a. proposals for strengthening world peacecdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/chapter_pdf/1950yun/1950_p1...a....

III. Political and Security Questions

A. PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING WORLD PEACE

1. Uniting for Peace

The item "United Action for Peace" was in-cluded in the agenda of the fifth session of theGeneral Assembly on the request of the UnitedStates delegation. It was considered by the Assem-bly's First Committee at its 354th to 371st meet-ings from 9 to 21 October, and by the Assemblyat its 299th to 302nd plenary meetings from1 to 3 November 1950.1

a. CONSIDERATION IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE

The Committee had before it five draft reso-lutions: one submitted by Chile (A/C.1/575);one submitted jointly by Canada, France, thePhilippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom, theUnited States and Uruguay (A/C.1/576); twosubmitted by the USSR (A/C.1/579, A/C.1/580)offered principally as a substitute for particularparts of the joint draft resolution; and one sub-mitted jointly by Iraq and Syria (A/C.1/585).The joint seven-Power draft resolution and theUSSR draft resolutions formed the basis of thegeneral discussion in the Committee, the Iraqi-Syrian draft resolution being discussed separately.

(1) Joint Seven-Power Draft Resolution

Amendments to the joint seven-Power draftresolution were proposed by Greece (A/C.1/577),Lebanon (A/C.1/578), Egypt (A/C.1/581), Yu-goslavia (A/C.1/582), the USSR (A/C.1/583)and Israel (A/C.1/584).

At the Committee's 363rd meeting on 13 Oc-tober a seven-Power revised draft resolution(A/C.1/576/Rev.1) was submitted, which incor-porated certain parts of the amendments proposedby Egypt, Greece, Lebanon and Yugoslavia andcontained a new section (E) which embodied theprinciples set forth in the Chilean draft resolu-tion (A/C.1/575).

The text of the revised seven-Power resolutionfollows:2

The General Assembly,Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the

United Nations are:

"To maintain international peace and security, and tothat end: to take effective collective measures for theprevention and removal of threats to the peace, and forthe suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches ofthe peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and inconformity with the principles of justice and interna-tional law, adjustment or settlement of international dis-putes or situations which might lead to a breach of thePeace", and

"To develop friendly relations among nations basedon respect for the3 principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriatemeasures to strengthen universal peace",

Finding that international tension exists on a dan-gerous scale,

Recalling its Resolution 290(IV) entitled, "Essentialsof Peace", which states that disregard of the Principlesof the Charter of the4 United Nations is primarily re-sponsible for the continuance of international tension,and desiring to contribute further to the objectives ofthat resolution,

Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by theSecurity Council of its primary responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and security, and theduty of the permanent members to seek unanimity andto exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the agree-ments for armed forces provided for in Article 43 ofthe Charter belongs to the Security Council and desiringto ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agree-ments, the United Nations have at its disposal means formaintaining international peace and security,

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to dis-charge its responsibilities on behalf of all the MemberStates, particularly those referred to in the two precedingparagraphs, does not relieve Member States of theirobligations or the United Nations of its responsibilityunder the Charter to maintain international peace andsecurity,

Recognizing in particular that such failure does notdeprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it

1 At its 371st meeting on 21 Oct., the Committeeagreed to the suggestion of the representative of Chilethat the agenda item "Strengthening of democratic prin-ciples as a means of contributing to the maintenance ofuniversal peace", proposed by his delegation, should bewithdrawn as it was covered in a resolution adopted bythe Committee. See p. 190.

2 Phrases have been italicized (other than initial wordsof paragraphs) and footnotes have been added editoriallyto indicate changes incorporated from the amendmentsof various delegations.

3 4 Incorporating amendment (A/C.1/578, points 1& 2) by Lebanon.

182 Yearbook of the United Nations

of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to themaintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that discharge by the General Assemblyof its responsibilities in these respects calls for possi-bilities of observation which would ascertain the factsand expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forceswhich could be used collectively; and for the possibilityof timely recommendation by the General Assembly toUnited Nations Members for collective action which, tobe effective, should be prompt,

1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because oflack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails toexercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security in any case where thereappears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace,or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall con-sider the matter immediately with a view to makingappropriate recommendations to Members for collectivemeasures, including in the case of a breach of the peaceor act of aggression the use of armed force when neces-sary, to maintain or restore international peace and secu-rity.5 If not in session at the time, the General Assemblymay meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency spe-cial session shall be called if requested by the SecurityCouncil on the vote of any seven members, or by amajority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. Adopts for this purpose the revisions in its rulesof procedure set forth in the annex to this resolution;

B

3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission, whichfor the calendar years 1951 and 1952 shall be composedof representatives of (9-14 Members), and which couldobserve and report on the situation in any area wherethere exists international tension the continuance ofwhich is likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-tional peace and security. Upon the invitation or withthe consent of the state into whose territory the Com-mission would go, the General Assembly, or the InterimCommittee when the Assembly is not in session, mayutilize the Commission if the Security Council is notexercising the functions assigned to it by the Charterwith respect to the matter in question. Decisions toutilize the Commission shall be made upon the affirma-tive vote of two-thirds of the members present andvoting. The Security Council may also utilize the Com-mission in accordance with its authority under the Char-ter;

4. The Commission shall have authority in its dis-cretion to appoint subcommissions and to utilize theservices of observers to assist it in the performance of itsfunctions;

5. Recommends to all governments and authoritiesthat they cooperate with the Commission and assist it inthe performance of its functions;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide thenecessary staff and facilities, utilizing where directed bythe Commission the United Nations panel of field ob-servers envisaged in resolution 297(IV) B;

7. Invites each Member of the United Nations tosurvey its resources in order to determine the nature and

scope of the assistance it may be in a position to renderin support of any recommendations of the SecurityCouncil or the General Assembly for the restoration ofinternational peace and security;

8. Recommends to the Members of the UnitedNations that each Member maintain within its na-tional armed forces elements so trained, organized, andequipped6 that they could promptly be made available,in accordance with their respective constitutional pro-cesses, for service as a United Nations unit or units,upon recommendation by the Security Council or Gen-eral Assembly without prejudice to the use of suchelements in exercise of the right of individual or collec-tive self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. Invites the Members of the United Nations toinform the Collective Measures Committee as soon aspossible of the measures taken in implementation of thepreceding paragraph;7

10. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, withthe approval of the Committee provided for in para-graph 11, a panel of military experts who could bemade available upon request of Member States whichwish to obtain technical advice regarding the organiza-tion, training, and equipment for prompt service asUnited Nations units of the elements referred to inparagraph 8;

D

11. Establishes a Collective Measures Committee con-sisting of representatives of (10—14) Members anddirects the Committee, in consultation with the Secre-tary-General and with Member States as the Committeefinds appropriate,8 to study and make a report to theSecurity Council and the General Assembly, not laterthan 1 September 1951, on methods, including those ofpart C of this resolution, which might be used to main-tain and strengthen international peace and security9 inaccordance with the Purposes and Principles of theCharter, taking account of collective self-defense andregional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Char-ter);

12. Recommends to all Members that they co-operatewith the Committee and assist it in the performance ofits functions;10

13. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish thestaff and facilities necessary for the effective accomplish-ment of the purposes set forth in parts C and D of thisresolution;

14. The General Assembly, in adopting the proposalsset forth above, is fully conscious that enduring peace

5 Incorporating part of Yugoslav amendment (A/C.1/-582).

6 Incorporating Egyptian amendment (A/C.1/581,point 1).

7 Incorporating Greek amendment (A/C.1/577).8 Incorporating Egyptian amendment (A/C.1/581,

point 2) .9 Incorporating Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/578,

point 4).10 Incorporating Egyptian amendment (A/C.1/581.

point 4).11 Incorporating principles of Chilean draft resolution

(A/C.1/575).

A

E11

C

Political and Security Questions 183

will not be secured solely by collective security arrange-ments against breaches of international peace and acts ofaggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace dependsalso upon the observance of all the principles and pur-poses established in the Charter of the United Nations,and especially upon respect for and observance of humanrights and fundamental freedoms for all and on theestablishment and maintenance of conditions of economicand social well-being in all countries; and accordingly

15. Urges Member States to respect fully, and tointensify Joint action, in cooperation with the UnitedNations, to develop and stimulate universal respect forand observance of, human rights and fundamental free-doms, and to intensify individual and collective effortsto achieve conditions of economic stability and socialprogress, particularly through the development of under-developed countries and areas.

The following amendments to the revised jointdraft resolution were considered by the Com-mittee:(i) Amendments submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/586/-Rev.1) which took the place of those previously sub-mitted by the USSR delegation (A/C.1/583, A/C.1/-586). The USSR proposed that paragraphs 4, 7, 8 and9 together with the reference to the "veto" in paragraph5 of the preamble be deleted; and that Article 106 ofthe Charter be invoked in place of the second part ofparagraph 6 of the preamble. In section A, paragraph 1,the USSR amendments provided that recommendationsby the General Assembly to maintain or restore peaceshould be referred to the Security Council in accordancewith Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter if they in-volved action; that emergency sessions should require anotice of ten days instead of twenty-four hours; and thatsuch sessions should be called at the request of the ma-jority of the Members of the United Nations or of theSecurity Council instead of at the request of any sevenmembers of the Security Council or by vote in theInterim Committee or otherwise.

In section B, paragraph 3, it was proposed (a) thatthe Peace Observation Commission should be of a repre-sentative character and should include the followingamong fourteen Members of the United Nations:Czechoslovakia, France, the People's Republic of China,the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the UnitedKingdom and the United States; and (b) to delete thereference to the Interim Committee. It was also pro-posed to delete the provision, in paragraph 6, for theutilization by the Commission of the United Nationspanel of field observers envisaged in resolution 297B (IV).

It was proposed to delete sections C and D. Lastly,the USSR amendment proposed consequential amend-ments to the rules of procedure contained in the Annexto the revised joint draft resolution.(ii) An amendment by Egypt (A/C.1/587) to add anew paragraph to section D to provide that the Collec-tive Measures Committee should give particular attentionto the degree of preparedness of national armed forces.(An earlier amendment by Egypt (A/C.1/581) to sec-tion D calling for the equipping of national forces insensitive areas was withdrawn.)(iii) An amendment by Lebanon (A/C.1/589) to in-clude among the statement of the conditions of lastingpeace in section E, paragraph 14, the implementation ofthe resolutions of the Security Council and the General

Assembly relating to the maintenance of internationalpeace and security.(iv) An amendment by Yugoslavia (A/C.1/582, point1) to insert in the preamble a reference to Article 2,paragraph 7, of the Charter and to the principle of equalrights and self-determination of peoples,(v) An Israeli amendment (A/C.1/584, points 1 & 2)to insert in the preamble, as a second paragraph, areaffirmation of the primary duty of Members to seeksettlement of international disputes by peaceful meansthrough the procedures of Chapter VI of the Charter,and to insert in the fifth paragraph a qualification in-dicating the primacy of Article 106 of the Charter.12

(2) USSR Draft Resolution

The first USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/579)provided that the Assembly should recommend tothe Security Council that it should take the nec-essary steps to ensure that the action provided forunder the Charter was taken with respect tothreats to the peace or acts of aggression, and forthe peaceful settlement of disputes or situationslikely to endanger the maintenance of interna-tional peace and security. The Assembly wouldalso recommend that the Security Council shoulddevise measures for the earliest application ofArticles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter regard-ing the placing of armed forces at the disposal ofthe Council by Members of the United Nationsand the effective functioning of the Military StaffCommittee.

The second USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/580)would have the Assembly recommend that, beforearmed forces were placed at the disposal of theSecurity Council under appropriate agreementsconcluded in accordance with Article 43 of theCharter, the permanent members of the SecurityCouncil should take steps to ensure the necessaryimplementation of Article 106 of the Charter,which provides that they should "consult with oneanother and as occasion requires with other Mem-bers of the United Nations with a view to suchjoint action on behalf of the Organization as maybe necessary for the purpose of maintaining inter-national peace and security".

(3) General Views Expressed in the Committee

A majority of Committee members, among themthe sponsors of the joint draft resolution and therepresentatives of Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Bra-zil, Chile, China, Denmark, Greece, Iraq, Israel,Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,Pakistan, Sweden, Union of South Africa, Vene-zuela and Yugoslavia, made statements in supportof the resolution. These representatives, broadly

12

This Article deals with transitional security arrange-ments.


speaking, took the view that, under the Charter,while primary responsibility for the maintenanceof international peace and security rests with theSecurity Council, that responsibility is not exclu-sive. Apart from Articles 11 and 14 of the Char-ter, Article 10 gives the Assembly the right tomake recommendations to Members on any mat-ters "within the scope of the present Charter"except in relation to situations in respect of whichthe Security Council is exercising its functions(Article 12). It was the view of these representa-tives that the Security Council was not exercisingits functions if, by a procedural vote, it decidedthat it was no longer seized of a question. Theway should, then, be open for the Assembly tomake recommendations on that question.

The words "primary responsibility" in Article24, in the opinion of these delegations, implieda secondary responsibility devolving on MemberStates which had conferred the responsibility pri-marily on the Security Council. The MemberStates were thus the mandating authority to whichpower returned once the Security Council, throughthe misuse of the rule of unanimity of permanentmembers, failed in the exercise of that responsi-bility.

The limitation under Article 12 affected notthe competence of the Assembly but the timewhen that competence would be exercised. Theprovision was only intended to regulate the workof the Organization in such a way as to avoid thepossibility of two of its organs discussing the samequestion simultaneously. Once, however, the Se-curity Council ceased to consider a question, orwas prevented from taking the necessary action,the Assembly was bound to make recommenda-tions on it in order to fulfil the fundamental pur-pose of the United Nations which was the main-tenance of peace.

United Nations action in Korea, it was stated,had only been made possible by accidental cir-cumstances such as the absence of a certain per-manent member from the meetings of the Council,the availability of United States troops in Japanand the presence of the Assembly's Commissionin Korea. The joint draft resolution was designedto eliminate this element of chance and to remedycertain organizational weaknesses of the UnitedNations.

The representative of Sweden stated that he wasin agreement with the principles in sections A andB of the draft resolution presented by the sevenPowers. He noted that during the past few yearsthe General Assembly had tended to extend its

competence beyond the limits indicated by theCharter. This was evident from resolution 39(1)of the Assembly concerning Franco Spain andresolution 193 A (III) recommending an em-bargo on raw materials to States neighbouringGreece. The letter of the Charter had been ex-ceeded in these decisions but this was a happydevelopment; the Charter like all other constitu-tions must develop so that it would not become adead letter. He supported the joint draft resolu-tion, with the reservation that Swedish forces wereprohibited by law from fighting outside Swedenexcept in defence of their own country.

The representative of Syria stated that the in-terpretation put forward by the sponsors of thejoint draft resolution regarding the Assembly'spower to use armed force had not occurred to anydelegation at San Francisco. Expressing his satis-faction with the large measure of support for thisinterpretation, he wondered why it had not pre-viously occurred to Members when the SecurityCouncil had failed to act. He considered, however,that the Assembly could not be convoked withoutthe affirmative votes of seven members of theSecurity Council, including the permanent mem-bers.

The representative of India felt that the word-ing of paragraph 1 of section A needed clarifica-tion. The phrase "because of lack of unanimity ofpermanent members" was not precise. For exam-ple, would it cover a draft resolution which inaddition to lacking the unanimity of the perma-nent members, failed to obtain a majority ofseven votes in the Council? Also, was it intendedthat section A should become operative upon therejection of a single draft resolution in the Se-curity Council, or could the Council have the nec-essary time in which to adopt an alternativeresolution?

The representatives of the Byelorussian SSR,Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR andthe USSR held the view that the seven-Power draftresolution, as it stood, was in conflict with sev-eral provisions of the Charter. It had been saidthat it was necessary to remedy the organizationalweaknesses of the Organization, but, these repre-sentatives contended, there could be no questionof strengthening the United Nations by weaken-ing the Security Council, which would be theinevitable result of the adoption of the proposalscontained in the joint draft resolution. The reasonfor the supposed incapacity of the Security Coun-cil to fight or forestall aggression had been ascribedby the proponents of this resolution to the prin-ciple of unanimity or the veto. If that were so,


steps should be taken under Article 109 of theCharter to abolish that provision.

But, it was argued, the deadlock on variousquestions affecting the maintenance of interna-tional peace and security had remained not becauseof the veto but because of the position taken inthe Security Council by the "Anglo-Americanbloc", which had consistently tried to foist deci-sions designed for its own purposes on the Secu-rity Council. These decisions concerned such vitalquestions as the admission of new Members, theorganization of armed forces of the United Na-tions under Article 43 of the Charter, the pro-hibition of atomic weapons, the regulation andreduction of armaments and many other questions.Attempts to do away with the "veto" had beenmade even in 1944, 1945, 1946 and 1947. Theevents in Korea, to which reference had beenmade, had not occurred at that time and could nottherefore be evoked to justify the campaign againstthe Security Council. One such attempt was theestablishment of the Interim Committee in 1947,when it had been said that the latter would actwhen the Security Council found itself incapableof taking the appropriate measures.

As regards the legal aspects of the question,these representatives expressed the view that Arti-cle 11 of the Charter made it quite clear that if arecommendation were to involve some action, theGeneral Assembly would have no right to takesuch action and consequently could not recom-mend what was to be done. To say that the Gen-eral Assembly could recommend action under theCharter to forestall aggression would be a viola-tion of Article 11, paragraph 2, which clearlyvested that prerogative in the Security Council.

Referring to the book The Law of the UnitedNations, by Professor Kelsen,13 the USSR repre-sentative stated that Professor Kelsen observedthat Article 11, paragraph 2, contained restrictionsto the powers of the General Assembly which werenot included in Article 10, with the result that theAssembly could discuss such questions but couldnot make recommendations even if the matterhad been brought before the Assembly by theCouncil itself, not only if it was a question of adispute or situation within the meaning of Arti-cle 12, paragraph 1, but also if the question was ofsuch a nature as to make action necessary. Theword "action", the representative of the USSR ex-plained, did not mean the same thing in the caseof the General Assembly and of the Council. Theconcept of "action" within the meaning of Article11 meant coercive action which was, exclusively,the function of the Security Council. That was the

only field in which the Assembly could not makea recommendation but must refer the matter tothe Security Council. The question of the necessityof action was, as Professor Kelsen indicated, to bedecided by the General Assembly, since it was re-quired to refer the matter to the Security Councilonly if the Assembly's conclusion was affirmative.The General Assembly could make recommenda-tions on any subject within the framework of theCharter, but those recommendations must notimply coercive action. For example, the Assembly,it was contended, had recognized its lack of com-petence when by resolution 181(II) it called uponthe Security Council to take action on Palestine.

The draft resolution proposed that the GeneralAssembly should immediately consider cases wherethere appeared to be a threat to the peace, breachof the peace or act of agression and should makethe necessary recommendations. But, the USSRrepresentative asked, who would determine theexistence of such conditions? This was, he stated,a substantive question which only the SecurityCouncil was competent to decide.

The representatives arguing along these linesheld that when a case involving action was re-ferred by the Assembly or by any other competentsource to the Security Council, the latter retainedcomplete freedom of action and might decide thatno action was required. The decisions of theAssembly were not binding upon the SecurityCouncil.

It had been further argued by the proponentsof the joint draft resolution that the SecurityCouncil would not be fulfilling its functions if itfailed to act effectively and with dispatch. Butwhat would be the criterion on which it would bedecided whether the Council had acted with effec-tiveness and dispatch and what body could takethat decision? If it was the General Assembly,when could it do so?—Before or after being con-voked? Moreover, it was argued, the General As-sembly was not an appellate body which couldpronounce judgment on the decisions of the Se-curity Council. The revised draft resolution pro-vided that a special session of the Assembly couldbe convoked on the vote of any seven membersof the Council. Such a provision was a violationof Article 20 of the Charter and also prejudgedthe Council's right to decide its procedure underArticle 30. It was further objected that 24 hours'notice for the Assembly's meeting was too shortand the time limit should be raised to ten days.

13

Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (Lon-don: Stevens, 1950), pp. 202, 204.


The USSR had proposed amendments to thiseffect (see above).

As regards section B of the seven-Power jointdraft resolution (A/C.1/576/Rev.1), the repre-sentatives of the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia,Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR had noobjection to the establishment of a Peace Observa-tion Commission provided the Commission wasrepresentative and was not a tool in the hands ofa group of Powers. It was not enough merely tosay that it should have nine to fourteen members.The character of the Commission should be givenmore exactly and it should include the five per-manent members of the Security Council. It wasproposed that the Peace Observation Commissionshould include Czechoslovakia, France, the Peo-ple's Republic of China, the USSR, the UnitedKingdom and the United States among its fourteenmembers. Further, reference to the Interim Com-mittee should be deleted since, in the opinion ofthese delegations, it was an illegal body; it wouldshow a spirit of co-operation on the part of thesponsors of the joint draft resolution to delete thatreference. The same applied to the reference inparagraph 6 of the resolution to Assembly resolu-tion 297 B (IV)14 which it was contended, hadbeen illegally adopted. Amendments to carry outthese changes had accordingly been submitted bythe USSR (see above).

As regards section C of the joint draft resolu-tion, which provided for the availability of armedforces for use by the Security Council or by theGeneral Assembly and for appointment by theSecretary-General of a panel of military experts,the representatives of the Byelorussian SSR, Czech-oslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and theUSSR expressed the view that this section violatedArticles 24, 25, 26, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 106and 108 of the Charter. Section C, it was argued,would abolish the exclusive competence in thesematters vested by the Charter in the Security Coun-cil as well as the need for special agreementswhich, under Article 43, were to be initiated bythe Council. Yet the importance of Article 43 hadnot been ignored at San Francisco. Thus, it wasstated, the rules of procedure of the Military StaffCommittee, unanimously adopted by the five per-manent members of the Council, said that theSecurity Council alone could dispose of the armedforces supplied to the United Nations. That prin-ciple was an integral element in the system ofcollective security envisaged in the Charter, a sys-tem based on the co-operation of all Members witha central body for action, namely, the SecurityCouncil. The powers of the Security Council could

not be transferred or shared without violatingArticle 25 of the Charter. Chapter VII, moreover,while dealing with enforcement action, did noteven mention the Assembly. In this connexion therepresentative of Poland quoted Law 264, adoptedby the Seventy-ninth Congress of the United Stateson 20 December 1945, which, he said, stated thatarmed forces supplied by virtue of Article 43 ofthe Charter would be placed at the disposal of theSecurity Council. The effect of paragraph 10 ofthe joint draft resolution, which provided for thesetting up of a panel of experts within the Sec-retariat, would be to turn the United Nations intoa military organization and also to duplicate thefunctions of the Military Staff Committee.

These representatives also opposed section D ofthe joint draft resolution, which provided for theestablishment of a Collective Measures Committeeto study and report to the Security Council andthe General Assembly on the placing of armedforces at the disposal of the United Nations. Theystated that such a Committee would duplicate thefunctions of the Security Council and the Mili-tary Staff Committee, the only bodies, in theirview, authorized to discuss the availability ofarmed forces for the United Nations.

In place of sections C and D, the USSR pro-posed the adoption of its two draft resolutions(A/C.1/579, A/C.1/580) recommending the tak-ing of the necessary action by the Security Coun-cil under the Charter with respect to threats to thepeace or acts of aggression and for the peacefulsettlement of disputes; the devising by the Councilof measures for application of the Charter pro-visions concerning armed forces and for the effec-tive functioning of the Military Staff Committee;and implementation by the permanent membersof Article 106 of the Charter (see above).

Replying to the arguments advanced against thedraft resolution (A/C.1/576/Rev.1), the repre-sentative of the United Kingdom maintained thatnot only the intention and aim of the Charter butalso its wording provided the General Assemblywith the necessary power to act on the basis ofthe joint seven-Power draft resolution. UnderArticle 10, the Assembly was entitled to discussany question or matter within the scope of theCharter with a view to making recommendations,subject only to the restriction that no provision inanother Article was applicable and precluded theGeneral Assembly from considering that givenmatter. Specifically, situations which might lead or

14

Referring to the creation of a United Nations Panelof Field Observers; for text, see Y.U.N., 1948-49, p. 425.


had led to an international dispute or a breach ofthe peace fell within the scope of the Charter andprima facie, therefore, Article 10 authorized theGeneral Assembly to make recommendations onsuch situations.

With regard to the exceptions to this generalprinciple, only Article 11, paragraph 2, and Arti-cle 12, paragraph 1, could be regarded as implyingcertain restrictions. It should therefore be consid-ered whether either of those Articles was draftedin such a way as to bar the General Assemblyfrom studying questions which it had, a priori,authority to discuss.

If the principle was accepted that Article 10gave the Assembly general authority to make rec-ommendations in the sphere concerned, then itwas necessary to consider in what circumstancesthe restrictions placed on its authority by Articles11 or 12 would make any eventual action takenby the Assembly illegal and contrary to theCharter.

The last sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 11set forth a restriction which should be clarified.The word "action" was not defined and it wasnatural to think that it meant coercive action,which only the Security Council was authorizedto take. According to that restrictive interpreta-tion, the last sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 11would be applicable only in critical situations.However, even if the word were given a widermeaning, the United Kingdom delegation felt thatno real difficulty would arise.

If it were assumed that there existed an inter-national dispute or breach of the peace, what thenwas the requirement contained in the last sentenceof paragraph 2 of Article 11? It stipulated thatsuch a question should be submitted, through theappropriate procedural machinery, before or afterdiscussion by the General Assembly, to the Secu-rity Council in order that it might, if necessary,exercise the powers conferred upon it by Chap-ters V, VI and VII of the Charter. If it was feltthat, under Article 24 of the Charter, the SecurityCouncil was primarily but not exclusively respon-sible for the maintenance of peace, it was onlynatural that Article 11 should provide that a ques-tion of that nature should be submitted to theSecurity Council. The authors of the seven-Powerdraft resolution were all agreed that if a questionnecessitating action were raised, it should undoubt-edly be referred to the Council through the ap-propriate procedure. The United Kingdom dele-gation considered, however, that if that procedurewere adopted and if the Security Council did not

make use of its powers, Article 11 would not inany way preclude the General Assembly fromexercising, in respect of such a situation, thepowers conferred upon it by Article 10. That wasobvious from the way in which the text wasdrafted, and even if the wording of the text didnot make it clear, there was no doubt that suchwas the intention of the Charter. The present draftresolution merely clarified and defined the powerswhich the letter of the law conferred upon theAssembly.

As far as Article 12 was concerned, it could notbe considered an obstacle to a recommendation onthe part of the Assembly, since the Security Coun-cil no longer fulfilled any function in connexionwith that question.

The representative of the United Kingdom rec-ognized that the Charter did not give the GeneralAssembly the power to take coercive action. TheAssembly could only make recommendations, butexperience had shown that the recommendationsof the General Assembly carried great force, in thesame way that the Security Council recommenda-tions had done on the Korean question in virtueof Article 39.

If, therefore, a General Assembly recommenda-tion implied positive action by a Member State, itwas perfectly lawful for the Member State toexercise the powers which it already possessedunder international law, including the right todefend itself and to assist friendly powers in theface of unjustified aggression.

Speaking on the same point, the representativeof Canada expressed surprise that the representa-tive of the USSR should have claimed, on the basisof Article 11, paragraph 2, that the Assemblyshould automatically refer any question requiringaction to the Security Council without using evenits right of discussion under Article 10. Was it notthe representative of the USSR who had proposedon numerous occasions that the Assembly shouldadopt important measures on questions whichwere or might be on the agenda of the SecurityCouncil? A week earlier (352nd meeting), it wasstated, the representative of the USSR had askedthat the Assembly should recommend the with-drawal of United Nations troops from Korea. Thatwas, however, a question requiring very seriousaction. In fact, the action referred to in Article 11,paragraph 2, was that which the Security Councilcould take under the Chapter of the Charter whichdefined its functions, i.e. Chapter V. That actionwas not, therefore, to be confused with recom-mendations which the General Assembly was em-


powered to make to Member States under theprovisions of that same Article.

Referring to paragraph C of the draft resolu-tion, the representative of Canada stated that itdid not recommend establishment of an inter-national armed force as implied by the critics ofthe resolution. It only provided for the formationof national contingents which might be used bythe United Nations while being at the same timeavailable for the national defence of each State.

Section D of the draft resolution was comple-mentary to section C. It was quite reasonable tosuggest that a temporary ad hoc committee shouldreport to the Security Council and the GeneralAssembly, before its next session, on the methodsby which the principles set forth for the formationof national contingents might be worked out. ThatCommittee might, for example, consider the argu-ments for and against an international force com-posed, not of national contingents, but of UnitedNations volunteers. No question arose, in thatsection, of the United Nations making strategicalplans, of placing armed forces at the disposal ofthe Secretary-General, or of conducting an inquisi-torial investigation into the resources of MemberStates.

It was surprising, the representative of Canadastated, that the USSR should have made an alter-native suggestion to the effect that the MilitaryStaff Committee should be asked to resume itswork and that the Security Council should beasked to work out military agreements underArticle 43 of the Charter. Actually, he said, it wasthe USSR which had hitherto prevented the Mili-tary Staff Committee from functioning and militaryagreements from being concluded.

(4 ) Voting on the Seven-Power and USSRDraft Resolutions

At the 368th meeting, the Committee began tovote paragraph by paragraph on the revised jointdraft resolution (A/C.1/576/Rev.1) and the out-standing amendments15 with the following results:USSR amendments (A/C.1/586/Rev.1); Egyptian

amendment (A/C.1/587) to section D, paragraph11; Yugoslav amendment (A/C.1/582, point 1);Israeli amendment (A/C.1/584, point 2): rejected

Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/589) to paragraph 14 ofsection E, which sought to include among the state-ment of the conditions of lasting peace the imple-mentation of the resolutions of the Security Counciland the General Assembly: adopted (after a verbalamendment by the representative of Chile) by 26votes to 1, with 32 abstentions

Israeli amendment (A/C.1/584, point 1), to insert inthe preamble as a second paragraph a reaffirmationthat international disputes should be settled by peace-

ful means: adopted by 12 votes to 11, with 37 ab-stentions

At the 369th meeting on 19 October, the rep-resentative of the United Kingdom, on behalf ofthe sponsors of the seven-Power draft resolution,proposed that the Peace Observation Commissionshould be composed of representatives of China,Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq,Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, USSR, theUnited Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay,and that the Collective Measures Committee shouldbe composed of the representatives of Australia,Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France,Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, the United King-dom, the United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.This proposal was adopted by 50 votes in favourto none against, with 8 abstentions, after anamendment submitted by the USSR representa-tive to substitute the "Chinese People's Republic"for "China" in the list of members of the Com-mission had been declared inadmissible by 40votes to 7, with 10 abstentions. The compositionof the Collective Measures Committee as pro-posed by the sponsors of the draft resolution(A/C.1/576/Rev.1) was approved by 50 votes tonone, with 5 abstentions. The representatives ofthe Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, theUkrainian SSR and the USSR had not taken partin the vote. They objected in principle to theCollective Measures Committee.

The seven-Power draft resolution (A./C.1/-576/Rev.1) was put to the vote by roll call andwas adopted, as a whole, by 50 votes to 5, with3 abstentions.

The Committee next considered the two USSRdraft resolutions (A/C.1/579, A/C.1/580). Tothe first of these draft resolutions, concerningaction to be taken by the Security Council, theapplication of the Charter provisions concerningarmed forces and the effective functioning of theMilitary Staff Committee,16 the representative ofFrance submitted an amendment (A/C.1/591) toadd a paragraph stating that the terms of thisdraft resolution should not in any way preventthe General Assembly from fulfilling its functionsunder the resolution submitted by the seven spon-soring Powers.

The representative of the USSR accepted anoral amendment by Uruguay adding the words"breaches of the peace" after the words "threats tothe peace", but stated that he was unable to acceptthe French amendment, which artificially linked

15 See p. 183.

16 See pp. 47, 49.


the USSR text to the draft resolution (A/C.1/-576/Rev.1) adopted by the Committee whichsome delegations had opposed while certain dele-gations had abstained from voting on it.

The representatives of China, France, Australia,the United Kingdom and the United States, amongothers, considered that unless the French amend-ment was incorporated the USSR draft resolutionwould contradict the seven-Power draft resolutionadopted by the Committee. The procedure pro-vided for in Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 to whichreference was made already existed, and, the rep-resentative stated, if the USSR, which was a mem-ber of the Military Staff Committee, really wantedprogress to be made, it could have taken the nec-essary steps without resorting to the indirect pro-cedure of proposing a resolution of the GeneralAssembly which, though legal in itself, seemeddesigned to contradict the seven-Power draft reso-lution. Acceptance of the French amendment,these representatives thought, seemed the only wayto dispel this suspicion. The problem was to pre-vent the vote already cast by a great majority ofthe Committee from being disavowed under thepretence of applying the Charter. The Frenchamendment was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with3 abstentions.

The draft resolution (A/C.1/579) as amendedby France and Uruguay was then adopted by 49votes to none, with 9 abstentions. The representa-tive of the Soviet Union explained that he hadabstained from voting on the draft resolution sincean amendment to which his delegation was op-posed had been incorporated in it.

The Committee voted next on the second USSRdraft resolution (A/C.1/580), concerning theimplementation by the permanent members of theCouncil of Article 106 of the Charter.17

The draft resolution was rejected by 34 votesto 6, with 18 abstentions.

(5 ) Iraqi-Syrian Draft Resolution

Finally, the Committee considered a joint Iraqi-Syrian draft resolution (A/C.1/585) which wouldhave the Assembly recommend to the Govern-ments of France, the United Kingdom, the UnitedStates and the USSR that they should meet duringthe fifth session of the General Assembly and dis-cuss afresh the outstanding problems threateningworld peace and crippling the United Nations,with a view to resolving fundamental differencesand reaching agreements in accordance with thespirit of the Charter, and report the results of theirdiscussions to the General Assembly not later than15 November 1950.

To this draft resolution, the USSR submitted anamendment (A/C.1/588) which proposed theinclusion among the Governments to which therecommendation was addressed the Government ofthe People's Republic of China.

After some discussion, the Committee adopteda Bolivian proposal to adjourn discussion on thedraft resolution till the next meeting (370th), atwhich the representative of Iraq introduced a re-vised Iraqi-Syrian draft resolution (A./C.1/585/-Rev.1), which recommended to the "permanentmembers of the Security Council that they meetand discuss individually and collectively, and withother nations concerned, the outstanding problemswhich threaten world peace . . .". It was requestedthat they should report to the General Assemblyduring the fifth session on any prospective prog-ress.

During the discussion which followed, one writ-ten amendment and various oral amendments weresubmitted by the representatives of El Salvador(A/C.1/594), Brazil, Netherlands, Israel, Mexico,the United States and Yugoslavia. These amend-ments were all withdrawn in view of a secondrevision of the draft resolution (A/C.1/585/-Rev.2) which was submitted at the next meeting(371st), and which incorporated most of theamendments.

After having recognized in the preamble, interalia, that the Charter charges the Security Councilwith the primary responsibility for maintaininginternational peace and security, and having re-affirmed the importance of unanimity among thepermanent members of the Security Council, therevised draft resolution provided that the Assem-bly recommend "to the permanent members of theSecurity Council that: (a) they meet and discuss,collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, withother States concerned, all problems which arelikely to threaten international peace and hamperthe activities of the United Nations, with a viewto their resolving fundamental differences andreaching agreement in accordance with the spiritand letter of the Charter; (b) they advise theGeneral Assembly and, when it is not in session,the Members of the United Nations, as soon asappropriate, of the results of their consultations."

A USSR proposal that the phrase "the perma-nent members of the Security Council" be replaced

dom, the United States of America, the People'sRepublic of China and the USSR" was, on the

17

See p. 183.

by "the Governments of France, the United King-


proposal of the representative of China, declaredinadmissible by 26 votes to 13, with 16 absten-tions.

Another USSR proposal that the words "havingin view among their number the People's Repub-lic of China" be inserted after the phrase "thepermanent members of the Security Council" was,on the proposal of the United States, also de-clared inadmissible, by 35 votes to 12, with 11abstentions.

The revised draft resolution of Iraq and Syria(A/C.1/585/Rev.2) was then put to the vote andadopted unanimously by the Committee by 59votes.

The First Committee recommended to the Gen-eral Assembly the adoption of three resolutionsA, B and C under the general heading "Unitingfor Peace".18

After the adoption of the Iraqi-Syrian draftresolution, the representative of Chile stated thatthe question covered by item 66 of the agenda ofthe General Assembly which had been introducedby his delegation (A/1317) entitled "Strengthen-ing of democratic principles as a means of con-tributing to the maintenance of universal peace"had been completely incorporated in the jointseven-Power draft resolution which had just beenadopted by the Committee under item 68. Hisdelegation therefore suggested that item 66 shouldbe withdrawn from the Committee's agenda. TheCommittee adopted this suggestion, without ob-jection.

b. CONSIDERATION BY THE GENERALASSEMBLY IN THE PLENARY MEETING

The report of the First Committee (A/1465)containing the three resolutions adopted by it wasdiscussed by the General Assembly at its 299th to302nd meetings from 1 to 4 November 1950. TheUSSR delegation reintroduced the amendments(A/1465, A/1466) and the draft resolution(A/1467) which the First Committee had re-jected (see above).

A number of representatives, among them thoseof Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ethiopia,France, Greece, Iceland, Iraq, the Philippines,Sweden, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, theUnited Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay andYugoslavia, expressed satisfaction with the threedraft resolutions recommended by the First Com-mittee. They held that the joint draft resolutionwhich had been originally presented by the sevenPowers not only had an unassailable legal basis in

accordance with the Charter, but was also neces-sary in the present state of world tension in orderto avoid a third world war. If adopted by theAssembly, it was stated, this draft resolution woulddeter future aggressors by enabling quick expo-sure and suppression of aggression.

Amplifying this thesis, the representative of theUnited States gave an account of the events whichhad led to the Second World War. He recalledJapan's attack on Manchuria in 1931 and the fail-ure of the League of Nations in applying restrain-ing measures. Japanese aggression had thereafterspread and the initial breach of peace could notbe localized. In 1935, Mussolini attacked and con-quered Ethiopia. In 1938, Hitler seized firstAustria and then Czechoslovakia. In 1939, Hitler-ite Germany and the Soviet Union, the UnitedStates representative said, combined to seize anddivide Poland. That was the succession of eventswhich touched off the Second World War.

He pointed out that although the taking of"effective collective measures" was included in thefirst of the stated Purposes of the United Nations,in the last five years the Security Council had beenunable to give effect to those words. With the at-tack on the Republic of Korea, it began to appearthat the pattern of 1931 had begun to repeat it-self. The seven-Power draft resolution, it wasstated, was aimed at arresting that trend. If inresponse to the resolution Member States actuallyestablished a system which would ensure that ag-gression would be promptly exposed, if they main-tained a collective strength and would use itpromptly in case of need, then a third world warmight be permanently averted.

Turning to the joint Iraqi-Syrian draft resolu-tion, the representative of the United States re-ferred to the statements by Secretary of StateAcheson in the general debate (279th meeting)and President Truman in his address to the Assem-bly (295th meeting) that the United States wasalways ready to negotiate with a sincere desire tosolve problems. The United States, he said, had noterritorial dispute and no national ambitions whichconflicted with the welfare of the Russian people.In his view the issue dividing the two countrieswas whether freedom and diversity in the worldshould be replaced by enforced conformity withthe pattern of Soviet totalitarianism. Maintainingthat the latter was the aim of Soviet foreign pol-icy, the representative of the United States quotedan editorial from Izvestia of 1 January 1950, which

18 For the text of the resolution as adopted by the

General Assembly, see pp. 193-95.


listed the "camp" growing around the USSR. Theeditorial said, the U.S. representative continued,that the forces of this "camp" were multiplyingevery day and listed Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bul-garia, Romania, Hungary, Albania, North Korea,Mongolia, the Chinese People's Republic and theEastern German Democratic Republic as membersof that "camp". But, the representative of theUnited States said, no people had yet come underthe "yoke represented by the USSR brand of im-perialist communism except by violent coercion".As long as this remained the programme of theSoviet Union the United States representative con-sidered the possibilities of negotiation between theUnited States and the USSR were limited thoughnot non-existent.

The representative of France stated that theseven-power draft resolution did not infringe uponthe Security Council's competence, responsibilitiesor powers, as had been suggested by several repre-sentatives. The Council should fulfil its role; if itdid so, it would be adequate as it had been in thepast; if for some reason, however, it failed to fulfilits role, the United Nations could not thereby beparalysed. That was the object of the present draftresolution.

Referring to Professor Kelsen's interpretationof the provisions of the Charter regarding thedefinition of the powers of the Security Counciland the General Assembly which the representativeof the USSR had expounded in the First Commit-tee, the representative of Cuba said that the re-striction in Article 12 applied only in cases wherethe Council is genuinely exercising its functionsand is not being undermined by absenteeism orbeing paralysed by the veto, and he quoted fromProfessor Kelsen's book to prove his point.19 Therepresentative of Cuba observed that in order tointerpret a legal text, particularly when it is apolitical document, the first thing to take into ac-count is the achievement of the purpose of thatdocument. In this case, those purposes are ex-pressed in the Preamble to the Charter and inArticles 1 and 2, which deal with purposes andprinciples. In other words, the function of the pro-vision must prevail over its form and even overprocedure. This view was expressed also by thePermanent Court of International Justice, therepresentative of Cuba claimed, in the case con-cerning the Chorzów factory in 1927. In that casethe Court stated that in the interpretation of arbi-tration treaties account must be taken not only oftheir historical development, as well as of theirterminology and of the grammatical and logicalmeaning of the words used, "but also and more

specially of the function which in the intention ofthe contracting parties, is to be attributed to thisprovision".20 The idea of the Court was, as it wasthat of the supporters of the seven-Power draftresolution, that the purpose of a legal interpreta-tion is to ensure that the aims of a given textwere achieved as effectively as possible.

The representatives of the Byelorussian SSR,Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR andthe USSR characterized the draft resolution asillegal, harmful and full of danger to the peace ofnations. The representative of the USSR in hisreply to the statements made in support of theresolution said that certain representatives had in-dulged in slanderous attacks against his country.Referring to the speech of the United States repre-sentative, he said that the economic and militaryfoundations for German and Italian aggressionhad been laid by the United States. Americanmonopolies, he concluded, had helped in rearmingGermany, and in this connexion he referred to theStandard Oil Company, which, he stated, had in1938 concluded an agreement with the Germanfirm of I.G. Farbenindustrie under which the latterwas given a share in the profits of aviation fuelproduced in the United States and in return re-frained from exporting its synthetic petrol fromGermany, thus accumulating stocks of that fuel formilitary purposes. —

As regards the statement made by the represen-tative of the United States that in 1939 USSR andHitler had concluded a pact for the partition ofPoland, the USSR representative said that it wasa mere slander and was easy to refute. What hadhappened in 1939 was that the Governments ofthe United Kingdom and France, under the patron-age of the United States Government, were en-couraging Hitler's ambitions in the hope that he

19 The passage quoted by the representative of Cuba

was as follows: "The restriction of the competence ofthe General Assembly is valid only during the time theSecurity Council is dealing with the dispute or situation;that means that the Assembly has the power to makerecommendations with respect to disputes or situationswith which the Council has not yet dealt or with whichit has ceased to deal. The words 'while the SecurityCouncil is exercising. . . the functions. . .' may be inter-preted to mean: while a dispute or situation is still onthe agenda of the Council. But it may also be interpretedto mean: while the Security Council is actually exercisingits functions; so that when the Council because of theexercise of the veto right is reduced to inaction, it shouldnot be considered as 'exercising' its functions." Kelsen,op. cit., pp. 216-17.

20 Permanent Court of International Justice, Collectionof Judgments: Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow(Claim for Indemnity Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8),Series A, No. 9 (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1927), p. 24.


would attack the Soviet Union. In the spring of1939, when negotiations were proceeding in Mos-cow with an Anglo-French Military Mission, theseGovernments were also carrying out parleys withHitler. Since Hitler's aggressive intentions hadbeen obvious throughout the years preceding 1939,the USSR Government proposed the conclusion ofnon-aggression and mutual aid pacts—an effortwhich was frustrated by the duplicity of these twoGovernments. On 17 September 1939, when Hitlerhad invaded and occupied Poland and his forceswere advancing towards the Soviet frontier, theUSSR forces stopped them at a line coincidingwith the Curzon Line, the history of which waswell known. This laid the foundations of an east-ern defensive front, of which Winston Churchillsaid on 1 October 1939: "That the Russian armiesshould stand on this line was clearly necessary forthe safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. Atany rate, the line is there, and an eastern front hasbeen created which Nazi Germany does not dareassail . . ."

Referring to Korea, the USSR representativeargued that the United States and its supportershad exposed the weakness of their case by refusingthe "accused", i.e. North Korea, the opportunity ofconfronting its accusers. This was because theywere afraid of the truth coming out.

In 1933, while the USSR delegation to theLeague of Nations was submitting proposals forthe organization of collective security, the UnitedKingdom and France had signed a pact of co-operation with Hitlerite Germany at Rome. Fur-ther, under the Anglo-German Naval Agreementof 1935, signed in London, Hitler had secured theright to build submarines with a total tonnageequal to that of the whole French submarine fleet.

The present draft resolution was not intendedto organize collective security but as a screen formilitary plans. To circumvent the veto, the USSRrepresentative argued, would not guarantee peace,because even without the veto the choice of peaceor war lay with the Great Powers. If there was noagreement between them on fundamental mattersaffecting the organization of international rela-tions, then whether the General Assembly decidedthese questions without the veto or the SecurityCouncil with the veto, there would still be a threatto peace.

The effort to abolish the veto, the USSR repre-sentative stated, was due only to the desire of theUnited States to impose its own will upon nations.To prove this point, he quoted from the bookWar or Peace by Mr. Dulles: "The veto has pre-vented the Security Council from doing what we

wanted and what the Soviet Union did not want;therefore, the veto should be abolished."21

Referring to the arguments of the representa-tive of Cuba regarding the functioning of theSecurity Council, the representative of the USSRstated that the Security Council is discharging itsfunctions even when, in a case of reported aggres-sion, by reason of the exercise of the veto, it doesnot determine that there is aggression or a threatto the peace. It had been suggested by the sup-porters of the draft resolution that the Council isdischarging its functions only when it finds thatthere is aggression. This amounted to saying thatthe Council discharges its functions only when itacts in accordance with the will of the majority.But it was stated in the Charter itself, in Article27, paragraph 2, that any permanent member hasthe right to disagree with the majority and in sucha case there is no decision. This was not a non-discharge of functions, as the Council's functionwas not necessarily to accept the majority decision.In reply to the representative of Cuba, who hadquoted from Professor Kelsen's book, the USSRrepresentative also quoted from this book to showthat Kelsen did not recognize the power of theAssembly to take action.22

The representative of Argentina stated that he•shared the belief in the principles underlying therecommendations under sections A, B and E ofthe draft resolution recommended by the FirstCommittee. But his doubts regarding the legalityof sections C and D, which sections in his opinionformed the most dynamic and fundamental partsof the resolution, had not been resolved by theconflicting legal theories propounded. He would,therefore, abstain from voting on the draft resolu-tion as a whole.

The representative of India stated that in theopinion of his Government this was not the timefor stressing the military aspect of the UnitedNations. Therefore his Government was unable tosupport sections C and also D, which contained areference to section C. Since these sections havebeen described as the core of the resolution, hewould abstain from voting on the resolution as awhole.

21 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York:Macmillan, 1950), p. 194.

22 The passage quoted by the representative of the

USSR was as follows: "If the General Assembly actsunder Article 11, paragraph 2, also the restrictions applythat the question must have been brought before theAssembly in the way determined in Article 11, para-graph 2, and that the question must be referred to theSecurity Council before any recommendation has beenmade, if action is necessary." Kelsen, op. cit., p. 204.


As one of the sponsors of the joint seven-Powerdraft resolution, the representative of Canadastated that though he respected honest doubts ex-pressed by certain representatives regarding theconstitutionality of that draft resolution, he wasconvinced, as were the other sponsors of the reso-lution, that it was within the terms of the Charter.Replying to the representative of the USSR, hestated that the version of history in the yearspreceding the last war given by that representativewould not bear analysis. The Soviet Union couldnot explain, for instance, its efforts to force thenations of the British Commonwealth and Franceto stop fighting Hitler even after the destructionof Poland. If the Soviet Union knew that it wasgoing to be attacked by Hitler, why did it de-nounce all attempts by the United Kingdom towarn it of that danger as efforts to divide it fromits friends of that moment, the Nazis? As regardsKorea, the Soviet Union did nothing in theinitial phase of the fighting to secure a cease-firebecause at that time North Korea was winning.It attempted to secure a cease-fire only when it hadbecome clear that North Korea was going to bedefeated. The representative of Canada said thatindividuals and nations both might have mademistakes in the thirties, but were not going torepeat them. Similarly they should not repeat themistakes of 25 June when they were not organizedto carry out the collective security obligations im-posed by the Charter.

The representative of Sweden reiterated thereservation of his Government regarding sectionC of the draft resolution, explained in the FirstCommittee (see above). This, he said, did notmean however that the Swedish delegation wasopposed to that section. The question would beexamined by his Government in accordance withthe usual constitutional procedure.

The representative of Iraq stated his Govern-ment's reservation regarding paragraph 3 in sec-tion B of the seven-Power draft resolution dealingwith the Peace Observation Commission. Sinceone of the members of that Commission was notrecognized by his Government, he would construethe provisions of that section in such a way thatinvitations to the Commission would not meaninvitations to every member of that Commission.In other words the invitation would be limited tocertain members of the proposed commission, be-cause certain States could not invite all membersof the Commission to their territories.

At the 302nd meeting of the Assembly on 3November 1950 the USSR amendments (A/1465,A/1466), the resolutions recommended by the

First Committee (A/1456) and the USSR draftresolution (A/1467) were put to the vote. Noneof the USSR amendments were adopted by theAssembly. The draft resolutions recommended bythe First Committee were adopted separately andthen as a whole, by 52 votes to 5, with 2 absten-tions.

The Assembly then voted on the USSR draftresolution (A/1467) which read as follows:

The General Assembly,Taking into account the particular importance of con-

certed action by the five permanent members of theSecurity Council in defending and strengthening peaceand security among the nations,

Recommends that before armed forces are placed atthe disposal of the Security Council under appropriateagreements concluded in accordance with Article 43 ofthe Charter, the five permanent members of the SecurityCouncil—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, theUnited States of America, the United Kingdom, Chinaand France—should take steps to ensure the necessaryimplementation of Article 106 of the Charter providingfor consultation between them, and that they shouldconsult together in accordance with the said Article 106of the Charter for the purpose of taking such joint actionon behalf of the Organization as may prove to be neces-sary for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity.

The draft resolution was rejected by 39 votes to5, with 11 abstentions.

The text of the resolution (377(V)) adoptedby the General Assembly at its 302nd plenarymeeting on 3 November 1950, was as follows:

UNITING FOR PEACE

The General Assembly,Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the

United Nations are:"To maintain international peace and security, and

to that end: to take effective collective measures forthe prevention and removal of threats to the peace,and for the suppression of acts of aggression or otherbreaches of the peace, and to bring about by peacefulmeans, and in conformity with the principles of jus-tice and international law, adjustment or settlementof international disputes or situations which mightlead to a breach of the peace", and

"To develop friendly relations among nations basedon respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropri-ate measures to strengthen universal peace",Reaffirming that it remains the primary duty of all

Members of the United Nations, when involved in aninternational dispute, to seek settlement of such a dis-pute by peaceful means through the procedures laiddown in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling thesuccessful achievements of the United Nations in thisregard on a number of previous occasions,

binding that international tension exists on a danger-ous scale,


Recalling its resolution 290(IV) entitled "Essentialsof Peace", which states that disregard of the Principlesof the Charter of the United Nations is primarily res-ponsible for the continuance of international tension,and desiring to contribute further to the objectives ofthat resolution,

Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by theSecurity Council of its primary responsibility for themaintenance of international peace and security, andthe duty of the permanent members to seek unanimityand to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating theagreements for armed forces provided for in Article43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, anddesiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of suchagreements, the United Nations has at its disposalmeans for maintaining international peace and security,

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to dis-charge its responsibilities on behalf of all the MemberStates, particularly those responsibilities referred to inthe two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve MemberStates of their obligations or the United Nations of itsresponsibility under the Charter to maintain interna-tional peace and security,

Recognizing in particular that such failure does notdeprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve itof its responsibilities under the Charter in regard tothe maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that discharge by the General Assemblyof its responsibilities in these respects calls for possi-bilities of observation which would ascertain the factsand expose aggressors; for the existence of armedforces which could be used collectively; and for thepossibility of timely recommendation by the GeneralAssembly to Members of the United Nations for collec-tive action which, to be effective, should be prompt,

1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because oflack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails toexercise its primary responsibility for the maintenanceof international peace and security in any case wherethere appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of thepeace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shallconsider the matter immediately with a view to makingappropriate recommendations to Members for collec-tive measures, including in the case of a breach of thepeace or act of aggression the use of armed force whennecessary, to maintain or restore international peaceand security. If not in session at the time, the GeneralAssembly may meet in emergency special session withintwenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emer-gency special session shall be called if requested by theSecurity Council on the vote of any seven members, orby a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. Adopts for this purpose the amendments to itsrules of procedure set forth in the annex to the presentresolution;

B

3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commissionwhich, for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall becomposed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colom-bia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, NewZealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Social-ist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland, the United States of America

and Uruguay, and which could observe and report onthe situation in any area where there exists inter-national tension the continuance of which is likely toendanger the maintenance of international peace andsecurity. Upon the invitation or with the consent ofthe State into whose territory the Commission wouldgo, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committeewhen the Assembly is not in session, may utilize theCommission if the Security Council is not exercisingthe functions assigned to it by the Charter with respectto the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Com-mission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The SecurityCouncil may also utilize the Commission in accordancewith its authority under the Charter;

4. Decides that the Commission shall have authorityin its discretion to appoint sub-commissions and toutilize the services of observers to assist it in the per-formance of its functions;

5. Recommends to all governments and authoritiesthat they co-operate with the Commission and assist itin the performance of its functions;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide thenecessary staff and facilities, utilizing, where directedby the Commission, the United Nations Panel of FieldObservers envisaged in General Assembly resolution297 B (IV);

7. Invites each Member of the United Nations tosurvey its resources in order to determine the natureand scope of the assistance it may be in a position torender in support of any recommendations of theSecurity Council or of the General Assembly for therestoration of international peace and security;

8. Recommends to the States Members of the UnitedNations that each Member maintain within its nationalarmed forces elements so trained, organized and equip-ped that they could promptly be made available, inaccordance with its constitutional processes, for serviceas a United Nations unit or units, upon recommenda-tion by the Security Council or the General Assembly,without prejudice to the use of such elements in exer-cise of the right of individual or collective self-defencerecognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. Invites the Members of the United Nations toinform the Collective Measures Committee providedfor in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measurestaken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, withthe approval of the Committee provided for in para-graph 11, a panel of military experts who could bemade available, on request, to Member States wishingto obtain technical advice regarding the organization,training, and equipment for prompt service as UnitedNations units of the elements referred to in para-graph 8;

D

11. Establishes a Collective Measures Committeeconsisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia,Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico,Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland, the United States ofAmerica, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and directs theCommittee, in consultation with the Secretary-Generaland with such Member States as the Committee findsappropriate, to study and make a report to the Security

A

C


Council and the General Assembly, not later than1 September 1951, on methods, including those in sectionC of the present resolution, which might be used tomaintain and strengthen international peace and se-curity in accordance with the Purposes and Principlesof the Charter, taking account of collective self-defenceand regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of theCharter);

12. Recommends to all Member States that they co-operate with the Committee and assist it in the per-formance of its functions;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish thestaff and facilities necessary for the effective accom-plishment of the purposes set forth in sections C andD of the present resolution;

14. Is fully conscious that, in adopting the proposalsset forth above, enduring peace will not be securedsolely by collective security arrangements againstbreaches of international peace and acts of aggression,but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also uponthe observance of all the Principles and Purposes es-tablished in the Charter of the United Nations, uponthe implementation of the resolutions of the SecurityCouncil, the General Assembly and other principalorgans of the United Nations intended to achieve themaintenance of international peace and security, andespecially upon respect for and observance of humanrights and fundamental freedoms for all and on theestablishment and maintenance of conditions of eco-nomic and social well-being in all countries; andaccordingly

15. Urges Member States to respect fully, and tointensify, joint action, in co-operation with the UnitedNations, to develop and stimulate universal respect forand observance of human rights and fundamental free-doms, and to intensify individual and collective effortsto achieve conditions of economic stability and socialprogress, particularly through the development of under-developed countries and areas.23

B

For the purpose of maintaining international peaceand security, in accordance with the Charter of theUnited Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters V,VI and VII of the Charter,

The General AssemblyRecommends to the Security Council:That it should take the necessary steps to ensure

that the action provided for under the Charter is takenwith respect to threats to the peace, breaches of thepeace or acts of aggression and with respect to thepeaceful settlement of disputes or situations likely toendanger the maintenance of international peace andsecurity;

That it should devise measures for the earliest ap-plication of Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charterof the United Nations regarding the placing of armedforces at the disposal of the Security Council by theStates Members of the United Nations and the effec-tive functioning of the Military Staff Committee;

The above dispositions should in no manner preventthe General Assembly from fulfilling its functions underresolution 377 A (V).

The General AssemblyRecognizing that the primary function of the United

Nations Organization is to maintain and promote peace,security and justice among all nations,

Recognizing the responsibility of all Member Statesto promote the cause of international peace in accord-ance with their obligations as provided in the Charter,

Recognizing that the Charter charges the SecurityCouncil with the primary responsibility for maintain-ing international peace and security,

Reaffirming the importance of unanimity among thepermanent members of the Security Council on allproblems which are likely to threaten world peace,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 190(III) en-titled "Appeal to the Great Powers to renew theirefforts to compose their differences and establish alasting peace",

Recommends to the permanent members of theSecurity Council that:

(a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise,and, if necessary, with other States concerned, allproblems which are likely to threaten internationalpeace and hamper the activities of the United Nations,with a view to their resolving fundamental differencesand reaching agreement in accordance with the spiritand letter of the Charter;

(b) They advise the General Assembly and, whenit is not in session, the Members of the United Nations,as soon as appropriate, of the results of their con-sultations.

2. Peace through Deeds andCondemnation of Propaganda

against Peace

The item "Declaration on the Removal of theThreat of a New War and the Strengthening ofPeace and Security among the Nations" was placedon the agenda of the fifth session of the GeneralAssembly by the USSR. The Assembly, at its 285thmeeting on 26 September 1950, on the recom-mendation of the General Committee, decided toinclude this question in its agenda and to refer itto the First Committee.

a. CONSIDERATION IN THE FIRST COMMITTEEThe First Committee considered the question at

its 372nd to 383rd meetings from 23 October to3 November.

Originally, six draft resolutions were submittedto the Committee: one (A/C.1/595) by the USSR;one (A/C.1/596) by Bolivia; one (A/C.1/597)jointly by France, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands,the United Kingdom and the United States; one(A/C.1/598) by India; one (A/C.1/603) byChile; and one (A/C.1/602) by Greece.

23 Annexed to this resolution were the relevant changes

in the Assembly's rules of procedure. For these, seepp. 43-44.

E


During the course of the discussion Bolivia andIndia joined the sponsors of the joint six-Powerdraft resolution (A/C.1/597/ and agreed on anew text (A/C.1/597/Rev.2). Greece withdrewits draft resolution (A/C.1/602). The Committee,thus, considered three draft resolutions, the USSRdraft resolution, the joint eight-Power draft resolu-tion and the Chilean draft resolution, in the orderin which they are dealt with below.

(1) USSR Draft Resolution

The text of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/-595) follows:

The General Assembly,Considering that the most important task of the

United Nations is to maintain international peace andsecurity, and to strengthen and develop friendly rela-tions among nations and co-operation between themin solving international problems,

Expressing its firm determination to avert the threatof a new war and sharing the nations' inflexible willto peace as expressed by the hundreds of millions ofsignatures appended to the Stockholm appeal,

Regarding the use of the atomic weapon and othermeans of the mass destruction of human beings as amost heinous international crime against humanity andbasing this attitude on the unanimously adopted GeneralAssembly resolution of 1946 on the need for prohibitingthe use of atomic energy for military purposes,

Noting that the events at present taking place inKorea and other areas of the Pacific Ocean emphasizewith added force the extreme importance and urgency,from the point of view of international peace andsecurity, of unifying for this purpose the efforts of thefive Powers which are permanent members of theSecurity Council and bear special responsibility for themaintenance of international peace,

The General AssemblyDecides to adopt the following Declaration:First. The General Assembly condemns the propa-

ganda in favour of a new war now being conductedin a number of countries and urges all States to pro-hibit such propaganda in their countries and call thoseresponsible to account.

Second. The General Assembly, recognizing that theuse of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggressionand the mass destruction of human beings is contra-dictory to international conscience and honour andincompatible with membership of the United Nations,declares that the use of the atomic weapon shall beunconditionally prohibited and that a strict system ofinternational control shall be instituted to ensure theexact and unconditional observance of this prohibition.

The General Assembly also declares that the firstGovernment to use the atomic weapon or any othermeans for the mass destruction of human beings againstany country will thereby commit a crime against human-ity and be regarded as a war criminal.

Third. The General Assembly, acting in recognitionof the need for strengthening peace, and taking intoaccount the special responsibilities of the permanent

members of the Security Council for ensuring peace,unanimously expresses the desire:

(a) That the United States of America, the UnitedKingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union shouldcombine their efforts for peace and conclude amongthemselves a Pact for the strengthening of peace;(b) That these great Powers should reduce theirpresent armed forces (land forces, military air forcesof all kinds, naval forces) by one third during 1950-1951 and that the question of a further reduction ofarmed forces should be brought up for considerationat one of the forthcoming sessions of the GeneralAssembly.

Introducing his draft resolution, the representa-tive of the USSR emphasized the vital interest ofhis country in the continuance of peace. TheUSSR, he said, depended on peaceful world con-ditions for the realization of its great reconstruc-tion programme. In support of this view, hequoted the statement made by Marshal Stalin toan American trade union delegation, in 1927, inwhich he had affirmed the possibility and desir-ability of peaceful co-existence of opposing eco-nomic systems. The same principle had beenaffirmed by Marshal Stalin in other pronounce-ments in 1946 and 1948. Finally Marshal Stalinhad, more recently, stated to Mr. Kingsbury Smiththat the USSR could co-operate with the UnitedStates in concluding a peace pact which wouldlead to gradual disarmament.

On the other hand, he stated, the policies of the"Anglo-American bloc" were characterized byforce, diktat and constraint. Thus, on 16 February1950, Mr. Acheson had advanced the idea of "totaldiplomacy" and rejected that of goodwill and toler-ance towards the leaders of the Soviet Union; inMr. Acheson's opinion, it was stated, the onlymethod of dealing with the Soviet Union was bycreating "situations of strength". Similar state-ments had been made by the leaders of the UnitedKingdom, such as Mr. Bevin, who had recentlystated that the atmosphere would become moreand more favourable to direct negotiation as thearmed forces of the West increased. This foreignpolicy, the representative of the USSR continued,was reflected in the huge and unprecedented mili-tary expenditure of the United States, in the con-clusion of aggressive pacts like the North AtlanticTreaty and in the creation of a German army of450,000 men camouflaged as a police force and ledby Hitlerite generals like Guderian, Haider andManteuffel. The "Anglo-American bloc" was usingnot only Germany but also Japan as an instrumentof its aggressive policy. In the United States,appropriations for the armed forces for 1949-50were three times greater than those of the pre-ceding year. In 1951, the budget for the armed


forces was expected to run to $50,000,000,000,or four times the 1949-50 estimates, and fiftytimes the 1938-39 budget.

One of the main objects of the USSR draft reso-lution was, the USSR representative said, theprohibition of the atomic weapon and the controlof atomic energy. On 11 June. 1947, the USSRhad submitted proposals for the control of atomicenergy to the Atomic Energy Commission. Thoseproposals had stipulated that the international con-trol commission might investigate the activities ofenterprises mining atomic raw materials and pro-ducing atomic energy. The Commission was to beempowered to control stockpiles of raw materialsand semi-finished products and control the utiliza-tion of atomic materials and of atomic energy; itwas also to ensure the technological control ofsuch undertakings and conduct special investiga-tion in cases where violations of the convention onatomic energy were suspected. The internationalcontrol commission was to take its decisions bysimple majority without the application of theunanimity rule. These proposals had also providedfor inspection visits without prior notice. As acounter to the USSR proposals on atomic energy,the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal proposals had beenintroduced which, the USSR representative stated,did not even provide for the prohibition of atomicweapons. That plan would place the ownership ofall atomic energy plants under an internationalsupervisory body and would prevent all Statesfrom showing initiative in developing the peace-ful industrial uses of atomic energy. Further, theplan violated the elementary sovereign rights ofStates. It had, therefore, not been acceptable to theSoviet Union.

The representative of the USSR stated that hiscountry was ready to renew its efforts to break thepresent deadlock and to ensure the outlawing ofatomic weapons and the establishment of effectiveinternational control, once the principle of pro-hibition had been adopted. A first step in thatdirection would be the adoption of the USSR de-claration (A/C.1/595) which, as far as atomicenergy was concerned, expressed the will of thepeoples of the world as shown in the StockholmAppeal. That appeal, it was claimed, had beensigned by 500,000,000 persons all over the world.

A majority of the members of the Committee,including the representatives of Australia, Bel-gium, Bolivia, Canada, China, Chile, Denmark,France, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, the UnitedKingdom and the United States maintained thatevery year the USSR introduced similar proposalswhich were either accepted by the Assembly only

after they had been radically amended or wererejected. In 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949 the USSRhad introduced proposals which were all, appa-rently, directed towards the condemnation of warpropaganda, the reduction of armaments and theprohibition of atomic weapons. Yet evidence wasavailable, these representatives contended, that atthe same time that it brought those proposals, theUSSR had been acting in a manner diametricallyopposed to its professed aims.

In support of this contention these representa-tives gave the following account. In 1946, theysaid, its armaments were steadily accumulatingand the Soviet Air Force was being built up to bethe greatest in the world. In 1947, it was stated,while the USSR was calling for the condemnationof war propaganda, its campaign of hatred againstWestern Governments had been intensified. In1947, too, the Cominform had been created andhad published, in its declaration, a violent attackon the Western Powers. The same year, the USSRhad broken with Yugoslavia and had attempted tointimidate that country as well as Iran and hadalso frustrated all efforts for the unification ofKorea.

In 1948, they continued, another resolution hadbeen presented by the USSR, calling for a one-third reduction of armaments, the prohibition ofatomic weapons and the

a. proposals for strengthening world peacecdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/chapter_pdf/1950yun/1950_p1...a....

Documents