a review of chapter 17 from military strategy: principles, practices, and historical perspectives by...

8/4/2019 A Review of Chapter 17 from Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives by John M. Collins

1/4

AUTHORS BACKGROUND

It is with distinguished authority that Colonel (ret) John M. Collins is able to write on topics

under the umbrella topic that is military strategy, such as he has done in Chapter 17 Sociopolitical

Terrorism within his bookMilitary Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical

Perspectives. During his illustrious military career Col Collins has had significant exposure to the

field of military strategy. As a primer, he was responsible for contingency planning for numerous military

divisions and corps, a special operations task force, and a military assistance command. The peak of his

military career was as the Director of Military Strategy Studies, and then as Chief of Strategic Research

Group at the National War College. Col Collins continued to gain exposure to the field of military

strategy by serving as a Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service for

the next 24 years.1

THESIS AND KEY ARGUMENTS

In Chapter 17 Sociopolitical Terrorism Col Collins makes several key points, of which only

the most important can be covered in this review. Col Collins definition of sociopolitical terrorism is of

utmost importance as it aids in differentiating acts of aggression and the strategies behind them, if any.

Col Collins proposes that sociopolitical terrorism epitomizes a strategically indirect approach and

enables individuals and small groups to exert great influence at minimal cost.2 A follow on point to this,

which is also very important, is explained by Col Collins as follows, Terrorists aim to cause anguish so

intense and widespread that authorities cannot cope, and consequently comply with their demands.3

Lastly, Col Collins contends that those individuals involved in terrorist activities are able to easily justify

their actions, even total massacres, because the ends they cherish justify any feasible means.4 This

review will reveal the evidence supporting these key points and explain their significance below.

1 About the Author from Military Strategy: Principles, Practice, and Historical Perspectives,

by John M. Collins (Washington DC: Brasseys Inc, 2002), 333.

2 John M. Collins, Chapter 17 - Sociopolitical Terrorism in Military Perspectives: Principles,Practices, and Historical Perspectives, (Washington DC: Brasseys Inc, 2002), 201.3 Collins, 201.4 Collins, 201.


2/4

EVIDENCE

In the introductory paragraphs of Chapter 17, Col Collins endeavors to build the framework for

an understanding of sociopolitical terrorism by defining it. First and foremost, Col Collins expresses the

motives of sociopolitical terrorists saying, Their purpose is to inspire such fear and confusion within

afflicted countries that national leaders must make a no-win decision: capitulate or lose popular support.5

Defining sociopolitical terrorism assists in determining the difference between acts of terrorism and other

acts of violence. He further accomplishes this by writing, Not all violence involves terrorism6 and then

citing examples in recent history.

He explains that John Hinckleys attempted assassination of President Reagan was not terrorism

because it was intended to imperil a single US official; whereas, Osama bin Ladens declaration of Jihad

against the US was a clear act of terrorism.7 To be clear, Col Collins has this to say in regards to

distinguishing the difference, Malicious assaults on a few isolated schools, churches, or synagogues

constitutes common crime, whereas methodological attempts to outlaw abortion, recast educational

systems, or combat religious beliefs using identical tactics constitutes sociopolitical terrorism.8

All of the above lends itself to Col Collins first point, but only the first part; the fact that the use

of terrorism requires little costs in comparison to national militaries has yet to be substantiated. In later

sections of the chapter, Col Collins indirectly emphasizes the comparative cost effectiveness of terrorism

over conventional warfare by suggesting that one attack can gain prevalent attention due to media

coverage.9 Col Collins also emphasizes the relative ease by which terrorists are able to acquire training in

the ways of terrorism thanks to the plethora of available guides on the internet.10

Col Collins second point is made valid through the recounting of several high profile terrorist acts

throughout history as he simultaneously relates the more common terrorist tools and tactics. The tools

5 Collins, 193.6 Collins, 193.7 Collins, 193.8 Collins, 193.9 Collins, 193.10 Collins, 195.


3/4

mentioned include: preferred weapons, such as those that can be [employed] adroitly with minimum

training,11 nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and chemical weapons. Col Collins emphasizes that

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons pose difficulties for terrorists, but the threat is none-the-less

real, citing successful use of a chemical nerve agent by a Tokyo based terrorist group.12 The tactics

mentioned include: assassination, abduction, hostage-taking, hijacking, demolitions, and nightmare

scenarios. Almost all of the terrorist acts mentioned resulted in the afflicted governments given in to

terrorist demands, or a complete massacre of the victims.13

The last point within the chapter, with which this review is concerned, was made evident with

nearly every example given, in that the perpetrators were willing to die for their cause. Many of the

terrorist acts referenced involved suicide bombings or similar acts where the terrorists did not escape

alive. Col Collins stresses this point by describing the romantic death wish made by one terrorist even

while on trial saying, [The terrorist] wanted to become Orion when [he] died.14

AUTHORS CONCLUSION

Col Collins, by including a chapter on sociopolitical terrorism in a book that was printed prior to

the September 11th attacks, indicates that he, as a strategy expert, recognized a growing trend, one that

was growing more impactful with each incident. This is evident in the phrase, The World Trade Center

debacle could have been much worse,15 which was made in connection to the parking garage bombing

years before September 2001. Col Collins went on to describe the possibility of a nightmare scenario

where attacks are carried out across the US and in succession until demands are met. He concludes by

saying, No showdown on such a scale has ever arisen anywhere in the world, but such scenarios give

counterterrorists nightmares.16

STUDENTS REVIEW

11 Collins, 194.12 Collins, 196.13 Collins, 193-200.14 Collins, 194.15 Collins, 200.16 Collins, 200.


4/4

This chapter in Col Collins book was a decent overview of the form of warfare that comprises

sociopolitical terrorism; however, Col Collins did not emphasize the fact that terrorism is a form of

warfare anywhere in the chapter. While defining sociopolitical terrorism, in the introduction, Col Collins

might have gotten the point across better by emphasizing that John Hinckley was not declaring war on the

US while Osama bin Laden was. Thereafter Col Collins could have highlighted from time to time how

sociopolitical terrorism is warfare on the cheap. Other than this oversight, the chapter is effective in

describing the key points surrounding sociopolitical terrorism.

a review of chapter 17 from military strategy: principles, practices, and historical perspectives by...

Documents