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A Pox on All Compromises: Reply toCraig (1999)

Craig (1999) starts out well in his essay, “Communication Theory as aField.” His essay identifies the central problem of communication theory:a proliferation of distinct communication theories and no consensusamong them—that is, “no canon of general theory to which they allrefer” (p. 119). The essay also suggests a positive course of action—”productive argumentation” (p. 120)—that might result in “theoreticaldiversity, argument, debate, even at the cost of occasional lapses intoacademic sniping” (p. 124).

Hear, hear. Many have made similar observations over the past coupleof decades; readers can now choose their idiosyncratic favorites from agrowing collection of articles about the ragged state of communicationtheory. There’s Craig (1993), of course. Beniger (1988, 1990) documentedthe degree to which core publications in the communication field fail tovalidate core theories and theorists. The Peters-Gonzales debate (Peters,1986, 1988; Gonzales, 1988) highlighted the field’s inability to definecore concepts—focusing on the “communicative.” A little more recently,the same issue of poorly defined core concepts was raised in the ex-change between Sparks (1995a, 1995b) and Potter, Cooper, & Dupagne(1993, 1995).

Craig’s conclusion is this: “This field of communication theory is nota repository of absolute truth. It claims no more than to be useful”(p. 154).

Yikes. In the end, Craig places communication theory(ies) alongsidehis notion of the “art” of rhetoric: a social practice “appealing to” or“marking out” common and public knowledge. Communicationtheory(ies) of this sort would create “a space for theoreticalmetadiscourse,” and this space for theoretical metadiscouse would then“engage . . . with practical metadiscourse on questions of communica-tion as a social practice” (see p. 154). Such constructivist1 notions aretrendy, to be sure, but, as presented by Craig, I don’t think they makemuch sense.

Though Craig describes real problems and proposes worthy goals,the strategy he offers to overcome those problems and achieve those

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goals is misrepresented and misguided—simply wrongheaded. In thisessay, I would like to detail two reasons for this wrongheadedness. Thefirst is found in Craig’s argument and the inconsistencies it entails: Hemisrepresents his position. The second is a brief example, based on re-cent research and theory concerning computer-mediated communica-tions, of how problems inevitably result from the lack (whether real orimagined) of truth.

The Argument in the MirrorHere is a brief summary of Craig’s basic argument (pp. 120–121), as Iunderstand it:

1. There are many competing, isolated communication theories.2. The best course of action at this time is to facilitate communication

and argumentation among these many competing, isolated communica-tion theories.

3. In order to accomplish #2, we would do well to construct a(meta)theory2 of communication theories.

4. This metatheory of communication theories should be based on aconceptualization [a theory] of communication as a social practice.

I have no bone to pick with #1. I’ve studied and taught mass commu-nication theory for some time, at the graduate level, at the undergradu-ate level. I’ve read the articles. I’ve assigned the books. It’s a mess, to besure, verging on incoherence, just as Craig describes it.

If we accept Craig’s description, this “putative communicationdiscipline[’s]” inability to “cohere as a self-sustaining whole that [is]something more than the sum of its parts” (p. 123), then #2 makes oneof the truly strong points of the essay, buoyed by Shotter (1997).

Beginning with #3, however, the argument goes astray. Perhaps a sortof metatheory is required to achieve the goals of #2; and Craig at firstdescribes the proper context for productive argumentation as a “dia-logical-dialectical disciplinary matrix.” Sounds promising. A scant fewsentences later, though, that context has become “a constitutivemetamodel” and, immediately thereafter, “theorizing communication asa social practice” (p. 121). From this point forward, it is increasinglydifficult to read Craig’s essay as an attempt to promote argumentationamong competing theories. It reads rather as the straightforward advo-cacy of a constitutive model of communication—stacking the deck againstany present or future alternative conceptualizations of the communica-tion process.

Obviously aware of such a reading, Craig immediately addresses thefollowing questions: Does this initial and ultimate assertion of “commu-nication as a social practice” beg all other theoretical questions posed in

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the essay? Does this assertion have implied truth characteristics? Arethese “absolute truth” characteristics?

Craig confronts these directly when he considers “The ConstitutiveModel of Communication as Metamodel” (pp. 124–128). After relyingheavily on Deetz (1994) for the conceptual particulars of the metamodel,Craig admits, “since the constitutive model typically denies that anyconcept has a true essence except as constituted within the communica-tion process, to assert that the constitutive model is the ‘true’ model ofcommunication would seem self-contradictory” (p. 127).

Indeed. Yet Craig argues that a constitutive metamodel is neither self-contradictory nor begging any of the questions posed within his “dia-logical-dialectical matrix” because (a) a constitutive metamodel is ametamodel (i.e., not a first-order constitutive model), (b) “there are manydifferent ways in which communication can be theorized, or constitutedsymbolically, within a constitutive metamodel” (p. 128), and (c) a con-stitutive metamodel leads to a “coherent” (apparently not synonymouswith “unified”) and “useful” field of communication.

Let’s take these reasons one by one:First, according to Craig, a communication metamodel should not be

confused with a “first-order” model of communication, for example, asociocultural model (p. 144) or a critical discourse model (p. 146). Ifsuch confusion takes place, then “paradox lurks” (p. 127).

The most significant difference between a first-order model and a sec-ond-order model (metamodel) is the “reflexive turn” of the latter: “Afirst-order model . . . is a perspective on communication. . . . A second-order model . . is a perspective on models . . .” (p. 127).

Craig’s uses this reflexive turn to deflect any criticism of a first-orderconstitutive model to the second-order constitutive model—and thenasserts the validity of the second-order model on the basis of its distinc-tion from the first-order model. The distinction between the two re-mains nominal, though. In both first- and second-order cases, the con-stitutive “perspective” of the model remains the same; therefore, theassumptions and operations of either model, regardless of its “order” orthe object of those assumptions and operations, remain the same.

If, according to Craig’s line of reasoning, a reflexive turn safely extri-cates any first-order constitutive model from criticisms of tautology andself-contradiction, then, by the same line of reasoning, subsequent re-flexive turns would render any n-order model less tautological and lessself-contradictory than any (n -1)-order model—a difficult position uponwhich to hang. Yet the only other argument found in support of a signifi-cant difference between first- and second-order constitutive models is theimplication that the constitutive metamodel is unique in function: “other[theoretical] traditions can be reconstructed according to the constitutivemetamodel as alternative types of communication explanations” (p. 128).

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However, these “other” traditions can be reconstructed according tofirst-order models as well, as Craig himself demonstrates with his theo-retical topoi (p. 132, Table 2, p. 134), so the argument cannot hang wellupon this single point either. Meanwhile, in glaring contrast to Craig’sclaim for metamodel distinction, the conceptual similarities between aconstitutive metamodel and its first-order antecedent remain prominent(those strikingly parallel references to Deetz, for instance; cf. p. 148).

Second, Craig claims that a constitutive metamodel is preferable toother models because it incorporates alternative models within it.4 Logi-cally, however, any theoretical model can incorporate other models—asfalse or distorted models, or both. This is, essentially, what the constitu-tive model does: It imports reconstructed versions of its alternatives,animating the hollow bodies of those theories while depriving them ofthe paradigmatic souls.

Admittedly, however, Craig’s constitutive metamodel does not, strictlyspeaking, assert the falseness of these alternative models. It cannot be-cause it denies the common validity of true–false distinctions. Because aconstitutive model denies any true–false basis for self-contradiction, itis, according to its own set of rules, not self-contradictory in that re-spect. Point taken—but only within the constitutive framework Craigprovides.

Third, Craig asserts that the constitutive metamodel leads to a “co-herent” and “useful” field of communication. This assertion is impor-tant because, in lieu of truth, the constitutive metamodel would assignvalue to communication models (including its own) according to theirpragmatics, which are interpreted by Craig chiefly in terms of culturalrelevance, as in these examples:

Transmission-like notions of communication, whatever their philosophical flaws, con-tinue to have cultural currency. (p. 127)

I envision communication theory as an open field of discourse engaged with the prob-lems of communication as a social practice, a theoretical metadiscourse that emergesfrom, extends, and informs practical metadiscourse. (p. 129)

In a practical discipline of communication, theory is designed to provide conceptualresources for reflecting on communication problems. (p. 130)

What is the practical value of the constitutive metamodel? Craig iden-tifies two components: coherency and usefulness. Coherency is intendedto provide a context for productive argumentation. Usefulness comesfrom the metamodel’s applicability within communication theory as a“practical discipline”: “My goal . . . is to show how the potential practi-cal relevance of all communication theories . . . can be exploited to con-

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struct a field . . . in which all communication theories can interact produc-tively with each other and . . . with communication practice” (p. 131).

Ultimately, Craig’s constitutive metamodel might hang (or fall) onthis issue alone. Regardless of any reflexive pseudo–second-order turn-ings or lurking truth-condition paradoxes, if the model is practical, if itsolves the problems plaguing communication theory, then, within theconstitutive framework Craig provides, the model is a valid one. So, weask, does a constitutive metamodel allow communication among com-peting, isolated theories5? Does it allow productive argumentation amongcompeting, isolated theories?

To do these things, Craig’s metamodel must attain at least three here-tofore unattainable goals: (a) retain the fundamental distinctions amongcompeting, isolated communication theories, while (b) establishing ef-fective lines of communication among competing, isolated theories, inorder to (c) promote productive argumentation among competing, iso-lated theories. Also, this metamodel must accomplish these three taskswithout itself being a first-order communication model (in order to avoidbegging those questions raised during “productive” argumentation).So, this metamodel must fail.6 It is difficult to imagine any singlemodel, meta- or otherwise, simultaneously serving two such dispar-ate masters as those of paradigmatic distinction and pragmatic syn-thesis.

Craig would hide the inevitability of this failure by assigning each ofthe three separate tasks above to three separate functionaries. His “dia-logical-dialectical matrix” retains the fundamental distinctions of thecompeting theories. His “constitutive metamodel” provides the com-munication channel among the competing theories. His “practical dis-course” then promotes productive argumentation by serving as adjudi-cator for all resulting competition and dispute.

Yet, each of these three functionaries is based on the same blatantlyconstitutive assumptions—the matrix and the practical discourse admit-tedly so; the constitutive metamodel despite Craig’s posturing otherwise.Craig’s final conceptualization of “Communication Theory as a Field,”then, is regarded better as “Communication Theory as ConstitutiveTheory.”

Here’s the kicker, though: If that alternate representation is used, thenthe argument is not so bad. It’s certainly no longer a simple misrepresen-tation. It’s certainly less tautological and less self-contradictory.7 It’s evenmore conducive to productive argumentation (as I’ll try to show in thesection following).

Of course, Craig’s argument then becomes an argument for constitu-tive modeling as exactly the sort of grand and unified communicationtheory that Craig so convolutedly seeks to shun. That could well be apositive, however, if the model were the problem solver Craig main-

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tains. I think, though, that the problems remain unsolved, and argumentremains wrongheaded—for still other reasons.

Truth or ConsequencesOnce again, here is Craig’s vision: “Communication theory as an openfield of discourse engaged with the problems of communication as asocial practice, a theoretical metadiscourse that emerges from, extends,and informs practical metadiscourse” (p. 129).8

How different is this vision from the current state of communicationtheory? Surely there has been no lack of practical cooks stirring the theo-retical communication soup. How much more open can our field ofdiscourse become, and what are the benefits of this continued and im-proved openness?

Perhaps Craig intends the vagaries of “metadiscourse” to serve as amechanism of variation in some great, blind-variation-and-selectionmelting pot of communication theory(ies)—a notion that has (to me) aninherent naturalistic appeal. However, Craig offers no suitable, accom-panying mechanism of selection. Without standards for evaluating and,when appropriate, terminating discourse, his proposal does little to stopthe lamented proliferation of communication theories. Let me give aslightly extended example of this sticky problem with Craig’s “open-ended diversity” (p. 128): the inability to differentiate among the good,the bad, and the ugly.The Indeterminate History ofTechnological DeterminismMarshall McLuhan’s ideas were extremely popular and widely influen-tial during their heyday. Their historical significance is indisputable; there-fore current compilations of communication theories listed by Craig (i.e.,Littlejohn, 1996) justifiably devote some portion of their texts to discus-sion of those ideas, even though those ideas are now controversial atbest, discredited at worst.9

It is not my intent here to further discredit McLuhanesque notions ofstrong technological determinism. I believe this has been well accom-plished; nor is it my intent to document the degree to which these no-tions infect discussions elsewhere, even among such respected tomes asThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions (cf. Kuhn’s broadly stroked no-tions of gestalt psychology and “neural programming” pp. 112, 195ff.).

Instead, I would like now to do this: (a) briefly document how as-sumptions of technological determinism early (and wrongly) shaped re-search of computer-mediated communication contexts, and (b) ask howa constitutive model of communication, as Craig describes it, could everhope to prevent errors similar.

First, though, let’s be clear about the extremity of McLuhan’s (1962)

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position: “It would seem that the extension of one or another of oursenses by mechanical means, such as the phonetic script, can act as asort of twist for the kaleidoscope of the entire sensorium” (p. 55).

In retrospect, this is quite a statement: The notion that “mechanicalmeans” (i.e., communication technologies or, by extension, any envi-ronmental context outside the normal boundaries of the human biologi-cal organism) can significantly alter the “sensorium” (human cognitiveprocesses). This claim assumes quite a bit about human cognition, biol-ogy, and general species evolution.10

Commonly, however, there are data-driven tests within the practicaldiscourse of communication research, including tests of McLuhan’s modeland those like it, and, most of the time, those tests get it right. There hasbeen, for instance, widespread rejection of strong media determinismbecause there is simply not a lot of observational evidence to support it.Without thorough examination of the paradigmatic assumptions under-lying this model—in both its strong and weak versions—technologicaldeterminism tends, however, to reappear. Outbreaks can be observedwhenever new technology becomes available within the mass market-place or simply whenever observational counterevidence has faded suf-ficiently in the short-term memory of practical discourse.

The case in point: computer-mediated communications. Early studiesof CMC by communication scholars, conducted well after the McLuhanperihelion, focused on the technological characteristics of the new me-dium. Influenced by observations in The Network Nation (Hiltz & Turoff,1978) and claims of “social presence” theory (Short, Williams, & Christie,1976), the first studies to present a tightly constructed and well-rea-soned model of CMC behavior come out of Carnegie-Mellon during the1980s—and got it all wrong.

As a single representative example, Kiesler, Siegal, & McGuire (1984),in a widely referenced article in American Psychologist, concluded thatonline communications has “a paucity of social context information”(p. 1128) that results in the “deindividuation” of online communicators(p. 1126). Over the next 10 years, this notion dominated theory andresearch on CMC and produced a variety of social presence spin-offs:Sproull and Kiesler’s (1986) own “social context cues” theory, a “re-duced cues” approach (Rice & Love, 1987), “cues-filtered-out” theo-ries (Culnan & Markus, 1987), “information richness theory” (Daft &Lengel, 1986), “media richness” (Rice, 1992), and the like.

All assumed some causal relationship between the technological char-acteristics of the communication medium and the behavioral character-istics of those who used that medium. In short, they assumed that “so-cial and organizational changes . . . stem mainly from how communica-tion technology changes . . . system interdependencies” (Sproull & Kiesler,1991, p. 3). Yet, at the same time this particular discourse was taking

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place, online participants were finding a great deal of social contextcreation, destruction, and manipulation by individuals within CMC con-texts. Indeed, for anyone actually involved in online activities, there wasa whole lot of individuation going on (Myers, 1987a, 1987b).

The communication research community eventually came around.Several (Spears & Lea, 1994; Blanchard, 1998; Postmes, Spears, & Lea,1998) now have noted the tension between the two sets of theories con-cerning CMC behavior—those based on technological differences andthose based on social necessities. Currently riding the internet waves arethriving bands of communication scholars focusing precisely on thoseaspects of CMC behavior that earlier researchers found “a paucity of”:the formation and maintenance of online community and the degree towhich social relationships shape technological contexts (Boudourides,1995; Kling, 1996; Sempsey, 1997; Chenault, 1998).

On one hand, perhaps, this is an example of how communicationresearch is self-correcting—a practical discourse success story. On theother hand, this particular self-correction seems a big waste of time.There was certainly enough evidence in the 1980s to question the basictenets of determinist models.

[S]ociologists have been wondering for over a century about how technological changes(along with bureaucratization, industrialization, urbanization and capitalism) have af-fected community (Wellman & Leighton 1979; Wellman 1988a). Have such changes ledcommunity to (a) fall apart, (b) persevere as village-like shelters from mass society, or (c)be liberated from the clasp of traditional solidary groups? . . . until the 1950s, sociolo-gists feared that rapid modernization would mean the loss of community, leaving ahandful of transitory, disconnected, weakly supportive relationships (e.g., Tönnies, 1887;Stein, 1960). Since then, more systematic ethnographic and survey techniques have dem-onstrated the persistence of community in neighborhood and kinship groups (e.g., Young& Willmott, 1957; Gans, 1962). (emphasis in original, Wellman & Gulia, 1996)

Even if wrong decisions were made or important evidence ignored inthis particular instance, it wouldn’t be the first or last time, in this or anyother academic field. More problematic, as the above Wellman & Gulia(1996) comments are meant to indicate, the same sort of analysis, basedon media determinist assumptions, is ongoing.

Although broad references to Gutenberg (1436) and McLuhan (1965) are often made(see Press, 1995), both sides of the debate are presentist and unscholarly. Consistentwith the present-oriented ethos of computer users, pundits write as if people had neverworried about community before the Internet arose.

Despite a growing and thoughtful literature [devoted to the study of CMC], . . . the mostpublicized views are those expressed in books and papers read by the computing com-

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munity and the public at large, like Turkle’s Life on the screen, and Stone’s The war ofdesire and technology at the close of the mechanical age… These tend to have journalis-tic appeal based on futurism and radical scenarios, or because they originate withincommunities unconstrained by prior social theory to project new social scenarios fromenvisioned changes in technology. (Wynn & Katz, 1997)

Do not devotees of “practical discourse” create a similar sort of com-munity, one that is “unconstrained by prior social theory”?

Why, one wonders, hasn’t the practical discourse community raisedmore fundamental criticisms of deterministic assumptions? It seems thefundamental assumptions of technological determinism were (are) neverclearly and definitively taken to task: It is only McLuhan’s version (orsome researcher X’s version) of technological determinism that falls intofaddish disfavor, to be resurrected under some new guise in some fol-lowing decade.

It is this, I would argue, that is the real problem with communicationtheory, and the real problem that Craig’s practical discourse is least likelyto solve: What are the fundamentals of communication? Or, as Peters(1988) put it, where do we locate the “communicative”?11

Craig’s practical discourse strategy would have us collect baskets oftheoretical concepts (“vocabularies”) that are simultaneously mutually(logically) exclusive and yet somehow productively coexistent: a MadHatter’s tea party. Though a constitutive metamodel well may allow allto participate in this party of discourse, it seems particularly ill suited toinform any of the participants when it is time to leave.

The NutshellHere are questions I’ve raised against Craig’s proposal:

Regarding the proposal’s internals, how is Craig’s metamodel signifi-cantly different from a “first-order” constitutive model of communica-tion? How can this metamodel retain fundamental, paradigmatic dis-tinctions among competing, isolated communication theories?

Regarding the proposal’s externals, how can a constitutive modelimprove the current situation by adjudicating among competing com-munication models? Most particularly, what mechanism allows it to re-duce misrepresentation and mistake?

In the end, Craig wants us all to get along. I much prefer his earliercall for argument, debate, and the occasional academic snipe.

David Myers is an associate professor and director of graduate studies in the Department of Com-munication at Loyola University in New Orleans. His research investigates transformations ofsigns and symbols within new media contexts, including computer games. Recent publications maybe found in Semiotica, 123(3/4) and Simulation & Gaming, 30(2).

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1 A brief note on terminology: Craig adopts throughout what I could call a “constructivist”position, but he much prefers the term “constitutive.” Obviously, this latter term originates withinWittgenstein’s distinction between constitutive-representative language and is closely associatedwith social constructivism; therefore, I am unconcerned about the appropriateness of its use. I ampuzzled, however, that Craig’s vocabulary does not acknowledge broader constructivist roots.2 There may be some controversy over this use of the term “metatheory.” This term, to my under-standing, is used properly. I am swayed to its use by the following:

Craig states “the potential of communication theory as a field can best be realized. . . not in aunified theory of communication but in a dialogical-dialetical disciplinary matrix, a commonlyunderstood (though always contestable) set of assumptions” (p. 120, emphasis added). At firstglance, this would seem to indicate that the term “metatheory” (being commonly associated withunified theory) is not preferred.

However, Craig subsequently offers a “constitutive model” as a solution to our communicationproblems. This constitutive model is “a metamodel that opens up a conceptual space in whichmany different theoretical models of communication can interact” (pp. 126–127). During Craig’sdiscussion, I am led to believe there is little significant difference between a “commonly understoodset of assumptions” (p. 120) and a “metamodel” (p. 126). Then, Craig equates communicationtheory with the “theoretical metadiscourse”(p. 129) that a commonly understood set of assump-tions (i.e., a metamodel) might provide. What I have done then, in my understanding, is collapse “acommon set of assumptions,” “a metamodel,” and “a theoretical metadiscourse” (all terms pre-ferred by Craig) into the term “metatheory.” Admittedly, however, this latter term is my own; Craigdoes not use it.3 One wonders why Craig, without comment, immediately chooses to emphasize “constituting”rather than “symbolizing” in his metamodel. In fact, it well may be that any one of his seven “first-order” models can be as easily raised to metamodel status. Implicit in the quote above, for instance,is the notion of a coherent metamodel based on semiotics (symbolizing) equally as well as discourse(constituting).4 It does, of course, rip the theoretical bowels from those other models by only incorporatingthem “pragmatically” rather than paradigmatically, but this appears of little concern to the consti-tutive modeler if that modeler assumes, as Craig seems to, that alternative models and theories are,at their core, only “alternative vocabularies” available for “critical reconstruction” (see p. 130).This cavalier manner of incorporation may be of more concern, of course, to those outside theconstitutive modeler fold.5 For the purpose of discussion, these can be limited to those seven “traditions” described byCraig.6 It must be said that there are arguments of note that any model attempting to accomplish whatCraig would like his model to do must fail. If the differences among communication theories aretruly based on unique paradigmatic assumptions concerning the “communicative,” then it is un-likely any superficial appeal to rhetorical similarities among these theories will mediate their differ-ences. It is rather more likely, as Kuhn (1970) notes, that any attempt at serious theoretical debatebetween distinct paradigmatic camps would simply not be effective: “Communication across therevolutionary divide is inevitably partial” (p. 149).

Let us, however, grant Craig his notion—admittedly an appealing one—that if these tasks hesets for his metamodel to accomplish were accomplishable, then it would be a good thing to accom-plish them. Even if this were the case, Craig’s argument remains a misrepresentation: It is simplynot what it purports to be.7 A caveat here. It is unclear to me, because I find no references pertinent, just how closely Craig’sconstitutive model borders on broader antifoundationalism. The closer it gets to Rorty’s brand ofall-inclusive relativism, the more it appears subject to renewed criticisms of this sort:

If we are told it is futile to seek outside our conceptual schemes for confirmation of them[,]isn’t this to take a stand about the ultimate nature of knowledge and reality, namely thatsince knowledge is always perspectival, reality is therefore constructed, and not discovered?Doesn’t anti-foundationalist talk of historicity, contingency, and the role of culture and lan-guage in shaping beliefs presuppose, at the very least, a complex world which acts in certaincausal ways upon us rather predictable creatures? The answer has to be that of course itdoes presuppose all this, or some version of it, and of course it does make implicit meta-

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physical commitments. There is no way Rorty’s (or anyone else’s) critique of traditionalphilosophy can get off the ground without assuming a very real and specific world of people,culture, traditions of belief, etc. which his arguments claim to portray correctly. The impos-sibility of getting outside our conceptual and perceptual schemes—the central insight ofanti-foundationalism—is itself implied by the ordinary realist assumptions that human be-ings are physical and cognitive creatures, whose perspectives are shaped by biological andcultural circumstances. (Clark, 1993)

8 The implied distinction between “practical” and “theoretical” metadiscourse is based, I as-sume, on a similar (and superficial) distinction between a first- and second-order constitutive model—which I find problematic. In this regard, this second part of the argument against Craig’s proposalextends the argument of the first part and focuses on the same crack in that proposal’s foundation.9 See Carey (1968, 1981) for significant themes of discreditation, though we all must realize that,in a polysemic world, reconstructions recur. Grosswiler (1996), for instance, describes McLuhan aspostmodern trendsetter.10 Similar claims about human bodily functions, such as radical changes to the digestive systemresulting from some mechanical extension of the human palate (say, forks and spoons), raise moreeyebrows. However, communication theory, it seems, in divorcing sign and symbol functions (cogni-tion) from other bodily functions (digestion), is allowed certain poetic licenses of the McLuhan sort.11 Craig seems to admit as much early when he laments the “plethora of definitions of communi-cation” (p. 122), yet he maintains later that “the field of communication theory is logically open tonew traditions, subject only to the limitation that each new tradition must be based on a uniquemodel of communicative practice” (p. 150).

Is communication a theoretical field whose core concepts are fundamentally indeterminate? Oris communication a theoretical field whose core concepts are rightfully determined elsewhere, forexample, in studies outside the current field of communication, whether interdisciplinary,multidisciplinary, pandisciplinary, metadisciplinary, or simply different? Are these important ques-tions, and, if they are, can Craig’s model provide answers?

Beniger, J. R. (1988). Information and communication: The new convergence. CommunicationResearch, 15, 198–218.

Beniger, J. R. (1990). Who are the most important theorists of communication? CommunicationResearch, 17, 698–715.

Blanchard, A. L. (1998). Virtual behavior settings: An application of behavior setting theories tovirtual communities CGU Research Institute. [Online]. Available: http://www.cgu.edu/inst/cguri/virtbehavset.htm

Boudourides, M. A. (1995). Social and psychological effects in computer–mediated communica-tion [Online]. Available: http://www.math.upatras.gr/~mboudour/articles/csi.html

Carey, J. (1968). Harold Adams Innis and Marshall McLuhan. In R. Rosenthal (Ed.), McLuhan:Pro and con (pp. 270–308). Baltimore: Penguin.

Carey, J. (1981). McLuhan and Mumford: The roots of modern media analysis. Journal of Com-munication, 31(3), 162–178.

Chenault, B. G. (1998). Developing personal and emotional relationships via computer-mediatedcommunication. CMC Magazine [Online]. Available: http://www.december.com/cmc/mag/1998/may/chenault.html

Clark, T. W. (1993). Humanism and postmodernism: A reconciliation. Humanist, 53, 18–23.[Online]. Available: http://world.std.com/~twc/Humanism.htm

Craig, R. T. (1993). Why are there so many communication theories? Journal of Communication,43(3), 26–33.

Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication Theory, 9, 119–161.Culnan, M. J., & Markus, M. L. (1987). Information technologies. In F. M. Jablin, L. L. Putnam,

K. H. Roberts, & L. W. Porter (Eds.). Handbook of organizational communication: An inter-disciplinary perspective. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Daft, R. L., & Lengel, R. H. (1986). Organizational information requirements, media richness andstructural design. Management Science, 32, 554–571.

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Deetz, S. A. (1994). Future of the discipline: The challenges, the research, and the social contribution.In S. A. Deetz (Ed.), Communication yearbook 17 (pp. 565–600). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gonzales, H. (1988). The evolution of communication as a field. Communication Research, 15,302–308.

Grosswiler, P. (1996). The dialectical methods of Marshall McLuhan, Marxism, and critical theory.Canadian Journal of Communication, 21(1). [Online]. Available: http://www.cjc-online.ca/BackIssues/21.1/grosswil.html

Hiltz, S. R., & Turoff, M. (1978). The network nation: Human communication via computer.Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Littlejohn, S. (1996). Theories of human communication (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.Kiesler, S., Siegler, J., & McGuire, T. W. (1984). Social psychological aspects of computer mediated

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