T H E ANSWERBy John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape

A partition pian for Bosnia.

T hree idea.s for' peace in Bosnia are now conceiv-able: the fast-fading Vance-Owen pian; LIIC newEuropean proposal to create u.N.-protected"safe havens" ft)r the Muslims; and the much

less discussed concept of partitioning Bosnia into threeindependent states. There's only one constant: theWestern powers wanL peace in the Balkans and don'twarn to spend much blood and treasure Lt) achieve it.The debate is therefore gtwerned by a judgmenl t)fwhal will work and how nuich force will be required loachieve il. Within these conslraiiiLs, paniLitin is the bestoption: it is tlie oniy plan that doesn't deny the r'ealityof what has happened, does noi acquiesce in the deci-mation of lhe Bosnian Muslims and has a chance ofbeing enforced withotii a rnajot" military embroilment.The Clinton adminisiration .should Itjok it t)ver,

Vance-Owen, which is siill the West's primary concep-llt)n of postwar Bosnia, offers nothing but trouble. Theplan would leave Bosnia's current external bt)rdersinlaci while ceding power to ten seniiautonomcjtts prt>vinces whose btu ders would be drawn along ethnic lines.Croats, Muslims and Serbs would each dtiminate ihreeprovinces, while the pi'tjvince around Sarajevo would bejointly administered. No group's provinces would befully coiuiguous; instead, each wtjiild control two ctni-tiguous provinces, with a third province geographicallyseparated from ihe t)Lher two. Each province would ruleitself, subject to a weak centi'al governmeni ("omprisingr epresentatives from each ethnic group, whose coopera-tion might well be impossible after the brutai past year.

Vance-Owen would require a two-step military opera-tion: compelling Bosnian Seib v\itlidrawals from seizedterritories (required because the Serbs now controlsome 70 percent of Bosnia, while Vance-Owen assignsthem only 43 percent), and gctiing Bosnian Serbs andBosnian Croats Lo submit to rtilc from Sarajevo. Other-wise, the intercommunal slaughter will continue. Thelirst step seems feasible, as we describe later in dis-cussing pai titicMi, which requires a similar military opei"-

JOHN J. ME,\RSHEI\IKR is professor of political science atlhe Universit)^ of Chicagt). R()Bt:RT A. PAPK teaches at theSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies, .Air University,Maxwell A.F.li., i-Ylabania. fhese views are those of theatiLht)rs alone.

ation. But Vance-Owen's land mine lies in Lhe near"impossibility ofthe second step: bringing power Lo Sara-jevo.

Several factors combine to make this diffictiU. First,Lhe Bosnian Serb and Croat poptrlations want lo joinSerbia and Croatia proper. Their submission to Sarajevomust be compelled by force—village i)y village, street bystreet, hotisc by house. Whatever army is responsible forbringing about Lhis submission would face endless guer-rilla resistance. Set"oiid, all tliree sides are wcll-Lrainedm guerrilla tactics antl well-armed for guerrilla war.Indeed, the military doctrine ofthe ft>rmer Yugoslaviastressed such tactics, and the Yugt)slav army held largestocks of weapons appropriate for gtierrilla war (mines,lighl mat hine gitns and light morlars). The Serbs, whowill resist Vance-Owen most fierreH. inherited the lion'sshare of these weapons.

Third, the moirriiainous and heavily wt)oded Lerrainof Bosnia is ideal for gtterrilla resistance. An Americanmilitary planner notes that Bosnia is "the most motin-tainons and inaccessible, fortress-like part ofthe ctjuri-try"—the r'egion to which the former Yugoslavian aimyplanned to withdraw and wage war against an Invader.Those who cile the (julf war as evidence that we can gointo Bosnia with ease should remember that Bosniaresembles Vietnam far more than h does Kuwait.Finally. Vance-Owen would creaLc a weak Bosnian cen-tral state that would be too feeble to impose rttle withits own forces. Western forces wotild have to fill thispower deficit.

What for ces wotild the West need to overcome theseobstacles? Ptiblic discussion suggests NATO would need50,000 to 70,000 soldiers to police a post-Vance-OwenBosnia, but the.se numbers are far too low. The Bt)snianSerb and the Bosnian Croat populations made Lrp50 percent of Bosnia's pre-war poptilatitm of 4.4 millitjnand controlled territory about two-thirds the size ofSouth X'ietnani. Tt^gether they now field roughly120.000 armed combatants, many of whtjiii are freefrom central conirtjl. Furthermore, they would see N.\Tt>coming and ft)r"iify themselves in the most defensibleteriain. Large infantry forces would be needed to dealwilll these iritiigenous fighters. The NATt) troop reqtiirc-ment is difficttlL Lo estimate, btu we can figtirc a roughminimum fVom similar counterinsurgency campaigns.

A peak ct)mmitmenl of 550,000 American troops wasinsufficient to defeat (!)oniniunist forces in Vietnam,(jernian and Italian forces of rougiily the same sizefailed to qtiell partisan le.sistance in Yugt)slavia duringWorld War II. Earlier, Austria-Hungary needed 200,000iroops to suhtitre a smaller and less organized Bosnianpopulation in 1878. Thus, a NATO lorxe of 400.000LrotJps seems reasonable.

Even so, N.vm iroops are poor!) suited for Uie war'they would face—lhey are besi al waging armored waragainst other conventional armies—and the citizensof NATO countries would likolv find the nature ofa guer-rilla war hard it) stonuuh. Winning snch wars dependson intelligence collection. Unft)rtrinaLely, the bestcollection techniques violate the laws of war: reconcen-iration of ptjptilations. tortur-e of insurgents. Guer-rilla war can be waged without these methods, butcivilized uictics impose a high militiiry cost.

For these reasons NATOwould be unwise tt> try it)enft)rce Vance-Owen, even, inthe unlikelv event thai theBosnian Serbs sign It. 1 hepritT of ptrtting lhis humpLy-dtimpty ofa multiethnic stateback together again would betoo greai. If \AT(J takes acrack at the jt)b. its Btjsniaristay is likely it) be painful arrciirnsuccessftrl.

Safe havon.s iire also apotential disaster. Under thisconcept lhe U.N. would sentlgrt)irnd forces to protect sixMuslim enclaves—Bihac, Sre-brenica, Zepa, Sarajevt),Gorazde and Tirzla—thai arenow besiegetl by BosnianSerb forces. Of the remaining1.7 millitm Muslims in Bosnia,1.2 million now live in lhe six havens, as residents t)rrefugees. The i .N. forces would expand the perimetersof these areas and take 'all necessary measures" tt)defentl them from Serb t>r Croat atlat k. Rept)rts say thecurrent t;.N. ibrce of 9.500 British, French. Spanish andCanadian troops wouid be expanded b) several lht)ir-sand to accomplish these goals.

This plan violates a prime law of statecrafi: Lhe tise ofIbrce should be married to a clearly defined politicalobje<:tive. Once the havens are secured, what next? Thejt)b of peacf-riuiking would be far from finished. Creat-ing havens would leave Bosnia dotted with Muslimenclaves trapped in a hostile Serbian sea. Becatise theyare geographically indefensible (Srebrenica and Zepaar'e less ihan ten miles in diametei) and economicallyunviable. the enclaves ctmld never form the core of anew state, and maintaining them ct)tilcl impose a largemiliLary cost on the Wesiein pt)wers. Expanding iheirsize would retiuire costly t)flensive operations. A itirtherrisk is Lhat iht- Serbs might riujve tht* war from the

t l l . l S J K A I I O N J I M | [ < 1 I I ( > \ \

havens to undefended areas, where nearlv 500,000 Mus-lims reside. This coirld lead Lhe u.\. eilher lo abandonsome Mtrslims fbr the sake of others or to expand thehavens prtjgrcssivcly to include all of Muslim-heldBosnia. Doing the latter wt>uld mean raising Westerntroop levels as wt'll. Thf plan tloes a bad job of tlividingthe respoiisii)ility lor" peace: the ti.N. wt)Lrld do Loomuch, the Bosniun Muslims too iittie, WTiat JohnKennedy said tjf Vietnam should apply to the Muslims:"In the final analysis it is their war."

A cleai" partition of Bosnia, while not perfect, isclearly the mt>si feasible st)kition. Bosnia would bedivided intt) three ethnically homogeneous stales. The(4'oatian and Serbian siaLes would be free to join(ir'eater Croatia and Greater Serbia, respectively; theBosnian-Muslim state wt)iild stand alone as an indepen-dent eriiity. Minority populations trappetl behind thenew boundaries could move to their new homes under

t:.N. auspices.A lasting sohition requires

that the Bosnian-Muslim statebe militarily and economicallyviable. U iTuist form a single,t oinpaci whole; it cannot be atiny "leopard spot" state. ItriiusL be iarge enough to posea substantial obstacle to anattacker and to meet the eco-nomic needs of its population.The Bosnian-Muslim stateshtjuld be ceiitcr'ed on Sara-jevo and cover a lar"ge portionof the eastern half olWhat waspre-war Bosnia-Hcrvegtnina,The nonhern border shouldrun from TesHc to Tuzla to thewestern bank of the DrinaRiver near Loznica. alt)ng thenorthernmost mountain ridgebefore the Pannonian plain.

The western border should run from Teslic it) Zcnica toKonjic. This is mountainous terrain, and Lhe BosnaRiver serves as a fallback line of defense. The southernbt)rder shtJtrld run from Konjic along lhe Neretva Riverstraight Lo the Serbian Ijorder. The Neretva Valley, withILS high ridges, is a strong line of defense. The easternbt)rder shcjirld run along the present bt)rder' betweenSerbia antl Bosnia tip to Loznica. Most of this borderioUow.s the Drina River.

The remaining lerriLory of Bosnia-Herzegovinawotrltl be divideti among the Croats and Serbs. TheCroats shoiiltl gel one large chunk of territory on thesouthwestern border of the new Bosnian-Muslim state.This would inclntle most of the two major areas(provinces 8 and 10) awarded to them irntier Vance-Owen. The Serbs should be given the remainder ofBtisnia-Herzegovina, which would include the Bihacantl the Bosanska Posavina areas. The Muslims of Bihac(pr"t)vincc 1 in Vance-Owen) would mt)ve to Lhe newBosnian-Muslim slate, while the (^Iroatians in lhe small

; t k 1 M l \ K \ \ K K I - l t i l t ( .

JUNE 14. 1993 THE NEW REPUBLIC 23

area of Bosanska Posavina (province 3) would relocaieIt) lheir new stale.

I'he key territorial tratle would be between the Mus-lims and the Serbs. Tlu; Serbs would give tip mtich oftheir territory in eastern Bt)siiia (province B) in returnfor Bihac (province I), whicli the Muslims now control.But the Serbs would still ct)ntr"ol the southeast andnt)rtheast corners of present Bosnia-Herzegovina, andilit'v woirld have a thirlv-five-mik'-witlc east-west corri-dor running along its nt>rtlierri border, connecting Ser-bia proper lo Lhe Serbian regions of Western Bosniaand Croatia. Under Lhis plan the Muslims woirltl corrirolaboirt 35 percent (8,000 square miles) of formerBosnian territory; the Serbs, 45 percent (10,500 squaremiles): and the (i roats. 20 percent (4,500 square miles).These percentages r ouglily r efleel lhe amount of terri-tory each ethnic group controlled in pre-war Bosnia.

How readily would the par ties accept such a plan? Wecannot tell for sure, becatisepanilion has not been widehdi.sctissed in public by the rivalgroups, but we can determint'someLhing about their atti-tudes from their pasL slate-meiiLs and behavior.

The Bosnian Muslims haveshown little interest in parli-tion and have instead argtiedft>r mainiaining the muliieth-nic Bt)snian state that exisk-din April 1992, before fightingbegan. This posilit^n was per"-liaps reasonable in Lhe war'searly stages. Bul a mullifihnicBosnia musl nt)w have littlfappeal for the Muslims aflertheir vast suffering al lheirrteighbors' hands. The (;r't)atsare likely to accept partition M i i MRM K-N m MM IKH :along thf lines we propt)se, asit woiiltl offer them mtich of the terriLory Lhey wereassigned by Vance-Owen, which they quickly accepted,riif Serbs art- nitjie likelv to balk. Tht)iigli thf planwould help diem reali/f their dream ofa Greater Ser-bia, they would also have to cede strbstantial territory ineastern Bosnia, including Sar ajevo, lo the Mtisllms. Thisthey would likely resist. But if the world powers tiscenough force and provide sufficient incentives, theSerbs can. we believe, be compelled.

There are ihree main ar"gunienLs against partititxi.First, some woirld argire thai the military means itrequires would escalate raiher than dampen the vio-lence in Bosnia. We would answer- lhat vit)lence is just aslikely to endure. Greater Serbia, if allowed to presideover its conquests, may well be emboldened by its cost-free expansionism to move on elsewhere. Regrettably,ihfre are times when lives can be saved only by threat-t-riiag Lt) Lake lives. Sft:ond, some would contfntl lhatthe pf)pulation transfer required by partition entailsneedless injury to innocents. Yet iransfer is already

occurring. Even Vance-Owen would produce its ownpopulatitMi transfers, since minorities would doubtlessbe driven from areas designated for t)lher groups.Transfer is a fact. The onl) question is whether it will bet)r"ganizfil. as f misioned hy panitiori, or" lefl It) the mur-derous melhtids of the ethnic cleanse is.

Finally, some might complain thai parlition is iiuoni-plete because it fails to solve t)iher' related Balkan tiou-bles thai could produce fnlure wars—most notablv theconflict in Serbia's Kt).sovo region. There's merii lo this.The Serbian government has ahead) begun a slow-motit)n expulsion of Kosovo's 1.6 million .Albanians,and signs abound Lhat it plans a nu)i"f dramatic andcomplete cleansing soon. Such a move could trigger ageneral Balkan war invoKing Albania, Macedonia andperhaps Bulgaria, Greece and Ttirkfy. The West shoultlreiterate that the cleansing of Kostjvt) will nt)i be Loler-ated. Il mighl also consider putting Kosovo on the table

as it negotiates with Serbiatjver Bosnia. Freeing theregion ct>tild be the price forfull peace with the West.

But critical queslionsremain. How can lhis settle-ment be enforced if the Serbsresist?' And can il be enforcedwiLli an acceptable militarycost to the great powers, par-ticularly the L'nited State.s? Webelieve ihe answer to thesequestions is yes, and lhat theUnited States should prepareto lead the alUancf inlo such astrateg)'.

Two basic military , cam-paigns cotrld be pursued. A"rollback" strategy would tisemassive military force—sup-

A\ IOI; I 111 Nl u Kl I-l IU u plifd simultaneotisly by West-ern air fbrtes and Btjsnian

Muslim gr tJtmd forces—to win a decisive vicLory againstthe Bt)snian Serbs and their Serbian supporters. Theywould be lefl with no choice btit lo accept Westerndemands. "Coercive bloodletting" is a less ambitioussti-ategy. It would use similar means, but wotildn'tdepend on decisive victory. Instead, it wonld presentthe Serbs with the prospect of a costly war of atiritit)niliai would conlinue until they acceptett pariiiion.

Ill theory, air power can be used thr'ee different ways:to decapitate an opponent's leadership, lo punish anoppt)iK'ru's pt)pulation t)r to weaken an oppoiieiU's mil-iLary force,s. Of these, only tiie last stands a chance atbeing effective, but oniy if it is applied in conjunctionwith gr otmd power.

Decapiuition—an approach tised in Desert Storm—wt)uld involve strikes gainst Serbian leadership inBosnia and .Serbia [)rt)pcr. The stiaieg)' has the advan-tage of requiring rclaiivel)' few st)rties over" a few days byprecision aircraft (mainly K-117s) against key leadershipand Lelecommunication fiacilities. Decapitation raids

24 TiiHNiiw REPUBLIC JUNE 14.1993

would also cause little collateral damage, given accurateLargeL intelligence. But finding and LargeLing Lhe keySerb leaders from the air woLild be very difficult. U.S.Lroops took days Lo find Manuel Noriega after LhePanama invasion, and Lhey were hunting him on Lhegroiuid. FLirthermore, killing the key Serbian leaders(Radovan Karadzic and Slohotlan Milosevic) probablywouldn't moderate Serb policies since extremist cur-rents run strong in both communities. Cutting com-numicaLiou links is also impracLical aiifl woirld havelittle effect even if accomplished. Bosnian Serbforces simply have too many ways to communicate withtheir leaders; and this body can fight even wiLhouL iLshead.

The second strategy, aerial punishment, wouldaLLempl lo inflict enough damage on ect)nomic targetsihal Serbian civilians would compel their leaders towithdraw from their occupied lands. While most ofBosnia's economy is already inruins, the Serbian standard ofliving could be SLibstantiallyreduced by a short air cam-paign. Sei'hia's meager airdefenses would be destroyedfirsL; F-117S, F-lUs, F-loEs, F-IHs,F-liis, A-f)s and Tomahawkcruise missiles would Lhenknock out its elecLric powergrids, oil refineries and fooddistribmion .system. In all, sev-eral luindred LargeLs would heattacked. W ith good weather,Lhe campaign might take lesstliau two weeks.

But punishmenl Is uiilikflyLo caLise the Serbs lo abandonthfir Bosnian conquests. Airattacks generate more publicanger against the attackerthan the target. Air ptiwerslaughtered British, German and Japanese civilians inWorfd War II; LhreaLened Egyptian civilians in the 1970"war of attrition" with Israel; and depopulated largeparLs of AfghanisLan in Lhe 1980s. In eath case, the citi-zenry did nt)t Lurn against its gt;)VcrnmenL. Mt^reover,Westerners concerned abouL Lhe Balkan siLuation formainly moral reasons would shrink from using suchindiscriminate means against uoncombaLaiiLs. Finally,Lhe opponent mosL vulnerable Lo aerial punishment—Serbia proper—is not the opponent Lhe West mostneeds to coerce. Even if Belgrade agrees to press LheBosnian Serbs for withdrawals, it is noL clear that Lheywould obey.

The third strategy—weakening the Serbian army Lothe poinL where Bosnian Muslim ground Lroops canforce iLs withdrawal—offers the best chance tjf success.This air campaign might include three sets of targets;the Serbian army in Serbia, Llic .^5,000-man BosnianSerb conventional army and the 35,000 Btjsuiari Serbirregulars. Of Lhcse three, Lhe Serbian convenlional

\r ioN ii\ |i\i Hill 1 <)\\'\y FOR n i i : NI'.VV

army in Serbia proper is the easiest Lo tiack. It is con-centrated in bases and arnietl with heavy weapons thatcan bf found frt>m the air. BuL destroying this armywould only reduce Serbia's ability to reinforce its forces inBt)snia; it would do nothing Lo weaken them direcLly.

Thf Bosnian Serb conventional armies present amt)ro imporLant target, and Lhey can be destroyed fromLhe air if conditions arc right. Since they seem to oper-ate in sniall mobile units of about 500 men and are con-sLanLly on Lhe move, Lhey need to be forced inLo a con-ccntr ation Lo be made vulnerable. (Air sLrikes could notdestroy Iraqi Scuds in open desert. The odds of findingsmaller artillery pieces lhat can be hidden in ibresLsand mt)irntairis are even worse.) How do we do Lhis?Engage them in ground acLion that forces them togaLher in one place. If Lhey fotigliL a large, well-armedland army, Lhey would have to mass in far larger num-bers. They would then present a target that could be

shaLLered from Lhe air.Btisnian Serb irregulars

would be more difficulL tostrike from Lhe air. Theseforces operate in Liny groupsof 100 or fewer and rely onmorLars and light arms to doLheir dirLy work. This makesthem hartl Lo find and difficnlLLo dislingiiish from Muslimand Croat fighters. On theoLher hand, iliesc attributesmake Lhem a minor factor inLhf larger miliLary equation.

Air power, in short, canhelp compel Serbian with-drawals by damaging theBosnian Serb regular forces.But all this depends on theBosnian Serbs facing a power-ful, well-arniftl ground oppo-nenl. The Bosnian Muslims,

)iot the Western powers, mirst supply these forces. To doLhis, Lhe WesL is going to have Lo give them hea\yweapons and provide Uaining.

The Bosnian Muslims have been losing territt)ry foriack of weapons, not Lroops. The Lotal Bosnian Muslimpopulation exceeds the Bosnian Serb population by atleast 300,000. However, Lhe Muslims can now arm onlysome 50,000 soldiers, while Lhe Bosnian Serbs have70,000 well-armed Lroops. What's more, the Serbs have1,500 artillery pieces, Lanks and oLher armored vehicles.The Bosnian Muslim.s have fewer than 50.

W'esLern miliLary assistance Lo the Bt>snian Muslimswt)uld equalize the balance. Weapons cotiltl be deliveredt)n C-130 transport aircr aft; these can use sliort, primitiveair,strips and can therefore operate from a number offifltis and loads in Muslim-held Bosnia. The c;-K Os coulddeliver lightinfan try weapons—rifies, morLars, shoulder-launched an Li-tank weapons, nighL vision devices,machine guns, mines—antl also heavier weapons,

continued on page 28

JUNE 14,1993 THE NEW REPUBLIC 25

inclntling 105mm and 155mm artillery pieces. WTien air-fields are not available, these weapons could be air-dropped. There's no need to ti.se Croadan-hcld tf rrilt)ryto transfVr these gt)ods. In a matter of months the Mus-lims would have 80,000 soldiers armed Lo the teeth andable to stt)p a Serbian of ff nsive in ils Lracks.

Ciiving the Bosnian Muslims an offensive capability ismor e dif frcull for two reasons. First, the Muslims proba-bh wt)uld need self-propelled artillery, lanks andarmored perst:)nnel carrifrs. which require the giant C^btransport aircraft, which in turn requires a long landingsnip. MusIim-conLrolled Bosnia has only three suchstrips—Sarajevo, Bihac and Tirzla—and none is securefrom Serbian anti-aircraft fire. So the heavy weaponswould have to be brxiiighi into Bosnia over Croatian-controlled land lotites. and it's likely Llie Croats wouldgrant passage relttctantly. Sectjiid, the Bosnian Muslimsliave little experience irsing heavy weapons t>r- conduct-ing offensive operations. Itwould rake a few liuiidrftiWestern advisers and aboirt twoyears after we begin armingthem for them to become prt)-fkient.

This strategy would lakflime. The Mtislims wonld w-i\n'u'c perhaps a year tt) halt iur-lher Serb gains and consoli-tlaie their defensive positionsbelore they cotiltl move toct)mpel Serb withdrawals. TheWfsL shtjuld therefore adopt atwo-phase plan—proifcling.Vlnslim ct)nsolidatiorr in tin-Ihst, ct)mpelling Serb with-tlrawals in the second. Thechoice between rollback andcoercive bit)otiIeiLing couid betleferred until ihe second[jliasf. In the first phase lheWfsi would organize, train and equip the Muslim forcesfbr defensive operations. A fleet of abouL 100 C-l.Wswt)uld ferry arms tt) the Muslims, while several hundredfighter- antl grt)tmd attack aircntft stand ready in Italyand on aircraft carriers in the Adriatic to destroy anylar-ge Serb offensiv es. The West wt>uld deploy 200 lo 400Special Operations Forces In Bosnia to assist its air oper-ations b) serving as gnurrid spotter"s and to help the Mir.s-lims develop a commantl and intelligence apparatus.

In the second phase, lhe West would prepare lheMuslims for t)fTensivf t)peralions and sirppoil iheseIrom thf air. fhe Serbs now have .some 350 main baitlclanks, 200 light armored vehicles and 1,000 artillery]>ieces. A coercive bloodletiing strategv could belaunched when the Bt)snian Mnslims have acquired aroirghly equivalent ground force. A rollback sirateg)'vvottid have to wait until thf Mttslims assembled grt)undforces around twice the ct)inl)at power" of Serb grorintiIbrcfs.

Diplt)niatic and economic incentives should be

I L S I R A I K I N 11 \ II \ l I I O I I ( J U A V H J K T U T N l \V Ki

joined to ihe.sf military punishments. M its mainreward, the Wesl shorrld t)ffer to recognize Gr'eater Ser-bia if the Ser'bs ctiopcrare with the Westerri program.Tlie Western power's sht)Lrld also promise lo lift ect)-nomic sanctions and perhaps even lo help rebtrild LheSerbian economy.

Once a peace agi'eement is signed, poptilaLionswould have to be moved in order to create homoge-neotis states. The hiternaiional comrntrnity should over-see and stibsidize this population excliangc. Specifically,lhe u.N. should establish a Biilkan Pt)pulailon Exchangecommission, modeled after the Leagtre of Nations-sponsored Refugee SfUlemeni Commission, whichmanaged the transfer of more than 1.5 million peoplebftween Greece and Turkey IVtini 1923 to 1931. Thiscommission should scctrr-e safe passage for" imniigraiiLs,establish a bank to help them buy and sell propertyand adrninisifr a Balkan .Marshall Fund to assist the

development of new hous-ing and indtrstry in immigra-tion zones, fhe connnissionshould have a ten-year man-dale: lwo years for reseLlle-meiit, fight years for eco-nomic developmeiU.

Ht)w can the long-term sur-vival o( the Bosnian-MtisUmstate be guaranteed? It wouldinevitably be weaker ihan itsrifighbors. Popttlation is agootl indicalor of latentmilitary power. AUtJwing forthe retum of reftigees, thereare lortghly 9 million Serbs,4.5 million Cr"t>als and maybe1.8 million Bosnian Muslims.There are alsti sonif 5.3 mil-lion ^Mbanians in the region:of these, 1.6 million live in theSerbian regit)n tjf Kostwo,

400,000 in Macedonia and 3.3 million in Albaniapr open Thus, Serbia wottld be Lhe sU'ongest state iti ther-egion and the Bosnian-Muslim state \'t)uld be amongthe weakfsi.

The NATO powers should therefore tmdertake tt) armit well. They should also issue a security guarantee,promising to intervene with air power if its neigh-bors attack. NMo should alst) foster a defensivealliance belween the Bosniun-MLtslim state, Croatia andAlbania. Those states are neither friends of Serbianor sU"t)ng fiiongh lo check iL alt)nf. fhey sht)ir]dhave good reason to ally themsflves with the Bt>snianMnslims.

This pariiiiorr plarr isri t perfect; and it isn't morallypure, ll rru-ans iiarisferring hundreds ol tht>usands ofrivilians from histt)ric homes and countries, ll meansrisking a small number- of American lives. But it is theonly plan that's rcalislic about what can bf achieved insuch a fi airght aifa and idealistic abfjiri tlit- principles atstake. And it can be done. •

T u c M c u / O t H M H i i r . l l l M P I d 1Q«1