a theory of minimalist democracy

A Theory of Minimalist Democracy

Chris Bidner1 Patrick Francois2 Francesco Trebbi2

1Simon Fraser University

2University of British Columbia, CIFAR

Formal Theory & Comparative Politics Conference, Sept 2015

Bidner, Francois, and Trebbi A Theory of Minimalist Democracy

Motivation

Broad Issues: Economic Development and Weak Political Institutions

Standard distinction: Democracy vs. Autocracy

But, many modern ‘democracies’ operate in a “political gray zone ...between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship”

‘hybrid regimes’, ‘illiberal democracies’, ‘semi-democracies’, ‘competitiveauthoritarianism’, ‘electoral authoritarianism’, ‘democratic authoritarianism’ ...


Motivation: The “Political Gray Zone”

0.2

.4.6

.8Sh

are

of C

ount

ries

1900 1950 2000year

Polity2 Score in (8,10] Polity2 Score in (0,8]Note: In 2012, Polity2 = 8 for Ghana, Indonesia, Paraguay, Philippines

The Gray Zone


Motivation

Such hybrids only satisfy minimal democratic requirements

Hold and respect regular, competitive, multi-party elections ...... but lack other key democratic elements, e.g.

an independent media & judiciary,freedoms of organization & expression,rule of law, etc.

Some examples (Møller & Skaaning, 2011)

Zambia, Senegal, Botswana, Sierra Leone; Ghana, Nigeria ...

Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador ...

Turkey, Macedonia, Ukraine, Thailand, Philippines ...


Motivation

Some questions:

Is minimalist democracy merely a temporary phase on the wayto full democracy?

Why do political elite respect electoral wishes of weak non-elite?

This paper:

propose a model in order to understand the equilibrium logic andemergence of minimalist democracies

provide some supportive empirical evidence


Key Features of the Model

Powerful political elite

No threat from masses; A&R (2006), Boix (2003), Fearon (2011)

Elections have no inherent bite; Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1988)

Benefits of office are imperfectly transferable

Some available patronage, endog. allocated; Przeworski (1991)

Coup threats

Inter-elite conflict with elections; Svolik (2012), Bueno deMesquita et al. (2003)

Citizens (correctly) anticipate non-representative leaders, but may bereluctant to vote for election violators

No redistribution motive; Meltzer & Richard (1981), A&R (2006)


Key Questions and Results

Why are elections valuable to a powerful political elite?Mechanism

Imperfect transferability of leadership rents⇒ risk of coupsElections facilitate inter-temporal rent transferability

cf. alternatives; e.g. legitimization, signalling strength, information acquisition ...

cf. elite franchise extension; Lizzeri & Persico (2004), Llavador & Oxoby (2005)

Under what conditions can minimalist democracy be supported?

When are (i) coups dissuaded, and (ii) elections respected?

Are elections any more than a randomization device?

Yes: provides a commitment to not renegotiate

How do transitions to Minimalist Democracy occur?

Focus on diminished patronage, empirical evidence


Model


ModelFundamentals

Dynamic Setting:

Infinite horizon, discrete time

Players:

(i) Citizens, and (ii) Elite; a Leader and Insider

Leader controls imperfectly transferable rents from political office:

U : “patronage”, fully transferable

F: “power”, non-transferable

Define extent of rent transferability:

ψ ≡ UF +U


ModelFundamentals

Timing within a period:

Leader chooses transfer τ ∈ [0,U ], consumes F +U − τInsider observes τ , decides whether to mount a coup

τ forgone, coup successful with probability γloser dies, replaced. winner fills leader position

If no coup, Leader decides whether to hold an election, andwhether to respect outcome

Each elite dies with probability δ. Repeat


ModelElections and Voting Outcomes

The General ApproachCitizens are essentially indifferent ...

Incumbent is re-elected with probability

p ∈ [0,1]

... except, unwilling to vote for a leader that has everunexpectedly refused to honour elections

e.g. doing so signals an undesirable characteristic

One FoundationLeader types: regular and tyrant

Regular: follows equilibrium incentives, never exploitsTyrant: refuses to step down, exploits with probability η→ 0Leader becomes a tyrant with probability ε→ 0 when taking office


Markov Perfect Equilibria

States: Voter attitude toward incumbent and challenger

Democratic Tyranny

(or held)

Leader Replaced

(via death or successful coup)

Election not respected

Legitimate

(or held)

Leader Replaced



Successful Coup

LeaderIllegitimate

Leader

Incumbent

(or held)

Incumbent dies

(naturally or via a coup)

Election unexpectedly not respected

w/prob pelected

Incumbent

w/prob 0elected

Two Cases of Interest

Autocratic Equilibrium: Elections never respected (held)

Minimalist Democracy Equilibria: Elections always respected


Autocratic EquilbriumBackground and Definitions

Features

Leaders never hold elections

Insiders may or may not coup, depending on offered patronage

Markov Strategies

Leader: patronage offer τA ∈ [0,U ]

Insider: coup decision cA(τ)

Value Functions

V LA = maxτ∈[0,U ]

{F +U − τ + (1− cA(τ) ·γ) · (1− δ) ·V LA

}V NA (τ) = max

c∈[0,1]

{c · [γ · (1− δ) ·V LA ] + (1− c) · [τ + (1− δ) ·V NA ]

}


Autocratic EquilbriumResults

Avoiding a coup requires a minimum transfer, τ̂A (endogenous)

Security is costly: τ̂A > 0

Lemma 1 Any autocratic equilibrium displays the following features.

1 Coups are avoided whenever it is strictly feasible to do so:τ̂A < U ⇒ τA = τ̂A.

2 Autocracy is always self-enforcing: V LA > VNA

Thus: coups arise if and only if there is insufficient patronage



Proposition 1 An Autocratic equilibrium always exists and isgenerically unique. Specifically:

A secure Autocratic equilibrium exists if and only ifψ ≥ µ2 ≡

γ ·(1−δ)1+γ ·(1−δ) ,

A strongly insecure Autocratic equilibrium exists if and only ifψ ≤ µ1 ≡

δ·γ ·(1−δ)δ+γ ·(1−δ) , and

A weakly insecure Autocratic equilibrium exists if and only ifψ ∈ [µ1,µ2).



Incumbent Bias: p

PatronageAvailablilty:ψ

µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

Incumbent Bias: p


µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

f(p)

g(p)

f(p)

P1 P2

S1

S2


µ2

µ1

1

0 1

Weakly Insecure Autocracy

Incumbent Bias: p

Strongly Insecure Autocracy

Secure Autocracy

γ·(1−δ)1+γ·(1−δ)

δ·γ·(1−δ)δ+γ·(1−δ)

2


Democratic EquilbriumBackground and Definitions

Features

Leaders always hold and respect elections

Peaceful power transfers: Insiders do not coup

States and Markov Strategies:

“Democratic”

(or held)

Incumbent Dies



Legitimate

(or held)

Leader Replaced



Successful Coup

LeaderIllegitimate

Leader

Incumbent

(or held)

Incumbent dies



w/prob pelected

Incumbent

w/prob 0elected

State

[ p ]

“Tyranny”State

[ 0 ]

Leader: patronage transfers τD ∈ [0,U ] and τT ∈ [0,U ]

Insider: coup decisions cD (τ) and cT (τ)


Democratic Equilbrium

Value Functions

V LD = maxτ∈[0,U ]

{F +U − τ + (1− cD (τ) ·γ) · (1− δ) · [p ·V LD + (1− p) ·VND ]}

VND (τ) = maxc∈[0,1]

{c · [γ · (1− δ) ·V LD ] + (1− c) · [τ + (1− δ) · (p ·VND + (1− p) ·V LD )]

}V LT = max

τ∈[0,U ]{F +U − τ + (1− cT (τ) ·γ) · (1− δ) ·V LT }

VNT = maxc∈[0,1]

{c · [γ · (1− δ) ·V LD ] + (1− c) · [τ + (1− δ) · (δ ·VND + (1− δ) ·VNT )]

}Minimalist democracy is supported only if

Democracy is Peaceful (no coups):

τD + (1− δ) · (p ·V ND + (1− p) ·V LD ) ≥ γ · (1− δ) ·V LD

Democracy is Self-Enforcing:

V ND ≥ VLT


Democratic EquilbriumDemocracy is Peaceful (no coups)

Avoiding a coup requires a minimum transfer, τ̂D (endogenous)

Security need not be costly: τ̂D ≤ 0 is possible

Lemma 2 Democratic leaders find it optimal to avoid coupswhenever it is feasible. That is, if τ̂D ≤ 0 then setting τD = 0 isoptimal, and if τ̂D ∈ (0,U ] then setting τD = τ̂D is optimal.

Thus: “no coups”⇔ τ̂D ≤U



Lemma 3 The ‘no coups’ condition is satisfied if p is sufficiently lowor if ψ is sufficiently high. Specifically,

it is satisfied with zero transfers if and only if p ≤ p∗ ≡ 1−γ1−γ ·(1−δ) ,

and

is satisfied with positive transfers if and only if p > p∗ andψ ≥ f (p) ≡ (1−δ)·(γ−(p·γ ·(1−δ)+(1−p)))

δ·(1+γ ·(1−δ)) .



Incumbent Bias: p

Patronag

eAvailab

lilty:ψ

µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

Incumbent Bias: p

Patronag

eAvailab

lilty:ψ

µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

f(p)

g(p)

f(p)

Incumbent Bias: p

Patronag

eAvailab

lilty:ψ

µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

f(p)

P1 P2

S1

S2

2


Democratic EquilbriumDemocracy is Self-Enforcing

Features of Leadership in Tyranny state

Will never win election

Face Insider that can coup⇒ Leader in Democracy state

Depending on patronage, Leader may be secure or insecure

Lemma 4: Democracy is self-enforcing–i.e. Leaders respectelections–only if a Leader in the Tyranny state is insecure.

Intuition

If secure, the whole pie is available (as in democractic state)

Insider compensated for coup threat

Insider gets at least this in democratic state


Democratic EquilbriumDemocracy is Self-Enforcing

Lemma 5 A leader in the tyranny state is insecure–and thus theself-enforcing condition can hold–only if p is sufficiently large or ψ issufficiently small. Specifically, only if

ψ ≤ g(p) ≡ (1−δ)·[γ ·(2−δ)·(1−p·(1−δ))−(1−p)·(1−δ)]2−δ−2·(1−δ)·p if parameters are in P1,

or

ψ ≤ µ2 if parameters are in P2.


Democratic EquilbriumWhen can democracy be self-enforcing?

Incumbent Bias: p

Patron

ageAvailab

lilty:ψ

µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

Incumbent Bias: p

Patronag

eAvailab

lilty:ψ

µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

f(p)

g(p)

f(p)

Incumbent Bias: p

Patronag

eAvailab

lilty:ψ

µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

f(p)

P1 P2

S1

S2

2


Democratic EquilbriumExistence

Proposition 2: If γ ≥ δ1/2/(1− δ), then a democratic equilibriumexists if and only if tyrants are insecure. Such an equilibrium isgenerically unique.

Proposition 3: If γ < δ1/2/(1− δ), then a democratic equilibriumexists if and only if ψ ≤ g(p) and p is sufficiently small that

p

1− p≤ γ

(1− δδ

)2− 1δ.

Such an equilibrium is generically unique, and involves zerotransfers in the democratic state.


Democratic EquilbriumExistence: A Summary

Minimalist Democracy requires:Coup threats are sufficiently weak: no coups

γ low: coup attempts are sufficiently impotentψ high: patronage is sufficiently abundantp low: challengers are sufficiently strong in elections

Coup threats are sufficiently strong: elections respectedγ high: coup attempts are sufficiently viableψ low: patronage is sufficiently scarcep high: challengers are sufficiently weak in elections

Comparison with existing arguments


Comments on ExtensionsN > 2 members of the elite

Allowing 1 leader and N − 1 insiders:

e.g. random insider can coup each periodcoup threats heightened relative to N = 2

insiders wait longer until next transferor, more insiders to pay

thus greater motivation to establish minimalist democracyambiguous effect on existence

‘no coup’ condition more difficult to satisfy‘self enforcing’ condition easier to satisfy


Comments on ExtensionsAsymmetries across the elite

Allowing different coup threats:

e.g. γ1 > γ2

‘no coup’ condition jeopardized when elite 2 is in power

‘self enforcing’ condition jeopardized when elite 1 is in power

Allowing different incumbent advantages:

e.g. p1 > p2

Elite 1 will value democratic leadership more

‘no coup’ condition jeopardized when elite 2 is in power

‘self enforcing’ condition jeopardized when elite 1 is in power


Further Issues


The Role of ElectionsAre elections just a randomization device?

Elections act as a special sort of randomization device

becomes biased against violators

Why not some sort of ‘internal’ power-sharing agreement?

e.g. weighted (p) coin toss, deterministic alternation

Consider a violation of such an agreement

Ultimately, only available punishment is coup threat

But this is costly to the coup instigator

Incentives to ‘forgive and forget’?

A return to the equilibrium path is Pareto improvement

Such agreements not renegotiation-proof


The Role of ElectionsAre elections just a randomization device?

A return to the equilibrium path is Pareto improvementLeader

Punish: chance at remaining tyranny leaderReturn to path: remain democratic leaderstrictly prefers latter, by self-enforcing condition

InsiderPunish: chance at becoming democratic leaderReturn to path: remain democratic insiderweakly prefers latter, by no-coup condition

Elections overcome this temptation

voters are at arms-length⇒ returning to the path is not an option


Transitions to Minimalist DemocracyThe Role of Diminished Patronage

Mechanism: ↓U ⇒↓ ψ⇒ leaders in tyranny state becomeinsecure⇒ respecting elections is supported

Incumbent Bias: p


µ2

µ1

p∗

1

0 1

S1

S2


Transitions to Minimalist DemocracyThe Role of Diminished Patronage

Multiple Equilibria

Even if minimalist democracy exists, so too does an autocraticequilibrium

Proposition 6 The democratic equilibrium generically strictly Paretodominates the autocratic equilibrium. In the special case whereψ = µ2 we have V LD = V LA and V ND = V NA , otherwise V LD > V

LA and

V ND > V NA .


Transitions to Minimalist Democracy

Consistent with existing accounts:

Political resource curse; Tsui (2011), Caselli & Tesei (2011)

Natural resources in Africa. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004):“... most African resource-dependent countries were

authoritarian governments and struggled with democraticconsolidation after the “third wave” of democratization.These resource-dependent countries include Algeria,Nigeria, Libya, Gabon, Cameroon, and the former Zaire.Besides South Africa, the transition to democracy has beensuccessful only in resource-poor countries such as Benin,Mali, Senegal, and Madagascar.”

Original empirical work:

Greater patronage (higher price for main export, Caselli & Tesei(2011)) associated with higher democracy scores

Specifically, the electoral component of democracy


Conclusions & Further Work


Conclusions & Future Work

Conclusions

Proposed a model with which to understand the equilibriumlogic and emergence of minimalist democracyElections are used and respected

to avoid violence due to non-transferabilities in the value of leaderdespite having no inherent ‘bite’despite all political power residing with political elites

Formal analysis delivers results that clarify, extend, and qualifyexisting informal argumentsTransitions to Minimalist Democracy

Arising from reduced patronage, some empirical support

Current Work

Transitions from minimalist to “full” democracy?


End


Appendix


Transitions to (Minimalist) DemocracyEmpirical Exercise

Following Caselli & Tesei (2011) and Brückner & Ciccone (2011)

∆Di,t = α0i +α1i · t +αt + β1 ·∆Pi,t−1 + β2 ·∆Pi,t−2 + β3 ·Ri,t + β4 ·Ri,t−1 + εit

where

∆Xi,t ≡ Xt −Xt−1

Di,t = Democracy score ( Details ... )

Pi,t = Price of main export commodity

Ri,t = Rainfall


Transitions to (Minimalist) DemocracyEmpirical Results

Resource abundance and autocratizations

𝚫 𝐏𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝟐𝒕 𝚫 𝐄𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭. 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩.𝒕 𝚫 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐥𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬𝒕 𝚫 𝐄𝐱𝐜. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭.𝒕

(1) (2) (3) (4)

𝚫 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐨𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞𝒕−𝟏 -0.86 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 [0.38]** [0.03]*** [0.22] [0.12]

𝚫 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐨𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞𝒕−𝟐 -1.03 -0.05 -0.19 -0.30 [0.50]** [0.04] [0.20] [0.15]**

𝐋𝐨𝐠 𝐑𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐚𝐥𝐥𝒕 -0.07 0.04 -0.21 0.10 [0.52] [0.06] [0.20] [0.16]

𝐋𝐨𝐠 𝐑𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐚𝐥𝐥𝒕−𝟏 -2.44 -0.25 -0.82 -0.68 [1.00]** [0.09]*** [0.39]** [0.34]**

Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes

Country-Specific Lin. Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 Observations 668 672 651 651

Notes:

All changes for the dependent variables (indicated with ) are computed between time t and t+1. Electoral

Competitiveness is defined as a dummy taking value 1 if Polity dimension XRCOMP =2 (transitional

arrangements between selection, ascription and/or designation, and competitive election) or XRCOMP =3

(election) and 0 otherwise. Inclusiveness is defined as a dummy taking value 1 if Polity dimension

PARCOMP =4 (transitional arrangements to fully politically competitive patterns of all voters) or

PARCOMP =5 (competitive: alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the

political arena.) and 0 otherwise. Executive Constraints is defined as a dummy taking value 1 if Polity

dimension XCONST =5 (substantial limitations on executive authority) or higher, and 0 otherwise.

Columns (5) to (8) report the same specifications as Columns (1) to (4) excluding periods of interregnum

(Polity = -77). Standard errors clustered at the country level in brackets below coefficients. *Significant at

90% confidence; **95% confidence; ***99% confidence level.


Some Stylized FactsPolity IV Components

Elections: XRCOMP

(1) Selection, (2) Dual/Transition, (3) Election

Inclusiveness: PARCOMP

(1) Repressed, (2) Suppressed, (3) Factional, (4) Transitional, (5) Competitive

Executive Constraints: EXCONST

(1) Unconstrained, (3) Slight-Moderate, (5) Substantial, (7) Executive Parity

PARCOMP: reflects “the extent to which the political system enables non-elites toinfluence political elites in regular ways” by addressing “the extent to whichalternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.”

Back Back 2


Some Stylized FactsPolity IV: Hybrids (only) have Elections

0.2

.4.6

.81

% o

f cou

ntry

-yea

rs w

ith m

ost d

emoc

ratic

sco

re

-10 -5 0 5 10polity2

Inclusiveness Electionskernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .6

Elections and Inclusiveness in the Gray Zone

Back


Some Stylized FactsPolity IV: Hybrids (only) have Elections

0.2

.4.6

.81

% o

f cou

ntry

-yea

rs w

ith m

ost d

emoc

ratic

sco

re

-10 -5 0 5 10polity2

Executive Constraints Electionskernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = .6

Elections and Executive Constraints in the Gray Zone

Back


Some Stylized FactsMinimalist Democracy and Exit from Autocracy

Bratton and van de Walle (1997):

“Few political institutions were strengthened by regimetransition. The state’s ability to respond to citizens’ needs, eitherby ensuring law and order ... or by providing basic services ...was still seriously deficient in many countries. National judicialand legislative institutions remained weak. Moreover, pastpractices of clientelism, rent-seeking, and fraud remained deeplyingrained ... The election of new leaders did not mean that theywould cease to search for the spoils of political office ... Seriousdoubts soon emerged whether opposition parties, a free press,labor unions, and various other civic, religious, and professionalassociations would prove strong enough to enforce theaccountability and transparency needed for democraticgovernance. ”

Back


Some Stylized FactsClassifying Types of Democracies

Classifying Types of Democracy

Elections

(XRCOMP)

(1) Selection (2) Dual/Transitional (3) Election

Incl

usi

ven

ess

(PA

RC

OM

P)

(0) Unregulated

Non-Democracy Minimalist

Democracy

(1) Repressed

(2) Suppressed

(3) Factional

(4) Transitional

(5) Competitive Other Full Democracy

Classifying Types of Democracy

Elections

(XRCOMP)

(1) Selection (2) Dual/Transitional (3) Election

Incl

usi

ven

ess

(PA

RC

OM

P) (0) Unregulated

Non-Democracy Minimalist

Democracy

(1) Repressed

(2) Suppressed

(3) Factional

(4) Transitional Other Full Democracy

(5) Competitive

PARCOMP–The competitiveness of participation: “the extent to which alternativepreferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.”A component of POLCOMP–Political competition: “the extent to which the politicalsystem enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways”

Back }


Some Stylized FactsNon-Democracy⇒Minimalist Democracy, Minimalist Democracy ; Full Democracy

Yearly transition matrix

To non-democracy at t

To minimalistdemocracy at t

To alternativedemocracy at t

To representativedemocracy at t

From non-democracy at t-1(4143 Total obs.)

97.7% 1.4% 0.3% 0.5%

From minimalistdemocracy at t-1(1289 Total obs.)

4.9% 92.0% 0.1% 2.9%

From alternativedemocracy at t-1(112 Total obs.)

0.9% 0.0% 91.1% 8.0%

Fromrepresentativedemocracy at t-1(2865 Total obs.)

0.4% 0.8% 0.0% 98.8%

Notes:

Electoral Competitiveness: Polity dimension XRCOMP =2 (transitional arrangements between selection,ascription and/or designation, and competitive election) or XRCOMP =3 (election). Inclusiveness: Politydimension PARCOMP =4 (transitional arrangements to fully politically competitive patterns of all voters)or PARCOMP =5 (competitive: alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in thepolitical arena.)

Non- democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 0 and Inclusiveness = 0.

Minimalist democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 1 and Inclusiveness = 0.

Alternative democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 0 and Inclusiveness = 1.

Representative democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 1 and Inclusiveness = 1.

Back


Some Stylized FactsPersistence of Types of Democracies

Transition matrix, conditional on experiencing a transition

To non-democracy at t

To minimalistdemocracy at t

To alternativedemocracy at t

To representativedemocracy at t

From non-democracy at t-1

63.6% 13.6% 22.7%

From minimalistdemocracy at t-1

62.0% 1.2% 36.7%

From alternativedemocracy at t-1

10.1% 0.0% 89.9%

Fromrepresentativedemocracy at t-1

33.3% 66.6% 0.0%

Notes:

Electoral Competitiveness: Polity dimension XRCOMP =2 (transitional arrangements between selection,ascription and/or designation, and competitive election) or XRCOMP =3 (election). Inclusiveness: Politydimension PARCOMP =4 (transitional arrangements to fully politically competitive patterns of all voters)or PARCOMP =5 (competitive: alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in thepolitical arena.)

Non- democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 0 and Inclusiveness = 0.

Minimalist democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 1 and Inclusiveness = 0.

Alternative democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 0 and Inclusiveness = 1.

Representative democracy if Electoral competitiveness = 1 and Inclusiveness = 1.

Back


Democratic EquilbriumResults: Comparison with existing arguments

Informal Arguments; Przeworski (1991, 1999)

stresses the ‘self enforcing’ condition, but does not model theconsequences of failing to step down

necessary conditions essentially our ‘no coup’ condition

Citizen (rebellion) threats; e.g. Fearon (2011)

essentially requires p be low enough

ejected leader needs sufficient chance of returning

because net benefit from violating election increasing in p

Back


The Role of ElectionsCan eqm path be supported by some other (renegotiation-proof) off-equilibrium play?

Under some parameters, yes. But in all cases

Coups on and off the path necessarily treated differently

e.g. coups on the path are punished

“Democratic”

(or held)

Incumbent Dies



“Legitimate”

(or used)

Leader Dies

(via death or Successful Coup)

Randomization device not respected

Successful Coup

Leader“Illegitimate”

Leader

Incumbent

(or held)

Incumbent dies



w/prob pelected

Incumbent

w/prob 0elected

State

[ p ]

“Tyranny”State

[ 0 ]

Information about past leader ‘legitimacy’ required

Back


The Role of Elections in Autocracies

Some existing explanations

legitimization, domestic and international; Schedler (2002)

information on supporters/opposition; Magaloni (2008)

signalling regime strength; Geddes (2006)

fair/efficient rent distribution; Blaydes (2011), Lust-Okar (2006)

“Ballots vs. Bullets”; Przeworski (1999)

Also, the use of democratic institutions more generally:

overcoming asymmetric information between leader andinsiders; Boix & Svolik (2013), Myerson (2008)

commitment to not expropriate; Boix (2003)

legislatures act as a ‘safe’ place to respond to oppositiondemands; Ghandi & Przeworski (2007)

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a theory of minimalist democracy

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