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A Tale of Two CaliphatesAugust 28, 2014William Brani and Ran !ereira

"TART was re#entl as$ed to gi%e a tal$ for the intelligen#e #ommunit #omparing and

#ontrasting the &slami# "tate's %ision for the #aliphate with that of al()a'ida's senior

leadership* As we prepared for the tal$, $e points of di%ergen#e +e#ame apparent, not

 ust for their respe#ti%e %isions for the Caliphate, +ut also regarding the operations and

strategies that support those %isions*

The Caliphate:

-or al()a'ida senior leadership, .the Caliphate/ is a master(frame that it dangles well

out in front of %iolent &slamist groups the world(o%er, hoping to align their otherwise

dispersed and di%erse %iolent #ampaigns on aimuths that #on%erge in the triumphant,

al+eit distant, future* The Caliphate is a #on#eptual destination a grandiose %i#tor

that signals the onset of glo+al #onuest in whi#h all of the world's territories will +e

go%erned + their interpretation of &slam*

-or the &slami# "tate, + #omparison, it is the realit of an e3tant Caliphate and its

asso#iated o+ligations that will purif &slam, rall dispersed a#tors to ma$e the hira, and

read uslims for the apo#alpti# militar +attle with the West in the 5e%ant* The

Caliphate's growth in sie and strength is seen as the means to the end of a 6nal

de#isi%e militar #onfrontation with the West* Where al()a'ida and its asso#iated

mo%ement summons 6ghters to a#ti%e ihadist fronts, Caliph &+rahim #alled upon

do#tors, urists and engineers to +uild the institutions of the #aliphate* !rimed + the

online dis#ourse of the last ten ears, aided + person(to(person so#ial media

intera#tionsand inspired + the &slami# "tate's ad%an#es on the ground, 6ghters

#laiming that .We Are All &"&"/ mo+ilie to oin the &slami# "tate independentl or from

within e3isting &slamist politi#al networ$s 7li$e "haria4Belgium and al(uhairoun inuropean states9, without the &slami# "tate ha%ing to esta+lish an e3tensi%e networ$ of

on(the(ground re#ruiters in uropean and Ameri#an #ities*

Operations:

Al()a'ida's $ineti# operations target the .far enem,/ the West, a+o%e all other targets*

:iewing their organiation as the %anguard of the ihad mo%ement, al()a'ida see$s to

use spe#ta#ular, mass(#asualt terrorist atta#$s to in#ite a hea%(handed militar

response from Western go%ernments* These state responses would seemingl e%iden#e

the War on &slam that al()a'ida portras in its propaganda, there+ polariing the

uslim and non(uslim worlds and ena+ling the ihadists to mo+ilie resour#es for a

#i%iliational #on;i#t* Al()a'ida strategist, A+u Ba$r

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names li$e Ansar al("haria ha%e wor$ed alongside of other "unni ihadists and

insurgents, man with di%ergent ideologi#al orientations* These front organiations are

designed to pro%ide +asi# so#ial ser%i#es to lo#al populations and to engage in da'wa,

the promulgation of their religious ideolog* -or al()a'ida, it is not et time to purif

&slam + for#e* %en atta#$s against the "hi'a should +e moderated until the ihadists

#an regain uslims' loalties*

B #ontrast, the &slami# "tate has thus far opted to deter full(s#ale Western inter%ention

in &ra and "ria while engaging in aggressi%e interne#ine %iolen#e to purge lo#al

#hallengers* When !resident ?+ama deploed @*"* militar ad%isors to &ra, the &slami#

"tate threatened that CalamitWillBefall@" %ia Twitter should the @*"* es#alate its

in%ol%ement in the 6ght* &n response to re#ent @*"* airstri$es, the &slami# "tate released

a %ideo of the murder of ournalist ames -ole and threatened to murder ournalist

"te%en "otlo should airstri$es #ontinue* While limited inter%ention ma ser%e to

+olster the legitima# and re#ruitment eorts of the &slami# "tate, as it #an weather

su#h a storm, +aiting a large(s#ale inter%ention is not in their +est interests*

&nstead of the far enem, the &slami# "tate's militar operations ha%e fo#used onatta#$ing #ompetitors in their midst who do not su+mit to their ideologi#al and

organiational prima#, and seiing the resour#es ne#essar to +uild the institutions of

the Caliphate* ?perations are not onl used to seie important +order #rossings, dams,

and oil 6elds or to wea$en #ompeting militias in territorial strongholds, +ut also to purif

&slam + for#e, using +rutal pu+li# e3e#utions and amputations to intimidate and deter

potential ri%als* The #aliphate's #onstru#tion is predi#ated upon the rigid enfor#ement

of the &slami# "tate's interpretation of &slami# law in strongholds li$e the #it of Raa in

"ria* @nli$e al()a'ida's more a##ommodating stan#e in the post Ara+(spring world,

whi#h resem+les A+u Ba$r

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uslim populations in return, until #ontinued @*"* engagement in the uslim world

+e#omes prohi+iti%e*

 The &slami# "tate is not #urrentl waging a strateg of attrition, +ut one of out+idding* &t

is using its militar superiorit to eliminate or su+ugate ri%al insurgent groups and non(

%iolent #ommunities in &ra and "ria that #ould e%entuall pose a threat to the

authorit the &slami# "tate see$s to impose* &nstead of in%iting uslim %s* Western

%iolen#e and +an$ing on that #on;i#t to polarie #ommunities and mo+ilie resour#es, it

is +ene6ting from the resour#es alread +eing mo+ilied + the se#tarian polariation

that is ta$ing pla#e in &ra, "ria and +eond, whi#h the a#ti%el see$ to e3a#er+ate*

 The &slami# "tates is willing and a+le to use e3treme %iolen#e to #ar%e out #ontrol at the

e3pense of its ri%als, and then to #onsolidate its hold on the resour#es pouring into the

#on;i#t*

Implications:

&f se#tarian #on;i#t pro%es to +e a greater means for insurgents to mo+ilie resour#es

and desta+ilie apostate regimes than al()a'ida's far(enem #entered war of attrition,

the model presented + the &slami# "tate will supplant that of al()a'ida* The &slami#"tate's rapid militar su##esses against the ."afa%ids/ and their allied "hia militias are

portraed to resem+le the !rophet uhammad's rapid militar su##esses after lea%ing

edina to #onuer e##a, #ausing the &slami# "tate's dedi#ated foot soldiers to see

their eorts as fa%ored + od* As se#tarian #on;i#ts spread, ihadist groups will foster

and e3ploit them* The West will +e relegated to the role of o+ser%er, less freuentl

targeted 7at least initiall9 +ut poorl positioned to ta$e an meaningful a#tion to

prote#t itself or others* The di=#ult of #oordinating and resol%ing the #ompeting

interests and a#tions of numerous e3ternal a#tors li$e &ran and Ee+ollah, not to

mention among Ameri#a's !ersian ulf allies, #ompli#ates an potential @*"*

inter%ention* "e#tarian %iolen#e ma parale the West's a+ilit to engage in the iddle

ast 7as it has in the 5e%ant9 where the "unni("hi'a demographi# split would allow for

larger s#ale se#tarian #on;i#t, se%ering regional ties more su##essfull than al()a'ida

operations to date* &n this #ase, the &slami# "tate will also ser%e as an agent of #hange

for al()a'ida and its asso#iated mo%ement, whi#h will ha%e no alternati%e +ut to e%ol%e

in potentiall unforeseen was, or perish*

&f the &slami# "tate's #aliphate proe#t fails, howe%er, their presen#e on the fringe of the

radi#al spe#trum ma ser%e to ma$e al()a'ida and its asso#iated mo%ement loo$ more

legitimate + #omparison* This fringe ee#t #ould +ene6t al()a'ida in two was* -irst,

as the international se#urit #ommunit hones in on the &slami# "tate it #ould result in

in#reased freedom of maneu%er in the short(term, the %er time when the #risis of

legitima# +rought on + the &slami# "tate has #reated a tremendous in#enti%e for al(

)a'ida to #ondu#t a su##essful atta#$ against the West* The @*"* militar withdrawalfrom Afghanistan and ongoing insta+ilit in the !a$istani tri+al +elts ma pro%ide the

reuisite safe(ha%en for al()a'ida to hat#h su#h an atta#$* !erhaps ironi#all, the

presen#e of large num+ers of foreign 6ghters in &ra and "ria drawn in + the &slami#

"tate and other organiations ma also pro%ide al()a'ida with an opportunit to turn

one or more of these indi%iduals around to atta#$ the West* "e#ond, an al()a'ida

per#ei%ed to +e more legitimate, dis#erning and fo#used on the .true enemies of &slam/

ma se#ure greater funding and popular support in the long(term*

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FGW?RH"Investigators:

William Brani 

Topics:

Al()aida and A=liated o%ements

Research Area::iolent roups and o%ements

Regions:

lo+al

https://www.start.umd.edu/people/william-braniffhttps://www.start.umd.edu/topics/al-qaida-and-affiliated-movementshttps://www.start.umd.edu/research-areas/violent-groups-and-movementshttps://www.start.umd.edu/regions/globalhttps://www.start.umd.edu/people/william-braniffhttps://www.start.umd.edu/topics/al-qaida-and-affiliated-movementshttps://www.start.umd.edu/research-areas/violent-groups-and-movementshttps://www.start.umd.edu/regions/global