a quest for inspiration in the liberal peace paradigm

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DOI: 10.1177/1354066108092306 2008; 14; 431 European Journal of International Relations

Tomas Baum A Quest for Inspiration in the Liberal Peace Paradigm: Back to Bentham?

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A Quest for Inspiration in the LiberalPeace Paradigm: Back to Bentham?

TOMAS BAUMFlemish Peace Institute, Brussels, Belgium

It is a fundamental dictum in the canon of IR theory that ‘democraciesdo not wage war against each other’. The philosopher Immanuel Kantis given credit for having originally advanced this essentially liberalresearch agenda in his essay entitled ‘Perpetual Peace’. The presentarticle intends to offer a reassessment of this view by examining Kant’scritical proposition, confronting it with the contemporary liberal per-spective of Jeremy Bentham, and evaluating its implications on policyrecommendations that are based on Kantian ideas. We will see howfundamental epistemological and ethical perspectives are the formativeprinciples of Kant’s peace essay and how these are not compatiblewith a liberal point of view. Bentham’s ‘Plan for a Universal andPerpetual Peace’ provides for a more genuine liberal inspiration. Thedifferences that exist between both philosophers will disclose a norma-tive predicament.

KEY WORDS ♦ critical philosophy ♦ democratic peace ♦ ethics ♦ liberalism ♦ political violence

The names — albeit not always the ideas — of Thucydides, Machiavelli,Hobbes, Rousseau or Kant not infrequently appear in present-day articlespublished in the paradigm of IR theory. From a rhetorical point of view,these benchmarks seem to offer well-established and recognized points ofdeparture for argumentation. At the same time, they elicit the caveat that‘accounts of a tradition serve to legitimise and circumscribe what counts asproper scholarship’ (Walker, 1993: 29). Immanuel Kant’s contributions area case in point. Between 1784 and 1795, Kant, at that time already a famousphilosopher, wrote some brief essays to oblige the general public. The last ofthese essays, entitled Perpetual Peace1 suggests, among other things, that

European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2008SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 14(3): 431–453

[DOI: 10.1177/1354066108092306]



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constitutional republics favour peaceful coexistence. This qualitative state-ment, which is based on ethical and juridical considerations, is translated bymany into the now famous dictum: ‘Democracies do not wage war againsteach other.’2 Currently, the idea of democratic peace is at a premium. Theoverall importance of the debate on democratic peace is acknowledged in thefield of IR theory (Maliniak et al., 2007: 20) and as an influential and intel-lectually useful idea found its way into foreign policy circles where it servesto justify choices already made or in the making (Fukuyama, 2006; Rice,2005; Ish-Shalom, 2006). In the current neo-liberal consensus, the associ-ated qualification often spells ‘liberal’ democratic peace: fundamental civicrights and representative government are supplemented with rights of privateproperty and access to the global market. The normative scope of the liberalapproach to democratic peace3 is the object of the following inquiry.

The War over Perpetual Peace, a comprehensive survey of (English lan-guage) interpretations of Kant’s peace essay, notes that Michael Doyle is thefirst author to mention Perpetual Peace as the intellectual forebear of the lib-eral peace phenomenon, that a large number of studies followed his ‘Kant,Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’4 (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b), and thatmany of these studies view Kant’s ideas as having laid the theoreticalgroundwork for the liberal peace claim (Easley, 2005). Doyle notes anencouraging record in relations between states with a liberal regime, observ-ing that ‘constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war withone another’. Various strategic and realistic arguments offer cogent explan-ations for the peaceful coexistence among liberal democracies, but he is look-ing for a specific argument that explains ‘the working of liberalism among itsown kind — a special pacification of “the state of war” resting on liberal-ism and nothing either more specific or more general’. To strengthen hiscase, Doyle refers to Kant as: ‘one of the greatest liberal philosophers’and ‘a source of insight, policy, and hope’ (Doyle, 1983a: 208–24). It is aninteresting question, indeed a fundamental one, whether liberal andKantian principles can readily be united. Kant can be read in ways that ques-tion the fundamental assumptions on which claims about a liberal inter-pretation are based.

A reconsideration of the arguments in Michael Doyle’s 1983 article willprove interesting, especially with regard to issues of policy. In my view, theappeal to Kant in Doyle’s liberal democratic theory falls short in the areas ofepistemology and ethics. The Kantian idea of perpetual peace is understoodas an empirical model (an unwarranted move into a critical frame of thought)and Kant’s proposals are interpreted in a way that does not conform to hisethical point of view. In addition, the roots of classic laissez-faire liberalismare traced back to Kant, whereas his texts offer inconclusive references tosubstantiate such a claim. Fortunately, a contemporary of Kant can offer the



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liberal democratic argument an alternative intellectual foundation. In the his-tory of philosophy, the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham — the foundingfather of utilitarianism — is a representative liberal thinker.

The overarching framework of my critique on Doyle’s 1983 interpretationwill be a comparison of the insights of Kant and Bentham.5 Such a compar-ison is useful for three reasons. First, both authors were Enlightenmentthinkers living in the same era and both advanced emancipatory ideas basedon the use of reason. Furthermore, Bentham also wrote on world peaceunder the title A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace.6 A comparison ofBentham’s plan and Kant’s sketch readily suggests itself. Finally, the implica-tions of the divergence between these two authors regarding epistemologicaland ethical issues will prove relevant to the current debate on liberal demo-cratic peace. In his book International Relations Theory: New NormativeApproaches, Chris Brown has confronted the Kantian perspective with aBenthamite approach. He offers an incisive judgement of the issues, yetwithout entering into a detailed reasoning of the fundamental philosophicalquestions at stake (Brown, 1992). A re-examination of the work of bothphilosophers with a view to assessing the normative and epistemologicalstarting principles of their thinking on International Relations will allow usto expose certain fallacious assumptions about basic precepts of the workingsof liberalism.

It is not surprising that the interpretation of Kant’s oeuvre is subject tomuch dispute and, indeed, we find a number of competing readings of thePerpetual Peace essay in the field of IR theory (Easley, 2005; Franceschet,2001). Over the years, several authors have modified the mainstream liberalunderstanding of Kant that is often based on an uncritical acceptance ofDoyle’s interpretation. I agree with Cecilia Lynch that Kant’s conceptions ofreason and duty play an important role in the peace essay and that these con-ceptions have been underestimated in the liberal approach. In addition,I share her concern regarding the interventionist implications of some of theanalyses (Lynch, 1994: 39–58). John MacMillan has argued convincingly thatthe predominant interpretation of Kant’s writings in the ‘inter-liberal statepeace discourse’ manifests some very un-Kantian characteristics. When advo-cating a rereading of Kant, he tries to place the notion of perpetual peaceinside a broader moral and political context. I take his suggestion to heart thatone ought to reflect on ‘the big picture’ (MacMillan, 1994: 549–62). GeorgCavallar has criticized Michael Doyle for taking Kant’s transcendental claimsas statements that can be verified empirically. According to Cavallar, thisresults in an inversion of the Kantian framework (Cavallar, 2001: 248). Wewill challenge a principal interpretation of Kant that has been seminal in theliberal democratic peace debate and is — prima facie — considered normative(Rengger, 2000: 762) yet fails to live up to its promise.




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The following argument offers contemporary theorists of liberal peace anincentive to question their own epistemological and ethical assumptions. Inview of the fact that the vocabulary we draw upon to understand and judgethe present has remained tributary to the tenets that pervade the Age ofEnlightenment (Bartelson, 1995: 262), it is beneficial to look into the the-oretical groundwork of two original thinkers of this period. The first sectionof this article offers an integrated epistemological and ethical account thatillustrates how Immanuel Kant’s peace essay can be understood in the lightof the rest of his oeuvre. And, indeed, rather to our surprise, we find our-selves in favour of elaborating on a thought of the typical Realist thinkerKenneth Waltz that there is a unity in Kant’s ideas that is hard to grasp(Waltz, 1962: 331–40). In the second section, we turn to the purer liberalthinking of Jeremy Bentham. A review of the epistemological and ethicalgroundwork is followed by a survey of his peace plan. A comparison withKant’s ideas will reveal pronounced differences. In the third section, theacquis of the former sections is used to illustrate the inaccurate reading ofPerpetual Peace by Michael Doyle. In addition, we argue for a reorientationtowards Bentham as a more suitable source of insight, policy, and hope,a source that is sensitive to the workings of liberalism among its own kindbut amalgamates empirical and normative claims.

A Guarantee for Perpetual Peace

Perpetual Peace is a plea for international co-operation at a time whenEurope was the stage for several wars aimed at maintaining or restoring thebalance of power. Although the essay is often read as a timeless plea for thesuspension of war, some elements of specifically relevant contemporaryimport in it should be stressed. Kant, who had instigated an epistemologicalrevolution with his Critique of Pure Reason, was very sympathetic towardsthe ideas that nurtured the French Revolution, albeit from a spectator’spoint of view only. During the last decade of the 18th century, the ideas bornout of the Age of Enlightenment had already gathered significant influencein the German-speaking part of Europe. Herder had written his ‘Letters con-cerning the Progress of Humanity’ in 1793, and the young Fichte producedhis ‘Contribution to the Rectification of the Public’s Judgement of theFrench Revolution’ in the same year. The publication of Kant’s PerpetualPeace in 1795 may be viewed in line with the writings of both these authorsas the culminating point in the perception of the merits of the FrenchRevolution (Gebhardt, 1965: 15). Moreover, it is very likely that the Treatyof Basle — establishing peace between authoritarian Prussia and revolution-ary France — was the occasion that prompted the publication of PerpetualPeace (Saner, 1967: 43–5; Caranti, 2006: 346). Kant modelled the sketch




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after the format of a typical 18th-century peace treaty. The first edition con-sists of a preamble, six preliminary articles, three definitive articles, and anappendix containing a guarantee. In the second edition, he added a secretarticle and a postscript on the tension between morals and politics.

The preliminary articles denounce the contemporary policies of theEuropean powers.7 Kant rejects secret agreements, territorial expansion onhereditary basis, standing armies, the contraction of national debts to financewars, interference in the internal affairs of other states, and dishonourabletactics. Prohibitive articles precede the constructive part: before lookingahead, one must look back. When looking at the future, Kant primarily seesthe potential of the ideals that nurtured the French Revolution. The firstdefinitive article — ‘The civil constitution in every state shall be republican’(204) — will thus be outspokenly inspired by the republican ideas. In rela-tion to each other, states should abide by the tenet that ‘International lawshall be based on federalism of free states’ (208), as it is stated in the seconddefinitive article. On the level of the individual citizen, Kant provides arather limited requirement in the third — and final — definitive article: ‘Thecosmopolitan law of citizenship shall be limited to conditions of generalhospitality’ (213).

The republican inspiration of the first article should not surprise us. InKant’s view, the French Revolution was ‘a sign of the reality of humanprogress, a philosophical event’ (Jaspers, 1962: 127; Bartelson, 1995: 273).Nonetheless, Kant acknowledges ‘the injustice of rebellion’ (246) and claimsthat, even should a ruler be found to be unjust, the people do not have theright to depose him by force of arms. Reason harbours a moral element thatis anchored in a legislative (227) stance. It is reason that constitutes the basisfor the engagement of the philosopher. Kant’s lifework — a description ofthe functions, limits, and the potentiality of reason — is contained in threemonumental critiques that focus on three elementary questions: What can Iknow? What shall I do? What may I hope for? The connection between thesecritiques is both the point of departure and the closing note of the guaran-tee of the perpetual peace ‘treaty’.

The guarantee of perpetual peace is provided by nothing less than that greatartist called Nature. In Nature’s mechanical progress we see that her aim is toproduce a harmony among men, against their will and actually through theirdiscord. As a necessity working according to laws we do not know, we submitto it as Destiny. But, considering its design in world history, we call itProvidence, in as much as we discern in it the profound wisdom of a highercause that predetermines the course of Nature and directs it to the objectivefinal end of mankind. We do not know or infer this Providence from the cun-ning contrivances of Nature, but, as in questions of the relation of the form ofthings to ends in general, we can and must supply it out of our own minds in




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order to conceive of its possibility by analogy to actions of human art.(217–18, emphasis added)

It is in this manner that Nature guarantees perpetual peace through themechanisms of human propensities themselves, and though the assurancewhich she gives us thereof is not sufficient to predict the advent of peace in atheoretical way, it suffices in a practical perspective and makes it our duty towork towards this (not merely a chimerical) aim. (227, emphasis added)

These quotations from the first supplement demonstrate how the entirerange of the critical philosophy informs the idea of perpetual peace. In thefirst quote, Kant emphasizes the limits of knowledge — ‘we do not knowor infer’ the existence of Providence — that lie at the centre of his Critiqueof Pure Reason’ (1781). The teleology related to ‘questions of the relation ofthe form of things to ends in general ’ is the subject of his Critique ofJudgement (1790): the idea of a divine plan opens up a perspective on thesignificance of leading a moral life. The second quote introduces the ‘prac-tical perspective’ and the concept of ‘duty’ that is central to the formal ethicsin the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In order to be able to properlyvalue the guarantee, an inquiry into Kant’s critical oeuvre is requiredsince different perspectives on the use of reason and judgement are closelyinterwoven.8

What can I know? At the end of the 18th century, the epistemologicaldebate was dominated by rationalism and empiricism, philosophical schoolsof thought of which, respectively, René Descartes and David Hume are themost famous representatives. Descartes takes universal doubt as a startingpoint to arrive at a certainty: the famous adage ‘Cogito ergo sum’. Humestarts with the certainty of sense perception to ultimately end up in univer-sal scepticism. An intermediary is found in Immanuel Kant. In his ‘Critiqueof Pure Reason’, he advances the view that one can say something about theworld that is absolutely true, before actually experiencing it, but not withouta reference to our sensory apparatus. Like Hume, he does not doubt the real-ity of sense perception. Space and time — the conditions of perception —are proverbially fixed glasses upon our noses. Kant values sense perception,but if we want to know the limits of knowledge, we need to go beyond senseperception and appeal to our rational potential. True knowledge stands ontwo legs: perception and thinking. In the relationship between these two fac-ulties, perception informs thinking and thinking informs perception. Theresult is an epistemological revolution. Whereas, previously, the hypothesiswas that a person had to penetrate reality in order to acquire knowledge, itnow appears that a person can actively subject an object to his or her ownconceptual scheme. This cognitive capacity results in true statements whenthe claims to truth confine themselves to the phenomenal world, but thisactive cognitive ability tends to pass beyond the bounds of perceived




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phenomena and excessively abstracts from reality. As a consequence, whenthe level of abstraction becomes too high, pure reason generates speculativeillusions such as attributing an existence to the ideas of a world, an Ego, orGod. Likewise, perpetual peace, or harmony between people, is a speculativeillusion, an idea that exceeds our knowledge apparatus (227). Therefore, wecannot verify whether or not we are moving in the right direction. A limita-tion on the legitimate use of reason in an epistemological perspective doesnot, however, imply a sceptical outcome. In a practical way, the ideas acquirea regulative status and an ethical dimension appears. This brings Kant toanother question: What shall I do?

Engaging in action implies making choices: we as individuals decide uponour actions. Decisions are neither true nor false, but still they are — likeknowledge — dependent on the use of reason.9 People are not only cog-nizant of their actions, they can also question them and such questioningcalls for a rational answer. The question ‘Why did I do this?’ does not referso much to the cause of my action as to the motive that precipitates it.Changes we perceive in nature are embedded in the laws of causality, but,when taking decisions, people like to think that they themselves are the orig-inators of the actions they have decided upon: the ability to decide on whatactions to take is what they refer to as their individual freedom. The essenceof Kant’s moral quest in his Critique of Practical Reason is precisely thisfreedom. Freedom cannot be fully contextualized in the world of knowledge(the world of pure reason): practical reason does not contemplate but ratherurges towards action. In an absolute mode, a motive takes the form of animperative or a moral law. The well-known categorical imperative urges arational being to ‘act only according to that maxim by which you can at thesame time will that it should become a universal law’. The categorical imper-ative is unconditional and should be distinguished from the hypotheticalimperative. The conditional nature of the latter — if you want B you mustdo A — makes this imperative unfit to act as a moral compass because itis not universally applicable and invariably dependent upon concrete cir-cumstances. Kant rejects instrumental ethics. An ethical imperative must becategorical.

The categorical imperative originates in personal autonomy, yet has toassume the character of reality in the physical world with its inherent laws ofcausality. Reason, therefore, deals with the world in two different ways: bydescribing the world conceptually and by interfering in its course (Jaspers,1962: 63; Bartelson, 1995: 264). In the first case, reason is theoretical; inthe latter, it is practical. However, this gives rise to an unbearable tension: onthe one hand, one has to avoid an excess of abstraction from a theoreticalpoint of view, while, on the other, the absolute abstraction of particular cir-cumstances becomes a necessity to our leading an ethical life.




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When we relate our moral qualities to the physical world, the human mindseems to be caught in a deadlock. Through a free play of our rational faculties,however, the idea of a teleological nature becomes accessible and bridges theworld of knowledge and the realm of ethics (Deleuze, 1995: 68). By inquir-ing into the idea of a teleological nature, we come closer to answering Kant’sthird question: What may we hope for?

The Critique of Judgement, the third critique, attempts to deal with theaforementioned tension by offering a reflection on our relation with totality.The Critique of Judgement proposes that the idea of totality exceeds our fac-ulty for knowledge but asks if such an idea might be accessible in a differentway. According to Kant, the aesthetic experiences allow a limited and mortalhuman being to gain an intuitive insight into a meaningful whole that iscalled Nature. In order to illustrate this possibility, the Critique ofJudgement’ deals with two different types of judgement: an aesthetic judge-ment and a teleological one. The first, also called a judgement of taste, aimsat universally valid recognition yet is not cognitive since it appeals to feelingsrather than to reason. Imagination can grasp an idea without formulating itconceptually. Important for our inquiry is the status of the teleologicaljudgement. Living organisms of which all parts are reciprocally both meansand ends reveal a purposiveness in nature. Mechanical principles alone do notsuffice to do justice to the particularity of living organisms, yet to speak of apurposiveness of Nature exceeds our faculty of knowledge. Nonetheless,teleological ideas can take on meaning when they are considered in analogywith creative (artistic) activities. Creative acts have a specific immanent pur-posiveness. Accordingly, we are justified in regarding Nature as if she is,indeed, the oeuvre of a creator acting according to a supernatural plan.

In the guarantee of Perpetual Peace, Kant returns to the line of reasoninghe developed in his Critique of Judgement (Cavallar, 1992: 254). Here againwe find Nature, has already become familiar to us, providing the guaranteeby visibly exhibiting a design with an inherent purposiveness. The reader ofPerpetual Peace is immediately warned of the limits of human reason by thecaveat: do not label this visible design ‘Providence’. After making the epis-temological restrictions explicit (217–19), Kant asks how Nature advances themoral propensity of men. He distinguishes three purposeful initiatives:Nature has provided man with the opportunity to live anywhere on earth;she has dispersed people all over the world and, at the same time, has forcedthem to engage to a lesser or fuller extent in lawful relations (219–22).10

Nevertheless, a teleological perspective threatens the absolute and uncondi-tional freedom required for ethical action. Consequently, Kant safeguardsfreedom from the deterministic implications of his appeal to Nature.11 Ourpractical reason is provided with a horizon, an outlook. Nature’s purposivecharacter is something that we ‘add from our own minds’ (218) in order to



make conceivable the idea of a meaningful totality. In this way, Nature cor-roborates the (speculative) idea of perpetual peace (227). Is a more adequateformulation of regulative ideas possible?

The preceding overview of the relationship between the three critiques liesrooted in the guarantee offered in the Perpetual Peace essay. According toKant, the three faculties of our rational mind are coexisting and cannot beviewed in individual isolation: our knowledge apparatus is limited in its abil-ity to deal with totality and the future, our own mind supplies the moral lawfrom within ourselves in order to engage the world as free persons, and theidea of a divine plan sustains the significance of our leading a moral life. Inthe words of Chris Brown: ‘Kant’s social philosophy is all of a piece; his inter-national theory is an essential part of his political theory, which emerges outof his moral philosophy, itself locked into his philosophy of science and purereason’ (Brown, 1992: 47). An authentic liberal view differs from thesketched-out critical endeavour, which brings us to the point where it isinstructive to take a look at the work of Jeremy Bentham, a classicliberal thinker.

The Desirability of Universal Peace

Like Kant’s critical undertaking, Jeremy Bentham’s liberal project is based onepistemological and ethical foundations. Bentham did not develop a newepistemological approach but, instead, built on the work of John Locke —as Hume did — and radicalized these ideas under the influence of the Frenchsensualist Helvetius (Mack, 1969: xvii). His moral and juridical thinking isgreatly informed by his empirical orientation. Sense perception is the sourceof all ideas, impressions, or knowledge. Bentham does not doubt the exis-tence of an objective outer world. However, the formulation of propositionsabout this world is much more problematic: every general proposition goingbeyond the particularity of an observation is a fiction. According toBentham, all general propositions suggest that there exists somethingbeyond what actually exists in reality. Language causes deception out of herown nature by having us assume a relation between words and entities. Someentities that we discuss as if they actually do exist are not always part of thesensible world. For instance, through force of habit, when triggered by aname, the mind may conceive of an object and automatically take its exis-tence for granted. The name gives the object an identity and acts as a certi-fication of its actual reality, which subsequently may well lead to dispute andanimosity. How to avoid this entanglement? Language analysis brings uscloser to a verifiable truth. Most of the concepts in science (e.g. movement,rest, and quality), morals (e.g. good and obligation), and the juridicalsphere (e.g. power and law) are precisely fictive entities, and issues of great


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importance are dependent upon the meaning of these words. Bentham pro-poses that fictive entities used in ethical, political, and juridical discourseshould be imbued with a clear and univocal meaning.

According to Bentham (Bentham, 1977: 495), the method of expositionor paraphrase provides a proper instrument to rid ourselves of the impuritiesthat contaminate the relationship between language and reality. When con-fronted with a word signifying a fictive entity, we should construe it into aproposition in order to clarify its meaning in the context within which it isbeing used. Subsequently, we reformulate this proposition into another onethat contains a reference to a real entity and that will render its meaning veri-fiable. The exposition of obligation is illustrative. The word obligation is, perse, a fictitious notion. Turned into a proposition, it might read as follows:‘An obligation is incumbent on a man’ (Harrison, 1983: 57–9). The para-phrase means: ‘An obligation weighs upon a man’. The meaning of obliga-tion is now observable: something heavy weighs upon a man so that he isrestricted in his movement. A fictitious notion is thus translated into a con-cept that is empirically grounded. Normative statements are deduced from —or reduced to — empirical statements. According to Bentham, expositionmakes ethical and juridical discourse more scientific. The interconnectednessof the different faculties of our rational mind is a given fact. ‘[G]reat is thelight thrown upon the whole field of logic, and thereby over the whole fieldof art and science, more especially the psychical, and thence the ethical ormoral branch of science’ (Bentham, 2000a).

Sensory perception is not only the source of knowledge; it is also the ref-erent for ethical action in Bentham’s perspective. His anthropological start-ing point is simple: human beings strive for the experience of pleasure andthe avoidance of pain. The empirical character of this starting point istwofold: Bentham has found that this proposition is verifiably true and thatethical action has an empirical foundation. However, I can only experiencepleasure through my own senses and a propensity towards self-interest is thenatural consequence. The impressions of others are not directly verifiableand thus less real to me. Every person can, however, value his/her own feel-ings subjectively and express this valuation vis-a-vis other people. Bentham’sethic will incorporate a social component on the basis of subjective appreci-ation. The quintessence of this moral and political perspective is contained inthe famous phrase ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ (Bentham,1977: 393). How this should be realized is explained in ‘An Introduction tothe Principles of Morals and Legislation’, Bentham’s central work publishedin 1789. The well-being of society is perceived as the sum of the well-beingof its individual members, and the enhancement of this well-being is a taskto be pursued by the individual as well as by the entire community. Self-interest properly conceived, that is to say, an enlightened self-interest, entails




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the awareness that individual actions fit within a bigger whole and that pureegoism serves no beneficial purpose. In the review of Bentham’s epistemol-ogical starting principle, we learned that the ethical and juridical discourse isinterspersed with fictive entities and that we should verify their meaning inorder to bring clarity to the concept. Once the terms have been clarified,a quantitative scientific formula to weigh the desirability of an action can bedrawn up. Bentham develops a moral arithmetic on a rational basis. Thevalue of pleasure or pain can be assessed by an individual and subsequentlyis assigned a positive or negative quantitative mark. In the first instance,intensity, duration, (in)certitude, and distance are the relevant parameters;fertility and purity are considered next. The social dimension is simply intro-duced by taking into account the number of people being affected and theeffect on the balance of their well-being (Bentham, 1970: 38–41). If allvalues are known, it then becomes merely a matter of calculation. That allinterests will harmonize within the bigger whole is an assumption. A propermoral action is the result of a rational calculation; an immoral action, on theother hand, is just the consequence of a misinterpreted self-interest.Nevertheless, the principle of utility rests upon a consequential validation: anaction is not judged by valuing its underlying intention or the meansemployed to pursue it, but rather by examining its resulting consequences.12

This refers to the hypothetical imperative — if you want B to happen, youshould do A — a position that Kant rejects.

In Bentham’s view, the relation between morals and legislation should bevery intimate. The philosopher and the jurist enter into an agreement:through education, the philosopher will try to promote the understandingand acceptance of the principle of utility, while the jurist (the representativeof the sovereign) will sanction the misunderstood self-interest by means ofcorrective action. The element that vindicates the pact between philosopherand jurist is their mutual reliance on empirical elements. Seen from an epis-temological perspective, one needs to deal with the real (verifiable) entity. Inan ethical perspective, people are characterized as being affective in two ways:pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. A utilitarian approach justifies the useof violence as long as, ultimately, the sum of happiness increases. Moreover,committing violence may be necessary because, as a rational being, one isexpected to promote the general well-being. With regard to the dispositionof the use of violence, Kant explicitly recognizes a distinction between thephilosopher and the jurist. Does not the disposition of power act upon one’sinclination to pass an objective judgement on the merits of arguments? (228).The reality of power makes discussion a mere optional tool and it seems quitesuperfluous to question the right of the stronger. The foregoing illustratesthe danger of the convergence of normative and empirical claims into onedimension. By acknowledging the difference between ‘knowing something’




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and ‘knowing what to do’, Kant retains the possibility of questioning theright of the stronger. Bentham deduces the normative from the empirical. Indoing so, he pays a price: the ruling power is above questioning; it can onlybe instrumentally countered by another power. The consequences of such aconfrontation will show which side can subsequently claim the right of thestronger. Yet, Kant will expose the instrumental line of reasoning as thesophist maxim ‘Fac et excusa’13 and renounce it: to avoid sophist maxims,normative claims have to pass beyond their empirical conditions.

Both Bentham and Kant take the potential for emancipation as a qualitythat is universal to all human beings. To Kant, the emancipation starts froma moral claim that recognizes the principle of freedom, while Bentham startsfrom the recognition of a self-interest properly conceived. An immoral act is,in the perspective of enlightened self-interest, a mere miscalculation. Theindividual has misjudged the entire situation and if he/she had only beenaware that act X would have had Z as an unintended consequence followingthe impact of Y, the intended consequence, the rational consideration wouldhave been based on a different approach. It is precisely Kant’s understandingthat totality as such surpasses our understanding. The idea of freedom asadvocated in the Critique of Practical Reason is complemented by the ideaof a teleological nature, thus providing the individual with a horizon to looktowards: Kant’s perpetual peace is an idea allowing for a hopeful vision of thefuture. Inspired by a more pragmatic spirit, Bentham prefers a plan.

‘A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace’, Bentham’s vision of thefuture, translates the utilitarian framework into an international context. Theutility of universal and perpetual peace is beyond doubt: it will advance gen-eral welfare. Bentham’s proposals are intended to inform policy and arespecifically directed at the two hegemonic powers, i.e. Great Britain andFrance: ‘The ensuing sheets are dedicated to the common welfare of all civ-ilized nations; but more particularly of Great Britain and France’ (Bentham,2000b: 1). This stands in sharp contrast with Kant, who addressed his pleato all states and their citizens. The preliminary articles of Kant’s essay arethus framed in general terms (e.g. ‘No state shall by force interfere witheither the constitution or government of another state’), whereas Bentham’sproposals are advanced in the terms of an enlightened self-interest of thehegemonic power (e.g. ‘That it is not the interest of Great Britain to haveany foreign dependencies whatsoever’). Self-interest properly conceived, andlikewise the principles of utility, remain the leitmotivs throughout Bentham’speace plan. From an ethical point of view, Bentham does not doubt that ina larger framework the interests of individuals harmonize. In an internationalcontext, Bentham defends the idea of free trade. In essence, his peace plan isa plea for the free market: all trade is essentially advantageous, even for theparty for which it is less advantageous (Bentham, 2000b: 6–9). Kant’s peace




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essay, by contrast, advocates an international juridical framework by means ofdefinitive articles for perpetual peace: the civil constitution in every state shallbe republican; international law shall be based on the federalism of freestates; and the cosmopolitan law of citizenship shall be limited to conditionsof general hospitality. The spirit of commerce and the role of trade are men-tioned in Perpetual Peace as providing a counterbalance to war and conflict,but without their being developed in detail.14 Specifically within the contextof the guarantee, we have to keep in mind that the briefly mentioned rela-tion between trade and war serves as an illustration of the purposive charac-ter of Nature and remains marginal to the general argument.

In more abstract terms, the difference between Kant and Bentham (andthe relevance of the inquiry at hand) revolves around the possibility of nor-mative judgements. Kant separates the order of knowing and the order ofacting in order to subsequently blend them again in an intuitive under-standing of a meaningful totality. The concept of hope has a substantialmeaning in his discourse: it represents an anticipating desire for a betterworld, and this in spite of a double limitation: with regard to knowledge,totality escapes us and, with respect to our actions, we often become con-scious of the negligible impact of our personal involvement in the world thatsurrounds us. The intuitive insight into the possibility of a better world sup-ports the idea of personal freedom as the normative standard for action. Thepact between empiricism and utilitarianism, resulting in the quantification ofnormative data and accompanied by a belief in the laws of the market,reduces all findings in Bentham’s programme to only one dimension.Empirical verification is both the motto of his epistemological starting pointand the basis for his ethics. The order of the verifiable offers the only stan-dard for an ethical life in which the anticipated impact stipulates the desir-ability of an action. On the one hand, Bentham objectively observes thatpeople pursue pleasure and seek to avoid pain. On the other hand, thisobjective observation becomes — without further ado — a normative andguiding principle for action.

A discussion about the normative side of the issue is avoided by an empha-sis on verifiable elements. The normative aspect is the concealed premise ofa pact that requires the actor to be objective, rational, and scientific in orderto realize the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.Bentham’s hope can only be translated in observed success, perceived asbeing a conformity with an arbitrarily chosen model. On the personal level,a utilitarian can only hope that his perceived interest is properly conceived,as the instruments to engage in critical reflection concerning the future aremissing. Somewhat simplified, this means that reflection is not useful andthat rational assessment means quantifying verifiable sensations. Especially inthe ethical realm, the pre-eminently normative dimension and limitations of




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Bentham’s liberal ethic become clear. If the utilitarian is mistaken, his erroris confined to only a miscalculation and the end result is a decrease in thenet sum of good fortune in the world. Frequently, others pay the price forhis mistake. The loss of momentum of utilitarian approaches becomes obvi-ous when violence becomes an element in the assessment of the means to anend and it can no longer be rejected. A violent action that ought to beavoided in one case because of the pain it causes may suddenly be judgedacceptable — or even worse, necessary — within the same logic. For all ofhis ignorance, the utilitarian cannot escape intervening in any of the areaswhere he thinks happiness can be promoted. It is peculiar that, takentogether, four constitutive liberal elements (empiricism, utilitarianism, quan-tification of normatively informed data, and a belief in the working of themarket) guarantee a pact that does not allow for discord between epistemo-logical and ethical questioning. This is a discord that, as we have seen, is con-stitutive for Kant’s approach. Ultimately, this will imply that the notion ofhope will become redundant in a liberal logic.15

In spite of its sceptical potential empiricism, the epistemological basis ofsocial hedonism entails a belief in instrumental rationality. However, onecannot reduce the moral field to instrumental control or the wish to achieveit. Empiricism, utilitarianism, the quantifying of normative data, and a beliefin the functioning of the market become complementary concepts thatinform each other reciprocally and avoid normative and reflective judge-ments. The foregoing exposition showed two different paradigms, bothrooted in ideas of Enlightenment and advancing the possibility of emancipa-tion through the use of reason. Universal rationality gains a distinct positionand is given an interpretation in the oeuvre of both authors, and the impli-cations of their divergences are significant for our understanding of therespective peace essays.

Bentham, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs

The work of Jeremy Bentham expresses a somewhat crude form of laissez-faire liberalism, but the liberal body of thought cannot distance itself com-pletely from the work of one of its founding fathers.16 The tradition of liberaldemocracy was first of all liberal (aimed at checking state power over society),and then democratic (aimed at the creation of structures that provided hold-ers of state power with a mandate of the people) (Sorensen, 1993: 5).Throughout their history, theories on liberal democracies have been troubledby this dual inheritance, leading to two strands of thought: laissez-faire liber-alism and social-welfare liberalism. It seems to be a constant feature that themore liberal a theory is, the less democratic it becomes. It is illustrative thatBentham modifies the democratic character of his own project to the point




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where a restriction of universal suffrage is not a fundamental problem(Macpherson, 1977: 34–7).

Liberalism can be understood in political and philosophical terms and hasacquired a broad meaning. However, one principle seems essential to allforms of liberalism: ‘the importance of the freedom of the individual’(Doyle, 1983a: 206). In Doyle’s view, this principle is safeguarded by a com-mitment to three rights: negative freedom, positive freedom, and democraticparticipation. According to Doyle, the success of liberalism in the domesticrealm remains undisputed. Four institutional roots mitigate the tensions thatexist among the different interests in society: fundamental civic rights, rep-resentative government, the rights of private property, and the free market.On the international level, relations between states with a liberal regimeshow an encouraging record, for it is found that ‘constitutionally secure lib-eral states have yet to engage in war with one another’. Various strategic andrealistic arguments may well explain the peaceful co-existence of liberaldemocracies, but Doyle seeks a specific argument that explains ‘the workingof liberalism among its own kind — a special pacification of “the state ofwar” resting on liberalism and nothing either more specific or more general’.To strengthen his case, Doyle appeals to Kant as being ‘one of the greatestliberal philosophers’ (Doyle, 1983a: 206). But is it not rather Bentham whois to be credited with inspiring the liberal discourse?

Doyle’s argument contains substantial formal and intrinsic elements thatrelate his work to the oeuvre of Bentham. In a methodological perspective,he agrees with the latter in applying a quantitative approach to a normativeinquiry. The emphasis on the working of the free market economy, as foundin Doyle’s article, is also a particular feature of Bentham’s peace proposal. Asthe latter’s liberal precursor, Doyle adopts the perspective of the hegemonicpower, and his text shows a clear preference for utilitarian reasoning. Beforeexamining his liberal position, we should analyse where his interpretation ofKant went wrong.

A central issue in Doyle’s ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’ isthe maintenance and gradual expansion of a peaceful liberal zone (Doyle,1983a: 213–15). Empirical verification does not suffice and Doyle turns toKant who allegedly argued ‘that Perpetual Peace will be guaranteed by theever-widening acceptance of the three “definitive articles” of peace’ (Doyle,1983a: 225). In the original essay we find, however, that Nature guaranteesthe idea of perpetual peace. As we have argued, Kant’s teleological view onNature bridges the gap between knowledge and action. By ignoring Kant’sown guarantee, Doyle is unable to value the merit of the critical elementthat permeates the essay. His analysis is unable to account for Kant’s strongnormative understanding, which is related to a bigger whole. In his secondarticle, Doyle argues that ‘international peace is not a utopian ideal to be




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reached . . . it is a condition that liberal states have already experienced intheir relations with each other’ (Doyle, 1983b: 349). The success of liberalregimes, both on the domestic and global fronts, proves, according to Doyle,that Kant’s predictions have become reality. On the basis of the observedliberal success, Doyle unravels the secret plan of Mother Nature and is able,with the help of a pacific calculus, to predict global peace in 2113 at theearliest (Doyle, 1983b: 352). Kant, for his part, considered it irrelevant toengage in a quantitative scientific debate on peace since the speculative ideaof peace provides a horizon for a meaningful moral life.

The fallacy of Doyle’s interpretation becomes clearly noticeable whenDoyle deals with the moral element: in his view, the possibility of perpetualpeace constitutes a plea urging us towards a moral obligation (Doyle, 1983a:228). This is a plain reversal of the Kantian logic: according to Kant, themoral imperative should not aim at an end. The categorical imperativereveals the absolute inner freedom that ought to transcend the het-eronomous character of the empirical world. When one takes the verifiablepossibility of peace as a starting point, one cannot escape the conditions dic-tated by the world as we know it. The categorical imperative, however, isunconditional. Doyle formulates his normative device in utilitarian terms:‘the goal of concerned liberals must be to reduce the harmful impact of thedilemmas without undermining the successes’ (Doyle, 1983b: 344). As aconclusion to Doyle’s Kant interpretation, we note that Kant pays someattention to trade and commerce in the Perpetual Peace essay, but acceptinghim as a proponent or representative of laissez faire liberalism, as Doylewould like us to (Doyle, 1983a: 208), seems a bridge too far.

The more we find Doyle’s views deviating from a Kantian perspective, themore striking becomes the resulting correspondence with the spirit ofBentham.17 The pacific calculus can be related to Bentham’s moral calculus.A continuous growth of the number of liberal democracies is measured withthe help of arbitrary18 parameters, but the qualitative dimensions perish inthe course of the measuring process.19 At the end of the 18th century, Doylecounts three liberal democracies, and in 1978 he already identifies 49. Thelist contains, among other states, France during the Reign of Terror, and theUnited States as of 1865 (Doyle, 1983a: 209–12), just about a centurybefore the Rosa Parks incident. These regimes do not live up to liberaldemocratic standards as advanced at the outset of the article. In his neglectof the qualitative dimension, Bentham also leads the way: he altered thedemocratic character of his undertaking for the sake of expediency(Macpherson, 1977: 34–7). This quantitative approach allows coveringup the blurring of qualitative distinctions in a scientific way because all therelevant data have to fit the verification mould to be counted, and theirsubstantial content and meaning is lost in the process.




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The emphasis on the workings of the free market as found in Bentham’splan also informs Doyle’s endeavour to a great extent (Doyle, 1983b: 347).By emphasizing that liberal principles should inform domestic and foreignpolicy, Doyle, in taking the laissez-faire position, proves himself theoreticallyvery consistent. Within liberal political theory, there is an ongoing debatebetween authentic liberals and proponents of a social correction. The dis-cussion concerns the desirability of a minimal framework (the vigilant state)or a maximal one (fostering participatory abilities). While Doyle first gives anencompassing definition of liberalism that harbours both views, he subse-quently tries to find common elements in order to proceed with the analysis(Doyle, 1983a: 207–8). In doing so, he reduces liberalism to its minimal def-inition and accounts only for the laissez-faire version. This becomes patentlyclear when he discusses the normative claims advanced by welfare liberalsconcerning poverty in the world. Every claim is confronted with empiricalconditions that make action impossible or inconvenient (Doyle, 1983b:338–42). The formulation of the desirable is subordinated to the knowledgeof the possible. Consequently, Doyle, like Bentham, adopts the perspectiveof the hegemonic power. There exists a zone of peace and cooperation thatcollaborates under US leadership, and foreign policy needs to envisage theexpansion of this zone, although he does add the rider that ‘The interests ofthe United States must be consistent with its principles’ (Doyle, 1983b:344–5). In a utilitarian logic, however, interests play a decisive part in thedecision-making process and often supersede a more principled approach.

The quest for the workings of liberalism among its own kind takes placewithin the boundaries of what I have called an empirical pact.20 The article‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’ does not explicitly deal with allthe elements of this pact, but, nevertheless, we see the heritage of the classicraw liberalism of Bentham still playing a significant role. Starting from thecomparison of the ideas of Kant and Bentham, we can identify the normativeimport of liberal thought more adequately. Liberals consider it their respon-sibility to promote democracy in the world; by doing so they promote peace,and peace is one of the most fundamental of political values (Jackson andSorensen, 2003: 121). Yet, in a consideration of the means to realize it, peacedoes not always prove itself to be such a fundamental value. Notwithstandingsome inherent awareness of responsibility, liberalism is stuck with an inabilityto be truly normative.

Concluding Remarks

On the basis of the sketched-out differences in the epistemological and eth-ical approaches, one senses the mutually exclusive nature of the notions ofhope and plan. The disparity between ‘knowing something’ and ‘knowing




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what to do’ is relevant for our relationship with a totality that cannot be fullycomprehended or mastered. When we remain conscious of our limitations,hope can still be a meaningful horizon for personal involvement. When‘knowing something’ and ‘knowing what to do’ coincide, the future becomesjust a plan that calls for completion. In this case, we are left with the expect-ation of a linear progress that has to be realized on the basis of what we canverify empirically as feasible at the present time. Unfortunately, we have noview of totality and, insofar as the existing power relations determine the cur-rent state of affairs, they also inform the ways of the world. But what dothe words hope and freedom mean when the existing power relations arevindicated or sanctified? An update of Kant’s oeuvre should account forcritical and ethical concerns. In the final section of his Perpetual Peace, Kantreiterates that perpetual peace is not an empty idea: ‘If we are summoned tothe task, if there exists a realistic hope of attaining the state of public law,albeit only in an approximation yet ever near and pressing, then perpetualpeace . . . is not an empty idea, but an assignment’ (251). This final consid-eration can only be interpreted in a meaningful way when the scope of thethree critiques is taken into full account. The idea of Nature offers an intui-tive insight into a meaningful horizon for human action and a juridical idealsupports moral autonomy.

‘Whereas for Bentham the future of international relations looks like plainsailing, to Kant it suggested the toughest of voyages — inescapable, impera-tive, yet with some hope of safety — across a literally endless sea.’ These wordsare used by W.B Gallie to illustrate that Kant is a deeper thinker than Bentham(Gallie, 1978: 35–6) and we can unreservedly agree. In addition, Bentham’sphilosophy reflects the thrust of the liberal argument better than the Kantianflag that is generally used by liberal scholars, as became clear in the analysis ofMichael Doyle’s article. The liberal inheritance must be seen for what it is:a vision that is unable to question its own assumptions and replaces the nor-mative debate concerning the desirability of certain objectives by a descriptivedebate on the feasibility of its model. Kant does not make a good liberal. Theimplications of the divergence between Bentham and Kant are far-reaching:liberals will find it hard to distance themselves from the work of Bentham andwill have a hard time accounting for the normative intent of Kant’s ethic.

The contrast between the Benthamite and the Kantian approach becomespatently obvious when we consider how both philosophers understand theirown roles. In Bentham’s view the philosopher and the jurist — the latterbeing the representative of the sovereign — enter into an agreement: byeducative means, the philosopher will try to promote the understanding andacceptance of the principle of utility, while the jurist will sanction the misun-derstood self-interest by corrective action. Power, policy, and advice areclosely interwoven. Kant’s essay Perpetual Peace contains a secret article




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(227–8) that amounts to a performative contradiction. But through it, Kantis able to exemplify the role of the philosopher. Whereas the ability to exer-cise control over power guarantees the existing order, it does so by ultimatelyrelying on the use of violence; on the other hand, there is the considerationthat power corrupts, which turns the use of violence into an element in thedeliberation of interests. The ability to exercise power interferes with theuntrammelled judgement of reason. It is hard to call into question the rightexercised by the victor in a conflict or the legitimacy of the hegemonic state.The objective reality of power and violence makes all advice an optionalrecourse only and the philosopher is reduced to playing the mere role of aservant. But a servant can serve his mistress in various ways: he can precedehis mistress and carry the torch, or he can follow her and bear her train. Theway in which Immanuel Kant, the pre-eminent philosopher of the Age ofEnlightenment, wants to serve is fairly unambiguous.

Notes

I would like to thank Ido Oren, Andreas Benkhe, Beate Jahn, the research staff at theFlemish Peace Institute and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

1. Citations in the text are translated from the German original ‘Zum ewigenFrieden’ (Kant, 1968: 195–251). References to the pages are in bracketsthroughout the text. Various English translations were consulted.

2. The motto is supported by historical evidence and even aspires to the status ofan empirical law in international politics (Levy, 1988: 662).

3. The concept of ‘liberal democratic peace’ will be the main focus of this article,though some of the arguments are also valid to support the discussion on relatedconcepts such as ‘republican peace’, ‘stable peace’ and ‘separate peace’.

4. Doyle has repeated his main theses about Kant on a regular basis; his interpret-ation of Kant did not change substantially. See Doyle (1997: 251–300) andCavallar (2001: 230).

5. Beate Jahn has explained how the liberal research agenda has very un-Kantiancharacteristics and she finds a forebear in the work of John Stuart Mill. See Jahn(2005: 177–207). It is worth noting that Jeremy Bentham was the intellectualgodfather of Mill and that the lineage can thus be traced back further as I amdoing in this article.

6. The published plan is a synthesis of three original essays by Bentham’s first pub-lisher John Bowring. See Hoogensen (2001).

7. For a detailed account of these policies, see Schroeder (1994: 100–50).8. Authors arguing for comprehensive interpretations of Kant’s critical oeuvre are,

among others, Bartelson (1995), Cavallar (1992), Jaspers (1962), Deleuze(1995), Saner (1967), Gerhardt (1995), and Renaut (1997).

9. There is a difference between knowing a verifiable truth and knowing whatto do.




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10. Juridical aspects will form an essential regulative complement to the moral per-spective. Man is by nature a rational — and thus — an ethical being and on thisbasis enters into lawful relationships. When practical reason wants to be normativein an external world, a juridical frame is needed. When he proposes the threedefinitive articles in Perpetual Peace, Kant describes an ideal institutional struc-ture to relate different actors, people, and states on a world scale. A treatment ofthe relation between morality and law can be found in Cavallar (1992, 2001),Kersting (1992) and Gerhardt (1995).

11. The ethical perspective is central in the composition of the peace essay. ‘Seek firstthe kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and your end (theblessing of perpetual peace) will necessarily follow’ (240). The paraphrase ofMatthew 6:33, ‘But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; andall these things shall be added unto you’, means that respect for the moral lawreplaces respect for God. The ethical dimension of the relation to a totality thatgoes beyond our theoretical understanding is thus emphasized.

12. The essence of a utilitarian validation of action is the phrase ‘the end justifies themeans’. A different assessment is articulated in the phrase ‘the ends and themeans justify the means’ (Honderich, 2006).

13. ‘First act and then proffer an excuse. Seize the favorable opportunity of usurpinga right. After the action, its justification will be made with greater ease and ele-gance and the violence can be extenuated’ (Kant, 1968: 236).

14. The labelling of Kant as a proponent of the idea that free trade is a condition forpeace is a tempting but perilous move. Herewith three considerations that callfor further attention: (1) acknowledgement of peaceful relational aspects of tradeas can be found in ‘Perpetual Peace’ is one thing, endorsement of free trade as ameans to peace is another; (2) in Kant’s ‘Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point ofView’ we find that the spirit of commerce causes hate and is in itself asocial; (3) inthe ‘Critique of Judgment’ we find that the commercial spirit brings with it adebasing self-interest and tends to degrade the character of the nation. However,in the structure of the argument developed here it suffices to assert that, insummo, Kant’s Peace essay is not a plea for free trade.

15. Norberto Bobbio argues that within the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition utili-tarianism and liberalism were to proceed in parallel ‘from the time of Benthamonwards, with utilitarianism becoming the major theoretical ally of the liberalstate’ (Bobbio, 2005: 58).

16. Doyle has engaged with Bentham’s legacy but focuses in a rather brief treatmenton the way this approach complements Locke’s legal institutionalism. The utili-tarian line of reasoning and the epistemological background are not questioned(Doyle, 1997: 226–8).

17. On the arbitrary nature of parameters, see (Goenner, 2004: 592). IdoOren found that ‘the current empirical measures of democracy came to beselected through a subtle historical process, whereby objective dimensions inwhich America resembled its enemies were eliminated, whereas those on whichAmerica differed the most from its enemies became privileged’ (Oren, 1995:147–84).




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18. The insignificance of the liberal peace claim in quantitative terms has beenexposed by Spiro (1994: 50–86). He develops an idea formulated by JohnMearsheimer: ‘democracies have been few in number over the past two centuriesand thus there have not been many cases where two democracies were in a pos-ition to fight each other’ (Mearsheimer, 1990: 50–1). It is very peculiar that theidea of ‘socialist pacification’ is not investigated by Doyle (Doyle, 1983a: 222)precisely because socialist societies are too limited in numbers.

19. John MacMillan notes a tendency towards homogenization of domestic politicalsystems in the liberal discourse (MacMillan, 1994: 553). One could go furtherand argue that the homogenization of epistemology and morals is an underlyingprinciple. It is noteworthy in this perspective that Bentham’s plan aspired tobring ‘universal’ and perpetual peace.

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a quest for inspiration in the liberal peace paradigm

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