a new normalcynew normalcy

AA New NormalcyNew Normalcy

6 Attack on New York ... The First Response

10 A Family of Security Plans

14 IMO Moves to Enhance International Maritime Security

19 U.S. Enacts Measure for Maritime Security

24 Citizens Assist in Keeping the Watch

27 New Security Measures in Mariner Credentials

Securing Our PortsSecuring Our Ports

29 Port Security Assessments

34 TSA Administers Grants for Port Security Improvements

36 The Automatic Identification System & Port Security

42 Houston–Galveston Area: On the Front Line

48 Establishing a Port Security Committee

P r o c e e d i n g sP r o c e e d i n g sApril–June 2003 Vol. 60, Number 2

On the CoverOn the Cover

Members of Port Security Unit 307 patrol Boston Harbor. Members of PSU 307, areserve unit based in St. Petersburg, Fla., were deployed to Boston followingterrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, DC and Pennsylvania. Photo byPublic Affairs Officer Megan Casey, USCG.

Industry InitiativesIndustry Initiatives

51 Barge Industry Develops First Coast Guard-Approved Security Plan

53 Building Security Guidance in the Domestic Passenger Vessel Industry

55 Perspectives on U.S. Security Initiatives Affecting International Liner Shipping

61 Cruising with Heightened Security Standards

64 The Pilot’s Role in Maritime Security

66 The Need for Vessel Security Officer Training

Expanded ProtectionExpanded Protection

68 Coast Guard Remains Ready with Mobile Units

70 Increased Coast Guard Assets for Homeland Security

73 Homeland Security—Foreign Passenger Vessel Security Program

75 Operation Safe Commerce–Northeast: Container Shipping Through Patrnerships

Looking ForwardLooking Forward

78 Smart Card Technology in the Maritime Transportation Industry

82 Technology for Port Security

85 Improving Our Future Capabilities with the Integrated Deepwater System

Always On DeckAlways On Deck

4 Assistant Commandant’s Perspective

5 Champion’s Point of View

90 PTP: Beyond Traditional Application

92 Mariner’s Seabag: What Can PREP Do for You?

Nautical Queries94 Engineering95 Deck

In Our Last IssueIn Our Last Issue

In reference to the Uninspected Passenger Vessels issue of Proceedings, October–December2002; Vol. 59, No. 4; p. 35, the caption should read as follows: The 12-pack Endeavour holdsa Certificate of Inspection allowing it to sail with 32 passengers within one mile of shore,with 15 passengers within 20 miles of a harbor of safe refuge, 12 passengers overnight, oras a recreational vessel when no passengers are onboard. Photo by KOS Photography, cour-tesy J Class Management.

Icon Credits:All are USCG illustrations.

Securing Our Ports skyline image; ExpandedProtection monitor image; and Looking Forwardbinocular image are copyright 2003 USCGand its licensors.

Industry Initiatives container image: courtesyHyundai Merchant Marine Co.

The landscape of the maritime community has changed dramatically in the pasttwo years, when I first wrote in this space. Though we experienced one of the mosthorrific acts of terrorism on U.S. soil, the maritime community today is more securebecause of the prompt measures taken by our partners in industry and otherfederal, state, and local governments. Maritime homeland security has become aprincipal mission and an integral element of our culture.

All sectors of our community now operate with greater awareness and cooperationas we move to make our marine transportation system more safe and secure.Several actions have recently been enacted to advance those goals on the nationaland international level. Most notable was passage of the Maritime TransportationSecurity Act (MTSA), signed by President Bush on Nov. 25, 2002. MTSA aligns withthe new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, which was adopted bythe International Maritime Organization in December 2002. Additionally, as asymbol of our renewed focus on security, the Coast Guard was transferred to thenew Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. President Bush createdthe new department, composed of 22 previously disparate domestic agencies, tobetter protect against threats to our homeland.

Our challenge in implementing many new security measures has been finding thebalance between facilitating the free flow of goods and services and protectingnational security. This issue of Proceedings offers a look at some of the initiativesthat the Coast Guard, other agencies, and industry have undertaken sinceSeptember 11.

A continuation of our partnerships with industry and other federal, state, and localagencies is vital to our success in meeting our maritime homeland security missionrequirements. Our relationships with other government agencies are crucial toensure coordination of efforts and most efficient use of resources. Our partnershipswith each of the industry groups are essential to ensuring the free flow of goodsand services, while maintaining programs and systems to ensure greater awareness.As importantly, we rely on every mariner, every dockworker and every boater toaid in keeping our ports and waterways secure by increasing their own awarenessof the maritime environment in which they work and play.

As I prepare to retire from active duty with the U.S. Coast Guard, I offer heartfeltthanks to the entire maritime community in cooperating to improve the security ofour maritime homeland and the safety of our marine transportation system.Because of the many active partnerships we have developed with industry andother agencies, the Coast Guard is better prepared to confront its future challengesand protect the American people and our ports,waterways and coasts. Thank you for being membersof a great American team. Semper Paratus!

Assistant Assistant Commandant’s Commandant’s PerspectivePerspective

by Rear Adm. PAUL J. PLUTA

Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security & Environmental Protection

Adm. Thomas H. CollinsCommandant

U.S. Coast Guard

The Marine Safety & Security Council

of theUnited States Coast Guard

Rear Adm. John E. CrowleyChief Counsel

ChairmanU.S. Coast Guard

Rear Adm. Paul J. PlutaAssistant Commandant

for Marine Safety, Security & Environmental Protection

MemberU.S. Coast Guard

Rear Adm. David BelzAssistant Commandant

for OperationsMember

U.S. Coast Guard

Cmdr. Laticia J. Argenti Executive SecretaryU.S. Coast Guard

Steven Venckus Legal Counsel

U.S. Coast Guard

Statement of Ownership,Management and Circulation

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vwyz(1).E: kn(2).F: abcdehjkloqst(1)List TCG-06

Ed. Note: Rear Adm. Thomas Gilmour relieved Rear Adm. Pluta July 1, 2003.

by Rear Adm. LARRY HERETH

Director; U.S. Coast Guard Port Security

Champion’s Champion’s Point of Point of

ViewView

The articles in this Maritime Homeland Security edition of Proceedings highlightonly a small portion of the many ongoing initiatives and entities involved in themonumental effort to improve our nation’s security. Both U.S. Coast Guardmembers and our partners in this effort from the maritime industry and otheragencies authored the articles. Included are discussions on how the maritimecommunity will need to routinely operate under a New Normalcy, some specificefforts needed for Expanded Protection for Securing Our Ports, commendableIndustry Initiatives taken voluntarily to improve the security of the maritimecommunity, and, Looking Forward, research and development efforts to utilizetechnology and new acquisitions.

The need to rapidly improve security has also necessitated that government investi-gate how we can better organize to provide the services needed to protect ournation. An example of the Coast Guard’s efforts to ensure the proper emphasis onsecurity was the establishment of the Port Security Directorate under the AssistantCommandant for Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (G-M). Thisnew directorate combines and gives proper emphasis to all previous security effortsunder G-M. It is only one of several new changes underway to better align theCoast Guard’s missions and units to serve the public.

The most significant organizational change within the federal government is themove of several agencies into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).The Coast Guard’s transition into DHS has proceeded smoothly. The new depart-ment has made it easier for the numerous agencies involved with homeland securi-ty to coordinate activities. The Coast Guard works with all five DHS Directoratesand in particular, interacts closely on security issues with the Border andTransportation Security directorate, which includes the Transportation SecurityAgency (TSA) and the former U.S. Customs and Immigration and NaturalizationServices, and with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)directorate. As discussed in an enclosed article authored by a senior TSA official,the Coast Guard, TSA and the Transportation Department’s MaritimeAdministration collaborate on the port security grant program. The Coast Guard isalso working very closely with IAIP on the Port Security Assessment programdiscussed in another article.

By the time you receive this edition, the well-publicized Temporary Interim Ruleson maritime security, mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of2002, will have been published in the Federal Register. We have worked closely withour partner agencies in DHS, as well as DOT and other government agencies, todevelop these important regulations. Our efforts have benefited from therecommendations of our industry partners provided both in writing and at publicforums. As with all our homeland security initiatives, we look forward to workingwith all our partners on implementation of this historic rulemaking and encouragetheir comments as we prepare to further refine the requirements prior topublication of final rules this coming autumn.

Editorial Team

Albert G. Kirchner Jr.Acting Executive Editor

Ellen RosenManaging Editor

Jesi HannoldSenior Graphic Designer/

Technical Writer

Proceedings (ISSN 0364-0981) ispublished quarterly by the CoastGuard’s Marine Safety, Security& Environmental Protection Directorate,in the interest of safety at sea underthe auspices of the Marine Safety &Security Council. Special permissionfor republication, either in whole orin part, except for copyrightedmaterial, is not required, providedcredit is given to Proceedings. Theviews expressed are those of theauthors and do not represent officialCoast Guard policy.

Editorial Contact

[email protected]

Editor, Proceedings MagazineU.S. Coast GuardNational Maritime Center4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 790Arlington, VA 22203-1804

Subscription Requests/Changes

Please include mailing label informationwhen changing address.

www.uscg.mil/proceedings

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View Proceedings Online atwww.uscg.mil/proceedings

6 Proceedings April–June 2003

Attack on New York

The First Responseby Capt. DANIEL R. CROCE

Governmental Public Affairs Officer; U.S. Coast Guard District 1 South

support the emergency response effort.Professional and heroic mariners from commercialferries to tug boats came to the aid of those who fellor jumped into the waters off Battery Park duringtheir attempt to escape the clouds of debris chasingthem from the collapsing towers.

Coast Guard personnel were immediatelydispatched to coordinate the evacuation ofManhattan. The Sandy Hook Pilots volunteeredtheir pilot boat New York to serve as an on-scenewaterway command post with Coast Guardpersonnel onboard. Coast Guard marine inspectorsand investigators from ActNY boarded ferries toensure order and safety. The knowledge andexperience of the Coast Guard and the local pilotsenabled them to provide critical direction via VHFradio to facilitate an orderly evacuation.

Civilian vessels operated in a rescue mode andwere sailing in unfamiliar and confined areas,initially with little or no visibility. The CoastGuard’s prompt establishment of vessel marshalingareas and the professional actions of the marinersonboard ferry, tug, charter fishing, marine policeand fire boats, minimized the potential of vesselcollisions and further injuries to the evacuees.

The first official order given by the Coast GuardCaptain of the Port, Rear Adm. Richard E. Bennis,was for the closure of the Port of NY/NJ to allincoming and outgoing vessel traffic. Since the citywas under attack and no one knew what was going

TheThemovement of vessels and cargothrough U.S. ports will foreverbe viewed differently as a result

of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center onSeptember 11. The U.S. Coast Guard, along withother government agencies and the shipping indus-try, has worked to improve the methods used toensure safety and prevent terrorism while preserv-ing the positive flow of commerce through themarine transportation system.

Through open communication, understanding andcooperation, mariners from all walks of lifecontributed to the continued flow of commerce andpassengers through marine transportation in thePort of New York/New Jersey (NY/NJ) at a time ofturmoil and chaos.

Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the WorldTrade Center, Coast Guard Activities New York(ActNY) directed the waterborne evacuation andrescue of approximately 350,000–500,000 civiliansfrom Manhattan Island. All mass transit, includingbus and rail terminals, was immediately shutdown. Bridges and tunnels were closed to vehiculartraffic and to subways over certain bridges. Theonly way out of New York City was to walk, or byboat.

In the critical hours that followed, five Coast Guardcutters, 12 small boats, and more than 100 publicand private vessels maneuvered around the watersoff Manhattan to rescue people off the sea walls and

April–June 2003 Proceedings 7

The Port of NY/NJ is the largest container port onthe East Coast, with approximately 6,000 containershandled inbound and outbound daily. Followingthe closure of the port, the captain of the port wasfaced with two opposing missions: the protection ofvulnerable and valuable targets, and the continua-tion of port commerce through the marine trans-portation system. To maintain a balance betweenthe two, the port reopened on Sept. 13 to vesseltraffic with the following restrictions in place:

· Access to security zones was only allowedwith the permission of on-scene Coast Guard assets;

· Recreational vessel traffic was restricted toweekdays from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. with a maximum speed of 10 knots in major waterways, and no recreational vessel traffic was permitted on restricted waterways;

· Passenger vessels carrying more than 50 passengers and operating in certain zones within the port were required to have a uniformed security person onboard;

· Commercial vessel movements were allowed only with proper Coast Guard approval;

· All vessels were boarded at

to happen next, the Coast Guard believed itnecessary to take this extreme precaution.

ActNY established an Incident Command Center atthe main Coast Guard base on Staten Island where1,500 active duty, reserve, and auxiliary personnelfrom Coast Guard stations nationwide were calledin for around-the-clock duty. Twenty-six additionalCoast Guard cutters and small boats were deployedto New York Harbor from units throughout theNortheast to support this operation.

Coast Guard personnel also were assigned asliaisons to the mayor of New York’s Office ofEmergency Management (OEM), the New YorkPolice Department, the Port Authority of New Yorkand New Jersey, and the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency. In these positions, the CoastGuard worked jointly with all other federal, stateand local law enforcement agencies through thevarious OEM offices in New York and New Jersey.

The joint forces formulated a working team thatdeveloped a good line of communication amongthe Coast Guard, FBI, Joint Terrorist Task Force,U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration andNaturalization Service, Port Authority Police, NewYork and New Jersey state marine police harborunits, U.S. Navy bomb squads, local, county andcity police departments, and emergency responseunits. A multi-agency security work group wasformed to meet with the port facility securitymanagers to exchange pertinent informationneeded to ensure the safety of marine terminalsaround the port.

Tug boats at Battery Park evacuate people from Manhattan to New Jersey, StatenIsland, Brooklyn and Queens. Photo by Public Affairs Officer Brandon Brewer, USCG.


sea by a Coast Guard law enforcement boarding team and marine inspectors.

Vessels over 300 gross tons, especially foreign-flagged vessels, had many other restrictionsimposed upon them. Before entering port, the fol-lowing requirementshad to be fulfilled:

· The vesselswere required toenter the port viaAmbrose or SandyHook Channel only;· The vesselor agent had to pro-vide the advancenotice of arrival tothe local CoastGuard office in NewYork 24 hours priorto arrival at the seabuoy;· A certifiedcopy of the crew list,including the nation-ality of the crew, hadto be provided;· The vesselcould not enter portuntil it had been sat-isfactorily inspectedby a Coast Guardboarding team;· The vesselwas required to have a pilot onboard;· The vessel was required to have a two-tug escort when transiting in the harbor less than 1nautical mile south of the Verrazano NarrowsBridge or the Outerbridge Crossing, with a speedrestriction of 8 knots.

The vessel’s agent had to confirm that the vessel’sberth was ready to receive the ship and provide thenames of the escort tugs prior to the vessel’s entry.Anchorages were either closed or restricted tolightering operations. No bunkering was allowed atanchorage.

To keep the local port community informed andinvolved in port operations and changes, the CoastGuard, the Port Authority and the Harbor Safety,

Navigation, and Operations Committee of the Portof NY/NJ coordinated outreach meetings toprovide information on the status of the port and tolisten to their questions and concerns. These meet-ings opened a good line of communication amongall agencies and companies involved with restoring

efficient marine trans-portation in the port.

Rapid disseminationof information to theport stakeholders con-cerning vessel move-ments and restric-tions was vital dur-ing the first hoursand days afterSeptember 11. Tofacilitate this, ActNY’sWaterways ManagementDivision developeda single consolidatedTraffic ManagementPlan (TMP). Theyused an Internet-based “burst fax”service to notify3,000 port communi-ty recipients simul-taneously of the

TMP changes. Thisinformation was alsomade available online.

Another Coast Guardmission affected by the terrorist attacks was theContainer Inspection Program. The Coast Guardhas always inspected containerized cargo carryinghazardous materials, but with the realistic threat ofa weapon of mass destruction or a dirty bombentering the port through such a container, theCoast Guard, Customs, and the Port Authorityneeded to rethink how to handle containerinspections.

Therefore, immediately after September 11,additional Coast Guard container inspectors werebrought to New York to increase the inspectionvolume. Containers were inspected not only toensure the proper loading of hazardous materialsand to assess the condition of the container, but alsowere inspected depending on the country of originor the port through which they were trans-shipped.

A man waiting to evacuate Manhattan crawled out on aledge at the Staten Island Ferry Terminal about an hourafter the World Trade Center towers collapsed. Photo byPublic Affairs Officer Brandon Brewer, USCG.


Containers targeted for inspection were putthrough mobile or stationary Vehicle and ContainerInspection Systems (VACIS), located throughoutthe port, prior to being examined or opened forinspection. A VACIS is an X-ray machine largeenough to handle a container. The Coast Guard andCustoms conducted these container inspections byforming teams dispatched daily to perform jointinspections throughout the port. This was a betteruse of manpower and improved productivity; up to500 containers were physically inspected each day. Throughout the various operational and procedur-al changes necessitated by the attacks, the CoastGuard worked closely with the Port Authority andthe maritime community through the HarborSafety, Navigation, and Operations Committee ofthe Port of NY/NJ to establish a new normalcy incontinuing marine operations in the port.Consequently, many of the new vessel movementrestrictions had been modified or were lifted as theCoast Guard and its partners gained a betterunderstanding of potential threats and how toprepare for them.

The 24-hour notice of arrival to port was extendedto 96 hours. This regulation requires certainpre-arrival information to be phoned, faxed ore-mailed to the centralized National VesselMovement Center. Two reasons for this require-ment were: (1) To gather the appropriate informa-tion about an incoming vessel in enough time toperform the proper investigative/backgroundchecks on the crew; and (2) To determine if a vesselboarding is necessary and if so, to complete this asexpeditiously as possible so as not to delay the vessel’s entry into the port.

Targeted high-interest vessels are required to have aCoast Guard sea marshal onboard during transitinto port. No vessel will be screened or permitted toenter the port unless a certified crew and passengerlist is submitted, and the 96-hour notice require-ment is met and verified through the Ship ArrivalsNotification System database by the Coast GuardPort State Control Arrivals Desk watchstander.

Throughout this time, the Coast Guard workedclosely with the Port Authority and the HarborSafety, Navigation, and Operations Committee ofthe Port of NY/NJ to continue the marine opera-tions in the port. Amongst the confusion fromrelocations of displaced personnel who lost officesat the World Trade Center and the sadness of theloss of life of co-workers, all concerned continuedto move forward. They reached out to the portcommunity and to federal government officials togather information and provide input into thenewly developing maritime security regulations.

Today, Coast Guard personnel onboard cutters,aircraft, boats and vehicles remain on aggressivewatch, patrolling domestic ports and coastlines toprovide an offshore security presence in theirimportant role of homeland security and enhancedmaritime domain awareness, and continue tocontribute to evolving maritime security regula-tions while working together with our interagencypartners under the new Department of HomelandSecurity.

Tugboats, ferries andCoast Guard vesselsevacuate people fromLower Manhattan onSeptember 11. TheCoast Guard BatteryPark Building is at thefar right. Photo byPublic Affairs OfficerBob Laura, USCG.


A Familyof Security Plans

by Lt. KEVIN ODITT

U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port, Vessel, & Facility Security

More than 95 percent of our foreign trade passesthrough our marine transportation system (MTS).Our MTS consists of more than 1,000 harborchannels, 25,000 miles of inland, intra-coastal, andcoastal waterways, and more than 3,700 terminalsat over 350 seaports located throughout the country.Waterborne cargoes include nearly 2 billion tons offreight and 3 billion tons of oil. Maritime commercecontributes nearly $1 trillion to our nation’s grossdomestic product. As the economy of the 21st

century becomes increasingly globalized, the safe,secure, and efficient operation of our MTS becomesever more important to our nation’s economic well-being as well as our national security.

September 11 exposed numerous national securityshortcomings. To ensure our enormous MTS infra-structure is adequately protected from disruptionby those hostile to our country, the Coast Guard hasre-energized its port security role.

This article provides a brief background on the U.S.Coast Guard’s historic role in port security andhighlights many of the actions we’re taking toimprove our ability to detect, deter, and disruptterrorist or other unlawful activities that aredetrimental to the safe and secure operation of ourMTS. Central to our port security regime is the“Family of Security Plans” concept.

BackgroundPort security has long been a responsibility of theCoast Guard. This responsibility has been

addressed in a number of U.S. laws. The MagnusonAct of 1950, amended by Executive Order 10173,clearly established the Coast Guard’s role in portsecurity. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of1972 reaffirmed the Coast Guard’s authority andresponsibility. These existing authorities providethe Coast Guard with the legal foundation toaddress today’s MTS security challenges.

September 11 re-awakened the nation to the realitythat we are not isolated from world events, and ourcritical transportation infrastructure, including ourMTS, is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. However,concerns about MTS security shortcomings wereraised prior to September 11, most notably in theAugust 2000 “Report of the InteragencyCommission on Crime and Security in U.S.Seaports.” The report identified our ports,waterways and coastal areas as being particularlyvulnerable to a broad range of criminal activity.Indeed, the Coast Guard, along with our otherfederal, state and local law enforcement partners,has for many years been engaged in drug andillegal migrant interdiction efforts. Similarly, theCoast Guard has partnered with a diverse array ofport stakeholders to improve MTS safety throughvessel traffic control schemes, safety zones andother initiatives aimed at improving harbor safety.The terrorist attacks of September 11 havecompelled the Coast Guard to re-evaluate andstrengthen our abilities to protect the nation’s ports,waterways, and coastal areas from possible attack.


DirectionIn December 2001, the Commandant reaffirmed theCoast Guard’s maritime homeland securitymission. The mission is to work in coordinationwith the Department of Defense (DOD), federal,state, and local agencies, owners and operators ofvessels and maritime facilities, and others withinterests in our nation’s MTS to detect, deter,prevent, and respond to attacks against U.S. territo-ry, population, and critical maritime infrastructureby terrorist organizations. The Commandantdefined five goals of the mission to include:

· build maritime domain awareness (MDA);· ensure positive/controlled movement of

high-interest vessels;· enhance presence and response capabilities;· protect critical infrastructure and enhance

Coast Guard force protection; and· increase domestic and international

outreach.

The Coast Guard is also listening to the public,Congress, and the international maritime commu-nity. In January 2002, the Coast Guard held a publicworkshop in Washington, D.C., that included morethan 300 individuals including members of thepublic and private sectors, port, facility, and vesselsecurity workgroups, and members of the interna-tional marine industry. They collectively expressedthe urgent need for security planning and uniformi-ty in the application and enforcement of requirements.

In addition to the January 2002 public workshop,the Coast Guard held seven public meetings acrossthe country from January 27, 2003 to February 11,2003. During these meetings the Coast Guarddiscussed requirements for security assessments,plans and specific security measures for ports,vessels, and facilities. These discussions helped toaid the Coast Guard in determining the types ofvessels and facilities that pose a risk of beinginvolved in a transportation security incident.

On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed intoeffect Public Law 107-295, the MaritimeTransportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002.MTSA’s key requirement is to prevent a maritimetransportation security incident (TSI)—defined asany incident that results in a significant loss of life,environmental damage, transportation systemdisruption, or economic disruption to a particulararea. Preventing incidents has long been a coreCoast Guard mission and the MTSA has empha-

sized our security specific mission and given useven broader authorities to implement it.

MTSA is a tremendously significant piece of legisla-tion. It will fundamentally change the securityculture of the entire maritime community, bothdomestically and internationally. It aligns with thenew International Ship and Port Facility SecurityCode (ISPS) because the congressional staffs devel-oped it with input from the Coast Guard (whichserves as U.S. lead to the International MaritimeOrganization [IMO]).

Some of the areas addressed by the MTSA include:requiring vessel and facility security plans; estab-lishing seaport security committees; requiring portvulnerability assessments; and periodic exercisingof port security plans.

Maritime security is an international responsibility.The IMO has recognized the need to address andestablish appropriate measures to enhance thesecurity of ships and of port facilities. It has amend-ed the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention by

The Coast Guard Cutter Escanaba enforces a security zonearound the M/V Palermo Senator as a small boat carrying amulti-agency inspection team approaches the cargo ship sixmiles off the New Jersey shore. Photo by Public Affairs OfficerEric Hedaa, USCG.


adding, among other things, a mandatory “Shipand Port Facility Security Code” for the purpose ofenhancing maritime security.

The “Family of Plans” ConceptMaritime security protocols must encompass theentire MTS. All aspects of the port, its infrastruc-ture, its geographic and strategic value, and its useby the public and private sectors must be consid-ered when strategies are developed to protect itfrom attack. Strategies must be appropriate for normalworking conditions as well as when security threatsarise. Traditional port infrastructure, such as passen-ger terminals, commercial vessels, anchorages, andwaterfront facilities, must be included, as well asthose assets not typically addressed in existing reg-ulations, such as public park areas on the water-front, other transportation infrastructure supplyingwaterfront areas, power supply infrastructure, anduninspected commercial and recreational vessels.The MTSA will provide the first national, wide-ranging security planning requirements for allmodes of transportation converging at a seaport. Inanticipation of the MTSAbeing approved, the CoastGuard had already pro-vided a framework forimplementing a compre-hensive plan that isaligned with the expecta-tions set out in the MTSA.Similar to the model thatwas used to construct thenational pollution responseplan, the framework ofthis plan will require a“family” of interrelatedsecurity plans. The PortSecurity Plan, FacilitySecurity Plan, and theVessel Security Plan willbe interrelated and unitedto form a comprehensiveset, or virtual “family,” ofplans. Each set of planswould be developed bythe public or private enti-ty most responsible forimplementation.

What is a Security PlanThe purpose of securityplans is to provide aframework to communi-

cate, identify risks, and coordinate resources to mit-igate threats and consequences. Each plan mustaddress the four principles of homeland security:awareness, prevention, response, and consequencemanagement. Each security plan will be based on asecurity assessment and will document the follow-ing elements:

· designation of security responsibilities and duties;

· performance standards for training and exercising;

· establishment of protective measures to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents; and

· measures to ensure appropriate response andconsequence mitigation actions.

All plans must provide for coordinated scalableactions to detect, deter, prevent, and respond tothreats at varying threat levels. The Coast Guardhas established Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels1, 2, and 3 to describe increasing threat levels and

corresponding activitiesto meet the threats. MAR-SEC will be linked to theHomeland Secur i tyAdvisory System (HSAS)and will serve as the mar-itime sector’s tool forcommunicating threats.

Port Security PlanThe Captain of the Port(COTP) will be responsi-ble for establishing portsecurity committees (PSC).The main goals of thePSC under the leadershipof the COTP will be todevelop, coordinate, andevaluate the port securityplan (PSP). Port securitycommittees may be secu-rity subcommittees ofexisting harbor safetycommittees or have portreadiness committees assubcommittees. A PSCcan be developed by the

COTP as best fits the needsof the port community.Port security committeeswill bring together marine

Lee Christopherson, of Vessel Traffic Service(VTS) Puget Sound, Wash., plots a vessel’sposition—part of an international cooperativetraffic system governing the Straits of Juan deFuca by both the American and Canadian VTSs.


transportation system representatives in port areaswith the specific objective of maritime homelandsecurity (MHLS).

The COTP will work with Coast Guard units(including groups, stations, and air stations), DOD,federal, state and local agencies, and owners andoperators of vessels and facilities, and other MTSstakeholders, including port authorities, serviceproviders, labor, and recreational boating commu-nities to develop a PSP. The PSP is the documentthat provides the framework for detecting,deterring, disrupting, and responding to MTSthreats.

The PSP would not replace existing contingencyplans like area contingency plans or other responseplans. However, these existing contingency planscould be modified to account for new or additionalsecurity requirements in the PSP. The PSP is acoordination tool for the port community and mustbe available to all of the appropriate law enforce-ment and port agencies with port security responsi-bilities. The PSP will be developed by the PSC tocomplement other security plans. PSPs will also beused to satisfy the evolving international portfacility security requirements for ports receivingcertain ships on international voyages, which wasfinalized in December 2002.

The Coast Guard has already begun overseeingsecurity assessments of selected port areas. Theseport security assessments will result in a compre-hensive report that includes an assessment of portvulnerabilities, impact analysis of damage/loss tocritical port assets, interdependencies of criticalport assets, recommendations for mitigatingvulnerabilities, and other information pertinent tothe development of the PSP.

Facility Security PlanAll facilities will be responsible for developing andimplementing facility security plans. In addition toaddressing the security needs of the facility, theymust also address the coordination and interface ofsecurity initiatives with both the port and vesselsecurity plans. As mentioned earlier, the facilitymay be the only link between the vessel and the port.

Currently, IMO is working on securityrequirements for facilities that receive vessels oninternational voyages. These requirements wouldmandate security assessments and facility securityplans for these facilities. It is measures such as thesethat will increase the level of security andawareness worldwide.

Vessel Security PlanThe security of vessels is an emerging concern.Their operations provide a target of opportunity forthose desiring to do harm to the interests of theUnited States. Owners and operators of vesselshave the primary responsibility for ensuring thephysical security and safety of their vessels.

The Coast Guard has been working both domesti-cally and internationally to implement require-ments and guidance for vessel security plans (VSP).With more than 7,000 different foreign ships callingon U.S. ports, it is essential that an internationalstandard for VSP be developed and implemented.IMO is developing security requirements for allvessels required to comply with SOLAS. Thesesecurity requirements would mandate that vesselsperform a security assessment and develop andimplement ship security plans.

A majority of vessels will be responsible fordeveloping and implementing VSPs. Those vesselsthat are not responsible for implementing a VSPwill be captured by the PSP. As has already beenmentioned, a critical component of the VSP will bethe coordination of its security initiatives with thefacility and port security plans.

ConclusionWith our nation’s reliance on maritime commerce,the Coast Guard has stepped up to provide the wayforward to a safer and more secure MTS. As CoastGuard Commandant Adm. Thomas Collins stated,“We must do all we can to provide neededmaritime security to ensure the freedom of ourcountry, without endangering liberty itself.Obviously we can’t do it alone. Despite our planswe have major gaps in capability now, which willprobably remain well into the coming years…butwe will press on to correct these gaps with a greatsense of urgency.” Together, the execution of the“family of plans” will enable the Coast Guard andmaritime community to fill these gaps to ensure thesecurity of the nation’s MTS.

Assets not typically addressed in existing regulations, such aspublic park areas on waterfronts, must be included in the MTSfamily of plans concept. Copyright 2003 USCG and its licensors.


IMO Moves to EnhanceInternational

Maritime Security

by Cmdr. SUZANNE E. ENGLEBERT

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety, Security & Environmental Protection

WhileWhile the United States rapidly imple-mented many measures after

September 11 to enhance domestic maritimesecurity, the Coast Guard concurrently achievedinternational security improvements through theInternational Maritime Organization (IMO). At aseemingly impossible pace by pre-September 11thstandards, the U.S. delegation to the IMO created anaggressive plan to substantially tighten securitythroughout the world.

A Breakneck Pace at the International LevelIn November 2001—merely two months after twocommercial airliners collided with the World TradeCenter buildings in New York—the IMO Assemblyadopted resolution A.924 (22). The IMO adoptedthe resolution, Review of Measures and Proceduresto Prevent Acts of Terrorism Which Threaten theSecurity of Passengers and Crews and the Safety ofShips, on the recommendation of the United Statesand numerous other nations, with the goal of signif-icantly enhancing maritime security and maritimedomain awareness. This resolution directed theorganization to develop appropriate measures toincrease maritime security.

By February 2002, the intersessional working group(ISWG) meeting of IMO’s Maritime SafetyCommittee (MSC) drafted substantial amendmentsto the 1974 Convention of Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS) to enhance security. Additionally, theISWG drafted a framework for a mandatorysecurity code and guidance measures to preventterrorism.

In May 2002, at the 75th session of IMO’s MSC,several countries proposed the work of February’sISWG to the delegation. The MSC established amaritime security working group to discuss mattersduring the session. The working group made signif-icant progress in developing a global maritimesecurity infrastructure. Building on the conceptsdeveloped at February’s ISWG, they developed arevised draft text of amendments to SOLASChapter XI and a new mandatory InternationalCode for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities(ISPS). The committee approved the draft text andsubmitted it to the December 2002 DiplomaticConference for adoption.

In September 2002, a second ISWG meeting washeld. The goal of the meeting was to clarify issuesfrom MSC 75 and further refine the proposedregulations and the ISPS Code. Another importantaspect to the ISWG meeting was the furtherdevelopment of non-mandatory guidance in Part Bof the ISPS Code for ships and port facilities.Significant progress was also made on the proposedamendments to SOLAS for port state controlmeasures.


The Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security:The Culmination of a Year of Intensive WorkFrom Dec. 9-13, 2002, the Diplomatic Conferencewas held. Representatives from 109 contractinggovernments to the SOLAS Convention attendedthe conference. United Nations specializedagencies, intergovernmental organizations andnon-governmental international organizations alsosent observers to the conference. Efforts inNovember 2001 and February, May and September2002 refined a number of key items, leavingrelatively few issues to be resolved at the conferenceitself.

Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thomas Collinsheaded the U.S. delegation. Adm. Collins said theconference represented strong collective resolve inprecluding a maritime parallel to the September 11terrorist attacks. Noting that shipping was aninternational business and that terrorism is aninternational threat requiring long-termmultilateral solutions, Adm. Collins told delegatesthat “the eyes of the world” were on the IMOmember states as they responded to the urgentchallenge to safeguard the physical and economicwelfare of their citizens from the threat of terrorism.

On Dec. 13, 2002—just more than a year since theterrorist atrocities in September 2001—the confer-ence adopted the SOLAS amendments, the mostfar-reaching of which is the ISPS Code. Given thepivotal role shipping plays in the conduct of world

trade, new international regulations are of crucialsignificance not only to the international maritimecommunity but the world community as a whole.

Highlights of Adopted MeasuresAmendments to SOLASIn total, the Diplomatic Conference adopted 11resolutions that will enter into force on July 1, 2004.Resolution 1 provided amendments to SOLAS.

Among other effects of the amendments,Resolution 1 created a new SOLAS chapter dealingspecifically with maritime security. Don’t beconfused by the new numbering! The existingSOLAS Chapter XI, Special Measures to EnhanceMaritime Safety, was renumbered as Chapter XI-1.A brand-new Chapter XI-2, Special Measures toEnhance Maritime Security, was added after therenumbered Chapter XI-1. The new SOLAS chaptercontains the mandatory requirement for ships andport facilities to comply with the ISPS Code.

While not an exhaustive list, amendments to theSOLAS Convention included automatic identifica-tion systems; ship-to-shore alert systems; port statecontrol; continuous synopsis record; responsibili-ties of various parties; threats to ships; and equiva-lent and alternative security arrangements.

Automatic Identification Systems (AIS)The Conference adopted modifications to ChapterV, Safety of Navigation with overwhelming

IMO’s headquarters in London. Photo courtesy IMO.


consensus. The Conference voted to accelerate thetimetable for installation of shipboard AIS. Ships,other than passenger ships and tankers, will berequired to fit AIS no later than the first safetyequipment survey after July 1, 2004 or by Dec. 31,2004, whichever occurs earlier.

Ship-to-Shore Alert SystemsThe Conference adopted a requirement for ships tobe equipped with a silent alert system to signalashore that a security incident is occurring orimminent to facilitate coastal state response.

Port State ControlThe SOLAS amendments covered both shipsalready in port and ships intending to enter port.They specified when port state control officersmight verify that ships comply with SOLAS andISPS Code requirements. They also allowed portstate control officers to take appropriate measuresin response to any deficiencies found, includingdenial of entry to, or expulsion from, port.

Continuous Synopsis RecordShips will be required tomaintain a continuousrecord of registry, owner-ship, operational control,etc. This will facilitate theability of the port statecontrol officers to assess thesecurity-related risks posedby a ship.

Responsibilities of VariousPartiesThe amendments spelledout the responsibilities ofadministrations, ships,companies and port facili-ties to comply with SOLASand the ISPS Code, includ-ing responsibilities to desig-nate security officers anddevelop threat assessmentsand implement securityplans, leaving the details tothe ISPS Code.

Threats to ShipsThis amendment detailedthe responsibilities of thecontracting governmentsregarding the security ofships traveling in theirwaters.

Equivalent and Alternative Security ArrangementsThis provision allows contracting governments theflexibility to negotiate alternative security arrange-ments with concerned administrations, yet ensuresthe new SOLAS requirement are met.

Adoption of the ISPS CodeIn addition to the above-mentioned Resolution 1,amendments to SOLAS, the Diplomatic Conferenceadopted Resolution 2: the ISPS Code. This Code:

· established an international framework involving cooperation between contractinggovernments, government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and portindustries. These parties will cooperate to detect and assess security threats. They willalso take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade;

· established the respective roles and respon-sibilities of the parties at the national and international level;

· ensured that security–related information iscollated and exchangedefficiently;· provided a methodology forsecurity assessments. Thus,plans and procedures willbe in place to react tosecurity levels if theychange; and· ensured confidence thatadequate and proportion-ate maritime securitymeasures are in place.

When the ISPS Code isimplemented, varyingsecurity levels will reducethe risk of a securityincident. Security levels, setby government agencies,will be based on changes inthreat. They will trigger theappropriate port and vessesecurity measures.Measures will be tailored toeach independent vessel orfacility depending on itsrisk of assessment andvulnerabilities.

The head of the U.S. Delegation, Coast GuardCommandant Adm. Thomas Collins, told theIMO member states, “The eyes of the world”were on them.


Part A of the ISPS Code contains mandatoryprovisions, while Part B contains non-mandatoryguidance. Highlights of the ISPS Code includesetting security levels; port facility, company andship security officer responsibilities and qualifica-tions; control measures; international ship securitycertificates; a Declaration of Security; contents ofport facility and ship security plans; andrecognized security organizations.

Setting Security LevelsThe ISPS Code defined three security levels:normal, heightened and exceptional. Provisions ofship and port facility security plans must containspecific measures to achieve the different securitylevels without undue delay.

Port Facility, Company and Ship Security OfficerResponsibilities and QualificationsThis specified the duties and qualifications ofsecurity officers.

Control MeasuresThis elaborated on control provisions of the SOLASamendments by spelling out grounds for determin-ing when a ship is not in compliance with theapplicable regulations. It also expanded control andcompliance measures to include expulsion fromport and denial of port entry.

International Ship Security CertificatesAdministrations will issue certificates to ships that

comply with the SOLAS regulations and ISPSCode.

Declaration of Security (DOS)A DOS ensures that security is seamless betweenthe ship, the shore and other ships. This tool is usedwhen clarification of responsibilities is needed formultiple parties that implement SOLAS regula-tions. The ISPS Code provided guidelines for whena DOS can be requested.

Contents of Port Facility Ship Security PlansPart B in particular provided considerable detail onthe types of issues that should be covered bysecurity plans and included the assessments usedto develop the plans.

Recognized Security OrganizationsThe ISPS Code specified the tasks contractinggovernments may designate to recognized securityorganizations and laid out substantial competen-cies to ensure a high minimum standard.

Other Adopted ResolutionsIn addition to the adoption of amendments toSOLAS (Resolution 1) and the ISPS Code(Resolution 2), the Conference adopted the follow-ing additional resolutions. These resolutionsreinforce SOLAS amendments and persuade portsand vessels not specifically incorporated by theCode to apply many of the new security measures.

IMO Secretary-General William A. O’Neal addressing the IMO Assembly in November 2001, in which itadopted Resolution A.924 (22)–Review of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism WhichThreaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety of Ships. Photo courtesy IMO.


Resolution 3 provided for IMO preparation of animpact assessment of long-range ships’ identifica-tion and tracking, the development of performancestandards and guidelines (if found necessary) andtraining and guidance on ship and port security. Italso called for the review of existing IMOresolutions on port state control procedures, safe-manning principles and the prevention of drugsmuggling; ships’ security when interfacing withfloating production storage units; facilitation ofmaritime traffic (in the context of security); andguidance on control and compliance measures notcovered by the ISPS Code.

Resolution 4 provided for future amendments toChapter XI of SOLAS without the prior requirementto convene a diplomatic conference.

Resolution 5 called for increased assistance to devel-oping countries to fund security-related expenses. Italso asked the Secretary General to consider thefeasibility of establishing a Maritime Security TrustFund.

Resolution 6 urged SOLAS party governments toquickly ratify the amended Convention and to meetsecurity plan and certification requirements inadvance of July 1, 2004. The resolution points outthat extensions are not authorized for the imple-mentation dates of the maritime security measures,and recommended that contracting governmentsdevelop certification processes for vessels and portfacilities prior to the July 1, 2004 implementationdate to alleviate any non compliance issues.

Resolution 7 encouraged governments toestablish suitable procedures to increasesecurity to vessels and facilities not coveredby Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, such as mobileoffshore drilling units and fixed and floatingplatforms.

Resolution 8 called on the InternationalLabor Organization to continue its work onseafarer documents as a high priority issue.

Resolution 9 invited the World CustomsOrganization to act quickly on issues suchas the security of international movementsof closed container transport units.

Resolution 10 called for prompt member-country action to implement long-range

identification and tracking of ships, including themeasures necessary to prepare for automaticresponse to INMARSTAT C polling and otherexisting satellite systems.

Resolution 11 emphasized humanitarian concerns,such as shore leave for crewmembers, and encour-aged Convention parties to report instances inwhich implementation of Convention or the ISPSCode provisions impact negatively on seafarers’welfare.

Since shortly after September 11, the Coast Guardwas an integral part in enhancing maritime securityworldwide. From November 2001 to December2002, the rapid adoption of the SOLAS amendmentsand the ISPS Code demonstrated impressiveinternational cooperation at the UN specializedagency. The SOLAS amendments and ISPS Codecomplement provisions in the recently enacted U.S.Maritime Transportation Security Act and willfacilitate U.S. implementation of that legislation inan internationally agreed manner. The entiremaritime community now has an aggressive plan tosubstantially tighten security throughout the world.

All amendments to SOLAS and the text of the ISPS Code canbe found at IMO’s Web site, www.imo.org.

IMO Assembly members sign the final act of the Diplomatic Conferenceon Maritime Security Dec. 13, 2002. On this day the members adoptedthe SOLAS amendments. Photo courtesy IMO.


U�S� Enacts Measure

for Maritime Security

by Cmdr. STEVEN D. POULIN

Legal Advisor; U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Directorate (G-MP)

On Nov. 25, 2002,President Bush enacted the MaritimeTransportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). Thislegislation requires the Secretary of the U.S.Department of Homeland Security to implementregulations that provide a comprehensive aegis formaritime security. The vast majority of theSecretary’s maritime security authorities andresponsibilities will be delegated to the Commandant.The U.S. Coast Guard is the primary federal agencydeveloping these regulations and will similarlyhave primary enforcement responsibility for them.The Coast Guard’s regulatory efforts are supportedby close partnerships with the Border andTransportation Security Directorate (TransportationSecurity Administration and the Bureau of Customsand Border Protection) and the Department ofTransportation (Maritime Administration). The reg-ulations will not only carry out the intent of the keysecurity provisions of the MTSA, but also willgenerally reflect the new international maritimesecurity requirements recently adopted inDecember 2002 by a diplomatic conferenceconvened under the auspices of the InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO). (See related article,page 14.)

Among other requirements, the regulations willcompel regulated vessels and facilities to conductsecurity assessments and to develop detailed

security plans to address vulnerabilities revealedby those assessments. Except where internationalobligations otherwise dictate, the assessments andsecurity plans must generally be submitted to theCoast Guard for approval. The regulations also willcontain requirements for the designation andcompetency of security personnel, includingstandards for training, drills and exercises. Theregulations will further establish the framework forarea maritime security committees to assist thecaptains of the port, as the local federal maritimesecurity coordinator, in conducting area securityassessment and developing area security plans.These plans will have to support and be consistentwith a National Maritime Transportation SecurityPlan that provides the overarching strategy forprotecting the marine transportation system. This“family of plans” approach establishes a layeredsystem of protection that involves all maritimestakeholders.

The IMO diplomatic conference adopted significantchanges to the International Convention for theSafety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), primarily a newChapter XI-2 containing enhancements formaritime security and a complementaryInternational Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)Code. The ISPS Code contains a mandatory Part Aand recommendatory guidelines in Part B. TheSOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code will comeinto force July 1, 2004, through the tacit amendment


process for all contracting parties to SOLAS, ofwhich the United States is one. These internalinstruments are an important achievement for tworeasons. First, the new requirements were adoptedby more than 100 nations at the diplomatic confer-ence, with IMO member states negotiating themfrom concept to reality in a little more than a year’stime. Second, the SOLAS amendments and ISPSCode provide remarkable detail regarding therecommendatory measures and guidelines thatmust be taken into account in meeting the requiredperformance standards.

As the SOLAS amendments and ISPS Code werebeing negotiated at IMO, Congress was developingthe MTSA. The MTSA is a diverse piece of legisla-tion. It passed unanimously by voice vote in theSenate and without object under suspension of therules in the House of Representatives, indicating itsbroad bipartisan support. Title I of the Act address-es the new requirements and standards for enhanc-ing maritime transportation security. Title IIcontains maritime policy improvements, mostlywaivers of cabotage and coastwise trade restrictions

as well as vessel-specific exemptions for certainstatutory and regulatory requirements. Title IIIincludes many new authorities to improve CoastGuard personnel practices, as requested by theAdministration, extensions of advisory committees,and numerous authorities supporting Coast Guardoperational programs. Title IV of the Act similarlycontains a range of additional authorities andcongressional directives regarding Coast Guardadministrative and operational activities, includingcertain reporting requirements. Title V contains thetraditional Coast Guard authorization provisionssetting year-end personnel strengths, trainingtargets and funding levels.

The Title I provisions are the most referenced whendiscussing the MTSA. Section 102 of that title,which is codified at 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701, containsthe key domestic maritime security requirements.In passing the MTSA, Congress made an expressfinding that it is in the “best interests of the UnitedStates” to adopt and implement the IMO instru-ments because they contain the “essential elements”for enhancing global maritime security. The SOLAS

Boarding team members of the Coast Guard Cutter Thetis conduct a boarding on a high-interest vesselwhile at sea.


amendments and the ISPS Code generally alignwith the requirements of 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701 andwill be the mechanism by which the statutoryrequirements are implemented. 46 U.S.C. Chapter701 does not prescribe a precise regulatory timeline.However, the MTSA does establish certain regula-tory benchmarks based on the promulgation of an“interim final rule.” The term “interim final rule” isa misnomer and should more properly be labeled a“temporary interim rule.” The temporary interimrule must be promulgated “as soon as practicable”(emphasis added). The MTSA waives theAdministrative Procedure Act (APA) for thispurpose, indicating the importance Congressattached to promulgating meaningful securityrequirements as soon as possible.

The new international maritime security require-ments enter into force on July 1, 2004, with theexception of the requirements for installation of anautomated identification system and a ship securi-ty alert system. Working backwards from theSOLAS and ISPS Code entry into force date, andapplying the benchmarks in 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701,the Coast Guard intends to issue the temporaryinterim rule no later than July 1, 2003. The tempo-rary interim rule expires on Nov. 25, 2003 (12months after enactment of the MTSA). The finalrule implementing 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701 must bepublished by that date to ensure the continuity ofenforceable requirements. However, the APAwaiver does not apply to the final rule, suggesting

it must be promulgated with a 30-day delay ineffective date. Simply, the Coast Guard must targetOct. 25, 2003 for publication of the final rule.

Where applicable, vessels and facilities have tosubmit their security plans to the Coast Guard byJanuary 2004, giving the Coast Guard until July 1,2004, to approve those plans. For foreign vesselsrequired to comply with SOLAS, consistent withU.S. treaty obligations, the Coast Guard intends toaccept flag administration approval of a shipsecurity plan as meeting the review and approvalprovisions of 46 U.S.C. Chapter 701, provided thesecurity plan meets the requirements of SOLAS andPart A of the ISPS Code, having fully applied therelevant provisions of Part B of the ISPS Code. Tofurther ease the administrative burden of planapproval and provide additional flexibility for themaritime industry, while at the same time ensuringenhanced security mandated by 46 U.S.C. Chapter701, the Coast Guard also intends to permit the useof approved industry alternative plans. Forexample, owners and operators of vessels or facili-ties that are similar in design and operation may beable to submit a single plan to the Coast Guard forapproval. If approved, the owner and operator mayimplement the plan for a specifically identified fleetof vessels or facilities. The Coast Guard is furtherconsidering the use of industry model plans,whereby a particular industry can petition theCoast Guard for permission to use a plan thatwould apply to a particular segment of industry.

Regulation 9 of new SOLASchapter XI-2 describes thecontrol and compliancemeasures to be taken byport states for a ship’s non-compliance with the newinternational requirements.Given that more than 90percent of the goods enter-ing U.S. ports are carriedaboard foreign-flaggedvessels, this regulation is ofcritical importance. It containstwo important prongs. First,it incorporates traditionalIMO port state controlpractice. This traditionalapproach accepts anddefers to the InternationalShip Security Certificate asvalidating the ship’s

Editor's Note - Security Rules Published July 1, 2003

The Maritime Transportion Security Act Temporary Interim Rules werepublished July 1, 2003. The comment period for the rulemaking closed July31, 2003. The regulations may be reviewed on the Federal Register Website: www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/fedreg/a030701c.html. Scroll down to"Coast Guard" where you will find links to the six rules and the AIS notice.

The regulations, together with comments from the public, may also beaccessed through the Internet on the public dockets atHTTP://DMS.DOT.GOV. When accessing the Docket ManagementSystem, the following docket numbers correspond to the listed parts ofTitle 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations:

Docket 33 CFR Part· 14792 101 · 14759 106· 14733 103 · 4757 AIS· 14749 104 · 14878 AIS Notice· 14732 105


compliance with the maritime security require-ments. Unless there are clear grounds for believingthe certificate is invalid or the ship is not in compli-ance, the port state control officer may not conducta further inspection of the vessel. However, whereclear grounds do exist, the port state control officermay detain the vessel until the deficiency isrectified to the port state control officer’ssatisfaction.

The second prong expands port state controlpractice to allow control of the vessel outside of theport and specifically includes denial of port entryand expulsion from port as enhanced port statecontrol mechanisms. The standard of clear groundswas retained as a threshold for exercising theseenhanced port state control mechanisms. Moreover,in a departure from traditional port state controlpractice, clear grounds can be based on conditionsexterior to the ship itself. For example, Part B of theISPS Code permits port states to consider thenon-compliance of a facility at which the shipcalled, or the non-compliance of another ship withwhich the ship subject to control had interacted, asfactors in the port state control decision matrix.Even then, any control exercised under regulation 9must be proportional to the threat posed by theship. In cases where the ship has been undulydelayed or detained, the ship shall be entitled tocompensation. However, the right to take actionswhen necessary for self-defense or national security,consistent with international law, is not constrainedby the new port state control regime.

The Coast Guard will accept the International ShipSecurity Certificate as reflecting the ship’s compli-ance with the new maritime security requirements,including the relevant requirements in 46 U.S.C.Chapter 701, provided the ship has fully applied theapplicable provisions of Part B of the ISPS Code.Essentially, the Coast Guard will use Part B as thebarometer for measuring compliance with SOLASchapter XI-2 and Part A of the ISPS Code, and hencethe regulation promulgated under 46 U.S.C.Chapter 701. If a ship has not implemented one ofthe prescribed measures in Part B of the ISPS Code,its security plan must have an approved alternativemeasure that achieves an equivalent level of securi-ty to meet the performance standards in Part A ofthe ISPS Code. At the 77th Session of IMO’sMaritime Safety Committee, the United States isproposing that an optional mechanism beestablished for the flag administration to attest tothe ship security plan’s application of Part B of the

ISPS Code as a means of reducing the potential fordelays to verify compliance.

46 U.S.C. Chapter 701 reinforces the port statecontrol regime under SOLAS. For example, vesselsor facilities located on or adjacent to waters subjectto the jurisdiction of the United States that may beinvolved in a transportation security incident maynot operate without an approved security planmore than 12 months after publication of thetemporary interim rule. Furthermore, the Secretaryis required to conduct assessments of foreign portsecurity. If the Secretary, in consultation with theDepartments of State and Defense, finds that aforeign port is not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures, the Secretary may deny entryinto the United States to any vessel arriving fromthat port or mandate that any such vesselimplement additional security measures. Lastly, theregime established by 46 U.S.C. 701 and itsimplementing regulations is supported by potentialcivil penalties of $25,000 per violation.

Neither the SOLAS amendments, the ISPS Code,nor the MTSA amends or alters the existing author-ity of the Coast Guard to control vessel movementunder the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA)or the Magnuson Act. Under the PWSA, CoastGuard captains of the port can control themovement and operation of vessels subject to thejurisdiction of the United States when there isreason to believe that the vessel does not complywith conditions of port entry or any applicable lawor treaty. There also is specific authority in thePWSA for the Coast Guard to take any measuresnecessary to prevent or respond to acts of terrorism.The Coast Guard’s independent authority underthe Magnuson Act is a delegation of nationalsecurity authority to Coast Guard captains of theport. This authorizes captains of the port to controlthe operation of vessels in the territorial sea andinternal waters of the United States when necessaryto prevent damage or injury to vessels, harbors,ports and waterfront facilities from sabotage orsubversive acts, or to secure the observance ofrights and obligations of the United States. ThePWSA and Magnuson Act authorities are typicallyexercised by imposing specific requirements onvessels and facilities through an order issued by thecaptain of the port or by establishing and control-ling access through security zones. The PWSA andMagnuson Act also provide broad authority to takesimilar actions and impose necessary requirementson “public and commercial structures” and“waterfront facilities,” respectively.


The PWSA and Magnuson Act are supported bysevere civil and criminal sanctions for non-compli-ance. These will no doubt continue to be an impor-tant part of the Coast Guard’s toolbox for ensuringthe security of the marine transportation systemthrough the direct regulation of the maritimeindustry. The new authorities in 46 U.S.C. Chapter701 cannot be considered in isolation, but rather asone element in the larger legal structure supportingthe Coast Guard’s lead role for maritime security.

The key principles that guided the U.S. delegation’snegotiations at IMO will also influence the CoastGuard’s regulatory strategy. Primarily, the CoastGuard’s approach will balance the need forenhanced security with the free flow of commerce.To that end, the regulations will be risk-based byfocusing on the vulnerabilities of those vessels andfacilities that are likely to be involved in atransportation security incident. Additionally, thesecurity measures outlined in the security plans willbe structured to address escalating threat levels.Understanding that the activities and operations ofvessels, facilities and ports are very diverse and thatone size does not fit all, the regulations will furtherestablish performance standards instead ofprescriptive requirements to provide additionalflexibility for the maritime industry. This ensuresconsistency and avoids the economic inequities thatwould result from disparate requirements.Alternatives will be allowed, provided they meet alevel of security that is equivalent to the establishedperformance standards. Finally, the regulations willavoid duplication or conflicts with the securityinitiatives of other federal agencies. The develop-ment of the regulations has been a model forinteragency cooperation and coordination.

The regulations implementing 46 U.S.C. Chapter701, the SOLAS amendments, and the ISPS Codewill likely be the first step in an iterative regulatoryprocess. Implementing the core maritime securityrequirements now paves the way for additionalimprovements that will come about throughsubsequent initiatives to improve identificationcredentials and processes, establish securitytraining programs, and implement cargo andcontainer initiatives to improve the security of thesupply chain. The task is daunting, but enhancedmaritime security is an “all-hands evolution.”Failure is not an option—the consequences are toohigh if we collectively fail to shore up the vulnera-bilities plaguing the marine transportation system.

Homeland SecurityAdvisory System

(HSAS) ThreatConditions

Corresponding Coast Guard

MARSEC Levels

Low = Green MARSEC 1

Guarded = Blue MARSEC 1

Elevated = Yellow MARSEC 1

High = Orange MARSEC 2

Severe = Red MARSEC 3

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)developed the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem (HSAS) to inform people of specific threatlevels. The higher the threat condition, the greaterthe risk of terrorist attacks. These risks includeboth the probability of an attack occurring and itspotential severity.

The Coast Guard sets Maritime Security (MAR-SEC) Levels that correspond to HSAS threatconditions. The HSAS threat conditions warn ofpotential threats, while Coast Guard MARSEClevels are security protection levels thatcorrespond to specific actions to be taken toensure the security of our nation’s ports andwaterways. While MARSEC levels generallycorrespond with HSAS threat conditions,captains of the port may raise MARSEC levels intheir respective port to address an immediatethreat to the marine transportation system (MTS).The Coast Guard MARSEC levels are part of aninternational maritime protective system that wasestablished because of the inherently globalnature of maritime transportation.

The following chart shows how the Coast Guardaligns MARSEC protection levels with HSASthreat levels.


Citizens Assist

in Keeping the Watch

by Cmdr. PATRICK GERRITY

MSO Detroit

A key component of the U.S. Coast Guard’smaritime homeland security mission ismaritime domain awareness (MDA). MDAis achieved a number of ways: by gatheringinformation through air, boat and vehiclepatrols; by assessing intelligence; and byworking with various port entities. Avaluable yet relatively untapped source ofMDA information are the thousands ofcitizens who work, recreate or live alongour nation’s waterways. To access theobservations of our citizens, Marine SafetyOffice (MSO) Detroit created the “RiverWatch Program,” a preventive law enforce-ment program modeled after the“Neighborhood Watch Program.”

Though developed by MSO Detroit, theRiver Watch Program is supported byDetroit-area offices of the FBI, the Immigration andNaturalization Service (INS), the Border Patrol, U.S.Customs and the Michigan State Police. Therefore,not only is the U.S. Coast Guard a benefactor ofinformation from our citizens, our law enforcementpartners are, too. In addition, the agencies pooltheir talent to ensure the program stays active andtheir funding helps to pay for the cost of programmaterials. The goals of the River Watch Programinclude:

· Increasing waterfront surveillance· Providing another means of deterrence· Increasing public confidence· Improving interoperability among agencies· Enhancing overall security

Preventive law enforcement programs have longproven to be an effective tool in thwarting unlawfulactivity in participating neighborhoods. One of theprimary reasons the program works is that itcauses potential criminals to be uncertain abouttheir detection. By implementing the River WatchProgram we will not only get assistance from thepublic, but also cause uncertainty in the minds ofpotential terrorists and criminals.

River Watch participants receive program materi-als, which include a decal, a wallet card and apamphlet. We expect citizens to affix the decal tothe windows of their homes or businesses or totheir vehicles or boats; it is our hope the decal sends

Image courtesy MSO Detroit.


a message to anyone planning an untoward act insoutheastern Michigan that people are watching!The wallet card contains the phone number andradio channel to use if suspicious activity isobserved. The pamphlet provides basic informationabout the types of suspicious activities citizensshould be alert to and areas on and along the waterthat we feel require extra awareness, such asbridges, marinas, and fueling facilities.

Each agency has agreed to provide information to awide variety of organizations. The Coast Guard insoutheastern Michigan has used various approach-es to deliver River Watch Program materials to thepublic. MSO Detroit personnel have providedinformation to facility operators, commercial vesseloperators and various industry groups. CoastGuard small boat stations have provided RiverWatch Program information to marinas; and theauxiliary has provided program information toboaters and to the public at boat shows. The RiverWatch Program has been adopted by every MSO inthe 9th District and it is spreading to other districts.Each MSO has modified the program slightly toaddress specific geographic concerns, but the tenetsof River Watch remain consistent throughout the9th District. The River Watch Program is easilyadaptable to other geographies, it’s relativelyinexpensive and so far we have found the public tobe extremely eager to assist us in protecting thecountry from incidents of terror.

In May 2002 Air Station Detroit launched the RiverWatch Program during a media event. Amongothers, Sen. Carl Levin; Commander 9th CoastGuard District Rear Adm. Ronald Silva; and U.S.Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan,Jeffrey Collins, spoke at this event. In addition,senior representatives from the Michigan StatePolice, the FBI, the INS, Customs and Border Patrolparticipated in the media event. Numerous federal,state and local law enforcement organizations werein the audience and the event was widely coveredby a broad array of regional television, radio andnewspaper reporters. By involving the public, MSODetroit has expanded the source of its MDA infor-mation and is better able to keep the watch.

To obtain more information on the River Watch Program,contact MSO Detroit at (313) 568-9490.


The front (Top)and back (Below)of the brochurefor MSO Detroit’sHomelandSecurity RiverWatch program.


New Security Measures

in Mariner Credentials

by Lt. Cmdr. TINA BASSETT

National Maritime Center

A Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) is aunique and important credential. It indi-cates a mariner’s qualifications, serves as

a photo ID, allows access to sensitive ports, andmay serve as a passport in certain situations. Afterthe terrorist attacks of September 11, the CoastGuard, along with other government agencies,looked for ways to improve the security and safetyof U.S. citizens. The marine safety program recog-nized that there were problems in the marinercredentialing system that could result in fraud, andthat an increased risk of marine safety incidentsexists if unqualified persons obtain an MMD.Additionally, the potential for exploitation of thesecredentials by criminal or terrorist organizations isreal and poses a threat to national security.

In response to these concerns, the Coast Guardbegan implementing new procedures designed toensure MMD holders do not pose a safety or securi-ty threat. The Coast Guard is working within exist-

ing statutory authority to implement enhancedscreening procedures for current MMD holders andapplicants for original MMDs. Applicationprocedures are essentially the same for the mariner,with the exception that renewals can no longer becompleted entirely through the mail. Applicantsmust now appear in person at a Coast GuardRegional Exam Center (REC) sometime during theapplication process to provide fingerprints andprove their identity with two forms of government-issued identification, one of which must be a photoID. Once mariners have completed this new processthey will be issued a new, more secure and tamper-resistant MMD card that was being developed priorto September 11. These new cards, in turn, maysomeday be replaced by the high-techTransportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC),which is a “smart card.”

The Coast Guard is working closely with themaritime industry and individual mariners to

S A M P L E

The front of this Merchant Mariner identification card (above left), displays an individualserial number in the lower left corner. This new card is being phased-in to the Coast Guard’snew security process. This will be a replacement for cards that do not show a serial number.

S A M P L E

S A M P L ES A M P L E


implement these new changes smoothly andminimize any inconvenience. Additional staff isbeing added to 14 of the 17 RECs nationwide tohelp reduce the backlog of applications. A prioritysystem has also been implemented to ensure thatapplications of mariners vital to our nation’smilitary efforts and industry are processed asquickly as possible:

· Priority one is assigned to mariners who are, or are about to be, employed on a vessel directly involved with a military operation. A letter from the shipping company, labor union, ship management company, or government agency attesting to the ship’s military purpose and the mariner’s position is needed for this priority.

· Priority two is given to mariners who are actively sailing. Evidence of current or scheduled employment onboard a vessel, such as a letter or recent certificate ofdischarge, is needed for this priority.

· Priority three is for all other transactions based on date of receipt.

The Coast Guard encourages mariners to renewtheir documents well in advance to minimize thepotential impact any processing delay may have

(regulations allow renewal 12 months prior to expi-ration). Submitting copies of identification and, ifapplicable, proof of Immigration and NaturalizationService status with the application (CG-719B) willspeed the screening procedures. Additionally,applicants are urged to carefully and honestlyconsider their responses to questions in Section IIIof the application (Narcotic, DWI/DUI, andConviction Record). Incomplete or incorrectresponses in this section may cause significantdelays and could result in denial of the MMD.

Currently, only mariners conducting normaltransactions (renewal, upgrade, endorsement, orduplicate), and original applicants are receiving thenew MMD card through the new process. At thetime this article went to press, the Coast Guard hadnot made a determination on accelerating thereplacement of all active MMDs. If that decision isreached, the Coast Guard will begin immediateoutreach to mariners and industry.

If you have additional questions, contact the NationalMaritime Center at the following address: CommandingOfficer, USCG National Maritime Center (MMD Team), 4200Wilson Blvd., Suite 630, Arlington, VA 22203-1804, (202)493-6798. The NMC Web site is www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/web/index.htm.

Before submitting your application,did you remember:

· Complete Sections I-V of theapplication – sign it!

· Sea Service (if applicable)· Fees· Medical examination· Drug test or proof of

enrollment in a program· Two passport sized photos· Proof of citizenship (and if

applicable, INS status)· Copies of identification

At the REC, remember to bringoriginal or certified copies of:

· Two government-issued IDs; one must be a photo ID

· The IDs submitted with your application (if different from above)

· Proof of INS status (if applicable)

· You do not need to bring fingerprint cards; the Coast Guard will take your prints at the REC


Port Security

Assessments

by Lt j.g. AARON DOWE

U.S. Coast Guard Office of Port Security Planning & Readiness

Background“The federal government should establish baselinevulnerability and threat assessments for terrorismat U.S. seaports as soon as possible. Priority shouldbe given to Strategic Seaports, Presidential DecisionDirective 40 ‘Controlled Ports,’ and economicallysignificant strategic seaports…”

Recommendation 7, Report of the InteragencyCommission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports;Fall 2000After more than a year of study, the InteragencyCommission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaportsconcluded what some involved with port securityhave believed for a long time—that U.S. ports arevulnerable to crime and terrorism. The Commissiondeveloped a long list of specific problems,including:

· No process for evaluating the vulnerabili-ties of seaports to terrorist attack;

· No minimum security standards or guide-lines for seaports and their facilities; and

· Inconsistent coordination with non-law enforcement agencies and significant private entities.

To address these issues, the Commissionrecommended that the U.S. Coast Guard conductvulnerability assessments and make those resultsavailable to all appropriate public and privateentities. Additionally, the commission recommend-ed creation of a “model port concept” that included“risk-based best practices for use by terminal and

vessel operators.” Covering a wide range of topics,from physical security, credentialing, and accredita-tion of private security, this product would serve asa framework for voluntary security improvementsby private and public entities at the local level.

Efforts Before September 11 The current port security assessment (PSA) effortbuilds on two years of groundwork conducted bythe Coast Guard’s Office of Waterways Security.The most significant part of this early effort was ajoint Department of Defense/U.S. Coast Guardproject to conduct vulnerability assessments on fivemilitarily significant U.S. ports: Baltimore, Md.;Apra Harbor, Guam; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;Charleston, S.C.; and Savannah, Ga. The CoastGuard provided port operations experience, andthe Department of Defense (DOD), through theDefense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), provid-ed technical expertise. This program employed amodified version of the Balanced SurvivabilityAssessment (BSA)—a program designed to identifythreats to significant military and civilianinfrastructure from an attack by weapons of massdestruction (WMD).

This PSA methodology covered many of the issuesof concern to marine transportation system (MTS)stakeholders and the reports it generated havebecome valuable post-September 11 assets. Thecaptains of the port (COTP) involved endorsed thisproduct and have provided feedback on ways toimprove the process.


Coast Guard Port Security ProgramCongress, recognizing the criticality of port securi-ty as an integral component of a more robust andterrorism-resistant transportation security environ-ment following September 11, provided the CoastGuard the means to make urgently needed invest-ments in the security of the nation’s ports andwaterways.

In the late fall of 2001, the Coast Guard undertookthis challenge. Along with other efforts, the serviceinitiated the Port Vulnerability Assessmentprogram. Later, “vulnerability” was discarded infavor of “security”—which gave us the current title:Port Security Assessment (PSA) program. This

better reflects the program’s broad objectives.Regardless of the name change, a look at theoriginal mission statement leaves little doubt as tothe program’s direction and purpose.

“The mission of the Coast Guard PVA program is tomake federal, state, and local governmental agencies andother appropriate port stakeholders aware of the suscep-tibility of maritime critical infrastructure and assets tonegative consequences from intentional acts, accidents,and natural disasters, and to recommend mitigationstrategies to protect the public, the environment, andU.S. economic interests as required for nationalsecurity.”

While simple in language, this statement allowedthe Coast Guard to take the initial steps along acomplex path that many envision will result in ameasurable improvement in the security of thenation’s maritime infrastructure.

An Overview of the ProgramThe PSA program rolled out as follows: 1. Developed a “Model Port” concept;2. Selected a PSA contractor;3. Built the Coast Guard PSA Oversight Team;4. Conducted the assessments; and5. Produced the final product.

Using expert input in the fields of physical security,vessel and facility operations, regulatory frame-work, crisis response and consequence manage-ment, a “model port” was developed and serves asthe technical methodology to conduct in-depthassessment. As there are more than 360 portsoperating in the United States, the ports weresorted by economic and strategic importance and alist of 55 ports to be assessed was developed. Thesecond process, a streamlined and user-friendlyversion of a Port Security Self-AssessmentMethodology, is under development and will bedistributed to COTPs to assist them, and port stake-holders to assess, the roughly 300 remaining ports.

After both the detailed and self-assessment efforts,periodic reassessments of ports will be conductedas funding permits. These reassessments aretentatively planned for every three to five years.

Developing a “Model Port” ConceptDelivered in late July 2002, the final draft of“Security Attributes of a Model Port (SA/MP) wasthe first step in the PSA Program. Initiated inresponse to Recommendation 7 of the Report of the

Petty Officer 2nd

Class Walter Reilly boards a Hanjinmotor vessel. Reilly is one of many inspectors atGroup/MSO Los Angeles/Long Beach who havebeen working on the front lines by initially board-ing all deep draft vessels that enter the ports ofLos Angeles and Long Beach since the September11 terrorist attacks. Photo by Petty Officer 2

nd

Class Daniel Tremper, USCG.


Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.Seaports, this document will serve as a baselinefrom which other parts of the program can bejudged and developed. It is intended to be a strate-gic document that incorporates security attributesto be used by members of the MTS community tobalance the competing interests of improvingsecurity and maintaining economic viability, evenin time of heightened security fears. Specifically, itprovides a description of a port by mission, goals,objectives, and benchmarks. Where appropriate, itprovides best practices to illustrate the kinds ofpractices captured by assessment teams.

The foundation of the SA/MP is a series of tableslisting the overarching security-related mission andgoals for a seaport, and security-related attributesof its associated systems. This information wascompiled by a team of maritime transportationindustry experts and various federal agency repre-sentatives, augmented by experts in physical secu-rity, information assurance, and counter-terrorism.

A dynamic document, the SA/MP will be updatedperiodically to take advantage of new information,practices, and procedures from a variety of sources.An important feature of future iterations will be anever-expanding collection of best practices gleanedfrom PSA assessments and other sources. For theCoast Guard PSA program management team, theSA/MP will also serve as a basis for analysis of portsecurity improvements and trends. By comparingthe results of PSAs and other analysis over time,managers can take both a broad, holistic, look atports and systems, or examine in more detail morespecific performance areas.

Selecting a PSA ContractorThe Coast Guard did not have on-hand sufficientpersonnel with the specialized skills required tocomplete the security assessments. To augmenttheir resources, a private contractor was hired toconduct the assessments for the nation’s mostcommercially and militarily critical seaports. InApril 2002, after a lengthy bidding process involv-ing six strong candidates, TRW Inc. (now part ofNorthrup-Grumman Mission Systems) was select-ed to perform the assessments. Under the blanketpurchase agreement, the contractor is:

· Developing “Model Port for Security” guidelines as recommended in the August 2000 Report of the Interagency Commission onCrime and Security in U.S. Seaports;

· Developing methods for and conducting PSAs for up to 55 ports throughout the United States; and

· Developing a port security self-assessmentmethodology to help local COTPs and stakeholders evaluate security conditions and make improvements within their ports.

Building the Coast Guard PSA Oversight TeamTo oversee this project in the field, the Coast Guardhas established a Port Security Assessment Team(PSAT). Drawn from both the public and privatesectors, and with a range of experience related tosecurity, the marine industry, and other disciplines,this team is part of the Coast Guard’s Directorate ofPort Security and is located at the Coast Guard’soffices in Arlington, Va.

Members of the PSAT will carry out a variety offunctions. During the pre-assessment process, teampersonnel accompany the contractor’s team leaderto the ports to act as liaison with the local CoastGuard units and other port stakeholders to scopethe port’s various activities to frame the assessmenteffort. This single point of contact will facilitateassessment coordination and maximize local stake-holder participation. During the assessment activi-ties team members provide a continuous line ofcommunication with local Coast Guard units and

Coast Guard Port Security Unit members in New Jersey drillconstantly around the country in Raider Boats in the event ofbeing called to action. Photo by Public Affairs Officer TomGillespie, USCG.


Identifying and prioritizing critical assets iscompleted using an advanced version of the CoastGuard’s port security risk assessment tool. TheCOTP asks key stakeholders to provide assistancein identifying situations that could interfere withany of the following:

· The federal government’s ability to perform essential national security missions and to ensure the general public health and safety.

· State and local government’s ability to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services.

· The orderly functioning of the economy, commerce, and the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial and transportation services.

Their input, combined with previously developedCoast Guard criticality data and any other locallyconducted risk, vulnerability, security and safetyassessments, is used to produce an overall pictureof the port’s critical infrastructure.

The major portion of the assessment process iscarried out by a nine-member team comprised ofCoast Guard liaison officers, the contractor teamleader (usually a former Coast Guard COTP), andanalysts in at least six disciplines includingmarine/port operations, operations readiness,physical security, structural/infrastructure security,anti-terrorism, and research/data capture.

stakeholders and ensure the contractor teams aremeeting the expectations of the contract. Once thecontract team has compiled a port’s PSA report, thePSAT is responsible for ensuring that the report isreviewed for completeness and for accuracy, and isthen delivered to the entities that can benefit fromthe information it contains.

In addition to being assigned to oversee thecontracted port assessments, members of the PSATcan also deploy as a full team to conduct assess-ments “in-house.” Team members will also beworking overseas conducting assessments atforeign passenger terminals, in support ofOCONUS Combatant Commanders when requested,and in this country in support of other federalagencies with tasking in the maritime and criticalinfrastructure arenas.

Conducting the AssessmentAlthough the details in any given assessment mustbe adapted to address the specific characteristics ofeach port, all assessments will have the same basicparts, including:

· Port familiarization· Pre-assessment· Criticality assessment · On-Site assessment · PSA report

The first step in any assessment is a port familiar-ization, allowing the assessment team a basicunderstanding of the port and its activities.Additionally, this portion is used to allow officialsin the port, including the COTP, local government,and industry to become familiar with theassessment process and the assessment team.Specifically, this involves gathering all availabledocuments, conducting an overview of the physicaland organizational layout of the port, establishingpoints of contact with stakeholders, and invitingtheir participation in the upcoming assessmentactivities.

During pre-assessment, a leadership teamcomprised of Coast Guard assessment teammembers and contract team members visits theport. Typically, this occurs four weeks before theon-site assessment. During this visit, the leadershipteam holds meetings with port stakeholders toprovide an in-depth explanation of assessmentprocess, schedule, and goals. Finally, arrangementsare made to visit all selected facilities andinfrastructure.


During six to 14 days on-site, this team visits theassets identified earlier to determine possiblevulnerabilities and the strategies to mitigate thosevulnerabilities. This portion of the process alsoincludes an evaluation of the security countermea-sures in place. Local public service systems, such aswater, electrical, communications, and otherutilities, are also assessed. Finally, the federal, state,local, and private emergency preparedness andresponse capabilities (law enforcement, firedepartments, emergency medical services, andhazardous materials response organizations) arequantified by evaluating manpower, training, andequipment levels. To accomplish all of these tasks,the team utilizes a mix of on-scene inspection andreview of documents, maps and charts, and plans.

The final stage of the on-site assessment is theoutbrief to the COTP and Harbor/Port SecurityCommittee. The outbrief covers a list of the systemelements assessed, infrastructure assessed, vulnera-bilities found, and descriptions of any vulnerabili-ties that pose an immediate risk and should becorrected before the issuance of the final report.

Final ProductOnce the field work is completed, the PSA Teamreturns home to organize, interpret, and process thedata collected during the assessment into a compre-hensive, integrated PSA report for distribution to

port stakeholders. At a minimum, the reportcontains:

· An assessment of identified critical infrastructure vulnerabilities;

· An impact analysis of damage/loss to critical infrastructures and their supportinginfrastructure;

· A description of interdependent critical infrastructures;

· Recommendations to reduce identified vulnerabilities; and

· Other information essential for the development of security contingency plansto mitigate the vulnerabilities.

Sensitive Security InformationSince portions of the report may be classified or areSensitive Security Information (SSI), distribution ofthe full, unedited report is limited. It is alsoimportant to protect proprietary information. In anattempt to overcome these limitations, each PSAreport has a standard format organized to facilitateeasy separation of the report into classified andunclassified versions, and be easily customized tolimit the information provided to the individualstakeholders. Therefore, as distributed, portions ofthese reports serve as a valuable tool to local portofficials and an integral part of the Commandant’shomeland security strategy.

Challenges AheadIn some respects, dealing with ports as whole“ports” presents new regulatory and practicalchallenges for the Coast Guard. Regulations havetraditionally been directed towards individualfacilities, vessels, and operators based on publiclaw and the Code of Federal Regulations. Yet theCOTP has always had the job of maintaining the“big picture” of the port, while dealing withindividual components as detailed in regulation.COTP Orders have dealt with issues bothport-wide and facility/vessel-specific. Thosetraditional enforcement activities will continue,while new regulations will require many facilitiesand vessels to prepare their own security assess-ments, procedures, and response plans. Captains ofthe Port will be expected to deal with all theirtraditional duties, while maintaining a strategicand tactical situational awareness in the port—trulyMaritime Domain Awareness in the first person—all under the watchful eye of citizens, industry, anda Congress with increased expectations of portsecurity.

The Coast Guard Port Security Assessment pro-gram focuses on a holistic approach to assessmentswhen determining the susceptibility of the maritimecritical infrastructure. Assessments of a port such asthis one in San Diego help to recommend mitigationstrategies to protect the public, environment and U.S.economic interest as required for national security.


TSA Administers Grants for Port SecurityImprovements

by MARIANNA MERRITT

Director, Performance Standards & Management; Transportation Security Administration

Congress has appropriated special funds toimplement many of the security measures that arenecessary for the maritime industry under theMaritime Transportation Security Act. TheDepartment of Defense Appropriations Act forfiscal year (FY)02 provided $92.3 million in funding“for emergency expenses to respond to theSeptember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the UnitedStates.”

In that legislation, Congress directed that the fundsbe dispersed for two grant categories: (1) securityassessments and mitigation strategies, and(2) enhanced facility and operational security. It fur-ther stipulated that the funding is to be used foradditional security activities not now beingperformed at the ports. Funds were provided to theundersecretary for transportation security. Since theTransportation Security Administration (TSA) wasnot yet fully staffed, the Maritime Administration(MARAD) and U.S. Coast Guard were designatedto serve as agents of TSA for the award process.Department of Transportation guidance, underwhich TSA and the Coast Guard still operated atthat time, stipulated that: (1) in addition to theassessment and enhancement improvementcategories, 10 percent of the funds should be award-ed to proof-of-concept projects; (2) preferenceshould be given to ports/terminals that initiatedsecurity improvements after September 11; and(3) the awards would commence in June 2002.

Grant Team GuidanceThe legislation imposed guidelines on eligible grantapplicants and on each grant category. Eligiblegrant applicants were limited to critical nationalseaports, which included strategic ports, controlledports, nationally significant economic ports (basedon cargo flows) and ports or terminals responsiblefor movement of a high volume of passengers.Criteria for each category included the following:

· Security Assessment category. Awards were to be based on port or terminal assessmentsthat identified vulnerabilities and proposed mitigation strategies.

· Enhanced Facility and Operation Security category. Ports were required to have a completed security assessment and offer security improvements in facility access control, physical security, cargo security orpassenger security.

· Proof-Of-Concept projects. Projects were required to show how port security wouldbe improved by implementation of the proposed changes.

The application period closed at midnight (EST) onMarch 28, 2002. More than 800 projects totalingnearly $700 million were received. Five percent ofthe total funding was awarded for projects submit-ted under the Security Assessment category. Tenpercent of the funding was awarded for proof-of-


concept projects and the remaining was awardedfor enhancement of facility and operation securitycategory projects.

Evaluation ProcessThe legislation provided for a three-level reviewprocess:

· A local/regional review by Coast Guard captains of the port (COTP) and MARAD regional directors to verify applicant eligibility and rank applications based on risk/mitigation.

· A national level review consisting of three teams (assessment, facility enhancements and proof-of-concept) of technical subject matter experts from the three agencies. In the assessment category, proposals from critical national security ports were evaluated for criticality of the security needaddressed, and probability of high-risk reduction and cost effectiveness. In the enhanced facility category, preference was given to proposals that centered on prevention vs. response, infrastructure vs. operational/personnel improvement, port-wide benefits and new equipment vs. replacement or upgrades as well as Coast Guard COTP/MARAD regional director rankings. The proof of concept team gave preference to projects with potential for national application and concentrated on identifying a few promising projects in eachof five categories: container tracking, cargoscreening, maritime domain awareness, command and control, and access control.

· An executive team of agency representa-tives then examined the proposed grant awards from an overarching national perspective.

Awards Announcement/OversightSelection board members Rear Adm. (Ret.) Bennis,Associate Under Secretary for Maritime and LandSecurity; Rear Adm. Pluta, Assistant Commandantfor Marine Safety, Security & EnvironmentalProtection; and Capt. Schubert, Administrator ofthe Maritime Administration, reviewed the teamrecommendations and in mid-June provided abriefing on the awards and process to Coast GuardCommandant Adm. Thomas Collins, former UnderSecretary of Transportation for Security JohnMagaw, and Transportation Secretary NormanMineta. Secretary Mineta announced the awards on

June 17. MARAD acquisition staff has begunnegotiations (contracting process, line item fund-ing) with the grantees and will administer theimplementation of the projects. TSA personnel willprovide oversight and review for projects that haveparticularly high potential for national application.

Another Round of GrantsThe FY02 Supplemental Request signed byPresident Bush provided an additional $104 millionin funding for port security grants.

On Jan. 14, 2003, a Broad Agency Announcement(BAA) was released establishing the second roundof port security grant funding. TSA, MARAD, andthe Coast Guard continue to cooperate to managethe Port Security Grant program. The BAA and PortSecurity Grant application information are postedat https://www.portsecuritygrants.dottsa.net (Note:https://). The application period closed on Feb. 27.More than 1,100 grant applications requesting morethan $1 billion in funds were submitted. Only $245million is available in grant money for this secondround.

A similar review process, joint field review byCoast Guard COTPs and Maritime Administrationregional directors and the national review by theExecutive Board, used for the first round of portsecurity grants is being followed. The reviewprocess is on track and TSA anticipates awardingthe grants in the summer of 2003.


The AutomaticIdentification System

& Port Security

by J.M. SOLLOSI

U.S. Coast Guard Office of Vessel Traffic Management

Seaports a r ee n g i n e s

of national and international economies. They arecritical components of the world’s economy andcritical components of nations’ infrastructures. Assuch, they are attractive targets to terrorists. Andthey are vulnerable. Seaports are intended to beaccessible. For years, international organizationshave strived to make seaports safer, more efficientand cleaner. Now, we are all faced with the possibil-ity that this very openness and this drive to greaterefficiency and capacity will render our ports andwaterways welcome targets of opportunity forterrorism.

The world’s maritime leaders have taken action tomaintain all we have strived for, and at the sametime, protect these assets from intentional damage.An important aspect of protecting ports and seaboundaries and enhancing maritime security isachieving and maintaining an acute level ofmaritime domain awareness (MDA). The opera-tional intent of MDA is to determine and monitorthe position, identity, cargo, course and speed ofevery vessel entering, departing, transiting orloitering in the maritime domain, including those ininnocent passage. In the context of this issue,delivering the Automatic Identification System(AIS) is one very positive step that can be taken.

AIS CapabilityIt is well known what AIS will do. AIS-equippedvessels will transmit and receive navigation infor-mation such as vessel identification, position,dimensions, type, course, speed, navigational sta-tus, draft, cargo type and destination in near realtime. AIS integrates a number of different technolo-gies: the Global Navigation Satellite System,Differential Global Positioning System, frequencyagile digital VHF transceivers, self-organizing com-munications protocols and an open system architec-ture which allows input from and output to otherAIS receivers or external devices such as electronicchart displays or HF/SATCOM radios. AIS wasoriginally designed and intended for use as a ship-to-ship collision avoidance tool and for monitoringtraffic in Vessel Traffic Service areas. However, AIScapability can be readily extrapolated to serve as atool for coastal and port states to achieve a level ofMDA, and thereby add a needed level of protection.

AIS ApplicabilityThe recent—and painstakingly developed—amend-ments to SOLAS, Chapter V, established an AIScarriage requirement for sea-going vessels over 300gross tons on international voyages and all vesselsover 500 gross tons on domestic voyages.Mandatory carriage under SOLAS V was scheduledfor a phased implementation from 2002 through2008, based on vessel type and tonnage. In addition


to SOLAS requirements, efforts are underway inmany countries to mandate AIS carriage domesti-cally for commercial non-SOLAS vessels.

The intent of this phased approach was to deliverAIS capability soonest to those vessels, eitherbecause of their size or employment, that posed thegreatest risk to safety and the environment.However, what constitutes risk has changed sincethis well-intentioned schedule was developed. Riskof terrorist attack extends to all watercraft. AIS canbe used to identify, track and monitor properlyequipped vessels and to sort out those on routinevoyages from those that depart from the norm orthe expected.

An accelerated schedule has been adopted in theinterests of improving security. This proposalrequires outfitting the SOLAS fleet by July 1, 2004,essentially moving the categories of vessels lessthan 50,000 tons into the first two years of theschedule rather than having them spread over fouradditional years.

The Port Security MissionProtecting the Marine Transportation System (MTS)is the primary element of maritime border security.The MTS includes waterways, ports, intermodalconnections, vessels and vehicles. A port securitymission includes protecting maritime borders bydetecting, disrupting and deterring terrorist attacksagainst territory, population and infrastructure;halting the flow of illegal drugs, migrants andcontraband through maritime routes; preventingillegal incursions of our exclusive economic zone(EEZ); suppressing violations of national andinternational laws in the maritime region; ensuringthe free flow of legitimate commerce; andresponding to events that occur.

Maritime borders are vulnerable. As an example,the United States maritime borders include 95,000miles of shoreline, 361 ports, and an exclusiveeconomic zone that spans 3.5 million square miles.Over 7,500 ships make more than 51,000 port callsannually. The passenger vessel industry carriesmore than 6.5 million people annually. Six millionloaded containers, 156 million tons of hazardousmaterial and nearly one billion tons of petroleumproducts enter our ports each year. The MTS moves95 percent of the nation’s overseas trade.The vulnerability of the MTS makes it an attractiveconduit and target for terrorists intent on massdestruction or mass disruption. Our maritimesecurity response to this threat must strike a

balance between the competing needs of economicglobalization, which emphasize the rapid andefficient movement of cargo, and a restrictivesecurity regime that minimizes the risk andconsequences of a terrorist attack.

The elements of a plan to achieve this sometimes-contradictory goal include establishing a commandand control infrastructure; building MDA; and

CURRENT SOLAS AIS IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

Regulation �� of SOLAS Chapter V—Carriagerequirements for navigational systems andequipment—sets out navigational equipment tobe carried onboard ships� according to ship type�The new regulation adds a requirement forcarriage of automatic identification systems(AISs) capable of providing information aboutthe ship to other ships and to coastal authoritiesautomatically�

The regulation requires AIS to be fitted aboardall ships of �� gross tons and upwards engagedon international voyages� cargo ships of ��gross tons and upwards not engaged oninternational voyages and passenger ships builton or after July �� It applies to shipsengaged on international voyages constructedbefore July �� according to the followingtimetable:

Passenger ships� not later than July �� ;

Tankers� not later than the first survey for safety equipment on or after July �� ;

Ships� other than passenger ships and tankers� of �� gross tons and upwards� not later than July �� ;

Ships not engaged on international voyages constructed before July �� will have to fit AISs not later than July ��


movements so that they may be afforded specialprotection. And AIS information is in a readilyexportable format. It may be exchanged among thevarious organizations, services or agencies with aninterest in protecting a port’s safety and enhancingits commerce.

InterdictionOnce a potential threat has been identified, a port orcoastal state must have the capability to detect,intercept and interdict it using patrol boats ormaritime patrol aircraft. Such action could disruptplanned criminal acts and prevent the eventualityof a catastrophe before it threatens the port.

The AIS would contribute to thismission by enabling the shore

authority to track certainsuspect vessels. It also

assists a shore authority indistinguishing normaltraffic from vesselsmoving contrary to atraffic scheme orprescribed route. AIScould also be used totrack patrol craftassets. The precision

navigation aspects ofAIS would be used in

intercept and interdictionoperations.

Asset Protection and IncidentResponse

High-interest vessels that could be usedas weapons or vessels carrying a large number ofpassengers should be identified, boarded andinspected offshore before they could do harm to ourports or population. Competent authorities need toensure the security of high-interest vessels whileunderway, particularly when maneuverin adjacentto critical infrastructure. This is necessary toprovide a visible, credible deterrent, and tomaintain control of traffic. A vessel escort programcould be employed to protect ships from externalhostile attack. The individual escorts will entail asecurity zone enforced by patrol craft serving asperimeter control. The “moving” security zoneswill likely begin (or end) at the sea buoy.

The use of AIS in conjunction with a properlyequipped Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) can serve askey elements of a traffic control and incident

formulating a plan for interdiction, port control,asset protection and incident response.

Command and ControlTo execute a security mission, the competentauthority must establish a command and controlstructure with communications links to otherorganizations, agencies and services—a keycapability when facing unconventional or unortho-dox threats. Port authorities and law enforcementagencies should operate using shared informationand connectivity along with a real-time commonoperational picture of ports and offshore approaches.

MDAIn order to achieve a maritimesecurity environment that effec-tively differentiates betweenbenign and threateningactivities, a port or coastalstate must have anawareness of all ves-sels—with their cargoand crew—that oper-ate to and from theirports, or transit theircoastal waters. Theessence of this MDA isthe timely possessionof information and intel-ligence, and the ability toconduct surveillance andreconnaissance of all vessels,cargo, and people that operatein the maritime domain well beforethe potential threat enters the maritimeboundaries. MDA is the linkage between offshoredomestic security operations and inshore port-related missions. Effective MDA demands not onlybetter collection of information and intelligence bymultiple agencies but, more importantly, fusion ofthat information and intelligence so that it may beanalyzed and transformed into actionableknowledge and tactical direction.

The AIS can readily contribute to achieving MDA.AIS can provide the position and identity of everyvessel within VHF-FM range to a coastal station.Even though AIS is presently limited to line-of-sight coverage and does not capture all vessels thatcould be considered a threat to national security, itprovides a clear picture of the routine traffic so thatmovements out of the ordinary can be more readilydetected. AIS also identifies hazardous material

“AIS�equipped vesselswill transmit and

receive navigationinformation such as vessel

identification� position�dimensions� type� course�

speed� navigational status�draft� cargo type anddestination in near

real time�”


response regime. Traffic control of all trackedvessels will enhance asset protection whether it bethe vessel itself or critical assets ashore. Using aVTS as the command and control center in conjunc-tion with highly accurate and timely AIS informa-tion can improve incident response and assetmanagement during incidents. Transponder-basedsystems will enhance awareness of all waterborneactivity and provide a greater capability to controlvessel movement within the port.

A strategy for protecting maritime assets andmarine infrastructure combines deterrence and astrong and active presence with the ability topreemptively respond to a bona fide threat.Surveillance provides some level of protection forcritical vessel movements and coastal facilities,marine and otherwise (e.g. nuclear power plants,oil refineries). However,providing deterrentdefenses will requirepatrol boats and air-craft. AIS can contributeto the surveillanceaspect of deterrence. Itcan be used as a forcemultiplier by enablingmore efficient com-mand and control, andit can be used to man-age the on-sceneresponse craft.

Unity Of EffortProper execution of asurveillance, communi-cations and responseeffort requires coordi-nation among variousand sometimes dis-parate national, interna-tional, local and privateorganizations. Theseorganizations mayalready be conductingsurveillance, creatinguseful databases, andcollecting and sharinginformation. In addi-tion to serving assources of information,the port facility opera-tor and the vessel oper-ator will be involved in

improving security at facilities and on vessels.Having primary responsibility for the security andsafety of their facilities and/or vessels, they mustbe aware of what is occurring on and around theirfacility or vessel and they must have theprocedures and personnel in place to prevent acriminal/terrorist act.

AIS can provide detailed vessel information to awide variety of users ashore. AIS information is ina readily exportable format and it can be distrib-uted along a network using a system of firewallsand access protection so that sensitive informationis withheld or delayed.

DiscussionAIS will permit the identification and locating ofany AIS-equipped ship from a properly configured

A I SA I S E l e m e n t sE l e m e n t s

USCG illustration. CPU and North America images copyright 2003 USCG and its licensors.


Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) test standards,neither document provides any detail other than tospecify the required interface standard. Thepurpose of including the long-range mode orsub-system in the AIS transponder requirements isto provide a capability for wide area and extendedrange automatic reporting of basic ship data, suchas a vessel’s identity and position, using commer-cially available global communications infrastructure.

Economic Issues Other issues arise that are neithertechnical nor regulatory. These regard the ability ofmanufacturers to equip the world’s fleet with AISand the cost of various options.

AIS manufacturers havenot yet reached fullproduction on the ship-board or the shoresideequipment needed torespond to the demandthat would be created byan accelerated carriagerequirement. The esti-mated population ofaffected SOLAS vesselsis 40,000. Acceleratingthe implementationschedule as has beenadopted will require thatmanufacturers respondto a demand for some2000 AIS units per month

over the next two years.CIRM, the international body that representsmarine electronics equipment manufacturers,confirmed at the special intersessional workinggroup of the Marine Safety Committee in March2002 that their members could meet this demand.

Mandatory ship reporting systems are supposed tobe at no cost to the reporting party. This being thecase, and if Inmarsat is selected as a reportingmedium, it will be necessary to establish an accountthrough which vessels report and the coastal stateassumes responsibility for the charges.Implementing any offshore surveillance schemewill require a shoreside infrastructure to receiveand process information. Receiver sites and arouting/data relay system will need to be acquired,and a traffic-monitoring center to which AISinformation will be routed will have to be equippedand staffed with trained personnel.

shore station. However, the system has legal,technical and other limitations.

Legal Issues The concern from an internationallaw perspective, particularly with respect to shipsfor which SOLAS provides an implementationschedule, is that Article 21(1)(2) of UNCLOSprevents coastal states from establishing equipmentrequirements on vessels in innocent passage, exceptin accordance with international standards.“International standards” in this context includesthe SOLAS implementation schedule. Thus, to theextent we seek to apply AIS requirements to vesselssubject to SOLAS in innocent passage, we need toamend the specified schedule.

Technical Issues AISbroadcasts are via VHFradio and thus limited toline-of-sight, usually notbeyond 20-30 miles. AISprotocols and standardsallow for interconnec-tion to a long-ranget e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o nsystem such as HF orSATCOM systems suchas Inmarsat. However,existing HF and SAT-COM systems onboardships are not capable ofreceiving and retrans-mitting AIS informationwithout modification.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO)performance standard for AIS requires that theequipment should function “as a means for littoralstates to obtain information about a ship or itscargo” when a vessel is operating in that state’s areaof maritime responsibility. An AIS long-rangereporting mode is required to satisfy this functionand to assist administrations in meeting theirresponsibilities for wide area or offshore trafficmonitoring. These responsibilities include safety ofnavigation, search and rescue (SAR), and environ-mental protection in offshore areas including thecontinental shelf and economic exclusion zones.

However, while further reference is made to a long-range mode in the International Telecommuni-cation Union-Radiotelecommunications (ITU-R)technical characteristics and draft Innternational

Risk of terrorist attackextends to all watercraft�

AIS can be used to identify�track and monitor properly

equipped vessels and tosort out those on routinevoyages from those thatdepart from the norm or

the expected�

There are obstacles to full and immediate imple-mentation of AIS. However, all can be overcomethrough cooperation and continued dedication toimproving the safety and security of marinetransportation worldwide.

The United States recommends that the world’smaritime nations jointly pursue a combination ofoptions to provide some level of coordinated MDAin all coastal and port states. This would be similarto the aviation tracking and monitoring processesthat have been in place for decades.

The most readily available solution is to establish asurveillance system that relies on cooperativevessels, and the AIS meets that need. Although it isas yet untested, it is available now. We should joint-ly take full advantage of AIS’s capability and itspotential. Many visionary, talented and dedicatedpeople in the International Association of MarineAids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities(IALA), IMO, ITU and IEC have worked long andhard to deliver AIS to the maritime world. Weshould ensure that the full potential of their effortsare realized.


ConclusionIn order to achieve a maritime security environ-ment that effectively differentiates between lawfuland unlawful activities, port and coastal statesmust have an awareness of all vessels operating toand from their ports, as well as those transitingtheir coastal waters. At the heart of this maritimedomain awareness are information, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels,cargo, and people well outside the traditionalmaritime boundaries. Effective MDA demands notonly better collection of information data bymultiple agencies but, more importantly, fusion ofthat information into a center that can analyze thedata and create actionable knowledge. This will bechallenging due to the number of different agenciesand services with an interest in vessel traffic, but itwill also be very powerful because it will leveragethe specialized and regional skills of variousparticipants and enhance cooperation. MDA existstoday, but only as a nascent capability. AIS candeliver maritime domain awareness faster andmore reliably than any other means at our disposal.

“A vessel escort program could be employed to protect ships from external hostile attack. The individualescorts will entail a security zone enforced by patrol craft serving as perimeter control.” During a securityoverflight on the Cape Fear River, N.C., Coast Guard smallboats escort a Navy deployment ship. Photo byPublic Affairs Officer Krystyna Hannum, USCG.


Houston–Galveston Area

On the Front Line

by Capt. KEVIN COOK

Captain of the Port; Houston–Galveston, and

Cmdr. PAUL THOMAS

Commnanding Officer; MSU Galveston

So begins another day in the Houston-Galveston-Port Arthur sector that will see Manta return to thewaters offshore Galveston to deliver a law enforce-ment team to four ships awaiting securityboardings prior to being cleared for entry.Meanwhile, USS Whirlwind, a U.S. Navy patrol craft170 working as part of the Maritime SecuritySquadron (MSS) in the task unit, is stationed off theentrance to Lake Charles, La., where it will deliver a

Coast Guard boarding team to a liquefied naturalgas (LNG) tanker. Once cleared for entry, membersof MSU Lake Charles will sea marshal the cargo-laden tanker to the Trinkline LNG terminal. In theport area, teams from Marine Safety Office (MSO)Houston and MSO Port Arthur will conduct harborpatrols, facility security checks, and dock-sideboardings of ships loading particularly hazardouscargoes. Coast Guard boats will enforce security

It’s 4:30 a.m. on Sunday. U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Manta checks in with theTask Unit Duty Officer (TUDO) working at the joint operations center onGroup Galveston, Texas. Manta reports it has a rendezvous with the C/SRhapsody of the Sea, and that the sea marshals have boarded Rhapsody fromthe Galveston pilot boat. The TUDO verifies that a team from Marine SafetyUnit (MSU) Galveston has completed the security sweep of the Texas cruiseship terminal on Galveston Island, and that all security measures are in place.Shortly thereafter a Dauphin helicopter from Coast Guard Air StationHouston checks in; the overflight of the transit route has been completed andthere are no suspicious vessels or activity. Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)Houston-Galveston verifies that all radar and visual contacts are checked intothe system and have been cleared for entry to U.S. waters. Everything isready; Rhapsody begins its inbound transit with 2,500 passengers underCoast Guard escort and protected by a moving security zone.


zones restricting access to highly industrializedwaterways throughout the ports of Beaumont, LakeCharles, Houston, Galveston, Texas City andFreeport. Fixed wing aircraft from Coast Guard AirStation Corpus Christi will patrol the off-shorelightering areas and approaches while Coast Guardauxiliary aircraft from Houston overfly theIntercoastal Waterway. Throughout the day theTask Unit Fusion Center will coordinate this activi-ty, target and track the resources, collate informa-tion coming in from dozens of sources, issueCaptain of the Port orders, and respond to amyriad of inquiries from local, state, and federalagencies, and the maritime industry.

IntroductionDesribed above is Operation Neptune Shield in thetask unit that protects the six major coastal ports insouthwest Louisiana and southeast/central Texas(Captain of the Port [COTP] Port Arthur and COTPHouston-Galveston zones), a 200-mile stretch ofcoast along the Gulf of Mexico that includes thedensest concentration of energy production,storage and refinery resources in the world.

Perhaps nowhere are the challenges associated withsecuring a big, busy, industrial port better illustrat-ed than in the Galveston Bay port entrance wherethe Houston Ship Channel provides the gateway tothe Ports of Houston, Texas City, and Galveston.This is the busiest port entrance in the nation andthe second largest petrochemical port complex inthe world. Virtually every sector of the maritimeindustry has a significant presence in GalvestonBay, including all aspects of the petrochemicalindustry (crude, product, chemical and gascarriers), container, roll-on/roll-off, bulk and breakbulk trades (including the largest containerterminal on the Gulf of Mexico), offshoreexploration and production (offshore supplyvessels, crew boats, survey vessels, mobile offshoredrilling units, fixed platforms), a vibrant commer-cial fishing fleet, large and small passenger vessels, andthe nation’s third densest recreational boating population.

Each day more than 700 vessel transits aremonitored by VTS Houston-Galveston and anaverage of 31 deep draft vessels enter the port. Eachweek there are more than 40 movements of liquidhazardous gas ships and barges, and an average of43 arrivals for ships carrying particularlyhazardous cargoes, of which at least 20 percentrequire at-sea high-risk vessel (HRV) boardingsprior to port entry. The Houston Ship Channel, 53

miles long and 400 feet wide, winds throughheavily populated areas and leads to refineries inthe Texas City and Houston areas that account formore than 50 percent of all the gasoline refined inthe United States. More than 20 percent of U.S. oilimports enter the nation from the lightering areasoffshore of Galveston, and about 30 percent ofdomestic LNG production comes from productionplatforms in the offshore area. In addition, the Portof Galveston is a thriving tourist and passengerport and is host to three major cruise ships withweekly and bi-weekly sailings.

This article describes how maritime homelandsecurity (MHLS) has become operational and isintegrated into the daily operations at one of ournation’s busiest and most economically vital portcomplexes through a consistent focus on coordina-tion of Coast Guard resources and partnering withthe maritime community and local law enforce-ment. For security reasons, this article is intention-ally vague with regard to specific tactics, resourcelaydowns, and activity levels.

Like all ports, the challenge in securing theHouston-Galveston port complex is in achievingthe proper balance between the need for securityand the necessary functions of the port, includingflow of commerce, access to the waterway, require-ments for safety, and ability to safeguard theenvironment. These tradeoffs are accentuated in a

U.S. Navy patrol coastals arrive at Group Galveston. Photo by NASAPhoto Department at Johnson Space Center.


In part to remedy this situation, the Commander of8th Coast Guard District ordered the establishmentof task units to carry out the MHLS missions with-in geographic sectors in the Gulf of Mexico, and allCoast Guard units within the COTP Houston-Galveston and Port Arthur zones were merged intoone Task Unit for that purpose.

Task Unit Regional Fusion Center (RFC) With thetask unit in place it was necessary to develop asystem for command and control that would allowfor seamless interaction and coordination of CoastGuard resources on a daily basis that was previous-ly only present during the emergency phase of amajor response to a maritime incident. The RFCwas established to coordinate MHLS activitythroughout the sector and to provide some resourcesavings by reducing redundant activity at CoastGuard commands in the task unit. The RFCprovides support for MHLS operation in thein-shore zone throughout the sector, and directsmost of the MHLS activity in the near- andoff-shore zones. The RFC consists of three branchesshown in the graph on page 45.

Task Unit Vessel Targeting Branch receives andscreens such information from agents and shippinginterests as the 96-hour advance notice of arrival,crew and cargo lists, and vessel histories. Thisbranch works very closely with the National VesselMovement Center to target vessels for security and

port where the sheer volume and diversity ofmaritime activity strains the capacity of the portsystem even before security measures are overlaidon it. In the Port of Houston, for example, even aminor delay to a vessel can set off a chain reactioninvolving pilots, harbor tugs, stevedores, refineriesand others that may cause a vessel to lose its placein the rotation and be forced to wait for a berth tocome open. What may have been a two-hour delay(to complete a port security boarding, for example)at another port with excess capacity, potentiallytranslates into a 36-hour delay in a port that has noslack in the system. The challenge is to ensure closecoordination and cooperation so that securitymeasures are integrated into the operations of theport and become part of the system.

Coordination of Coast Guard ResourcesThe challenge of coordinating the new MHLSmissions was initially complicated by the fact that asingle Coast Guard group (Group Galveston)serves two separate COTP zones, which include theequivalent of four medium or large marine safetyoffices (MSO Houston-Galveston, MSO PortArthur, MSU Galveston, and MSU Lake Charles).One group commander was faced with theominous task of prioritizing resource requests fromtwo COTPs for missions spread out over 200 milesof coastline and 25,000 square miles of ExclusiveEconomic Zone off-shore.


port state controlboardings basedon Coast Guardcriteria, and coor-dinates extensive-l y w i t h t h eImmigration andNatura l iza t ionService and U.S.Customs on avariety of othervessel, cargo andcrew issues. Italso produces thed a i l y v e s s e la p p r o a c h l i s t ,cleared to enterlist, and lightering zone activity list for use by allCoast Guard and U.S. Navy commands in the taskunit.

Task Unit Operations Center is co-located with theGroup Galveston Operations Center and staffedcontinuously by the TUDO. The TUDO maintainsthe regional situation and resource status includingthe locations and status of all Coast Guard vesselsand aircraft, all partner agency resources, and allhigh-interest vessels. Tactical assignments for theMaritime Security Squadron, Marine Safety andSecurity Team (when attached), and other CoastGuard resources are made at the Operations Center.The Task Unit Operations Center is the nerve centerof the regional MHLS efforts where real timeinformation is translated into direction for CoastGuard and other agency action. The TUDO worksvery closely with VTS Houston-Galveston to ensurethat all vessels entering Galveston Bay have beencleared for entry and is the information lifeline forCoast Guard and Navy vessels executing the MHLSmission in near- and off-shore zones.

Task Unit Information & Analysis Branch is the centralpoint for gathering, analyzing and disseminatinginformation from government and non-govern-ment sources, and maintaining liaison with locallaw enforcement, intelligence and industrypartners. This branch produces the daily maritimedomain awareness (MDA) brief for the task unitand provides threat alerts as appropriate to thelocal maritime industry and Coast Guardcommands. The Information and Analysis Branchhas established an extensive network of contactsand working groups designed to facilitate informa-tion sharing and raise awareness among maritime

and law enforce-ment stakehold-ers. Along withthe port securitycommittee, thisnetwork has beenlargely responsi-ble for the excep-tional degree ofcooperation with-in the sector andthe success ofsevera l jo in tagency/industryin i t ia t ives toenhance securitywhile minimizing

the impact on commerce.

The RFC has proven to be not only efficient, butextremely effective and absolutely essential to thesmooth integration of U.S. Navy vessels and crewsinto the task unit. It provides “one stop shopping”for government and industry with the need toknow the status of MHLS operations in the sector,and gives the task unit the ability to react rapidly tothreat information or changes in tactical situations.

Coast Guard patrol boats and Navy patrol coastals rendezvous offthe coast of Galveston to form Maritime Security Squadron Lite861: CGC Stingray of Mobile, Al.; CGC Manta of Freeport, Texas;CGC Manowar of Galveston, Texas; USS Chinook, USS Whirlwind,and USS Thunderbolt, all of Little Creek, Va. Photo by NASAPhoto Department at Johnson Space Center.


Extending PartnershipsThe MHLS partnering effort has focused on vastlyincreasing the local network of and interactionamong local, state, and federal law enforcementand intelligence agencies, and completely engagingthe maritime community in planning and, to someextent, executing the security mission. The corpo-rate security/law enforcement agency outreachprogram puts senior-level law enforcement andcorporate security personnel together with CoastGuard security and intelligence personnel todiscuss suspicious threat incidents, review newlyimplemented security requirements, and establishcommunications protocols.

The Houston-Galveston Port Intelligence Team wasestablished to aid the timely exchange of threatinformation among government agencies havingoperational oversight in ports served by theHouston Ship Channel. Prior to this, exchangingport-related intelligence among federal, state andlocal government agencies was haphazard or non-existent. As this 20-plus agency group has maturedorganizationally, so have the quality and quantityof intelligence that has been disseminated (stow-aways, suspicious surveillance activities, diverthreats, etc.). The group's successful response to,and vetting of, a terrorist threat against localrefineries last summer underscored the effective-ness of the intelligence team. Current membershipincludes representatives from the Air NationalGuard, Customs, Department of Labor, DOD

Criminal Investigative Service, FBI, Immigrationand Naturalization Service, Military SealiftCommand, NASA, Office of Naval Intelligence,Port of Houston Authority Police, U.S. Attorney'sOffice, and local/county law enforcement agencies.

The maritime community in the Houston-Galveston area was quick to react to the call forheightened security in the wake of the Septemberattacks, and capitalized on the very strong networkin place for the coordination of safety and environ-mental protection issues. The Houston-GalvestonNavigational Safety Advisory Council(HOGANSAC), a federally mandated advisorycouncil in existence since 1991, quickly formed anad hoc Port Security Subcommittee, and followedup with a formal charter for a standing PortSecurity Committee by February 2002. The PSC hasbeen essential to the successful integration ofMHLS requirements into the function of the port,and a large reason for the overwhelming coopera-tion from the entire maritime community. Some ofthe more notable initiatives of the PSC and the mar-itime community at large have been participation ina system that allows mariners to report suspiciousactivity to VTS Houston-Galveston, Port Authorityof Houston dedicating their fireboats to conductsecurity patrols with Coast Guardsmen embarked,and the PSC publishing guidelines on credentialingand recommendations for the use of electronicsurveillance. In June 2002, the PSC co-hosted a portsecurity planning workshop. In November they

diverted to intercept and investigate the vesselwhile agents, owners, and operators are contactedashore. In the port area, vessels are met by a singleteam of agents to clear crew, cargo, safety, securityand environmental issues prior to operation.Containers are scanned as they are unloaded.Surveillance and intrusion detection systemsmonitor control spaces onboard ship, at marineterminals and at remote unattended infrastructure,and feed a centralized security station thatdispatches vessel and shore patrols. The port is inMARSEC 1, operating with the everyday “normal”security measures in place … and thriving.

This is Operation Neptune Shield in the not-so-distant future. Security measures are fully integrat-ed into the function of the port, and all stakehold-ers are engaged in the joint security efforts. Theway forward is built on the foundation of strongpartnership and coordination of resources that wehave laid, not just since September 11, but in themonths and years prior. The challenge of securingour ports is a daunting one, but it is not unlike thechallenge we faced in the wake of the Exxon Valdezincident and the resulting Oil Pollution Act of 1990.By building our capability, planning for coordinat-ed action with shared resources, and maintainingopen lines of communications we can meet thischallenge, too. The Houston-Galveston maritimecommunity is well on the way.

adopted Interim MARSEC II measures for ship andfacilities, and in January 2003 the first draft of thePort Security Plan was published.

The Way ForwardIt’s 4:30 a.m. on Sunday. The Atlantic Area FusionCenter in Norfolk, Va., calls the IntegratedCommand Center in Galveston to verify the day’sarrivals and departures, and passes active vesselcontacts from the Area Vessel Monitoring Station tothe Houston-Galveston VTS. VTS receives theAutomatic Identification System (AIS) signals fromthe 30 ships in the Gulf of Mexico bound forGalveston Bay, and automatically cross referencesthe information with the overseas cargo inspectiondatabase to verify that the cargo was cleared at thepoint or origin. Signals from the vessel indicatedthat cargo hatch or container seals have not beenaltered since inspection. The crew information ischecked and a message is automatically generatedto Coast Guard cutters offshore with names andboarding priorities of approaching ships. At thedispatch offices of the local pilots associations,agents and harbor tugs, a subset of the same data isavailable and they know which vessels are clearedto enter the port that day, the estimated time ofarrival and any inspections or documentationrequired prior to cargo operations. Patrol aircraftdetect a vessel 120 nautical miles out that is notchecked into the traffic control system and is nottransmitting AIS. CGC Manta is immediately



Establishing a Port Security Committee

by Lt. Cmdr. KEVIN KIEFER

Chief of Port Management Department; MSO Corpus Christi

TTo pro provideovide the maritimeindustry with

new security guidance procedures related to theMaritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), theU.S. Coast Guard has produced three informativeNavigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars(NVICs). The first NVIC released, NVIC 9-02(Guidelines for Port Security Committees, and PortSecurity Plans Required for U.S. Ports), was specif-ically created to establish a Port SecurityCommittee for assessing and reducing securitythreats and vulnerabilities.

There are a number of ways available for establish-ing and maintaining these Port SecurityCommittees, thereby allowing each Marine SafetyOffice (MSO)/Captain of the Port (COTP) to createa committee focused on the specific port’s needs.This article describes the path taken by MSOCorpus Christi and shares its experiences andlessons learned.

Area of ResponsibilityMSO Corpus Christi is located on the Texas CoastalBend. Its area of responsibility is large, extendingnorth to the Colorado River, south to the U.S.-Mexican border, and spreading more than 200 milesinto the Gulf of Mexico. It covers approximately 340miles of South Texas waterways, including the GulfIntracoastal Waterway, the Corpus Christi Bay, andvarious ports along the Gulf Coast—essentially, thesouthern half of the Texas coast.

Affectionately referred to as the “Texas Riviera,”Corpus Christi is indeed a water lover’s haven with

tourists and commercial fishermen continually onthe waterways. However, interspersed among thesesmaller vessels is the daily crossing of large cargoships. In terms of tonnage, Corpus Christi is theseventh largest port in the United States, and thefourth largest in terms of movement of crude oiland petroleum products. With the recent militaryoutload operation in the Port of Corpus Christi, theusually busy waterways have become even busier.

Strategic Port of EmbarkationCorpus Christi’s convenient location on the CoastalBend and its numerous port and intermodal facili-ties offer a wide interface between the water andsurface modes of transportation. For this reason, itis one of the Strategic Ports of Embarkation (SPOE)chosen by the Department of Defense. These strate-gic ports have the ability to quickly and safelysupport deployment of military personnel andcargo in defense contingencies to meet the missionrequirements of overseas commanders.

To assure rapid execution and deployment fornational defense, each SPOE is required to form aPort Readiness Committee (PRC). The PRC meetsregularly, working with appropriate governmentagencies and port stakeholders. A PRC meetingusually addresses local intelligence issues, portsecurity requirements, and processes to improveport security and operational efficiency throughdrills and exercises.

Creation of Port Security Committee (PSC)NVIC 9-02 advises that Port Security Committeeactivities be coordinated with existing PRCs when-


ever possible. Because of the PRCs’ proven successwith recent exercises and actual military outloadoperations, MSO Corpus Christi determined thatthe PRC—as well as the local Harbor SafetyCommittee—should jointly form the basis for thenew PSC for the Port of Corpus Christi. For adviceon establishing PSCs, the MSO then turned to otherMSOs that were in various PSC developmentstages. Lessons learned from other MSOs greatlyassisted MSO Corpus Christi in their planning.

MSO Corpus Christi is planning to develop fourPSCs because there are four main ports (Port ofCorpus Christi, Port of Port Lavaca–Point Comfort,Port of Victoria, and Port of Brownsville) within theMSO’s area of responsibility (AOR). The differentport locations necessitate some different membersand area concerns due to different physical charac-teristics and port uses. Each PSC will be consideredseparate and equal, and the COTP will remainactively involved in each one. Other MSOs withmore than one major port have also used thisapproach.

PSC MembershipThere are a number of ways to meet the require-ments in comprising the PSC. NVIC 9-02 recom-mends involving a large number of organizations inthe PSC. However, even if eachorganization only sends onerepresentative, the resultingdiverse group will potentiallybe large and difficult to man-age. Some MSOs that havetaken this approach havetherefore divided the largecommittee into subcommit-tees or smaller groups basedon the organization’s func-tions (e.g., response organiza-tions, container terminals, refinery terminals, etc.).Other MSOs have developed a smaller steeringcommittee that helps direct and manage the larger,diverse PSC.

Another approach, and the approach that MSOCorpus Christi has decided to use, is a small PSCcomposed of representatives from existing larger,sector-specific groups. For example, about 30 lawenforcement agencies were already meeting month-ly through the Corpus Christi Intelligence SharingGroup prior to the PSC’s creation; now they sendone member to the PSC who then reports the infor-mation back to the entire group. The Coastal Bend

Business Roundtable Security Forum, a group ofrefinery terminal security managers, is also usingthis approach. In addition, the PSC reports to thelarger and all-encompassing HSC, thereby ensuringthat every Port of Corpus Christi organization isinvolved with the PSC’s efforts to maintain security.

Corpus Christi PSC members include a representa-tive from the following organizations (note thateach PSC may be slightly different in itsmembership):

· Bureau of Customs and Border Protection· Emergency Operations Center (of Corpus

Christi)· FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force· Federal Emergency Management Agency· Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association· Pilots Association· Port of Corpus Christi Authority· Transportation Security Administration· U.S. Coast Guard· U.S. Navy

Members also include a representative from localfacilities, marine insurance brokers, railroadcompanies, shipping agencies, and shipyards.Other groups can be invited to discuss specific

issues on an as-needed basis (asspecific security situations arise).

Meeting of the PSCThe COTP began the firstmeeting by providingmembers with an overview ofCoast Guard activities in theport, and introducing theMTSA and NVIC 9-02. Asrequired by the NVIC, each

PSC has a list of requirements toaccomplish that will further ensure the safety andsecurity of their port. Recognizing the intricacies ofthe NVIC’s required Port Security Plan (PSP), thePSC decided to immediately begin draftingelements of it. Fortunately, the PSC had numeroussecurity assessments regarding the Port of CorpusChristi already compiled (including the CoastGuard Port Security Assessment completed inSeptember 2002). The PSC agreed to use thefindings from these assessments as the main basisfor developing the PSP.

The first element of the PSP that the PSC decided toaddress was identifying requirements they felt

Through groups suchas the PSC...key

stakeholders can bebrought together to helpdetermine and mitigate

high-risk situations.

An 87-foot CoastGuard patrol boatescorts the USNSCape Rise, which is aMilitary SealiftCommand Roll-on/Roll-off ship.Photo courtesy MSOCorpus Christi.


were necessary for the Port of Corpus Christi tomeet Homeland Security Advisory System(HSAS)/Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels.Starting with existing MARSEC requirements fromanother MSO, they determined which of thoseideas applied to Corpus Christi. The PSC willcontinue developing elements of the PSP at futuremeetings. (Note that although there will eventuallybe four PSCs headed by MSO CorpusChristi/COTP, only one PSP is required for theAOR.)

The PSC is also taking ideas and best practices fromother groups, combining them into the future PSP.For example, one idea mentioned was originated bythe Coastal Bend Business Roundtable SecurityForum. Their notification system, essentially a Web-based digital paging system, can notify facilities,port authority, Coast Guard, and other agencies ofan emergency situation within one minute. Anotheridea, originally discussed at the IntelligenceSharing Group Forum, concerns security guardprocedures for vessels with Detain on Boardcrewmembers. Also discussed was the Declarationof Security (mentioned in NVIC 10-02, SecurityGuidelines for Vessels); the group decided it was agood template in addressing security concernsbetween vessels and facilities, and will beginimplementing it as soon as needed.

The PSC meeting provided an open forum for past,present and future security-related issues. Overall,both the MSO and the various industry groups felt

that the new PSC and its purpose was a good ideaand worthwhile for all involved.

ConclusionTo successfully meet the NVIC 9-02 requirements,the PSC developed both short-term and long-termobjectives. Short-term objectives of the PortSecurity Committee include completing theHSAS/MARSEC requirements and drafting thecommittee’s charter. Long-term objectives includefinishing the PSP by the December 2003 deadlineand aligning it with new domestic and internation-al security requirements. While there are numeroussecurity measures being conducted in the Port ofCorpus Christi, the interweaving thread is the PSC.To allow maritime commerce to continue movingeffectively while maintaining a high security level,it is imperative that all maritime stakeholderscommunicate their actions with each other.Through groups such as the PSC, these key stake-holders can be brought together to help determineand mitigate high-risk situations. This group andits members will play an active role in the contin-ued security of the Port of Corpus Christi.

The success of MSO Corpus Christi’s PSC is due inpart to the cooperation of other MSOs who provid-ed their own experiences and lessons learnedregarding their PSC developments.

To learn more about Corpus Christi’s PSC, contact Lt. Cmdr.Kiefer at (361) 888-3162 (ext 500) [email protected].


Barge Industry Develops First Coast Guard�

Approved Security Plan

by AMY BRANDT

Manager–Government Affairs; The American Waterways Operators

The American Waterways Operators (AWO), thenational trade association for the tugboat, towboatand barge industry, has developed a model vesselsecurity plan to reduce the likelihood of a terroristattack involving barges or towing vessels. TheAWO Model Vessel Security Plan is the first indus-try standard security plan to be approved by theU.S. Coast Guard. In a recent letter, Rear Adm.Larry Hereth, Director of Port Security, informedAWO that U.S. tugboat, towboat and barge compa-nies that implement the AWO Model VesselSecurity Plan will be considered to be in compliancewith the guidance provided in Navigation andVessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 10-02, SecurityGuidelines for Vessels. "I commend AmericanWaterways Operators for its efforts in establishing amodel security plan that raises the securitystandard for a significant portion of the maritimeindustry," the admiral wrote. "I look forward tofurther strengthening the U.S. Coast Guard’spartnership with AWO in our fight against terrorism."

The goal of the AWO Model Vessel Security Plan isto protect people and property and prevent vesselsfrom being used as weapons of mass destruction.The plan was developed after the September 11terrorist attacks by a special AWO Security WorkingGroup, including representatives from the CoastGuard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Development of the PlanAWO developed the Model Vessel Security Plan toassist member companies in improving the securityof their operations. The process began in November2001, less than two months after September 11 andmore than a year before passage of the Maritime

Transportation Security Act of 2002, which makesvessel and facility security plans mandatory. AWOVice Chairman of the Board Steve Scalzo, of FossMaritime Company, led a high-level workinggroup that met with Rear Adm. Paul Pluta, CoastGuard Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety,Security and Environmental Protection, and Maj.Gen. Robert Griffin, Director of Civil Works for theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The working groupreviewed potential threats and vulnerabilities to themarine transportation system and recommendedthat AWO work with Coast Guard and Corps ofEngineers officials to develop a model securityplan.

From January to March 2002, representatives from10 AWO member companies, the Coast Guard, andthe Corps of Engineers met to develop and finalizethe plan. The AWO board of directors unanimouslyvoted to approve the plan in April 2002. In unveil-ing the new plan, AWO President and CEO TomAllegretti said, "In developing this Model VesselSecurity Plan, AWO continues its effort to be aconstructive leader in the safety and security of theAmerican tugboat, towboat and barge industry. Wehope this plan provides AWO members with atemplate that they can use to develop and augmenttheir own vessel security plans. In this way, ourindustry continues its role as 'the eyes and ears' onthe waterways of this nation."

Last fall, the Coast Guard issued NVIC 10-02,which provides guidelines for the development ofvessel security plans. The NVIC stated that theCoast Guard would consider accepting industry-developed standards as meeting the criteria


contained in the NVIC. Aftermaking minor modificationsto the Model Vessel SecurityPlan to ensure consistencywith the NVIC, AWO submit-ted the plan for Coast Guardapproval. In March, the CoastGuard signaled its approval,making the AWO ModelVessel Security Plan the firstindustry standard plan to besubmitted to and approved bythe Coast Guard.

AWO members are now work-ing to implement the planthroughout their operations.AWO has also asked the Coast

Guard to recognize the plan asan equivalent standard toforthcoming vessel securityplan regulations, which theagency will release thissummer.

Elements of the PlanThe AWO Model Vessel Security Plan begins byidentifying guiding principles for vessel securityplans and terrorism prevention. The plan describessecurity policies and procedures that companiesshould have in place to assign responsibility forsecurity, both onboard vessels and on shore. Acompany's security policies and procedures shouldinclude means to: (1) detect security threats early;(2) prevent or restrict access to the vessel; and(3) ensure communications between the vessel, thecompany, and appropriate authorities at all times.The plan specifies that a company’s vessel securityplan should include common-sense actions that canbe implemented by companies and crewmembersin the event of a suspected or actual terrorist attack.The AWO plan requires companies to designatecompany and vessel security officers.

The plan also provides guidance on areas thatcompanies should address in developing vesselsecurity plans specific to their operations, includingawareness, training, personnel practices, planning,and emergency response. The plan uses the CoastGuard’s Maritime Security (MARSEC) conditions totrigger the security level in place aboard the vessel.Companies may elect to move to a higher securitylevel than that designated by the Coast Guard, butnot to a lower one.

In addition, the AWO Model Vessel Security Plancontains a matrix that lists both required andrecommended actions to be taken with regard tophysical security of vessels and fleeting areas, enroute or in transit security, communications, andcargo. These actions are geared to the Coast Guard'sthree MARSEC conditions, and vary based uponthe type of cargo carried. An appendix to the plancategorizes nearly 100 commonly carried hazardouscargoes that could potentially be used as weaponsof mass destruction. The cargo classification tabledetermines what actions vessel operators shouldtake when transporting those cargoes. Anotherappendix lists types of suspicious activity thatvessel crewmembers should be aware of and reportto the Coast Guard’s 24-hour National ResponseCenter.

Distribution of the Security PlanSince the plan was finalized last year, AWO hasshared it widely with government and industryorganizations interested in maritime security.Recently, the plan was featured at the March 2003Inland Waterways Conference sponsored by the 8th

Coast Guard District and the Ohio Valley andMississippi Valley Divisions of the Corps ofEngineers. In March 2002, the Coast Guard’s MarineSafety Office-St. Louis invited AWO to present theModel Vessel Security Plan to law enforcementpersonnel, including the FBI, National Guard, statepolice agencies, local Corps of Engineers officials,and other agencies. The Towing Safety AdvisoryCommittee (TSAC) has also recognized the AWOplan as a practical and effective security-enhance-ment tool and urged the Coast Guard to approvesimilar industry-developed security standards forother segments of the maritime industry. Copies ofthe plan have been shared with the NavigationSafety Advisory Council (NAVSAC) and HarborSafety Committees throughout the country. TheAWO plan is also referenced in the AmericanBureau of Shipping’s Guide for Ship Security.

The American Waterways Operators is the national tradeassociation representing the U.S. tugboat, towboat, and bargeindustry. Headquartered in the Washington, D.C. area, theassociation is comprised of 375 member companies operatingnearly 80 percent of the towing equipment in the United States.AWO has three primary missions: advocacy, safety, andindustry image. The AWO Model Security Plan is available onthe AWO Web site at www.americanwaterways.com under"Model Vessel Security Plan."

Crewmember Seaman April Dunlap,aboard a Station Curtis Bay, Md.utility boat, watches a barge getloaded during a Homeland Securitypatrol in Baltimore Harbor. Photo byPublic Affairs Officer Zach Zubricki,USCG.


Building SecurityGuidance

in the Domestic Passenger Vessel Industry

by GARY FROMMELT

PVA President & Project Manager; Hornblower Marine Services

September 11 challengedall our

perceptions of protection of life and property. In thedomestic environment, security was a concept thatthwarted vandalism and theft. It secured property.Safety programs protected life.

As we were to learn in the days following theattacks, industry and government alike mobilizedto secure waterborne passenger transportation.Those actions ranged from total port shutdown, toseverely constrained vital operations, to confusion,to continued unrestricted operation.

The Passenger Vessel Association’s (PVA) first inter-action with the U.S. Coast Guard was a conferencecall on Sept. 12. That call brought many of our ferryoperators and PVA officers and staff into directcontact with the rapidly forming port and water-way security cadre in Coast Guard Headquarters. Itwas obvious that many of the passenger vesseloperators were taking steps to heighten security oftheir operations and not all were Coast Guarddriven. As with the country as a whole, ourmembers wanted to do something in response toour newly realized vulnerability.

Most of the major ports were quickly placed underCaptain of the Port orders. All other ports experi-enced some sort of Coast Guard interaction, fromrecommended actions to queries asking, “What are

you doing to improve security?” Another conceptthat was gaining currency was “the new normalcy.”The idea was that we must change—permanently.Even the most remote and smallest passengervessel operation now had to think about what anew normalcy meant to that operation.

The PVA response was to publish a series of PVAMember Updates, transmitted regularly tomembers via email and fax. Those updates outlinedsecurity steps developed through the sharedexperience of our members, and guidance gleanedfrom the international-based regulations in Title 33,Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 120 and 128 andits interpretive U.S. Coast Guard Navigation andVessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 3-96, which weregenerally only applicable to large ocean-goingcruise ships.

From the absence of existing plans that focused ondomestic passenger vessel operations, it was clearthat government and operators alike tended todefault to those practices in which everyone hadpersonal experience—airport check-in and screen-ing procedures. While these early actions may havebeen a sincere effort to do something, it was notnecessarily effective or sustainable for the domesticpassenger vessel industry. Domestic passengervessel operations are diverse. Our ferries and tourvessels are essentially mass transit and walk-upservice operations. Dinner cruise vessels have more


in common with restaurants than transportation.Vessels that rely on charter business often dealt withgroups who already had a family, business, orfraternal relationship.

To assist our members in their efforts to establish aneffective and sustainable new normalcy, weembarked on creating the PVA’s Passenger VesselSecurity Guidelines. The process relied heavily onour members’ experiences and innovations. Thisinformation was developed through round-tablesessions at regional meetings, conference calls,meetings of our standing committees, and monitor-ing legislative and international activities.

To ensure that our efforts paralleled the CoastGuard’s concept of new normalcy and that theywould gain wide acceptance, we involved CoastGuard officials in our work. The interaction startedwith that initial conference call and continuedthrough review draft.

PVA’s Passenger Vessel Security Guidelines havegone a very long way towards establishing acommon understanding between the domesticpassenger vessel industry and our regulators.

They are a first step, although a giant one.Subsequent to their distribution we cooperated in aCoast Guard task group convened to develop

security screening on large passenger-carry-ing ferries. We also met with the Maritimeand Land Security division within theTransportation Security Administration. Our2003 annual convention featured presenta-tions on security issues by Coast Guard andTSA experts.

In addition, PVA’s internal focus continuesto embrace the new normalcy. While severalof our councils and committees—compris-ing member volunteers, PVA staff, and insome cases, Coast Guard personnel—haveincluded security issues in their initiatives,the PVA Safety and Loss Control Committeechanged its name to the Safety and SecurityCommittee to better address this criticalfunction. Without a doubt, this group ofdedicated volunteers, many of whom spentcountless hours toward the creation of thePVA Security Guidelines, will continue toemphasize the importance of security with-in the confines of the PVA membership andindustry at large.

PVA’s highest goal for the year 2003 is to refine thePVA Passenger Vessel Security Guidelines into adocument to be submitted to the Coast Guard forapproval as an “industry standard” for our sector.When this is accomplished, our domestic passengervessels will have an alternative method of satisfy-ing their legal responsibilities established by theMaritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

One thing we know in this ever-changing statutoryand regulatory arena is that security measures willevolve just as marine safety evolved—through agovernment and industry cooperative effort. Thateffort will continue to define and redefine ourprogress toward a new normalcy that can meet orexceed our success in passenger vessel safety.

The passenger vessel industry plays a vital role in the U.S.transportation system, carrying more than 200 millionpassengers each year. The Passenger Vessel Association is thenational organization representing the interests of owners andoperators of dinner cruise vessels, sightseeing and excursionvessels, whale watch and eco-tour vessels, gaming boats, carand passenger ferries, private charter boats, windjammers,DUKWs (amphibious vessels) and overnight cruise ships.Readers can obtain more PVA nformation on the association’sWeb site at www.passengervessel.com.

DUKWs, or DUCKs, are amphibious tour vehicles that are able to travel onland and water. Photo by Ken Olsen, USCG.


Perspectives on U�S� Security Initiatives

Affecting International Liner Shipping

by CHRISTOPHER KOCH

President & CEO; World Shipping Council

As efforts to secure ourselves againstthe risk of terrorism continue, it isimperative for world trade that

governments and industry continue to makemeaningful progress in improving the safety andsecurity of international maritime transportationsystems. We are all faced with the tension betweenimproving security and not unnecessarily damag-ing trade or the economy. Meaningful, sustainedcooperation between industry and government isessential to develop effective multi-facetedstrategies for mitigating those vulnerabilities, andto ensure that the implementation of securitystrategies does not unnecessarily disrupt the flow ofcommerce.

Containers and Liner ShippingShipping containers were developed as a moreefficient, less expensive way to move goods. Theintermodal movement of sealed containers not onlyreduced damage and pilferage of goods, it facilitat-ed the development of intermodal supply chains,moving goods internationally from door to doorwith remarkable efficiency. More than 800 ocean-going liner vessels, mostly containerships androll-on/roll-off vessels, now make more than 22,000port calls to the United States each year. Last year,Americans purchased and imported goods frommore than 178,000 foreign businesses. In serving

this flow of international trade, the liner shippingindustry carried roughly six million containers ofimport cargo to the United States and carriedapproximately 3.3 million containers of exportcargo being shipped from more than 202,000American businesses. The value of that cargo wasroughly $500 billion, or more than $1.3 billion perday. This remarkable system serves Americanimporters, exporters and consumers by providingregularly scheduled services to and from virtuallyevery country in the world. This access to an inex-pensive, efficient and highly reliable transportationsystem not only strengthens the U.S. and worldeconomies, but also has dramatically driveneconomic growth and globalization.

The principal issue and challenge facing the indus-try, its customers, and the governments of theinternational trading community is how to enhancethe security of this commercial process in a waythat both prevents terrorist attacks and enablestrade to flow efficiently and reliably. This challengeis indeed substantial. But so have been the efforts ofgovernment and industry. At times, there havebeen differences that the industry has expressedregarding certain regulatory proposals. The linershipping industry has, however, fully andconsistently supported the core strategy of the U.S.government to:


· Develop a new international security regime at the International Maritime Organization covering ships and port facilities, and

· Build cooperative agreements with its trading partners that facilitate (1) pre- loading cargo manifest review, (2) notices not to load cargo that requires further review, and (3) the establishment of capabilities at ports of loading to allow security officials to inspect any high-risk container for security reasons.

Maritime security strategies must protect nations’abilities to maintain open trade even in theaftermath of a future terrorist attack. Potentialresponses to terrorist attacks, such as closing downall U.S. ports—or even certain vital ports—couldcause severe economic damage to this country andour trading partners. Security systems must bedesigned to protect the flow of “safe” internationalcommerce that has met increased securitystandards, while further scrutinizing the high-riskcommerce that fails to meet those standards.

Organizing a Unified Government StrategyImproving the security of international traderequires international standards, cooperation, and

implementation of new security practices. Withinthe U.S. government this requires a tightly integrat-ed strategy with clearly delineated agency respon-sibilities, not only in detecting and preventingterrorist attacks against the international cargotransportation system and its ports, but also inadequate contingency and response planning. Sucha system is logical to describe but is complicated tobuild. Maritime security is the responsibility ofmultiple government agencies with differingagendas relating to their perceived roles in themaritime security mission.

The formation of the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) has placed most of the governmentagencies with maritime security roles under oneumbrella. These agencies include: the U.S. CoastGuard, which oversees many vital elements of themaritime security mission such as ship and portsecurity, the Directorate of Border andTransportation Security, under which lies theBureau of Customs and Border Protection(Customs), which oversees trade and has taken thelead role on container and cargo security, and theTransportation Security Administration (TSA),which has broad authority for transportationsecurity in all modes, including maritime. Also inthe mix are DHS’s Bureau of Citizenship and

Gantry cranes load a container ship. Photo courtesy Maersk Sealand.


Immigration Services andthe State Department,which have overlappingauthority for foreignseafarers who enter theUnited States aboardinternational liner ship-ping vessels. Establishingthe DHS will ultimatelyhelp resolve the organiza-tional and jurisdictionalconfusion, but even withthe formation of DHS,organizational protection-ism, inefficient processesand redundant require-ments must be subordi-nated by each agency tobuild a clear, unifiedmaritime security system.

Once the U.S. govern-ment develops a clearvision of how securitycan be improved, it in many cases needs to thenobtain international agreement in order to achieveeffective implementation. This can be done inseveral ways, and it must be done, as there areobvious limitations on U.S. jurisdiction overinternational transportation. One example ofsignificant progress in this regard is the CoastGuard’s development of meaningful new ship andport security regulations, for which it obtainedinternational agreement at the InternationalMaritime Organization. Another example is theCustoms Service entering into bilateral agreementswith various nations as part of the ContainerSecurity Initiative—a logical approach to increasingthe security of shipping in the absence of an inter-nationally accepted program with internationalstandards. Other security initiatives that willrequire international agreement include standardsfor seafarer credentialing documents and standardsfor container seals and sensors.

Cargo and Supply Chain SecurityContainer Security Initiative (CSI)CSI is a program through which Customs is estab-lishing government-to-government agreementswith other nations’ Customs organizations to(1) establish security criteria to identify and targethigh-risk containers, (2) develop and implementpre-screening processes to target and screen high-risk containers before they are loaded aboard a

vessel in the foreign portof departure, and(3) develop and deploydetection technologies toquickly screen and inspectidentified containers priorto loading. CSI agree-ments are critical becausethey will help foster thecontinuation of trade ifthe industry is ever besetby a terrorist attack.Without such agreementsand capabilities in placeto inspect containers inforeign ports of loading,it could be difficult toprovide sufficient securi-ty confidence to keepinternational trade flowing.

Considerable progresshas been made in estab-lishing CSI agreements,

and more progress is imminent. To date, CSI decla-rations have been signed covering 18 of the top 20mega-ports for a total of 24 ports in 15 countries.These ports handle approximately 60 percent of thecargo that is transported to the United States. Apossible CSI agreement with the European Unionwould expand the cooperative initiative and itssecurity enhancements to even more Europeanports. These initiatives between Customs and itscounterparts are an essential, logical core elementof enhanced container security.

There are, however, several important challengesthat CSI faces. First, the progress and establishmentof these agreements has been, in diplomatic timeframes, rapid and successful. It is important,however, for the governments involved to showthat CSI agreements are more than paperdocuments, but are real initiatives with adequatestaffing, container inspection levels and containerinspection equipment, and at least somenonclassified indication that they are producingsuccessful results. Unless this is done, questionsabout the adequacy of container security and CSIwill continue unabated. The second challengefacing CSI is its expansion to smaller ports.Customs has appropriately focused on the largestvolume ports to begin the program. But theprogram logically should be expanded to otherports.

Hyundai containers are unloaded and transferred toa truck. Photo courtesy Hyundai Merchant MarineCompany.


program appears to be moving ahead deliberative-ly and purposefully.

Trade Act ImplementationThe Trade Act of 2002 requires Customs to establishadvance electronic documentation for all U.S.imports and exports in all transportation modes.While technically not part of the Trade Act require-ments, Customs started with inbound ocean freightusing the 24-hour rule. Customs is now examininghow it will establish the cargo security rules foroutbound ocean freight and for the othertransportation modes.

Testing and Analysis of New Security TechnologiesThe government and industry recognize that newtechnologies may play a role in enhancing supplychain security. The most important technologies todate are the non-intrusive container inspectionmachines that U.S. and foreign Customs agenciesare deploying to inspect the contents of shippingcontainers. The role and value of that technology isvery clear, because it answers the most importantquestion from a security perspective—what is inthe sealed container? Non-intrusive inspectiontechnology provides a highly efficient way toinspect containers about which security questionsare raised, and, because it is the only technologythat answers the above security question, itswidespread deployment and enhanced use is bothnecessary and predictable.

It is not surprising that a host of different technolo-gy vendors are urging governments to considertheir particular products as solutions to supplychain security concerns. The U.S. government isworking to try to institute programs to identifysupply chain gaps and assess some of thesepossibilities. One such program, Operation SafeCommerce, will provide funds to analyze and testsupply chain security possibilities during thecourse of this year. While the picture in this regardis not entirely clear, initial indications suggest thatthe process being used to assess security technolo-gies is becoming better informed and moreanalytical. There is a growing recognition that thegovernment needs to work with industry to clearlyidentify and validate supply chain security require-ments, because those requirements should drivetechnology, not vice versa.

Vessel and Port SecurityThe Maritime Transportation Security Act, which

Customs’24-Hour RuleAn essential elementof the CSI strategy isproviding the gov-ernment with cargoshipment informationfor screening beforevessel loading. Sincethe rule was pro-posed last fall, the linershipping industry andits customers haveexpended substan-tial time, energy andmoney in changingtheir systems andbusiness processesto comply with theU.S. government’sregulations requir-ing cargo informa-tion to be filed

electronically to Customs 24 hours before vesselloading. It has been expensive and difficult. But itis a clear and necessary piece of the government’sstrategy, and its early implementation has beengenerally handled with care and consideration byCustoms.

Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)C-TPAT is a voluntary program between Customsand industry members (importers, shippers,carriers, freight forwarders, etc.) to foster enhancedsupply chain security. The principle is that if indus-try partners voluntarily undertake certain actionsto improve their supply chain security, Customswill give their cargoes expedited treatment. C-TPATimporters, for example, are also expected to useonly ocean carriers, brokers, freight-forwarders andnon-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs)that are enrolled in C-TPAT. The World ShippingCouncil and its member lines have fully supportedthe ocean carrier portion of C-TPAT.

C-TPAT started by establishing a broad scope andensuring all participants have security plans inplace. C-TPAT now has more than 2,300 partici-pants, including importers, carriers (all modes),brokers/consolidators/NVOCCs, and U.S. marineports and terminals. The program includes 70 of thetop 100 U.S. importers, 39 of the top 50 oceancarriers (including all World Shipping Councilmembers), and 36 percent of U.S. imports by value.The development of “trusted shippers” under this

A Maersk container ship enters the NewYork Harbor between Governor’s Island andthe Statue of Liberty. Photo courtesy MaerskSealand.


the plenary role and full responsibility for thesesecurity matters.

With respect to containerized cargo security,however, it is and will continue to be very impor-tant that Customs be the agency responsible forcargo security. The Coast Guard should notduplicate that mission or act on container securityindependently of Customs. A clear Memoranda ofAgreement between the Coast Guard and Customsis needed to define roles and missions in this areato avoid confusion.

Personnel SecurityAn estimated 200,000 foreign seafarers come to theUnited States each year. They are but a smallpercentage of the roughly 36 million foreignerswho visit the United States each year for businessor tourism. With that said, seafarers of all nationsmust be recognized as vital components of ourmaritime security system, and it is thereforeessential that vessel operators and their crews beprovided with a clear, fair and predictable set ofrules.

The issues of checking and credentialing transportworkers have been receiving considerable attentionby the U.S. government, but viable solutions havenot yet emerged. The liner shipping industry hasexpressed its support for the government toestablish a national credentialing program, withuniform, minimum federal standards, institute afederal background check process, utilize “smartcard” technology that incorporates biometric datain the credentialing of appropriate transportationworkers, and negotiate an international agreementfor a new international biometric seafarer identifi-cation document.

Transportation Worker Identification CardsThe TSA has been tasked with the development ofa system of background checks and identificationcards for U.S.transport work-ers. To date, TSAhas not proposedimplementationof any particularprogram or sys-tem, and appearsto be strugglingwith the enor-mity and com-plexity of the

became law last year, requires the Coast Guard todevelop security plans and requirements for vesselsand marine terminals. Prior to the passage of theMTSA, the Coast Guard had been strongly advocat-ing that the International Maritime Organization(IMO) establish new rules in this regard, and theIMO quickly and successfully agreed to newinternational vessel and port facility securityrequirements in December 2002. The Coast Guardsubsequently issued for comment an extensive setof proposals that would essentially implement thenew U.S. legislation’s mandate by requiringcompliance with the new IMO ship and portfacility security code. The Coast Guard is nowdeveloping regulations to implement variousaspects of the legislation and the IMO rules, whichwill enter into force on July 1, 2004. The CoastGuard’s effort to work with the IMO to develop thisnew security regime is a model of how toimplement consistent international and domesticsecurity requirements. The Council, along withmany other industry representatives, supported theCoast Guard’s objective to use internationallyagreed IMO standards to meet the requirements ofthe new U.S. law.

The liner industry has been very supportive of thestrategy and the leadership of the U.S. Coast Guardnot only in its efforts at the IMO, but also in itsdomestic security efforts. Immediately afterSeptember 11, the Coast Guard implementedseveral measures to improve tracking of vesselsdestined for U.S. ports and the crews and passen-gers onboard those vessels. Advance Notices ofArrival (NOAs) are now required 96 hours prior toarrival in a U.S. port (except for voyages of shorterduration). Further, through its Sea Marshallprogram, establishment of safety and securityzones, and escorts of high-risk vessels, the CoastGuard has taken steps to prevent vessels frombecoming terrorist targets or weapon deliverydevices.

The Coast Guard will remain a separate stand-alone agency within DHS, reporting directly to theSecretary. It will be important with this independ-ent structure, however, that there not be duplicationor inconsistent approaches with other branches ofthe new department. With that said, one questionwill be: what role, if any, does the TSA have withrespect to ships and ports? Given the Coast Guard’ssuccessful record and that it is highly regarded byport and flag states around the world, it wouldseem logical that the Coast Guard should be given

An APL vessel maneuvers close to shore. Photocourtesy APL.


task. There are millions of transportation workers inthe United States, and different U.S. laws requiredifferent requirements for different classes ofworkers (e.g., truck drivers hauling explosives). Thechallenge of designing a system with a common setof biometric identifiers for maritime, truck, rail,transit and other workers is substantial.

International Seafarer CredentialsThe United States has been supporting the develop-ment of a universal biometric seafarer identificationcard by the International Labor Organization (ILO).The Council has been working with U.S. officials tohelp formulate a position at the ILO talks thatwould enable a new biometric seafarer identifica-tion document to include or provide direct electron-ic access to the necessary data elements required forthe processing of a U.S. visa. This credential isimportant because, given that the U.S. governmentis not likely to waive the visa requirement forforeign seafarers, it could conceivably enable aforeign seafarer to use his biometric seafarer identi-fication credential to apply for and expedite visaissuance at any overseas consulate or embassy. TheU.S. position at the ILO appears to support thisbasic objective, and hopefully the ILO negotiationswill produce a clear and acceptable new set ofstandards and a new instrument for seafarer identi-fication to be ready for approval during its 91st

session in the summer of 2003.

Crew List VisasThe State Department has proposed the eliminationof crew list visas because it has security concernswith its current crew list visa system. The Councilhas suggested that a final rule on this issue could beaffected by the outcome of the ILO discussions on auniversal biometric seafarer identification docu-ment, as discussed above. A positive decision by theILO, which meets U.S. objectives, could, along withother international and domestic security initiativesregarding vessels and their crews, provide suchnew circumstances surrounding the crew list visasystem that it would provide assurances againstadmitting undesirable persons to the United States.

If a determination were to be made, however, thatabolition of the crew list visa would be warrantedeven after the introduction of a universal interna-tional biometric seafarer document, the StateDepartment must address: the need for an expeditedand privileged individuals visa application processfor seafarers, including a significant reduction inthe current visa processing time; the need for a

credible “signing off/on” visa waiver program; theneed to keep costs for obtaining individual seafarervisas at a minimum; and, the possibility that othercountries may impose reciprocal visa requirementson U.S. flagged and crewed vessels.

Electronic Filing of Crew InformationThe Immigration and Naturalization Service(before its transfer to DHS) issued proposed rules torequire the advance electronic filing of crewmem-ber information with the U.S. government. TheCouncil has supported the statutorily requiredadvance electronic crew manifest submission. Itwill be consistent with the Coast Guard’s Notice ofArrival (NOA) crewmember information require-ments and will take the industry a significant stepcloser to what remains its ultimate goal—a singleadvance electronic crewmember submission pervessel to one central government repository. Untilthat system is created, however, we are concernedthat the INS and Customs, which administers thegovernment data system that will receive theelectronic crew manifests, need to provide theindustry sufficient flexibility in meeting the report-ing requirements during this interim period with-out having to invest in new and expensive data systems.

ConclusionClearly there are many interlinking pieces to thismaritime transportation security puzzle. T h egovernment is still in the early stages of developingprocedures and rules to deal with the issuesrelevant to maritime cargo security. The bottom lineis that carriers, shippers, ports, terminal operators,and government agencies are all in this together.Cooperative initiatives will be necessary to retainthe benefits that all trading nations receive from thecurrent efficiencies and predictable service thatliner shipping provides the world’s economy.

Government and industry are now engaged in anexceptionally difficult endeavor to institutesafeguards against the risk of terrorism whileprotecting the benefits of a free society and freetrade. Success is essential. It is incumbent on all theparticipants in this international transportationprocess to help the U.S. government and interna-tional community succeed. The members of theWorld Shipping Council are committed to helpingthe U.S. government succeed in these efforts, andcommend those in public service and industry whoare doing their best to address this new andcomplex set of challenges.


Cruising with Heightened

Security Standards

by MICHAEL CRYE

President; International Council of Cruise Lines

In the hours i m m e d i a t e l yfollowing the

tragic events of September 11, no one could havepredicted the effect it would have on the transporta-tion industry. One of the most visible was theimportance of security. The cruise industry, anindustry with an enviable safety record, quicklyimplemented measures to ensure the highest levelof security for their passengers and crew.

Through existing regulations, proactive planning,and a strong U.S. Coast Guard and industrypartnership, the cruise industry was well

positioned to address the increased securitydemands of the post-September 11 terrorist threat.Upon hearing the news of the attacks, theInternational Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL)immediately became the liaison and crisis center forthe cruise industry. With a goal to implementcontinuous communications with governmentagencies and a higher level of security awarenessand vigilance aboard cruise ships, we initiatedcontact with government partners such as the CoastGuard, Immigration and Naturalization Serviceand the Department of Transportation.

Our first decision was to require allcruise ships to begin operating atsecurity level III—the highest level—according to plans that were filed withthe Coast Guard. Additional securitymeasures that were not apparent toour passengers were also beingimplemented on the cruise ships whileunderway and in the port areas aswell. Since the plans were already inplace, the transition to security level IIIwas accomplished swiftly anduniformly across the industry. Specificmeasures implemented at level IIIsecurity included:

· 100 percent screening of cargo and baggage; and

· 100 percent positive identification (i.e., picture ID check) of personnel before they board the vessel.A security guard checks the ID of passengers boarding the Sea

Princess cruise ship. Cruise lines have increased their securitychecks, which are now very similar to what one would encounterat an airport. Photo by Public Affairs Officer Christopher Grisafe,USCG.


Since that day, the industry has expanded itscommunication efforts by continuing to work close-ly with the appropriate federal, state and localagencies while opening lines of communicationwith the FBI, Department of Defense, Departmentof State, and U.S. Customs to further enhancesecurity partnerships. In addition, ICCL executiveshave testified on Capitol Hill in congressionalhearings relating to maritime security and havedone briefings for Homeland Security.

On the international front, we have been movingforward on security issues as well. ICCL supportedthe Coast Guard’s efforts at the InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO) to develop a resolu-tion calling for the review, update and amendmentof existing instruments related to maritime securityand the development of any new conventionsnecessary to improve maritime security. ICCLattended the 75th session of the IMO MaritimeSafety Committee. A working group was held

during these meetings to address various areasaffecting the ICCL member cruise lines in matters ofmaritime security. Some of these areas includecurrent security regulations; duties of ship, cruiseline and port facility security officers, and the newCoast Guard Navigation and Vessel InspectionCirculars (NVICs) threat level system. The ICCLwill continue to participate in meetings such asthese to further address matters of maritime safety.

Many of the security requirements adopted by theIMO for all of maritime industry are measures thatlarge passenger ships have been living with for anumber of years. We are very fortunate that we hadsecurity plans in place and trained security staffthat could immediately implement our securityplans. A fundamental principle that I learned in theCoast Guard long ago—proper planning preventspoor performance—has proven itself once again.Our partnership and excellent communicationswith the Coast Guard have facilitated the planning

Petty Officer 1st Class O’Bry prepares to launch the CGC Pompano’s smallboat to enforce a 100-yard securityzone around the cruise ship Seabourne Sun. Photo by Lt. Dan C. Jones, USCG.


and execution of security measures withoutunduly hindering the travel vacation experience.

The cruise industry’s highest priority has alwaysbeen to ensure the safety and security of its passen-gers and crew. A cruise ship has certain inherentsecurity advantages because of its controlledenvironment allowing limited access. We takeevery precaution to ensure everything that goes onand off the cruise ship is 100 percent secured andidentified and determined to be what it has beenrepresented to be. Because the safety and securityof our passengers and crew is our highest priority,we continually embrace the newest technologicalinnovations to enhance our safety posture and byreassuring our passengers that new securitymeasures will not take away from the overallvacation experience.

Reassuring Americans that it is safe to travel hastaken the time and talent of many people in theindustry. In fact, according to a poll conducted bythe Institute for Social Research at the University ofMichigan, about half of all Americans feel no moresafe and secure from terrorism today than they feltimmediately after the September 11 attacks. TheICCL and the individual cruise lines have beenactively communicating the safety and securityprocedures that are in place through mediainterviews, our respective Web sites, and direct

communications with travel agencies. The cruiseindustry is using every marketing and communica-tion tool available to encourage travel andreestablish consumer confidence.

These efforts have produced excellent results.Passenger bookings are on an upward swing withmany lines reporting reservation volume at recordlevels. In short, consumer confidence is returningand the industry is rebounding beyond anyone’sexpectations.

These are challenging times—not only from asecurity standpoint but also from a business pointof view. We believe it is our responsibility as anindustry to demand nothing less than the highestsecurity for our passengers while providing them amemorable vacation experience. The Coast Guardhas been an exemplary partner in our efforts.

Industry can act as the eyes and ears for govern-ment if we together develop the means to adequate-ly share information. The Coast Guard will neverhave the assets to continuously protect our entirecoastline. It is incumbent on us to develop effectivemethods to share information that can empowerindustry to effectively assist in this essentialmission. We trust the Coast Guard, in itsever-increasing role in our national securitystructure, will leverage its assets by effectivelyutilizing industry.

A Coast GuardStation Miami Beach41-foot patrol boatrides beside thecruise ship Voyagerof the Seas as ittransits inboundthrough the Port ofMiami. Photo byTelfair Brown Sr.,USCG.


The Pilot’s Rolein Maritime Security

by J. SCOTT RAINEY

Deputy Director; American Pilots’ Association

The The events of September 11 had aprofound impact on membersof the American Pilots’

Association (APA), as Americans and as pilots. Theday-to-day operations of pilots were impactedalmost immediately by the terrorist attacks. SinceSeptember 11, our members throughout the countryhave been working closely with the U.S. CoastGuard helping to implement the security measuresthat were initially imposed as well as the measuresthat are currently in effect. In many places, this hasrequired significant changes in pilotage operations.

Under normal circum-stances, an APA-member pilot is theonly U.S. citizen on aforeign ship movingin the fragile port andwaterway system thatis the lifeline of thiscountry. The pilotcomes aboard the shipwhile it is in U.S.waters to direct its navigation and to prevent it fromengaging in unsafe operations. APA-member pilotsplay an important role in protecting our nation, inboth normal and extraordinary circumstances.

In order to provide the nation with these criticalservices, pilots need to focus on their piloting tasks.Pilots are not combat personnel, security guards,law enforcement officials, or inspectors. As weconsider ways to assist in enhancing port security,we need to be careful that we do not do anythingthat would detract from or jeopardize essentialpiloting functions. To do so would create a risk of an

accidental catastrophe that could have effects justas devastating as one occurring by terrorist design.

This is not to say, however, that pilots cannotprovide important assistance in protecting againstthreats to maritime operations. Pilots are frequent-ly referred to as the eyes and ears of a port. As theonly U.S. citizens on the hundreds of foreign shipswith foreign crews moving in our waters each day,state pilots know a great deal about what ishappening not only on the ships but in thesurrounding waters as well. They are in a unique

position to detectsuspicious or unusualactivities.

Many of our APAmember groups havealready contributedgreatly to our height-ened maritime securi-ty posture. The UnitedNew York and NewJersey Sandy Hook

Pilots have received numerous citations for theirleadership and initiative in response to theSeptember 11 attacks on New York’s World TradeCenter. The Sandy Hook pilots provided theirstation boat, New York, as an on-scene commandplatform and assisted the Coast Guard in coordi-nating the maritime industry’s heroic response.APA member groups have worked closely with theCoast Guard Sea Marshals. In some areas, the CoastGuard does not have adequate boats for boardinglarge commercial vessels offshore. In many cases,APA pilots have assisted Coast Guard personnel toboard and disembark.

“The pilot comes aboard the ship

while it is in U.S. waters

to direct its navigation

and to prevent it from engaging in

unsafe operations.”


To further enhance maritime domain awareness(MDA), APA pilot groups share their vessel arrivaland departure information with the Coast Guardand other appropriate commands, such as the JointHarbor Operations Center in Norfolk. APAmembers assist in MDA in other ways as well. Forexample, the Charleston Bar Pilots helped establisha Volunteer Port Security Force (VPSF). The VPSF is

comprised of commercial mariners who operateroutinely in the port.

In virtually every major commercial port, APAmember pilots actively participate in local HarborSafety and/or Port Security Committees. Thesebodies are comprised of maritime industry andgovernment representatives who are familiar withtheir specific waterways and harbors. Pilots haveprovided needed operational input in the establish-ment and execution of new safety and securityzones, tug and other vessel escort procedures, andother operational security measures.

Recognizing the important role state pilots play, theAPA and the U.S. Coast Guard on Sept. 25, 2002signed a memorandum of agreement regardingmaritime security. A major part of our partnershipproject with the Coast Guard is an examination ofways to improve communications between pilotsserving on ships and the Coast Guard. We arelooking at communication procedures, methods,and protocols. The idea is to give quick and accu-rate notice to the Coast Guard of any suspiciousactivities, particularly onboard the pilot’s ship,without compromising the pilot’s duties or safety.

The APA is proud of its members’ role in enhancingour nation’s maritime security.

The American Pilots Association is the national trade associa-tion of professional maritime pilots. Its membership is made upof 56 groups of state-licensed pilots, comprising virtually allstate pilots in the country, as well as the three groups of U.S.-registered pilots operating in the Great Lakes. APA memberspilot more than 95 percent of all international trade vesselsmoving in U.S. waters.

A pilot (on radio) talks to another vessel’s pilot as theSealand Kodiak transits Harro Straits through PugetSound. Photo by John Bobb, USCG.

A harbor pilot brings the inbound cruise ship Voyager of the Seas through the port of Miami while talkingby walkie-talkie to tug operators. Law enforcement operators accompany the pilot onboard incomingcruise ships as part of the nation’s heightened security measures. Photo by Telfair Brown Sr., USCG.


The Need for Vessel Security Officer Training

by LEN CROSS

Manager, Maritime Security Department; Han-Padron Associates

Bodies of water a r ecarrying larger ships and transporting more passen-gers and greater quantities of high-value andhazardous cargo than decades ago. The shippingindustry has witnessed innovative designs in shipconstruction and operation to handle this increasedcargo/passenger load, and, as a result, trainingprograms have been developed to prepare crews inthe safe handling and operations of these ships. But,as these changes occur, we must also determinewhether security training is being adjustedproportionately.

As the expansion continues, the industry’s riskexposure has grown. The threats of previous yearshave given way to new, more lethal threats.Stowaways, narcotics smuggling, piracy and terror-ism are some of the security issues facing theshipping industry. The nature of the threat variesaccording to the type of ship and the cargo/passen-gers it is carrying. Often, the individuals engaged inthese activities are educated, well-trained,organized, and have an excellent knowledge of howthe industry operates.

For example, many members of narcotics rings havecollege degrees; al Qaeda has a formalized trainingprogram with a 90+ page training manual thatrefers to targeting the maritime industry andrecruiting resources within it for future operations.In light of this level of sophistication on the part ofthe enemy, the question must be asked, “Are Vessel

Security Officers (VSOs) sufficiently trained and dothey comprehend the nature of the threats theyface?”

Many vessels today do not have a designated,full-time VSO, and the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) is currently consideringwhether this should be a full- or a part-timerequirement for certain categories and sizes ofships. Regardless of the depth of the duty, awell-designed training program will prepare theVSO to protect the ship, to assess threats andvulnerability, understand and use protectivetechnology, and learn to recognize and respond to avariety of emergency situations.

The VSO’s role is similar to that of the Port SecurityOfficer. VSOs continually watch for situations thatcould harm or adversely affect the ship, crew,passengers or cargo; they are also the first respon-ders in an emergency. The ideal training curriculumfor VSOs should be focused on four key areas:maritime, law enforcement, physical security andthreat assessment.

The maritime section would provide the VSO withan overview of shipping operations, portoperations, ship design and construction, andidentification and location of critical areas ofvarious types of ships. These subjects are importantwhen conducting a port threat assessment and indeveloping a ship search plan.


The law enforcement element of the trainingwould concentrate on maritime/criminal law, rulesof evidence, report writing, use of force, weaponstraining, defensive tactics, crisis management,search techniques, crime scene management/evidence handling, communications, and identifi-cation of fraudulent documents. These coursesprepare the VSO to assist the law enforcementofficers in investigating events, and could helpreduce the non-operating time of the ship due tolegal requirements. In addition, the classes wouldensure that the VSO thoroughly understands theinformation needed in an incident report andensure that evidence was properly collected,preserved, and identified so that it would be accept-able as evidence in court.

The physical security portion of the training wouldinclude classes on planning, development andimplementation of a ship security survey; accesscontrol; effective use of lighting and closed circuittelevision; hazardous materials incident response;alarm/intrusion detection systems; and identifica-tion of critical operation areas, such as the engineroom, communication room, ventilation systems,etc. Training in physical security helps the VSO tounderstand the concept of systems integration—howall elements interact, resulting in a strong deterrentto potential adversaries.

Threat assessment is the final element to VSOtraining curriculum. It addresses cargo theft, piracy,narcotics smuggling, terrorism, organized crime,and stowaways/alien smuggling. The classes,taught by active law enforcement officers who haveexpertise in these matters, would provide VSOs

with the final tools needed to perform their tasks—knowledge of the nature of the threat and how itmanifests itself.

By knowing a threat in all its forms, knowing theirships’ routines and ports of call, and knowing howto develop a strategy to combat threat, VSOs ensurethe safe and secure operations of their ships andfellow crewmembers wherever they travel. Inaddition, a well-trained VSO reduces litigation

exposure and enhances ship opera-tions capability. A shipping line thatinvests in a formal trainingprogram for its VSO is adopting aproactive rather than a reactiveapproach to security, and is investingin ship operations, not court/legalcosts.

The author is the manager of the MaritimeSecurity Department of Han-PadronAssociates, a marine engineering firm. He has26 years of experience as a special agent withthe FBI, and has worked on major terrorist andbombing cases, including the World TradeCenter (1993), Oklahoma City and the SANGBuilding, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

“Stowaways, narcotics smuggling, piracy and terrorism are some ofthe security issues facing the shipping industry.” A member of a CoastGuard boarding team arrests a man suspected of drug smuggling.

CGC Alex Haley underway in Cook Inlet near Nikiski, Alaska whileconducting a maritime homeland security patrol. The Haley will providesecurity for Cook Inlet oil platforms, the Nikiski liquified natural gasterminal, and the pipeline terminal in Valdez. Photo by Mark Farmer, USCG.


Coast Guard Remains Ready

with Mobile Unitsby Cmdr. MIKE GIGLIO

Assistant Chief; U.S. Coast Guard Office of Defense Operations

Always ready for the call.T h i s

maxim has guided Coast Guard operations formore than 200 years, and, since the tragic events ofSeptember 11, it has become more significant—andmore challenging. We are all now painfully awarethat “the call” can occur at any time, at any place,and be caused by a faceless enemy whose actionscan impose far-reaching damage and devastation.Now more than ever, the Coast Guard must beready to combat new and emerging threats, withlittle or no warning.

One way the Coast Guard has risen to meet today’sunique challenges is the establishment of newMaritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST). Thesedomestic, highly mobile units, comprised of bothactive-duty and reserve personnel, provide special-ized law enforcement and force protection capabili-ties to meet heightened port security requirements.Modeled after existing Coast Guard programs—thePort Security Unit (PSU) and the Law EnforcementDetachment (LEDET)—the MSSTs provide special-ized skills and capabilities to detect, deter andprevent terrorism. MSSTs were specificallydesigned to protect vital commercial and militaryshipping and critical infrastructure againstmaritime threats. Possessing multi-mission adapt-ability, MSSTs will surge to support securityrequirements for major marine events, such as theOlympics and Operation Sail, and will supportCoast Guard and other interagency forces perform-ing more traditional missions, including search andrescue, counter-drug operations, and alien migrantinterdiction operations.

Maritime safety and security, environmentalprotection, and homeland defense have alwaysbeen core Coast Guard mission areas. However,significant service downsizing in the early 90’sresulted in a fundamental shift in organizationalfocus away from some maritime security functions.September 11 revealed an urgent need for rebuild-ing Coast Guard security capabilities and resultedin the rapid development of special tools and newskills to counter emerging asymmetric threats.MSSTs are just one of the tools the Coast Guard isdeveloping to adapt to this new threat environment.

Equipped with six armed fast boats and a mix oflethal and non-lethal weapons, MSSTs providedefense-in-depth, pushing out the defensiveperimeter from the ship or facility being protected.Unit personnel are trained in advanced boat tacticsand weapons skills designed to prevent terroristsfrom reaching their objective. The Coast Guard isalso leveraging advanced technology to improvethe MSST’s ability to interdict chemical, biological,radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents and highexplosives concealed in merchant shipping.

A key factor in the MSSTs’ success is their ability tocoordinate and operate with other Coast Guard,government and private sector groups. The coordi-nation function will be performed by the MSSTs’planning branch. The planning branch providesexpertise in marine safety and regulatory responsi-bilities and will interface with Port SecurityCommittees, which are composed of governmentand private sector stakeholders. Planning staffs willensure that MSSTs are familiar with port activities,


port security and other contingency plans, portvulnerabilities, and risk mitigation strategies.

As a military service and branch of the armedforces, the Coast Guard maintains a state of readi-ness to support the Navy during times of war andother contingencies. Coast Guard platforms andpersonnel provide unique, non-redundant capabil-ities to augment Naval forces at home and abroad.To ensure interoperability with the Navy, MSSTpersonnel are trained in joint tactics, techniquesand procedures at the Coast Guard’s SpecialMissions Training Center located at Marine CorpsBase Camp Lejeune, N.C. There they receive train-ing in advanced boat tactics, use of lethal andnon-lethal weapons, and advanced law enforce-ment tactics. The Navy and Coast Guard areexpanding opportunities to integrate training,which will provide the synergy needed for theservices to work together. This ultimately enhancesperformance in the field and ensures standardiza-tion of doctrine and tactics. Four teams have nowreceived this specialized training.

Structured for quick response, the MSSTs will beready to go anywhere at any time— boats andcrews will be able to load and deploy via ground orair transportation to any domestic port in theUnited States and its territories within hours ofnotification. They will perform 24x7 day and nightoperations, and will be capable of remainingon-scene for weeks at a time. These new and uniqueteams fill a vital role in our nation’s response toterrorism, and they provide the Commandant witha highly effective tool to combatmaritime related threats to nationalsecurity. Out in front once again, theseteams prove the Coast Guard’scenturies old commitment to answer“the call”—whenever it happens andin whatever form it takes.

Organizationally, the MSSTs fall underthe operational control of the two AreaCommanders who are responsible forCoast Guard operations nationwide.Once deployed and depending on thenature of the mission, tactical controlmay be assigned to a GroupCommander, Captain of the Port, orother appropriate unit commander.Each MSST is commanded by anactive duty officer, and is comprised of104 Coast Guard men and women (71

active-duty augmented by 33 reservists). The MSSTcan be deployed as a single unit or in flexible forcepackages tailored to meet mission requirements.This operational flexibility is a key attribute of theMSST that allows for unit employment in a widerange of maritime security missions.

The first four MSSTs were commissioned in Seattle,Wa., Chesapeake, Va., Galveston, Texas, and SanPedro, Calif. Two more teams are included in thePresident’s 2003 budget and additional teams arebeing considered as part of the Coast Guard’smulti-year resource plan. As the lead federalagency for Maritime Homeland Security, the CoastGuard has set a clear course for enhancing theNation’s security and MSSTs are a vital componentof the service’s strategic plan.

TOP: Petty Officer 3rd Class Robert J. Dellavalle practices his defense tactics on his partner, Petty Officer 3rd Class BradleyM. Krise, while instructor Petty Officer Ryan T. Frye supervises. All are members of MSST 91103. Photo by Petty Officer 4th

Class Lance Jones, USCG. BOTTOM: MSST members and Petty Officers Thomas Duffy (left), Jason Miele (center) andNicholas McConnell patrol near the Statue of Liberty. Photo by Petty Officer Tom Sperduto, USCG.


Increased Coast Guard Assets

for Homeland Security

by Cmdr. CHRIS CARTER

Chief; U.S. Coast Guard Migrant Interdiction Division

Since the tragic eventsof September 11, the U.S. Coast Guard has placed anincreased emphasis on the port security missionunder the broad legal and regulatory authorities ofour captains of the port (COPTs). In the popularpress, this activity is typically described as beingcarried out by "Coast Guard Sea Marshals." This isbecause the first visible response to the terroristattacks was to place small teams of armed CoastGuard personnel aboard vessels entering or depart-ing ports to secure access to the bridge of the vessel,protecting it from terrorists or hijackers, especiallyin the Pacific area. Since then, a more complete setof capabilities has been developed. As we shall see,Operation Sea Marshal now refers to one of severalcompatible law enforcement capabilities and is notsimply a job title.

The National Strategy for Homeland Securityaligns and focuses homeland security functions intosix critical mission areas: intelligence and warning,border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defend-ing against catastrophic terrorism, and emergencypreparedness and response. The Coast Guard hasresponsibilities in all of these areas.

The Coast Guard's maritime homeland security(MHLS) mission is to prevent a terrorist event fromoccurring in or via the maritime domain of theUnited States. To achieve this mission, the CoastGuard will:

· Achieve and maintain maritime domain awareness;

· Detect, deter and defend against any attack;· Monitor and control the movement of

high-interest vessels;· Defend maritime borders, ports, water-

ways and coastal approaches;· Safeguard the U.S. maritime transportation

system and protect critical infrastructure; and · Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism.

MHLS starts with Risk-Based ResourceManagement. A risk analysis conducted shortlyafter Sept. 11, 2001 concluded that the 55 largestports in America handle more than 90 percent of alltraffic and cargo. Of these, the top 18 are consideredto be militarily or economically strategic "tier one"ports. To fight the war against terrorism, the CoastGuard will initially concentrate its efforts on theseports, and other heavily trafficked or critical sealanes and waterways while expending a reasonableeffort to surveil all other maritime areas. To accom-plish these duties without significant negativeimpact on traditional missions such as fisheriesenforcement and migrant and drug interdiction, weare adding a number of assets and personnel toTeam Coast Guard:

Small Boat Allowances: These resources, and thenecessary support personnel, are being added to"plus-up" selected Marine Safety Offices (MSO) andGroups with additional patrol and escort capability.This will provide an enhanced capability to


conduct shore-side and waterside harborpatrols, to enforce security zones established bythe COTP, to conduct security boardings andescorts of high-interest vessels and to provideincreased presence within and surveillance ofU.S. ports and waterways.

Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs):The Coast Guard is also in the process ofdeploying these mobile, multi-mission lawenforcement/force protection assets primarilyfocused toward improving port security andharbor defense capabilities in our nation'sstrategic seaports. MSSTs are equipped witharmed fast boats, specialized detection systemsand personnel trained in the tactics andtechniques for enforcing Department of DefenseRestricted Areas, Naval Vessel Protective Zones,security zones established by the COTP toprotect naval vessels, Military Sealift Command(MSC), Ready Reserve Force (RRF), or commer-cial vessels carrying critical military cargoes,other high-value assets (e.g., cruise ships andliquid and natural gas [LNG] tankships), andother critical port infrastructure. MSSTs willenhance the Coast Guard's MARSEC 1 securityposture and will be able to deploy nationwide.MSSTs will be staffed with qualified CoastGuard boarding officers and boarding teammembers possessing specialized skills forperforming anti-terrorism/force protectionmissions.

Operation Sea Marshal: We are adding lawenforcement personnel in military or economi-cally strategic ports for Vessel Security Team(i.e., “Sea Marshaling”) duty. These teams aredesigned to provide positive control of high-interest vessels (HIV) by protecting them frominternal threats (terrorist hijacking) to ensurethat the vessel remains under the control of theMaster and the direction of the Pilot, and toprovide valuable on-scene situational awareness.HIVs are commercial vessels that may pose arelatively high security risk to the United States.

A security boarding of an HIV is a risk manage-ment tactic that provides the operationalcommander with valuable information to optimizethe evaluation and mitigation of risks. Because theCoast Guard will employ its organic law enforce-ment authority to board, search and inspect asnecessary, and specific COTP authorities to controlthe movement of vessels in the U.S. territorial sea,

Vessel Security Teams will be led by a qualifiedboarding officer as defined in the Coast GuardMaritime Law Enforcement Manual.

To safely operate in a fluid threat environment,Vessel Security Teams [boarding officers] willperform initial safety inspections, ensure spaceaccountability (when appropriate), and be able tolocate stowaways, chemical, biological, radiologi-cal, nuclear (CBRNE), and other contraband. Toaccomplish these tasks, teams must possess some

A Coast Guard law enforcement officer stands watch on the bridge ofa merchant vessel during transit of the San Francisco Bay.


limited marine safety expertise. Because lawenforcement personnel may encounter terroristactivity, the program must include the necessaryinteragency relation-ships to ensure theavailability of promptand appropriate fed-eral, state or locallaw enforcementresponse for thiscontingency.

We are also capital-izing on enhancedcounter-terrorismintelligence andvessel movementinformation to assessand respond to MHLSrisks. This will be done by assigning intelligenceteams in various ports, improving secure commu-nications capabilities at groups, MSOs, andstations, and adding personnel for maritimedomain awareness operations center watches.

Finally, Automatic Identification System (AIS)receivers will be installed in various locations. AIScan provide information such as identification,

position, heading, ship length, beam type, draftand hazardous cargo information from anyAIS-equipped vessel. This information will be

captured and dis-played to improvemaritime domainawareness.

The combination ofimproved informa-tion, enhanced intel-ligence, secure com-munications, andadditional vesselsand personnel dedi-cated to MHLS inthe most criticalmilitarily or econom-

ically strategic portswill facilitate the groups’ and stations’ ability tosupport the COTP/MSO in successfully carrying outtheir port security mandate and achieve theobjectives of the MHLS mission.

These initiatives will make our ports and water-ways safer for both the maritime industry andrecreational boaters.

A Coast Guard law enforcement officer communicates with other Coast Guard assets to ensure thatsecurity is maintained around a merchant vessel.

Mission Areas of the National Strategy for Homeland Security

· Intelligence and Warning, · Border and Transportation Security, · Domestic Counter-terrorism, · Protecting Critical Infrastructure, · Defending Against Catastrophic Terrorism, · Emergency Preparedness and Response


Homeland Security

Foreign PassengerVessel Security Program

by Cmdr. ALAN MARSILIO,Lt. BUDDY REAMS, andLt. MATT EDWARDS

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Center

The effects of the September 11 terrorist attackshave been felt throughout the U.S. Coast Guard innumerous ways, forever changing the way theCoast Guard does business. Marine safety person-nel, already tasked with ensuring safety oncommercial vessels, have become key in the CoastGuard’s role as sea guardians for homeland securi-ty. One specific area that has been dramaticallyimpacted is the foreign passenger vessel andpassenger terminal security program. The MarineSafety Center (MSC), charged with the review ofvessel construction plans, has helped lead the wayto improved security on passenger vessels, bothforeign and domestic, that call on U.S. ports. TheMSC was one of the first units to identify necessarychanges and to see that they were captured inimplementing guidance, the new Navigation andVessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 4-02, “Securityfor Passenger Vessels and Passenger Terminals.”

What is the Foreign Passenger Vessel/TerminalSecurity Program?The Foreign Passenger Vessel/Terminal SecurityProgram had its inception as a result of the murderof a U.S. citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, during thehijacking of the passenger vessel Achille Lauro in1985. While this incident did not occur in U.S.waters, it became apparent that proactive steps

would be necessary to avoid such future atrocities.The requirements for the Foreign PassengerVessel/Terminal Security Program are codified in33 CFR 120 and amplified by NVIC 3-96 (superced-ed by NVIC 4-02). This program requires a vesselsecurity plan for each foreign passenger vessel over100 gross tons, carrying more than 12 passengersfor hire, and making voyages more than 24 hours(any part of which is on the high seas) that embarksor disembarks passengers in a U.S. port. Likewise,a terminal security plan is necessary for any termi-nal receiving one of the aforementioned vessels.This requires the operators of vessels, predominate-ly cruise ships, and passenger terminals to examineand document the assets, procedures, and policiesnecessary to ensure a minimum level of security.

This program originally called for the NationalMaritime Center (NMC) to review vessel securityplans and for the captain of the port (COTP) toreview the Terminal Security Plans in their zone. In1999, the responsibility for the vessel securityreviews was transferred to the MSC.

There are some similarities between the applicabil-ity requirements of the Coast Guard's ControlVerification Examination (CVE) Program and theVessel Security Program (VSP), as it relates to cruise


ships. The CVE program applies only to thoseforeign vessels "embarking or disembarking"passengers at U.S. ports, which essentially means atleast one passenger is beginning or ending theirvoyage in the U.S. The VSP program applies to all ofthese vessels but extends coverage to any foreignvessel that discharges passengers in U.S. (or itsterritories) ports, even if those passengers camefrom foreign ports, are only sightseeing in the U.S.,and will return overseas on the same vessel duringthe same voyage.

NVIC 4-02 implemented sweeping changes in thetype of security measures expected and also placeda deadline on submitting revised plans, a step toaccelerate the implementation of the new measures.A primary goal of NVIC 4-02 is to mesh the VesselSecurity Plans with the Terminal Security Plans tocreate a family of robust, comprehensive plans todeter a terrorist threat on a vessel at any of its U.S.ports. NVIC 4-02 requires the operators of all affect-ed vessels (approximately 190) to incorporate newguidance and resubmit their security plans to theMSC for Coast Guard approval.

How did we do it?Vessels that do not comply with the NVIC 4-02standards, i.e., possess a security plan approved bythe MSC, will soon be prohibited from entering aU.S. port. It was therefore necessary to identifythose vessels that visit or will be visiting U.S. portsand alert their operators of this new guidance. Aninitial list of passenger vessels involved in the CoastGuard Port State Control program was generatedand their owners were quickly notified. Finalizingthe list of those vessels not currently in the PortState Control program required a complete searchof all previous records to obtain a list of vessels

historically calling on U.S. ports. This entailedsearching through nearly five years of correspon-dence regarding security plan review. The next taskinvolved determining which of the vessels hadchanged names or owners. Finally, we foundaddresses for all the owners/operators and sentthem letters explaining the changes and the acceler-ated timeline for submitting the changes. While werecognized that this list of affected vessels wouldnot be all-inclusive, our goal was to initially receivesecurity plans from 90 percent of all vessels identi-fied in our document search.

The new Vessel Security Plans have to be receivedand reviewed, and correspondence needs to begenerated in an expedited manner. As such, it wasessential that a process be developed to carry outthese tasks. The status of all vessel plans is trackedin a database. At any given time, it is easy todetermine what plans have arrived and are in thereview process, what plans have been returned forrevision, and what plans have been approved. Itwas equally important to formulate plan reviewguidance and create standard comments for planreview letters. A work instruction was developedfor staff engineers to identify key areas of thesecurity plan and to determine what is acceptablebased on the new standards. Concurrently,standard comments were written to expedite thestaff engineers’ review as well as to promoteconsistency.

Where are we now?Vessel owners and operators and the MSC staff arein the final stages of this process of updates. In aneffort to reduce the number of times a plan is resub-mitted for review, we hosted industry meetings todetail our concerns and expectations for eachsection of the NVIC. This coupled with the meticu-lous comments presented in our plan reviewcorrespondence will help the operators of cruisevessels calling on U.S. ports to quickly meet thecountry’s new security expectations. In addition toproviding the highest level of security reasonablypossible onboard foreign passenger vessels, thisprocess has been invaluable in laying the ground-work for the Coast Guard’s efforts to implementand integrate the requirements of the recentlyenacted domestic Maritime Transportation SecurityAct and the International Ship and Port FacilitySecurity Code. These comprehensive standards willeventually encompass virtually every class ofvessel operating in U.S. waters and all are based ona robust, flexible, and consistent set of security planexpectations.

Petty Officer 2nd

Class Travis Sanders, a boarding officer with MSO Mobile, looksfor foreign vessels due to arrive in the Port of Mobile using the Ship ArrivalNotification System (SANS). Photo by Public Affairs Officer Chad Saylor, USCG.


Operation SafeCommerce–Northeast

Container SecurityThrough Partnerships

by Public Affairs Officer AMY THOMAS

U.S. Coast Guard 1st District

CarCargogo container security and docu-mentation, specifically for

cargo entering the United States from foreigncountries, is the focus of a public-private sectorpartnership in the 1st Coast Guard District.Although standards have existed since the 1940s forcargo container size and weight limits, there was nostandard for verifying the containers’ contentsbefore they were loaded onto ships, trains andtrucks and routed through global distributionchannels.

The U.S. Attorneys for the Districts of NewHampshire and Vermont, along with the Governorof New Hampshire, the U.S. Marshal for theDistricts of New Hampshire and Vermont, the 1st

Coast Guard District Commander, and others,formed Operation Safe Commerce (OSC)–Northeast to respond to the potential threat tohomeland security from the 1.2 million cargo con-tainers entering the United States through the portsof Montreal and Halifax each year. The challenge forOSC Northeast was to safeguard containers enter-ing the country without impeding the flow of commerce.

“This is a new world for us in terms of figuring outwho our partners are, and trying to define what the

processes are of the whole supply chain,” said RearAdm. Vivien Crea, commander of the 1st CoastGuard District in Boston.

Using theories developed by Stephen Flynn, aretired Coast Guard commander and now SeniorFellow on the Council on Foreign Relations in NewYork City, OSC–Northeast’s goal is to “push backthe borders” by validating legitimate cargoes attheir points of origin. This, Flynn theorized, wouldkeep potentially dangerous weapons orcomponents as far from American shores as possible.

Rear Adm. George Naccara, Adm. Crea’s predeces-sor, and Capt. Peter Boynton on the 1st Coast GuardDistrict staff, joined in OSC–Northeast. Throughtheir leadership, they sought to involve the CoastGuard and use its maritime safety and portsecurity role in helping to prototype safeguards forthe container supply chain.

With Flynn’s theories in its back pocket, theOSC–Northeast steering committee set out to deter-mine just how vulnerable cargo containers, bordersand global supply chains were. The objective wasthreefold. Committee members sought first todefine the end-to-end supply chain relationship;


second, to survey low-cost seal, intrusion and track-ing systems; and third, to conduct a demonstrationof an instrumented cargo container belonging tovolunteer private manufacturer Osram Sylvania.

“Nobody had actually tracked and documentedeach step of the process of manufacturing andimporting goods, much less what gates they had togo through,” Crea said.

Officials with the Volpe National TransportationSystems Center, in Cambridge, Mass., installedsensors, intrusion alarms and tracking devices onthe Osram Sylvania container in order to monitorthe container’s progress on its journey fromSlovakia to Hillsborough, N.H.

At the conclusion of the test run from Slovakia,future recommendations for successful OSCprograms were made. First, OSC programs shouldbe conducted in conjunction with similar govern-

ment and industry initiatives to ensure the bestresults. Second, all participants should agree on thesupply chain evaluation criteria. Last, all futureOSC initiatives should be designed to optimizesecurity, mobility and economic influence.

Concurrent with OSC–Northeast, a similar projectwas developed in Boston. Its focus is to secure U.S.seaports and to enhance security practices alreadyin place. Boston–A Model Port completed its firstphase in June 2002 with the signing of a charter bythe members of the steering committee. Itsmembership includes Coast Guard Captain of thePort of Boston, Coast Guard Group Boston, the FBI,U.S. Customs Service, state of Massachusetts, city ofBoston, MASSPORT, and other local governmentsand private sector participants.

Charter members of Boston–A Model Portexamined the knowledge learned from the success-ful coordination of high-visibility transits, such as

Coast Guard Petty Officers Leah Ingram and Chris Bolin conduct a security round on the liquefied natural gastanker Polar Eagle at a transfer facility in Nikiski, Alaska. The two Coastguardsmen are part of a four-personSea Marshal’s security team dispatched from MSO Anchorage to assess the vessel’s security and provideadditional protection during its transit through Cook Inlet. Photo by Public Affairs Officer Keith Alholm, USCG.


liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers through BostonHarbor, and are applying that knowledge acrossdifferent types of port activities.

“Seaports are critical in the safe and secure move-ment of goods and commodities, the cornerstone ofglobal economy. Thus the whole environment of theseaport is the focus of Boston’s efforts,” said Lt.Cmdr. Robert Crane of the Coast Guard’s MaritimeHomeland Security division in Boston.Consequently, Boston–A Model Port created workgroups composed of numerous stakeholders toanalyze the safety and security of bulk cargoes,passenger vessels, consequence management,intelligence networking and other securitymeasures within the seaport.

Similar to OSC–Northeast and Boston–A ModelPort, the New York/New Jersey Mega Port projectwill address the security of the millions of contain-ers carrying vastly diverse cargoes into that port.With the Port Authority of NY/NJ taking the lead,the Mega Port project focuses on more complexinternational supply chains, specifically thosebetween megaports. The project will provide moredetailed descriptions of global supply chains andprototype technology and methods to secure thosesupply chains. Additionally, the project will captureand share best practices among government andprivate sector entities.

Plans are to analyze gaps in the security of thesupply chains of several volunteer shippers whoroutinely move goods originating in Europe andSoutheast Asia.

Additional projects under the auspices of OSC areemerging elsewhere across the country. Congress,through the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Actfor Further Recovery From and Response toTerrorist Attacks on the United States (Public Law107-206), provided grant funds for OSC to improvethe security of international and domestic supplychains through discreet pilot projects involving thethree largest container load centers. As a result, thePort of Los Angeles/Long Beach, Port ofSeattle/Tacoma, and the Port Authority of NewYork and New Jersey have submitted proposals forfunding under this initiative. These grants arescheduled to be announced by TSA during thesummer of 2003.

To be successful, Crea said she thinks that engagingthe private sector is the most important step. “Ifthey know where their goods are, and have somepredictability of when they’re going to arrive, theycan reduce their costs significantly,” Crea said.“There’s definitely an incentive.”

Inspecting the millions of containers that enter theUnited States every year is a task that is next toimpossible and could bring trade to a virtualstandstill. Through the partnering of governmentand industry, limited resources can be put to moreefficient use to keep commerce flowing smoothly.According to Crea, if 95 percent of the containerscoming in have been packed and shipped bytrusted partners, more focus can be placed on theother 5 percent that were not.

“We don’t have any choice,” said Crea. “We are amaritime trading nation. Clearly, it’s preferable tokeep [the threat] as far off our shores as possible. Ifwe can push back to the source port and start thechain of custody there, it’s less of a threat to us.”

Petty Officer 2nd Class James Benton checks to seeif the seal on a container has been tampered with.Photo by Public Affairs Officer Dana Warr, USCG.


Smart Card Technologyin the Maritime

Transportation Industry

by JIM ZOK

Associate Administrator, Financial Approvals & Cargo Preference; MARAD

InIn the post-September 11 world, there is acontinuing need to assess potentialnational security vulnerabilities. The

transportation system is working diligently toidentify any security gaps and propose technicaland procedural solutions that would seal thosebreaches. Because the marine transportationsystem moves the majority of the products andgoods into and out of the country, there is anespecially urgent need to address problem spotsand head off potential threats. Technology providesa number of effective methods for addressingimmediate and long-term vulnerabilities—andinteroperable “smart card” technology offers greatpromise in this area.

According to Government Smart Card InteroperabilitySpecification1, published by the National Institute ofStandards and Technology (NIST), “A…smart cardsystem consists of a host computer with one ormore smart card readers attached to hardwarecommunications ports. Smart cards can be insertedinto the readers and software running on the hostcomputer communicates with these cards.…” Inaddition to the core data used to identify the card-holder, a smart card could be enhanced withbiometric data such as fingerprints, facial geometry,and iris scan. Smart cards become “interoperable”when they are created in such a way that differentvendor cards can function with other vendorsoftware and smart card readers. (The NIST specifi-cation named above outlines how this can beachieved.)

Currently working groups within the InternationalOrganization for Standardization (ISO) are usingthe NIST Interoperability Specification as a draftwork item for the development of an ISOInteroperability Smart Card Standard. In addition,many other standards defining biometrics and dataformatting are being developed at ISO and otherstandards bodies to support credentialing effortsand promote interoperability. International organi-zations such as the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) and International LaborOrganization (ILO) are working on how toimplement these technologies to benefit the safetyand efficiency of the global maritime industry.

Potential applications within the marinetransportation industry for interoperable smartcards are numerous. For example, the MerchantMariner Document (MMD) card issued by the U.S.Coast Guard could incorporate a computer chipinto the card enabling it to contain data on licensesand certifications, as well as other pertinentinformation such as lifeboat and tankermanendorsements. Data that the mariner is required tocarry at all times could be stored on the card, ascould training and assessment information used byunions, shipboard officers, training schools, theCoast Guard, and the mariners themselves. Havingsuch an electronic system for the MMD, the CoastGuard could find it easier to automate RegionalExamination Centers (RECs) and mariners couldkeep better track of their competency and verifycourse completion more easily. Information on thecard can be protected to allow only persons with

the proper authority the right to access, read andwrite to appropriate data elements as defined bythe business rule.

Smart card technology could make controllingaccess to ports much easier and make ports signifi-cantly more secure. When a mariner wants to entera port, the controllingfacility would use theinformation providedon the card to deter-mine whether accesscan be granted. Thenumber of options forthe card to interfacewith facility securitysystems is many, andaffects the degree ofsecurity at a givenfacility. The facility’ssecurity plan andbusiness processeswould define thedegree of securityrequired, and ulti-mately the most effec-tive and efficient wayto implement the tech-nology. The smartcard of a foreignmariner could containpassport, VISA andImmigration andNaturalization Service(INS) informationverifiable through asecure connection tothe issuing organiza-tion. Biometric datacan positively matchthe person holding thecard to the identitycarried on the card.The b iometr ica l lyverified identity couldthen be checked against any globally distributed“watch list.”

It is possible port administrators, unions, or portoperators could issue cards to port workers that, inaddition to the usual identification and biometricdata, could also contain notes regarding key skill ortraining areas or specific access limitations. Usingthe smart card technology to control port access

could also be applied to truckers who transportgoods to and from the ports via land routes.

What benefits can be realized by integrating thesmart card technology into the marine transporta-tion system? The movement of people and goodsthrough the system would be greatly enhanced,

while providing anoptimal level of secu-rity not easily achievedtoday. A secure inte-grated network ofinformation wouldallow various organi-zations to limit accessto their facilities astheir policy dictates.These same sourcescould be queried asneeded to provide avariety of security-related information,and intelligence entitieswould be able tobroadcast alert mes-sages as needed.

Even with the possi-bility of so many ben-efits, though, objec-tions have beenraised to this technol-ogy. An importanthurdle to be over-come is the issue ofindividual privacy.An advanced technol-ogy card that containspersonal informationcould draw opposition.Balancing one’s pri-vacy rights againstnational security isan issue that is draw-ing debate, and one

that would have to be resolved before a compre-hensive form of smart card technology could beimplemented for the marine transportationindustry. In addition, trust levels for specific dataownership and security must be established beforedata exchange agreements can be reached.

What is needed before we can move forward with acomprehensive program of smart card interoper-


Copyright 2003 USCG and its licensors.


gy and share security information, federal agenciesneed to work in concert to create a coordinated planfor smart card interoperability. The informal intera-gency advisory board created by GSA has provenan effective forum to exchange ideas and improvepractices. The efforts led by the Office ofManagement and Budget have also aided the feder-al government’s progress towards accomplishmentof this goal. Procurements must be handledthrough a single contracting vehicle, the GSA“Smart Access Common ID Contract.” Finally,numerous agencies must identify their existingidentification card projects or requirements that arecandidates for system integration efforts or whichcould be upgraded and consolidated, usinginteroperable smart cards.

Coordination between governmentagencies (including state and local govern-ments), as well as corporations, unions, andother entities. The federal government will

need to provide strong, visible leadership topromote the development, implementation, andcontinued use of standards for smart cards, biomet-rics, and vendor interoperability. For the maritimeindustry, the federal government will have topromote and encourage the use of smart cardtechnology with regulators, ports, unions, shipoperators, and owners. In addition, the federal

government will have toassume leadership andcoordinate a whole host ofrelated policy issues such asprivacy, liability, process andwork flow standards, riskassessment methods,systems interfaces, securitystandards, audit processes,appeals practices, etc.

Investigate fundingrequirements for fullimplementation offederally mandated

smart card technology.Decisions must be made onhow such a program wouldbe cost shared or funded andhow fees will be determinedand collected. State and localgovernments will need todetermine their funding

requirements as well, andindicate whether assistance

ability for the industry? At a minimum, there areseveral goals that come to mind. Some would haveto be successfully completed for the program towork effectively, while others need only to be start-ed for the maritime community to realize benefits.

Increase and promote standardization oftokens (smart cards) and the interoperabil-ity of the required databases. A number ofstandards need to be in place to guarantee

success. Fortunately, a number of initiatives arealready underway. In addition to the NIST smartcard specification mentioned earlier, the U.S.General Services Administration (GSA) and NISTare working with several agencies and organiza-tions to develop standards for structured securityand data protection. Further, GSA and NIST areworking with private industry to create interna-tional standards. Through the ISO there existworking groups that are developing biometric,smart card and database standards to address inter-operability issues. Ongoing efforts at theInternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),the IMO and the ILO are also assisting to drivestandards to the international level.

Coordination of federal government effortsfor smart card and database interoperability.In order to implement smart card technolo-

“In addition to the core data used to identify the card holder, a smart card could beenhanced with biometric data such as fingerprints, facial geometry, and iris scan.”USCG illustration. Face image and fingerprint on page 81 are copyright 2003 USCGand its licensors.

1.

2.

3.

4.


(in the form of grants, cost sharing, etc.) would beneeded for implementation. The maritime industrymust identify its fiscal needs, securing whateverloan guarantees or other financing mechanismsmay be required.

Develop test beds to evaluate technolo-gies and determine best practices for themaritime environment. During hiscongressional testimony on April 9,

2003, Secretary Tom Ridge of the Departmentof Homeland Security (DHS) highlighted theTransportation Security Administration(TSA) Transportation Worker IdentificationCredential (TWIC) project as a prime exam-ple of the use of technology to improvesecurity and facilitate trade across all thetransportation sectors. The TWIC iscurrently initiating two regional pilotprograms in the greater Philadelphia-Wilmington and Los Angeles-Long Beachareas, which will evaluate a range ofadvanced identification and informationtechnologies at six to 10 facilities in eachregion. The TWIC program supports therequirements of the Maritime TransportationSecurity Act, which requires an increase intransportation worker security, by enhancingaccess control for individuals requiringunescorted physical access to secure areas of thenational transportation system (maritime,aviation, transit, rail, and other surface modes). Asanother specific example, the Ship OperationsCooperative Program's (SOCP) Smart Card Projectis investigating the development of a mechanism tofacilitate mariner tracking, training, and certifica-tions; expediting shipboard mariner sign on/signoff; and the need to improve security for both shipsand port facilities. With the support from otherinterested organizations, SOCP is working with itsmaritime industry partners to evaluate smart cardtechnologies and consider potential applicationsthat would add value to the maritime industry.Inherent in the design and implementation of aMariner Administrative Smart Card for the indus-try, SOCP has recognized the need for an open andexpandable system architecture to accommodatefuture maritime industry business requirementsand desires. With that key goal in mind, SOCP isworking closely with its members and industry

partners to ensure that technology fielded in aSOCP Mariner Administrative Smart CardDemonstration satisfy this requirement.

Smart card technology offers many securitybenefits to the marine transportation industry.Proper implementation of this technology wouldprovide expandability and could be built upon inthe future to enhance system operation andeffectiveness. Though many issues need to beworked through, it is a technology that will allowus to enhance the movement of goods and peoplethrough the system while at the same time provid-ing an improved level of security.

1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Interagency Report 6887, Version 2.0, dated July 8, 2002.Available in PDF format on the NIST Web site: http://smartcard.nist.gov/gscis.html.

5.


Technologyfor Port Security

by RIC WALKER

U.S. Coast Guard Research & Development Center; CATs-I Information Center

The terrorist a t t a c k s o fSeptember 11

moved a lot of cheese. The 1998 best seller, “WhoMoved My Cheese?” by Spencer Johnson, M.D., is asimple parable that reveals some profound truthsabout change, and how we deal with it. Our worldhas changed, our lives have changed, and securityis foremost on everyone’s mind these days.

The U.S. Coast Guard is no exception. The nation’sports are critical to our economic vitality. They areamong the most valuable and most vulnerableassets of the country, and the Coast Guard is on thefrontlines of the port security challenge.

Port security is not a new mission for the CoastGuard, but it has obviously taken on a new urgencyand a higher priority since September 11. Terms likemaritime domain awareness, high-interest vessels,and threat assessment are common as we search outthe new location of the cheese.

The Coast Guard Research & Development Centerhas also responded to the shift in priorities swiftlyand decisively. For example, numerous R&D Centertechnical staff deployed to several ports to assist inresponse activities. An additional goal was todocument areas where improved technology mightenhance Coast Guard mission effectiveness insecuring our ports against terrorist attacks andother threats in the future.

The insight gained during this time was key informulating how we might best help the CoastGuard to fulfill their missions. The result was a newR&D Center program—the Captain of the Port(COTP) Advanced Technologies Integration

program, known as CATs-I. The purpose of thisprogram is to evaluate advanced technologies toenhance the Coast Guard’s port security capabili-ties and to improve COTP and Group-levelcommand centers. The technologies and conceptsbeing evaluated will provide an integrated toolsetof capabilities to establish local domain awarenessand to prevent and respond to incidents in the portenvironment.

Working with the area commanders, Miami/PortEverglades and the port of San Francisco wereidentified as key partners. They serve as “opera-tional laboratories” for the test and evaluation oftechnologies for improved security. The R&DCenter has partnered with COTP, group, and localstakeholders in the two ports to identify the mostcritical port security performance needs. Severaltechnologies were identified for test and evaluationthat will address these performance needs.

The purpose of CATs-I is not merely to test equip-ment, but to evaluate technologies and provideinformation that will assist the Coast Guard in theacquisition of new systems for improved portsecurity. Characterizing the cost and performancetradeoffs of new technologies is one of the keyelements being provided for informed decisionmaking. In addition, the R&D Center is workingwith operational staff in the ports to develop aconcept of operations for each technology to ensurethe most effective integration into Coast Guardoperations.

CATs-I TechnologiesThe R&D Center is investigating the followingCATs-I technologies:

Common Situation Display System (CSDS)CSDS is a Web-based information display anddistribution system for establishing, maintaining,and communicating situational awareness in nearreal time to Coast Guard and non-Coast Guarddecision-makers. It was developed utilizing theNational Interagency Incident Management-Incident Command System (NIIMS ICS) protocolsto support daily operations and to provide allpertinent incident response data, forms, geographicdisplays, and response asset tracking to members ofa Unified Command via the Internet. CSDSprovides access to Coast Guard incident responseinformation from outside the Coat Guard Intranetfirewall, which allows for the expeditious flow ofinformation between the Coast Guard andnon-Coast Guard Unified Command partner agencies.

Protected Voice CommsThe Protected Voice Communications systemconsists of hard-mounted and portable satellitephones. It is designed to provide communicationswhen port or land infrastructure is destroyed oroverloaded, or vessels are operating in knowncommunication dead zones. Satellite phones allowcommunications between interested partieswithout resorting to radio broadcasts, therebyproviding some protection to the flow of informa-tion. These commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)satellite phones are intended to supplement currentand soon-to-be-procured Coast Guard voicesystems. They should provide another alternativefor critical communications with other agencies,such as police and firefighters, the DrugEnforcement Administration, FBI, and Immigrationand Naturalization Service, connecting units bothon shore and afloat.

Blue Force TrackingThis system is designed to acquire and display theposition of Coast Guard and other friendly assets(blue force) while underway in the port. This infor-mation may be provided to the appropriatecommand centers via the CSDS. The graphicaldisplay of the location of blue force assets is a key

element for situational awareness and should leadto improved command and control and incidentresponse. Automatic Identification System (AIS)technology will be assessed for the operationalbenefits it may provide for blue force tracking. TheAIS gathers and distributes live vessel movementinformation, including a vessel's identification,position, course, and speed. CSDS has the capabili-ty to present this information using icons on a chartfor a CATs-I view of the asset distribution through-out the port.

Exclusion Zone BarriersIn recent months numerous security zones havebeen established to help protect critical port assetsand infrastructure. The Coast Guard is also muchmore serious about enforcing these and othersecure zones that may have existed beforeSeptember 11. To aid in this process, exclusionbarriers are being designed to keep intruders out ofsecure areas or away from vulnerable vessels orfacilities. They can range from simple floats thatmark a line of a security zone to sophisticatedsystems that can stop a moving vessel.

Trip WiresOne of the capabilities that is essential to portsecurity is the rapid response to suspect activities.Trip wires are designed to decrease response timeby providing an alert when an intruder approachesa security zone. A variety of technologies are usedin land-based systems to protect homes andbusinesses but have not been evaluated in a marineenvironment. Trip wire sensors may be combinedwith exclusion barriers and surveillance systemsfor an integrated approach to protecting criticalassets.

Day/Night SurveillanceOne of the main goals for improving port securityis enhanced local domain awareness. Surveillancesystems are capable of providing a continuous viewof the activity in a port. The Day/NightSurveillance system being investigated under thisprogram consists of a long-range, infrared camera

Coast Guard officers posing as terrorists are quickly apprehended during a port security exercise in Port Everglades, Fla.


automatic detection andtracking processor, and it willdisplay geographic targettracks and vectors, as well asreal-time video images.

Several of the systems men-tioned above have beeninstalled in Miami or SanFrancisco. Technical evalua-tion of these systems isongoing. Operational evalua-tions were conducted in bothpartner ports during the firsthalf of FY03. Operationalexperience to date has result-

ed in several recommendations for improvements,and these will be addressed over the next severalmonths. Based on the accomplishments to date, theCoast Guard has recently committed to operationaldeployment of several of these enhanced systemsfor port security in the south Florida area.

In addition, the Unified Command for CATs-I hasapproved several more technologies for investiga-tion, and these will be pursued during the remain-der of this fiscal year. In particular, the R&D Centerwill work with the COTPs and groups to:

· Improve the integration of sensors with command and control systems,

· Investigate systems for detecting chemical,biological, radiological and nuclear threats,

· Develop improved port security planning tools,

· Evaluate systems for inspecting and detect-ing underwater threats,

· Evaluate ways to improve the identifica-tion of friendly forces, and

· Assess means to improve the data commu-nications with vessels underway.

In a related effort the R&D Center will also investi-gate technologies for improved underwater portsecurity, including anti-swimmer systems, andsensors and platforms for inspecting ship hulls andpier structures.

The U.S. Coast Guard Research & DevelopmentCenter is working with the Coast Guard, withparticular focus on the COTPs and groups to live inthis new world, to help all to achieve theirmissions, and to learn to manage in a new worldwhere the cheese is constantly moving.

and a daylight TV camera to monitor the harborarea, anchorage, and port approach zones. TheCATs-I camera systems will be remotely operatedfrom fixed, land-based locations using wirelesstechnology. The system will allow the Coast Guardto remotely detect, classify, and identify targets ofinterest in the harbor and harbor approach duringboth day and night.

RADNETThis system uses COTS radar to provide radarsurveillance capability to Coast Guard Groups andCOTPs. RADNET uses a networkable radar andwireless technology to provide radar surveillancecoverage of a port/coastal area. Display and controlof the radar is provided to the Coast Guardcommand center via the Internet or throughwireless modems. The system can support up tofour remote locations. If necessary, the radar unit israpidly deployable to other locations and availablecommercially at relatively low cost. Working inconcert with the Day/Night Surveillance system, itmay provide increased range of target detection,and the ability to provide target range and location.Operators in the command center may select targetsof interest, and pass appropriate intercept informa-tion to vessels on patrol, significantly increasing theeffectiveness of their time on the water.

Port Security System (PSS)The PSS is designed to provide an integratedcommand and control system for port securitysensors at Coast Guard groups, stations, andMarine Safety Offices. It can integrate the controland output of multiple sensors into one console.Such resources as the day/night surveillancecameras, RADNET radar, and trip wires could bemanaged via the PSS. The system is designed forcollateral or unattended operation by relying on an

Capt. James Watson, COTP Miami, discusses improvements in portsecurity as a result of new technologies, like the Port Security System being

tested under the Research & Development Center’s CATs-I project.


by Lt. Cmdr. ANDREA PALERMO

Communications Director; U.S. Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System

The U.S. coastline presents an arrayof attractive targets to

terrorists who may exploit our relatively openborders and waterways to infiltrate weapons andoperatives into the United States. These targets area complex, interdependent system of criticalinfrastructure located within the marine transporta-tion system. This system encompasses a network ofnavigable waters, publicly and privately ownedvessels, port terminals, intermodal connections,shipyards, vessel repair facilities, and a trainedlabor pool operating and maintaining thisinfrastructure. Attacks on these targets coulddamage critical military facilities, shut down vitaleconomic hubs and cause economic and environ-mental disasters.

As a result of the September 11 attacks, the U.S.Coast Guard was designated the lead agency formaritime homeland security (MHLS). The MHLSmission requires the United States to strike a vitalbalance between facilitating the free flow of goodsand services and protecting national security. Thispresents a formidable task. Thousands of watercraftin an enormous area make it extraordinarilydifficult to sort out illicit traffic—the United Stateshas more than 95,000 miles of coast and anExclusive Economic Zone covering more than 3.5million square miles. The Coast Guard must alsooperate in a wide variety of environments, fromArctic waters to the Caribbean and Pacific. Theamount of traffic involved is also daunting. More

than 7,500 foreign-flag ships visit the United Statesevery year, many with multinational crews andcargo. Some experts believe that maritime tradecould triple by 2020.

The potential for terrorist attacks in this maritimedomain and the responsibility of protectingAmerican lives, property, and interests in thenation’s inland waterways, in nearby coastalwaters, and on the high seas are two reasons whythe Coast Guard’s current Deepwater assets mustbe upgraded and progressively recapitalized.Current Deepwater assets are reaching the end oftheir useful service lives. They are technologicallyand operationally obsolete. There is a compellingneed to modernize and enhance the operationalcapabilities of these assets to ensure that nationalmaritime security and safety requirements can bemet as well as supporting our additional mission areas.

To address these shortfalls, the Coast Guardestablished the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS)Program. IDS is an acquisition project to renovate,modernize and/or replace the Coast Guard’sDeepwater assets with an integrated system ofsurface and air platforms, along with command,control, communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) and logisticssystems. Rather than focusing on a specific class ofcutter or aircraft, the Coast Guard has focused onthe capability to perform all of its 14 federallymandated missions in the Deepwater region,

Improving OurFuture Capabilitieswith the IntegratedDeepwater System


including countering terrorist threats, rescuingmariners in distress, catching drug smugglers,stopping illegal migrants, and protecting themarine environment. The new IDS assets willpossess common systems and technologies,common operational concepts, and a commonlogistics base. When fully implemented, theDeepwater system will give the Coast Guard asignificantly improved ability to perform each of itsmissions, along the U.S. coast or in its harbors andports or far from U.S. borders. This will include theability to detect and identify all activities in themaritime arena—known as maritime domainawareness (MDA)—as well as the improved abilityto intercept and engage those activities that pose adirect threat to U.S. sovereignty and security.

The Coast Guard’s ability to respond so rapidly tothe attacks on the World Trade Center and thePentagon validated its reputation as an effective,multi-mission force. Coast Guard forces previouslyassigned to law-enforcement operations––including55 cutters, 42 aircraft, and thousands of CoastGuard men and women––were immediatelyreassigned to homeland security tasks. Cutterspatrolled offshore and in U.S. harbors to maintain adeterrent presence and escort cruise ships, tankers,and other high-value units into and out ofAmerican ports. Coast Guard Port Security Units,normally staged overseas, were deployed in severalU.S. ports. Coast Guard personnel also wereemployed as Sky Marshals on commercial airliners

and as Sea Marshals onboard commercial shipping.As always, the Coast Guard responded with speedand agility to the threat at hand.

The Coast Guard has always played a critical role insecuring the American homeland. The DeepwaterProgram provides an unprecedented opportunityto strengthen our fleet, providing the men andwomen of the Coast Guard the capabilities neededto perform these missions as well as futuremissions well into the 21st century. On June 25,2002, the Coast Guard awarded the Deepwatercontract to Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS),a joint venture between Lockheed Martin andNorthrop Grumman. This long-term relationshipbetween the Coast Guard and the system integrator(SI), ICGS, promises to deliver to the men andwomen of the Coast Guard an integrated system ofships, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, improvedC4ISR and supporting logistics infrastructure.

While many people believe that homeland securitymissions only take place close to shore (such as portsecurity missions), the truth is that a successfulMHLS strategy must push out U.S. borders to sea ifthreats are to be detected and eliminated wellbefore they reach the shore. Interdicting threats tohomeland security as far from shore as possible hasbecome more vital as potential adversaries havelengthened their reach. Any other strategy takesunnecessary risks with our national security. IDSassets will be designed with the speed and weapon-

ry needed to interdict and eliminate identifiedthreats.

Deepwater assets require the flexibility to confronta wide range of challenges. The multi-missiondesign of Deepwater assets will enable the CoastGuard to respond to an array of threats, protectingcritical infrastructure in U.S. ports and harbors aswell as far out to sea. Deepwater assets will bedesigned to maintain an extended on-scenepresence and provide an optimal command andcontrol capability. Finally, the IDS solution providesan affordable means for our allies to participate in acommon effort to improve interoperability in ourrespective naval forces. Each of these capabilitiescontributes to the Coast Guard's homeland securitystrategy and is an essential element of Americansafety and security on our maritime front lines.

The Coast Guard’s MHLS strategy complementsthe president’s national strategy for homeland secu-rity. In this national strategy, there are three broadobjectives to be accomplished: 1. Prevent terrorist attacks within the United

States;2. Reduce America’s vulnerability to

terrorism; and3. Minimize the damage and recover from

attacks that do occur.The national homeland security strategy is a soundstrategy that depends primarily on sharing infor-

mation, securing U.S. borders, protecting vitalinfrastructure, partnering with others at home andabroad, and preparing to respond quickly to futureevents. The modernization of the Coast Guard’scutters and aircraft, complemented with modernC4ISR capability through the IDS Program, isessential to the Coast Guard’s ability to execute thisstrategy effectively.

Deepwater assets will contribute importantcapabilities to each of the Coast Guard’s sixelements of homeland security strategy, as well asmeeting the president’s strategy for homelandsecurity:1. Increase MDA–build and leverage MDA to

create a comprehensive knowledge base formaritime security operations;

2. Conduct enhanced maritime security operations–establish and maintain a new threshold level of maritime security readiness, including layered maritime security operations for selective area control and denial, heightened levels of emergency preparedness, and a targeted response to the threat of terrorism;

3. Close port security gaps–strengthen the port security posture and reduce the vulnerability of strategic economic and military ports;

4. Build critical security capabilities–developrequired capabilities, improve core compe-tencies, and recapitalize the Coast Guard

INTEROPERABILITY SCENARIO

1 HAE–UAV WIDE-AREA SURVEILLANCE

Florida coast is surveyed for drug activity; HAE–UAV thenflies to northeast to patrol fisheries and continues north tolocate iceberg position; real-time data sent ashore andintegrated into common operating picture.

2 MPA PROSECUTION

MPA flies from Cape Cod; detects, classifies and identifiesfishery violator; prosecution completed by imaging theboat in closed area.

3 NSC INTEROPERABILITY WITH DODNSC deployed with DOD and participates in NATO exercise in North Sea.

4 MULTI-ASSET OPERATIONS

FRC receives TOI data from an OPC (including VUAV data) and a VRS; supports rescue mission.

5 OVER–THE–HORIZON OPERATIONS

OTH prosecution conducted by LRI; data from VUAV and HAE–UAV allows OPC to perform simultaneousprosecutions.

6 SHORE–BASED COMMAND CENTER

HAE–UAV relays surveillance information via SATCOM to shore command center; center relays informationand Drug Enforcement Administration intelligence reports into the command operating picture and cues OPCand FRC via SATCOM.

HAE-UAV = High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

MPA = Maritime Patrol AircraftNSC = National Security CutterFRC = Fast Response CutterTOI = Target of InterestVUAV = VETOL (Vertical Take-off and Landing)

Unmanned Aerial VehicleOTH = Over The HorizonVRS = VETOL Recovery and Surveillance AircraftOPC = Offshore Patrol CutterLRI = Long Range Interceptor


Deepwater environment follow the SDCIP tasksequence. This mission execution sequence wasderived from a review of operational tactics pastand present, across all missions and across allmaritime services. The process starts withsurveilling vast areas of the seas. Surveillancedetects objects. These objects are then classified aseither a target of interest (TOI) or as friendly. Theobject is then identified, for example, as a vessel,debris, etc. Those objects classified as TOIsmandate some form of prosecution. Prosecutioncan entail saving someone in the water, sending anarmed boarding party onto the TOI forlaw-enforcement action, or delivering ordnance ontarget. A combination of air and surface assets canbe employed to conduct these missions. The SI’ssystem concepts, developed in accordance withIDS minimum performance requirements, aredesigned to provide the Coast Guard with a systemof assets to execute this task sequence better.

Consequence management is another importantaspect of MHLS. It is quite possible that anotherattack will occur despite our best efforts atprevention. The Deepwater Program’s investmentsin command and control infrastructure, as well ascutter and aircraft capabilities, will enable faster,better-coordinated responses to terrorist incidents.These capabilities will be essential for the Service tobuild on its impressive track record of consequencemanagement.

Cooperation between the Navy and Coast Guard isanother essential component of safeguardingMHLS. Deepwater will enhance this cooperation,enabling the Coast Guard to meet its obligationsunder the National Fleet agreement, whichaddresses the operational integration of our units,as well as synchronized planning, training, andprocurement between the two services. Homelandsecurity and defense are key elements of thenational fleet policy, and the Navy and CoastGuard are working to ensure that scarceresources––our people, our ships, and aircraft, andthe taxpayers’ dollars––are allocated to meet themost critical needs confronting the nation. LastApril, the Deepwater Program Executive Officersigned a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)with Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton, the Navy’sDeputy Program Executive Officer for Ships. ThisMOU will ensure the Deepwater Program is totallyinteroperable and compatible with Navyplatforms. It provides the mechanism for the CoastGuard and the Navy to explore areas of technicalcommonality such as C4ISR systems, combat

for maritime security operations; 5. Leverage partnerships to mitigate security

risks–organize and sustain a public-privatesector partnership, while increasing international cooperation; and

6. Ensure readiness for homeland defense operations–prepare, equip, and train forcesto conduct both homeland security and homeland defense operations and to transition smoothly between them.

Achieving MDA—the comprehensive information,intelligence, and knowledge of all relevant entitieswithin the U.S. maritime domain and their respec-tive activities that could affect America’s security,safety, economy, or environment —allows the CoastGuard to anticipate and respond to potential threatsin a timely fashion, as well as optimize the deploy-ment of valuable assets. Deepwater will improvethe Coast Guard’s existing C4ISR capabilities,enabling a common operational picture (targets ofinterest, ships, geospatial data, cargoes, portfacilities, trade routes, personnel manifests, etc.),thereby improving risk assessments of terrorist andcriminal activity in the maritime domain. Inaddition, Deepwater's improved C4ISR system willbe interoperable with the Navy and other federalagency systems to provide MDA and improvedomestic interagency communication and coordination.

An explanation of the Deepwater task sequence—surveil, detect, classify, identify, and prosecute(SDCIP)—is important to understanding howDeepwater's design contributes to MHLS. TheCoast Guard's missions performed in the

Dr. Vance D. Coffman, CEO of Lockheed Martin (front); Rear Adm.Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard (center); andDr. Ronald D. Sugar, President of Northrop Grumman, signcontracts which award Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grummanwith the Coast Guard’s Deepwater contract. Photo by Telfair H.Brown, USCG.

systems, modularity, human systems integrationand automation, air and surface interfaces, and totalship computer environments. Modernizing theCoast Guard fleet will enhance joint missions,including enforcement of economic sanctions andforce protection.

The ICGS’ proposed implementation plan is basedon the Coast Guard’s 1998 mission profile andnotional funding levels. The actual implementationschedule, asset types, and numbers of assets mayvary, based on updated mission requirements andactual funding provided. However, ICGS proposedthree new classes of cutters and their associatedsmall boats, a new fixed-wing manned aircraft fleet,a combination of new and upgraded helicopters,and both cutter-based and land-based unmannedair vehicles (UAVs). All of these highly capableassets are linked with state-of-the-art C4ISRsystems and supported by an integrated logisticssystem.

President Bush has acknowledged the criticalimportance of modernizing the Coast Guard. InFebruary he stated, “. . . I hold in high esteem theUnited States Coast Guard. We’ve got a plan to beefup the Coast Guard, to modernize her ships, tomake sure the Coast Guard is available around allthe coasts of the country to protect the homeland.”The president was referring to the DeepwaterProgram. To demonstrate his support of the CoastGuard and the Deepwater Program, the budget forfiscal year (FY)03 requested the largest increase inthe history of the Coast Guard. This trend contin-ued with the President’s proposed budget for FY2004. In the President’s national strategy forhomeland security, it is noted that the President iscommitted to building a strong and effective CoastGuard. His proposal calls for providing thenecessary resources to acquire the sensors,command-and-control systems, shore-side facilities,boats and cutters, aircraft, and people the CoastGuard requires to perform all of its missions.

The Coast Guard has demonstrated time and timeagain its devotion to duty and its devotion to thesafety and security of the American people. TheIntegrated Deepwater System, supported by ourpartners in industry, promises to bring to the menand the women of the Coast Guard the necessarytools to maintain operational excellence at anaffordable cost well into the 21st century.

Bell Eagle Eye Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Global Hawk High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Long–Range Interceptor

AB–139 VRA, Recovery and Surveillance Aircraft

National Security Cutter


INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM:A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS


Beyond Traditional Application

by NAOMI CHANG1

Whether preventing safety or security mishaps, oneconcept remains true: one of the best preventive elementsis the human element. Prevention Through People (PTP) istraditionally thought of as a strategic approach to increasesafety and environmental protection. Preventingaccidents and spills through risk analysis, mariner educa-tion and best practice review is not a new concept. Whatis new, however, is our expanded focus on issues relatedto homeland security and tools used to wage war againstterror. The following will highlight how the PTP mindset,which was traditionally used to prevent safety andenvironmental mishaps, is also an avenue in preventingmaritime terror attacks via strategies and specific practices.

What makes an approach a “Prevention ThroughPeople” strategy?The PTP philosophy states that a focus on people is themost effective and efficient way to solve most problemsrelated to safety and environmental protection. Effectiveness isbased on studies that cite human factors as the root causeof more than 80 percent of marine casuaities andaccidents. In the case of terrorism, it is the people onvessels and in ports that prevent acts of terror. While the“nuts and bolts” of technology play a role in prevention,it is the people behind the technology using theirawareness, inquisitiveness, training and communicationsthat constitute a “PTP” strategy.

Evolving from the PTP philosophy, concrete practiceswere developed to further safety and environmentalprotection initiatives. Those, too, can apply to securityissues. Commonalities between preventing safety andsecurity mishaps using person-centered practice includethe following:

· Solutions are non-regulatory in nature;· Prevention, rather than reaction, is the mindset;· All port and vessel stakeholders are part of the

solution;

· Education and training are paramount;· Sharing best practices is key; and· Stakeholder motivations are high

Prevention Through People in PracticeAlthough U.S. Coast Guard units and maritime industriesmay not be using the term “PTP” to characterize theirsecurity initiatives, human factor elements run deep with-in their plans of action. Currently, Coast Guard portsacross the country are looking at human factors in theirhomeland security initiatives. Although not exhaustive,the following is a list of Coast Guard security programsthat may be considered “PTP” in nature:

· Coast Guard Group and Marine Safety Office (MSO) Boston initiated Coast Watch Boston. Theyare available 24 hours a day to take reports of anyunusual maritime-related activities, such as unusual business in the port or unusual activitiesby vessels in the harbor. Most of these examples of “unusual” activity relate to the human element.

· The Homeland Security Harbor Watch Program, administered through the U.S. Coast Guard’s 9th

District, and the Bay and Delta Guardian Watch Program, administered through the 11th District, are like neighborhood watch programs for the water. These programs are meant to inform, educate, and enlist the assistance of all persons who witness suspicious activities.

· Capt. Ronald W. Branch, Captain of the Port, MSO for New Orleans, developed a person- centered practice to prevent security mishaps. Hewrote in the June 2002 Marine Safety Bulletin (Volume II, Issue IV), “All masters, mates, pilots,deckhands and agents can serve as our ‘eyes andears’ in the field as they go about the normal busi-ness of the port.” His request for assistance was directed to everyone in the maritime industry community in combating terror.

1Naomi Chang is a Potomac Management Group, Inc. technical writer for the U.S. Coast Guard’s Human Element and Ship DesignDivision (G-MSE-1) in Washington, DC.


In addition to the Coast Guard, merchant mariners alsouse approaches to security that are person-centered innature.

· The April 2002 American Bureau of Shipping publication Activities discussed the application ofrisk management techniques to maritime security. Risk-Based Decision Making is a classic PTPinitiative.

· The Maritime Institute for Technology and Graduate Studies (MITAGS) offers a security awareness workshop. This course discusses understanding and coping with potential terrorist attacks.

· American Waterways Operators (AWO) has developed guidelines for ensuring security on boats for crews and for the surrounding areas.

Specific Practices for PreventionCoast Guard and merchant mariner guidelines alikeprovide specific examples of prevention tactics, such asgathering intelligence and conducting drills to test acrew’s readiness in response to security threats. Otherperson-centered tactics include using positive identifica-tion badges for personnel, vendors, and visitors.Guidelines such as these suggest awareness of suspicioussituations that may include vehicles or small boats loiter-ing in restricted areas, or unknown persons trying to gainspecific information about a vessel’s security, personnel,or standard operating procedures by questioning person-nel or their families.

The important role mariners perform in the war againstterrorism include being more mindful of surroundingevents and unfamiliar persons, and then informingcrewmembers and other area ships of the suspiciousactivity. Such basic tenets of the human element—includ-ing awareness, inquisitiveness, training and communica-tion—enhance port security.

Awareness of Suspicious BehaviorWith both the Coat Guard and maritime industry tellingmariners to look out for “suspicious” behaviors, animportant question is raised: “What makes an activity ora person suspect enough to cause alarm?” What oneperson believes to be “suspicious” may not be suspiciousto another. Or the observer may feel that there isinsufficient cause for urgency and, therefore, take noaction. For example, a stranger photographing a vesselmay be part of a tour group with an interest in ships, butthat same person photographing specifically locatedvessel facilities, such as the placement of loading armsand cargo cranes on the dock or looking for areas thatcould be potential bomb spots, could be cause for alarm.

Any occurrence that seems unusual should bequestioned.

InquisitivenessAn inquisitive attitude can be one of the best deterrents toterrorist attacks. If an unfamiliar person’s activity looksout of the ordinary, don’t be shy—ask. Approach theindividual and ask detailed questions in a civil manner.Routine questions, such as requesting a work ordernumber or asking for the name of the job supervisor,should be provided in a direct manner. If the person hasnothing to hide, he or she will probably give a detailedresponse in an equally civil manner. Vague, inaccurate, orconfusing answers are red flags that should be reported.But even double-checking with a supervisor about thequestioned activity is a good follow-up to the situationand should not be discouraged.

TrainingThe addition of security awareness training for marinersis a crucial part of a prevention plan. Conducting drills totest crew readiness and educating staff about securitypolicies are necessary parts of security training, and bothfall under the umbrella of PTP. Preparation for what maycome is more desirable than having to realize theweaknesses after an attack.

CommunicationIncreasing communication is another non-regulatorypractice. Communication with ships in the vicinity keepseveryone apprised of current situations. Reports ofsuspicious activities or vessels can easily be transmittedvia radio to other ships as well as to local law enforcementdepartments, thereby ensuring that everyone is alerted toa situation. Just as truckers use citizen band (CB) radios toreport erratic and dangerous drivers to other truckers andlaw enforcement officers, so, too, can mariners reportsuspicious behavior to each other.

On a recent visit to Anchorage, Alaska, Coast GuardCommandant Thomas Collins stated, “Safety and securi-ty are not oil and water.” Preventing safety and securitymishaps is something that we can all do throughout ourdaily business. By using non-regulatory strategies, havinga prevention mindset, involving all stakeholders, offeringappropriate training and sharing best practices, bothsafety and security are within reach. Prevention can beachieved by using one of the best preventive elements:the human element.

The Coast Guard National Response Center (NRC), at (800) 424-8802, can be reached 24 hours a day. It is a national clearinghouse forinformation for all suspected or actual terrorists attacks in the U.S.domestic marine industry.


M A R I N E R ’ S S E A B A GM A R I N E R ‘ S S E A B A G

What Can PREP Do for You?

by Lt. Cmdr. MICHAEL HEISLER

NSFCC Preparedness Department

The National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC)Preparedness Department has been improving thepreparedness of response communities for more than adecade by developing, executing, and evaluating nation-al Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP)government-led area exercises. Through the years wehave continuously revised and improved our exerciseprocesses to meet or exceed the needs of our customers—the “response community.”

HistoryThe Preparedness Department was established in 1991 aspart of the NSFCC to lead the design and evaluation ofgovernment-led PREP area exercises. Our department isbilleted for 18 members with a blend of six civilians and12 U.S. Coast Guard active duty personnel. We recentlywelcomed the addition of two new valuable resourceswhen we received two new planner billets, a mass rescueoperation planner and a port security planner. Thedepartment is tasked with developing six government-led PREP area exercises annually and one Spill ofNational Significance (SONS) exercise biennially.

PREP was developed after the Exxon Valdez and othermajor oil pollution incidents to establish a workableexercise program, which meets the intent of section4202(a) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). PREPsupports preparedness within the National ResponseSystem (NRS) through the routine exercise of AreaContingency Plans and required industry facility andvessel response plans. The NRS is the mechanism forcoordinating response actions by all levels of governmentin response to an oil spill or hazardous materials release.At the national level, the National Oil and HazardousSubstance Contingency Plan (NCP) provides response

guidance for the NRS and is supplemented by theRegional Contingency Plans at the regional level and theArea Contingency Plans (and industry facility and vesselresponse plans) at the local level. The focus of the NCP isto achieve the best response through an efficient, coordi-nated and effective response by the entire responsecommunity—federal, state, local government and theindustry responsible party.

The goal of PREP is to conduct 20 area exercises per yearnationwide, with six of the 20 annual exercises beinggovernment-led and the remainder being industry-led.The primary difference in the two types of exercises is inwho is responsible for leading the design effort. Forgovernment-led exercises, either the Coast Guard or theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) lead the designeffort, and for industry-led exercises, the industry partici-pant in the area exercise leads the design effort.Commandant (G-MOR) tasked the PreparednessDepartment with being the lead design agent for all CoastGuard government-led PREP area exercises. We alsoprovide support to EPA federal on-scene coordinatorstasked with government-led area exercises when requested.

PREP exercises differ from other types of exercises in thatper the PREP guidelines, the focus of the exercises is “onthe interaction between the responsible party and thefederal, state, and local government” in the exercise ofboth the Area Contingency Plan and the industryresponse plan. Therefore, the focus of PREP exercises isaligned with the focus of the NCP. The guidelines alsorequire the formation of an exercise design team withrepresentatives from industry, federal, state, and local andstate governments.


In the late 1990s, we were asked to adaptour processes to support the exercise ofnon-oil spill contingency plans whichalso require a coordinated federal, state,and local government (and often indus-try, as well) response effort. Our firstsuch effort was the 1996 Key WestCruise Ship (now called Mass RescueOperations or MRO) Exercise. Everyyear since then, we have done at leastone non-oil spill response exercise(MRO, HAZMAT or Mass CareExercise). Participation in these othertypes of exercises required us to developexpertise in the emergency managementprocesses and procedures used by stateand local governments in responding tomajor incidents and in the use of theNational Interagency IncidentManagement System (NIIMS) basedIncident Command System (ICS) tosupport responses to “all hazards andall risks.”

PresentSince September 11, we have used our expertise gained indesigning “all hazards and all risks” exercises to assistresponse organizations within a geographic area tobecome better prepared for what the future may bring.We are much more flexible in our exercise scheduling anddesign process and work closely with the responsecommunity to develop the type of exercise that meetsboth their Homeland Security and NRS preparednessneeds and objectives. Our new and improved exercisescheduling system allows FOSCs to schedule PREPexercises when it best meets their needs within adesignated calendar year.

Today, we readily accept the challenge of designingexercises that address “all hazards and all risks,”including Homeland Security-type scenarios. Mostrecently, we conducted a highly successful PREP exercisein northwest Florida—Comprehensive HAZMATEmergency Response Capability Assessment/PREP(CHER-CAP/PREP)—which had a scenario consisting ofan oil spill and HAZMAT release resulting from an act ofterrorism. The After Action Report and Lessons Learnedfrom this exercise, and all PREP exercises, are captured inthe Coast Guard Standard After Action Information &Lessons Learned System (CG SAILS).

With our current staffing and approval of our programmanager (G-MOR), we are capable of supporting up toeight exercises annually—six PREP and two additional

exercises. However, funding for non-PREP exercises mustcontinue to come from the unit requesting the exercise.We also offer the following services: facilitate IncidentReviews in lieu of conducting an exercise, provideincident response management command post supportfor actual responses, and assist in a full range ofcontingency plan assessments.

FutureOur role in providing preparedness support will evolveas the government and industry continue to meet thechallenge of protecting the environment, public healthand welfare. Recent significant events, such as the CoastGuard transferring to the Department of HomelandSecurity and the release of Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive (HSPD-5) are bound to have animpact on they way we do business. For example, HSPD-5 calls for the creation of a new National IncidentManagement System and a National Response Plan,which will obviously have some effect on the currentresponse management system (NIIMS ICS) and the NCP.Whatever changes come our way we will remain stead-fast in our belief: “Preparedness Perfects Response.”

More information about PREP can be found on the NSFCC Web site:www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfweb/index.html.

Participants attend a planning meeting during a PREP exercise in Juneau, Alaska.


NauticalNautical

EngineeringEngineering

QueriesQueries

1-B, 2-B, 3-A, 4-C, 5-C, 6-A, 7-B, 8-A, 9-C, 10-A

1. The mechanical efficiency of a particular centrifugalbilge pump is 92.5 percent. What is the smallest motorlisted that can effectively operate this pump at a capacityof 100 gpm and a discharge head of 15 feet?

A. 1/4 horsepower motorB. 1/2 horsepower motorC. 3/4 horsepower motorD. 1 horsepower motor

2. It is desired to operate an air compressor with a 12-inch flywheel at a speed of 510 RPM. If the motor runs at1,750 RPM, what size motor pulley should be used?

A. 2.5 inches B. 3.5 inches C. 4.5 inches D. 5.5 inches

3. If your vessel burns 2.9 tons of fuel per hour operat-ing at a speed of 20 knots, how many tons per hour willit burn at a speed of 15 knots?

A. 1.2 tonsB. 1.6 tonsC. 2 tonsD. 2.4 tons

4. A boiler forced draft pressure gauge indicates nineinches of water. This corresponds to a pressure of____________.

A. 0.216 psiB. 0.228 psiC. 0.325 psiD. 0.433 psi

5. A machine capable of producing 1,650 foot-pounds ofwork per second is considered to produce how muchhorsepower?

A. 1 horsepowerB. 2 horsepower C. 3 horsepowerD. 4 horsepower

6. The capacity of a particular ballast pump is 200gallons per minute. Approximately how long will it taketo ballast a tank with 68.5 long tons of seawater?

A. 1.5 hoursB. 2 hoursC. 2.5 hoursD. 3 hours

7. An oil fog lubrication system is recommended for__________.

A. gear shaft bearingsB. high-speed continuous operation of roller

bearingsC. low and moderate speed ball bearingsD. heavily loaded and high-speed ball bearings

8. The heat required to change a substance from a solidto a liquid while at its freezing temperature, is known asthe latent heat of _____________.

A. fusionB. vaporizationC. condensationD. sublimation

9. A distinguishing feature of an eductor, whencompared to other pumps, is the ______________.

A. discharge end being smaller than the suction end

B. small size of impellerC. lack of moving partsD. ease at which the wearing rings may be

changed

10. The average salinity of normal seawater, whenexpressed as brine density, is equivalent to _________.

A. 1/32ndsB. 1.5/32ndsC. 2/32ndsD. 3/32nds

Answers:

6. How should the lifeboat sea painter be rigged?A. Spliced into the ring on the stem postB. Secured by a toggle around the outboard side

of a forward thwartC. Secured to the inboard side of a forward

thwart and led inboard of the fallsD. Secured by a toggle to the stem post and led

outboard of the falls

7. While on watch, you notice that the air temperature isdropping and is approaching the dew point. Which typeof weather should be forecasted?

A. Hail B. Heavy rainC. Sleet D. Fog

8. The major factor that causes the color differencebetween a red star (Betelgeuse) and a blue star (Rigel) is__________.

A. its surface temperatureB. the elevation above the horizonC. the mass of the starD. the contrast to nearby stars

9. BOTH INTERNATIONAL & INLAND: You see a redsidelight bearing NW (315°). That vessel may be heading__________.

A. NW (315°) B. East (090°)C. SW (225°) D. West (270°)

10. BOTH INTERNATIONAL & INLAND: In fog, youhear apparently forward of your beam a fog signal oftwo prolonged blasts in succession every two minutes.This signal indicates a __________.

A. power-driven vessel making way through thewater

B. vessel being pushed aheadC. vessel restricted in her ability to maneuverD. power-driven vessel underway, but stopped

and making no way through the water

NauticalNautical

DeckDeck

QueriesQueries

1-C, 2-C, 3.-B , 4-A, 5- A, 6-C, 7-D, 8-A, 9-C , 10-D

1. You are signing on a crew. A prospective crewmanpresents a Merchant Mariner's Document that yoususpect has been tampered with when he reports to signthe Shipping Articles. Which action should you take?

A. Confiscate the document and deliver it to the Coast Guard.

B. Sign the man on and notify the Coast Guard at the first U.S. port of call.

C. Refuse to sign the man on articles until authorized by the Coast Guard.

D. Refuse to sign the man on and notify the FBI of unauthorized use of a federal document.

2. Uncleared crew curios remaining onboard during adomestic coastwise voyage after returning from foreignshould be __________.

A. listed in the Official LogbookB. cleared prior to the next foreign voyageC. noted in the Traveling Curio ManifestD. retained under locked security by the owner

3. An alien crewmember with a D-1 permit leaves thevessel in a U.S. port and fails to return. The first reportyou make should be to the __________.

A. Customs Service B. Immigration ServiceC. local police D. OCMI

4. A document which has a list of names, birthplacesand residences of persons employed on a merchantvessel bound from a U.S. port on a foreign voyage and isrequired at every port is called the __________.

A. Certified Crew ListB. Crew ManifestC. Shipping ArticlesD. Station Bill

5. You are coming to anchor in eight fathoms of water.In this case, the __________.

A. anchor may be dropped from the hawsepipeB. anchor should be lowered to within two

fathoms of the bottom before being droppedC. anchor should be lowered to the bottom, then

the ship backed, and the remainder of the cable veered

D. scope should be less than three times the depth of the water

Answers:


U.S. Department of Homeland Security

United States Coast Guard

National Maritime Center4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 630Arlington, VA 22203-1804

Official BusinessPenalty for Private Use $300

U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thomas H. Collins shakes hands with Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary ofTransportation, during the Change of Watch Ceremony Feb. 25, 2003. The ceremony commemorates the transfer of theU.S. Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security. Photo by PublicAffairs Officer Harry C. Craft III, USCG.

a new normalcynew normalcy

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