a reflection on the alternative philosophy of science

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A reflection on the alternative philosophy of science Author(s): Dachun LIU, Yongmou LIU and Mao Xin Source: Frontiers of Philosophy in China, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 576-588Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27765995Accessed: 16-03-2015 21:33 UTC

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Front. Philos. China 2009, 4(4): 576-588 DOI 10.1007/sll466-009-0038-x

RESEARCH ARTICLE

LIU Dachun, LIU Yongmou

A reflection on the alternative philosophy of science

? Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2009

Abstract A prominent phenomenon in contemporary philosophy of science has

been the unexpected rise of alternative philosophers of science. This article

analyses in depth such alternative philosophers of science as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and Michel Foucault, summarizing the similarities and differences

between alternative philosophies of science and traditional philosophy of science so as to unveil the trends in contemporary philosophy of science. With its

different principles and foundation, alternative philosophy of science has made

breakthroughs in terms of its field of vision, scope, and methodology, and its

relationship with science has become more humanistic and pluralistic. Attention

should be given to alternative perspectives in the contemporary philosophy of

science, and research should be expanded into the fields of the epistemology of

science and cognitive science, the sociology of scientific knowledge and

scientific anthropology, the scientific cultural philosophy, and scientific ethics.

Keywords alternative philosophy of science, traditional philosophy of science, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault

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Translated by Mao Xin from Zhongguo renmin daxue xuebao A ^^ ? (Journal of Renmin University of China), 2008, (3): 32^10_ LIU Dachun (ISI) School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China E-mail: [email protected]

LIU Yongmou (ISI) School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China E-mail : liuyongmou74@y ahoo. com. cn



A reflection on the alternative philosophy of science 577

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1 Introduction

More than 30 years ago, Feyerabend said that the philosophy of science was a

subject with a great past, but no future (Feyerabend 1999, pp. 127-137). From the

perspective of traditional philosophy of science, philosophy of science today might be declining, perhaps even ending. Although philosophy of science is increasingly

introspective, with new perspectives and new themes rising, the traditional study of

philosophy of science is gradually losing its orthodox position, becoming instead one voice in a pluralistic discussion. New approaches to research, quite different

from the traditional ones in their processes and interests, have broken through traditional limitations on the scope of problems and of solutions, greatly changing the basic form of the philosophy of science and increasingly gaining in power.

The rise of the alternative philosophy of science ? as compared to the

traditional or standard philosophy of science ? is demonstrated by the attention

received by the influential alternative philosophers of science and their theories

in academic circles. If we see Carnap, Reichenbach, and Hempel as

representative traditional philosophers of science, and Popper, Kuhn, and

Lakatos as transitional figures representing the shift from the traditional to the

alternative, then Feyerabend, Heidegger, the Frankfurt School, Rorty, Foucault,

Derrida, and Lyotard should be classified as alternative philosophers of science.

Chronologically speaking, some of them were contemporary with traditional

philosophers of science and some later, but all have stirred up discussion and led

new trends in the field. In addition, there are a group of contemporary scholars

active in the philosophy of science, including Agassi, Haack, and Hess, who do

not belong to the alternative category but who are deeply influenced by the

alternative philosophers of science, leaving behind the scientist camp and

gradually becoming humanistic, expanding towards new horizons. In this paper, we will present three of the most typical alternative philosophers of science, whom we may say were essential in the transformation of the field ?

Feyerabend, Rorty, and Foucault ? in order to roughly sketch the spirit of the

alternative philosophers of science and to introduce some of their thinking.

2 Feyerabend: The true meaning of "farewell to reason"

The critical power and impact of Feyerabend's so-called alternative thinking is



578 LIU Dachun, LIU Yongmou

unmatched. Once a fanatic positivist and later a student of Popper, he ultimately came out against both logical positivism and his mentor, becoming the "the worst

enemy of science."1 The early Feyerabend mainly focused on the problem of

explanation in scientific theory and on the problem of empiricism. After the

1970's, he changed his focus from the study of the history of science to the study of the relationship between science and society, and also of issues concerning freedom. Feyerabend advocated a "return to history" (Feyerabend 1978, p. 282), appreciating the historicist study of science and negating logicism. As a humanist,

Feyerabend criticized scientific chauvinism, pointing out that the standards which separated science and non-science were not only man-made but also harmful to the development of science. Science is not the only possible form of human knowledge, and he believed we need to break its monopoly. To him, science was just one tool that people invented to deal with their environment:

primitive witchcraft, mythology, religion, and metaphysics also contained rich

knowledge. He even held that "science is the myth of today, myths were the science of the past" (Feyerabend 1999, p. 60). Through his study of science's

history, Feyerabend criticized empiricism, pointing out that there was no theory in the history of science that could agree with all the facts in its domain: the

empiricist claim that experience was the basis of knowledge could not be

justified, and no experience could exist without theorization and subjectivity.

Feyerabend believed that contemporary empiricism had already gotten into

trouble; "That is, some of the methods of modern empiricism which are

introduced by the spirit of anti-dogmatism and progress are bound to lead to the

establishment of a dogmatic metaphysics and to the construction of defence

mechanisms which make this metaphysics safe from refutation by experimental

inquiry" (Ibid., p. 78). He also criticized rationalism, pointing out that the

instances in science's history which showed that various traditional

methodologies founded on the basis of reason were inadequate for the

development of science, and even hampered it. He judged that the concept of

science had gone far beyond the narrow scope of "reason" as explained by most

contemporary rationalists, and was not restricted by the boundaries of "reason".

Feyerabend also criticized the falsificationism advocated by Popper and Lakatos,

mercilessly rejecting the principle of falsification and holding that "a strict

principle of falsification, or a 'naive falsificationism' as Lakatos called it, would

wipe out science as we know it and would never have permitted it to start"

(Feyerabend 1975, p. 176). Feyerabend also strongly opposed political rule by

1 In 1987, Feyerabend was listed by Nature magazine as science's worst enemy. In light of his

impact on traditional philosophy of science, he was not only the suspected of being an enemy of science, but also of being the most dangerous enemy of the standardized philosophy of science (see Horgan 1993).




"experts", demanding that intellectuals be cleared out from the centre stage of

social life; he claimed that non-professionals should intervene in the activity of

science, believing that this could lead to a liberal society. Feyerabend also argued that science should be separated from the government in case science might intervene in and encroach upon freedom. In fact, the later Feyerabend turned

from criticizing science and philosophy to pondering human freedom and

happiness.

Feyerabend is famous for his "against method", and for asserting "anything

goes". Based on careful and rigorous analysis and criticism of the history of

science, Feyerabend established an alternative anarchic epistemology and

pluralistic methodology. He considered science to be essentially an anarchic

enterprise and felt that all methodologies have their limitations; we must

therefore abandon methodological monism, adopting a pluralistic methodology characterized by divergence and openness. Science is a free practice and

scientific discovery has no absolute laws to follow; science is always utilizing the

methods and results of non-science to enrich itself. He wrote that "Looking at the

actual historical situation we see that science was advanced in many different

ways and that scientific problems were attacked by many different methods. In

practice the only principle that is constantly adhered to seems to be: 'anything

goes'" (Feyerabend 1999, p. 122). His statement that "anything goes" first

represents a kind of free and easy academic environment and a democratic

scientific spirit which opposes academic arbitrariness. Feyerabend discovered

that the traditional philosophy of science had changed science into a kind of

myth and had attributed the superiority of natural science to its special

methodological system, which was not good for the development of science. He

said that although existing scientific methods have their value, if we insist that

science must be done only according to them, we could only obtain the opposite

effect. Of course, the existing theories and methods which have already been

affirmed by the philosophy of science should not be negated altogether; rather,

no methods should be treated as dogmatic and programmable even if they are

effective in scientific practice. For a scientist, the most important thing is to

choose; this includes daring to refute the existing method, and even negating it.

Feyerabend emphasized more the particularity of science, comparing it to the

tradition which placed greater emphasis on generality and instrumental

characteristics. A scientist should pay attention to the particularity of her or his

scientific practice; too much attention to the instrumental, to abstract features and

generality, will harm the progress of science. Therefore, Feyerabend's "against

method", his contrariness, is not the discarding of method but rather a demand

for plural methods and independent choices. Anarchism is not doing whatever

you want, but rather being aware of methodological monism: "I do not say that

epistemology should become anarchic, or the philosophy of science should




become anarchic. I say that both disciplines should receive anarchism as a

medicine. Epistemology is sick; it must be cured, and the medicine is anarchy" (Feyerabend 1978, p. 127). Unlike traditional science, which emphasized accuracy, Feyerabend believed that ambiguity could better ensure variation. He

pointed out that the rough dichotomy between right and wrong came at the cost

of omitting the special and details. Feyerabend considered himself neither a

rationalist nor an irrationalist because the division of rationalism and irrationalism is extreme; between them there should be many more possibilities, anarchic epistemology and pluralistic methodology among them.

Feyerabend developed a school of his own in the philosophy of science,

considering himself as a destroyer of the philosophy of science and a critic of all

theories. Some say, 'He was a rationalist, but his view caused great damage to

rationalism; he was a realist, but his theory brought great threats on realism; at

the same time, he was a relativist, but he never advocated relativism in any form"

(Feyerabend 1990, translator's preface). He was against method and also argued for pluralistic methods; he was against reason and not in favor of irrationalism; his style was like the sophist's, but also had elements of postmodernism. In a

word, people have differing views about Feyerabend. His contribution to the

philosophy of science was unique and a breakthrough. For him, all the

contradictory characteristics in science have nowhere to hide. No one can deny that he led the philosophy of science to turn away from logicism and incomplete historicism toward relativism, irrationalism, and even anti-scientism. This

disintegrated the traditional philosophy of science, but also spurred people to

open up various new approaches in their thinking about science, creating a

broader horizon for inquiry.

3 Rorty: Promoting the "post philosophical culture"

Rorty also gained his academic maturity in the tradition of analytic philosophy, and also turned back to attack it ? which is said to be the reason for his

departure from Princeton's philosophy department. Rorty's rebellion began with

his thinking about the linguistic turn that occurred after Wittgenstein, and ended

with his claim for the end of philosophy and his promotion of a kind of

"post-philosophical culture". As compared with Feyerabend, Rorty was not only

rebelling against analytic philosophy but also the whole Western philosophical tradition. This tradition started with Plato, constantly seeking a real sort of

knowledge that transcended the "seeming" and finding absolute reality beyond a

given phenomenon. Rorty believed that the fundamental spirit of traditional

Western philosophy was represented by the metaphor of the "mirror of nature".

According to it, human knowledge is an accurate representation of truth, and




epistemology is the study of how one may keep this mirror clean and thus maintain the accuracy of the representation. Yet for Rorty, the so-called

"mind-body" problem is fundamentally a false one: There is no entity called "mind" which is separate from the body. This proposition broke the "mirror of

nature", shaking the basis of epistemology. Rorty pointed out that after Kant, the

development of traditional epistemology started to deviate from fundamentalism, and after entering the 20th century, Sellars and Quine struck at it again. Following the clues of the "mirror of nature", Rorty questioned the linguistic turn of

analytic philosophy. He considered it progress that analytic philosophy used

"language to substitute 'mind' or 'consciousness' as the medium out of which beliefs and desires are constructed, the third, mediating, element between self and world" (Rorty 1989, p. 10). They had not completely abandoned the

non-historical, delusive Platonic dream of absolute reality, and therefore could neither solve the fundamental difficulties faced by traditional epistemology nor

break the curse of representationalism. Criticizing the tradition, Rorty advocated

using non-reductive physicalism to replace epistemological fundamentalism, and also to create a net to replace "the mirror of nature" by weaving together belief and desire. Rorty emphasized the weaving of the net of metaphor and belief,

believing that without various beliefs and desires being interwoven, there is no

independent mind; the mind itself is nothing but a huge net formed by a large number of beliefs and desires (Rorty 1991, p. 116). Cognition is not the

representation of mind to the things outside it; judgment as to the authenticity of a certain belief and whether a certain belief is right or wrong is actually decided

by the relationship between the different beliefs and the way they are related to one other. This is a coherent and holistic conception of truth.

Going a step further, Rorty extended the scope of his research from

epistemology to ethics and politics, the result of which was his promotion of

post-philosophical culture. Rorty believed that contemporary philosophy was

very different from traditional philosophy; some philosophers such as

Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger maintain a common historicist stance in

order to reject the trend of non-historicism which eternalizes history. Rorty

suggested that philosophers should merge American and continental philosophy

together under the theme of pragmatism, and that this combination would finally

produce a post-philosophical culture; the construction of this post-philosophical culture would finally destroy representationalism, essentialism, and

fundamentalism, break the monopoly held by philosophical truth, and finally take

philosophy off its throne, allowing it to find its own place again (Rorty 2004, author's preface). According to Rorty, in post-philosophical culture, it is not that we can solve the problem of traditional philosophy, but rather that we adopt an

indifferent attitude towards it and set it aside. The post-philosophical culture is

not constructive, but is rather a kind of therapy, or a kind of dialogue. We cannot




get to know the world itself nor its essence through philosophical research, and we also cannot use it to master the essence of the activity of cognition and the

people who engage in it. Therefore, philosophy in post-philosophical culture is no longer a foundation which can reveal epistemological views offered by science, morality, art, or religion. In this culture, neither priest, physicist, poet, nor party would be considered more rational, more scientific, or more profound than the others (Rorty 2004, pp. 14-15). No special sector of culture has

privilege; philosophy, science, culture, politics, and certain other sectors are all

equal. "We no longer worship anything, where we treat nothing as a

quasi-divinity, where we treat everything ? our language, our conscience, our

community ? as a product of time and chance" (Rorty 1989, p. 22). Of course,

there are no so-called "capitalized 'Philosophers'," for no one can preside over

the court of reason. Only the lower-case "philosophers" exist as experts who can

understand how things connect to one another.

Rorty integrated philosophy of science into his construction of

"post-philosophical culture" and his critique of scienticism. He was against scienticism which blindly worshipped science, and was also against treating science as the foundation for the whole of culture ? especially against

attributing the success of science to its unique methods. He believed, in

accordance with Quine, Sellas, and Davison, that analytic philosophy had already transcended and negated itself, and finally announced the failure of the

scientification of philosophy and of the pursuit of certainty. Therefore, science is no longer the model for all sectors of culture to imitate, nor is it the only way to

get in touch with reality. Rorty believed that in traditional ideology, science was

basically equal to truth; thus science obtained a sublime position that no other sector of human knowledge could reach. Science thus turned out to be the

foundation of all the human knowledge; however, all of these assertions were

misunderstandings. Rorty considered the mythicizing effect of natural science as

one of the ideas which contemporary Western philosophy should try to extirpate

(Rorty 2003, p. 15): Scientists seem to be forming a new priesthood, although scientists should not occupy such unique status. No one should: all the people

who engage in different sectors of culture should be equal. Rorty advocated the

adoption of the "Baconist scientific viewpoint", emphasizing science as the guide for and foundation of technology, focusing on technological function, scientific

pragmatism, and the social influence of science. On this basis, Rorty turned to

pragmatism and advocated a kind of "dialogue science" which transcended

scienticism and opposed both fundamentalism and the pursuit of certainty in the

philosophy of science; he tried to eliminate the opposition between science and

the humanities, and to integrate them. Thus, as one critic put it, "the features of

Rorty's explanation of natural science were completely sociological,

psychological, and pragmatic, refusing all 'deep' explanation. He never wanted




to explore why natural science was so successful" (Jiang 1998, p. 146). All in all,

Rorty's philosophy of science was a counter-revolution against the "strong reason" of science which seeks universality and necessity; it reflected the revival of holism and organism, and also the strong desire for communication between two great culture traditions ? science and the humanities.

4 Foucault: Dedicated to the "deconstruction of the subject"

Among these three alternative philosophers, Foucault is the most famous. His

behavior was often eccentric and unreasonable; his subjects of study were often

"out of the way"; and his thoughts were often shocking to the public. He fully fit

the label "alternative"2. The main thrust of Foucault's philosophy was its

deconstruction of the subject. The reason why Foucault chose this stance was that

he believed that contemporary philosophy's emphasis on and pride in the subject was superstitious, and that all the problems faced by the contemporary Western

world could find their origins in this superstition. Theoretical problems ? the

chaos in contemporary philosophy and thought ? are included in these problems.

So too are practical problems, that is, the contemporary viewpoint of practice, the

mess in contemporary ethics, and the historical situation in which individuals are

homogeneously formed by the discipline of the contemporary world. Foucault

believed that there was no independent subject (Foucault 1997, p. 19) and that

the concept of human nature related to this was not a scientific one (Foucault

2003a, p. 217): Both were constructed at the beginning of the 19th century

(Foucault 2001, p. 430). The archeology of knowledge and genealogy of power

gave the deconstruction of the subject an epistemologica! and methodological

foundation, especially the method of micro-analyzing power. Foucault used this

archeology and genealogy to deconstruct the subject and subjective philosophy from both their historical and social aspects. The historical critique of the subject is mainly embodied in Foucault's theory of the "knowledge prototype". Foucault

applied archeology to analyze more than 400 years of the history of Western

thinking, pointing out that the concept of the subject was a historical notion that

only emerged in contemporary times and relating the history of the birth and

death of the subject: he concluded that the subject was bound to die, and already

2 We need not see it as taboo to note that Foucault used drugs, engaged in promiscuous sex,

showed suicidal tendencies, and spent time in a psychiatric clinic. The themes of Foucault's

works mainly concern madmen, psychiatric hospitals, prisons, sexual experiences, and crime.

He believed that only in the darkness can we find the truth about human nature: For example, he held that disturbed individuals were more authentic and even more normal than the sane ?

people who were disciplined by knowledge-power in the modern world. Another example of this belief is his advocacy for the abolishment of punishment.




was dying. Foucault pointed out that all of his research was aimed at revealing the history of the process in our culture that turned human beings into subjects (Foucault 1992, p. 271); this process was in fact the process through which

modern knowledge-power produced modern people. Foucault introduced the method of origin analysis from genealogy

? that is, the micro-analysis of power and also turned the subject of research from knowledge to power, revealing the

profound relationships between the subject, knowledge, and power. According to

Foucault, modern people are the result of the process which turns human beings into subjects, and modern people are essentially the slaves of knowledge and

power. There are three elements in the process of "turning a human being into a

subject": differentiation, discipline, and subjectification. Modern science and

knowledge have changed society into a sort of controlling machine, and made

modern people voluntarily accept the rule of science and knowledge. It is modern

knowledge and power which construct non-diversified, subjectified modern

people. Therefore, Foucault advocated a program of emancipation including

anti-discipline and anti-subjectification, articulated as such things as a "local

fight" and an "aesthetics of survival".

Foucault began his philosophical studies by studying the history of science, and his philosophy of science grew around the issue of the subject. The problem of knowledge was just the starting point for Foucault; his philosophy ultimately aimed at the real historical situation of the modern people behind knowledge.

Aiming at the deconstruction of the subject, Foucault's research was different

from both scientific epistemology and also the traditional study of the history of

science. According to Foucault's expression of his views, his study of knowledge was aligned along the discourse-axis of practice-knowledge-science, not that of

consciousness-knowledge-science (Foucault 2003b, p. 204). Unlike proponents of scientific epistemology, Foucault viewed knowledge and science from a

practical angle; that is, he saw them as a kind of historical activity unfolding in

reality, paying attention to how knowledge got its name without paying attention

to its legitimacy. Unlike students of the history of science, Foucault treated

science and knowledge from a discursive perspective; that is, he treated them as

one among the group of discourses which formed according to certain

regulations. He never paid attention to how science was born (from pre-science or non-science), but rather focused on the formation of its discourse. Foucault

used the archeology of knowledge to eliminate the distinction between science

and non-science, denying scientific progress and also the corresponding

conception of truth, emphasizing the incommensurability of science from

different ages. Since he introduced the micro-analytical method of power from

genealogy to the study of knowledge, he destroyed the traditional view that

science was value-neutral, pointing out the autonomous aspect of knowledge

practice for the subject, with special emphasis on the relationships among




knowledge, power, and politics. As a post-modern theory of knowledge which opposed the subject, Foucault's

philosophy had many unique views. Foucault believed that truth should be

pluralistic, that knowledge should be a subject corresponding to an object; and that science was not progressing towards objective truth. The standards of

knowledge and science are historical. Knowledge is a discursive practice, and the

practice of knowledge is an integral part of social practice in its entirety;

knowledge is not just defined in the process of demonstration, but can also be

defined in its story, thinking, narration, administrative system, and political decisions (Ibid.). There is no ranking of different subjects according to their

objectivity and how scientific they are. Knowledge is not a product of the process of subjective cognition; rather, it is a process of historical practice, and the

subject and object have often been influenced, changed, and constructed by

knowledge practice (Foucault 2003c, preface, pp. 4-5). Foucault believed there

was a relatively stable structure behind science and knowledge which decided

them, free of the human or subjective control which constructed the subject. This

structure is also historical, and as such will change along with the transitions of

history; knowledge archeology is focusing on revealing this "construction".

Foucault also believed that in modern society, knowledge and power are more

intimately integrated, supporting and becoming entangled with one other,

forming a kind of symbiotic relationship. In modern society, knowledge and

power have formed a kind of complex symbiotic relationship and have finally formed an institutionalized truth system as a kind of practice.3 This truth system

possesses a very important position in the overall operation of modern society, and is the core of social institutions. Truth is the result of struggle between

different powers, and science functions as a kind of ideology. The history of

knowledge is also the history of war, the history of battling amongst powers. The

process of the development of modern knowledge was a process of disciplinizing

knowledge (creating a hierarchy of knowledge centered on power) (Foucault

2004, p. 172). After World War Two, a rebellion of repressed knowledge was

rising; genealogical research into "repressed knowledge"4 was an effort to oppose

disciplinizing knowledge. All in all, Foucault's alternative philosophy of science

opposed the frame of the subject-object dichotomy and overthrew the traditional

epistemology and viewpoints of science, presenting itself as "anti-science". Of

3 In Foucault's genealogy, the truth system was also called a machine, an institution, a strategy,

and a deployment in other places. 4 The repressed knowledge mentioned by Foucault mainly falls into two types: one is

long-neglected marginal knowledge, such as the historical knowledge about disturbed

individuals, prisons, sex, and massacres. The other has been deprived of its qualification to be

knowledge and is considered as inadequate and imprecise; it is naive knowledge, low in the

hierarchy and beneath the level of recognized knowledge and science.




course, Foucault 's philosophy of science went against the subject and used historicism to replace it, raising many important issues, but it faced contradictions it could not resolve.

5 The enlightenment triggered by the emergence of the alternative philosophers of science

Deeply analyzing the implications of alternative philosophy of science and

comparing the similarities and differences between it and traditional philosophy of science are important for unveiling the trends in and direction of the

development of contemporary philosophy of science. From the thoughts of

Feyerabend, Rorty, and Foucault, we find that alternative philosophy of science

is different from traditional philosophy of science in its aims and foundations; it

has broken through the scope of traditional philosophy of science's views,

discussions, and methods. Alternative philosophy of science has also changed its

relationship with science. In general, alternative philosophy of science is

showing more tolerant, egalitarian, and pluralistic characteristics. The emergence of this new force is in fact representative of a major change that has occurred in

contemporary philosophy of science.

The emergence of alternative philosophy of science marked the eclipse of

fundamentalism and essentialism, and the rise of pluralism. Following the

waning of science chauvinism, the fundamentalists who insist that natural

science has an objective foundation and the essentialists who insist that natural

science can master the essence of objects via external observation of

phenomenon are now being questioned about their beliefs. The viewpoint that

sees natural science as objective truth, and science as a linear accumulation with

continued progress, is being shaken. Research methods are changing from an

emphasis on construction toward one on deconstruction of fundamentalism and

all other absolutist tendencies. Alternative philosophers of science do not just

question existing beliefs and find new ones to replace them, but rather believe

that theory and method are developing to towards no certain end. The direction

can only be decided temporarily, through continued negation. As pluralism

gradually permeates the philosophy of science, natural science is more and more

treated as one element of a plural culture, and epistemological scientific research

is more and more one approach among many. The general posture of science has

turned from pan-scientism to moderate scientism, and has led to various

reconciliations of views. When it later turned to anti-scientism, it gained considerable diversity.

The important change brought about by the alternative philosophers of science

is the propagation of the phenomenological method, the hermeneutic method,




and the post-modern "deconstruction" method; at the same time, the aim of research has turned away from a preference for action and has sought operability to question scientific culture and make social criticisms. Since 1970, some

scholars have begun to apply the methods of phenomenology and hermeneutics towards resolving the problems in the philosophy of science; structuralism and

post-modernism have gained power. The permeation of the philosophy of science

by the deconstruction method has changed science's philosophical basis and its

mainstream viewpoints greatly, as well as changing the traditional understanding of science and technology. Traditional philosophy of science treated the

knowledge of natural science as the model of human knowledge, emphasizing not only its truth but also its emphasis on operation and operability. Traditional

philosophy of science not only demanded the scientific reconstruction of nature

but also promoted the practice of the model based on natural science, not only

scientifically reforming nature but also scientifically reforming society and even

human beings. Yet along with the popularizing of deconstruction, there is more

and more questioning of natural science. The philosophy of science is no longer a

subject which defends natural science; rather, it gradually turns, seeking to keep a

distance from science and to act as a bystander. Since people already confirmed

that the systematic approach could not resolve all problems, preference for action

and pursuit of operability cannot override everything else. On the contrary, the

questioning of certain scientific cultural systems and the criticism of society has

become something of a fad.

The alternative philosophers of science make contemporary philosophy of

science's scope of views and discussion increasingly pluralistic; the aim of

research thus turns towards the integration of science and the humanities. In

alternative philosophy of science, science is first understood as an ontological

thing which decides human essence. Pragmatism was introduced into the

philosophy of science, which made philosophy a unity integrated with its context;

thus, its understanding, explanation, and application are necessarily

scenario-dependent. Second, compared to the traditional philosophy of science

with its emphasis on the neutral value of natural science and its focus on nature

without regard for human beings, the alternative philosophers of science have

revived science as a humane science, and see the scientific world as a part of the

human world. The relationship between the scientific world and the living world

has become the centre of the study of the philosophy of science. Third, science is

more and more seen as a kind of practice and as a culture phenomenon. Last but

not least, at the turn of the century, natural science has been thrust from its throne, and people are calling for science to be integrated with the humanities. How to

close the gap between them is a very important problem in contemporary

philosophy of science.

Of course, the expansion, transition, and transformation of such study should




insist on theoretical courage ? the belief that "anything is possible"

? and on the spirit of innovation, following the latest trends in the development of

contemporary philosophy. We also need to remember the time and space in which we carry on our studies, staying in step with reality. With the alternative

philosophy of science, the important thing is not to follow it blindly, nor to reject it blindly, but rather to try to respond to it properly.

References

Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against Method. New York: Verso

Feyerabend, P. (1978). Science in a Free Society. London: NLB

Feyerabend, P. (1987). Farewell to Reason. London/ New York: Verso

Feyerabend, P. (1990). Science in a Free Society (in Chinese), trans, by Lan Zheng. Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe

Feyerabend, P. (1999). Knowledge, Science and Relativism. Cambridge University Press Foucault, M. (1992). "The attached words of Foucault: subject and power". In: Dreyfus, L. &

Rabinow, Paul eds. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (in Chinese), trans, by Zhang Jianchao. Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe

Foucault, M. (1997). The Eye of Power ? Interview with Foucault (in Chinese), trans, by Yan

Feng. Shanghai: Shanghai renming chubanshe Foucault, M. (2001). Les Mots et Les Choses: Une Archeologie des Sciences Humaines (in

Chinese), trans, by Mo Weimin. Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian

Foucault, M. (2003a). Anthology of Foucault (in Chinese), trans, by Du Xiaozhen. Shanghai: Shanghai yuandong chubanshe

Foucault, M. (2003b). L Arch?ologie du Savoir (in Chinese), trans, by Xie Qiang and Ma Yue.

Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian Foucault, M. (2003c). Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the Age of Reason (in

Chinese), trans, by Liu Beicheng. Beijing: Shenghuo dushu xinzhi sanlian shudian

Foucault, M. (2004). 77 Faut Defender La Soci?t? (in Chinese), trans, by Qian Han. Shanghai: Shanghai renming chubanshe

Jiang Jinsong (1998). Cong ziren zhijing dao xinnian zhi wang ?

Rorty zhexue shuping hk ? mZ^M?n? ^ & (From the Mirror of Nature to the Net of Belief: Reviews of Rorty's Philosophy). Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe

Profile, H. (1993). "Paul K. Feyerabend: The worst enemy of science". Scientific American,

May Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. London/ New York: Cambridge

University Press

Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. London/ New York: Cambridge

University Press

Rorty, R. (2003). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (in Chinese), trans, by Li Youzheng. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan

Rorty, R. (2004). Post-Philosophical Culture (in Chinese), trans, by Huang Yong. Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe



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