, nor did we see any build-ups when we were out of the clouds. The lesson I learned from this is that from now on, I will turn the radar on when I'm in IMC conditions, whether or not I hear talk of convective activity on the radio

Takeaways: Although ATC didn’t report any convective activity; Meteorology had issued a Thunderstorm TP for the route of flight, and the hail event occurred within the TP area. Takeaways:

• As stated in the AM SUP-4WX.1.1: The Turbulence Plot System, or TP System, is the primary method for weather hazard avoidance

• Best practice: Plot applicable TPs in the SEC F-PLN. (Can’t remember how? Check the OE Guide OE.3.34).

• Ensure crew awareness of TPs and make a plan to actively use the radar when transiting any thunderstorm related TP areas.

• For a review of radar procedures, see Topics of Interest article ‘Radar Operation’ within the SCL.

Second Event: LGA- SLC (Diversion to DEN)

ASAP: (CA) In cruise flight approaching line of thunderstorms/wx. Dispatch uplinked TP and suggested route TXC-MTU. ATC cleared. Initial wx assessment on A/C radar indicated 2 possible routes/gaps through line-current track and SW track. Extended deviation around line to south 3rd option. Information from dispatch, ATC and PIREP (preceding-approximately 5+ minutes-American flight) indicated present west track (40 knot HW) was a good initial plan. Briefed F/As and PAX. Seat belt sign on. Received updates from ATC/American flight as approached wx. First American report was a large temp increase (-28C) and possible performance issue. For possible icing and increasing turbulence engine anti-ice/ign-on. American flight then reported worsening ride and route/gap appeared to be closing. Although IMC, ATC and A/C radar showed green return but added rapid onset of mod-turb and increase in static discharge drove turn away from line of weather and toward ATC heading 130. During turn it became apparent this option was not going to clear immediate cell(red) to south. Directed F/O and told ATC turning back to SW. In turn rapid onset of hail resulted in damage to both forward windows and radar loss. Declared emergency with ATC and advised turning and descending. Flight deck communication with F/O difficult due to noise. Took over as PF. Quickly assessed engines ok and no noticeable pressure issue. Disconnected A/P, continued turn and started descent. One ECAM message of forward window heat inop noted and cleared-QRH checked as time allowed. Due to damage discussed and agreed on initial divert toward DEN. Transferred A/C control and ATC coordination to F/O. Talked to F/As and PAX several times to assess/inform on issues and DEN divert. Told to plan for yellow emergency. ACARS message to company and eventually talked to and advised dispatch and mx of status and

DEN divert plan. Required briefings and checklists completed. Confirmed emergency equipment requirement with ATC. Due to possible unknown damage slowed to configure early. Planned autoland due to limited visibility. As configured to flaps 2-A/P, A/THR and configuration speeds lost. F/O hand flew A/C and I reset FACs per ECAM. Discussed go-around and assessed forward visibility on final if autoland failed. Landing uneventful. After RWY turnoff contacted emergency ops for inspection. A/C checked OK. Had emergency vehicles and follow-me truck escort to gate. Visibility for taxi was acceptable.

Takeaways: An NTSB investigation of this event is underway, however here are a few initial takeaways:

• This was a very dynamic weather system; with cells which grew almost 10,000 feet within a 5 to 10 minute time period. Cells with that much up-flow can toss hail out in all directions, much like water from a lawn sprinkler. While the downwind side of the thunderstorm poses the st risk for hail, hail can be dispersed several miles in all directions from a fast growing cell.

• Employment and interpretation of the A319/320 weather radar is part science, part art, with active pilot interaction required. Rapidly growing cells require aggressive use of the radar TILT feature to avoid “over-scanning”. See fleet Topics of Interest article ‘Radar Operation’ and Vol. 1 SP.11 for guidance.

• Because of the threat of hail and turbulence around a cell, thunderstorm avoidance guidelines should be followed. Per Vol. 1 SP.11: As a general rule, avoid deviating around the downwind side of large thunderstorms, if possible. When this is not possible, stay at least one mile downwind from the return for every one knot of wind. (e.g., If the wind is 50 knots, deviate at least 50 miles to the downwind side.)

• In addition to their weather radar, this crew did seek additional weather information from ATC and dispatch. Pilots should use all resources available to aid with severe weather avoidance.

• Here’s an interesting factoid: In North America, hail is most common in the area where Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming meet, known as "Hail Alley". Hail in this region most often occurs between the months of March and October during the afternoon and evening hours, with the bulk of the occurrences from May through September. Cheyenne, Wyoming is North America's most hail-prone city with an average of nine to ten hailstorms per season. This incident occurred by the border of Nebraska and Colorado. This is, of course, an area that we transit with regularity.

• Fortunately, the aircraft was capable of an autolanding as forward visibility was reduced. For additional information on hail avoidance and mitigation, see Airbus Safety First article ‘Managing Hailstones’ included at the end of this newsletter.

A321 Multiscan Weather Radar Computer Based Training (internet connection required)

http://player.piksel.com/player.php?video_uuid=kt8o2eb9

http://player.piksel.com/player.php?video_uuid=g98y608t

http://player.piksel.com/player.php?video_uuid=j5h8x19i

Unheeded Windshear Warnings

The FOQA team has been scrubbing the FOQA database for windshear events and found 45 airline-wide Windshear on Approach events since JAN 2013 where flight crews elected to continue and not go around. The A319/320 has the highest rate of any Delta fleet – In the last year we have had 9 events of which the crew continued to landing. Below are two nearly identical instances where the aircraft continued to land after receiving a windshear warning. We’re not talking a brief, spurious windshear warning but a sustained warning

for each. The FOQA analysis found plenty of secondary indications in airspeed, pitch, thrust, etc. to corroborate the warnings. Here is a brief synopsis:

• KPHX Rwy 26. A320. Reactive windshear at 374 HAT that lasted 16 seconds. Loss of 13 knots. Thrust increased from 48% to 79%. The PF disengaged the AP during the warning and pitched from 1.5 to 7.5 degrees. Pilot continued to a landing.

• KSLC Rwy 16L. A319. Reactive windshear at 307 HAT that lasted 15 seconds. Loss of 17 knots. Thrust increased from 42% to 70%. The AP was disengaged prior to warning and pitch increased 4 degrees. [ASAP report indicates that the warning occurred for three seconds with no other windshear indications and an

uneventful landing was made. Report also noted that “…an over-dependence on one source would have caused a low altitude go-around.”]

These events were investigated (including ALPA Gatekeeper calls) and have been classified as Flight Safety Incidents (FSIs).

Page 7.32 of the FCTM requires a windshear escape maneuver to be flown if a

windshear encounter occurs during the approach. In simulator training, the scenarios tend to provide ominous conditions – LLWS Alerts and the presents of thunderstorms. Windshear can occur without convective activity present. In these two cases the crews had VFR+ conditions with just some gusty winds: Neither had stormy TRWs in the METAR.

The fleet expects crews to immediately react to all windshear warnings encountered during the approach phase by performing the Windshear escape maneuver.

Flight Deck Door Write-ups We’ve had a request from TechOps regarding logbook write-ups of the Flight Deck Door locking mechanism. They’ve asked that crews please provide as much information as possible when making these write-ups, to include any striker or channel lights that illuminate on the overhead panel. These lights may only appear intermittently, so any identification of which lights illuminate is very helpful.

APU (Bleed On) Takeoffs

Each summer the fleet experiences several excessive EGT exceedences which result in extensive engine repair. The majority of these excessive exceedences occur at a few airports. Generally, those airports are high pressure altitude or, for terrain purposed, require TOGA/FLEX power for a longer period during the departure. For example the high pressure altitude at MEX has resulted in several excessive exceedences as has the RNO departures from Rwy 16 requires TOGA/FLEX for 3,000’ prior to CLB power reduction.

Tech Ops has confirmed that a takeoff without the use of engine bleed air reduces the EGT temperature by approximately 10C. That 10C can make the difference between allowing the engine to remain on wing, or be removed and repair.

This summer (at least) three airports have been identified to test APU bleed on takeoffs. At the identified airports (MEX, RNO and SLC) the WDR takeoff data line will include APU. Crews should then apply the APU on for Takeoff [Vol 1. SP 2.1] procedure. If APU bleed air is not available, use Packs Off for Takeoff [Vol. 1 SP 2.2] procedure.

Note: APU Bleed Air may be required with either the TOGA or FLEX takeoff power setting.

ASAP Events Lessons Learned

Flight Directors Off (CA) Assigned LDA DME Rwy 35 into SLC. Approach kept us high so we configured with gear, flaps, and full speed brakes to get down to 6100 ft at KERNN. PF set 6100 in the FCU and selected open descent. Soon after we got a WINDSHEAR DET FAULT message. As I was looking at the ECAM message we received a TCAS RA with no previous TA advisory. The RA command was “monitor vertical speed” and we needed to reduce our descent rate. The PF turned off the autopilot but initially confused the yellow zero reference bar on the VVI with the green vertical velocity bar and thought he was in the green fly to zone when he really needed to reduce his descent rate. I told him to fly to the green and he quickly recognized his error. We then received a “climb” RA command. As he started to climb the airspeed began to decay because we had forgotten to turn off the flight directors. Since we were in open descent the thrust remained in idle. The airspeed decayed until it reached the Vls hook and autothrust reverted to speed (approx 145 kts). The PF selected a higher speed as we climbed for the RA. As we were climbing, the PF then went to TOGA power. Since we were already high on the approach and now having to climb for the RA, I felt the best course of action was to discontinue our approach, slow down the pace of events and not try to salvage the approach. (FO) Leehy4 arrival to LDA 35 at SLC. Direct HLMET, intercept localizer. Passing HLMET at 12000'/210k, cleared to 11000'. Cleared visual approach, maintain 190k. Already high so open descent to 6100' for KERNN, gear down, full speed brake (A319), flaps 2 at 190k, approach armed, localizer captured, autopilot on. WINDSHEAR DET FAULT followed by RA “monitor vertical speed” (we never got a TA). I disconnected autopilot but misinterpreted VSI and stated "we are good". Captain said we needed to reduce descent rate. As I began correcting around 9200', RA stated “climb” followed immediately by “increase climb”. As I expertly traded airspeed for altitude because I failed to call for FD's off, I noted airspeed decreasing to 145k. I instinctively went to selected speed which of course had no effect in open descent. Autothrust went to mode reversion as we approached the VLS hook at 140k and we continued climbing at that speed until “clear of conflict”. Due to RA, altitude, and proximity to airport, Captain directed go around. Preventive Measures: (CA) A lot of distractions in a very short time on this approach. Our workload was high with a runway change, being kept high on the approach, the ECAM distraction and the sudden TCAS RA without any warning. By forgetting to turn off the flight directors in the heat of the moment we made our lives a lot more complicated. We always train in the simulator for relatively simple TCAS events with advanced warning of a TA before the RA event… (FO) Obviously, I needed to call for FD's off with a monitor vertical speed RA as that required a reduction in vertical speed. TCAS RAs continue to be one of our fleet’s most common ASAP reports and one of the most common errors during the RA maneuver is failing to turn off the Flight Directors. “This automatically places the autothrust in speed mode, and allows maneuvering with the autothrust maintaining the current selected or managed speed. This greatly reduces pilot workload allowing the pilot to concentrate on flight path, while the autothrust automatically takes care of the airspeed.” (FCTM 1.32) If left in a fixed thrust mode (like OP DES), the aircraft could end up fast or slow as the PF

follows the RA vertical speed commands. Pop-up RAs are difficult to train, but one good technique to prepare for one is when you receive a TA, rehearse what you would do if it was an RA. Just like we brief go around procedures, think and/or verbalize “autopilot off, flight directors off”. If you’re PM, the maneuver directs you to turn off the FDs, whether called for or not. For a good review, see the Fleet Topics of Interest, “Complying with TCAS RAs” and “Understanding Autothrust.”

But leave the Autothrust On We got a "traffic" warning followed by a "descend, descend now" RA. I turned off the autopilot and autothrottles and commanded the F/O to turn off the flight directors. The RA commanded a 1500 ft/min rate of descent… Another error we see in complying with RAs is turning off the autothrust. Boeing fleets turn off the autopilot and autothrottles during an RA, but leave the flight directors on. Muscle memory from turning off the autothrottles for years is strong. But by turning off the autothrust you’re left to monitor the airspeed and power, greatly increasing your workload. And you’re on an Airbus now—it’s Autothrust. Do you know how fast you were going? On an intercept heading for visual approach to 16L at DEN, instructed to hold 170 knots to LEETS. We were advised of traffic intercepting the parallel runway 16R. We saw the traffic and also said the traffic looked closer than normal but was intercepting final and spacing was safe. We got a TCAS traffic alert and the PM asked if I was ok with him switching the TCAS from RA/TA to TA (per the Company pages) in order to prevent a resolution advisory. I said yes and disconnected the autopilot to stay slightly east of the final approach course as a precaution against any drifting by the parallel traffic. Since we and the parallel traffic were right next to each other I called for managed speed to slow us in order to stagger our approaches and increase my comfort zone. This traffic distraction caused me to forget about the 170kts to Leets clearance. At approximately 1.5 miles outside Leets DEN approach asked what our speed was. The PM responded 135 knots and I then realized we were non-compliant with the speed restriction. Of course traffic behind us got close enough to get ATC's attention and we were asked to make the soonest turnoff we could to prevent a go-around behind us. We were given an ATC number to call and explained we were distracted by the parallel traffic. Preventive Measures: Communicate, communicate, communicate. I should have asked the PM if he was all right with us slowing early to stagger our approach with the parallel traffic-but I didn't. We should have communicated with DEN approach that we were slowing early for traffic or asked them if we could slow early- but we didn't. This is definitely a lesson learned for me. Communicate. I think it means Speak Up! Airspeed assignments are just as binding as altitude assignments once you accept them. If you need to slow, advise ATC before doing so. Conditions On preflight we reviewed MEL 33-40-01A, Navigation Light System. "May be inop for day operations", (O) Procedures; Limited to day operations only. We determined our RNO turn would get us back to SLC two hours prior to sundown. Pre-pushback message listed the MEL and did not say “Stay at Gate.” In RNO, Dispatch ACARS’ed us to call him. He said the release was not valid due to the conditional flight plan remark. We missed the comment in the dispatch remarks section regarding the conditional FDR—"valid only if MEL 33-40-01A is cleared from logbook.” Evidently, the dispatcher wanted SLC maintenance to fix the light bulbs before we left SLC, and he put a note on the release that we were to not depart until we verified the MELs were cleared. We should have clarified exactly what the dispatcher wanted "verified" before we left. The bottom line is we left with a legal MEL and complied with the daytime provisions of that MEL. Preventive Measures: Read the Remarks section of the FDR more carefully. A clearer message would have driven us to stop the operation and call Dispatch to see if he still wanted to fix the MEL issue before departure. Going

forward, we agreed we will be more proactive in clarifying messages on the release. We believed we had "verified" the MEL. Neither of us had ever seen a comment added to the bottom of the MELs like this one. They departed with a legal MEL. They did not depart with a legal release, however. According to the FOM, “A conditional FDR may be issued whenever the dispatcher is unable to rectify a particular issue on the FDR prior to sending it, yet the FDR itself is predicated upon the issue being resolved.” This MEL states “DISP.APPR.REQ’D”, which this Dispatcher wasn’t quite ready to give. Remember, we don’t always have the system- wide picture on the flight deck. Fully review the MEL and Dispatch Remarks (possibly Supplementary Route Info) at the bottom of the release. They may show more than “Have a good flight.”

“Come in Rangoon!” Departed SLC for GEG. Near BOI Lead FA notified cockpit a medical situation was developing in cabin. Time to continue to GEG noted as 44 min. A distressed passenger was attended to by a nurse and doctor. I immediately sent an ACARS message to Dispatch giving heads up and accelerated the aircraft. About 3 min later Lead advised CPR was being administered. I immediately declared a Medical Emergency with ATC and initiated a descent to BOI. I was unable to locate freq for ATL radio (I know it is in FAT) so directed FO to contact BOI Ops on their freq which was successful. He informed BOI of our divert. Requested ATC to call for medical assistance to be standing by, which they did. Ground personnel were waiting on arrival and door opened promptly. Preventive Measures: Convert a "lettered" address in the free text ACARS message page to a high priority handling desk that will respond timely. ATL radio freq should be published on the 10-7 page for quicker access. Maybe a newsletter article for where to find ATL Radio freqs in a hurry. All good suggestions, so here’s your article. You can find the ATL Radio frequencies in the FAT in the Secure Content Locker under Airway Manual>Comm Maps & Freqs. To get faster access, add the FAT to your Favorites, then bookmark Comm Maps & Freqs. For easy access from Flight Deck Pro, click on the Manuals icon in the upper left of the toolbar, then select Communications. The comm pages will open in a PDF on the right half of the screen. Scroll down to pages 5 and 6 to find ATL Radio. If you select the Manuals icon and it says “No Manuals,” you need to add them. It’s on the Update page. Select the Settings icon in the upper right, then Updates. At the bottom, select Manuals. Add checkmarks to the manuals you wish to add.

Flight Crew Incidents AUS-JFK SHIP 3119, emergency declared for flap fault, zero flap landing at destination

• During vectors for approach, ECAM message: F/CTL FLAPS FAULT • Discontinued approach/ ECAM and QRH procedure performed • Emergency declared and runway 22R requested for length • Zero flap landing accomplished • Ship has history, same malfunction occurred within last two days

Follow-up

This aircraft had a previous flap fault event on 01MAY16. See details of this event below. As with the previous event, JFK maintenance found torque limiter had popped on the #1 actuator assembly on the left wing. All other actuator were inspected – no other discrepancies found. The #1 actuator assembly was replaced and operation was normal.

AUS-JFK SHIP 3119 NYC declared emergency due to F/CTL FLAPS FAULT

• Flap Fault message displayed when flaps were selected from 1 to 2

• Crew discontinued approach, applied ECAM and QRH procedures • Fault message remained illuminated • Flaps 1 landing completed • Crew cleared to continue

Follow-up

Upon inspection the flap actuator assemblies, maintenance found that the torque limiter had popped on the #1 actuator assembly on the left wing. The track for that assembly was found to be lacking the proper lubrication. After performing a full lube of carriage rollers and flap track, flaps actuated normally. Maintenance actuated flaps numerous times and operations were normal.

GDL-ATL Ship 3273 Diversion to IAH due to dual ELAC failure and reversion to alternate law.

• Normal ground operations; after T/O crew got EICAM message - Flt Control L (and R) Aileron Fault

• A/C reverted to Alternate Law but flew fine – No autopilot • Crew flew the departure to above 10,000 feet due to terrain before consulting QRH • Crew continued climb out and consulted MX/Disp/Chief Line Check Pilot • Collective decision to divert to IAH • Yellow emerg briefed to FAs / PA made to pax • Crew declared emerg; normal approach and landing • All standard debrief items complete; crew cleared to continue

Follow-up

Reports indicate that the flight crew observed both AIL R FAULT and AIL L FAULT messages. Although the left and right ailerons were not operating, both spoilers remained operable. Maintenance control / dispatch consulted and the decision to divert to IAH was reached.

Troubleshooting identified a faulty elevator and aileron computer (ELAC). The #1 ELAC was replaced, subsequent system test were normal and the aircraft dispatched for ATL. Log entry provided below.

The aircraft returned to ATL and the aircraft was removed from service for further troubleshooting. Technical Services is assisted maintenance with recommended actions. Performing wiring checks at the interface between ELACs and side stick transducer units. The replacement of the Captain’s and F/O’s “roll” side stick transducer units is likely (precautionary due to reports that right rudder trim was required to compensate for the slight roll attitude). The DFDR and CVR have been quarantined by Flight Safety. TechOps Fleet Engineering and Technical Services groups have been contacted. Flt Ops will partner with TechOps to investigate further.

AUS-JFK SHIP 3119 declared emergency due to F/CTL FLAPS FAULT

• Flap Fault message displayed when flaps were selected from 1 to 2 • Crew discontinued approach, applied ECAM and QRH procedures • Fault message remained illuminated • Flaps 1 landing completed • Crew cleared to continue

Follow-up

Upon inspection the flap actuator assemblies, maintenance found that the torque limiter had popped on the #1 actuator assembly on the left wing. The track for that assembly was found to be lacking the proper lubrication. After performing a full lube of carriage rollers and flap track, flaps actuated normally. Maintenance actuated flaps numerous times and operations were normal.

DTW-MEX SHIP 3140 CA inadvertently put temperature in altimeter box in MCDU for arrival causing cabin

to climb

• Just prior to descent CA entered ATIS info into MCDU for approach • Temperature of 23 was placed in altimeter setting • When descent began cabin began to climb unexpectedly • CA declared an emergency • Crew donned masks – passenger masks did not drop • Descended with clearance to 13,000 • Manual pressurization was selected • FAs were notified • When FO activated approach he noticed altimeter error, corrected mistake, and selected auto

pressurization • Cabin control regained, emergency cancelled • Cleared to continue

FYI – Procedural error

Reports indicate that the crew incorrectly entered field elevation into FMS (on approach). This error caused the cabin pressurization to rapidly climb. The flight crew initially believed they had an emergency situation and started the process of declaring an emergency with ATC inbound MEX. The error was detected and they corrected pressurization problem. Emergency declaration was retracted and flight landed without incident.

LAS-DTW Ship 3140. Crew declared emergency upon arrival due to loss of green hydraulic system en route.

• While en route at cruise, crew received ECAM message; Eng 1 Green Low Pressure appeared • Shortly after low quality in green system appeared • Appropriate QRH procedure completed • Disp and MX Control consulted via ATL radio • WX and conditions allowed continued flight to DTW • Emergency declared with approach control • Yellow Emergency briefed with crew; passengers briefed • Landed on runway 04R, stopping straight ahead because nose wheel steering unavailable • ARFF met and inspected then released a/c to gate • Towed to gate

• No media or crew concerns • All required reports briefed with crew • All standard debrief items complete • Rotation complete, crew cleared to continue

Follow-up

Maintenance found the green hydraulic system quantity low. The left engine driven hydraulic pump and associated case drain filter replaced. After properly servicing system, no leaks were found and operational checks were good.

OAK-SLC Ship 3214 Bird strike evidence found on exterior pre-flight inspection.

• During walk around, crew found evidence of a bird strike on the radome • MTC and disp. notified • Contract mx called out to inspect aircraft • Ship has been cleared and returned to service • Flight departed 48 min. late • MSP CPO Ray Baltera consulted

• All standard debrief items complete • No known pax/FA/media issues • Crew will continue

Follow-up

An inspection was performed by contract maintenance and the aircraft was cleared for service – no damage found. See lo entry below.

GRR-MSP Ship 3277 Emergency declared and divert to GRB due to strong electrical odor in the cockpit.

• CA was PF; climbing through FL200 crew noticed a strong electrical burning odor localized to the cockpit. No visible smoke

• Crew donned the O2 mask, declared emergency with ATC and started the divert to GRB while running the QRH

• CA passed control of the A/C to the FO; briefed the FAs and pax; ACARS emergency divert message sent to Disp

• ARFF surveyed the A/C with infrared temperature sensors and then later cleared the A/C to the gate and deplaned

• All standard debrief items complete; crew cleared to continue Follow-up

Reports indicate that all instruments operated normally during this event and the aircraft landed without incident. Upon inspection, maintenance discovered that the F/O’s main flood light panel was inoperative and the associated circuit breaker popped. It was determined that the light assembly was the culprit. MEL 33- 10-01A, Cockpit and Instrument Panel Lighting System, and ER/A 547003-14 was used to dispatch the aircraft. The light assembly (p/n 32-3300-3-0632)and circuit breaker (precautionary) will be replaced at the next opportunity.

DTW-DCA Ship 3262. Divert to IAD due BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT message.

• On approach to RWY 01 DCA and after gear extension - BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT message • Go around executed, QRH and ODM consulted - Divert to IAD initiated • Crew contacted disp. via radio and sent message through ACARS • Message reappeared when gear was extended for approach into IAD • Landing uneventful, taxied to gate

• No known crew/pax/media concerns • All standard debrief items completed by FODM Steve Drosos • DTW CP Jim Breaugh and MSP ACP John Klinger consulted • Crew will continue

Follow-up

Reports indicate that BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT message appeared during final approach approximately 30 seconds after gear extension.

Maintenance determined that the #1 MLG tachometer was at fault. The tachometer-drive was replaced in accordance with AMM32-42-68 and the aircraft was returned to service.

SLC-AUS Ship 3213. Emergency declared due to loss of Green Hyd Syst.

• 40 minutes into flight, loss of Green Hydraulic system • QRH procedure complete • Maintenance and dispatcher consulted; decision made to continue to AUS • Shortly before top of descent, emergency declared with Houston Center • Yellow emergency declared with Flight Attendants • Uneventful landing, aircraft towed to the gate • Crew cleared to continue

Follow-up

Crew observed low pressure/quantity warnings for #1 engine driven pump (green system).

Maintenance discovered a leak at a check valve on the green system high pressure manifold. A damaged packing was replaced, system serviced and a successful leak check performed.

Thank You for Filing ASAP Reports

These reports are invaluable to the fleet and to Delta. We use the information from ASAPs to develop or revamp policies and procedures and to monitor safety. Without your reports, the quality of Flight Standards would be dramatically decreased.

Honestly, we really appreciate your reports! That said, when you file reports, we need details. A report that identifies a date and place and simply says “and we missed the restriction” does the program no good – and it could cost the crew the opportunity for the protections afforded by ASAP. The ASAP program is a two way street. The crew gives the program valuable information and the program provided

protections. Please, for the good of the program and to assure you receive the protections afforded by the ASAP program, file detailed reports.

One final request: As a common courtesy to your flying partner, if you plan to file an ASAP report, please inform your crewmate. Each week we have several incidents where only one crewmember filed a report. Each pilot must file an independent report to receive ASAP program protections. Thank You!

Topic of Interest: Windshear

Windshear!

Introduction

Windshear continues to pose one of the greatest threats to flight safety. This was demonstrated in a

recent severe downdraft encounter at SLC, which resulted in the aircraft descending to 132 feet AGL

during the Windshear Escape Maneuver. If the crew had delayed the escape maneuver, or hadn’t flown it

correctly, there is a good chance the aircraft would not have been able to overcome the shear.

The above example makes the following data more troubling. In the past two years the fleet has had 13

crews disregard the aircraft’s windshear warning and continue the approach to a landing. In each

case FOQA data confirms the presence of the shear, and yet the crew did not recognize its symptoms.

ASAP reports also indicate confusion among crews on when an approach or departure should be delayed

due to reported windshear.

In this Bus Bite we’ll review types of windshear, Delta rules for windshear avoidance, windshear

recognition, and the aircraft’s reactive windshear system.

Types of Windshear

The three common types of shear are:

Convective storm shear: this includes both wet and dry microbursts.

Non-convective (cold and warm) frontal system shear.

Windshear associated with strong winds near the ground.

Microbursts

Microbursts consist of intense, non-rotating, highly localized downward airflow with velocities up to 7,000

ft/min, which emanate below a convective cloud base. Extreme microbursts may produce conditions which

exceed the maximum performance the aircraft, even when a windshear escape maneuver is being

performed. Microbursts can take 2-5 min to develop maximum intensity and may then be sustained for an

equal period of time. They can also develop in groups, which then persist for up to half an hour. The

following sequence depicts a “wet microburst”, common in many areas in which we fly.

Microbursts also occur in relatively dry conditions. Once it gains sufficient downward momentum, a down

flow with evaporative cooling accelerates to the surface to induce a "dry microburst" with little or no

precipitation reaching the surface. Dry microbursts are commonly seen in high or dry areas (i.e. KDEN or

KSLC) and most likely below cumulus clouds when the dew point is 30° C or more below the ambient

temperature. The convective activity that generates a dry microburst is more difficult to detect, either on

Windshear

A319/320 Fleet Articles

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radar or visually. The best visual indications are virga trailing below a cumulus, or dust spreading (often in

all directions) on the surface. The picture below illustrates a dry microburst.

Microburst facts:

Microbursts are typically 1 to 3 miles across and

therefore take 20 – 30 seconds to transit in a jet

aircraft during departure or approach.

Approximately 1% of all thunderstorms produce

microbursts.

An aircraft transiting a microburst first encounters an

increasing performance shear, followed by decreasing

performance. If the crew delays the windshear

escape maneuver, this means the aircraft reaches the

decreasing performance shear with thrust reduced

and therefore at its most vulnerable.

The maximum wind measured at an airport due to a

microburst was 130 knots at Andrews AFB near

Washington DC. (The wind may have actually been higher, as 130 was the measuring equipment’s

maximum limit).

Per the Airway Manual (Ref. SUP-4WX.2.20) if ATC issues a “microburst alert” for the runway of

intended landing, a go-around must be executed.

Frontal System Shear

Substantial changes in wind direction and speed can be encountered close to low-pressure centers and

their associated cold, warm, and occluded fronts. Penetrating a cold front from either side leads to a

headwind increase, potentially creating a performance-increasing shear, while a warm front produces a

headwind decrease, resulting in a performance-decreasing shear. Frontal shear through a warm front is

generally more severe than a cold front with large head/tail and vertical wind changes in the lowest 1,000

ft above ground level. The magnitude of the shear may be significant when:

The temperature difference across the front is at least 6° C,

The temperature gradient along the front shows a minimum of 6° C change over 50 nm,

The speed of frontal movement is greater than 30 kt.

TP messages are issued when Delta Meteorology forecasts low altitude frontal shear below 5000 feet AGL.

The exact height of the shear will not normally be provided in the TP. This is because the level of the

shear surface changes continually as the front moves toward or away from the station. All low altitude

frontal shear TPs are labeled “ADVISORY.” This is because additional information is required before a plan

of action can be implemented.

Windshear Associated With Strong Surface Winds

Terrain-induced low altitude windshear may be generated by strong surface winds combined with

mountainous terrain, small hills, or even large buildings. Additional lake and sea breeze windshear may

result from strong temperature gradients between sun-heated terrain and water-cooled air. In particular,

strong temperature change across an inversion may trigger very variable wind conditions.

Windshear Avoidance

The Airway Manual specifies Delta’s policy on windshear avoidance. Per the AM SUP-4WX.2.20:

It is Delta’s policy to avoid known or probable severe low altitude windshear. Known severe low altitude

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windshear conditions which must be avoided or require immediate action if encountered are:

Occurring at or below 1000 feet AGL, AND

Greater than 15 knot indicated airspeed change (loss or gain) from reference airspeed, or

Vertical aircraft speed changes greater than 500 feet per minute, or

Activation of the on-board windshear alert system.

Additionally,

Flights must not depart or commence the final approach segment to a runway where Doppler Radar has

generated a “microburst alert.”

Windshear Avoidance Questions and Answers

Q: A previous airliner on the same approach reported a 20-knot loss of airspeed at 800 feet

AGL. Am I required to perform a go-around?

A: Yes, unless sufficient time has transpired so that the crew is certain the windshear conditions no longer

apply.

Q: The Tower issues a “low level windshear alert” for my intended landing runway. Do I need

to go-around?

A: Not necessarily. A go-around is only required when a “microburst alert” for your landing runway has

been issued. Prudence and good judgment may lead you to performing a go-around, but one is not

required based on a windshear alert only.

Q: The Tower issues a “microburst alert” for runway 8R at ATL. Can I continue my approach to

runway 8L?

A: Yes, although again good judgment and discretion may dictate otherwise.

Windshear Recognition

Recognizing windshear is never a problem in the sim. Generally the instructor has lightning flashing and

ATIS reports of LLWS advisories to foreshadow the event. The windshear scenarios programmed in the

sim have all been constructed from actual weather conditions. When they occur, the crew is primed and

the response instantaneous. In real life however, the shear may be much more insidious. Let’s next

discuss why.

Ask your fellow pilot what the first indication of windshear is. Most will answer a rising or falling trend

arrow or airspeed indication. However, FOQA indicates this isn’t always the case. The reason is that many

shears begin gradually, well within the ability of the Flight Guidance and A/THR system to compensate.

With these shears airspeed is steady, because the A/THR is working to maintain the speed. Therefore the

first indication of shear is usually an unusual thrust setting. With non-moving thrust levers in the Airbus,

discerning this requires a good scan of N1 and a basic understanding of what thrust level is appropriate.

In the eight cases where the crew continued the approach following a windshear warning, it’s likely the

crew wasn’t aware there was a problem until the aircraft sounded the alarm. When it did, the crew likely

discounted it as a false warning.

Airbus Windshear System

The A319 and A320 employ a reactive windshear detection system. Unlike some other aircraft in the Delta

fleet, these aircraft do not have a predictive system installed. (A321s will come equipped with both

reactive and predictive systems). Therefore, when a windshear warning occurs, it means that the aircraft

is already in the windshear.

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Per Delta (and Airbus) guidance, a reactive windshear warning requires an

immediate Windshear Escape Maneuver (Ref. FCTM 7.31):

Advance the thrust levers to their forward limits (TOGA).

Disconnect autopilot.

Follow the SRS commands. Use full back stick, if necessary, to follow

the pitch commands.

Note: Unlike other aircraft you may have flown, TOGA thrust can be

selected at any time on the Airbus without restriction. The engine’s FADEC

prevents over-boosting or compressor stalls from occurring.

The aircraft’s windshear system is active during the following conditions:

After takeoff, from 5 seconds after lift off up to 1,300 feet RA

During approach, from 1,300 feet RA down to 50 feet.

The Airbus windshear system is extremely reliable and does not often produce false warnings. In each of

the eight cases where the windshear warning activated (and the crew continued the approach), the

presence of windshear was later confirmed by FOQA data.

Airbus Performance

From an aircraft performance standpoint, how much of a downdraft can the A320 overcome? Airbus

provides the following data:

Conditions: A320, CFM 56-5A1, 132,300 lbs, pressure altitude 4,000 feet, temp 27° C, VAPP 142.

Performance: The aircraft has the capability to maintain level flight in a 2,040 ft/min downdraft

without any airspeed change.

If the downdraft exceeds this climb capability, the A/C will descend unless the pitch attitude is

increased to trade airspeed for altitude (part of the escape maneuver).

In the case of a decreasing performance tailwind shear:

Conditions: Same as above except at zero altitude, ISA, and flaps 3.

Performance: The aircraft is able to maintain speed in horizontal flight when experiencing a

decreasing performance shear of 4 kt/sec.

Summary

Microburst windshear can exceed the performance capabilities of transport aircraft. Pilots should use all

available resources to ensure severe windshear is avoided and safety of flight is not compromised. If the

aircraft’s windshear system alerts (i.e. “WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR”), during the altitude range when the

system is active, an immediate Windshear Escape Maneuver must be accomplished.