a reply to perry d. klein's "multiplying the problems of intelligence by eight"

A Reply to Perry D. Klein's "Multiplying the Problems of Intelligence by Eight"Author(s): Howard GardnerSource: Canadian Journal of Education / Revue canadienne de l'éducation, Vol. 23, No. 1(Winter, 1998), pp. 96-102Published by: Canadian Society for the Study of EducationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1585968 .

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A Reply to Perry D. Klein's "Multiplying the Problems of Intelligence by Eight"

Howard Gardner harvard graduate school of education

Responding to a tough, tough-minded, and sarcastically titled critique poses a

problem for the target of the piece. Adopting the Chomskian confrontational mode, he can reply back even more vociferously, showing that he can be even

tougher and nastier than his critic. Adopting the Piagetian conciliatory tone, he can reply in muted points, conceding some errors and looking for points of

agreement and for constructive compromises. By temperament, I locate myself somewhere between these two stances. I sel-

dom start an argument, but I am unlikely to let criticism pass without comment. I take into account the tone of the critic. In the end, however, I am less inter- ested in winning the debate than in advancing my own understanding and, one would hope, the understandings of those who listen carefully to both sides.

The bulk of my response is a series of points, loosely coupled to the presentation in Perry Klein's article. However, it is important to set my response in context, and that involves clarifying two major areas.

DOMAINS VS. INTELLIGENCE

Like many critics, Perry Klein confuses or conflates the concepts of intelligence and domain. As I conceive it, an intelligence is a biopsychological potential. Because of evolutionary pressures, human beings have evolved over a long period of time to be sensitive to certain kinds of information in the environment or culture, and to process this content in certain ways. Specific neurological structures subserve each of the several intelligences. In the absence of proper stimulation, however, an intelligence will not develop; it is not an instinct.

Whereas the notion of "intelligences" comes initially from the biological sciences, "domain" is a cultural concept. Every culture features a large number of disciplines, crafts, activities, and so on, in which at least some members attain expertise. Activities ranging from chess to psychology to ballet to mechanics are all domains. Both the boundaries and the details of domains will change over time, depending on individual and cultural values and practices.

It is easy to see why intelligences can be confused with domains; indeed, I have done so myself. But they are different concepts. Any intelligence (like spatial intelligence) can be drawn on in many domains (ranging from chess to

96 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 23, 1 (1998): 96-102



DEBAT / DISCUSSION 97

sailing to sculpture); and, in turn, any domain can involve one or more intelligences (for example, chess presumably draws on spatial, logical, personal, and perhaps other intelligences as well).

Starting with his very first example, Klein confuses these concepts throughout his paper. He claims that MI theory is circular because being "a good dancer" is the same as having "high bodily kinesthetic intelligence." But the domain of dancing involves several intelligences, and one can be a credible dancer even with modest bodily-kinesthetic intelligence. By the same token, possession of high bodily potential does not mean that one will become a good dancer. One has to decide to pursue this domain and then to have considerable practice, good teachers, cultural support, and the like. Inasmuch as dancing is in no sense equivalent to bodily kinesthetic intelligence, the charge of circularity evaporates.

SIZE OF UNIT AND SCHOLARLY GOALS

Much of Klein's paper is an attack on the notion of intelligence as a viable psychological construct. On the one hand, he seems sympathetic to the notion of a single "general intelligence" and he expresses regret that I have broken this venerable concept down into a number of varieties. On the other hand, he is also partial to the notion that individuals have very specific kinds of abilities or skills, and he critiques my intelligences for being too broad and undifferentiated a concept.

Klein would like to have it both ways but he can't. All constructs have regions where they are appropriate and applicable, and other regions where they involve a stretch or are manifestly inappropriate. When speaking of diseases, it has traditionally been appropriate to speak at the level of tissues and organs; and in recent years, it has sometimes been possible to add explanations at the cellular or even the molecular level. In analyzing social structures, one may speak of entities ranging from the family or the local neighbourhood to the entire nation or the "global community." One level of analysis does not vitiate or invalidate the others; each has its proper scope.

I have never denied the existence of "g," only its provenance and significance. If one is conducting a certain kind of factor analysis of scholastically oriented tests, one will come up with a measure like "g." By the same token, I go on at great length in Frames of Mind (1983/1993b) to illustrate that each intelligence is itself composed of subintelligences, which may, a la Fodor, operate in modular fashion; and I indicate that an individual might be strong in one subintelligence (say, dealing with wide spaces, or solving human conflict) while not as strong in another associated subintelligence (dealing with circumscribed spaces, or directing others in battle).

The question, then, is not "one intelligence or several intelligences or dozens of subintelligences." Rather, the question is: Under which circumstances does it make most scientific sense to invoke concepts at these varying levels of analysis?



98 DEBAT / DISCUSSION

I believe that the positing of a small number of relatively independent intelligences has several virtues: it respects neural organization; it reflects a plausible evolutionary course; it organizes a vast amount of data in a convenient way; it provides a framework that can guide (and has guided) teachers who are con- cerned with questions of pedagogy, curriculum, and assessment. Indeed, although this is not in itself evidence for the theory, I am quite sure that "MI" theory would have been ignored in both psychological and educational circles if, like J. P. Guilford (1967), I had asserted the existence of 120 or 150 different intelligences. George Miller's magic number 7 (Miller, 1956) has relevance that extends beyond the limits of short-term memory.

Klein questions whether the correlation among the various subintelligences is sufficiently great to legitimate their grouping under a single label. This is a reasonable question and it might well yield different answers for different candidate subintelligences. At present, we lack sufficient data to answer the question.

My own prediction is that, for two reasons, future research will confirm the utility of speaking of "linguistic" or "spatial" or "interpersonal" intelligences rather than referring only to the candidate subintelligences-for example, "foreign-language-learning intelligence" or "conflict-resolution intelligence." First of all, the neural regions involved in the subintelligences-of-one-intelligence are closer to one another and are more likely to work in consort. Second, most tasks in a domain call on more than one of the subintelligences. As individuals become practised at these tasks, they will necessarily strengthen the associated subintelligences, and so measures of subintelligences drawn from the same family will show higher correlations than measures of subintelligences drawn from two separate intelligences.

Having made these two general points, let me now turn to Klein's more specific comments.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

1. Following Husserl, Klein points out that one can use the intelligences to refer both to an operation (like recognizing a certain kind of pattern) and to a content (the pattern itself). I agree. Indeed, the concept of an intelligence possesses power precisely because, loosely speaking, it resonates with a particular content, but its operations can be brought to bear on other kinds of content as well. This makes evolutionary sense because, spandrel-like, capacities that have evolved for one purpose (analyzing a specific content in a specific way) can be hijacked for other purposes.

Thus, for example, spatial intelligence is typically invoked by the content of finding one's way around an unfamiliar neighbourhood or by examining the architecture of a building. However, processes of spatial intelligence can also be invoked when one is hearing a work of music, to create a spatial image of the movements, or to organize phrases or sections in an architectonic way. This



DIBAT / DISCUSSION 99

versatility of the intelligences turns out to be very important for educational ends, as I describe below.

2. In challenging the intelligences, Klein questions how the concept of mammal can be construed without linguistic intelligence. However, infants without language, globally aphasic patients, and individuals in cultures without a Linnae- an taxonomy can all make plausible groupings of animals, which might even be equivalent to the distinction between mammal (except for dolphins!) and non- mammal. The principal intelligence at work would be naturalist intelligence- the capacity to recognize patterns in the natural world. When an individual organizes these discriminations and perceptions, she uses logical intelligence; if she codifies the classification in language, she uses linguistic intelligence.

3. Klein says that the intelligences cannot be both independent and interactive in many human activities. This simply does not follow. Members of a quartet are independent organisms who interact well and subtly in the performance of musical compositions. Moreover, I have never claimed that intelligences are completely independent; rather, they are relatively independent from one another, as illustrated by the fact that strength in one intelligence does not predict strength or weakness in other intelligences.

EMPIRICAL ISSUES

1. Klein notes that exceptional individuals (genius is his word, not one that I favour) are often outstanding in more than one intelligence. I not only grant this point, I insist on it and suggest that the extraordinariness is a function of strength in two or more intelligences, often ones unusual for the domain (Gardner, 1993a). But Klein misses the point here. If exceptional lawyers were all strong in linguistic and personal intelligences, my analysis would be suspect. But some lawyers stand out by virtue of their combination of linguistic and logical analysis; some by virtue of their logical and interpersonal skills; still others (say, entertainment or patent lawyers) for their musical or spatial intelligences.

I would agree that an individual may be outstanding in a domain, even if some of his associated subintelligences are less striking than others. No doubt there are great writers who are not skilled in learning foreign languages or in performing grammatical parsing. However, for the reasons stated above, I'd bet that writers are more likely to be excellent in these domains than, say, a comparison group of architects or physicists.

2. The issue of the source of prodigious behaviour is currently a subject of controversy. No doubt, the domains offered by society and the resources presented by parents affect the nature and recognition of prodigiousness. However, most educators and most psychologists do not take seriously the claim that Mozart or Bobby Fischer are the results of training, rather than training imposed on a genetically well-prepared set of intelligences (Winner, 1996). And the issue is not whether chess players are better than others at sailing or drawing or sculpting or




engineering; the question is whether, given an equivalent amount of training, chess players would be more likely to excel in these other spatial pursuits than would matched groups of clinical psychologists or poets.

3. One of Klein's asides is revealing. He says that autism--"primarily an impairment of intrapersonal understanding" - affects other intelligences. I would agree. A principal purpose of my theory is to allow locutions like the one Klein inadvertently employed. In contrast, he appears to oppose that practice; such a prohibition would only force him to resort to circumlocution.

4. Klein's point about the splinter skills of savants is an interesting one. It might be that at least some of these individuals have only a single subintelligence and cannot develop an associated one. In this respect, then, such savants might differ from unimpaired individuals for whom subintelligences more readily reinforce one another.

5. I completely disagree with the claim that dyslexic students typically are normal in aspects of language other than reading. Indeed, dyslexic persons can be picked out from an early age precisely because of difficulties in handling rhymes, naming colours, naming objects, and so on (cf. Bryant, 1993).

6. Klein makes appropriate reference to the work of Case and his colleagues, work showing the power of having a central numerical sense. It is important to note in this regard that Case has moved very far in his own thinking. Rather than seeing various abilities as all reflecting the same cognitive structures, he now speaks of "central conceptual structures" which map onto capacities quite like those of multiple intelligences theory (Case, 1991; Case & Okamoto, 1995).

7. I remain sceptical about claims for transfer. My reading of the extensive psychological literature collected over nearly a century is that transfer is far more difficult to obtain than one would wish. The "high road" of transfer, involving explicit labelling of the domains to be compared, appears to be a promising concept. However, such transfer does not invalidate MI theory. MI theory is threatened if transfer across intellectual domains occurs readily, and if transfer within an intelligence occurs no more readily than transfer across intelligences.

8. Reluctantly, I agree with Klein that my own empirical efforts to investigate the relationships among intelligences were less productive than I had hoped. Put frankly, it is very difficult to conduct such research, because it requires the construction of sets of new instruments as well as the time and resources to familiarize individuals with the materials. I do hope that more work along these lines will be done. In the meantime, my own work on multiple intelligences continues to be based chiefly on review of the primary literature (Gardner, in press-a).

PEDAGOGY

Although I continue to work on the theory of multiple intelligences, my own work over the past 15 years has been primarily on practical applications and



DEBAT / DISCUSSION 101

implications of the theory. I have written dozens of articles on this subject, authored a book (Gardner, 1993c), and drafted another (Gardner, unpublished manuscript). And my own efforts have represented but a few drops in the ocean of writings by educators of many persuasions.

I agree with Klein that many applications of MI theory, though well inten- tioned, have been superficial and ill advised (Gardner, 1995). I would add the point, missed by Klein, that one should never proceed directly from psychological or scientific theory to educational practices. Educational practice is a co-function of one's values, on the one hand, and one's reflections on efforts to achieve successful learning and pedagogy, on the other. Neither falls directly from scientific discovery, though both can be informed by relevant scientific work.

Put directly, then, MI theory cannot tell us whether to teach one or more intelligences; whether to teach to strengths or weaknesses; whether to focus on pedagogy or assessment. Rather, once one has made such decisions, one can then draw on the theory for possible practices or lessons.

This critique applies as well to some of Klein's comments. He assumes that a focus on strengths will yield a neglect of areas of weakness. As a practical matter, that result might or might not occur; in any event, it does not follow from the theory. Elsewhere, he assumes that a focus on multiple intelligences would harden traditional categories of privilege. Again, that might or might not happen, but is not linked to the theory. Klein needs to distinguish much more sharply between values or practices that follow directly from the theory (few, if any) and his own favourite hobbyhorses or bugbears.

I've elected not to review Klein's educational comments point by point, since I have dealt with these points elsewhere (e.g., Gardner 1993c, 1995, in press-a). Far more useful, I believe, is a brief statement of the two major educational implications that I have drawn from the theory, after many years of thought and experimentation:

1. We need to take differences among individuals very seriously. Rather than teaching all students the same content in the same way, and assessing them in the same way, we now have the opportunity (especially through technology) to individualize education. The intelligences offer one initial way in which we might begin to think about individual differences in the classroom and in other educational environments.

2. Important curricular ideas can and should be presented to students in many ways. MI theory suggests a number of different entry points (how to introduce the topic); various analogies and metaphors (where unfamiliar materials are illuminated by more familiar instances); and different "model languages" or "ways of representing" the key points of a concept, theory, or idea (Gardner, in press-b, unpublished manuscript).

When the variety of intelligences is exploited in the presentation of curricula, two desirable outcomes are obtained. First, more students are reached. Second,




students are exposed to expert knowledge - because experts are individuals who have multiple representations of the same content.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

In my view, multiple intelligences theory is a far richer, more flexible, and more useful set of ideas than Klein's article implied. On the conceptual level, MI theory insists not on a domination by a single middle-level construct, but rather on a place for that construct in between the overarching notion of a general intelligence and an endless list of specific skills and subskills. On the empirical level, it provides a far better explanation for many groups and behaviours than does either the general or the local perspective. Finally, despite inevitable carica- tures, the theory lays the groundwork for an education that can reach more students and do so in a way that deepens their understanding.

REFERENCES

Bryant, P. (1993). Reading in development. In C. Pratt & A. E. Gareton (Eds.), Systems of repre- sentation in children (pp. 51-66). Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Case, R. (1991). The mind's staircase. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Case, R., & Okamoto, Y. (1995). The role of central conceptual structures in the development of children's thought (Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, vol. 61, nos. 1-2, serial 246). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gardner, H. (1993a). Creating minds: An anatomy of creativity seen through the lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi. New York: Basic Books.

Gardner, H. (1993b). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic Books. (Tenth anniversary edition of 1983 text, with a new foreword)

Gardner, H. (1993c). Multiple intelligences: The theory in practice. New York: Basic Books.

Gardner, H. (1995). Reflections on multiple intelligences: Myths and messages. Phi Delta Kappan, 77(3), 200-209.

Gardner, H. (in press-a). Are there additional intelligences? In J. Kane (Ed.), Education, information, and transformation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Gardner, H. (in press-b). Multiple approaches to understanding. In C. Reigeluth (Ed.), Instructional- design theories and models, vol. 2. Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Gardner, H. (unpublished manuscript). An education for all human beings.

Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of intelligence. New York: McGraw Hill.

Miller, G. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97.

Winner, E. (1996). Gifted children: Myths and realities. New York: Basic Books.

H. Gardner is Professor of Education and Co-Director of Project Zero at Harvard University Graduate School of Education, 6 Appian Way, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A. 02138.



a reply to perry d. klein's "multiplying the problems of intelligence by eight"

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