A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

CHAPTER ITHE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES, 1775

The Americans of the eighteenth century were notably a maritime people and no better sailors were to be found. The British colonies were close to the sea, and were distant from each other, scattered along a coast line of more than a thousand miles; so that, in the absence of good roads, intercommunication was almost altogether by water. The ocean trade also, chiefly with England and the West Indies, was extensive. Fishing was one of the most important industries, especially of the northeastern colonies, and the handling of small vessels on the Banks of Newfoundland at all seasons of the year trained large numbers of men in seamanship. The whale fishery likewise furnished an unsurpassed school for mariners.

A considerable proportion of the colonists, therefore, were at home upon the sea, and more than this they were to some extent practiced in maritime warfare. England, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was at war with various foreign nations a great part of the time, and almost from the beginning of the colonial period American privateers and letters of marque scoured the ocean in search of French or Spanish prizes. Large fleets were fitted out and manned by provincials for the expedition under Phips against Quebec in 1690 and for Pepperrell's successful descent upon Louisburg in 1745. Privateering during the French and Indian War of 1754 furnished a profitable field for American enterprise and gave to many seamen an experience which proved of service twenty years later. Even in times of peace the prevalence of piracy necessitated vigilance, and nearly every merchantman was armed and prepared for resistance (See Weeden's Economic and Social History of New England, chs. v, ix, xiv, xvi; and Atlantic Monthly, September and October, 1861, for journal of Captain Norton of Newport, 1741. See Appendix I for authorities.)

It would seem, then, that American seamen at the opening of the Revolution had the training and experience which made them the best sort of raw material for an efficient naval force. The lack of true naval tradition, however, and of military discipline, and the poverty of the country, imposed limitations which, together with the overwhelming force of the enemy, seriously restricted the field of enterprise. Nevertheless, the patriotic cause was greatly aided and independence made possible by the activities of armed men afloat.

The navigation laws of Great Britain were naturally unpopular in the colonies, and their stricter enforcement after the peace of 1763, together with the imposition of new customs duties, led to almost universal efforts to evade them. In 1764 the British schooner St. John was fired upon by Rhode Islanders, and in 1769 the

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armed sloop Liberty, engaged in the suppression of smuggling, made herself so obnoxious to the people of Newport that they seized and burned her. In 1772 the schooner Gaspee, on similar duty, was stationed in Narragansett Bay and caused great annoyance by stopping and examining all vessels. The people were exasperated at the arrogant behavior of her commander, who in many cases exceeded his authority. On the 9th of June, as the Gaspee was chasing a vessel bound from Newport to Providence, she ran aground about seven miles from Providence; she was hard and fast and the tide was ebbing. After nightfall a party of men in boats descended the river from Providence and attacked the schooner. After a short contest, in which the commanding officer of the Gaspee was wounded, she was captured. The prisoners and everything of value having been removed, she was set on fire and in a few hours blew up. Little effort was made to conduct this affair secretly, and yet in spite of the diligent inquiry of a court of five commissioners, all of whom were in sympathy with the British ministry, no credible evidence could be adduced implicating any person; showing a practical unanimity of feeling in the colony (R. I. Colony Records, vi, 427-430, vii, 55-192; Bartlett's Destruction of the Gaspee; Staple's Destruction of the Gaspee; Channing's United States, iii, 124-127, 151.)

The first public service afloat, under Revolutionary authority, was perhaps the voyage of the schooner Quero, of Salem, Captain John Derby, despatched to England by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress with the news of the Battle of Lexington. She sailed April 29, 1775, some days later than General Gage's official despatches and arrived at her destination nearly two weeks ahead of them (Essex Institute Collections, January, 1900; Century Magazine, September, 1899.)

Early in May, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon of sixteen guns, Captain John Linzee, seized two American sloops in Vineyard Sound; "on which the People fitted out two Vessels, went in Pursuit of them, retook and brought them both into a Harbour, and sent the Prisoners to Taunton Gaol." (New England Chronicle, May 18, 1775; American Archives, Series IV, ii, 608.) - PICTURE1

The islands in Boston Harbor had long been used by the colonists for pasturage and were well stocked with cattle and sheep which the British troops in the town took measures to secure for their consumption. Soon after the battle of Lexington they succeeded in carrying off all the livestock on Governor's and Thompson's Islands. The Americans, May 27, with the intention of forestalling similar raids, landed between two and three hundred men on Hog Island who attempted to bring off the cattle and sheep, while a detachment of about thirty men crossed over to Noddle's Island (East Boston) for the same purpose, when "about a hundred Regulars landed upon the last mentioned and pursued our Men till they had got safely back to Hog Island; then the Regulars began to fire very briskly by Platoons upon our Men. In the mean time an armed Schooner with a Number of Barges came up to Hog Island to prevent our People's leaving said Island, which she could not effect; after that several Barges were towing her back to her

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Station, as there was little Wind and flood Tide. Our People put in a heavy Fire of small Arms upon the Barges, and two 3 Pounders coming up to our Assistance began to play upon them and soon obliged the Barges to quit her and to carry off her Crew; After which our people set Fire to her, although the Barges exerted themselves very vigorously to prevent it. She was burnt [the next day] upon the Way of Winisimet Ferry. We have not lost a single Life, although the Engagement was very warm from the armed Schooner (which mounted four 6 Pounders and 12 swivels), from an armed Sloop that lay within Reach of Small Arms, from one or two 12 Pounders upon Noddle's Island, and from the Barges which were all fixed with swivels." (Boston Gazette, June 5,1775.) The American loss was four wounded, one of whom died two days later; that of the British was said to be twenty killed and fifty wounded. The stock, amounting to over four hundred sheep, about thirty cattle and some horses, were brought away by the provincials. During the siege of Boston various other attempts, successful and unsuccessful, were made to bring away live stock from the islands of the harbor, thereby reducing the possible sources of food supply of the British shut up in the town (Sumner's History of East Boston, 367-389; Frothingham's Siege of Boston, 108, 109, 225; Green's Three Military Diaries, 86; Almon's Remembrancer, i, 112; Amer. Archives, IV, ii, 719; Boston Gazette, June 5, 1775; N. E. Chronicle, May 25, June 15, July 27, October 5, 1775.)

Josiah Quincy in a letter to John Adams, dated September 22, 1775, proposed a plan for making the investment of Boston complete and so forcing the capitulation of the besieged British army. His proposal was to build five forts, three of them on Long Island, so placed as to command the channels of the harbor, including the narrows which were guarded by the enemy's men-of-war in Nantasket Roads; these ships could be driven out by the fire of the forts. He would then sink hulks in the narrows. No ships could thenceforth pass in or out and "both Seamen and Soldiers, if they don't escape by a timely Flight, must become Prisoners at Discretion." Quincy also thought that "Row Gallies must be our first mode of Defence by Sea." (Adams MSS.)

Near the eastern frontier of Maine, in a situation most exposed to British attack, lay the little seaport of Machias. The one staple of the town was lumber, and this the inhabitants exchanged at Boston for the various supplies they needed. In the spring of 1775 food was scarce, for the previous year's crops had failed. Consequently a petition, dated May 25, was sent to the General Court or Provincial Congress of Massachusetts at Watertown, begging for provisions and promising to send back lumber in return. News of the fight at Lexington and Concord had lately reached Machias and had stirred the patriotism of the people, who in spite of their isolated position, were in the main devoted to the provincial cause and had their committee of safety and correspondence. A committee of the General Court reported June 7 in favor of sending the provisions. Meanwhile Captain Ichabod Jones, a merchant engaged in trade with Machias, had proceeded from Boston to that place with two sloops, the Unity and the Polly, loaded with provisions and escorted by the armed schooner Margaretta under

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the command of Midshipman Moore of the British navy. They arrived June 2 and Jones took measures to procure a return cargo of lumber for the use of the British troops in Boston. As the only means of obtaining the much needed provisions it was voted in town meeting, notwithstanding the opposition of a large minority of staunch patriots, to allow Jones to take his lumber. He proceeded accordingly to distribute the provisions, but to those only who had voted in his favor. The patriots, under the lead of Benjamin Foster and Jeremiah O'Brien, were determined to prevent the shipping of the lumber to Boston. On Sunday, June 11, an unsuccessful attempt was made to capture Jones and the officers of the Margaretta while at church. They took the alarm and Jones fled to the woods, where he was taken some days later; the officers escaped to their vessel. Moore then threatened to bombard the town (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., vi (April, 1895), 124-130.)

"Upon this a party of our men went directly to stripping the sloop [Unity] that lay at the wharf and another party went off to take possession of the other sloop which lay below & brought her up nigh a wharf & anchored in the stream. The Tender [Margaretta] did not fire, but weighed her anchors as privately as possible and in the dusk of the evening fell down & came to within musket shot of the sloop, which obliged our people to slip their cable & run the sloop aground. In the meantime a considerable number of our people went down in boats & canoes, lined the shore directly opposite to the Tender, & having demanded her to surrender to America, received for answer, 'fire & be damn'd'; they immediately fired in upon her, which she returned and a smart engagement ensued. The Tender at last slipped her cable & fell down to a small sloop commanded by Capt. Tobey & lashed herself to her for the remainder of the night. In the morning of the 12th she took Capt. Tobey out of his vessel for a pilot & made all the sail they could to get off, as the wind & tide favored; but having carried away her main boom and meeting with a sloop from the Bay of Fundy, they came to, robbed the sloop of her boom & gaff, took almost all her provisions together with Mr. Robert Avery of Norwich in Connecticut, and proceeded on their voyage. Our people, seeing her go off in the morning, determined to follow her.

"About forty men armed with guns, swords, axes & pitch forks went in Capt. Jones's sloop under the command of Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien; about twenty, armed in the same manner & under the command of Capt. Benj. Foster, went in a small schooner. During the chase our people built them breastworks of pine boards and anything they could find in the vessels that would screen them from the enemy's fire. The Tender, upon the first appearance of our people, cut her boats from her stern & made all the sail she could, but being a very dull sailor they soon came up with her and a most obstinate engagement ensued, both sides being determined to conquer or die; but the Tender was obliged to yield, her Capt. was wounded in the breast with two balls, of which wounds he died next morning. Poor Mr. Avery was killed and one of the marines, and five wounded. Only one of our men was killed and six wounded, one of which is since dead of his wounds. The battle was fought at the entrance of our harbour &

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lasted for near the space of one hour. We have in our possession four double fortifyed three pounders & fourteen swivels and a number of small arms, which we took with the Tender, besides a very small quantity of ammunition." (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., vi, 130, 131 (report of Machias Committee of Correspondence, June 14, 1775). Foster's schooner is said to have run aground and to have taken no part in the battle. The Unity returned to Machias with the Margaretta as her prize. O'Brien's five brothers were with him in this enterprise (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., 1847, January, 1891, April, 1895; New England Magazine, August, 1895; Massachusetts Magazine, April, 1910; Sherman's Life of Jeremiah O'Brien, chs. ii-v; Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775.)

Joseph Wheaton, one of the Unity's crew, wrote many years later a detailed account of the action. He says that the Margaretta, after having replaced her broken boom, "was Making Sail when our Vessel came in Sight; then commenced the chace, a Small lumber boat in pursuit of a well armed British vessel of war - in a Short time she cut away her three boats. Standing for sea while thus pursuing, we aranged our selves, appointed Jeremiah Obrien our conductor, John Steele to steer our Vessel, and in about two hours we received her first fire, but before we could reach her she had cut our rigging and Sails emmencely; but having gained to about one hundred yards, one Thomas Neight fired his wall piece, wounded the man at the helm and the Vessel broached too, when we nearly all fired. At this moment Captain Moore imployed himself at a box of hand granades and put two on board our Vessel, which through our crew into great disorder, they having killed and wounded nine men. Still two ranks which were near the prow got a second fire, when our bowsprit was run through the main shrouds of the Margarette and Sail, when Six of us Jumped on her quarter deck and, with clubed Muskets drove the crew from their quarters, from the waist into the hold of the Margarette; the Capt. lay mortally wounded, Robert Avery was killed and eight marines & Saylors lay dead on her deck, the Lieutenant wounded in her cabin. Thus ended this bloody affray." (Adams MSS., Wheaton to President Adams, February 21, 1801. See another account by Wheaton in Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (January, 1891), 109.) Wheaton says that fourteen of the Americans were killed and wounded.

According to the British account the Americans attempted to board the Margaretta with boats and canoes during the night before the battle, but were beaten off. In the next day's chase Foster's schooner continued in company with the Unity to the end. As these vessels approached they were received by the Margaretta with a broadside of swivels, small arms, and hand grenades, but they both came alongside, the Unity on the starboard and the schooner on the larboard bow (British Admiralty Records, Admirals' Despatches 485, July 24, 1775, No. 2.)

The General Court of Massachusetts resolved, June 26, 1775: "That the thanks of this Congress be, and they are hereby given to Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien and Capt. Benjamin Foster and the other brave men under their command, for their

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courage and good conduct in taking one of the tenders belonging to our enemies and two sloops belonging to Ichabod Jones, and for preventing the ministerial troops being supplied with lumber; and that the said tender, sloops, their cargoes remain in the hands of the said captains O'Brien and Foster and the men under their command, for them to improve as they shall think most for their and the public advantage until the further action of this or some future Congress." (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., vi, 132.) The Unity was fitted out with the Margaretta's guns, renamed the Machias Liberty and put under Jeremiah O'Brien's command; she was presumably chosen as a cruiser in preference to the Margaretta, on account of her superior sailing qualities.

About a month after the capture of the Margaretta the British schooner Diligent, carrying eight or ten guns and fifty men, and the tender Tapnaquish, with sixteen swivels and twenty men (Wheaton (Adams MSS.) gives these vessels a smaller number of men and guns), appeared off Machias. The captain of the Diligent going ashore in his boat was seized by a small party of Americans stationed near the mouth of the bay and sent to Machias. Jeremiah O'Brien in the Machias Liberty and Benjamin Foster in another vessel were then sent down the river, found the British vessels and took them without firing a gun. According to Wheaton, O'Brien subsequently cruised in the Bay of Fundy and took a number of British merchant vessels (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (1847), 246, ii (January, 1891), 111; Life of O'Brien, ch. vi; Massachusetts Mag., January, 1910.)

Foster and O'Brien were next sent by the Machias Committee of Safety to Watertown to report their exploits to the Provincial Congress. Under their charge went also the prisoners taken in the Margaretta, Diligent and Tapnaquish together with Ichabod Jones. They proceeded as far as Falmouth (Portland), a week's voyage, by water. The ruthless burning of Falmouth by the British under Captain Henry Mowatt several weeks later is supposed to have been, in part at least, an act of retaliation for the capture of the British vessels at Machias. The journey of O'Brien and Foster from Falmouth to Watertown was made by land and took about ten days. On August 11th the prisoners were delivered at Watertown by their captors, who about the same time reported also to General Washington at the headquarters of the army in Cambridge. They petitioned the Provincial Congress for the privilege of raising a company of men among themselves at the expense of the Province, to be used in the defense of Machias and to give occupation to numbers of young men who in the distress of war times were without means of support. They also asked that the officers of the Machias Liberty be given commissions and that men be stationed on board her, this vessel to be supplied and equipped and used for the defense of the town, which might easily be blockaded by a small force. The petitions were favorably received by the Congress and O'Brien was appointed to command both the Machias Liberty and the Diligent. These vessels were thereby taken into the service of the colony and became the nucleus of the Massachusetts navy. O'Brien soon returned to Machias in order to oversee the fltting out of his vessels (O'Brien, ch.

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vi; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 346, 354; Records of General Court of Massachusetts, August 21, 23,1775; Massachusetts Spy, August 16, 1775.)

Off Cape Ann, August 9, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon, Captain Linzee, fell in with two schooners from the West Indies, bound to Salem. One of these schooners, says a report from Gloucester, was "soon brought to, the other taking advantage of a fair wind, put into our harbour, but Linzee having made a prize of the first, pursued the second into the harbour and brought the first with him. He anchored and sent two barges with fifteen men in each, armed with muskets and swivels; these were attended with a whale boat in which was the Lieutenant and six privates. Their orders were to seize the loaded schooner and bring her under the Falcon's bow. The Militia and other inhabitants were alarmed at this daring attempt and prepared for a vigorous opposition. The barge-men under the command of the Lieutenant boarded the schooner at the cabbin windows, which provoked a smart fire from our people on the shore, by which three of the enemy were killed and the Lieutenant wounded in the thigh, who thereupon returned to the man of war. Upon this Linzee sent the other schooner and a small cutter he had to attend him, well armed, with orders to fire upon the damn'd rebels wherever they could see them and that he would in the mean time cannonade the town; he immediately fired a broadside upon the thickest settlements and stood himself with diabolical pleasure to see what havock his cannon might make . . . Not a ball struck or wounded an individual person, although they went through our houses in almost every direction when filled with women and children . . . Our little party at the waterside performed wonders, for they soon made themselves masters of both the schooners, the cutter, the two barges, the boat, and every man in them, and all that pertained to them. In the action, which lasted several hours, we lost but one man, two others wounded, one of which is since dead, the other very slightly wounded. We took of the men of war's men thirty-five, several were wounded and one since dead; twenty-four were sent to head-quarters, the remainder, being impressed from this and the neighboring towns, were permitted to return to their friends." (Pennsylvania Packet, August 28, 1775; N. E. Chronicle, August 25, 1775.)

Captain Linzee, who makes the date of the affair August 8, states in his report to the admiral at Boston that having anchored in Gloucester harbor he "sent Lieut. Thornborough with the Pinnace, Long Boat and Jolly Boat, mann'd and arm'd in order to bring the Schooner out, the Master coming in from sea at the same time in a small tender, I directed him to go and assist the Lieutenant. When the Boats had passed a Point of Rocks that was between the Ship and Schooner, they received a heavy fire from the Rebels who were hidden behind Rocks and Houses, and behind Schooners aground at Wharfs, but notwithstanding the heavy fire from the Rebels, Lieut. Thornborough boarded the Schooner and was himself and three men wounded from Shore. On the Rebels firing on the Boats, I fired from the ship into the Town, to draw the Rebels from the Boats. I very soon observed the Rebels payed little attention to the firing from the ship and seeing their fire continued very heavy from the schooner the Lieutenant had boarded, I

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made an attempt to set fire to the Town." Hoping that by this means the attention of the Americans would be directed to saving their houses, so that the schooner could be brought off, Linzee sent a party ashore to fire the town; but the powder used for the purpose was set off prematurely, "one of the Men was blowed up," and the attempt failed. The town was then bombarded. "About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the lieutenant was brought on board under cover of the Masters' fire from the Schooner, who could not leave her. All the Boats were much damaged by the shots and lay on the side of the Schooner next to the Rebels; on my being acquainted with the situation of the Master, I sent the Prize Schooner to anchor ahead the Schooner the Master was in and veer alongside to take him and People away, who were very much exposed to the Rebels' fire, but from want of an officer to send her in, it was not performed, the Vessel not anchored properly." The master, despairing of succor, surrendered about seven in the evening "with the Gunner, fifteen Seamen, Seven Marines, one Boy, and ten prest Americans." The next morning the Falcon weighed anchor and proceeded to Nantasket Roads (Magazine of History, August, 1905.)

Several other affairs, of little importance in themselves, showed the readiness of the provincials for action upon the water at an early period, before there was naval organization of any kind to give authority to their acts (Boston Gazette, September 11, October 2, 9, 1775; Penn. Packet, September 4, 1775.) Boston being the seat of war at this time, most of the maritime events naturally took place in New England waters during the first year. As early as August, 1775, however, a South Carolina sloop, sent out by the Council of Safety, captured a British vessel on the Florida coast (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180.)

The situation of affairs in America, as is well known, caused great concern in England for a considerable time before the actual outbreak of the rebellion. Of all the measures proposed by whig or tory for the adjustment of the difficulty, probably the wisest, for the conservation of the empire, was suggested by Viscount Barrington, the Secretary at War; but wisdom availed little with the British ministry of that day. Barrington's advice was given in a series of letters written in the years 1774 and 1775 to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the Colonies (Political Life of William Wildman, Viscount Barrington, by his brother Shute (London, 1814), 140-152.) His opinion was that the colonies could not be subdued by the army, and that even if they could, the permanent occupation of America by a large force would be necessary, a source of constant exasperation to the colonists and of enormous expense to the government. The troops, he thought, should be withdrawn to Canada, Nova Scotia, and East Florida, and there quartered "till they can be employed with good effect elsewhere." The reduction of the rebellious colonies should be left to the navy. November 14, 1774, he writes: "The naval force may be so employed as must necessarily reduce the Colony [Massachusetts] to submission without shedding a drop of blood." (Ibid., 141.) A few weeks later, December 24, he goes a little more into detail. Speaking especially of New England he says: "Conquest by land is unnecessary, when the country can be reduced first by distress and then to

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obedience by our Marine totally interrupting all commerce and fishery, and even seizing all the ships in the ports, with very little expense and less bloodshed." As to the colonies south of New England, "a strict execution of the Act of Navigation and other restrictive laws would probably be sufficient at present." A few frigates and sloops could enforce those laws and prevent almost all commerce - "Though we must depend on our smaller ships for the active part of this plan, I think a squadron of ships of the line should be stationed in North America, both to prevent the intervention of foreign powers and any attempt of the Colonies to attack our smaller vessels by sea." "The Colonies will in a few months feel their distress; their spirits, not animated by any little successes on their part or violence of persecution on ours, will sink; they will be consequently inclined to treat, probably to submit to a certain degree." (Barrington, 144-147.) Concessions could then be made without loss of dignity, the mistake of imposing further obnoxious taxes being avoided. Barrington wrote on the same subject to Dartmouth the next year; and also to Lord North, August 8, 1775, saying: "My own opinion always has been and still is, that the Americans may be reduced by the fleet, but never can be by the army." (Ibid., 151)

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

CHAPTER IINAVAL ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION

The events already related took place under the stress of circumstances, most of them unauthorized by Continental or Provincial Congress. It is now necessary to interrupt the narrative of naval operations in order to sketch briefly the various sources of authority and the administrative systems under which acted the different classes of vessels throughout the course of the war. These classes were: First, Continental vessels; second, the state navies; third, the privateers, commissioned either by the Continental government or by the various states, and in some cases by both (In the preparation of so much of this chapter as relates to the administration and organization of the American naval forms, Paullin's Navy of the American Revolution has been closely followed. See also Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1888-1904, 1917-1957; Works of John Adams, ii, 462-464, 469, 470, 479-484, iii, 6-12.)

Public vessels cruising under Continental authority comprised not only the Continental navy, strictly speaking, including vessels fitted out in France, but also the fleets organized by Washington in Massachusetts Bay in 1775 and later in New York; by Arnold on Lake Champlain in 1776 and by Pollock in 1778 on the Mississippi River.

General Washington took the first actual step towards placing a Continental force upon the sea by fitting out the schooner Hannah, which sailed from Beverly

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September 5, 1775, and returned to port two days later with a prize. An important measure in making effective the siege of Boston, then in progress, was the intercepting of supplies coming to the town by water; the supplies being at the same time of the utmost value to the American army investing the town. Before the end of the year seven other vessels, officered and manned from the army, were fitted out by Washington. The next year he organized a similar but smaller fleet at New York (see next chapter.)

The first official suggestion of a Continental navy came from the Assembly of Rhode Island which, August 26, 1776, declared "that the building and equipping an American fleet, as soon as possible, would greatly and essentially conduce to the preservation of the lives, liberty and property of the good people of these colonies," and instructed the delegates from that province in the Continental Congress "to use their whole influence at the ensuing congress for building at the Continental expence a fleet of sufficient force for the protection of these colonies." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 231.) The Rhode Island delegates presented their instructions to Congress October 3 and this brought the matter fairly before that body. Discussion of these instructions was postponed from time to time and it was several weeks before definite action was taken on them. Meanwhile intelligence had been received of the sailing from England of two brigs laden with military supplies bound to Quebec. The practicability of intercepting these vessels was considered in Congress October 5. Strong opposition was developed on the part of a vociferous minority to any participation of the Continental government in maritime warfare; to them it appeared sheer madness to send ships out upon the sea to meet the overwhelming naval force of England. After a lively debate the matter was referred to a committee consisting of John Adams, John Langdon, and Silas Deane. Upon the recommendation of this committee it was decided to instruct Washington at once to procure two Massachusetts cruisers for that service and to request the cooperation of the governors of Rhode Island and Connecticut (Journals of Continental Congress, October 3, 5,1775; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 950, 1038, 1888-1890.)

Elbridge Gerry wrote from Watertown, October 9, 1775, to Samuel Adams, then a member of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, saying: "If the Continent should fit out a heavy ship or two and increase them as circumstances shall admit, the Colonies large privateers, and individuals small ones, surely we may soon expect to see the coast clear of cutters." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 993.)

On the advice of the committee appointed October 5, Congress voted on the 13th to fit out two vessels, one of them to carry ten guns, to cruise three months to the eastward in the hope of intercepting British transports. Another committee of three was appointed to inquire into the expense. October 30, 1775, is an important date in naval legislation. Congress resolved to arm the second of the vessels already provided for with fourteen guns and also authorized two additional vessels which might carry as many as twenty and thirty-six guns respectively, "for the protection and defence of the United Colonies." By this vote

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Congress was fully committed to the policy of maintaining a naval armament. On the same day a committee of seven was formed by adding four members to those already appointed (Jour. Cont. Congr., October 6, 7, 13,17, 30, 1775.) This committee was the first executive body for the management of naval affairs. It was known as the Naval Committee and the members were John Langdon of New Hampshire, John Adams of Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Silas Deane of Connecticut, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina.

During the closing months of 1775 much legislation necessary for the organization of the navy was enacted by Congress on the recommendation of the Naval Committee. In the beginning there was strong opposition to all enterprises of a naval character, but it gradually broke down before the arguments of the more far-sighted and reasonable members. November 10 the Marine Corps was established. On the 25th captures of British ships of war, transports, and supply vessels were authorized and the several colonies were advised to set up prize courts. The apportionment of the shares in prizes was prescribed. In the case of privateers all the proceeds went to the owners and captors; in the case of Continental or colony cruisers two thirds of the value of a prize when a transport or supply vessel, one half when a vessel of war, went to the government, while the captors took the rest. November 28, "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies" (See Appendix II) were adopted. These early navy regulations were brief, relating chiefly to discipline and prescribing the ration and pay. The rules provided for courts martial, but not for courts of inquiry; there was much subsequent legislation on the subject of naval courts. Pensions for permanent disability and bounties, to be awarded in certain cases, were provided for, the necessary funds for which were to be set apart from the proceeds of prizes. The rules of November 28 were framed by John Adams and were based on British regulations. Adams was a leader in all this early legislation and the part he took in the founding of the Revolutionary navy was important and influential (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 10, 17, 23, 24, 25, 28, 1775; Adams's Works, iii, 7-11; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1111.)

In November the Naval Committee purchased four merchant vessels under the provisions of October 13 and 30, to be converted into men-of-war. These vessels, as named by the committee, were the ships Alfred and Columbus and the brigs Cabot and Andrew Doria. The first was named in honor of the supposed founder of the English navy, the second and third for famous discoverers, and the fourth for the great Genoese admiral. Other vessels were authorized and purchased from time to time, the first of which was a sloop called the Providence (Adams, iii, 12; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1938; .Jour. Cont. Congr., December 2, 1775.)

Definite action was taken in Congress on the Rhode Island instructions December 11, when a committee of twelve was "appointed to devise ways and means for furnishing these colonies with a naval armament." Two days later this committee "brought in their report, which being read and debated was agreed to

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as follows: That five ships of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-eight guns, three of twenty-four guns, making in the whole thirteen, can be fitted for the sea probably by the last of March next, viz: in New Hampshire one, in Massachusetts Bay two, in Connecticut one, in Rhode Island two, in New York two, in Pennsylvania four, and in Maryland one. That the cost of these ships so fitted will not be more than 66,666 2/3 dollars each on the average, allowing two complete suits of sails for each ship, equal in the whole to 866,666 2/3 dollars."

Of these frigates, the Raleigh, of 32 guns, was built at Portsmouth, New Hampshire; the Hancock, 32, and the Boston, 24, at Salisbury and Newburyport on the Merrimac River; the Warren, 32, and the Providence, 28, at Providence; the Trumbull, 28, at Chatham on the Connecticut River; the Montgomery, 28, and the Congress, 24, at Poughkeepsie on the Hudson River; the Randolph, 32, Washington, 32, Effingham, 28, and Delaware, 24, at or near Philadelphia on the Delaware River; and the Virginia, 28, at Baltimore. The actual number of guns on a ship was generally in excess of the rate; a thirty-two gun frigate commonly carried about thirty-six guns. With a few exceptions these frigates were armed with no guns heavier than twelve-pounders. The smaller vessels of the Revolutionary navy carried only four and six-pounders. All were long guns; the light, short, large-calibre guns called carronades had not yet come into general use. Some vessels carried a secondary battery, mounted on deck or in the tops, of small light mortars called coehorns or of swivels, which were light guns mounted on pivots. December 13, 1775, the day when these thirteen frigates were provided for, is another important date in the early history of the navy. On the 14th a committee of thirteen was chosen by ballot to superintend the construction and equipment of the frigates (Jour. Cont. Congr., December 11, 13, 14, 1775. See Appendix V.)

From descriptions of three of these frigates, furnished nearly two years later to Admiral Howe, commanding the British fleet on the North American station, we are able to get an idea of their appearance and dimensions. The Hancock is describedas follows, beginning with the figure head: "A Man's Head with Yellow Breeches, white Stockings, Blue Coat with Yellow Button Holes, small cocked Hat with a Yellow Lace, has a Mast in lieu of an Ensign Staff with a Latteen Sail on it, has a Fore and Aft Driver Boom, with another across, Two Top Gallant Royal Masts, Pole mizen topmast, a whole Mizen Yard and mounts 32 Guns, has a Rattle Snake carved on the Stern, Netting all around the Ship, Stern Black and Yellow, Quarter Galleries all Yellow." "Principal Dimensions of the Rebel Frigate Hancock. Length on the upper Deck, 140 ft. 8 ins. Breadth on Do. 30.2. Length of Keel for Tonnage, 116.2 3/4. Extreme Breadth, 35.2. Depth in the Hold, 10.7. Burthen in Tons, 764. Heigth between Decks, 5.6. Do. in the Waste, 5.0. Size of the Gun Ports, fore & aft, 2.7. up & down, 2.2. Length on the Quarter Deck, 57.8. Length on the Forecastle, 31.3. Draught of Water, afore, 14.0, abaft, 15.10. Heigth of the Ports from the Surface of the Water, Forward, 9.0, Midships, 8.2, Abaft, 9.2." Then the Boston: "An IndianHead with a Bow and Arrow in the Hand, painted White, Red and Yellow, Two top gallant Royal Masts, Pole mizen

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topmast on which she hoists a Top gallant Sail, painted nearly like the Hancock with Netting all round, has a Garf, a Mast in room of an Ensign Staff with a Latteen Sail on it, and mounts 30 guns." "Dimensions of the Armed Ship named the Delaware...Length on the Gun Deck, 121 Feet; Keel for Tonnage, 96; Extreme Breadth, 32.6. The Ship lately built, Mounts twenty four Guns on the Upper Deck; And when furnished with proper Artillery, capable of carrying twelve Pounders with great facility." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Adm. Desp. 487, August 28, 1777, nos. 7 and 8; A. D. 488, November 23, 1777, no. 3.) The figures for the Warren and Providence, from the journal of the committee in charge of building those ships, are: length on the gun deck, 132 feet, 1 inch and 124.4, respectively; keel 110.10 3/4 and 102.8 1/2; beam, 34.5 1/2 and 33.10 3/8; hold 11, and 10.8. The committee voted to have a few eighteen pounders cast for these two frigates, and accordingly some guns of that weight were mounted on them (Magazine of History, December, 1908, and February, 1909. For the whole journal see lbid., November, 1908, to April, 1909. See Archives de la Marine, B7 459 (Whipple's letter of May 31, 1778)

Meanwhile, November 2, 1775, the Naval Committee had been given power by Congress to "agree with such officers and seamen as are proper to man and command " the vessels they had purchased and were fitting out. On the 5th the committee selected Esek Hopkins, an old sea captain of Providence and brother of Stephen Hopkins, for the command of this little fleet (Field's Life of Hopkins, 78.) December 7 John Paul Jones "was appointed Senior Lieut. of the Navy." (Jones MSS., October 10, 1776; Sands's Life of Jones, 33.) On the 22d the Naval Committee "laid before Congress a list of the officers by them appointed, agreeable to the resolutions of Congress, viz: Ezek Hopkins, Esqr., commander-in-chief of the fleet. Captains, Dudley Saltonstall, Esqr., of the Alfred, Abraham Whipple, Esqr., of the Columbus, Nicholas Biddle, Esqr., of the Andrew Doria, John Burrows Hopkins, Esqr., of the Cabot. 1st lieutenants, John Paul Jones [etc.] . . . Resolved, That the pay of the commander-in-chief of the Fleet be 125 dollars per calendar month. Resolved, That commissions be granted to the above officers agreeable to their rank in the above appointment." In addition to those named above there were in the list four other first lieutenants, five second lieutenants, and three third lieutenants (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 2, December 22, 1775.) This is the beginning of a list of officers for the Continental navy which, in the course of the war and including marine officers and those commissioned in France, contained nearly three hundred and thirty names (See Appendix VI.) There were in addition medical officers, pursers, midshipmen, and warrant officers of whom no lists have been preserved. The largest number of petty officers, seamen, and marines in the navy at any one time may have been about three thousand.

Uniforms for the officers of the navy were adopted by the Marine Committee September 5, 1776, but probably they were not commonly worn, as few officers could afford a complete outfit. For line officers a blue coat with red lapels, blue breeches, and red waistcoat were prescribed; for marine officers, a green coat

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faced with white and with a silver epaulette on the right shoulder, white waistcoat and breeches and black gaiters (Am. Arch., V, ii, 181.)

It has generally been supposed that the intention of Congress in making Hopkins commander-in-chief was to give him the same rank that Washington held in the army. It seems more likely, however, that Congress merely meant to give him command of this particular fleet. The wording of his appointment by the Naval Committee and of the resolutions quoted above, together with the fact that each of the captains was assigned, also by resolution of Congress, to a specified vessel, would indicate this. Stephen Hopkins, writing to Esek November 6, 1775, says: "You will perceive by a letter from the Committee, dated yesterday, that they have pitched upon you to take the Command of a Small Fleet, which they and I hope will be but the beginning of one much larger." (Hopkins, 78.) A resolution of Congress dated January 2, 1778, states that Hopkins "was appointed commander in chief of the fleet fitted out by the Naval Committee." (Jour. Cont. Congr., January 2, 1778.) He does not appear to have been mentioned officially and authoritatively, that is to say by the Naval or Marine Committee, though he was once by a special committee (Sands, 310.), as the commander-in-chief of the navy. In addition to his own fleet, several other Continental vessels cruised in 1776, which do not seem to have been under his orders (see ch. V) Hopkins was an elderly man at this time, having been born in 1718. He had spent much of his life at sea and was a privateersman in the French and Indian War (Hopkins, ch. i.)

Of the members of the committee of thirteen chosen December 14, 1775, "for carrying into execution the resolutions of Congress for fitting out armed vessels," ten had served on the committee of twelve which had recommended building the frigates and five had been members of the original Naval Committee. This new committee, consisting of one representative from each colony, became the second executive body for the administration of naval affairs. It was called the Marine Committee and was at first constituted as follows: Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, John Hancock of Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Silas Deane of Connecticut, Francis Lewis of New York, Stephen Crane of New Jersey, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, George Read of Delaware, Samuel Chase of Maryland, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina, and John Houston of Georgia. The membership changed from time to time. The Naval Committee continued in the meantime to occupy itself in fitting out the small fleet of vessels purchased for the service and placed under the command of Commodore Hopkins, and to prepare for an expedition which was being planned. January 25,1776, although the Marine Committee had already taken charge of general naval affairs, Congress voted to leave the direction of this fleet to the Naval Committee, which soon afterwards, this duty being accomplished, ceased to exist (Jour. Cont. Congr., January 25,1776.) The Marine Committee employed agents to supervise the construction of the frigates in the distant colonies, taking charge itself of

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those at Philadelphia. Before the end of the year 1775 the organization of a Continental navy was achieved.

In the course of time the mass of details connected with naval administration became too much for the Marine Committee easily to handle. Prize agents in the various seacoast towns were appointed to superintend the trial and condemnation of the prizes taken by Continental cruisers. Most of the prize agents were also Continental agents, in which capacity they performed various other duties of a naval sort. John Bradford at Boston had the most important of these agencies (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1113, 1114.) For the further relief of the Marine Committee and at their suggestion, Congress appointed three persons, November 6, 1776, "to execute the business of the navy, under the direction" of the committee. This body of three was known as the Navy Board and the men appointed to serve on it were John Nixon and John Wharton of Pennsylvania and Francis Hopkinson of New Jersey. The lack of maritime knowledge and experience among members of Congress was keenly felt at this time. William Ellery of Rhode Island, who had recently become a member of the Marine Committee, wrote home to his friend William Vernon, November 7, 1776, "The Conduct of the Affairs of a Navy as well as those of an Army We are yet to learn. We are still unacquainted with the systematical Management of them." (Publications of R.I. Hist. Soc., viii (January, 1901), 201.) April 19, 1777, another committee of three was authorized, to take charge of naval affairs in New England; the men selected for this board were William Vernon of Rhode Island, James Warren of Massachusetts, and John Deshon of Connecticut. The first of these boards was then called the Navy Board of the Middle Department or District, the second the Navy Board of the Eastern Department, or they were called the boards at Philadelphia and at Boston respectively (Jour. Cont. Congr., April 23, November 6,1776, April 19,1777.)

The Eastern Navy Board, owing to its distance from the seat of government at Philadelphia, was allowed more discretion and became a more important body than that of the middle department. The greater naval activity in New England waters, due to remoteness from the centre of military operations, put more work and responsibility on the eastern board. Its original members retained office several years without change. Their instructions, dated July 10, 1777, imposed upon them "the Superintendance of all Naval and Marine Affairs of the United States of America within the four Eastern States under the direction of the Marine Committee" in "whatever relates to the Building, Manning, and fitting for Sea all Armed Vessels of the United States built, or ordered by the Congress to build in the Eastern Department, and to provide all materials and Stores necessary for that purpose." They were "to keep an exact Register of all the Officers, Sailors, and Marines in the Continental Navy fitted and Manned within" the eastern district, and were "empower'd to order Courts Martial." They were also instructed to keep strict account of expenditures and to do many other things (Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 207-210.)

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With further experience it became apparent that the Marine Committee was too large and its members too deficient in special knowledge of naval science to admit of prompt, capable, and expert handling of the affairs entrusted to them. In October, 1776, John Paul Jones wrote to Robert Morris (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1106; Sands, 55) that efficiency in naval administration could only be obtained by the appointment of a competent board of admiralty. William Ellery wrote to William Vernon, February 26, 1777: "The Congress are fully sensible of the Importance of having a respectable Navy and have endeavoured to form and equip One, but through Ignorance and Neglect they have not been able to accomplish their Purpose yet. I hope however to see One afloat before long. A proper Board of Admiralty is very much wanted. The Members of Congress are unacquainted with this Department. As One of the Marine Committee I sensibly feel my Ignorance in this Respect." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 204.) For three years, however, little was done in the way of improving administration except the appointment of the navy boards and agents. Finally, October 28, 1779, upon the recommendation of the Marine Committee a Board of Admiralty was established by Congress. This was a body of five members, two of whom were to be members of Congress, while the other three, called commissioners, were to be men possessing a knowledge of naval matters. A quorum of three was necessary for the transaction of business. The Marine Committee then came to an end, but the navy boards at Philadelphia and Boston and the navy agents were retained under this reorganization (Jour. Cont. Congr., June 9, October 28, 1779.)

Positions on the Board of Admiralty were declined by several to whom they were offered, and it was not only difficult to keep two congressional members continuously on the board, but it proved to be impossible to find three suitable persons willing to serve as commissioners. Consequently the membership was never full and the work of the board was much interrupted by frequent lack of a quorum. As first organized, in December, 1779, the Board of Admiralty contained three members: Francis Lewis of New York, commissioner; James Forbes of Maryland and William Ellery of Rhode Island, congressional members. A few months later Forbes died and his place was taken by James Madison of Virginia. The Board of Admiralty was much hampered by half-hearted cooperation on the part of Congress and by want of money. Its membership dwindled to a point where nothing could be done in default of a quorum, until finally, in the summer of 1781, it passed out of existence (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 26, December 3, 7, 8, 1779.)

Meanwhile, February 7, 1781, Congress had passed a resolution putting the affairs of the navy under a single head, to be called the Secretary of Marine. No one was found, however, to take the place and the office was never filled. Robert Morris, who as Superintendent of Finance had close relations with the navy, gradually assumed direction of naval affairs as the Board of Admiralty became more and more helpless. August 29 Congress voted to appoint an Agent of Marine to take charge of naval matters until a secretary could be found, and September 7 it placed these affairs under the care of the Superintendent of

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Finance until an agent could be appointed. The navy boards were abolished, although the board at Boston continued its functions several months longer. The result of it all was that Morris continued to direct naval affairs, as Agent of Marine, during the remainder of the war. He had already served on the Marine Committee and his great ability, business experience, and familiarity with maritime affairs made him the best executive head that the navy could have had (Jour. Cont. Congr., February 7, August 29, September 7, 1781.)

By way of summary it is perhaps well to review in a few words the history of the administration of the Continental navy. The first executive of the service was the Naval Committee which in 1775 began the work of organizing a navy. Next came the Marine Committee which directed naval affairs for four years, ending in December 1779. Then followed the Board of Admiralty which managed the department a year and a half, when, in the summer of 1781, Robert Morris took charge and as Agent of Marine remained at the head of the navy until after the end of the war.

As soon as representatives of the United States had established themselves in France, naval affairs became an important part of their duties. This began in July, 1776, with Silas Deane, the first American agent. After the arrival of Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee in the following December, to serve with Deane as commissioners, they shared the duties with him, although he still continued to exercise special supervision of naval matters until the spring of 1778, when he was superseded as commissioner by John Adams. After this, Franklin did the largest share of naval work, and from the time of his assuming the office of minister to France in February, 1779, he had sole charge of naval affairs abroad until the end of the war. This naval office in Paris had agents in various ports of France and in a few of Spain and Holland. It performed many functions, such as buying, building, manning, and fitting out vessels and providing naval stores, commissioning officers, directing cruises, disposing of prizes, exchanging prisoners, and commissioning privateers. Besides this office in France the naval interests of the United States in the West Indies and in Louisiana were entrusted to agents. These were William Bingham at Martinique, and Oliver Pollock in New Orleans (Paullin, ch. ix; Wharton's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, letters of Deans and Franklin; Hale's Franklin in France.)

The sentiment of local independence and the loose federation of the colonies, united only for mutual protection, naturally led to individual action, and the need that each state felt of the defense of its own shores, too urgent to wait for the deliberations of the Continental Congress, brought about the establishment of separate small navies; so that, in addition to the Continental navy, eleven of the thirteen states maintained armed vessels, New Jersey and Delaware being the exceptions. Naval administration in the various states was generally, at the outset, in charge of the Committee of Safety, and later, of the state executive or of a board which had under its care naval affairs alone or in combination with military affairs. The state navies varied much in size and force. Being used

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chiefly for coast defense, the vessels were usually smaller than those of the Continental navy, and many of them were merely boats and galleys adapted for operating in shallow waters. Some of the state ships, however, were ocean cruisers of considerable size and force (For the state navies, see Paullin, chs. xi-xvii.)

The first American armed vessels commissioned by any public authority were two sloops fitted out by Rhode Island, June 15, 1775. The people of this colony had been annoyed by the British frigate Rose, cruising in Narragansett Bay. These sloops immediately went to sea under the command of Abraham Whipple, and on the same day, June 15, chased ashore and destroyed a tender of the Rose (Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775; Historical Magazine, April, 1868; Am. Arch., IV, ii, 1118; Hopkins, 63-67; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 485, June 19, 1775.) One of the sloops, the Katy, was subsequently taken into the Continental service under the name Providence. The state of Rhode Island afterwards kept a small force cruising in the bay.

In the course of the war the Massachusetts navy comprised fifteen seagoing vessels and one galley.

The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, after some ineffectual attempts in June, 1775, to provide for armed vessels, made a beginning August 21, by taking the Machias Liberty and Diligent into the service of the colony (Jour. Third Provincial Congress of Mass., June 7, 11, 13, 20, 1775.) The actual establishment of a state navy, however, came in the following winter, when a committee was appointed December 29, of which John Adams was a member, "to consider & report a plan for fitting out Armed Vessels for the defence of American Liberty." (Records of General Court of Mass., December 29, 1775, January 11, February 7, 8, 17, April 20, 1776; Paullin, ch. xi.) In decisive action looking towards a naval force Connecticut preceded Massachusetts. Early in July, 1775, two vessels were provided for and in August they were purchased. A valuable prize was taken in October. Connecticut fitted out twelve vessels during the war, four of them galleys (Papers New London Hist. Soc., Part IV, i (1893), 34; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 264-268; Paullin, ch. xii.)

Pennsylvania began July 6, 1775, by providing for the defense of the Delaware River by means of boats and galleys. The Pennsylvania navy consisted of about ten vessels and nearly thirty boats and galleys for river and bay defense. The fleet was under the command of a commodore (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 495, 510, 511, 858, 862, 1811, 1820, 1836, 1839, iv, 515, 521; Penn. Archives, Series II, i; Wallace's Life of William Bradford; Paullin, ch. xiii.) The Virginia navy, authorized by the Provincial Convention in December, 1775, comprised first and last seventy two vessels of all classes including many ships, brigs and schooners; but apparently most of them were small, poorly manned, and lightly armed, and were used largely for commerce. The naval duties of the fleet were confined mostly to Chesapeake Bay (Southern Literary Messenger, January to April, 1857; Virginia

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Hist. Register, July, April, October, 1848; Va. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., July, 1893; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 114, 866, v, 227, vi, 1598; Paullin, ch. xiv.) Maryland shared with Virginia the defense of Chesapeake Bay, and in addition to one vessel of some size and force, maintained a considerable fleet of galleys, boats, and barges (Am. Arch., IV, v, 1509,1510.) The chief concern of North Carolina was to protect and keep open Ocracoke Inlet, connecting Pamlico Sound with the ocean, through which an important part of the commerce, not only of North Carolina but of Virginia, was carried on. A small fleet for this purpose was stationed in the sounds (Ibid., 1357, 1363.) Georgia's navy was small and unimportant, consisting mostly of galleys. A schooner, however, was commissioned as early as June, 1775 9Paullin, ch. xvi, for Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina.) The defense of Charleston required a considerable force, and South Carolina was one of the first states to begin the organization of a navy. She appears to have had about fifteen sea-going vessels, some of them larger and more heavily armed than any other state or Continental ships. The force also included several galleys (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180, iv, 45-54; Paullin, ch. xv.) As regards the two remaining states, New York's naval enterprise was confined to organizing a small fleet for local defense. The early occupation by the British of New York City and the adjacent waters prevented any further operations (Jour. Prov. Congr. of New York, i, 228, 349; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1401, 1450.) New Hampshire voted in 1776 to build a galley and appointed a committee to procure an armed vessel. After this her only naval activity, aside from encouraging privateering and setting up a prize court, consisted in fitting out a twenty-two-gun ship for temporary service in 1779 (Ibid., 10, 15, 17, 24; Paullin, ch. xvii.)

Privateers composed the third and a very important class of vessels employed during the Revolution. The word privateer was used at that time, and later, too, with the utmost disregard of its true meaning. Persons with an understanding of maritime affairs constantly spoke of Continental and state cruisers, especially the smaller ones, as privateers. The term was often wrongly used even in official correspondence. It is necessary that lines should be sharply drawn between these different classes of armed vessels. Letters of marque, so called from the letters or commissions they carried, were armed trading vessels authorized to make prizes. They also were generally, and more properly, called privateers. The latter name should, strictly speaking, be reserved for private armed vessels carrying no cargo and devoted exclusively to warlike use. All kinds of armed vessels, however, during the Revolution, even Continental frigates, were employed under special circumstances as cargo carriers.

The General Court of Massachusetts, November 1, 1775, passed "An Act for Encouraging the Fixing out of Armed Vessells, to defend the Sea Coast of America, and for Erecting a Court to Try and Condemn all Vessells that shall be found infesting the same." The preamble of this important measure, written by Elbridge Gerry, set forth in detail the justification of the colonists in taking up arms. "Whereas the present administration of Great Britain, being divested of

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justice and humanity and strangers to that magnanimity and sacred regard for liberty which inspired their venerable predecessors, have been endeavouring thro' a series of years to establish a system of despotism over the American colonies and by their venal and corrupt measures have so extended their influence over the British parliament that, by a prostituted majority, it is now become a political engine of slavery; and whereas the military tools of these our unnatural enemies, while restrained by the united forces of the American colonies from proceeding in their sanguinary career of devastation and slaughter, are infesting the sea coast with armed vessells and daily endeavouring to distress the inhabitants by burning their towns and destroying their dwellings . . . and making captures of provision and other vessels, being the property of said inhabitants; and whereas their majesties King William and Queen Mary by the royal charter of this colony . . . did grant, establish and ordain that, in the absence of the governor and lieutenant-governor of the colony, a majority of the council shall have full power . . . for the special defence of their said province or territory, to assemble in martial array and put in warlike posture the inhabitants of their said province or territory and to lead and conduct them and with them to encounter, expulse, resist and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by land, . . . and also to kill, slay, destroy, and conquer by all fitting ways, enterprizes and means whatsoever all and every such person and persons as should at any time thereafter attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion, detriment or annoyance of their said province or territory . . . ; and whereas it is expressly resolved by the grand Congress of America, 'That each colony, at their own expence, make such provision by armed vessells or otherwise . . . as their respective assemblies . . . shall judge expedient . . . for the protection of their harbours and navigation on the sea-coasts,' . . . and it is the duty and interest of this colony to exert itself, as well for the purpose of keeping supplies from the enemy as for those mentioned in the paragraphs of the charter and resolve now recited; therefore . . . Be it enacted," etc. This act authorized a majority of the council to commission masters of private armed vessels. During the following winter and spring other acts were passed supplementing or superseding that of November 1. Courts for the trial of prizes were established at Plymouth, Ipswich, and Falmouth (Portland); and April 13, 1776, it was provided that in addition to these places courts might also be held in Barnstable or Dartmouth for the southern district, in Boston, Salem, or Newburyport for the middle district, and in Pownalborough (Wiscasset) for the eastern district (Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, November 1, 1775, February 14, March 19, April 13, May 8, 1776.) Massachusetts probably sent out not far from one half of all the American private armed vessels commissioned during the Revolution.

The Continental Congress authorized privateering March 23,1776, and on April 2 and 3 adopted a form of Commission for privateers and resolved to send copies in blank, signed by the President of Congress, to the various colonies, there to be issued to privateersmen giving bonds; a set of instructions for commanding officers was drafted (See Appendix III.) Several of the colonies or states used these Continental commissions altogether, not establishing state privateering.

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Pennsylvania sent out flve hundred vessels under Continental commissions and, it is believed, used no others. Six hundred and twenty-six Massachusetts privateers sailed under Continental letters of marque, but that state also sent nearly a thousand others to sea under her own commissions; it is probable, however, that in many instances the same vessel may have sailed at one time under one commission and later under the other. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, and South Carolina, and probably some of the other states, issued their own commissions, but the first four also employed those of the Congress - Connecticut and Maryland more than two hundred each. Sixty-four Virginia privateers sailed under Continental commissions. The American Commissioners in Paris - later the minister to France - and the naval agent of Congress in the West Indies likewise commissioned privateers. A rough estimate only of the total number and force of American vessels engaged in privateering on the patriotic side during the Revolution is possible. The Library of Congress has printed a list of nearly seventeen hundred letters of marque issued by the Continental Congress to privateers carrying, approximately, fifteen thousand guns - probably light ones for the most part - and fifty-nine thousand men. After deducting duplicates, that is to say, in cases of two or more commissions being successively issued to the same vessel, and deducting also armed boats and galleys, there remain more than thirteen hundred sea-going vessels. The thousand commissions issued by Massachusetts probably represented more than seven hundred different vessels, after making the same proportionate allowance for duplicates. Several hundred additional privateers must have been commissioned by other states and in France and the West Indies. Assuming the total number of private armed vessels to have been two thousand, and there were probably a good many more, they doubtless carried very nearly eighteen thousand guns and seventy thousand men. There seem to have been about the same number of British privateersmen, according to Governor Hutchinson, who, speaking of the difficulty of manning the British navy, says: "Some have proposed pressing the crews of all privateers, in which service it is computed 70,000 men are employed." (Diary, ii, 264 (June 27, 1779.) Judging from the scanty information at hand concerning British privateering, it is probable that their vessels engaged in this form of warfare were considerably less numerous but decidedly superior in force to the Americans; the latter seem to have carried on the average between eight and nine guns and less than thirty-five men, the British about seventeen guns and seventy-five or more men (Jour. Cont. Congr., March 23, April 2, 3, 1776, May 2,1780; Naval Records of Amer. Rev. (calendar), 217-495; Emmons's Statistical History of the Navy, 127; Mass. Archives, clxiv to clxxii; Penn. Archives, II, i, 366; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 27; Sheffield's Rhode Island Privateers; Paullin; Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson; Williams's History of Liverpool Privateers, App. iv, list of 95 vessels; London Chronicle, April 1, 29,1779, lists of 100 privateers from Liverpool and 121 from New York; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, February 27, 1779, No. 3, list of 69 New York privateers. See Appendix VII.)

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Valuable service to the country was rendered by the privateers, and they contributed in a large degree to the naval defense, and so to the fortunate outcome of the war. On the other hand, the system was subject to abuses and was in many ways detrimental to the regular naval service. William Whipple, writing to Josiah Bartlett from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, July 12, 1778, says: "I agree with you that the privateers have much distressed the trade of our Enemies, but had there been no privateers is it not probable there would have been a much larger number of Public Ships than has been fitted out, which might have distressed the Enemy nearly as much & furnished these States with necessaries on much better terms than they have been supplied by Privateers ? . . . No kind of Business can so effectually introduce Luxury, Extravagance and every kind of Dissipation, that tend to the destruction of the morals of people. Those who are actually engaged in it soon lose every Idea of right & wrong, & for want of an opportunity of gratifying their insatiable avarice with the property of the Enemies of their Country, will without the least compunction seize that of her Friends . . . There is at this time 5 Privateers fitting out here, which I suppose will take 400 men. These must be by far the greater part Countrymen, for the Seamen are chiefly gone, & most of them in Hallifax Gaol. Besides all this, you may depend no public ship will ever be manned while there is a privateer fitting out. The reason is plain: Those people who have the most influence with Seamen think it their interest to discourage the Public service, because by that they promote their own interest, viz., Privateering." (Historical Magazine, March, 1862.)

As intimated in the foregoing, privateers at times made trouble by seizing neutral vessels. In his advocacy of a strong navy in preference to a service under private control Whipple was in advance of his time. William Vernon, of the Navy Board at Boston, wrote to John Adams, December 17, 1778, that the Continental ships in port "may sail in Three Weeks, if it was possible to get Men, wch we shall never be able to accomplish, unless some method is taken to prevent desertion, and a stopage of Private Ships Sailing, until our ships are Mann'd. The infamous practice of seducing our Men to leave the ships and taking them off at an out-Port, with many other base methods, will make it impossible ever to get our ships ready to Sail in force, or perhaps otherwise than single Ships." He wishes that "an Embargo upon all Private Property, whether Arm'd or Merchant ships, may take Place thro' all the United States, until the Fleet is compleatly Mann'd.... You can scarsely form an Idea of the increase and groath of the extravagance of the People in their demands for Labour and every Article for Sale &c; dissipation has no bounds at present; when or where it will stop, or if a reform will take place, I dare not predict." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 256.) The expedient of laying a temporary embargo upon privateers was occasionally resorted to.

A more favorable opinion of privateering is found in a letter of John Adams to the President of Congress, dated Amsterdam, September 16, 1780. Speaking of commerce destroying he says: "This is a short, easy, and infallible method of humbling the English, preventing the effusion of an ocean of blood, and bringing

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the war to a conclusion. In this policy I hope our countrymen will join [the French and Spanish] with the utmost alacrity. Privateering is as well understood by them as any people whatsoever; and it is by cutting off supplies, not by attacks, sieges, or assaults, that I expect deliverance from enemies." (Wharton, iv, 58. On the Profits Of privateering, see Channing, iii, 398.)

No doubt what was then needed, as in every war, was a well-balanced naval force made up of a sufficient number of fighting ships and commerce destroyers in the right proportions. Privateering was more popular than the regular naval service on account of the greater freedom from the restraints of military discipline and because the profits were larger; for privateersmen were devoted almost wholly to commerce destroying and were consequently likely to take more prizes in the long run. In addition to this and besides having higher pay, the entire value of their prizes went to the owners and captors. When the prizes of Continental cruisers were ships of war, one half the proceeds went to the captors, and in other cases only one third. In October, 1776, Congress increased the shares of the captors to the whole and to one half the value of these two classes of prizes respectively, in order to put Continental vessels more nearly on terms of equality with privateers. Bounties and other inducements were resorted to for the purpose of obtaining recruits. It would probably have been better if not more than half as many private commissions had been issued, provided that a correspondingly more powerful regular fleet could have been put upon the sea (Jour. Cont. Congr., April 17, August 5, October 30, 1776, March 29, 1777, July 11, 1780. For further discussion of privateering and commerce destroying, see ch. XIX.)

It occasionally happened during the Revolution that vessels built or purchased and fitted out for the Continental service subsequently found their way into one of the state navies, or perhaps became privateers ; and the reverse was also true in one or two instances. It was also the case not infrequently that two or all three of the different classes of vessels cruised together in squadrons or on expeditions. Officers likewise, beginning as privateersmen or in state service, were sometimes transferred to the Continental navy; and, on the other hand, unemployed Continental officers and seamen, especially towards the end of the war, sought service in the state navies or in privateers. For these reasons there was to some extent a sort of blending of the three classes of sea service, both as regards ships and personnel. The narrative therefore will follow a more natural course in describing the naval operations of the war to a certain extent in a chronological or geographical order and not strictly in conformity with the classes of service concerned.

The disparity between the sea power of America and that of England, great as it actually was, will be found less marked than mere figures would indicate, when we inquire into the true condition of the British fleet and of naval administration in England. Our enemy had many difficulties to contend with which must be set off against the numbers of ships, guns, and men to be found in statistical tables. After the Revolution of 1688 the navy was less dependent on the King than it

23

formerly had been and looked more to Parliament for favor, which was an advantage in some ways, but brought the service more into partisan politics. During the first three quarters and more of the eighteenth century the British navy suffered much from corruption and mismanagement in civil administration, and at times also from incompetent commanders at sea. Before the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 a high degree of efficiency had been brought about, but after that a decided falling off took place and continued many years (Hannay's Short History of the Royal Navy, ii, 2, 101, 117, 118,133,134,136.)

It is not easy to make an estimate of the real strength of the British navy at the time of the American Revolution, for figures derived from different sources vary, and many ships were sent to sea in such poor condition that they were by no means able to perform the service to be expected from their nominal force. The number of vessels of all classes in 1775 was stated to be two hundred and seventy, including one hundred and thirty-one ships of the line, that is, ships carrying sixty or more guns on two or more decks; in 1783 the number was four hundred and sixty- eight, including a hundred and seventy-four ships of the line. During the same time the number of men increased from eighteen thousand to one hundred and ten thousand. In January, 1778, there were supposed to be two hundred and seventy-four vessels of all classes ready for immediate service, of which ninety-two were on the North American station besides thirteen at Newfoundland and forty-one in the West Indies. At the end of the year the total effective force was three hundred and seventeen, while the numbers in the Western Hemisphere were somewhat reduced. These figures seem formidable when compared with those of the Continental navy, including Washington's little fleet in Massachusetts Bay, which comprised altogether, during the whole course of the war, between fifty and sixty vessels in actual service, rating from thirty-two-gun frigates down to small schooners and sloops. To these are to be added the small craft on inland waters, the state navies, including perhaps forty or more sea-going cruisers, and the privateers, numerous to be sure, and capable of inflicting serious injury upon commerce, but in no sense a menace even to the lighter regular cruisers of the enemy. These American figures of course very greatly exceed the number in service at any one time. Nevertheless the British were beset with manifold troubles and their ships found plenty of occupation. The active and fast-sailing rebel privateers required close watching and led their pursuers many a long chase. Supplies had to be brought from Europe, and for the convoy of these as well as of troop-ships a considerable part of their force must be diverted from purely warlike employment. The loss of the seafaring population of America as a source of supply for the manning of the British navy was likewise severely felt at a time when naval expansion was necessary. In 1778 the navy of France and later those of Spain and Holland entered the contest against England and threatened her naval supremacy (Hannay, ii, 210-214, 219; Clowes's Royal Navy, iii, 327, 328; Schomberg's Naval Chronology, i, 424, 436, 440, 453, ii, 1, 36, 68, 124; Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs, iv, 291; Data collected by R. W. Neeser from Parliamentary Reports and other

24

sources. See also Weeser's Introduction to Naval History Society Publications, iii.)

Yet a foe to the British navy more malign than foreign navies was found in the Admiralty at home, and that was maladministration. In 1771 the Earl of Sandwich, who had previously been first lord of the Admiralty for two short terms, was again appointed to the office and held it until 1782. The administration of the navy under Sandwich was not only weak, but reached nearly the lowest depths of corruption. In 1778, "embezzlement, larceny, swindling" and other like abuses prevailed in the dockyards. Money was voted for repairs and the ships were not repaired. "Vessels reported as well found and ready for sea lay in the naval harbours rotting." From 1775 to 1782, seventy-six vessels of the navy, including fourteen of sixty-four or more guns, "capsized, foundered, or were wrecked." The nation was charged with four thousand more men than were rated on the books of the navy. There was collusion between dockyard officials and shipowners; the former would inspect and condemn vessels and the latter, having bought a ship, would change her name and appearance and sell her back to the government for transport service (Belcher's First American Civil War, i, 290-292.) Some of the admirals participated in the fruits of embezzlement, and the management of naval affairs at New York under Arbuthnot was corrupt. Maltreatment of seamen, bad food, scurvy, and other evils were due largely to the dishonesty of pursers. Insubordination and disaffection resulted, and it was said that from 1774 to 1780 forty-two thousand men deserted from the navy. During the same time eighteen thousand died of disease. Incompetent medical service was the rule, and the mortality, especially in tropical seas, was appalling; but an exception to this is to be found in the fleet of Admiral Rodney, whose surgeon brought about reforms which saved countless lives (Belcher, 295-297, 304-308; Publications of Navy Records Soc., xxxii, 80-83; Hannay, ii, 205-210, 214-216; Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., xliv, 364-368 ; Data collected by R. W. Neeser.)

Charles Middleton, the comptroller of the navy, in the course of correspondence with Sandwich, spoke very plainly of the abuses in naval administration (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 2-10, 16-30.) In 1779 he writes, "The desertions from ships and hospitals are beyond imagination. The discipline of service is entirely lost, and to a great measure owing to admiralty indulgences, but still more to admiralty negligence. The want of vigour at that board has weakened its authority to such a degree over the officers of the fleet, that no respect is paid to its orders . . . For want of Plan, for want of men of professional knowledge used to business to assist at the admiralty, and for want of method and execution, one error has produced another, and the whole has become such a mass of confusion, that I see no prospect of reducing it to order. All I can do at the navy office will avail but little if the admiralty continues what it is at present. It is, indeed, so wretchedly bad, that if I waited for official orders and kept within the mere line of duty without pressing or proposing what ought to come unasked for, we must inevitably stand still . . . The whole system of the admiralty is rotten . . . The dockyards, from want of proper attention to appointments, are in wretched disabled state, without spirit,

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without discipline." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 4, 5, 6.) In another letter he says: "For want of proper men to conduct the business at the ports, no expedition is used in refitting the ships. The officers are not kept to their duty. The men are daily deserting in scores, and those who remain are inclined to mutiny." (Ibid., 7.) Again, February 3, 1781, after relating much of the same sort, he observes: "I cannot be an acquiescent witness of the present weak state of the yards, and likely to continue so, according to the current arrangements, at a crisis when the utmost efforts of every officer in every department of the navy from the highest to the lowest, are most loudly demanded." (Ibid., 26.) To this Sandwich replies: "I have neither leisure nor inclination to enter into a discussion upon the subject of the letter with which you have favoured me." (Ibid., 27.) In 1786, Middleton, speaking of Sandwich's administration, says that "all his successors, notwithstanding their great pretensions to a regard for the public service, have proceeded in the same way; and I find politics have got too great a hold on this branch of the navy for me to withstand it." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 30.)

It may be inferred from all this that the British navy was less formidable than the imposing array of ships on the printed lists would indicate; and yet service traditions of the right sort and fitness for the sea gave the English a superiority as a fighting force over other European navies out of proportion to their numbers.

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

CHAPTER IIIWASHINGTON'S FLEET, 1775 AND 1776

General Washington took command of the American army at Cambridge July 3, 1775, and the siege of Boston was closely maintained at every point except on the water side of the town. Here the British received provisions and military stores without interruption. It was of great importance to intercept these supplies as far as possible with a view to distressing the enemy; and furthermore the scarcity of the munitions of war with the colonists suggested their capture from the British as the readiest means of obtaining them. In August, Washington had some correspondence with the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts as to the advisability of fitting out armed vessels for the purpose, but without immediate result (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 327.)

Accordingly, there being no Continental naval establishment at that time, he determined to employ detachments of the army, for which he required no further authority than the general discretion allowed him for the effective prosecution of the siege. The regiments recruited in Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, and other shore towns were composed largely of seafaring men; the regiment of Colonel John Glover of Marblehead afterwards became noted for ferrying the Continental army across the East River to New York after the Battle of Long Island and

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across the Delaware before the Battle of Trenton. Washington drew upon these regiments of sailors and fishermen for the crews of the vessels fitted out in the fall of 1775.

The first of these vessels was the schooner Hannah, and Captain Nicholson Broughton was put in command. His instructions, signed by Washington and dated September 2, 1775, were as follows: "You, being appointed a Captain in the Army of the United Colonies of North-America, are hereby directed to take the command of a detachment of said Army and proceed on board the Schooner Hannah, at Beverly, lately fitted out and equipped with arms, ammunition and provisions, at the Continental expense. You are to proceed, as commander of said Schooner, immediately on a cruise against such vessels as may be found on the high seas or elsewhere, bound inwards and outwards, to or from Boston, in the service of the Ministerial Army, and to take and seize all such vessels laden with soldiers, arms, ammunition or provisions, for or from said Army, or which you shall have good reason to suspect are in such service." Broughton was to send his prizes into "the safest and nearest Port to this camp"; papers disclosing the enemy's designs were to be searched for; prisoners were to be humanely treated, allowed to retain their private property and sent to headquarters under a guard furnished by the Continental officer stationed at the port; the apportionment of prize money was prescribed; armed vessels of the enemy were to be avoided, the sole object of the enterprise being the interception of supplies; a system of signals was to be established for communicating with other vessels to be sent out. The instructions concluded with the injunction "to be extremely careful and frugal of your ammunition; by no means to waste any of it in salutes, or any purpose but what is absolutely necessary'' (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 633.)

Broughton went to sea September 5; two days later he put into Gloucester and made the following report: "I sailed from Beverly last Tuesday at ten o'clock, with a fair wind; proceeded on my cruise. On the same day, about five o'clock, saw two ships of war; they gave me chase. I made back towards Cape Ann, but did not go in. Next morning I saw a ship under my lee quarter; she giving me chase, I run into Cape Ann harbour. I went out again that night about sunset and stood to the southward. Next morning saw a ship under my lee quarter; I perceived her to be a large ship. I tacked and stood back for the land; soon after I put about and stood towards her again and found her a ship of no force. I came up with her, hailed, and asked where she came from; was answered, from Piscataqua, and bound to Boston. I told him he must bear away and go into Cape Ann; but being very loth, I told him if he did not I should fire on her. On that she bore away and I have brought her safe into Cape Ann harbour, and have delivered the ship and prisoners into the hands and care of the Committee of Safety for this Town of Gloucester, and have desired them to send the prisoners under proper guard to your Excellency for further orders." This prize was the ship Unity, loaded with naval stores and lumber (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 668,683.) It was the first capture made by a Continental vessel.

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Early in October Colonel Glover was instructed to procure two other vessels in Salem or Newburyport and fit them out as soon as possible. The Hannah was laid aside, and in her place another schooner was hired, "of better fame for sailing." There was considerable delay in getting these vessels ready for sea (Ibid., 946, 948, 994.) Meanwhile Washington had received the instructions of Congress of October 5, to attempt the capture of the two brigs bound to Quebec (See above, p. 22.) Governor Cooke of Rhode Island was unable to give aid in this matter, one of the Rhode Island vessels being unfit for service, while the other, the sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, was on a voyage to Bermuda in quest of powder. For several weeks General Washington and Governor Cooke had been corresponding in regard to this enterprise. The scarcity of gunpowder in the American army caused Washington great anxiety, and at his solicitation the governor had dispatched the Katy to Bermuda, which at that time seemed to be the most likely place to get it (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 36, 69, 137, 461, 631, 653, 654, 682, 710, 718, 728, 808, 842, 1037.) The people of Bermuda were friendly to the popular cause in America and gave trouble to the British by their opposition to the enforcement of laws forbidding trade with the Revolutionists (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, No. 55, March 16, 1778.)

For the expedition to the Gulf of St. Lawrence two of the schooners recently procured were chosen. They were called the Lynch and the Franklin and were put under the command of Captains Broughton and Selman. Their orders were issued October 16: "The honourable Continental Congress having received intelligence that two north country brigantines of no force sailed from England some time ago for Quebeck, laden with six thousand stands of arms, a large quantity of powder and other stores, you are hereby directed to make all possible despatch for the River St. Lawrence and there to take such a station as will best enable you to intercept the above vessels. You are also to seize and take any other transports laden with men, ammunition, clothing, or other stores for the use of the Ministerial Army or Navy in America, and secure them in such places as may be most safe and convenient." Captain Broughton was to command the expedition. If they found that the brigs had already passed, they were still to cruise off the mouth of the river as long as the season would permit and attempt to seize all vessels in the service of the British army. It was thought that in case of the capture of Quebec by the Americans, such vessels would be likely to come down the river. Canadian vessels, however, not in the British service, were not to be in any way molested. After some further delay the Lynch and Franklin sailed from Marblehead October 21 (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1068, 1075, 1076, 1083, 1109, 1134.)

Soon after this, Captain Whipple returned from Bermuda, where he had been well received by the people, but found no powder. The Katy was at once fitted out for a cruise to the eastward. In the meantime work had been pushed on other vessels for Washington's fleet under many difficulties, and by the end of October four, in addition to the Lynch and Franklin, were ready for service. They were the schooners Lee and Warren at Salem and Marblehead and the brigantine

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Washington and schooner Harrison at Plymouth. The Lee, commanded by Captain Manley of Marblehead, and Harrison, Captain Coit of Connecticut, were at sea October 29; the Warren, Captain Adams of New Hampshire, and the Washington, Captain Martindale of Rhode Island, got away early in November. Their services were needed, as the enemy's transports continued to arrive in Boston. Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington's military secretary, suggested as colors for the fleet "a flag with a white ground, a tree in the middle, the motto, 'Appeal to Heaven.'" This, the New England pine-tree flag, was used on the floating batteries about Boston, and six months later was prescribed by the Provincial Congress for the Massachusetts navy (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1083, 1126, 1134, 1167, 1181, 1182, 1208, 1246,1250,1251,1345; Rec. Gen. Court Mass., April 29, 1776.)

The Lynch and Franklin arrived in the Strait of Canso early in November and cruised in this neighborhood about two weeks, not being able to get further at that time on account of head winds. They took a few small vessels which were afterwards released, not being considered lawful prize. November 17 they appeared before Charlottetown, the capital of the Island of St. John's (Prince Edward Island). This was the farthest point they reached. Here the conduct of Broughton and Selman showed a singular want of propriety for which their only excuse seems to have been the information they had received that preparations were being carried on there for assisting in the defense of Quebec. They supposed they "should do essential service by breaking up a nest of recruits intended to be sent against Montgomery, who commanded our forces in Quebeck." In the excess of their zeal the Americans seized both public and private property and brought away as prisoners three prominent citizens, including the acting governor. Upon arriving at Cambridge, these men were promptly released and their property restored by General Washington, who severely reproved Broughton and Selman. Washington was disappointed and dissatisfied with the results of this enterprise, and believed that if they had gone farther and cruised in the mouth of the St. Lawrence, "all the vessels coming down that river must [have fallen] into their hands." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1337, 1379, 1407, 1419, iv, 158, 178, 181, 214, 451; Salem Gazette, July 22, 1856, quoted in Waite's Origin of the American Navy.)

Meanwhile the other vessels of Washington's little fleet cruised with more or less success. The Harrison brought two prizes into Plymouth November 6; they were a schooner and sloop from Nova Scotia bound to Boston with provisions. As the season advanced and the weather became severe, some of these soldier sailors grew discontented and troublesome. William Watson, Washington's agent at Plymouth, on November 23 found the crew of the Harrison "an uneasy set of fellows who have got soured by the severity of the season," and on the 29th he wrote to the commander-in-chief "that the people on board the Brigantine Washington are in general discontented and have agreed to do no duty on board said vessel, and say that they enlisted to serve in the army and not as marines. I believe Capt. Martindale has done all in his power to make things easy. His

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people really appear to me to be a set of the most unprincipled abandoned fellows I ever saw. I am very apprehensive that little is to be expected from fellows drawn promiscuously from the army for this business; but that if people were enlisted for the purpose of privateering, much might be expected from them." Washington wrote to the President of Congress December 4: "The plague, trouble and vexation I have had with the crews of all the armed vessels is inexpressible. I do believe there is not on earth a more disorderly set. Every time they come into port we hear of nothing but mutinous complaints. Manly's success has lately, and but lately, quieted his people. The crews of the Washington and Harrison have actually deserted them, so that I have been under the necessity of ordering the agent to lay the latter up, and get hands for the other on the best terms he could." On the same day, however, news of a fortunate cruise of Captain Manley having reached Plymouth, Watson wrote: "After repairing on board the brig Saturday night, inquiring into the cause of the uneasiness among the people and finding it principally owing to their want of clothing, and after supplying them with what they wanted, the whole crew, to a man, gave three cheers and declared their readiness to go to sea the next morning. The warm weather at that time and the news of Captain Manly's good success had a very happy influence on the minds of the people." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1378, 1658, 1713, iv, 179, 181.)

John Manley was the most successful of the captains and was regarded by Washington with especial favor. He was about forty-two years of age and of English birth, but had lived since early manhood in Marblehead. His vessel, the Lee, was a seventy-two ton schooner carrying a large square-sail on the fore topmast; she mounted four four-pounders and ten swivels, and was manned by fifty soldiers from Glover's regiment. Early in November Manley captured two or three small vessels. About the middle of the month a British frigate arrived at Boston with another vessel under convoy. It was learned that a third vessel which had been with them had not arrived. Manley, who happened to be at Beverly, received this information from headquarters and immediately went to sea in search of the belated vessel. On the 29th he sighted a sail which proved to be the object of his search, the brigantine Nancy, which when overhauled surrendered without resistance and was taken into Gloucester. The Nancy carried a large cargo of ordnance and military stores which were of the utmost value to the American army. Besides other things there were two thousand muskets, thirty-one tons of musket shot, three thousand round shot, several barrels of powder, and a thirteen-inch brass mortar, which promised to be most useful in the siege of Boston. A few days later the mortar was "fixed on its bed before the Continental Laboratory [in Cambridge]. It is called The Congress, and is pronounced to be the noblest piece of ordnance ever landed in America." (N. E. Chronicle, December 7,1775.) Manley continued his cruise, and within a few days captured a three hundred ton ship called the Concord. A little later he took two other vessels and still another before the end of the year. On board one of these prizes were important letters of Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1537, 1721, 1722, iv, 168, 179, 180, 181, 214, 227,

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314; Coll. Essex Institute, January, 1909; Boston Gazette, December 4, 25, 1775 ; Mass. Spy, December 15, 1775.)

In regard to the capture of the Nancy, Lord Sandwich, then at the head of the Admiralty, said: "The loss of the ordnance store ship is a fatal event, and by what Mr. Pringle tells me, has been most probably owing to the treachery of the master, who went out under convoy which he parted from on his passage and tho' a frigate on the coast of America, which he met at sea, took him under her protection, he parted from her also and continued to be beating backwards and forwards near the shore till he was picked up by the enemy's whaleboats." (Hist. Manuscripts Commission, Stopford-Sackville MS., 20.)

From the preceding narrative it appears that the close of the year 1775 found the Americans beginning in a resolute if somewhat feeble way to curtail in a slight measure the complete control of the sea held by their enemy. In a letter to Richard Henry Lee, dated November 27, before Manley's more notable successes, Washington sums up the situation in New England waters: "In answer to your inquiries respecting armed vessels, there are none of any tolerable force belonging to this Government. I know of but two of any kind; those very small." He doubtless alludes to the Machias Liberty and Diligent and to the provincial government of Massachusetts. "At the Continental expense I have fitted out six, two of which are upon the cruise directed by Congress; the rest ply about Capes Cod and Ann, as yet to very little purpose. These vessels are all manned by officers and soldiers, but how far, as they are upon the old establishment which has not more than a month to exist, they can be ordered off this station, I will not undertake to say; but suppose they might be engaged anew. Belonging to Providence there are two armed vessels, and I am told Connecticut has one." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1687.) As it was usual to call most armed vessels privateers, references to them in the newspapers and in correspondence cannot be relied on, but presumably some of those commissioned by Massachusetts had begun to cruise by the end of the year. Colonel Joseph Ward, writing to John Adams from the camp at Roxbury December 3, expresses his belief that naval enterprise on the part of the separate colonies will bring the best results (Adams MSS.)

On the 1st of January, 1776, Washington appointed Manley commodore of his fleet and he hoisted his pennant on board the schooner Hancock, which had just been added to the force. The terms of enlistment of the soldiers who had manned the vessels having just expired, new crews were recruited from the seafaring population along shore. All the vessels received new commanders. Daniel Waters took the Lee, Samuel Tucker the Franklin, Charles Dyar the Harrison, John Ayres the Lynch, and William Burke the Warren. The commissions and instructions of the first three of these captains were dated January 20; of the other two, February 1. The Washington, Captain Martindale, had been captured by the British frigate Fowey off Cape Ann in December, and taken into Boston (Coll. Essex Inst., January, 1909; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 257, 791,

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793, 910; Sheppard's Life of Tucker, 31-35, 49, 50; Boston Gazette, January 1, 1776; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 485, December 15, 1775.)

In January, Manley took two prizes off Nantasket and was convoying them to Plymouth when he fell in with a British eight-gun schooner and had a brisk engagement in sight of the enemy's fleet in Nantasket Roads. The schooner sheered off and ran into Boston Harbor. Washington wrote to Manley, January 28: "I received your agreeable letter of the 26th instant giving an account of your having taken and carried into Plymouth two of the enemy's transports. Your conduct in engaging the eight-gun schooner with so few hands as you went out with, your attention in securing your prizes and your general good behavior since you first engaged in the service, merit my and your country's thanks." He goes on to suggest appointing stations for the different vessels, so as to give a better chance of intercepting the enemy's supplies, saying that the other captains, having been instructed to take orders from Manley, dared not disobey; "I wish you could inspire the captains of the other armed schooners under your command with some of your activity and industry." (Ford's Writings of Washington, iii, 382, 383.) A few days later Manley had another encounter with the enemy. As he was coming out of Plymouth January 30, an armed brig (which went from Boston for the purpose of taking him, as he supposed) gave him chase, upon which he ran his vessel on shore a little south of the North River in Scituate. The brig came to anchor and fired not less than four hundred times upon the privateer; but, very remarkable, no man was even wounded. One ball entered the stern and passed but about six inches from Captain Manly, who was confined by sickness in his cabin. The next day one hundred and thirty balls were found upon the adjacent shore. Besides the above, which is from a correspondent near where the affair happened, we hear that after the brig ceased firing she manned her boats, boarded Captain Manly's vessel (the people being ashore) and endeavoured to set her on fire; but seeing our people coming upon them, they were glad to get off without effecting their design. She has since been got off, is refitting and nearly ready for another cruise." (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 910 (letter from Cambridge, February 1, 1776) The Hancock took two prizes in March, one of which was armed and only surrendered after an engagement. The Lee and Franklin captured a large brigantine early in February and sent her into Gloucester (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 863, 883, 910, 936, v, 196, 834; Washington, iii, 382, 403; Tucker, 56; Coll. Essex Inst., January, 1909; Boston Gazette, January 22, 29, February 12, March 11, 18, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, February 1, 8, 1776.)

Meanwhile, during the occupation of Boston by the British, other vessels than those of Washington's fleet were cruising in Massachusetts Bay and to the eastward. In December the Rhode Island sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, captured one of the enemy's ships. The privateer Yankee Hero of Newburyport cruised in February and March with success. Among the prizes taken was "a large Ship from and own'd in London, laden with Coal, Cheese and Porter, bound for the Ministerial Assassins at Boston." February 26, 1776, fifteen prizes were advertised to be tried at Ipswich, and March 25, twelve others at Plymouth

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(Boston Gazette, December 11, 1775, January 22, February 19, 26, March 4, 18, 25, 1776; Mass. Spy, January 26, 1776.)

The great event of the month of March was heralded with a joy which found expression in somewhat extravagant language. On the 18th the evacuation of Boston was announced in the "Gazette," which was published at Watertown: "On Friday [March 15] it was reported they were plundering the town, breaking and destroying everything they could not carry away. And yesterday morning this last account was verified by the speedy and precipitate retreat of the whole of the Ministerial butchering, murdering and plundering Banditti of Lord North's mercenaries." March 22, Colonel Joseph Ward wrote to John Adams: "The 17th Inst. the Pirates all abandoned their Works in Boston & Charlestown & went on board their Ships, & on the 20th they burnt & destroyed the Works on Castle Island. They now lye in Nantasket Road waiting for a fair wind; we keep a vigilant eye over them lest they should make an attack on some unexpected quarter." (Boston Gazette, March 18,1776; Adams MSS.)

Soon after the evacuation Washington went to New York with the main army, leaving General Artemas Ward in command at Boston. The fleet then passed under Ward's orders. Captain Manley was appointed to command one of the new frigates authorized by Congress in December, 1775, and gave up the schooner Hancock to Captain Tucker; and the Franklin was commanded for a short time by James Mugford of Marblehead. The Hancock on May 7 captured two brigs off Boston Harbor in sight of two or three British men-of-war at anchor, which had remained after the evacuation. The prizes were taken into Lynn (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 396; N. E. Chronicle, May 9, 1776; Boston Gazette, May 13, 1776.)

On May 17 the Franklin captured the ship Hope with a large cargo of military stores including seventy-five tons of powder. Mugford took his prize into Boston, running by the British fleet in the harbor. "The enemy on board the men of war below, intolerably vexed and chagrined that the above ship should be taken and unloaded in their open view, formed a design of wreaking their vengeance on the gallant Capt. Mugford, who took her. The Sunday following [May 19] Capt. Mugford, in company with Capt. Cunningham in the Lady Washington, a small privateer armed with swivels, blunderbusses and muskets, fell down in order to go out in the bay. The enemy observed their sailing and fitted out a fleet of boats for the purpose of surprizing and taking them in the night; and the Franklin's running aground in the Gut gave them a good opportunity for executing their plan. The Lady Washington came to anchor near capt. Mugford, and between 9 and 10 o'clock he discovered a number of boats which he hailed and received for answer, that they were from Boston. He ordered them to keep off, or he would fire upon them. They begged him for God's sake not to fire, for they were going on board him. Capt. Mugford instantly fired and was followed by all his men, and cutting his cable bro't his broadside to bear, when be discharged his cannon loaded with musket ball directly in upon them. Before the cannon could be charged a second time, 2 or 3 boats were alongside, each of them supposed to

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have as many men on board as the Franklin, which were only 21, including officers. By the best accounts there were not less than 13 boats in all, many of them armed with swivels and having on board, at the lowest computation, 200 men. Capt. Mugford and his men plied those alongside so closely with fire arms and spears and with such intrepidity, activity and success, that two boats were soon sunk and all the men either killed or drowned. But while the heroic Mugford, with outstretched arms, was righteously dealing death and destruction to our base and unnatural enemies, he received a fatal ball in his body, which in a few minutes put a period to a life, from which, had it been spared, his oppressed country would undoubtedly have reaped very eminent advantages. After our brave men had maintained this unequal contest for about half an hour, the enemy thought proper to retire. The carnage among them must have been great, for besides the two boat loads killed and drowned many were doubtless killed and wounded on board the others. Great execution was done by the spears. One man with that weapon is positive of having killed nine of the enemy. The number of boats which attacked the Franklin was about 8 or 9. The remainder, to the number of 4 or 5, at the same time attacked Capt. Cunningham in the Lady Washington, who then had on board only 6 men besides himself. This brave little company gave the boats such a warm reception that the enemy were soon glad to give over the contest, after suffering, it is thought, considerable loss." (Boston Gazette, May 20, 27, 1776; Am- Arch., IV, vi, 495, 496.)

General Ward's report of May 20 differs somewhat from the above as to the manner of Mugford's death. He says: "Captain Mugford was very fiercely attacked by twelve or thirteen boats full of men, but he and his men exerted themselves with remarkable bravery, beat off the enemy, sunk several of their boats, and killed a number of their men; it is supposed they lost sixty or seventy. The intrepid Captain Mugford fell a little before the enemy left his schooner; he was ran through with a lance while he was cutting off the hands of the pirates as they were attempting to board him, and it is said that with his own hands he cut off five pairs of theirs. No other man was killed or wounded on board the Franklin . . . Mr. Mugford was not commissioned Captain of the Franklin, but Master; and as the other officers had left the schooner, he took command." A week later Ward gave further details as to the part taken by the Lady Washington: "The Franklin had twenty-one men, officers included; the Lady Washington had seven, Captain Cunningham commander. She was attacked by five boats, which were supposed to contain near or quite a hundred men; but after repeated efforts to board her they were beaten off by the intrepidity and exertions of the little company, who gloriously defended the Lady against the brutal ravishers of liberty." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 532, 602.)

In regard to the Franklin's prize, General Howe wrote from Halifax, June 7, to Lord George Germain: "It is with concern I am to advise your lordship of another ordnance store ship, named the Hope, being taken in Boston Bay. She had a large proportion of entrenching tools on board and, it is said, 1500 barrels of powder. I understand the master was suspected of treachery before the ship left

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England and that Captain Dickson, commanding the Greyhound, gave information of the suspicion to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, sometime before she sailed under his convoy." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 35.)

Many transports sailed from England for America in the spring of 1776. It was reported by a shipmaster lately arrived from France that a fleet of about forty with five thousand troops on board had sailed from Plymouth March 10 (Adams MSS., April 30,1776.) Another fleet of thirty-three troopships conveying three thousand Highlanders sailed from Scotland for Boston before news of the evacuation of the town reached England. Some of them arrived while the British fleet was still in the harbor and were able to join it. One of them, however, early in June was so unfortunate as to fall in with the schooners Lee, Captain Waters, and Warren, Captain Burke, and was captured and taken safely into port. She had about a hundred soldiers on board (Papers of Cont. Congress, 152, 2, 45; Boston Gazette, June 10, 1776.)

In a letter to Washington dated June 16, 1776, General Ward gives an account of the measures taken to make complete the evacuation of Boston. He says: "The thirteenth Instant at evening I ordered five Hundred men with proper officers, a detachment of the Train with a thirteen Inch Mortar, two Eighteen pounders and some small Cannon, under the Command of Colo. Whitcomb, to take post on Long Island to annoy the Enemys Ships; the necessary works were thrown up in the night and the next morning our Cannon and Mortar began to play upon the pirates, which soon drove them all out of the harbour. The Fleet consisted of thirteen in number, the Renown of fifty Guns, several smaller ships of War and some transports with Highlanders on board; as near as we could judge there were about eight hundred Troops on board the Transports. They blew up the Light house as they went off and then put to sea with their Fleet. I think it probable they will leave some Frigates to cruize in the bay. A number of the Colony troops and militia were to have thrown up some works the same night on Petticks Island and Nantasket head, but by some unfortunate obstructions they did not get their Canon ready in time; however, they gave the Enemy a number of Shot as the Ships passed through the Channel. Our shot cut away some of their yards and rigging and several sent into the ships sides, but the Shells from the Mortar terryfied them most; they returned a fierce shot from the Commodores ship without any effect and got under sail with all expedition." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 99.) An officer of the militia, sent to Nantasket Head, says that, after great and unavoidable delay, guns were mounted on Quaker Hill. The fleet had already dropped down and anchored opposite the lighthouse. "The Commodore lay foremost and after firing the second shot he blew up the Light-House, and at the fourth round the whole fleet got under way a second time. Some of our shot we have no doubt struck him, as all the boats in the fleet were sent to tow him off. He fired but one shot, but we pelted him till out of reach of our cannon." (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 946.) The British fleet, commanded by Commodore Banks, consisted of eight ships, two snows, two brigs, and a schooner. The Renown, with two other men-of-war and twelve transports, arrived at Halifax July 6 (Ibid.,

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917, 931, 945; Almon, iii, 201, 235, 236; Boston Gazette, June 17,1776; Continental Journal, June 20,1776; Adams MSS., June 16, 1776.)

It is probable that some of the fleet of Scotch transports bound to Boston were intercepted by Commodore Banks and taken into Halifax with him; several of these ships got safely into that place eventually. But June 16, only two days after the last British vessel had been driven out of Boston Harbor, two of these transports unsuspiciously approached the port. The officer of militia stationed at Nantasket gives an account of what passed under his notice, as the vessels came within view of that point, saying: "On Sunday afternoon we saw a ship and a brigantine standing in for the Light House channel, chased and fired upon by four privateers." One of these seems to have been the schooner Warren, Captain Burke, of Washington's fleet. The combatants "frequently exchanged broadsides. We, supposing them to be part of the Scotch fleet, got every man to his quarters and carried one eighteen-pounder to Point Alderton on purpose to hinder their retreat should they get into the road, opposite where we had three eighteen pounders. About five o'clock the privateers left them and stood for the southward, when the ship and brig crowded all their sail for the channel. Our orders were not to fire till the last [the brig] got abreast of us. In tacking, she got aground just under our cannon, when we hailed her to strike to this Colony; they refused and we flred one eighteen-pounder loaded with round and canister shot, when she struck and cried out for quarters. We ordered the boat and Captain on shore and then fired at the ship, but being quite dark, we supposed she had struck. By this time the privateers came up. A Captain of the Highlanders in the brigantine's boat came on shore. Some time after, the ship got under way and stood for the Narrows, when a fine privateer brigantine [the Defence of the Connecticut navy], commanded by Captain Harding of New Haven, . . . and five schooners gave chase. The brig came alongside, when a hot engagement ensued, which lasted three quarters of an hour, when the ship struck. The brigantine floating, took advantage of the confusion and attempted to follow, both supposing the enemy in possession of Boston." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 946; Continental Journal, June 20, 1776. )

The Defence had sailed from Plymouth in the morning. One of her lieutenants, Samuel Smedley, says that firing was heard in the direction of Boston. It was foggy, but cleared in the afternoon and the vessels in action were then seen. On account of light wind it was sunset before the Defence came up with the schooners, which were then making off, and learned that the strangers were transports. "We made the best of our way towards them and at eleven at night found them at anchor a small distance above where the Light-House formerly stood. We likewise ran close to them and anchored. Hailed them from whence they came. They answered from England. Captain Harding ordered them immediately to strike. They, like brave soldiers, refused and immediately a very heavy fire began and at the end of near two hours we made them surrender." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1127.) According to this statement the Defence captured the transports without any help from the schooners, which Smedley accuses of

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cowardice and thinks should not share in the prizes. General Ward in his report says "that the Continental Privatiers have taken and brought into Nantasket in this Harbour a Ship and a Brig from Glasgow with two hundred and ten Highlanders on board." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 99.) The losses are variously stated, the lowest for the Americans being three wounded, one of them mortally; for the British, four killed including a major, and eight or ten wounded. Two days later another vessel was taken, with one hundred and twelve Highlanders, but whether by privateers or by Washington's fleet is not clear. There were now over four hundred soldiers, taken on transports, confined in the vicinity of Boston. It was reported that at just about the same time two more of these Scotch transports were taken by a Rhode Island privateer and sent into Dartmouth (New Bedford), and two others were captured by the Continental brig Andrew Doria (Continental Journal, June 20, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, June 20, July 4,1776; Boston Gazette, June 24, July 15, 1776; Letters of John and Abigail Adams, 95, 96; Tucker, 57-60; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 36; See ch. 6.)

The capture of their transports was disturbing to the British authorities, and the Admiralty called upon Admiral Howe, who in 1776 relieved Admiral Shuldham in command of the North American station, for an investigation, to which he replied in February, 1777. In this report was inclosed a letter written by Shuldham in February, 1776, in which, referring to the earlier captures made by Washington's fleet, he had suggested "that all Supplies to this Country might be sent in Armed Vessels, I mean such as our Old Forty Gun Ships with only their upper Tier of Guns, for however numerous our Cruizers may be or however attentive our Officers to their Duty, it has been found impossible to prevent some of our Ordnance and other valuable Stores, in small Vessels, falling into the hands of the Rebels, and here I must take occasion to say that in the course of my Service I never found Officers perform their Duty with so much perseverance and Vigilance as ours on this important Service; indeed the firmness with which they have resisted the rigor of this long and severe Winter in constantly keeping the Sea on their respective Stations is unprecedented and incredible. At the same time I must beg leave to observe to you the very few Ships I am provided with to enable me to co-operate with the Army, Cruize off the Ports of the Rebels to prevent their receiving Supplies, or protect those destined to this place from falling into their hands." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, February 26, 1776.) Howe's inquiries brought out the fact that Shuldham in March, 1776, had detailed seven small cruisers to remain with Commodore Banks in Boston Harbor, in order to insure the safety of such transports as might arrive after the departure for Halifax of the main body of the British. Other service, however, prevented these vessels from being on hand when needed. The frigate Milford and two or three smaller vessels, with the Renown, made up the whole available force for the protection of the transports. Howe added that "respecting the Use that has been made of the Harbour of Boston as an Asylum for the Rebel Cruizers and their Prizes, their Lordships knowing the Nature and Circumstances of the Port will be apprised of the Impossibility to prevent an Enemy from profiting greatly by the Advantages of such a Situation." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, No. 24, February 20, 1777.)

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The vessels of Washington's fleet continued to cruise in Massachusetts Bay during the whole of the year 1776. Captain Tucker in the Hancock and Captain Skimmer, who had taken Mugford's place in the Franklin, captured the armed ship Peggy and two brigs in July. Tucker is said to have taken thirty or forty prizes in all, of which the last was brought into port in December and furnished the army with much-needed clothing. The operations of the fleet and of other American armed vessels were a good deal hampered by British cruisers in Massachusetts Bay. John Adams learned from a correspondent that "Our Bay is infested with 3 or 4 frigates which have retaken some valuable Prizes and interrupt our coasting trade." (Adams MS., September 17,1776.) It was recorded in a newspaper that "Monday and Tuesday last the British Tyrant Frigate Milford was seen in our Bay, and to have two Schooners and a Sloop as Prizes. She has taken the Continental Privateer Warren, Capt. Burk, and is continually cruizing between Cape-Cod and Cape-Ann, that we apprehend she will intercept all our Trade. 'Tis hoped that some of our American Frigates win come this Way and rid our Coast of this inhuman Plunderer." (Continental Journal, September 5, 1776; Am. Arch., V, ii, 116.) The Warren is believed to have been the only one of Washington's fleet to be captured, except the brigantine Washington taken in December, 1775. Early in the year 1777 the fleet was broken up by order of the Marine Committee; the Lee, however, continued to cruise several months longer. The vessels were disposed of as they were put out of commission, and some of the officers were taken into the Continental navy (Ibid,, i, 662, iii, 685, 799; Tucker, 61-65; Boston Gazette, July 8, August 5, September 9, 1776; Marine Committee Letter Book, 59, 62, 114 (February 7, March 21, November 22, 1777)

Upon his arrival in New York in April, 1776, General Washington began to fit out another but much smaller fleet for the defense of the neighboring waters. He was aided by the cooperation of the New York Committee of Safety. Two sloops, the General Schuyler and the General Mifflin, were fitted out. Other vessels, wholly or partly under Washington's control or under the New York Committee, were the schooner General Putnam, the sloop Montgomery and the galleys Lady Washington, Washington, and Spitfire. The galleys were used in the defense of the Hudson and the two last named came from Rhode Island. The larger vessels cruised, mostly about Long Island and along the New Jersey shore, with some success. In June one of the transports which had been captured by the Andrew Doria, as has just been related, was retaken by the British frigate Cerberus and was then taken again by the General Schuyler, under the command of Lieutenant Joseph Davison. In the same month the Schuyler, cruising in company with the Montgomery, recaptured four prizes of the British frigate Greyhound (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 410, 545, 563, 564, V, i, 141; N. E. Chronicle, July 4,1775; Washington, iv, 167, 318; Jour. N.Y. Prov. Congr., i, 416; R.I. Colonial Rec., vii, 582; Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 131 (Davison to Washington, June 27, 1776)

On August 3, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Tupper reported to General Washington the operations of a flotilla of five galleys on the Hudson: "I am now to inform your Excellency that my flag being hoisted on board of the Washington, I

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came up with the Ships [Phoenix and Rose] & attacked at 1/4 past One this Afternoon. The Phoenix fired the first Gun, which was return'd by the Lady Washington, whose Shot went thro the Phoenix. Upon my Orders the Lady Washington put about to form a Line; the tide was such that the Washington & Spitfire was exposed to the Broad Sides of the Ships for 1/2 of an hour without Suffering mutch Damage. We engaged them an hour & a half and then we thought to retreat to Dobb's Ferry about 4 miles below the Ships." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 337 (Tupper to Washington, August 3, 1776); Am. Arch., V, i, 766.) The Americans lost one killed and thirteen wounded, one of them mortally.

Another account says that the Washington "came within grape shot of the ships and sustained their whole fire for a quarter of an hour before the other ships could come up, the Lady Washington falling into the line according to orders. The Spitfire advanced to the assistance of the Washington and behaved well. We had as hot a fire as perhaps ever was known for an hour and a half. The Washington, on board of which I was, had her bow guns knocked away, many of her oars, and some shot in her waist. The Lady Washington had her bow gun, a 32 pounder, split seven inches. The Spitfire was hulled between wind and water. The Phoenix was hulled six times. We had four men killed and fourteen wounded. Our force was very inferior to the enemy; the lower tier of one side of the Phoenix was equal to that of all gallies. Yet our Commodore resolved to attack them, and for six small gallies to lie near two hours within grape shot of one ship of 44 guns and another of 24 guns is no contemptible affair." (Almon, iv, 49 (letter from Tarrytown, August 4, 1776) ; Am. Arch., V, i, 751.)

The British account says that at one o'clock six of the Rebels' schooners and Row Gallies attacked us. We began and kept up a constant fire at them for Two Hours, at which time they Row'd away down the River and came to an anchor in sight of us." One of the galleys was seen to have sustained considerable damage. The Phoenix, which had received only two shot in her hull, prepared to run down to the American flotilla, but the wind shifted and the pilot advised against it on account of the narrowness of the channel (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, August 4,1776. See Mag. of History, November, 1905.) Two weeks later the Phoenix and Rose, at anchor in the river, were attacked by fireships (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, August 17, 1776. See ch. 5.) Movements in the immediate vicinity of New York were brought to an end after the occupation of that place by the British in August, 1776.

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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER IV

THE NEW PROVIDENCE EXPEDITION, 1776

The Naval Committee was busy during the winter of 1775 and 1776 fitting out the four vessels which had been purchased in November - the Alfred, Columbus, Andrew Doria, and Cabot. Commodore Hopkins arrived in Philadelphia early in the winter on board the sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, which brought seamen from Rhode Island to man the fleet (Hopkins,81; R.I. Hist. Mag., July, 1885, journal of Lieutenant Trevett.) The Katy was taken into the navy and called the Providence. Three other vessels were added to the fleet - a sloop named the Hornet and two schooners, the Wasp and Fly. The Hornet and Wasp were at Baltimore.

On January 5, 1776, the Naval Committee issued "Orders and Directions for the Commander in Chief of the Fleet of the United Colonies." These general instructions related to discipline and to matters concerning the management of the fleet. The commodore was to correspond regularly with Congress "and with the commander in chief of the Continental forces in America." He was to give his orders to subordinate officers in writing, and the captains of the fleet were to make him monthly returns of conditions on board each vessel, the state of the ship and of the crew and the quantity of stores and provisions. He was to give directions for the captains to follow in case of separation; to appoint officers for any vessels that might be captured; to give special attention to the care of the men under his command and to the arms and ammunition; and prisoners were to "be well and humanely treated." (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 578; Hopkins, 84.)

The committee also gave the commodore special instructions and sailing orders of the same date. He was "to proceed with the said fleet to sea and, if the winds and weather will possibly admit of it, to proceed directly for Chesapeak Bay in Virginia, and when nearly arrived there you will send forward a small swift sailing vessel to gain intelligence of the enemies situation and strength. If by such intelligence you find that they are not greatly superior to your own, you are immediately to enter the said bay, search out and attack, take or destroy all the naval force of our enemies that you may find there. If you should be so fortunate as to execute this business successfully in Virginia, you are then to proceed immediately to the southward and make yourself master of such forces as the enemy may have both in North and South Carolina, in such manner as you may think most prudent from the intelligence you shall receive, either by dividing your fleet or keeping it together. Having compleated your business in the Carolinas, you are without delay to proceed northward directly to Rhode Island and attack, take and destroy all the enemies naval force that you may find there." He was also ordered to seize transports and supply vessels, advised as to the disposal of

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prisoners, and directed to fit out his prizes for service when suitable and appoint officers for them, calling on the assemblies and committees of safety of the various colonies for aid, if necessary, in all matters. Notwithstanding these particular orders which it is hoped you will be able to execute, if bad winds or stormy weather or any other unforseen accident or disaster disable you so to do, you are then to follow such courses as your best judgment shall suggest to you as most useful to the American cause and to distress the enemy by all means in your power." (Hopkins, 94-97.)

In the fall of 1775, Governor Dunmore of Virginia organized a flotilla of small vessels in the Chesapeake with which he ravaged the shores of the bay and of the rivers flowing into it (See infra, and ch. 5.) It was for the purpose of attempting the destruction of this fleet that Hopkins was ordered to begin his cruise by entering Chesapeake Bay.

The Alfred was selected as the flagship of the fleet, and when she was ready to be put into commission the commodore went on board and the Continental colors were hoisted by Lieutenant John Paul Jones, for the first time on any regular naval vessel of the United States, and were properly saluted. This was a yellow flag bearing "a lively representation of a rattlesnake," with the motto "Don't tread on me." The exact date of this ceremony is uncertain (Hopkins, 98; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 360.)

The ice in the river delayed the sailing of the expedition, which it was hoped would get away by the middle of January. Meanwhile on the 4th the following notice was published: "The Naval Committee give possitive orders that every Officer in the Sea and Marine Service, and all the Common Men belonging to each, who have enlisted into the Service of the United Colonies on board the ships now fiting out, that they immediately repair on board their respective ships as they would avoid being deemed deserters, and all those who have undertaken to be security for any of them are hereby called upon to procure and deliver up the men they have engaged for, or they will be immediately called upon in a proper and effectual way."(Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 8, 1776, No. 5, from a copy sent to the British admiral.) On the same day the four largest vessels cast off from the wharf at Philadelphia, but were unable to make way through the ice until January 17, and then only as far as Reedy Island on the Delaware side of the river. Here they remained until February 11, when, having been joined by the Providence and Fly, they proceeded down to Cape Henlopen. The Hornet and Wasp, having come around from Baltimore, arrived in Delaware Bay on the 13th; these two are believed to have been the first vessels of the Continental navy to get to sea. The fleet sailed from the Delaware February 17, 1776 (Hopkins, 91, 100; Am. Arch., IV, v, 823; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 8, 1776, No. 10; Ibid., July 8, 1776, inclosing " A Journal of a Cruse In the Brig Andrew Doria," taken in a recaptured prize.)

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The force was made up as follows: the ships Alfred, 24, flagship, Commodore Hopkins and Captain Saltonstall, and Columbus, 20, Captain Whipple; the brigs Andrew Doria, 14, Captain Biddle, and Cabot, 14, Captain John B. Hopkins, son of the commodore; the sloops Providence, 12, Captain Hazard, and Hornet, 10, Captain Stone; and the schooners Fly, 8, Captain Hacker, and Wasp, 8, Captain Alexander. Each of the first two was manned by a crew of two hundred and twenty, including sixty marines; the Alfred carried twenty and the Columbus eighteen nine-pounders on the lower deck, with ten sixes on the upper deck. The Andrew Doria and the Cabot were armed with six-pounders, the former having sixteen, the latter fourteen, and each carried twelve swivels; the Doria had a crew of a hundred and thirty and the Cabot a hundred and twenty, with thirty marines in each case. The Providence, though sometimes called a brig, was rigged as a sloop, and mounted twelve six-pounders and ten swivels; her crew consisted of ninety men including twenty-eight marines (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 8, 1777, No. 4, being information collected by agents of the British admiral, a source not always perfectly reliable.)

It is evident that several days before sailing Hopkins had determined to disregard his instructions and, taking advantage of the discretion allowed him in case of unforeseen difficulties, to abandon the projected cruise along the southern coast. In his first orders to his captains, dated February 14, three days before his departure, he says: "In Case you should be separated in a Gale of Wind or otherwise, you then are to use all possible Means to join the Fleet as soon as possible. But if you cannot in four days after you leave the Fleet, You are to make the best of your way to the Southern part of Abaco, one of the Bahama Islands, and there wait for the Fleet fourteen days. But if the Fleet does not join you in that time, You are to Cruise in such place as you think will most Annoy the Enemy and you are to send into port for Tryal all British Vessels or Property, or other Vessels with any Supplies for the Ministerial Forces, who you may make Yourself Master of, to such place as you may think best within the United Colonies." (MS. Orders to Captain Hacker.) At the same time the Commodore furnished the Captains with a very complete set of signals. In appointing a rendezvous at Abaco, Hopkins had in mind a descent upon the island of New Providence in the Bahama group, for the purpose of seizing a quantity of powder known to be stored there. Scarcity of powder was a cause of the greatest anxiety to Washington, especially during the first year of the war. Congress in secret session had considered the feasibility of obtaining powder from New Providence (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 1179, 1180; Hopkins, 101; Jour. Cont. Congr., November 29, 1775.)

In his report of the expedition, addressed to the President of Congress and dated April 9, 1776, Hopkins says: "When I put to Sea the 17th Febry. from Cape Henlopen, we had many Sick and four of the Vessels had a large number on board with the Small Pox. The Hornet & Wasp join'd me two days before. The Wind came at N. E. which made it unsafe to lye there. The Wind after we got out came on to blow hard. I did not think we were in a Condition to keep on a Cold

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Coast and appointed our Rendezvous at Abaco, one of the Bahama Islands. The second night we lost the Hornet and Fly." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 33; Ain. Arch., IV, v, 823.) From this it would seem to have been the commodore's purpose to give the impression that the state of the weather after be got to sea had caused him to change his plans; whereas be had fully made up his mind in advance. The fleet arrived at Abaco March 1. Hopkins says: "I then formed an Expedition against New Providence which I put in Execution the 3rd March by Landing 200 Marines under the Command of Captn. Nicholas and 50 Sailors under the Command of Lieutt. Weaver of the Cabot, who was well acquainted there." Two sloops from New Providence had been seized, to be used for transporting the landing party. They embarked Saturday evening March 2. The next morning the fleet got under way and at 10 o'clock came to at some distance from the island. It had been intended to take the place by surprise, but the fleet had been seen and the forts fired alarm guns. "We then ran in," says Lieutenant Jones of the Alfred, "and anchored at a small key three leagues to windward of the town, and from thence the Commodore despatched the marines, with the sloop Providence and schooner Wasp to cover their landing. They landed without opposition." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 33; Journal of the Andrew Doria; Sherburne's life of John Paul Jones, 12. For an account of the expedition, see Hopkins, ch. iv.)

Samuel Nicholas, captain of marines on the Alfred, in a letter dated April 10, says that on March 3, at two o'clock he "landed all our men, 270 in number under my command, at the east end of the Island at a place called New-Guinea. The inhabitants were very much alarmed at our appearance and supposed us to be Spaniards, but were soon undeceived after our landing. Just as I had formed the men I received a message from the Governor desiring to know what our intentions were. I sent him for answer, to take possession of all the warlike stores on the Island belonging to the crown, but had no design of touching the property or hurting the persons of any of the inhabitants, unless in our defence. As soon as the messenger was gone I marched forward to take possession of Fort Montague, a fortification built of stone, about half way between our landing place and the town. As we approached the fort (within about a mile, having a deep cove to go round, with a prodigious thicket on one side and the water on the other, entirely open to their view) they fired three twelve pound shot, which made us halt and consult what was best to be done. We then thought it more prudent to send a flag to let them know what our designs were in coming there; we soon received an answer letting us know that it was by the Governor's orders that they had fired. They spiked up the cannon and abandoned the fort and retired to the fort within the town. I then marched and took possession of it." (Mass. Spy, May 10, 1776; Am. Arch., IV, v, 846.) In the fort were found seventeen cannon, thirty-two-pounders, eighteens and twelves, from which the spikes were easily removed. Nicholas and his men spent the night in the fort. In the evening Hopkins, hearing that there was a force of over two hundred men in the main fort at Nassau, published a manifesto addressed to the inhabitants of the island declaring his intention "to take possession of the powder and warlike stores

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belonging to the Crown and if I am not opposed in putting my design in execution, the persons and property of the inhabitants shall be safe, neither shall they be suffered to be hurt in case they make no resistance." (Am. Arch., IV, v, 46.) This had a good effect and no opposition was met with.

"The next morning by daylight," says Nicholas, we marched forward to the town, to take possession of the Governor's house, which stands on an eminence with two four pounders, which commands the garrison and town. On our march I met an express from the Governor to the same purport as the first; I sent him the same answer as before. The messenger then told me I might march into the town and if I thought proper into the fort, without interruption; on which I marched into the town. I then drafted a guard and went up to the Governor's and demanded the keys of the fort, which were given to me immediately; and then took possession of fort Nassau. In it there were about forty cannon mounted and well loaded for our reception, with round, langridge and cannister shot; all this was accomplished without firing a single shot from our side." (Mass. Spy, May 10, 1776.) The fleet, which had been lying behind Hog Island, soon afterwards came into the harbor; the commodore and captains then landed and came up to the fort. In Fort Nassau were found great quantities of military stores, including seventy-one cannon - ranging in size from nine-pounders to thirty-twos, fifteen brass mortars, and twenty-four casks of powder. The governor had contrived to send off a hundred and fifty casks of powder the night before, thereby defeating in great measure the main object sought in taking the island. The value of the property brought away, however, largely made up for this disappointment. After this the governor was kept under guard in his own house until the fleet was ready to sail. About two weeks were occupied in loading the captured stores on board the fleet, and it was necessary to impress a large sloop in order to carry everything. This vessel, called the Endeavor, was put under the command of Lieutenant Hinman of the Cabot. During this time the Fly rejoined the fleet and "gave an Account that he got foul of the Hornet and carried away the Boom and head of her Mast and I hear since she has got into some port of South Carolina." It afterwards turned out that the Hornet was driven off the coast of South Carolina by bad weather and finally succeeded in getting back into Delaware Bay about April 1. Hopkins took on board the fleet as prisoners the governor and lieutenant-governor of New Providence and another high official (Mass. Spy, May 10, 1776; Am Arch., IV, v, 407, 823, 824; R.I. Hist. May., July, 1885; Life of Joshua Barney, 31-33.)

The fleet set sail on the return voyage March 17. The next day Hopkins issued orders to his captains: "You are to keep company with the ship I am in if possible, but should you separate by accident you are then to make the best of your way to Block Island Channel and there to cruise in 30 fathom water south from Block Island six days, in order to join the fleet. If they do not join you in that time, you may cruise in such places as you think will most annoy the Enemy or go in Port, as you think fit." (Am. Arch., IV, v, 47.) The Wasp parted from the fleet soon after sailing. For over two weeks the voyage to Rhode Island was uneventful. April 4

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the British six-gun schooner Hawk was captured by the Columbus. The Hawk belonged to the British fleet at Newport. Captain Nicholas says: "We made Block Island in the afternoon [of the 4th] ; the Commodore then gave orders to the brigs to stand in for Rhode-Island, to see if any more of the fleet were out and join us next morning, which was accordingly done, but without seeing any vessels." At daylight the brig Bolton was taken by the Alfred after firing a few shots; she was a bomb-vessel of eight guns and two howitzers. The fleet cruised all day in sight of Block Island, and in the evening took a brigantine and sloop from New York. 1, We had at sunset 12 sail, a very pleasant evening." (Mass. Spy, May 10, 1776.)

Of the events of the night Hopkins gives a brief account in his report. Very early in the morning of April 6 the fleet "fell in with the Glascow and her Tender and Engaged her near three hours. We lost 6 Men Killed and as many Wounded; the Cabot had 4 Men killed and 7 Wounded, the Captain is among the latter; the Columbus had one Man who lost his Arm. We received a considerable damage in our Ship, but the greatest was in having our Wheel Ropes & Blocks shott away, which gave the Glascow time to make Sail, which I did not think proper to follow as it would have brought an Action with the whole of their Fleet and as I had upwards of 30 of our best Seamen on board the Prizes, and some that were on board had got too much Liquor out of the Prizes to be fit for Duty. Thought it most prudent to give over Chace and Secure our Prizes & got nothing but the Glascow's Tender and arrived here [New London] the 7th with all the Fleet. . . . The Officers all behaved well on board the Alfred, but too much praise cannot be given to the Officers of the Cabot, who gave and sustained the whole Fire for some considerable time within Pistol Shott." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 33.)

Nicholas gives a more minute recital of the affair: ,At 12 o'clock went to bed and at half past one was awaked by the noise of all hands to quarters; we were soon ready for action. The best part of my company with my first Lieut. was placed in the barge on the main deck, the remaining part with my second Lieutenant and myself on the quarter deck. We had discovered a large ship standing directly for us. The Cabot was foremost of the fleet, our ship close after, not more than 100 yards behind, but to windward with all, when the brigantine came close up. The ship hailed and was soon answered by the Cabot, who soon found her to be the Glasgow; the brigantine immediately fired her broadside and instantly received a return of two fold, which, owing to the weight of metal, damaged her so much in her hull and rigging as obliged her to retire for a while to refit. We then came up, not having it in our power to fire a shot before without hurting the brigantine, and engaged her side by side for three glasses as hot as possibly could be on both sides. The first broadside she fired, my second Lieutenant fell dead close by my side; he was shot by a musket ball through the head." (Mass. Spy, May 10, 1776.)

John Paul Jones's narrative of the action in the Alfred's log-book gives a few additional details: "At 2 A.M. cleared ship for action. At half past two the Cabot, being between us and the enemy, began to engage and soon after we did the

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same. At the third glass the enemy bore away and by crowding sail at length got a considerable way ahead, made signals for the rest of the English fleet at Rhode Island to come to her assistance, and steered directly for the harbor. The Commodore then thought it imprudent to risk our prizes, &c. by pursuing farther; therefore, to prevent our being decoyed into their hands, at half past six made the signal to leave off chase and haul by the wind to join our prizes. The Cabot was disabled at the second broadside, the captain being dangerously wounded, the master and several men killed. The enemy's whole fire was then directed at us and an unlucky shot having carried away our wheel-block and ropes, the ship broached to and gave the enemy an opportunity of raking us with several broadsides before we were again in condition to steer the ship and return the fire. In the action we received several shot under water, which made the ship very leaky; we had besides the mainmast shot through and the upper works and rigging very considerably damaged." (Sherburne, 14.)

Captain Whipple of the Columbus reported to the commodore that when the Glasgow was sighted he was to leeward and "hauled up for her," but the position of the other ships "Instantly kill'd all the wind, which put it out of my Power to get up with her. I strove all in my Power, but in vain; before that I had got close enough for a Close Engagement, the Glasgow had made all Sail for the Harbour of Newport. I continued Chace under all Sail that I had, except Steering Sails and the Wind being before the Beam, she firing her two Stern Chaces into me as fast as possible and my keeping up a Fire with my Bow Guns and now and then a Broadside, put it out of my Power to get near enough to have a close Engagement. I continued this Chace while you thought proper to hoist a Signal to return into the Fleet; I accordingly Obeyed the Signal." (Hopkins, 130, 131; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1156.)

Apparently the Andrew Doria was less closely engaged than the others. One of her officers, Lieutenant Josiah, says that the Cabot having fired the first broadside at the Glasgow, "she return'd two fold, which oblig'd ye Cabot to sheer off and had like to have been foul of us, which oblig'd us to tack to gett clear; the Commodore came up next and Discharg'd several Broadside and received as many, which did Considerable Damage in his hull & Riggen, which oblig'd him to sheer off. The Glascow then made all the sail she possible could for Newport & made a running fight for 7 Glases. We receiv'd several shott in ye hull & riggen, one upon the Quarter through the Netting and stove ye arm Chest upon the Quarter Deck and wounded our Drummer in ye Legg." (Journal of the Andrew Doria.)

The Glasgow was a ship of twenty guns and a hundred and fifty men, commanded by Captain Tyringham Howe, whose report of the engagement says: "On Saturday the 6th of April, 1776, At two A.M. Block Island then bearing N. W. about eight Leagues, we discovered a Fleet on the weather beam, consisting of seven or eight Sail; tacked and stood towards them and soon perceived them to be two or three large Ships and other Square Rigged Vessels. Turned all hands

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to Quarters, hauled up the Mainsail and kept standing on to the N. W. with a light breeze and smooth Water, the Fleet then coming down before it. At half past two a large Brig, much like the Bolton but larger, came within hail and seemed to hesitate about giving any answer, but still kept standing towards us and on being asked what other Ships were in company with her, they answered 'the Columbus and Alfred, a two and twenty Gun frigate.' And almost immediately a hand Grenadoe was thrown out of her top. We exchanged our- Broadsides. She then shot a head and lay on our bow, to make room for a large Ship with a top-light to come on our Broadside and another Ship ran under our Stern, Raked as she passed and then luft up on our Lee beam, whilst a Brig took her Station on our Larboard Quarter and a Sloop kept altering her Station occasionally. At this time the Clerk having the care of the dispatches for the So. Ward to destroy, if the ship should be boarded or in danger of being taken, hove the bag overboard with a shot in it. At four the Station of every Vessel was altered, as the two ships had dropt on each quarter and a Brig kept a stern giving a continual fire. Bore away and made Sail for Rhode Island, with the whole fleet within Musket shot on our Quarters and Stern. Got two Stern chase guns out of the Cabin and kept giving and receiving a very warm fire. At daylight perceived the Rebel fleet to consist of two Ships, two Brigs and a Sloop, and a large Ship and Snow that kept to Windward as soon as the Action began. At half past six the Fleet hauled their Wind and at Seven tacked and stood to the S. S. W. Employed reeving, knotting and splicing and the Carpenters making fishes for the Masts. At half past seven made a Signal and fired several guns occasionally to alarm the fleet at Rhode Island Harbour. The Rose, Swan and Nautilus then being working out. We had one Man Killed and three Wounded by the musketry from the Enemy." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, April 19,1776; London Chronicle, June 11, 1776; briefer accounts in Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Letters, No. 1902, 22 (April 27, 1776), and Captains' Logs, No. 398 (April 6, 1776)

An American prisoner on board the Glasgow says that the sloop Providence, joining in the attack, directed her fire at the Glasgows' "stern without any great effect. The most of her shot went about six feet above the deck; whereas, if they had been properly levelled, they must soon have cleared it of men. The Glasgow got at a distance, when she fired smartly, and the engagement lasted about six glasses, when they both seemed willing to quit. The Glasgow was considerably damaged in her hull, had ten shot through her mainmast, fifty-two through her mizen staysail, one hundred and ten through mainsail, and eighty-eight through her foresail; had her spars carried away and her rigging cut to pieces." (Constitutional Gazette, New York, May 29, 1776, quoted in Sands, 45, 46.)

The Glasgow was seriously crippled and her escape from a superior force shows a lack of cooperation on the part of the Continental fleet, and perhaps excessive prudence in not carrying the pursuit farther towards Newport. It was an instance of the want of naval training and esprit de corps to be expected in a new, raw service. Moreover, the American vessels, except the Alfred, were inferior sailing

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craft to begin with, and besides this were too deeply laden with the military stores brought from New Providence to be easily and quickly handled.

Hopkins took his fleet and prizes into New London April 8. Here over two hundred sick men were landed; also the military stores. The next day the Andrew Doria was sent out on a short cruise and recaptured a prize from the British. Some of the heavy guns from New Providence were sent to Dartmouth, on Buzzard's Bay; and upon the departure of the British from Narragansett Bay soon afterwards, the Cabot, Captain Hinman, was sent to Newport with several of the guns. The prisoners brought from New Providence were paroled. The commodore's report of April 9 was read in Congress and published in the newspapers. It caused great satisfaction, and Hopkins received a letter of congratulation from John Hancock, the President of Congress. His popularity at this time, both in the fleet and among the people, seems to have been genuine. The Marine Committee suggested the purchase of the prize schooner Hawk for the service, to be renamed the Hopkins. John Paul Jones, who as a lieutenant on the Alfred had had an opportunity to estimate the commodore's qualifications, wrote of him, April 14: "I have the pleasure of assuring you that the commander-in-chief is respected through the fleet and I verily believe that the officers and men in general would go any length to execute his orders." (Sherburne, 13.) There was a reaction, however, later on. Upon reflection people came to the opinion that the escape of the Glasgow was unnecessary and discreditable. Captain Whipple was accused of cowardice and demanded a court-martial, by which he was honorably acquitted. Captain Hazard of the Providence was less fortunate; he also was court-martialed and was relieved of his command. (Am. Arch., IV, v, 824, 867, 956, 966, 1005, 1111, 1156, 1168, vi, 409, 552, 553; Hopkins, 125-135 ; Journal of the Andrew Doria.)

The British fleet, consisting of the frigate Rose, the Glasgow, the Nautilus, Swan, and several tenders, had found Newport Harbor an uncomfortable anchorage. April 5 they went to sea, but all except the Glasgow and her tender returned in the evening and anchored off Coddington Point, north of Newport. At daylight the next morning, while the Glasgow was engaged with the American fleet, the Continental troops mounted two eighteen-pounders on the point, opened fire, and drove them from their anchorage. When the Glasgow came in after her battle, she and some of the smaller vessels anchored off Brenton's Point; the others went to sea. On the morning of the 7th the Glasgow and the vessels with her were fired upon by guns which had been mounted on Brenton's Point during the night, and driven up the bay. Later they too went to sea and the whole fleet sailed for Halifax. April 11 another British man-of-war, the Phoenix, brought two prizes into Newport, but she was driven out again and the prizes recaptured (Boston Gazette, April 15, 22, 1776; Constitutional Gazette (New York), April 17, May 29, 1776, quoted in Sands, 46-48.) After the Glasgow had arrived at Halifax, Admiral Shuldham, in command of the station, wrote to the Admiralty that he found her "in so shattered a Condition and would require so much time and more Stores than there is in this Yard to put her into proper repair, I intend sending her

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to Plymouth as soon as she can be got ready." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, April 19, 1776.)

Commodore Hopkins received one hundred and seventy men from the army to take the place of those he had lost through sickness. He then sailed, April 19, for Newport, but "the Alfred got ashore near Fisher's Island and was obliged to be lightened to get her off, which we did without much damage." They went back to New London and sailed again April 24; they went up to Providence the next day. There Hopkins landed over a hundred more sick men. Just at this time he received an order from Washington to send back to the army the men who had been loaned to him, as they were needed in New York. It was practically impossible to get recruits in Providence, because the attractions of privateering were so superior to those of the regular naval service. Delay in getting their pay for the first cruise also caused discontent and tended to make the service unpopular. The commodore had received information from the Marine Committee of two small British fleets in southern waters. A force organized by Governor Dunmore in Virginia consisted of the frigate Liverpool, 28, two sloops of war, and many small. vessels. "It is said & believed that both the Liverpool & Otter are exceedingly weak from the Want of Hands, their Men being chiefly employed on Board a Number of small Tenders fitted out by Lord Dunmore to distress the Trade on the Coast of Virginia & Bay of Chesepeak. His Lordship has now between 100 & 150 Sail of Vessels great & small, the most of which are Prizes & many of them valuable. Those, so far from being any Addition in point of Strength will rather weaken the Men of War, whose Hands are employed in the small Vessels." The British had another naval force at Wilmington, North Carolina. "Whether you have formed any Expedition or not, the Execution of which will interfere with an Attempt upon either or both of the above Fleets we cannot determine; but if that should not be the Case, there is no Service from the present Appearance of things in which You could better promote the Interest of your Country than by the Destruction of the Enemie's Fleet in North Carolina or Virginia; for as the Seat of War will most probably be transferred in the ensuing Campaign to the Southern Colonies, such a Maneuvre attended with Success will disconcert or at least retard their Military Operations for a Length of Time, give Spirits to our Friends & afford them an Opportunity of improving their Preparations for resistance." (MS. Letter of Marine Committee, April, 1776.) Apparently because the Marine Committee became convinced that this plan was impracticable in view of the weak condition of the fleet, it was given up and, May 10, Hopkins was ordered. to send a squadron against the Newfoundland fishery. He himself had already been preparing for a four months' cruise, but all such schemes now had to be abandoned for lack of seamen to man his fleet. Three vessels, however, were fitted out and sent away. The command of the Providence was given to Jones, May 10, and he was ordered to New York with the men who were to be returned to the army. The Andrew Doria and Cabot were sent off on a cruise May 19. The Fly was kept for a while on the lookout for British men-of-war off the entrance of Narragansett Bay. The Alfred and Columbus remained at Providence waiting for fresh crews. (Am; Arch., IV, v,

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1001, 1005, 1079, 1140,1168, vi, 409, 410, 418, 430, 431, 551; Hopkins, 135-140; Journal of the Andrew Doria.)

Dissatisfaction with the conduct of Commodore Hopkins and some of his officers gradually increased in and out of Congress. Complaints of ill treatment on board the fleet, as well as instances of insubordination and desertion, came to the ears of the Marine Committee. All this of course still further increased the difficulty of manning the ships, with consequent delay apparently endless and the increasing probability of nothing important being accomplished. A committee of seven was appointed by Congress to investigate, and June 14 the commodore and Captains Saltonstall and Whipple were ordered to Philadelphia to appear before the Marine Committee and be interrogated in regard to their conduct. Saltonstall and Whipple were examined in July and were exonerated by Congress. The inquiry into Hopkins's case came in August and he was questioned on three points: his alleged disobedience of orders in not visiting the southern coast during the cruise of his fleet; his poor management in permitting the escape of the Glasgow; and his inactivity since arriving in port. His defense was that, as he did not sail until six weeks after his orders were issued, conditions had changed, especially in regard to the force of the British, which had increased in Virginia and the Carolinas; but there is no mention of this in his report of April 9. He had written to his brother before the inquiry: "I intended to go from New Providence to Georgia, had I not received intelligence three or four days before I sailed that a frigate of twenty-eight guns had arrived there, which made the force in my opinion too strong for us. At Virginia they were likewise too strong. In Delaware and New York it would not do to attempt. Rhode Island I was sensible was stronger than we, but the force there was nearer equal than anywhere else, which was the reason of my attempts there." (Hopkins, 154.) Hopkins was doubtless justified in using the discretion allowed him in his orders to depart from those orders in case of apparent necessity or expediency, and being on the spot he was presumably the best judge of the course to be pursued; but in order to establish his naval reputation it was incumbent upon him to convince others of the necessity or expediency. As to the second point, relating to the Glasgow, Hopkins seems to show a disposition to shift the blame upon his subordinates; no doubt some of his officers were not to be depended upon for prompt and efficient action. On the third point, the excessive amount of sickness in the fleet and the practical impossibility of obtaining recruits in sufficient numbers should have extenuated his shortcomings. There appears to have been a strong prejudice against Hopkins in Congress and it fared hard with him, although he was zealously and ably defended by John Adams. August 15, Congress resolved "that the said Commodore Hopkins, during his cruize to the southward, did not pay due regard to the tenor of his instructions, whereby he was expressly directed to annoy the enemy's ships upon the coasts of the southern states; and that his reasons for not going from [New] Providence immediately to the Carolinas are by no means satisfactory." The next day it was further resolved "that the said conduct of Commodore Hopkins deserves the censure of this house and the house does accordingly censure him." Three days later he was ordered back to Rhode Island

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to resume command of his fleet (Am. Arch., IV, v, 1698, vi, 764, 885, 886,1678,1705, V, i, 994; Jour. Cont. Congr., August 15, 16, 1776; Hopkins, ch. v.)

Of the result of this inquiry John Adams wrote: "Although this resolution of censure was not in my opinion demanded by justice and consequently was inconsistent with good policy, as it tended to discourage an officer and diminish his authority by tarnishing his reputation, yet as it went not so far as to cashier him, which had been the object intended by the spirit that dictated the prosecution, I had the satisfaction to think that I had not labored wholly in vain in his defense." (Hopkins, 160.) When John Paul Jones heard of the outcome he wrote a friendly and sympathetic letter to his commander, saying: "Your late trouble will tend to your future advantage by pointing out your friends and enemies. You will thereby be enabled to retain the one part while you guard against the other. You will be thrice welcome to your native land and to your nearest concerns." (Ibid., 162.)

The fleet of Commodore Hopkins performed no further service collectively, but the fortunes of the various vessels composing it, during the remainder of the year 1776, may be conveniently followed here. The sloop Providence, having taken to New York the soldiers who had been borrowed from the army, returned to Providence, and in June was occupied for a while convoying vessels back and forth between Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound. "In performing these last services Captain Jones found great difficulty from the enemy's frigates then cruising round Block Island, with which he had several rencontres in one of which he saved a brigantine that was a stranger from Hispaniola, closely pursued by the Cerberus and laden with public military stores. That brigantine was afterwards purchased by the Continent and called the Hampden." (Sands, 38 (Jones's journal prepared at request of the king of France.) Jones was then ordered to Boston, where he collected a convoy which he conducted safely to Delaware Bay, arriving August 1. At this time the British fleet and army were on their way from Halifax to New York. Jones saw several of their ships, but was able to avoid them (Sands, 37, 38; Am. Arch., IV, vi, 418, 511, 820, 844, 972, 980.)

The Andrew Doria and Cabot sailed on a short cruise to the eastward May 19. Soon after getting to sea they were chased by the Cerberus and became separated. May 29, in latitude 41° 19' north, longitude 57° 12' west, the Andrew Doria captured two Scotch transports of the fleet bound to Boston. "At 4 A.M. saw two Ships to ye North'd, Made Sail and Hauld our Wind to ye North'd. At 6 Do. Brought the Northermost too, a Ship from Glascow . . . with 100 Highland Troops on Board & officers; made her hoist her Boat out & the Capt. came on board. Detained the Boat till we Brought the other too, from Glascow with ye same number of troops. [Lieutenant James Josiah, the writer of the journal] went on board and sent ye Capt. and four Men on board ye Brig [Andrew Doria], receiv'd orders for sending all the troops on board the other ship and went Prize

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master with Eleven Hands. Sent all the Arms on board ye Brig from both Ships, two Hundred & odd." (Journal of the Andrew Doria.) These transports were the Crawford and Oxford. All the soldiers, two hundred and seventeen in number, with several women and children, were put on the Oxford. The Andrew Doria cruised with her prizes nearly two weeks and then, being to windward of Nantucket Shoals, they were chased by five British vessels. Captain Biddle signaled the transports to steer different courses and lost sight of them. The Crawford, in command of Lieutenant Josiah as prizemaster, was retaken by the Cerberus, but was captured again by the General Schuyler of Washington's New York fleet (See ch. 3.) Josiah while a prisoner was treated with such severity as to occasion threats of retaliation, but he was eventually exchanged. On board the Oxford, containing the soldiers, the prize crew was overcome by the prisoners, who got possession of the ship and carried her into Hampton Roads. Their triumph was brief, however, for she was soon recaptured by Captain Barron of the Virginia navy. The next year the Oxford again fell into the hands of the British. The Andrew Doria put into Newport June 14 and soon went out again. She cruised most of the time during the rest of the year, taking several prizes. In October she changed her captain. The Columbus also went to sea in June and on the 18th had a brush with the Cerberus, losing one man. At this time there were three British frigates around Block Island. The Columbus took four or five prizes before the end of the year and the Cabot made a few captures. (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 430, 431, 539, 551, 902, 931, 972, 979, 998, 999, V, i, 659, 832, 1094, 1095, ii, 115, 132, 378, 1226, iii, 667, 848; Boston Gazette, June 24, July 29, September 16, 30, October 7, 28, 1776; N. E. (Independent) Chronicle, July 4, October 10, 1776; Military and Naval Mag. of U. S., June, 1834; So. Lit. Messenger, February, 1857; R. I. Hist. Mag., October, 1885; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, July 8,1776, inclosing Journal of the Andrew Doria; Williams, 202.)

Captain Jones in the Providence sailed from Delaware Bay August 21. In the latitude of Bermuda he fell in with the British frigate Solebay, 28. "She sailed fast and pursued us by the wind, till after four hours chase, the sea running very cross, she got within musket shot of our lee quarter. As they had continued firing at us from the first without showing colours, I now ordered ours to be hoisted and began to fire at them. Upon this they also hoisted American colors and fired guns to leeward. But the bait would not take, for having everything prepared, I bore away before the wind and set all our light sail at once, so that before her sails could be trimmed and steering sails set, I was almost out of reach of grape and soon after out of reach of cannon shot . . . Had he foreseen this motion and been prepared to counteract it, he might have fired several broadsides of double-headed and grape shot, which would have done us very material damage. But he was a bad marksman, and though within pistol shot, did not touch the Providence with one of the many shots he fired." (Sands, 49 (letter of September 4, 1776.) After cruising about two weeks longer, being short of water and wood, Jones decided to run into some port of Nova Scotia or Cape Breton. "I had besides," he says, "a prospect of destroying the English shipping in these parts. The 16th and 17th [of September] I had a very heavy gale from the N. W. which obliged me to

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dismount all my guns and stick everything I could into the bold. The 19th I made the Isle of Sable and on the 20th, being between it and the main, I met with an English frigate [the Milford.], with a merchant ship under her convoy. I had hove to, to give my people an opportunity of taking fish, when the frigate came in sight directly to windward, and was so good natured as to save me the trouble of chasing him, by bearing down the instant he discovered us. When he came within cannon shot, I made sail to try his speed. Quartering and finding that I had the advantage, I shortened sail to give him a wild goose chase and tempt him to throw away powder and shot. Accordingly a curious mock engagement was maintained between us for eight hours," until nightfall. "He excited my contempt so much by his continued firing at more than twice the proper distance, that when he rounded to, to give his broadside, I ordered my marine officer to return the salute with only a single musket. We saw him next morning, standing to the westward." Jones then went into Canso and got a supply of wood and water; also several recruits. About a dozen fishing vessels were seized there and at the Island of Madame, three of which were released and as many more destroyed. "The evening of the 25th brought with it a violent gale of wind with rain, which obliged me to anchor in the entrance of Narrow Shock, where I rode it out with both anchors and whole cables ahead. Two of our prizes, the ship Alexander and [schooner] Sea Flower, had come out before the gale began. The ship anchored under a point and rode it out; but the schooner, after anchoring, drove and ran ashore. She was a valuable prize, but as I could not get her off, I next day ordered her to be set on fire. The schooner Ebenezer, taken at Canso, was driven on a reef of sunken rocks and there totally lost, the people having with difficulty saved themselves on a raft. Towards noon on the 26th the gale began to abate." (Sands, 50, 51, 52 (September 30, 1776).) To remain longer in these waters, with so many prizes to protect, seemed an unwarrantable risk, and Jones therefore turned homeward. September 30 he was off Sable Island and just a week later in Newport Harbor. On this cruise he had ruined the fishery at Canso and Madame and had taken sixteen prizes; half of them were sent into port and the others destroyed or lost. (Am. Arch., V, i, 784, ii, 171-174, 624, 1105, 1226, 1303, 1304; Sands, 39, 48-54; Independent Chronicle, October 17, 1776; Boston Gazette, October 28, 1776.)

Jones proposed an expedition with three vessels to the west coast of Africa, where he was sure it would be possible to reap a rich harvest of prizes. Commodore Hopkins, however, determined to send a small squadron to Cape Breton in order to inflict further injury upon the fishery, and to attempt the capture of the coal fleet and the release of American prisoners working in the mines. The Alfred, with Jones in command of the expedition, and the Hampden, Captain Hacker, sailed towards the end of October. Jones wished to take the Providence also, but could not enlist a crew for her. At the outset, however, the Hampden ran on a ledge and was so injured that she was left behind, her crew being transferred to the Providence. The expedition, with the Alfred and Providence, made a fresh start November 1. On that day Jones issued instructions for Captain Hacker, saying: "The wind being now fair, we will proceed according to

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Orders for Spanish River near Cape North on the Island of Cape Briton"; and prescribing signals for foggy weather (MS. Letter.) On his way through Vineyard Sound, Jones boarded a Rhode Island privateer, acting under the orders of Commodore Hopkins, and impressed some deserters from the navy. Thence he proceeded directly for his cruising grounds and soon after his arrival, took three prizes off Louisburg. These were a brig and snow, which were sent back to American ports, and a large armed ship called the Mellish, with so rich a cargo of soldiers' clothing that Jones kept her under convoy. He wrote to the Marine Committee, November 12: "This prize is, I believe, the most valuable that has been taken by the American arms. She made some defence, but it was trifling. The loss will distress the enemy more than can be easily imagined, as the clothing on board of her is the Last intended to be sent out for Canada this season and all that has preceded it is already taken. The situation of Burgoyne's army must soon become insupportable. I shall not lose sight of a prize of such importance, but will sink her rather than suffer her to fall again into their hands." (Sands, 56.) Jones afterwards recommended that the Mellish be armed and taken into the service.

A few days after this, during a stormy night, the Providence parted company and returned to Rhode Island; there had been discontent on this vessel among both officers and men, who represented that she leaked badly and was unsafe. Jones says that "previous to this step there had been an Unaccountable murmering in the Sloop for which I could see no Just foundation and in Vain had I represented to them how much humanity was concerned in our endeavours to relieve our Captive, ill treated Brethern from the Coal Mines. Since my arrival here I understand that as soon as Night came on they Put before the Wind. Being thus deserted the Epedemical discontent became General on Board the Alfred; the season was indeed Severe and everyone was for returning immediately to port, but I was determined at all hazards, while my provision lasted, to persevere in my first plan. When the Gale abated I found myself in sight of the N. E. Reef of the Isle of Sable & the wind continuing Northerly obliged me to beat up the South side of the Island. After exercising much Patience I weathered the N. W. Reef of the Island and on the 22d [of November], being off Canso, I sent my Boats in to Burn a Fine Transport with Irish Provision Bound for Canada., she having run aground within the Harbour; they were also ordered to Burn the Oil warehouse with the Contents and all the Materials for the Fishery, which having effected I carried off a small, fast sailing schooner which I purposed to Employ as a Tender instead of the Providence. On the 24th off Louisburg, it being thick weather, in the Afternoon I found myself surrounded by three Ships. Everyone Assured me that they were English Men of War and indeed I was of that opinion myself, for I had been informed by a Gentleman who came off from Canso that three Frigates on that Station had been Cruising for [me] ever since my expedition there in the Providence. Resolving to sell my liberty as dear as possible, I stood for and . . . Took the nearest; I took also the other two, tho' they were at a Considerable distance assunder. These three Ships were . . . Transports Bound from the Coal Mines of Cape Briton for N. York Under Convoy of the Flora Frigate; they had

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Seen her a few hours before, and had the weather been clear she would then have been in sight. They left no Transports behind them at Spanish River, but they said the Roe Buck man of War was stationed there and that if there had been any Prisoners of ours there they had entered [the British service]. I made the best of my way to the Southward to prevent falling in with the Flora the next day, and on the 26th I fell in with and took a Ship of Ten Guns from Liverpool for Hallifax." She was a letter of marque called the John. "I had now on Board an Hundred and Forty Prisoners, so that my Provision was consumed very Fast; I had the Mellish, the three Ships from the Coal Mines and the last taken Ship under Convoy; the best of my Sailors were sent on Board [these] Five Ships and the number left were barely sufficient to Guard the Prisoners. So that all circumstances considered, I concluded it most for the interest and Honor of the Service to Form the Prizes into a Squadron and proceed with them into Port. I was unfortunate in meeting with high Winds and Frequent Gales from the Westward. I however kept the Squadron together till the 7th of December on St Georges Bank, when a large Ship [the frigate Milford] Gave us chace. As she came so neare before Night that we could distinguish her as a Ship of War, I ordered the Mellish . . . and the rest of the Fastest Sailers to Crowd Sail and go a Head. I kept the Liverpool Ship with me, as She was of some Force and her Cargo by invoice not worth more than £1100 Sterling. In the Night I tacked and afterwards carried a Top light in order to lead the Enemy away from the Ships that had been ordered ahead. In the Morning they were out of Sight and I found the Enemy two points on my lee Quarter at the same distance as the night before. As the Alfred's Provisions and Water were by this time almost entirely consumed, so that She sailed very ill by the Wind, and as the Ship I had by me, the John, made much less lee way, I ordered her to Fall a Stern to Windward of the Enemy and make the Signal Agreed on, if She was of Superiour or inferiour Force; that in the one Case we might each make the best of our way, or in the other come to Action. After a considerable time the Signal was made that the Enemy was of Superiour Force, but in the intrim the wind had encreased with Severe Squalls to a Hard Gale, so that in the Evening I drove the Alfred thro' the Water Seven and Eight Knots under two Courses, a point from the Wind. Towards Night the Enemy Wore on the other Tack, but before that time the Sea had risen so very high that it was impossible to Hoist a Boat, so that had he been near the John it would have been impossible for him to have Taken her, unless they had wilfully given her up and continued voluntarily by the Enemy through the whole of the very dark and Stormy night that ensued." Yet the John, however unnecessarily, surrendered to the Milford. Admiral Howe in reporting this affair says that the Alfred was chased "without effect, by means of the thick weather that critically happened and secured her Escape." According to the log of the Milford a boat was lowered from the frigate and took possession of the John (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, March 31, 1777, and Masters' Logs, No. 1865 (log of Milford.) The report of Captain Jones goes on to say that in the evening of December 14, being then in Massachusetts Bay and fearing to be driven out, "I resolved to run into Plymouth, but in working up the Harbour the Ship missed Stays in a Violent Snow Squall on the South side, which obliged me to Anchor

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immediately in little more than three Fathom. She grounded at low water and Beat considerably, but we got her off in the morning and Arrived the 15th in the Nantasket Road with a tight ship and no perceptible damage whatever. I had then only two days provision left and the Number of my Prisoners brought in equalled the Number of my whole Crew when I left Rhode Island." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 107 (Jones to Marine Committee, January 12, 1777.) The John was apparently the only prize lost. The Mellish ran through Nantucket Shoals and got safely into Dartmouth. It was fortunate for Jones and for his valuable prize that fate did not lead them to Rhode Island, for a powerful British fleet had taken possession of Newport December 7 (Am. Arch., V, i, 1106, ii, 454, 1194, 1195, 1226, 1277, 1303, iii, 490, 491, 659, 668, 738, 789, 1162, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1356; Sands, 40-42, 54-57; Independent Chronicle, November 28, December 26, 1776; Boston Gazette, December 2, 23, 30, 1776; R.I. Hist. Mag., October, 1885. For experience of Lieutenant Trevett, as a spy in Newport soon after this, see Ibid., January, 1886.)

After Jones had sailed on this cruise in November, Hopkins received orders from the Marine Committee, dated October 10, 23, and 30, to proceed southward with the Alfred, Columbus, Cabot, Providence, and Hampden, or as many of them as were available; one or both of the new frigates under construction in Rhode Island might be joined to the squadron if they could be got ready for sea. He was to cruise in the neighborhood of Cape Fear, North Carolina, where he would find three British men-of-war with a large number of prizes and other vessels under their protection; and later perhaps still farther south. On the way to the Carolinas he was to look for two other British cruisers, the Galatea, 20, and Nautilus, 16, said to be off the Virginia capes. All these vessels, it was thought, might be captured or destroyed. "As this Service to the Southward is of much publick importance, we expect from Your Zeal and Attachment to the Interest of the United States that you proceed on and execute this Service with all possible Vigor and despatch." (MS. Letter to Hopkins, October 23, 1776; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 38.)

Two of the vessels it was proposed to send were with Jones and others could not be manned without great delay; so the enterprise fell through. Some of the small vessels of Hopkins's original fleet, however, were in more southern waters and performed what little service they could. In the spring of 1776 the Wasp and Hornet were in Delaware Bay and the former took part in an action with two British frigates (See ch, 5.) The Fly was sent to New York in June and after that, cruised along the New Jersey shore. The Wasp was ordered to Bermuda and the West Indies in August; she sent a valuable prize into Philadelphia and later joined the Fly. They were instructed by the Marine Committee, November 1 and 11, to keep a lookout for vessels going into and out of New York, now occupied by the British. Hopkins and Jones had also been ordered to intercept, when possible, storeships from Europe bound to New York. "We immagine there must be Transports, Store Ships and provision vessels daily arriving or expected to arrive at that place for supplying our enemies with provisions and other Stores,

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and the design of your present Cruize is to intercept as many of those Vessels and supplies as you possibly can." The Fly and Wasp, if chased, were to run into some river or inlet on the New Jersey coast. Prizes were to be sent to Philadelphia, or into Egg Harbor, or any other safe place, as seemed most expedient. "You must be careful not to let any british frigate get between you and the land and then there's no danger, for they cannot pursue you in shore and they have no boats or Tenders that can take you; besides, the country people will assist in driving them off shore, if they should attempt to follow you in . . . Altho' we recommend your taking good care of your Vessel and people, yet we should deem it more praiseworthy in an officer to loose his vessel in a bold enterprise than to loose a good Prize by too timid a Conduct." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 42 (to Captain Warner of the Fly, November 1, 1776.) November 11 the committee wrote: "We have received intelligence that our enemies at New York are about to embarque 15,000 Men on board their Transports, but where they are bound remains to be found out. The Station assigned you makes it probable that we may best discover their destination by your means, for it will be impossible this fleet of Transports can get out of Sandy hook without your seeing them.

When you discover this fleet, watch their motions and the moment they get out to Sea and shape their course, send your boat on Shore with a Letter to be dispatched by express informing us what course they steer, how many sail they consist of, if you can ascertain their numbers, and how many Ships of war attend them . . . If this fleet steer to the Southward either the Fly or Wasp, whichever sails fastest, must precede the fleet, keeping in shore and ahead of them . . . The dullest sailer of the Fly or Wasp must follow after this fleet and watch their motions . . . In short we think you may by a spirited execution of these Orders prevent them from coming by Surprize on any part of this Continent, and be assured you cannot recommend yourself more effectually to our friendship. If you could find an opportunity of attacking and taking one of the fleet on their coming out, it might be the means of giving us ample intelligence." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 43 (to Warner.) This was the fleet which soon afterwards occupied Newport; it sailed from New York December 1, the transports passing through Long Island Sound, the larger men-of-war outside. About the end of November the Fly returned to Philadelphia and on December 21 was sent down the Delaware to watch some British vessels cruising off the capes. The Wasp continued on the New Jersey shore for a while and then watched these vessels from the outside. The Hornet cruised during the summer and in December was ordered to the West Indies; but she did not go, being in Christiana Creek and unable to get out through a British fleet in Delaware Bay (Am. Arch., V, i, 137, 1118, 1181, ii, 970, 1199, 1200, 1292, iii, 461, 507, 637, 904, 1148, 1175, 1176, 1213, 1331, 1332, 1458, 1484; Pennsylvania Gazette, October 16, 1776; Mar. Com. Letter Book. 17, 30, 38, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48 (August 23, October 10, 23, 30, November 1, 11, 29, December 14, 25, 1776).)

According to Admiral Howe's letter of February 20, 1777, the British vessels employed in Delaware and Chesapeake Bays during 1776, some or all of them

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being stationed part of the time in one bay and part in the other and occasionally cruising off the capes, were the Roebuck of forty-four guns, the frigates Liverpool and Fowey, and the sloop of war Otter; while the frigate "Orpheus appears to have been rather appointed for the necessary and more general purpose of cruising between the port of New York and Entrance of the Delaware, than confined to the particular Guard of the last." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, No. 24.)

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

CHAPTER VOTHER EVENTS ON THE SEA IN 1776

Having followed the movements of two fleets in service during 1776, there remain to be considered various cruises and actions of a number of single vessels, public and private, that went out upon the sea in that year; and some other events as well.

The Massachusetts navy began its existence in August, 1775, when the Machias Liberty and Diligent were taken into the service of the province and Jeremiah O'Brien was put in command of them. The Diligent was afterwards commanded by Captain John Lambert. These vessels cruised intermittently and with some success for over a year, or until October, 1776. In February they were at Newburyport and received new crews. In the spring O'Brien took two or three small prizes (O'Brien, chs. vii, viii, ix; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 1294, vi, 800, V, iii, 384,387; Massachusetts Mag., January, April, 1910; Boston Gazette, June 10, July 29, 1776; Mass. Court Rec., February 8, March 23, 1776.)

Meanwhile the force had been increased. As a result of the report of the committee appointed December 29, 1775, to consider the subject of a state navy, ten vessels were authorized by the General Court of Massachusetts in February, 1776, the number being shortly afterwards reduced to five. April 20 it was resolved "that the Brigantine building at Kingston be called the Independence, that the Brigantine building at Dartmouth be called the Rising Empire, that the Sloop building at Salisbury be called the Tyrannicide, that oneof the Sloops building at Swanzey be called the Republic and the other the Freedom." The Tyrannicide was changed into a brigantine a few months later. Another vessel, the brigantine Massachusetts, was built at Salisbury in the spring. The Tyrannicide, Captain John Fisk, carrying fourteen guns and seventy-five men, seems to have been the first of these newly constructed vessels to get to sea. She sailed July 8 and four days later captured a prize. Captain Fisk's report, dated July 17, says: "This may serve to acquaint your Honours that in latitude 40° 26' north, longitude 65° 50' west, I fell in with the armed schooner Despatch from Halifax, bound to New York; and after an engagement of one-and-a-half hour, she struck to the American arms. I boarded her and found on

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board eight carriage guns and twelve swivel guns, twenty small arms, sixteen pistols, twenty cutlasses, some cartridges, boxes, and belts for bayonets, nine half barrels powder, all the accoutrement for said cannon. The Commander and one man were killed, and seven others wounded. The crew consisted of thirty men and one boy. I lost one man killed and ten wounded, and my vessel was much shattered, which obliged me to return with my prize, which I have at anchor in Salem Harbour, and wait your Honours' orders how to proceed with the prisoners. All the Captain's papers and orders were thrown overboard." (Coll. Essex Inst., January, 1906.) Fisk sailed again and during the month of August took four prizes, one of which was recaptured by a British frigate which chased and nearly caught the Tyrannicide. Upon Fisk's advice his sloop's rig was changed after her return from this cruise. October 29, Fisk was ordered on another cruise to the eastward of Nantucket Shoals as far as the ninth meridian of longitude and south to the twelfth parallel of north latitude. Meanwhile the brigantine Independence, Captain Simeon Sampson, whose instructions of July 26 were apparently the next issued after those of Captain Fisk, was "Directed Imediately to proceed on a Cruize not only against our Unatural Enemies, but also for ye Protection of the Trade of the United States, and you are directed to Range the Coast of the Province of Main . . . and from thence proceed as farr Southward as the Lattitude thirty-four North, and not further West than the Shoals of Nantuckett, nor further East than the Island [of] Sable, on the Coast of Nova Scotia." The Independence accomplished little during the year (Mass. Court Rec., April 20, May 4, September 13, 1776; Rec. Mass. Council, July 26, October 29, 1776; Am. Arch., V, i, 405, 552; Boston Gazette, August 19, 1776; Massachusetts Mag., April, 1908, January, 1909.)

Richard Derby of Salem reported, October 3, that on the previous evening the brigantine Massachusetts, "belonging to this State, aryved here." She bad been cruising during September under the command of Captain Daniel Souther, who, Derby says, "Informs me that a few Days after he sailed he fell in with & Took a Brigantine of about 250 Tons from Falmouth in England mounting six three pound Cannon & having on board a Captain & about 20 Privates of the 16th Regiment of Dragoons, with their Horse Accoutrements . . . He parted from the Prize this Day week in a Storm which has Continued almost ever since, but as the wind has been favourable this Day or two I Expect every moment to see or to hear of her being aryved at Boston. The prisoners in all amount to 35 which Cap Souther tho't too many to Cary the Cruise with him & therefor tho't best to Return & Land them, Espetially as he Expected to Do it in a few Days, but Gales of wind have prevented him. The Honble Board I hope will send me Directions how to Dispose of the Prisoners . . . They say the People in Brittain know Nothing what is passing in America & Capt Souther Informs me the Chaplain has told him the People in England begin to grow very weary." (Massachusetts Mag., October, 1908; Boston Gazette, October 7, 1776.)

The sloops Republic, Captain John Foster Williams, and Freedom, Captain John Clouston, when ready for sea were ordered to Boston. In October the Republic

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was sent on a cruise off Nantucket and soon captured the British armed ship Julius Caesar. The Republic was afterwards employed in commercial voyages. Captain Clouston's orders are dated September 20, 1776: "The sloop Freedom under your command, being in all respects equipped in a warlike manner and being also well and properly manned, so as to enable you to proceed on a cruise, you therefore are directed to range the eastern shore of this State laying between the River Piscataqua and Machias, in order to clear that coast of any of the enemy's cruisers that may be infesting the same; and from thence proceed to the mouth of the River St. Lawrence and there cruise until the first of November, in order to intercept any of the enemy's vessels that may be passing that way; and from thence you must proceed to the coast of Newfoundland and there cruise until the middle of November aforesaid, in order to surprise and seize such vessels of the enemy as you meet upon that coast or in any of the harbours of the same; after which you may proceed upon a cruise as far southward as latitude 38° north and continue upon said cruise so long as you find it practicable or expedient; and then you are to return to the harbour of Boston, always using every necessary precaution to prevent the sloop under your command from falling into the hands of the enemy. You are to observe and follow such orders and directions as you shall from time to time receive from Captain Daniel Souther, provided they are consistent with the instructions now given you. And whereas you have received a commission by force of arms to attack, seize and take on the high seas all ships and other vessels belonging to the inhabitants of Great Britain, or others infesting the sea-coast of this Continent, you are therefore punctually to follow the instructions already delivered you for regulating your conduct in this matter, and in all things conduct yourself consistent with the trust reposed in you." (Massachusetts Mag., April, 1909.) These instructions were probably not carried out, and after her return from a short cruise, the Freedom was altered into a brigantine, being fitted out with the masts, sails, and rigging of the Rising Empire. This vessel for some reason, after a very short cruise, had been reported by her captain to be "totally unflt for the service," and was put out of commission (Ibid., April, July, 1909, July, 1911; Mass. Court Rec., October 9, 1776.)

In May, 1776, the Connecticut brig Defence, Captain Harding, captured several tories crossing to Long Island. Harding then fitted out three small sloops to search for tories, the Defence being too well known to them. In a letter expressing well defined opinions of toryism, Governor Trumbull of Connecticut acknowledged Harding's reports "communicating alarming intelligence of a most unnatural and traitorous combination among the inhabitants of this Colony. Possessed of and enjoying the most valuable and important privileges, to betray them all into the hands of our cruel oppressors is shocking and astonishing conduct and evinces the deep degeneracy and wickedness of which mankind is capable. Have laid your communication before my Council. They are equally shocked at this horrid baseness and will with me be ready to come into any proper measures to defeat and suppress this wicked conspiracy to the utmost of our power; and in the mean time approve and applaud your zeal and activity to

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discover and apprehend any persons concerned in this blackest treason." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 503.) The Defence afterwards performed valuable service in Massachusetts Bay, returning to New London in July, and continued cruising during the rest of the year (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 439, 470, 482, 483, 503, 531; Connecticut Courant, July 22, 1776; Continental Journal, October 10, 1776; New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 37.)

Delaware and Chesapeake Bays and the Carolina sounds witnessed a good deal of marine conflict during the year 1776. Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia maintained many small craft, as well as some large vessels, for defense, and a number of captures were made early in the year. Several Continental vessels also cruised in these waters. In March the British sloop of war Otter, with several tenders and prizes, came up Chesapeake Bay nearly as far as Baltimore. The ship Defence, Captain James Nicholson, of the Maryland navy, went out to meet the Otter, drove her down the bay and recaptured her prizes. Governor Dunmore of Virginia employed a considerable fleet in Chesapeake Bay, which in July comprised more than forty vessels. Whatever British men-of-war happened to be stationed in the bay, and there were generally a few at least, were attached to this fleet. A family of tories, John Goodrich and several sons, also cruised about the bay in Dunmore's service. The chief function of the state cruisers was to check the ravages of these vessels along the shores of the bays and rivers. Several of their prizes were recaptured by the navies of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, and other captures, some of them important, were occasionally made. June 20, Captain James Barron of the Virginia navy took the Oxford, one of the fleet of Scotch transports bound to Boston, and brought her into Jamestown (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 114, 122, 123, 125, 126, v, 199, vi, 1559, V, i, 152, 525, ii, 162, iii, 821, 1607; Almon, iii, 31; Boston Gazette, February 5, May 20, July 15, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, May 23, 1776; So. Lit. Messenger, February, 1857.)

After the departure of Hopkins's fleet for New Providence in February, the Marine Committee fitted out other Continental vessels from time to time. Those that cruised along the coast of the Middle States were the brigs Lexington and Reprisal, of sixteen guns each, and the sloops Independence and Sachem, of ten guns each, and Mosquito of four guns. April 7, in sight of the Virginia capes, Captain John Barry of the Lexington reported to the Marine Committee: "I have the pleasure to acquaint you that at one P.M. this day I fell in with the sloop Edward [of eight guns], belonging to the Liverpool frigate. She engaged us near two glasses. They killed two of our men and wounded two more. We shattered her in a terrible manner, as you will see. We killed and wounded several of her crew. I shall give you a particular account of the powder and arms taken out of her, as well as my proceedings in general. I have the happiness to acquaint you that all our people behaved with much courage." (Pennsylvania Gazette, April 17, 1776.) Captain Barry was an Irishman by birth and afterwards became a distinguished officer of the navy. In July the sloop Sachem captured a heavily

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armed British letter of marque brig (Am. Arch., IV, v, 810, V, ii, 823; Almon, iii, 81; Griffin's Life of Barry, 30; Barney, 45, 46; N. E. Chronicle, April 25, 1776.)

The British man-of-war Roebuck, 44, cruised about the Virginia and Delaware capes from the middle of March until June. May 5, in company with the Liverpool, 28, and a number of tenders and prizes, she came up Delaware Bay. On the 8th these vessels were met below Chester by thirteen Pennsylvania galleys and an engagement followed which lasted all the afternoon. The Continental schooner Wasp, Captain Alexander, came out of Christiana Creek, into which she had been driven the day before by the British, and recaptured one of their prizes - a brig. The Roebuck was considerably injured in her rigging and, in attempting to get near the galleys, grounded on a shoal; the Liverpool anchored near by for her protection. During the night the Roebuck got off and the British dropped down the river. The galleys followed and another action took place. An American prisoner, impressed on board the Roebuck, says that the galleys "attacked the men-of-war the second day with more courage and conduct [and] the Roebuck received many shots betwixt wind and water; some went quite through, some in her quarter, and was much raked fore and aft . . . During the engagement one man was killed by a shot which took his arm almost off. Six were much hurt and burned by an eighteen-pound cartridge of powder taking fire, among whom was an acting lieutenant." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 810.) The British ships then retreated. In his official report to the admiral the captain of the Roebuck says: "On the 5th of May I took the Liverpool with me, sailed up the River as far as Wilmington, where I was attacked in a shallow part of the River by thirteen Row Gallies attended by several FireShips and Launches, which in two long Engagements I beat off and did my utmost to destroy . . . After having fully executed what I had in view, I returned to the Capes the 15th." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, November 28, 1776.) The presence of the Reprisal and Hornet in the bay, or near by, although they took no part in the action, may have contributed to the discomfort of the Englishmen's situation (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 395, 408, 498, 809-811; Almon, iii, 173; Boston Gazette, May 20, 1776 ; Barney, 40-43; Wallace's Life of Bradford, 367.)

The Reprisal, Captain Lambert Wickes, was ordered June 10 to Martinique, but she did not sail at once; at the end of the month she was still in the Delaware. On the 29th the armed brig Nancy, from the West Indies bound to Philadelphia with ammunition and military stores, was chased off the Delaware capes by six British men-of-war and tenders; she engaged the latter and beat them off. The Lexington and Reprisal came to the Nancy's rescue, and under cover of a fog she was run ashore near Cape May and the most valuable part of her cargo, including two hundred and seventy barrels of powder, was saved. The fog soon lifted and the British were seen to be very near and sending in boats. The Nancy's captain and crew then quitted her after setting her on fire, a large quantity of powder being still on board. Two or three of the British boats then came in, boarded the Nancy "and took possession of her with three cheers; soon after which the fire took the desired effect and blew the pirates forty or flfty yards into the air and much shattered one of their boats under her stern. Eleven dead

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bodies have since come on shore with two gold-laced hats and a leg with a garter. From the great number of limbs floating and driven ashore it is supposed thirty or forty of them were destroyed by the explosion." (Am. Arch., V, i, 14.) According to a British account, which may, however, refer to another incident, the boats sent in "boarded amidst a heavy fire from the shore, where thousands of people had assembled to protect her. Finding it impossible to get her off, we set her on fire, with orders to quit her without loss of time, as we found her cargo consisted of three hundred and sixty barrels of powder with some saltpetre and dry goods; but unfortunately, before we had all left her, she blew up and a mate and six men was blown to pieces in her. The oars of the other boats were all knocked to atoms and two men had their ribs broke; but considering the whole, we was amazingly fortunate, as the pieces of the vessel was falling all round for some time." (Navy Rec. Soc., vi, 35, journal of Lieutenant (later RearAdmiral) James, in which discrepancies in date and other details may perhaps be accounted for by its having been written two years later, in prison.) The Americans mounted a gun on shore and opened fire on the men-of-war. The fire was returned and Lieutenant Wickes, brother of the captain of the Reprisal, was killed (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 783, V, i, 14; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, narrative of Lieutenant Matthewman.)

The Reprisal sailed July 3 for the West Indies, taking out as passenger William Bingham, who was to be the American commercial and naval agent at Martinique. The Reprisal convoyed thirteen merchantmen to a safe distance beyond the Delaware capes. During the voyage she took and manned three prizes, which left her very short-handed. As she was approaching the port of St. Pierre, July 27, the British sloop of war Shark, 16, came out of the harbor. Captain Chapman of the Shark says that at half-past five that afternoon a ship was seen coming around the northern point of the bay and was suspected of being an American. At seven the Shark slipped her cables and made sail. Half an hour later the Reprisal tacked. "We wore and stood towards him & haild him twice in French, to which he made no answer; we afterwards haild him in English, he continued to make sail from us & made no reply. At 9 fir'd a shot ahead of him and haild in English, told him we was an English Man of War; he made no answer, but bore down and fired a Broadside into us, which we returned immediately and continued engaging 1/2 an hour, then he back'd his Maintops & dropt astern & afterwards tack'd; 1/4 past 10 we tack'd & stood towards him, at 1/2 past 10 they fired two shot at us from the shore, which occasioned us to bear away; he kept his Wind and anchord in the Bay." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captain's Logs, No. 895 (log of the Shark.) Wickes says that be replied to both the French and English hail of the Shark and that the latter fired a shot at ten o'clock followed by three others in succession, to which the Reprisal returned four, whereupon the English made sail in order to withdraw from the contest. A French officer on shore thought that the English fire was the more rapid and better delivered. He says that after parting from the Reprisal, the Shark chased a schooner, which took refuge under a battery; whereupon the battery fired two shot at the Shark. The next day she returned to her anchorage in the harbor. The

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Reprisal went back to the United States in September and the sloop Independence, Captain John Young, was sent out to take her place. Naval stores were greatly needed at all times and the Marine Committee took measures to obtain them in the West Indies, the depot for European goods of that kind. Ships of war were largely employed for their transportation (Am. Arch., V, i, 180, 249, 609, 706, 741, ii, 324, 410; Almon, iv, 103; Archives de la Marine, B7 458; Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 23, 293, 295 (Wickes to Committee of Secret Correspondence, July 11, 13, 1776) ; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 20, 26 (September 20, October 4, 1776); Boston Gazette, August 19, October 7, 1776; Independent Chronicle, October 3, 1776.)

In the spring of 1776 a British expedition was sent against the southern colonies. A fleet of transports with troops under the command of General Cornwallis sailed from Cork convoyed by two fifty-gun ships and several smaller vessels commanded by Commodore Parker. In May this force arrived in North Carolina and was joined by General Clinton, who had left Boston with several regiments in January; Clinton now assumed the command. The objective point of the expedition having been left to his discretion, he determined to attack Charleston, and on June 4 the fleet appeared off the bar at the harbor entrance of that town.

Meanwhile the Americans had been making preparations for defense. A force of five or six thousand, less than half of them regulars and all raw troops, was collected under the command of General Charles Lee. A fort of palmetto logs was built at the southern end of Sullivan's Island whichcom manded the channel. This fort was garrisoned by about three hundred and flfty regular troops and a few militia under Colonel Moultrie. Seven or eight hundred men were stationed at the northern end of Sullivan's Island to oppose the approach of the British from Long Island. The South Carolina navy, at that time consisting of three vessels, probably took some part in the defense of the town.

The British met with some difficulty and delay in getting over the bar, but by June 27 were ready for the attack. Their naval force consisted of the Bristol and Experiment of flfty guns each, the twenty-eight-gun frigates Solebay, Syren, Active, and Actaeon, the Sphynx, 20, the Friendship, 18, the bomb-vessel Thunder, which carried two mortars, and a few smaller armed vessels (For the expedition against Charleston, see Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1205-1210; Almon, iii, 142, 189-192, 264-267, 314-319; Dawson's Battles of the United States, ch. x; Pennsylvania Gazette, September 11, Nov. 20,1776; Penn. Evening Post, April 23,1776; Winsor's Narrative and Critical History of America, vi, 168-172, 229; Channing, iii, 226-228; Clowes, iii, 371-379.)

On the 28th the attack was made. Commodore Parker says in his report: "At half an hour after ten I made the signal to weigh, and about a quarter after eleven the Bristol, Experiment, Active and Solebay brought up against the fort. Thunder Bomb, covered by the Friendship armed vessel, brought the Saliant Angle of the East Bastion to bear N. W. by N. and . . . threw several shells a little before and

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during the engagement in a very good direction. The Sphynx, Actaeon and Syren were to have been to the westward, to prevent fireships and other vessels from annoying the ships engaged, to enfilade the works, and if the rebels should be driven from them, to cut off their retreat if possible. This last service was not performed, owing to the ignorance of the pilot, who run the three frigates aground. The Sphynx and Syren got off in a few hours, but the Actaeon remained fast till the next morning, when the captain and officers thought proper to scuttle and set her on fire." (Almon, iii, 189, 190 (July 9, 1776.)

The engagement lasted ten hours. The fort was little damaged by the bombardment it received from the British, while the fire of the Americans was delivered slowly and accurately, and with marked effect upon the ships of the enemy. In his report to the President of Congress General Lee says the ships "anchored at less than half musket shot from the fort and commenced one of the most furious and incessant fires I ever saw or heard." About half-past four in the afternoon the fort appeared to the British to have been silenced, but this was due to a failure of ammunition, and upon the arrival of a fresh supply, an hour and a half later, the fire was renewed. The Americans behaved extremely well, and Lee, upon visiting the fort, "found them determined and cool to the last degree; their behavior would have done honor to the oldest troops." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1205 (Lee's report, July 2, 1776.) Moultrie became thenceforth one of the heroes of the Revolution and the fort was named for him. The British troops who had landed on Long Island, to what number is uncertain, had intended to cross over to Sullivan's Island and attack the fort in the rear, where it was partly open and unfinished. The islands were separated by a shallow channel usually passable at low tide, but continued easterly winds had so backed up the water that it was too deep to be forded.

At about nine o'clock in the evening the British fire ceased and two hours later the fleet dropped down to its former anchorage. The Actaeon, after she had been set fire to and abandoned by her crew the next morning, was boarded by Americans who brought away her colors and some other property; half an hour later she blew up. The damage suffered by the British ships was heavy, especially by the Bristol and Experiment, and upon these two ships also the loss was greatest, which altogether amounted to sixty-four killed and a hundred and forty-one wounded, many of the latter dying from their injuries soon afterwards. The American loss was twelve killed and twenty-five wounded, five of them mortally. The attack was not renewed, and after making repairs, the fleet sailed for New York.

Under the encouragement of acts passed by the Continental Congress and the various provincial assemblies, privateering flourished during 1776, although it came very far from assuming the proportions that it attained in later years. Only thirty-four private commissions were issued under the authority of the Continental government, but probably a much larger number of privateers were sent out by the separate states. Vessels of this class cruised at sea, along the Atlantic coast,

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and in West Indian and European waters. The privateersmen were commonly successful, but first and last a good many of them fell into the hands of the enemy.

Captain James Tracy was unfortunate enough to fall in with a British frigate, mistaking her for a merchantman. Tracy sailed from Newburyport, June 7, in the brig Yankee Hero, carrying twelve guns and twenty-six men, including officers. He expected to get more men at Boston. Off Cape Ann the captain sighted a sail which he determined to chase, and here he received a reinforcement of fourteen men who came out from the shore in boats; with forty, he still had only a third of his complement. Tracy then bore away for the sail, which was five leagues distant, to the east-southeast; when too late he discovered the chase to be a man-of-war. He now put about for the shore with the ship, which turned out to be the frigate Milford, in pursuit. The wind, which had been westerly, died away, and in an hour and a half the frigate, having taken a fresh breeze from the south, was within half a mile and began to fire her bow chasers. The wind shifted to the west again. Tracy reserved his fire until the enemy should be within close range. She soon came up on the Yankee Hero's lee quarter within pistol-shot and the unequal contest became warm. The account of the affair was "chiefly collected from those who were in the engagement." "After some time the ship hauled her wind so close, which obliged the brig to do the same, that Capt. Tracy was unable to fight his lee guns; upon this he backed under her stern, but the ship, which sailed much faster and worked as quick, had the advantage and brought her broadside again upon him, which he could not evade, and in this manner they lay not an hundred feet from each other yawing to and fro for an hour and twenty minutes, the privateer's men valiantly maintaining their quarters against such a superior force. About this time the ship's foremast guns beginning to slack fire, Capt. Tracy tacked under his stern and when clear of the smoke and fire, perceived his rigging to be most shockingly cut, yards flying about without braces, some of his principal sails shot to rags and half of his men to appearance dying and wounded." The first lieutenant was among the wounded. The frigate having sheared off there was a short lull, during which the wounded were carried below and the crew began to repair the rigging. They were getting nearer shore and Tracy hoped to be able to escape. Before things could be put to rights, however, the frigate "again came up and renewed the attack, which obliged Capt. Tracy to have recourse to his guns again, though he still kept some hands aloft to his rigging, but before the brig had again fired two broadsides, Captain Tracy received a wound in his right thigh and in a few minutes he could not stand; he laid himself over the arm chest and barricadoe, determined to keep up the fire, but in a short time, from pain and loss of blood, he was unable to command, growing faint, and they helped him below. As soon as he came to, he found his flring had ceased and his people round him wounded, not having a surgeon with them, in a most distressed situation, most of them groaning and some expiring. Struck severely with such a spectacle, Capt. Tracy ordered his people to take him up in a chair upon the quarter deck and resolved again to attack the ship, which was all this time keeping up her fire; but after getting into the air, he was so

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faint that he was for some time unable to speak and finding no alternative but they must be taken or sunk, for the sake of the brave men that remained he ordered them to strike to the ship." (Mass. Spy, September 11, 1776.) The action lasted over two hours and the Yankee Hero lost four killed and thirteen wounded. On the Milford were thirty American prisoners who had been impressed and were forced to fight against their countrymen. The frigate took her prize to Halifax (Ibid., June 21, September 11, 1776; Am. Arch., IV, vi, 746-749; Mil. and Nav. Mag. of U. S., May, 1835.)

In May, 1776, the American privateer Camden, 14, fought three hours with the brigantine Earl of Warwick, 16. An explosion then took place on the Warwick which killed and wounded thirty men and she was obliged to strike (London Chronicle, July 13, 1776.) About the same time the privateer Cromwell, 20, captured and took into Philadelphia the British sloop of war Lynx (Ibid.) The private armed sloop Yankee, Captain Henry Johnson, of Boston, cruised in the English Channel, and, having taken two prizes, had many prisoners on board. The captain of one of the prizes and one or two other British officers, being in Captain Johnson's cabin, seized a cutlass which had been carelessly left within reach, and, arousing the other prisoners, soon had possession of the Yankee, which they took into Dover (Am. Arch., V, i, 684, 755, 750; Boston Gazette, July 15, December 9, 1776. For other operations of privateers in 1776, see Am Arch., V, i, 588, 874, 958, ii, 232, 346; Almon, iii, 34, 235, 267, 268, iv, 159, 160, 161 ; Boston Gazette, June 17, August 12, September 2, 16, 30, November 25, December 30, 1776; Independent Chronicle, June 13, October 17, November 14, 28, 1776.)

Several attempts were made during the Revolution to destroy British men-of-war at anchor. Such an enterprise was discussed in 1775 in reference to the British fleet in Boston Harbor, and some preparations seem to have been made to carry it out. Samuel Osgood wrote to John Adams from the camp at Roxbury, October 23,1775: "The famous Water Machine from Connecticutt is every Day expected in Camp; it must unavoidably be a clumsy Business, as its Weight is about a Tun. I wish it might succeed [and] the Ships be blown up beyond the Attraction of the Earth, for it is the only Way or Chance they have of reaching St Peter's Gate." (Adams MSS.) The "Water Machine" here referred to was probably the contrivance of David Bushnell of Counecticut, which afterward excited great interest; yet just at this time John Hancock, President of Congress, wrote to General Washington: "Captn. John Macpherson having informed the Congress that he had invented a method by which with their leave he would take or destroy every ministerial armed vessel in North America, they appointed Govn. Hopkins, Mr. Randolph & Mr. J. Rutledge to confer with him on the subject, for he would not consent to communicate the secret to any but a committee & you. These Gentlemen reported that the scheme in theory appeared practicable and that, though its success could not be relied on without experience, they thought it well worth attempting on the fleet in & about Boston harbour, their destruction being an object of the utmost consequence. The Congress have therefore directed

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Capt. Macpherson to repair immediately to Cambridge." (Letters to Washington, 89, 72 (October 20, 1775).)

These projects went no farther at the time, and the British continued to ride safely at anchor in the harbor until they saw fit to take their departure the next spring. In July, 1776, preparations of a similar nature were made. On the night of August 17 two fireships in the Hudson River attacked the ships Phoenix and Rose, which had recently been assaulted by galleys. One of the fireships ignited the Rose's tender, which was "totally consumed." The other approached the Phoenix, whereupon that ship opened fire and cut her cable. The English account says: "Ten Minutes Afterwards she boarded us upon the Starboard Bow, at which time the Rebels set fire to the Train and left her. Set the Fore Topsail and Headsails, which fortunately cast the ship and disengaged her from the Fire Ship, after having been Twenty Minutes with her Jibb Boom over the Gun whale." (Brit. Adm. Rec. A. D. 487, August 17,1776, remarks on board H.M.S. Phoenix.) The British then prudently dropped down the river to a new anchorage. The most interesting attempt to destroy a British manof-war was made in New York Harbor about the same time, with a submarine boat and torpedo designed by David Bushnell. The operator succeeded in bringing his boat under a British ship, but was unable to attach the torpedo to her side, on account of the copper sheathing, then drifted away and lost his bearings. The torpedo, left floating in the harbor, afterwards exploded with great force ; it contained a hundred and fifty pounds of powder which was ignited by a time-lock. Two subsequent trials, made in the Hudson River, also failed. The next year Bushnell endeavored to draw a torpedo against the side of a ship in Black Point Bay, near New London, by means of a line. But the line, having been discovered, was hauled in by the crew of a schooner near by; whereupon the torpedo exploded, demolishing the schooner and killing three men (Am. Arch., V, i, 155, 451, 692; Almon, iii, 341, vi, 90; Ford's Washington, iii, 202, iv, 348, x, 504; Clark's Naval History, i, ch. v; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1893; Boston Gazette, August 26, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, August 29, 1776.)

Towards the end of the year 1776 some of the thirteen frigates authorized by Congress in December, 1775, were nearly ready for service. The Raleigh's keel was laid at Portsmouth March 21 and just two months later she was ready to enter the water. "On Tuesday the 21st inst. the Continental Frigate of thirty-two guns, built at this place under the direction of John Langdon, Esq., was Launched amidst the acclamation of many thousand spectators. She is esteemed by all those who are judges that have seen her, to be one of the compleatest ships ever built in America. The unwearied diligence and care of the three Master-Builders, Messrs. Hacket, Hill and Paul, together with Mr. Thompson under whose inspection she was built, and the good order and industry of the Carpenters deserve particular notice; scarcely a single instance of a person being in liquor, or any difference among the men in the yard during the time of her building, every man with pleasure exerting himself to the utmost; and altho' the greatest care was taken that only the best of timber was used and the

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work perform'd in a most masterly manner, the whole time from her raising to the day she launched did not exceed sixty working days, and what afforded a most pleasing view (which was manifest in the countenance of the spectators) this noble fabrick was compleatly to her anchors in the main channel in less than six minutes from the time [of] the run, without the least hurt; and what is truly remarkable, not a single person met with the least accident in launching, tho' near five hundred men were employed in and about her when ran off." (New Hampshire Gazette, May 25, 1776, quoted in N. H. General Rec., January, 1907.)

On September 21 the Marine Committee directed that the frigates Boston, Captain Hector McNeill, and Raleigh, Captain Thomas Thompson, should be fitted out as expeditiously as possible, and these vessels were ordered to cruise in Massachusetts Bay and to the eastward, in search of the British frigate Milford. October 23 these orders were modified by joining with these two vessels the frigate Hancock, and instructions were issued for Captains Manley, McNeill, and Thompson: "You are hereby directed to act in concert and Cruize together for the following purposes and on the following stations. Your first object must be to inform yourselves in the best manner possible, if any of the British men of war are Cruizing in the bay of Boston or off the Coast of Massachusetts, and all such you are to endeavour with your utmost force to take, sink, or destroy. Having effected this service you are to proceed together towards Rhode Island and there make prize of or destroy any of the enemies Ships of war that may be found Cruizing off the Harbour or Coast of Rhode Island. The Prizes you make are to be sent into the nearest Port. When you arrive at Rhode Island, if Commodore Hopkins should not be already sailed on his Southern expedition and the two frigates built in that State should not be ready for the Sea, in that case you are to join Commodore Hopkins and proceed with him on the said expedition, producing those orders to him to justify the measure. But if the Rhode Island frigates should be ready for the sea, there will be no Occasion for you or either of you to go Southward. And you will then proceed, taking with you any Continental Vessel that may be at Rhode Island and ready, if Commodore Hopkins should be sailed before you come there, and proceed to Cruize against the enemies Ships & Vessels that may be found off the Coast between the Harbour of Newport and the Banks of Newfoundland. We have no doubt from your zeal and attachment to the cause of America that you will execute this service with all possible dispatch and vigor, and so bid you heartily farewell." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 39.) The frigate Randolph, built at Philadelphia, was put under the command of Captain Biddle and was expected to sail before the end of the year. For one reason or another, however, chiefly, no doubt, the difficulty of manning the ships and the British blockade, no Continental frigate got to sea in 1776 (Am. Arch., V, ii, 428, 1200, iii, 826, 827, 1198, 1254, 1332, 1484; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 21, 22, 23, 24 (September 21, 1776.)

In October the Reprisal was placed at the disposal of the Committee of Secret Correspondence of Congress and the Lexington, Andrew Doria, and Sachem

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were put under the orders of the Secret Committee; these were two distinct committees. These vessels, in addition to other duties, carried important dispatches. The Reprisal was ordered to take Franklin, who had been appointed a commissioner to France, to his post; and afterwards to cruise in the English Channel. She sailed about the 1st of November and anchored in Quiberon Bay a month later; two small prizes were taken during the voyage. Franklin went ashore at Auray, and made the best of his way to Paris, where he arrived December 22 (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 34, 35 (October 17, 18, 1776); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 75, 83, 95 (October 24, 1776) ; Am. Arch., V, ii, 1092, 1115, 1197-1199, 1211-1213, 1215, iii, 1197.)

The Lexington, Captain William Hallock, went to the West Indies in the service of the Secret Committee of Congress and on her way back from Cape Francois, in December, was captured off the Delaware capes by the British frigate Pearl. About this time there were six British ships in this vicinity or stationed in the bay, which at the end of the year was closely blockaded. A lieutenant and a small prize crew were put on the Lexington and seventy of her own crew were left on board. The same evening these prisoners recaptured the ship and, though without officers to direct them, took her safe into port (Am. Arch., V, iii, 1484, 1486; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, narrative of Lieutenant Matthewman; Port Folio, June, 1814, memoir of Commodore Dale.)

Under orders dated October 17, 1776, the Andrew Doria, Captain Isaiah Robinson, sailed for the Dutch island of St. Eustatius for a cargo of military supplies. Upon arriving at that place and anchoring in the roads, November 16, the Andrew Doria fired a salute of eleven guns, which was returned by the fort with two guns less, as for a merchantman. This has been called the first salute given the American flag in a foreign port, but about three weeks before this an American schooner had had her colors saluted at the Danish island of St. Croix. In response to a British complaint the salute to the Andrew Doria was disavowed by the Dutch government and the governor of St. Eustatius was recalled. The Andrew Doria, having taken on the stores for which she was sent, sailed for Philadelphia. On the return voyage, near Porto Rico, she captured the British twelve-gun sloop of war Racehorse after an engagement of two hours. A few days later another prize was taken, but was recaptured. The Andrew Doria and Racehorse arrived safely in port (Barney, 47-51; Amer. Hist. Rev., viii (July, 1903), 691-695; N. E. Mag., July, 1893; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 34; Pap. Cont. Congr., 28, 173 (March 28,1777.)

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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER VI

LAKE CHAMPLAIN, 1776

In the days when the frontier severing Canada from New England and New York was a wilderness, the only easy avenue of communication was by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. With the exception of a few miles of rapids in the river, the whole distance from the St. Lawrence to the head of Lake Champlain was navigable, and as the shores were rough and densely wooded, the only practicable route was by water. This natural gateway was therefore of great military importance, and a struggle for its possession has marked every war involving Canada and the colonies or states to the south.

Even before the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1775, it was understood that the British had planned to get control of Lake Champlain and Lake George and the Hudson River, so as to separate New England from the other colonies (MassHist. Soc. Proc., xii (April, 1872), 227 (letter Of Samuel Adams, November 16, 1775.) In anticipation of this, Ticonderoga was taken by the Americans under Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, May 10, and Crown Point two days later. A schooner had been impressed at Skenesborough (Whitehall) at the extreme head of Lake Champlain, and in her Arnold proceeded with fifty men, May 14, to St. John's on the Richelieu, at the head of the rapids. This place was taken on the 18th. Having found there nine bateaux, Arnold destroyed five of them and brought away the other four, together with a seventy-ton sloop. He then returned up the lake to Crown Point (Am. Arch., IV, ii, 645, 839.) The Americans now had full control of the lake. All naval enterprises on these inland waters were carried on by the army, which was under the command of General Schuyler.

The British entered upon the construction of two vessels at St. John's in the summer of 1775, but this place was again taken by the Americans under General Montgomery in November. Montgomery then began his progress through Canada, which ended with his death at Quebec on December 31. Meanwhile Arnold, having accomplished his remarkable and arduous winter march through the wilds of Maine, shared in the unsuccessful assault of Montgomery on Quebec. He spent the winter before that stronghold, hoping to gain possession of it in the spring; but upon the arrival of a British fleet in the St. Lawrence in May, 1776, the Americans were obliged to fall back up the river and evacuate Canada, finally withdrawing from St. John's to Isle aux Noix June 18. The retreat from Sorel was conducted in an orderly manner and with trifling loss by General Sullivan, all the baggage and stores being dragged up over the rapids of the Richelieu in bateaux. The army was much weakened by the prevalence of smallpox and by disability through inoculation as a protection against that disease. Everything that could have been of value to the enemy at Chambly and

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St. John's was destroyed. General Schuyler wrote to Sullivan, June 25: "Painful as the evacuation of Canada is to me, yet a retreat without loss greatly alleviates that pain, not only because it reflects honour upon you, but that I have now a confidant hope, that by recruiting your Army and keeping up a naval superiority on the Lake, we shall be able to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the inhabited parts of these Colonies." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1107.) Arnold, who had left Montreal June 15 and joined Sullivan at St. John's, advised building twenty or thirty gondolas, row-galleys, and floating batteries for the defense of the lake, and for this purpose believed that three hundred ship carpenters would be needed. Gondolas were flat-bottomed boats, difficult to handle, while galleys were larger and probably had keels; oars and sails were employed in both (Ibid., iii, 468, 738, 1208, 1342-1344, 1392-1394, vi, 1101-1108.)

Meanwhile American naval interests on the lake had not been wholly neglected. During the preceding twelve months some construction had been undertaken and different officers had been from time to time in command of the vessels in service. The last of these officers to be appointed commodore of the little fleet was Captain Jacobus Wyncoop, who received his orders from General Schuyler in May, 1776. After the return of the army from Canada in June, ship-building at Skenesborough was pushed with vigor, urged on by the restless energy of Arnold, who had had some nautical experience and who in August was put in command. He wished to build at least one powerful frigate, but that was beyond the resources at his disposal. This activity of the Americans compelled the British also, as soon as they had recovered possession of St. John's, to begin the construction of a fleet. A ship and two schooners were taken apart, transported over and around the rapids, and rebuilt at St. John's. Besides these large vessels the British had thirty long-boats from the squadron in the St. Lawrence, many flat-bottomed boats, a heavily armed radeau, a gondola weighing thirty tons which had been left by the Americans at Quebec, and more than four hundred bateaux for the transportation of troops and supplies. According to Captain Douglas, commanding the British squadron in the St. Lawrence, this force included "above thirty flghting vessels of different sorts and sizes." In this contest of ship-building during the summer of 1776 the British had a great advantage. Their fleet of men-of-war and transports in the St. Lawrence furnished them with an abundant force of ship carpenters and other artisans, as well as regular naval crews for the vessels when finished. It was with the greatest difficulty that the Americans procured a sufficient number of mechanics to build the fleet with which they were later obliged to meet the greatly superior force which the British brought against them. The demand for carpenters in the seaport towns for work upon public and private naval craft was far beyond the supply (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 4, 11-14, 49, v, 437, 1397, 1460, 1464, 1694, V, i, 563, 603, 744-746, 747, 797, 937, 969, 1277, ii, 1178, 1179.)

On August 7, General Gates issued instructions to Arnold to take the fleet as far as Split Rock or to, but not beyond, Isle aux Tetes, and there make stand against the enemy; but if the British had decidedly superior force, Arnold was to fall back

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to Ticonderoga. Ten days later, the fleet being at Crown Point, an advance of the British was reported. At this time Wyncoop, who commanded the schooner Royal Savage, claimed also to be still in command of the fleet. The conflicting orders of Arnold and Wyncoop on the occasion of this supposed advance of the British naturally caused confusion. Gates ordered Wyncoop to be put under arrest and sent back to Ticonderoga and thenceforth Arnold's authority was undisputed. The fleet left Crown Point August 24, went into Willsborough September 1, having encountered a severe storm, and on the 18th was at Isle la Motte. Arnold then wrote to Gates: "I intend first fair wind to come up as high as Isle Valcour, where is a good harbour and where we shall have the advantage of attacking the enemy in the open Lake, where the row-galleys, as their motion is quick, will give us a great advantage over the enemy; and if they are too many for us, we can retire." (Am. Arch., v, ii, 481.) Arnold appears, however, to have remained in the vicinity of Isle la Motte until September 23. The American fleet then retreated up the lake to the strait between Valcour Island and the New York shore. This locality, which had previously been surveyed, afforded an excellent and secluded anchorage in a cove on the west side of the island, almost concealed by trees from vessels passing up the lake in the channel to the east of Valcour. October 1, Arnold received intelligence that the British were nearly ready to advance from St. John's, and their movement began on the 4th (Ibid., i, 826, 1002, 1003, 1051, 1096, 1123, 1185-1187, 1201, 1266, 1267, ii, 185, 186, 481, 834, 835.)

The two fleets were now ready for the conflict, and a statement of their comparative strength at the time may be made. The American force under Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold consisted of the sloop Enterprise, Captain Dickenson, carrying twelve four-pounders, ten swivels, and fifty men; the schooners Royal Savage, Captain Hawley, with four six-pounders and eight fours, ten swivels, and fifty men, and Revenge, Captain Seaman, with four four-pounders and four twos, ten swivels, and thirty- five men; the gondolas New Haven, Providence, Boston, Spitfire, Philadelphia, Connecticut, Jersey, and New York, each carrying one twelve-pounder and two nines, eight swivels, and forty-five men; and the galleys Lee with one twelve-pounder, one nine, and four fours, Trumbull with one eighteen-pounder, one twelve, two nines, and four sixes, Congress with two twelve-pounders, two eights, and four sixes, and Washington with one eighteen- pounder, one twelve, two nines, and four fours, the galleys altogether carrying also fifty-eight swivels and three hundred and twenty-six men. The American force on the lake likewise included a schooner, the Liberty, and a galley called the Gates, but these two vessels took no part in subsequent events. The opposing fleet was commanded by Captain Thomas Pringle of the British navy, who had with him on his flagship General Carleton, commanding the army. The force consisted of the ship Inflexible, mounting eighteen twelve-pounders; the schooners Maria with fourteen six-pounders and Carleton with twelve sixes; the radeau Thunderer with six twenty-four-pounders, six twelves, and two howitzers; the gondola Loyal Convert, seven nine-pounders; twenty gunboats, each with one twenty-four-pounder or a nine and some of them with howitzers; four longboats armed with one carriage gun each; and twenty-four long-boats

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loaded with provisions and stores. The American fleet of fifteen vessels therefore mounted eighty-six guns, throwing a total weight of metal of six hundred and five pounds, and a hundred and fifty-two swivels, while the British had about the same number of guns, but much heavier ones, discharging a total weight of over a thousand pounds. The superiority of heavy guns to light ones is much greater than in proportion to the difference in weight of projectile, one twelve-pounder being far more effective than two sixes. The Inflexible alone was a match for a good part of the American fleet; but on the other hand, the powerful battery of the Thunderer was in great measure useless because of her slowness and clumsiness. As to men, the full complement of the American fleet was eight hundred and twenty-one, but the number actually engaged was doubtless much smaller, as only five hundred had been obtained by October 1; there may have been about seven hundred at the time of the battle, and those in large part at least of poor quality, for Arnold had to take what be could get; their conduct in the battles that followed, however, could not have been better. The British fleet was manned by six hundred and ninety-seven officers and men from the regular navy. Arnold hoisted his flag on the galley Congress, and the second in command, General David Waterbury, on the galley Washington. Pringle and Carleton were both on the schooner Maria (Am. Arch., V, i, 1123,1201, iii, 834, 1017, 1039, 1179.)

The British fleet anchored during the night of October 10 between Grand and Long Islands and got under way the next morning with a northeast wind. It was seen at eight o'clock by the Americans off Cumberland Head. Waterbury promptly went on board the Congress to consult with Arnold, to whom he expressed the "opinion that the fleet ought immediately to come to sail and fight them on a retreat in main Lake, as they were so much superiour to us in number and strength, and we being in such a disadvantageous harbour to fight a number so much superiour and the enemy being able with their small boats to surround us on every side, as I knew they could, we lying between an island and the main. But General Arnold was of the opinion that it was best to draw the fleet in a line where we lay, in the bay of Valcour. The fleet very soon came up with us and surrounded us, when a very hot engagement ensued." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1224.)

Through neglecting to reconnoitre, the British did not discover the American fleet until they had passed Valcour Island, and it was then necessary to attack from the leeward, at a disadvantage. Arnold, in his report of October 12 to General Gates, says that when the British were first seen on the morning of the 11th, "we immediately prepar'd to receive them, the gallies and Royal Savage were ordered under way, the rest of our fleet lay at anchor. At Eleven O'Clock [the enemy] ran under the lee of Valcour & began the attack. The schooner [Royal Savage] by some bad management fell to lee-ward and was first attack'd, one of her masts was wounded & her rigging shot away; the Captain thought prudent to run her on the point of Valcour, where all the men were saved . . . At half past twelve the engagement became general & very warm. Some of the enemy's ships & all their Gondolas beat & row'd up within musket shot of us . . . The

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Enemy landed a large number of Indians on the Island & each shore, who kept an incessant fire on us, but did little damage; the Enemy had to appearance upwards of one thousand men in batteaus prepared for boarding. We suffered much for want of Seamen and gunners; I was obliged myself to point most of the guns on board the Congress, which I believe did good execution." The enemy "continued a very hot fire with round & Grape Shot until five O'Clock when they thought proper to retire to about six or seven hundred yards distance & continued [their fire] until dark." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163; Am. Arch., V, ii, 1038.) Arnold's decision to hold his ground and fight was wise; retreat would have been demoralizing and disastrous.

Captain Pringle's report, dated October 15, says: "Upon the 11th I came up with the rebel fleet commanded by Benedict Arnold. They were at anchor under the island of Valicour and formed a strong line extending from the island to the west side of the continent. The wind was so unfavorable that for a considerable time nothing could be brought into action with them but the gun boats; the Carleton schooner, commanded by Mr. Dacres, by much perseverance at last got to their assistance, but as none of the other vessels of the fleet could then get up, I did not think it by any means adviseable to continue so partial and unequal a combat. Consequently, with the approbation of his excellency general Carleton, who did me the honour of being on board the Maria, I called off the Carleton and gun boats and brought the whole fleet to anchor in a line as near as possible to the rebels, that their retreat might be cut off." (London Chronicle, November 26, 1776; Am. Arch., V, ii, 1069; Almon, iv, 86. For reports of Douglas and Carleton, see Ibid., 84.)

Of the American losses Arnold says: "The Congress and Washington have suffered greatly; the latter lost her first Lieutenant killed, Captain and Master wounded . . . The Congress reciev'd seven shot between wind and water, was hull'd a dozen times, had her main mast wounded in two places, & her yard in one; the Washington was hull'd a number of times, her main mast shot through & must have a new one. Both vessels are very leaky and want repairing . . . The New York lost all her officers except her Captain. The Philada. was hull'd in so many places that she sunk about one hour after the engagement was over. The whole kill'd & wounded amounted to about sixty." After dark the British set fire to the Royal Savage, fearing that the Americans would again take possession of her and float her; she soon blew up. In concluding his report Arnold says: "I cannot in justice to the officers in the fleet omit mentioning their spirited conduct during the action." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163. On the whole campaign, see Dawson's Battles of the United States, ch. xiii, with official reports and many references; Mahan's account in Clowes, iii, 354-370, and in Scribner's Mag., February, 1898; Amer. Hist. Record, October, November, 1874; Coll. Conn. Hist. Soc., vii (1899), 239-291.)

After the battle was over it was evident that the American fleet could not endure another day's contest under such disadvantages. "On consulting with General

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Waterbury & Colo. Wigglesworth," says Arnold, "it was thought prudent to return to Crown point, every vessel's ammunition being nearly three fourths spent & the Enemy greatly superior to us in Ships and men. At 7 O'Clock Col. Wigglesworth in the Trumbull got under way, the Gondolas and small vessels followed, & the Congress and Washington brought up the rear; the Enemy did not attempt to molest us." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163.) Waterbury says that a council was held, "to secure a retreat through their fleet to get to Crown Point, which was done with so much secrecy that we went through them entirely undiscovered." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163.) It is remarkable that thirteen American vessels should have been able to pass through the British fleet without detection. Pringle merely says that his purpose to cut off their retreat was "frustrated by the extreme obscurity of the night, and in the morning the rebels had got a considerable distance from us up the Lake." (London Chronicle, November 26, 1776.) It has been suggested that Arnold led his fleet around the north end of Valcour and so avoided the British fleet (Amer. Hist. Rec., November, 1874, and Hag. Amer. Hist., June, 1881. The author, W. C. Watson, presents strong though not wholly convincing evidence in favor of this view.)

The Americans retreated south up the lake, and early in the morning, October 12. reached Schuyler's Island, ten miles from Valcour. Here Arnold wrote his report to General Gates of the preceding day's battle, adding: "Most of the fleet is this minute come to an anchor; the Wind is small to the Southward. The Enemy's fleet is under way to Leeward and beating up. As soon as our leaks are stopp'd the whole fleet will make the utmost dispatch to Crown point, where I beg you will send ammunition & your farther orders for us. On the whole, I think we have had a very fortunate escape." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163.) But it was too early to talk of escape, with the enemy in hot pursuit. Such repairs as were possible were hastily made; two of the gondolas were so much injured that it was necessary to abandon them, and they were sunk. "We remained no longer at Schuyler's Island," says Arnold in a later report, "than to stop our leaks and mend the sails of the Washington. At two o'clock P.M., the 12th, weighed anchor with a fresh breeze to the southward. The enemy's fleet at the same time got under way; our gondola made very little way ahead." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1079 (to General Schuyler, October 15,1776.) Waterbury says of his vessel, the Washington, that she was "so torn to pieces that it was almost impossible to keep her above water; my sails was so shot that carrying sail split them from foot to head." "In the evening," continues Arnold, "the wind moderated and we made such progress that at six o'clock next morning we were about off Willsborough, twenty-eight miles from Crown Point. The enemy's fleet were very little way above Schuyler's Island. The wind breezed up to the southward, so that we gained very little by beating or rowing; at the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze from the northeast, and by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside of us. The Washington and Congress were in the rear; the rest of our fleet were ahead, except two gondolas sunk at Schuyler's Island." (Ibid.)

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Waterbury's story of the retreat on the night of October 12 and the next morning gives fuller details. "The enemy still pursued all night. I found next morning that they gained upon us very fast and that they would very soon overtake me. The rest of the fleet all being much ahead of me, I sent my boat on board of General Arnold, to get liberty to put my wounded in the boat and send them forward and run my vessel on shore and blow her up. I received for answer, by no means to run her ashore, but to push forward to Split Rock, where he would. draw the fleet in a line and engage them again; but when I came to Split Rock, the whole fleet was making their escape as fast as they could and left me in the rear to fall into the enemy's hands. But before I struck to them, the ship of eighteen twelve-pounders [Inflexible] and a schooner of fourteen six-pounders [Maria] had surrounded me, which obliged me to strike, and I thought it prudent to surrender myself prisoner of war." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1224.)

Arnold's narrative of the running fight continues: "The Washington galley was in such a shattered condition and had so many men killed and wounded, she struck to the enemy after receiving a few broadsides. We were then attacked in the Congress galley by a ship mounting eighteen twelve-pounders, a schooner of fourteen sixes and one of twelve sixes, two under our stern and one on our broadsides, within musket shot. They kept up an incessant fire on us for about five glasses with round and grape shot, which we returned as briskly. The sails, rigging and hull of the Congress were shattered and torn in pieces, the First Lieutenant and three men killed, when to prevent her falling into the enemy's hands, who had seven sail around me, I ran her ashore in a small creek ten miles from Crown Point, on the east side; when, after saving our small arms, I set her on fire with four gondolas, with whose crews I reached Crown Point through the woods that evening and very luckily escaped the savages who waylaid the road in two hours after we passed." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1080.)

Pringle's report says: "Upon the 13th I again saw 11 sail of their fleet making off to Crown Point, who, after a chace of seven hours, I came up with in the Maria, having the Carleton and Inflexible a small distance astern.; the rest of the fleet almost out of sight. The action began at twelve o'clock and lasted two hours, at which time Arnold in the Congress galley and five gondolas ran on shore and were directly abandoned and blown up by the enemy, a circumstance they were greatly favoured in by the wind being off shore and the narrowness of the lake." (London Chronicle, November 26, 1776.) The British loss in killed and wounded was about forty. A letter from Albany, dated October 17, says that the second engagement was fought "most of the time in musket shot, very warm and sharp, in which our men conducted with inimitable spirit and bravery, but were obliged to submit to superior strength. In this affair our fleet is almost totally ruined; only one galley escaped, with sloop Enterprise and two small schooners (One of then must have been the Liberty which was not in the action.) and one gondola; the rest all taken, burnt and destroyed." The Washington "is the only vessel that the enemy possessed themselves of. Col. Wigglesworth in the Trumbull galley is arrived at Ticonderoga." (Boston Gazette, October 28,1776.) Arnold concludes

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his story of this series of disasters by recounting that at four o'clock in the morning of October 14 he reached Ticonderoga "exceedingly fatigued and unwell, having been without sleep or refreshment for near three days. Of our whole fleet we have saved only two galleys, two small schooners, one gondola and one sloop. General Waterbury with one hundred and ten prisoners were returned [on parole] by Carleton last night. On board of the Congress we had twenty odd men killed and wounded. Our whole loss amounts to eighty odd. The enemy's fleet were last night three miles below Crown Point; their army is doubtless at their heels." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1080.) An early attack on Ticonderoga was expected.

Captain Douglas at Quebec, when he learned of the British victory, wrote to the Admiralty: "The ship Inflexible with the Maria and Carleton schooners, all reconstructions, did the whole of the second day's business, the flat- bottomed rideau called the Thunderer and the gondola called the Loyal Convert, with the gunboats, not having been able to keep up with them." (Ibid., 1178. For Carleton's report, see lbid., 1040.) The British ship and schooners, armed with eighteen twelve-pounders and twenty-six sixes, had the Americans at their mercy, especially in the running fight of the 13th. The clumsy gondolas were practically useless and the galleys not much better.

Ezra Green, a surgeon in the American army wrote from Ticonderoga, October 30, to a friend, giving a brief account of the battles on the lake and of subsequent events. He says the American prisoners, after their release on parole, reported that they had been "treated very kindly by the Indians as well as by the King's troops who were at the time at Crown Point within 15 miles of this place, where they have been ever since the destruction of our Fleet. We have lately been alarm'd several times. On Monday morning last there was a proper alarm occasioned by a number of the enemies boats which hove in sight, and a report from a scouting party that the Enemy were moving on; where the Fleet is now I can't learn, or what is the reason they don't come on I can't conceive. 'T is thought they are 10 or 12 thousand strong, including Canadians and Indians. We are in a much better situation now than we were fourteen days ago and the militia are continually coming in. Our sick are recovering and it is thought we are as ready for them now as ever we shall be. There has been a vast deal of work done since the fight and we think ourselves in so good a position that we shall be disappointed if they don't attack us. However, I believe they wait for nothing but a fair wind." (Diary of Ezra Green, 5, 6.)

By the time the British had taken Crown Point the season was far advanced. This fact and the presence of a formidable American force deterred them from at once attempting the capture of Ticonderoga. They withdrew to Canada for the winter, and their purpose of occupying the valley of the Hudson and separating New England from the other states was put off. They returned the next year under General Burgoyne, but the opportunity had passed. Howe had gone to Philadelphia and Burgoyne, unsupported from the south, was forced to surrender

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his army at Saratoga. The French alliance followed as a direct consequence. The American naval supremacy on Lake Champlain in the summer of 1776 had compelled the British to spend precious time in building a fleet strong enough to overcome it. The American defeat which followed was a victory. The obstruction to the British advance and a year's delay saved the American cause from almost certain ruin. It thus came about through a singular instance of the irony of fate, not altogether pleasant to contemplate, that we owe the salvation of our country at a critical juncture to one of the blackest traitors in history.

The end of the year 1776 found the War for Independence well advanced and a fair share of the strife had fallen upon the sea forces of the Revolutionists. A comparatively few small vessels, mostly converted merchantmen, under Continental and state authority, supplemented by privateers, had done the enemy a good deal of injury. It would be difficult to make even an approximate estimate of the number of American privateers at this period. Thirty-our were commissioned by the Continental Congress in 1776; probably a much larger number by the various states, as Continental letters of marque do not seem to have come into common use at this early date (Naval Records of the American Revolution (calendar), 217-495.)

In 1776 the British navy appears to have had somewhat more than a hundred vessels in active service manned by twenty-eight thousand seamen and marines. According to the returns of Admiral Shuldham the fleet on the North American station comprised forty-three vessels of all classes in March and fifty-four in July. Probably forty of these were superior to the best ships on the American side in that year. In September, Admiral Howe reported a total of seventy vessels on the station. In November, according to a letter from London, "the Marine Force of England now in America consists of two ships of the line, ten fifties, and seventy-one frigates and armed vessels, amounting in the whole to eighty-three ships and vessels of war and 15,000 seamen." (Boston Gazette, February 24,1777; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 22, July 6, 1776, A. D. 487, July 28, September 18, 1776; Am. Arch., V, i, 463, ii, 1318; Schomberg, iv, 318-321.)

The British attempted to meet the difficulties encountered in manning their ships by impressing Americans that fell into their hands or by inducing them to enlist. Their crews were thereby made up in part of unreliable material which required close watching. The disadvantages of this state of things appear in a letter of Shuldham to the Admiralty calling their attention to the many supernumeraries in the ships' companies. He says: "I must beg they will please to observe that these being composed of Men taken out of the Rebel Vessels, no confidence can be placed in them, and although the Captains of His Majesty's Ships under my Command have all of them more or less entered Americans to fill up their Complements and are now by the Law empowered to do so with regard to Men taken in future, yet it deserves to be seriously considered that if, by a constant diminution of the British Seamen upon this Service, this measure was carried to excess without any Supply from home to be distributed among the Fleet, the

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consequence may be very alarming; their Lordships will therefore see the necessity there is of my keeping compleat the parties of Marines belonging to the different Ships." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, April 25,1776.)

From March 10, 1776, to the end of the year the British took a hundred and forty American vessels and recaptured twenty-six, said to be mostly small trading vessels. American cruisers made three hundred and forty-two captures from the British, of which forty-four were recaptured, eighteen released, and five burned at sea, and the rest brought into port. The Continental navy alone made over sixty captures (London Chronicle, May 15, 1777; Am. Arch., V, iii, 1523-1530; Almon, iv, 312, v, 103-107; Neeser's Statistical History of U. S. Navy, ii, 24, 284; Clowes, iii, 396, giving smaller figures. Probably all the lists are incomplete.) Besides the loss inflicted upon commerce, troops and valuable military stores had been intercepted, the evacuation of Boston had been hastened, and, most important of all, the British advance from Canada had been checked.

The outlook for the next year was full of promise and encouragement for the Americans. Besides the smaller vessels of the Continental navy, which had already done good service, it was expected that thirteen fine new frigates would soon be in commission. Experience and training were beginning to tell in greater efficiency, and several of the captains showed signs of a capacity for developing superior military and naval qualities. October 10, 1776, Congress revised the navy list and established the relative rank of twenty-four captains. This difficult and delicate task, though doubtless influenced to some extent by political and personal considerations, was probably done with as much wisdom and justice as could have been expected with the knowledge of conditions possessed by Congress at the time. The arrangement caused dissatisfaction, however, on the part of some officers, especially John Paul Jones, who as eighteenth on the list felt that, having been the senior lieutenant, he should have stood much higher upon promotion. Some months later he wrote to Robert Morris regarding the qualifications of officers: "I cannot but lament that so little delicacy hath been Observed in the Appointment and Promotion of Officers in the Sea Service, many of whom are not only grossly illiterate, but want even the Capacity of commanding Merchant Vessells. I was lately on a Court Martial where a Captain of Marines made his Mark and where the President could not read the Oath which he attempted to administer, without Spelling and making blunders. As the Sea Officers are so subject to be seen by foreigners, what conclusions must they draw of Americans in general from Characters so Rude & Contracted. In my Judgement the Abilities of Sea Officers ought to be as far Superior to the abilities of officers in the Army as the nature of a Sea Service is more complicated and admits of a greater number of Cases than can possibly happen on the Land; therefore the discipline by Sea ought to be the more perfect and regular, were it compatible with short Enlistments." (Jones MSS., July 28, 1777. See Sands, 59-65, 304-310.)

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The last important naval legislation of the year 1776 was passed November 20, when the Continental Congress resolved to build three ships of seventy-four guns each, five frigates of thirty-six guns, an eighteen-gun brig, and a packet boat. Only four of these vessels were completed, and those under modifications of the act generally reducing their size (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 20, 1776, July 25, 1777.) These four were the ship of the line America of seventy-four guns, the frigate Alliance, and two sloops of war, the General Gates and the Saratoga. Only the last three ever served in the Continental Navy.

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER VII

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1777

Owing to various causes the thirteen frigates provided for by Congress in 1775 were much delayed in fitting out and going into commission, and some of them never got to sea. The Warren and Providence were perhaps the first to be completed, but the difficulty of manning them and the occupation of Newport and the lower bay by the British kept them in port. Commodore Hopkins hoisted his pennant on the Warren early in December, 1776, perhaps before, and anchored her in the Providence River. He had with him also the frigate Providence, the ship Columbus, the brig Hampden, and the sloop Providence. January 2, 1777, Hopkins, having been informed that the British frigate Diamond was aground near Warwick Neck below the mouth of the river, went down to the vicinity in the sloop Providence. The Diamond managed to get off during the night; for allowing her to escape Hopkins was much criticized. Writing, March 13, to William Ellery, the commodore says in self-defense that as it was blowing very hard it was thought best not to try to get the frigates down the river. When he arrived on the scene in the Providence he "found the Diamond ashore on a shoal which runs off S. W. from Patience, about half a mile from that Island and a little more S. E. from Warwick Neck, and as there is about eleven feet of water on that shoal at low water and not a very hard bottom and the tide about half down, she did not careen. There lay about one mile and a half" away "a fifty gun ship with her top-sails loose and her anchor apeak, who, as the wind was, could have fetch'd within pistol shot of the Diamond, but the wind blowing so hard was I think the reason of her not coming to sail. The truth is the ships could not have got down, and if the wind had not blow'd so hard and they could, it would not in my judgment have been prudent, neither should I have ordered them down, as the enemy's ships could have come to sail with any wind that our ships could and a great deal better, as they lay in a wide channel and we in a narrow and very crooked one . . . I went ashore at Warwick and saw Colonel Bowen, who told me he had sent for two eighteen -pounders, and in less than half an hour they came. I went on board the sloop and we dropp'd down under the ship's stern a little more than musket shott off, it being then a little after sun sett. We fired a number

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of shott, which she returned from her stern chacers. The ship careen'd at dusk about as much as she would have done had she been under sail. After they had fired about twenty-six shott from the shore, they ceased and soon after hail'd the sloop and said they wanted to speak with me. I went ashore and was informed they were out of ammunition. I offer'd them powder and stuff for wads, but we had no shott that would do. They sent to Providence for powder and shott and I went on board the sloop and sent some junk ashore for wads. Soon after they hail'd again from the shore and I went to see what they wanted and gave Capt. Whipple orders not to fire much more, as I thought it would do but little execution, it being night and could not take good aim with the guns. When I got on shore, the officer that commanded there desir'd I would let them have some bread out of the sloop, which I sent the boat off for, but the people not making the boat well fast, while they were getting the bread she drifted away and I could not get aboard again. The ship by lightening got off about 2 o'clock the same night, and on the whole, as the ship was on a shoal almost under cover of a 50 gun ship and got off again before it was possible to have done anything with our frigates, I thought it of no moment." (R.I. Hist. Mag., October, 1886; Hopkins, 167-177.) Another ship took the Diamond's station and soon after this an abortive attempt was made to destroy her with a fireship (R. I. Hist. Mag., January, 1886, journal of Lieutenant Trevett.) Commodore Parker, commanding the British fleet at Newport, wrote to the Admiralty, January 7: "The Continental Fleet is in Providence River, beyond our reach at present." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 486. See also Ibid., December 11, 1776.)

Hopkins was ordered by the Marine Committee, January 21, to get the Warren and Providence to sea as soon as possible, to cruise from Rhode Island to Virginia. But the commodore's active sea service in the navy had already come to an end. As the result of a petition signed by some of the Warren's officers and of the Marine Committee's examination of one of them, Captain John Grannis of the marines, Congress resolved, March 26, that "Esek Hopkins be immediately and he is hereby suspended from his command in the American Navy." After passing the remainder of the year under suspension, the commodore was formally dismissed from the service January 2, 1778. April 4, 1777, Captains John B. Hopkins, Abraham Whipple, and Dudley Saltonstall were instructed to make every effort to get to sea with the frigates Warren, Providence, and Trumbull, in search of British transports and merchantmen; but these vessels were doomed to idle away the entire year in their native rivers (Hopkins, 185-203 ; Jour. Cont. Congr., March 26, 1777, January 2, 1778; Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 225-230 (February 19, 1777), 235; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 50, 65 (January 21, April 4, 1777)

The plans of the Marine Committee for preying upon British commerce and the movements of American armed vessels in general might have been effectually hindered if the British commander had adopted the suggestions offered to General Howe by Lord George Germain, who wrote March 3, 1777, that the King was of the "opinion that a warm diversion upon the coasts of the Massachusetts

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Bay and New Hampshire would not only impede the levies for the Continental Army, but tend much to the security of our trade, and indeed it scarcely admits a doubt but that these benefits must inevitably result from such an arrangement. For as on one hand, it is scarcely to be expected that those provinces will part with men when their presence must be wanted for the internal defence of their own respective districts, so on the other, a salutary check will unavoidably be put to the successes of the rebel privateers, when we have destroyed or taken possession of their ports. It is, therefore, the King's pleasure that Lord Howe and you take this matter into your serious consideration so far as your intended plan will admit." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 58.)

Early in the year the Marine Committee had intended sending to the West Indies, and along the southern coast as far as Pensacola and the Mississippi, a squadron composed of the Alfred and Cabot, then at Boston, and the Columbus, sloop Providence and Hampden, in the Providence River, all under the command of John Paul Jones; but the project was not carried out, owing, as Jones believed, to the opposition of Commodore Hopkins (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 52, 54 (February 1, 5, 1777); Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 117-121, 191, 197 (February 28, March 1, 1777) ; Sands, 58, 59, 64.) The Columbus and Hampden remained in Narragansett Bay several months. The sloop Providence, Captain Jonathan Pitcher, ran the blockade of the British fleet in the lower bay in February, passing "so near a 50 gun ship about 2 A.M. as to hear them talking on board." She went into New Bedford and then made a cruise to the eastward. Off Cape Breton she captured a transport brig with a small body of soldiers for Burgoyne's army. This vessel did not surrender, however, without resistance. John Trevett, lieutenant of marines on the Providence, says that the "brig bore down on us and began a fire at long shot; we ran from her about one hour, until we got in good order for action, when we took in sail and let her come up close along side. The sea being smooth, we cut away all her colors in forty minutes and they began to be slack, but in a few minutes they began to fire as brisk as ever and cut our sails and rigging badly; it lasted about forty minutes longer, when we cut away her main-topmast. We hailed them without a trumpet, being close on her starboard quarter, to know whether they gave up or not, and the answer was 'yes.' . . . We found she was direct from England and that she had 25 soldiers and two officers on board, besides the crew, and was loaded with King's stores and bound for Quebec." The Providence soon afterwards returned to New Bedford (R.I. Hist. Mag., April, 1886.)

The brig Cabot, Captain Joseph Olney, also cruised to the eastward, and in March, while off the coast of Nova Scotia, she was chased by the British frigate Milford. The captain ran her ashore and had just time to escape with his crew; they afterwards, it is said, seized a schooner and made their way back to Boston. The Milford, "after a wearisome struggle of 14 days, got the Continental Brig Cabot . . . off, and sent her to Halifax, where she arrived and is now fitting out with the greatest expedition for sea." (Boston Gazette, June 16, 1777 ; Continental Journal, April 10, 1777 ; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 607

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(log of the Milford.) The Cabot was taken into the British navy; she is believed to have been the first vessel of the Continental navy to be captured, except the Lexington, which was recaptured.

On April 23 the Marine Committee ordered to sea the Alfred, Captain Hinman, then at Boston, and the sloop Providence, which, after returning from her eastern cruise, had been put under the command of Captain John P. Rathburne. The vessels were to cruise separately "in such Latitudes as will be most likely to fall in with and intercept the enemies Transport vessels coming to reinforce or supply their Army at New York." Continuing their instructions the Committee wrote: "You are to use your true endeavours to take, burn, sink, or destroy as many of the enemies Vessels of every kind, as it may be your good fortune to fall in with. The Prizes you may be lucky enough to take you will send into such Ports of the United States as you shall think will be the safest and most convenient . . . It is expected from every Commander in our Navy that he use his officers and people well, still preserving strict discipline and decorum; that Prisoners be treated with humanity; and that great care be taken of the ships, their materials and stores, all which we desire you will carefully observe and advise us of your proceedings by every opportunity. We expect your most dilligent exertions will be used to execute these orders with all possible dispatch and in the best manner for the service of your Country." The Alfred was to return to port by July 1 and then receive fresh orders. The Providence was to cruise three months, and if, on returning to port, she found no further instructions, she was then to take in provisions and proceed on another three months' cruise (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 70, 71 (April 23,1777) The Alfred seems to have performed no important service under these orders. Indeed she probably did not go to sea at all before July; very likely she was unable to enlist a crew in time.

In June the sloop Providence sailed from New Bedford, and off Sandy Hook saw a ship, brig, schooner, and sloop standing to the southeast and followed them. "About 3 P.M.," says Lieutenant Trevett in his journal, "we came up with the ship, the other vessels being near to her weather bow, and hailed her. She had her pennant and ensign flying, but gave us no answer and we gave her a bow gun, intending to break her cabin windows. We drew very near her, but the wind being scant we found we could not get to windward, so we bore away and went under her lee, as near as we could, and gave her a good broadside. She immediately gave us as good a one and run us aboard on our starboard quarter and hung there about five minutes, until she broke all our sweeps that were lashed there. At the same time the brig of 10 guns and the schooner of 8 [guns] lost no time, all three of them firing into us at once. As the ship fell off she gave us her starboard broadside and we shot ahead of them with our sails and rigging much cut to pieces. We then bore away, all hands employed in fixing our rigging. We had but a poor crew at this time. Our loss was our sailing master, Capt. George Sinkins of Newport, who was killed, and only two or three men slightly wounded. We hove him overboard, got our rigging repaired as soon as possible, and made sail for the ship. We came up with her just after sunset with a determination to board

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her, for we well knew if we carried the ship that the rest of the vessels would fall into our hands. We ran within half Pistol shot and gave her a full broadside, but all three of them played their part so well we gave it up." The schooner was taken, however, and from her it was learned that the ship carried sixteen guns. After this the Providence cruised several weeks in the Gulf Stream. A sail was seen, acting strangely, and was chased, and upon coming up with her in the night, she was found to be an abandoned ship, evidently French, under full sail; rudderless, though otherwise in good condition. It being apparently impracticable to get her into port, she was burned to prevent her falling into British hands. The Providence returned to New Bedford in August (R.I. Hist. Mag., April, 1886.)

Meanwhile Captain Jones remained on shore, having held out to him successively various promises of active employment afloat. The disappointment of his expectation of taking a squadron to sea occurred a few weeks after his arrival at Boston in the Alfred, in December, 1776. In March he was appointed to command one of three vessels which Congress had ordered to be purchased at Boston. In May he was directed to proceed to France in the ship Amphitrite, which had brought over military stores, and after his arrival there the American Commissioners were expected, by order of Congress, to procure for him the command of a frigate. These Plans were abandoned in turn; and June 14, 1777, he was given command of the new eighteen-gun ship Ranger, just built at Portsmouth. On the same day it was resolved in Congress: "That the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen stripes alternate red and white; that the Union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation." Jones is said to have hoisted this flag on the Ranger for the first time it was ever raised on any man-of-war. For several months after that be was busy fitting out his ship. The Ranger was one hundred and sixteen feet long over all, twenty-eight feet wide, and measured three hundred and eight tons. She mounted eighteen six-pounders; she was pierced for twenty-six guns, but Jones considered her too light a ship for so heavy an armament (Sherburne, 36-40; Sands, 66-70; 7ones MSS., Jones to Morris, April 7, July 28, 1777; Remick's Kittery in the Revolution, 9, 10, gives the Ranger 14 nines and 4 sixes; Admiral Arbuthnot reported in 1780 (Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 486, May 23,1780) that she mounted 20 sixes.)

The Randolph, built at Philadelphia, was one of the first of the frigates to be ready for service, but the close blockade of Delaware Bay held her and other Continental vessels in port several weeks; then there was further delay due to ice in the river. January 30, 1777, the frigate was ordered to sail "the moment the Ice will permit," accompanied by the Hornet and Fly and a convoy of merchantmen, to be escorted "fairly off to sea." In these orders, signed for the Marine Committee by Robert Morris, Captain Biddle received general instructions as to his conduct. "For your encouragement in this service," says Morris, "I must observe that there are no Cruizing Ships an over match for you, except the two Deckers, for altho you think you have not seamen enough, yet that is just their case; except the Roebuck there is none of them half manned, therefore you have only to avoid two Deckers or engaging when there is more than one in sight. Any

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of their other single ships you need not fear, especially if you can persuade your men to board. Remember what a glorious exploit it will be, to add one of their frigates or 20 Gun ships to our navy in a few days after you get out, and if the Randolph has but Heels, I think you can and will do it; you will then get seamen Plenty. If your ship sails remarkably fast, you may take libertys with them. If she does not, be more cautious and try to find out her trim . . . You'l observe that many merchant vessels are expected in with valuable Stores to this port, therefore you'l afford them all possible protection and had best keep in their tract as long as you can." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 49 (January 30, 1777) As soon as the ice would permit, about February 1, the Randolph, Hornet, and Fly proceeded down the river with their convoy and got safely to sea (Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, App., 4, 49, 57, 115, 137, 147 (Morris to Hancock, December 14, 30, 1776, January 3, 26, February 4, 10, 1777)

Morris wrote further instructions for Biddle February 15 and forwarded them to him by the Fly, which had returned to port. The Randolph was now to proceed to the West Indies. The Marine Committee had decided to send all the armed vessels at Philadelphia to those islands. Biddle was given letters to William Bingham, the navy agent at Martinique, and to other persons at St. Eustatius, Curacao, Cape Francois, and Mole St. Nicholas, to whom he was to apply in turn, until he had a full cargo of military stores and supplies for the army, to be brought back at once to the safest port. The Dutch government had prohibited the exportation of such supplies to America, but the traffic was still conducted on a large scale, in Dutch as well as French ports. Arms, ammunition, and clothing were brought from Europe to the West Indies for transshipment to the United States. It was hoped that these stores could be procured in sufficient quantity and without delay at Martinique. "These supplies are exceedingly necessary for the service of the ensuing campaigne and you cannot render your Country a more essential service than by bringing them soon and safe in . . . As you command the first American frigate that has got out to sea, it is expected that you contend warmly on all necessary occasions for the honor of the American flag. At every foreign port you enter, salute their forts and waite on the Governor General or Commander in Chief, asking the liberty of their ports for the ships of the United States of America. Take care that your people do not molest their Trade nor Inhabitants nor in any shape disturb that good understanding we have with them." Prizes were to be sent into Martinique, St. Eustatius, or other ports, where the cargoes might be sold, if to greater advantage, the vessels, however, being always brought to American ports. "As the British men of war on the West India stations are not often well manned, it would give great eclat to our Naval Service it you can make prize of one or more of them and if so, you will do well to tempt some of their best warrant officers, such as Boatswains, Gunners, Quarter Masters and their several mates, to enter our service, for we would wish you to bring both these and plenty of Common Sailors home, to assist in manning our other ships of war." Seamen from other prizes also, and in the various ports visited, were to be procured for the service when possible. "When your errand to the West Indies is compleated, you'l observe it is mentioned already that you are

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to return to some safe port in these United States of America. The uncertainty of the fate of war makes us cautious of saying positively which shall be the best port. There is little doubt but this [Philadelphia] will be the most convenient to receive the stores at, being most centrical and probably not very distant from the scenes of action, and as you are well enabled to defend yourself against most single ships and capable, we hope, of outsailing any of the enemies, it appears that you might venture to call at Cape Henlopen or Cape May for intelligence, without incurring the charge of rashness, and we will endeavour to keep out some small Cruizers about the time you are expected, to give you information." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 55 (February 15,1777) Signals were prescribed for communication with the shore and with other vessels. Most unfortunately the Randolph had not proceeded far on her voyage before she encountered a heavy gale, in which she was dismasted and was obliged to put into Charleston in a crippled condition. Before arriving there a mutiny broke out among English sailors on board, but was soon quelled. March 29 the Sachem, Captain James Robinson, was sent to Martinique with duplicates of the dispatches for Bingham which the Randolph had not been able to deliver (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 55, 57, 58 (February 15, 17, 18, 1777), 59 (February 5, 1777), 64 (March 29, 1777); Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, app., 151, 177 (February 10, 19, 1777) ; Port Folio, October, 1809; Amer. Hist. Review, viii (July, 1903), 687.)

The Raleigh, Hancock, and Boston were the only others of the thirteen frigates that cruised at sea during 1777. The Virginia, built at Baltimore, was ready for sea early in the year, and her commander, Captain James Nicholson, received instructions in April to proceed to the West Indies, but, owing to the close blockade of Chesapeake Bay by the British, she could not get out. Repeated orders were sent to Nicholson to get the Virginia to sea, but she was forced to remain idle in port throughout the whole year (Ibid., 51, 66, 85, 86, 104, 108, 116, 117 (January 24, April 8, 29, May 1, October 23, November 6, December 2, 12, 1777) The occupation of New York and Philadelphia by the British, in 1777, prevented the frigates Montgomery and Congress, in the Hudson River, and the Delaware, Washington, and Effingham, in the Delaware River, from rendering active sea service; and the New York frigates were destroyed before the end of the year, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy (Ibid., 65 (April 8, 1777); Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, app., 4, 9, 21 (December 14, 16, 21, 1776); Almon, v, 425-431.) The Trumbull did not leave the Connecticut River, where she was built, until 1779; and, as already related, the Warren and Providence were held in port more than a year after they were ready for sea.

In April, 1777, an expedition was sent by General Howe from New York against Connecticut under the command of General Tryon, the royal governor of New York. A landing was made at Fairfield, whence they proceeded to Danbury and destroyed a large quantity of public stores. Upon returning to their ships the British were harassed by a small force of Americans under Generals Arnold, Wooster, and Silliman. Arnold wrote to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, April 30: "After the enemy reimbark'd they imediately weighed Anchor and stood for

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Huntington harbour, Long Island, where they doubtless are at this time. I think it very probable they have in Contemplation the Destroying the Continental Frigate [Trumbull] at Saybrook, which may be easily effected by a few small Tenders, as there is no Battery or Armed Vessell to Cover her. If she cannot be got over the Barr & secured in harbour, will it not be prudent to move her up the river to some place of greater safety? I know not If your honour or the Continental agents have the Direction of her; that she is greatly exposed & ought to be secured, there is no doubt. I should Imagine she might be easily got over the barr with proper lighters & an Easterly wind, & secured In Guilford, Sachems head, or New Haven, where she might be got in readiness for the Seas." (Trumbull MSS., vi, 90. See also Ibid., 87, 96, letters of General Silliman (April 29,1777) on the operations against Tryon and of Captain John Shipman (May 1, 1777) on the dangerous situation of the frigate Trumbull.)

In view of this clear statement of the frigate's situation, we learn with surprise that - apparently in response to the orders of April 4, but possibly to earlier orders that have not been preserved - Captain Saltonstall went to sea and on April 12 wrote a letter to the Marine Committee dated "on board the Continental ship of war Trumbull," off the Virginia capes, saying: "I have the pleasure to acquaint you that at one P.M. I fell in with two transports from England, one of eight, the other of ten guns. They engaged us three glasses, when they strucktheir colours. They killed seven of our men and wounded eight more. We shattered them in a terrible manner and killed and wounded numbers of their crews. I have the pleasure to inform you that our people behaved well and with much courage." (Almon, v, 135.) It is obvious that Saltonstall's "Continental ship of war" could not have been the frigate Trumbull, which was securely shut up in the river. It is likely that, owing to the importance of the service to be performed, a vessel was impressed, chartered, or borrowed for the occasion, perhaps the ten-gun sloop Trumbull, a Connecticut privateer (The sloop Trumbull is known to have been in commission at this time. Saltonstall's name appears in a list of Connecticut privateers as commander of the Governor Trumbull, a 20-gun ship, though probably at a later date. See Conn. State Records, i, 567; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 212, 214, 225, 229, 231, 256; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 28; Nav. Rec. of Am. Rev. (calendar) 478; Conn. Gazette, July 18,1777; Data from the Library of the Navy Department.)

Although the frigates Hancock and Boston had received cruising orders in the fall of 1776, such was the delay in fitting them out that they did not get to sea until May, 1777. The frigate Milford and other vessels of the enemy had long been a terror to American navigators in eastern waters and the need of regular fighting ships more powerful than the state cruisers and privateers was greatly felt. The General Court of Massachusetts resolved, April 24, that the Hancock and Boston ought to put to sea at once in pursuit of the Milford. It was arranged that the Continental frigates should be accompanied for twenty-five days by nine privateers, including two or three of considerable force, and by any others that should be ready by May 1. The commanders of these privateers, serving under

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Captains Manley and McNeill of the Hancock and Boston, were to be put upon the same footing for the time being as regular officers and their vessels were to be insured by the state (Mass. Court Rec., April 24, 26, 1777.) As a squadron, this assemblage of vessels amounted to nothing. With proper cooperation it might have constituted a force capable of meeting with some prospect of success any British squadron it was likely to fall in with. But the privateers took no part whatever in the cruise after the first few days; becoming separated, they were soon dropped behind by the frigates.

Another unfortunate circumstance, which may have had much to do with events soon to happen, was the lack of cordial relations between the captains of the frigates. Such being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that Dr. Samuel Cooper should have had forebodings when he wrote to John Adams, April 3, 1777: "Manly and McNeal do not agree. It is not, I believe, the Fault of the first . . . If they are not better united, infinite Damage may acrue." (Adams MSS.) Another of Adams's correspondents, Dr. William Gordon, wrote to him June 5: "The frigates have been sailed about a fortnight. Maritime affairs have been most horridly managed. We have beaten G. B. in dilatoriness & blunders. Where the fault hath lain I know not, but the credit of the Continent & Congress requires amendment." (Ibid.)

The squadron sailed from Boston May 21. Within six days the privateers had all parted from the frigates, some by choice, the others through bad weather. May 29 a brig was captured; she belonged to a fleet of transports under convoy of the Somerset, of sixty-four guns, and a frigate. "At break of day the 30th," says Captain McNeill, "we discover'd the Somersett and three large Ships under her Convoy. Capt. Manley was not convinced of the size of our Opponent untill she was within Shott of him, when very luckily for him the Hancock's Heels saved his Bacon. She nevertheless pursued him with great earnestness untill I tack'd upon her Convoy, who was a good way astern of her at that time. As soon as she saw me within random Shott of them, she left Capt. Manley & return'd to their protection; she then chac'd me about Six hours, but not being able to come up with me, she rejoin'd her Convoy just as night came on. Capt. Manley & myself then Steer'd to the Eastw'd and Northw'd in hopes of falling in with some others of the fleet, but saw no Enemy except a few miserable Fishermen untill Saturday June the Seventh, on the Morning of which day we fell in with the Fox, a British Frigate of 28 Guns Commanded by Capt. Patrick Fotheringham. She at first meant to Engage, but thought I was best to try her Heels, which would have effectually Saved her from me, but the Hancock coming up with her, an Action ensued which did not end untill after we came up, by which time the Hancock & the Fox were both very much damaged." (N.H. Geneal. Record, January, 1907 (McNeill to Marine Committee, July 16, 1777) A seaman on the Boston says of the fight: "At 6 A.M. Capt. Manly & she Exchanged some guns and then she Run & we in full Chace after her ... Betwixt the hours of 12 & one P.M. Capt. Manly Began to Engage Broadside & Broadside, our ship coming up fast as Posable; at last up we came and gave them a Noble Broadside which made them to strike a

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medeatly a Bout half after one." (N. H. Geneal. Record, January, 1907 (McNeill to Marine Committee, July 16, 1777)

According to the British account the Hancock was sighted from the Fox at five o'clock in the morning and the Boston soon afterwards. Captain Fotheringham says that after a half-hour's action with the Hancock, "I could plainly see that the other Ship to Windward was of nearly the same Force as the one I was engaged with, which was of thirty-two guns." He then tried to escape, hoping to fall in with some friendly cruiser or to draw the American ships apart, "but notwithstanding all the Sail I could make, the Ship I had before engaged came up with me about Noon and engaged me very close till a Quarter after one, when the other Ship came up and raked me and carried away my Main Yard," and did other damage. At half-past one the Fox would no longer answer her helm, and with one enemy on the bow and another on the quarter, she could not bring guns to bear on them. "I therefore at Quarter before two gave the Ship up in order to save my People." The Fox lost her lieutenant of marines and one man killed and ten wounded, two of them mortally; she was short of her full complement by thirty-three men (Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5309.) Admiral Montagu wrote from St. John's to Germain, June 11: "I was yesterday made very unhappy by a letter I received from Captain Fotheringham of his Majesty's ship Fox, acquainting me that he was taken the 7th instant by two American privateers on the banks, one called the Hancock of 32 guns and 347 men, the other of 28 guns called the Boston, full of men, the largest commanded by Manly, the other by McNeal." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 69.)

Continuing his report of the cruise McNeill says: "The weather proving unfavourable for some time afterwards, we were severall days fitting the Fox & Capt. Manley his own Ship. I had sent my first Lieut. (Mr Browne) on board the Fox the day she was taken, but Captain Manley refused giving him the Command & I was finaly obliged to withdraw him for the sake of peace. I urged Capt. Manley to make the best of our way to Charlestown, South Carolina, there to Join Captain Biddle, fitt & clean our Ships, & then to Cruise for the West India Fleet untill towards the fall of the year, by which time our own Coast would probably be clear & we might return without any risque compared with what must be now Expected. He at first attended to my proposal, but afterwards did as he pleas'd; the event will prove whether I judge right or not. In short we loiter'd away three weeks or a Month before we sett our faces homeward, by which time the Coast of New England from Cape Sable as far as New York was so cover'd with cruisers that there was no escaping them.

"On Sunday the 6th of July, being 15 leagues to the Eastwd of Cape Sable, we took a Sloop from Louisburgh bound for Halifax, but delaying some time with her, we were chac'd towards evening by three Ships. We also being three, we did not make any efforts to avoid those Ships in Course of the night; on the Contrary Capt. Manley Tow'd the Sloop before spoken of untill next morning, by which time one of the Ships was a head of us and Tack'd upon us, the Second Ship,

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which was a two decker, was on our Lee quarter about three Leagues from us, and the third Ship about as far right a Stern. Capt. Manley then thought proper to sett fire to the Sloop & quitted her and endeavour'd to make the best of our way, but the first Ship being up within Shott about noon, we exchanged some Shott with her at a distance & then having spoke Capt. Manley, we agreed to tack and Engage her. We immediately Tack'd and Capt. Manley begun the Action with his head to the Northward & the Enemy on the opposite Tack, we being close under the Hancock's Stem, also fell in with the Enemy in our turn and Exchanged about five broad Sides with her. Her Shott was so well aim'd that some of them pass'd through our Ship under the wale, so that we could not Tack upon the Enemy untill we had stop'd those holes; this was however done in a few Minutes, but not before the two deck Ship had goten very near us. Unfortunately the Fox did not tack at the same time we did, by which means the Enemy got between her and us and she was obliged to pass under the fire of the first Ship above mention'd and the fire of the two deck Ship also. Capt. Manley seeing that the Fox was beyond Saveing, put about and stood to the Southd, the Fox bore away and run to the Eastwd, and we kept the Wind to the Northwd. The two deck Ship then put about and follow'd the Hancock, leaving the Fox and me to the other two Ships. The Fox fled and defended herself bravely, haveing also some advantage in point of Sailing; we were constrain'd to keep the Wind for our own Security, being neither able to run from nor fight such force as then appear'd to Leward." (N. H. Geneal. Rec., January, 1907.)

The vessel described by McNeill as a two-decker was the British forty-four-gun ship Rainbow, Commodore Collier, and she was accompanied by the ten-gun brig Victor. The third vessel, which appeared about the same time, was the frigate Flora of thirty-two guns. Collier says in his report that July 6, in the afternoon, being twelve leagues southwest of Cape Sambro, he first sighted the American squadron. Night came on, and the next morning the American ships, with a sloop in company, were five or six miles distant. They set fire to the sloop and at six o'clock another sail was observed "standing towards the rebel ships." This vessel was thought to be an American also and trying to join the others. "About Ten in the Morning the Enemy's Ships went away lasking, and Three Quarters of an Hour afterwards I was surprized to see several Shot exchanged between the sternmost of them and the Stranger who had last joined and whom I had hitherto looked upon as another of their Fleet. I then hoisted my Colours, shortly after which the two sternmost of the Rebel Frigates hawled their Wind, whilst the headmost kept away about two Points from it. This brought the English Ship (which I afterwards found was the Flora) more abreast of them, who passed to Windward, exchanging a Broadside with each and pursuing the Fugitive, who from the Alteration two or three Times of her Course, seemed uncertain which to steer. The Flora gained fast upon her, which she perceiving, hawled her Wind again and soon afterwards tacked and stood after her Comrades, exchanging a Broadside with the Flora as they passed each other. I was just putting about after the two Ships when I observed this Manoeuvre of the Rebel Frigate, which made me stand on something longer before I tacked, hoping to get her within Reach of

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my Guns as she passed us. I accordingly did so, but had not the good Fortune to bring down either a Mast or Sail by my Fire. I tacked immediately after her and soon afterwards saw the headmost Rebel Frigate put about; she passed me just out of Gunshot to Windward and appeared a very fine Ship of 34 Guns with Rebel Colours flying. One of the Gentlemen of my Quarter Deck had been a Prisoner lately at Boston and knew her to be the Hancock, on board of whom Manley commanded, the Sea Officer in whom the Congress place great Confidence and who is the Second in Rank in their Navy. The Ship I had fired upon I found outsailed me and soon after my tacking, went away lasking; whilst the other Frigate kept her wind. I then saw with Concern that one of the three must unavoidably escape, if they thus steered different Courses. I therefore judged it best to put about and follow the Hancock, which appeared the largest Ship. Whilst I was in Stays the Flora passed me very near, in Pursuit of the Ship I had fired upon. It was about Two o'Clock in the Afternoon of Monday the 7th of July that I tacked after Manley, who seemed at first rather to outsail the Rainbow, but I understood afterwards that to endeavour making his Ship sail better, he started all his Water forward and by that Means put her out of Trim. An Hour before the Close of Day he altered his Course and kept away large; however, we got so near to him before dark as enabled us by Means of a Night-glass to keep Sight of him all Night. At Dawn of Day she was not much more than a Mile ahead of me, soon after which we saw a small Sail to Leeward which we found to be the Victor Brig, who as we passed fired at the Rebel Frigate and killed one of the Men at the Wheel, but was not able from bad sailing to keep up or come near any more. About Four in the Morning I began firing the Bow chace upon her, with occasional Broadsides loaded with Round and Grape, as I could bring them to bear, some of which struck her Masts and Sails. Half an Hour past Eight I was so near as to hail her and let them know that if they expected Quarter, they must strike immediately. Manley took a few Minutes to consider and a fresher Breeze just then springing up, he availed himself of it by attempting to set some of the Steering Sails on the other Side. I therefore fired into him, upon which he struck the Rebel Colours to His Majesty's Ship, after a Chace of upwards of 39 Hours." (London Chronicle, August 26, 1777.)

To make the story more complete we may quote from the report of Captain Brisbane of the Flora. "On the 7th Instant at day break, Cape Sable bearing N. N. E. about fourteen Leagues, we discovered three Sail of Ships and a Sloop on our weather Quarter and a Sail on our Lee Quarter, standing to the Westward on the same Tack the Flora was. I thought it my duty to see what they were, tacked and stood towards them, upon which the Sloop, that was towed by the headmost ship, was cast off and set on fire. We passed within point blank shot to leeward of the three Ships, hoisted our Colours and fired a Shot at the headmost to show theirs, which they paid no attention to, fired a second at the Sternmost, stood on and as soon as we could fetch their wake, tacked and followed them.

At 9 A.M., Upon their finding that we weathered and came up with them, they formed a line ahead, hoisted Continental Colours, and began firing their Stern

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Chace. At 10 the two sternmost Ships shortened Sail, tacked and came close under our lee Quarter. Exchanging Broadsides as we passed each other, we stood on to the Ship who had not tacked, gave her our fire which she returned; she attempted to stay, missed and wore, which gave us an opportunity of raking her. We then wore and gave chace after her, the two other Ships being at this time close upon a Wind on different tacks. During this transaction we run considerably to leeward, which gave the Ship on our lee Quarter an opportunity of joining us fast, and upon her being abreast of our Chace, she tacked and proved to be His Majesty's Ship the Rainbow. She fired several well pointed Shot at the Chace, one of the Enemy soon afterwards tacked and stood to the South West, the Rainbow tacked and followed her; we continued standing to the northward after the Chace, who, upon the Rainbow's tacking, kept away more from the wind and set steering Sails and soon afterward began firing her Stern Chace at us. At 6 P.M. we came up close to her, upon which she struck her Colours and proved to be his Majesty's Ship the Fox, that had been taken a month before that by the Hancock and Boston, Continental Ships, on the Banks of Newfoundland. The Ship that we afterwards learned to be the Boston was, at the time the Fox struck, as far to windward as we could but discover the head of her Topsails out of the Water." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, August 28,1777, No. 2.)

The British took their prizes into Halifax. In his report Collier says the Hancock had two hundred and twenty-nine men on board, her complement being two hundred and ninety; and according to a letter of his to Germain, she carried thirty-two guns, chiefly twelve-pounders, and was "said to be the largest and fastest sailing frigate ever built . . . Manly seem'd filled with rage and grief at finding he had so easily surrendered to a ship of only 44 guns, believing all along that it was the Raisonable, of 64 guns, who was chasing him." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 69, 70; London Chronicle, August 26, 1777 ; Boston Gazette, July 28, August 11, 18, 1777 ;Almon, v, 262; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, August 28, 1777, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, Captains' Letters, No. 1611.2 (Collier to Stephens, July 12, 1777), Captains' Logs, Nos. 360, 762 (logs of Flora and Rainbow). No report by Captain Manley appears to be accessible.) The Hancock appears to have been one of the very best and fastest of the Continental frigates, and if Manley had not made the mistake of altering her trim in the vain attempt to improve her speed, he might have escaped from the Rainbow. Failing in this, he should have made a spirited resistance, in which, by some lucky accident, he might possibly have succeeded in reversing the result; or by crippling his adversary, have been able to escape. Manley's record in the naval service up to this time had been excellent and his reputation was high among friends and foes. Collier, in his letter to Germain, says of him: "We have all long wished to get this man into our possession, from his talents and intrepidity, and fortunate it is that we have clone so, as he was beginning to shew the Americans what they had not been accustomed to, the seeing of one of his Majesty's ships in their possession, for he had just taken the Fox of 28 guns . . . Every body here is overjoyed at the capture of Mr. Manly, esteeming him more capable of doing mischief to the

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King's subjects than General Lee was." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 70. General Charles Lee had been taken prisoner by the British several months before.) Manley rendered very efficient service also in the later years of the war, but on this occasion he failed to stand the test. He should not have feared to exchange a few shots, even in the belief that he was engaging the Raisonable, and would then soon have discovered that he had only a forty-four to deal with. We shall see that a few months later his fellow-officer, Captain Biddle, was not afraid to engage a sixty-four, with no thought, apparently, of striking his flag before the last extremity. Manley was sent a prisoner to New York, where he remained many months. The loss of the Hancock was almost a calamity. She was taken into the British service under the name of the Iris and fought only too effectually against her old companions in the Continental navy.

Meanwhile the Boston escaped and found her way to Wiscasset. In his report to the Marine Committee, which was dated at that place July 16, Captain McNeill relates his proceedings since losing sight of his consorts on the 7th: "In a few hours we saw two more of the Enemy about two points on our weather bow; from these we were obliged to tack to the Southwd . . . After Standing two hours to the Southwd we espied another Ship bearing S. W. of us, who appeared to be in chace towards us. I then hove about to the Northwd again & stood on untill Nine o'Clock the Evening; the chace coming down upon us very fast all the time. As soon as the Moon was down I tack'd and Stood to the Southwd and in less than an hour saw the Lights of the Chacing Ship Standing athwart our Stern about 3/4 of a Mile from us. On Tuesday Morning the 8th Current I saw five Sail of the Enemy to the Leward of me, three on the Lee bow and two on the Lee Quarter, at the same time saw Cape Sable bearing N.N.E., five leagues. The Wind coming to the Southwd I stood across the Bay of Fundy, determin'd to Shelter myself in the first port I could make and get intellegence, which happened to be this river where I arriv'd on Thursday the 10th Instant. On my arrival here I found that the Milford Frigate had been in about fourteen days past & that she had penetrated up as far as we now are, Namely at Wichcasset point. There is scarce a day, but one or two of the Enemys Ships are Seen off the Mouth of this river and the Coasting Vessells are very much distress'd. In this my present Situation I am much at a Loss what to do, my Ship's Company are so diminished by Manning the Fox & the Men otherwise Lost since we Sail'd from Boston; my Ship is very Fowl . . . and besides that, we cannot make her Sail fast, trim which way we will . . . We have certain Accounts of twelve Sail of the Enemys Cruisers between Cape Ann & Cape Sable, severall of whom are large Ships." (N. H. Geneal. Rec., January, 1907.) Perhaps the size of the British fleet cruising in eastern waters was magnified in McNeill's imagination. In due time he brought his ship back to Boston, where his reception was not cordial. He was severely blamed for not having come to the Hancock's rescue and was held by public opinion in large degree responsible for the loss of that ship. He was tried by court-martial and suspended (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 109 (November 12,1777); Adams MSS., October 9, 1777, McNeill to John Adams, complaining of conditions in the navy.)

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At Charleston, where the Randolph had put in for repairs after being dismasted, Captain Biddle received orders from the Marine Committee, dated April 26 and 29, to cruise in the West Indies and later attempt to intercept a British fleet of merchantmen which was expected to leave Jamaica under convoy about July 26. In the first of these orders, April 26, the Committee wrote: "Your letter of the 14th instant is the only one we have received since the misfortune of carrying away your Masts or indeed since you left the Capes of Delaware, so that we are strangers to the cause and manner of that unfortunate accident . . . We observe with infinite concern that your people have been and remain Sickly'; this has happened in so many of our Ships that we cannot help atributing it to some cause that may with proper care & attention be removed. You should therefore insist that your Officers do frequently see the Ship thoroughly and perfectly cleansed, aloft and below from Stem to Stern, burn Powder and wash with vinigar betwixt Decks, order Hammocks, all bedding and bed Cloths and Body Cloaths daily into the quarters or to be aired on Deck, make the people keep their persons cleanly and use exercise, give them as frequent changes of wholesome food as you can, Fish when you can get it and fresh food in Port. Ventilate the Hold and between Decks constantly. In short, cleanliness, exercise, fresh air and wholesome food will restore or preserve health more than medicine and it is deserving the utmost attention of any or every officer to preserve the Health & Spirits of the men." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 73 (April 26, 1777)

The Marine Committee planned to collect as many vessels as possible to act in concert against the expected Jamaica fleet, in the hope of capturing a number of them. General orders dated April 29 were issued, addressed to the commanders of vessels designated to take part in the enterprise. They were to rendezvous at Abaco, one of the Bahama Islands, July 25, the senior captain was to take command as commodore, and they were to hold a council of war and decide upon the best cruising ground, the most effectual disposition of their ships, and a code of signals. "The Commodore or Council of war are empowered to order or do anything they may think necessary or essential to enable the Squadron to perform the intended Service, whether pointed out by the Committee or not." All information obtained regarding the Jamaica fleet must be reported to the commodore. "These things done, and the sooner they are accomplished the better, the Squadron must weigh and sail under the Signals and Orders of the Commodore to the appointed Station, which we suppose will be near the Havannah." While waiting for the Jamaica fleet the time should be spent in drill and repeating signals. "The men should be constantly exercised at the Guns, and infinite pains taken on board every Ship to sweeten the Air and keep not only the Ship clean but the Men so in their Cloathing and Persons. During this Cruize there is little doubt but Prizes will be taken by the Squadron before the Jamaica fleet appears and such may be sent into Georgia or Carolina, but in doing this care must be taken that no ship is much weakened by sending away their men in such Prizes. Should they be of little value it may probably be best to burn them and encourage the seamen found on board to enter our Service by offering them share of Prize Money to be taken, Pay and allowance equal to those already

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engaged, and assurance of good treatment." Inasmuch as "the main object of this enterprize appears the Jamaica Fleet, it must be the business of the Commodore to keep the Frigates together until he finds out the strength of the Convoy, and if it be such as he judges he can cope with, with a tolerable prospect of success, he is to make the proper disposition for attacking to the best advantage and engage their ships of war, whilst all the smaller vessels are employed in attacking and taking the Merchantmen. It must be remembered that the enemy generally send home for Convoy such of their Ships of war as have been long in the West Indies. They are frequently foul and ill manned, which are circumstances favourable for engaging them, even if they should appear of superior force. If you can but make Prizes of the Convoy or any part of them, we think it will then be in the power of the Squadron to take any number of the Merchantmen, and such as cannot be manned and brought into Port may be sunk or Burned. Should the Convoy consist of such or so many Ships as it would be folly or rashness to engage, the Squadron in that case had best to seperate and hover after the fleet; for as we have little doubt but most of our ships will outsail theirs, being cleaner, you may in this manner pick up a vast many of their Merchant ships, altho protected by Superior force." If after this service the squadron should be too distant from the seat of government to receive fresh orders, the Commodore must call a Council of war of all the Commanders, with him, and any enterprize or expedition planned by that Council, that has for its object the service of the United States of America, to distress or disable the enemies of these States or to Capture their Ships of war or Merchantmen, will meet our approbation & if executed with vigour, will merit the praise of all America. Our ships should never be Idle. The Navy is in its infancy and a few brilliant strokes at this Era would give it a Credit and importance that would induce seamen from all parts to seek the employ, for nothing is more evident than that America has the means and must in time become the first Maritime power in the world." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 78 (April 29,1777)

The Andrew Doria, Captain Isaiah Robinson, the sloop Surprise, Captain Benjamin Dunn, and the Fly, Captain Elisha Warner, were ordered in April to clear the Cape May channel of British ships, and a little later the Independence, Captain John Young, was instructed to warn vessels away from Chesapeake and Delaware Bays. In May the Andrew Doria and Surprise, together with the Columbus, Captain Hoysted Hacker, still blockaded in Narragansett Bay, were ordered to repair to the rendezvous at Abaco, where they were expected to meet the Randolph and cruise after the Jamaica fleet. This promising and well conceived project seems never to have been carried out or even entered upon, presumably because a sufficient number of vessels, especially frigates, could not be brought together (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 68, 69 (April 18, 1777), 73 (April 26, 1777), 77, 78 (April 29, 1777), 86, 88 (May 2, 1777), 90 (May 13, 1777), 91 (May 16, 1777)

The Randolph sailed some time during the summer and early in September was off Charleston. Biddle reported: "I have the Pleasure to acquaint You that on the

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fourth of Sept. 30 Leags. S. E. of Charles Town Barr I met with and took, after a little Resistance, the True Britain, Thomas Venture Master, of twenty six-pounders and seventy-four Men, the Brig Charming Peggy, Capt. Lyon, both Laden with Rum for the British Army and Navy and bound from Jamaica to New York, The Ship Severn, Capt. Henderson, of eight four-pounders, who had been taken by an American Cruizer on His passage from Jamaica to London And Retaken by the True Britain, Also a French Brig laden with salt going from the West Indies for Charles Town, Which Capt. Venture had made Prize of. There was a small Sloop in Company with those Vessels that made Her escape, the Weather being Squally, whilst I was Manning the Rest. I Arrived Safe here with my Prize the 7th inst. I have not laid Claim to Salvadge for the French Brig, as I thought it would be most agreeable to Congress to give her up. . . The Randolph's Bottom is very foul, having lain in this Port the three worst Months in the Year since We Cleared; And Being apprehensive that the Worms will Ruin Her Bottom unless they are soon destroyed, I have thought Proper and am preparing to heave Her down. I shall be as expeditious as possible and hope to be Ready to execute any Orders You may Please to send by the Return of the Express. I cannot omit telling You that My Officers have on every Occasion given me the greatest Satisfaction. Two better Officers are not met in the Service than Barnes and Mcdougall, My first and second Leiuts. And the Men I took from here behaved exceeding well." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 2, 241 (Biddle to Morris, September 12,1777) The Marine Committee issued orders to Biddle, dated October 24, to proceed to France as soon as his ship could be made ready for the voyage. Upon his arrival there he was to report to the American Commissioners and await their directions, in the mean time making a short cruise in European waters, if it should seem advisable (lbid., 237,241; Mar. Cont. Letter Book, 105 (October 24,1777); Port Folio, October, 1809.)

Captain Thomas Thompson, of the frigate Raleigh at Portsmouth, received instructions, dated April 29, to cruise against vessels bound to New York until June, but if he could not obtain suitable guns for his ship he was to proceed directly to France for them; in July he was to open sealed orders. As late as May 22, according to information furnished to Admiral Howe, the Raleigh had only six or eight of her thirty-two guns mounted. At this time there were at Portsmouth, besides the frigate, the Ranger and three or four large privateers. The keel of the America of seventy-four guns had just been laid. It was nearly the middle of August when the Raleigh went to sea and set sail for France. Probably she had received her guns by that time and her voyage was in the service of Congress and the American Commissioners at Paris. She was accompanied by the Alfred, Captain Hinman, who had also received sailing orders in April, which directed him after cruising in the Atlantic to return to Boston for fresh instructions (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 70, 81, 84 (April 23, 29, 1777), 92 (June 1, 1777), 102 (September 6, 1777); Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 487, June 29, 1777, No. 10; Remick, 216 (list of Raleigh's crew); N. R. Geneal. Rec., April, July, October, 1905.)

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The third day after sailing for France a small schooner from New York was taken by the Raleigh, on board of which Captain Thompson found "275 Spanish milled dollars, 137 counterfeited bills of 30 dollars each, in imitation of the bills emitted by Congress May the 10th, 1775, and 40 counterfeited bills of seven dollars each, imitating the Massachusetts sword-in-hand money; the whole making 4390 dollars which I shall commit to the flames after preserving samples. The schooner being of little value we burnt her." The most important events of the passage are told in Thompson's report, dated at sea September 28, 1777, in latitude 49° 35' north, Iongitude 13° 13' west: "At daylight Sept. 2 we took a snow called the Nancy . . . being part of the Windward Island fleet, which had outsailed her the day before. Having by this capture discovered the situation of the fleet and found that they were convoyed by the Camel, Druid, Weazel and Grass. hopper ships of war, the former a very large, lofty ship, carrying twenty-two 12-pounders . . . we made sail in quest of the fleet and next morning discovered them from the mast head. At sun-set we were near enough to distinguish the leading ship as well as their number, which was sixty sail, bearing East by North; the wind being then west, I made a signal as being one of the fleet left astern, for I had possessed myself of the signal from the prize. I hailed Capt. Hinman and told him my intention was to run into the fleet in the morning and attack the convoy, which I thought we were able to destroy; I therefore ordered him to keep close under the Raleigh's stern until we come alongside the Commodore, which ship we would both attack. Unluckily in the night the wind shifted to North; the fleet then hauled up close to the wind, which brought us to leeward; in the morning it came to blow fresh. At daylight we saw the body of the fleet bearing about N.E. at two or three leagues distance, steering East North East. We made sail and the Raleigh soon fetched up to the fleet under double reefed topsails, but the Alfred, being tender-sided, could not carry sail and therefore fell a great way to leeward and astern. I could not take in any sail for fear of being discovered to be a strange ship; we therefore kept our sails shaking in the wind, thinking the Alfred might come up, but Capt. Hinman made signal that his ship was overpressed with sail. Seeing no chance of his coming up and being fearful of being discovered, I determined to make sail and stand into the fleet and take my chance alone. While we were laying to, most of the merchant ships had got ahead into the fleet; however, I hauled in and passed a few of them and desired them to go under the Commodore's stern. By this they took us to be some British frigate which had joined the fleet. I stood on close to the wind, making for one of the ships of war which was to the windward of all the fleet, repeating the Commodore's signals. Our ports were down and our guns housed and we shot up alongside within pistol shot; then we up sails, out guns, hoisted Continental colours and bid them strike to the Thirteen United States. Sudden surprize threw them into confusion and their sails flew all aback, upon which we complimented them with a gun for each State, a whole broadside into their hull . . . Our second broadside was aimed at their rigging, which had its desired effect . . . In about a quarter of an hour all hands quitted quarters on board the British man of war, we cleared her decks totally; not a man was seen nor a gun fired on board her for twenty minutes before we left her. She lay like a log alongside of us entirely at

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the mercy of our shot, which flew very thick; we fired twelve broadsides, besides a constant fire from our musquetry. We were alongside of her forty-five minutes; when we left her she seemed to be water logged and in a most shattered condition. During this little engagement my officers and men behaved with the greatest fortitude and resolution, particularly the green hands . . . My intention was to sink the enemy's ship, if I could not bring her off, and I should have effectually sunk her in a few minutes more, could we have staid. Our firing had thrown the fleet into confusion. A squall prevented them from seeing us at first; when it cleared up, one was running one way and one another, some upon the wind and some before it. Their Commodore and the other ships of force tacked and stood right for us, but had not the wind favoured him and we drifted to leeward, he could not have fetched us and I should certainly have sunk the ship. However, I staid by her until he came pretty near, and we being in danger of being surrounded, I made sail and ran down to the Alfred, who was lying about four miles to the leeward . . . When we had got pretty near the Alfred, I took in top gallant sails and shortened sail to wait for the British Commodore, but he soon tacked and stood again into the fleet." (Almon, v, 403, 404.)

The vessel engaged by the Raleigh was the fourteen-gun sloop of war Druid. According to the report of Lieutenant Bourchier of the Druid, "on the 4th of September, in the latitude 40.33. N., longitude 50.17. W., at half past four in the evening, we discovered a strange sail on our larboard quarter, bearing West and steering for us. We were then (from the irregularity of the fleet) about five miles distant from the Camel, to windward, repeating the signal for the convoy to go under the Camel's stern and obliging those ships to bear down; the Weazle at a great distance to leeward and out of our sight. We cleared ship for action and turned all hands to quarters. At five o'clock she came within pistol shot, when I could plainly perceive her to be a rebel privateer mounting 38 or 40 guns, her decks and tops full of men. She hailed and desired us to strike to the honour of the Congress's colours, hoisted her ensign, and began to engage. The first broadside sent a shot through Captain Carteret's thigh bone and killed the master. I then took the command on the quarter deck and continued the action. At half past five she came close alongside and kept an irregular but very hot firing. At six she made sail ahead. I attempted to do the same and keep her broadside on, but the shattered condition of the rigging rendered the sails almost useless to the ship. As the head-sails only were of service, we edged away and kept her nearly on our bow till twenty minutes past six. She then had the wind abaft, sheared off, hauled down her colours, and made sail. I attempted to wear ship and rake her, but the rigging being entirely shot to pieces, could not bring her round. I then tried to make what sail I could and pursue the enemy, but found most of the masts and yards wounded . . . with four feet ten inches water in the bold. At half past seven we brought to, with our foresail and mizen on our larboard tack, to plug the shot holes between wind and water, clear the wreck and pump the ship out. I then perceived another rebel privateer laying to, bearing S.S.W. six or seven miles off, and by her appearance I suppose she mounted

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about 20 guns. The Camel was then in chace about two or three miles distant; soon after, the Weazle spoke to us and gave chace also." (Almon, v, 402.)

Conditions on board the Camel, the British commodore's ship, are set forth in her log. "Fresh Breezes & Squally Wr. At 1 P.M. fired 2 guns & made the Signal for the fleet to come under our Stern; the headmost Vessels paying no attention to the Signal, Fired 3 Shott at them to bring them to. At 5 fresh Breezes & Hazy Wr. Heard the report of a No. of Guns fired in the No. Wt. Quarter, which we imagined was an Action, from the unusual quickness of their Firing. Wore Ship with all possible speed & stood towards the report, when the Haze dispersing, we perceiv'd His Majesty's Sloop Druid in close engagement with a large Rebel Priva [teer] of 36 Guns, which she Beat off & upon perceiving us to be in chase of her, made off under all the Sail she could possibly Croud, as did another Rebel privateer which lay to Leeward of Her. Continued in Chase of them till Night, when we lost sight both of them & the Convoy." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 156 (log of the Camel); also No. 4172 (log of the Druid)

The Raleigh's loss was one killed and two wounded. The Druid had six killed and twenty-six wounded, of whom five, including the captain, died of their wounds. The Raleigh and Alfred followed the fleet several days, but without again exchanging shots with the enemy. Thompson says: "We have since challenged him for three days successively to come out of his fleet and engage us, but he declines the challenge. Himself and the other armed ships keep close together a little astern of the fleet and fine weather favours them; we wait for a storm and then, if any advantage offers, intend to make the best use of it, but we must not venture among them as they are now prepared, neither can we trust to the Alfred's sailing. Had she been a stiff ship and sailed equally well with the Raleigh, we should in all probability have destroyed the convoy and dispersed the whole fleet, badly manned as we are, having only 180 men, chiefly green hands. I cannot trust to working the ship were I to go into the fleet, but if the enemy will attack where we have room, we are able to defend ourselves or destroy them. I could at first have cut off several of the merchantmen, but must by that means have been discovered and thereby have lost our chance at the King's ships; and I am determined never to wax against merchantmen where I have an opportunity of waxing against the King. I should have preferred sinking that ship to the richest capture in the fleet." These excuses seem inadequate. John Paul Jones found the Alfred capable of giving excellent service. If Thompson had been an enterprising officer, it is difficult to believe that he would have allowed this rich fleet to get away without leaving a single prize in his hands. As to warring against merchantmen, American commanders had express orders to pursue fleets under convoy and make as many captures as possible. The ships and cargoes were needed by the impoverished Continental government, and every blow struck at the enemy's commerce helped a little to turn the scale in this closely contested war. In due time the Raleigh and Alfred arrived in France; also the sloop Independence, Captain Young, which had been sent out with dispatches (Almon, v, 401-405; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 99 (to Captain Young, July 5,1777)

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Early in the year 1777 the sloop Revenge, American privateer of ten guns, Captain Joseph Sheffield, cruising to the windward of Barbadoes, is reported to have fought four hours with two British ships, each carrying fourteen guns, and to have captured one of them. The ship Thomas, a prize of the Revenge and presumably this same one, was recaptured by the sloop of war Unicorn while running into Newport, not knowing it was occupied by the British (Boston Gazette, February 24, 1777; London Chronicle, May 3, 1777; William's Liverpool Privateers, 195-198.) The report came from New York, March 24, that within two months the British men-of-war stationed about Chesapeake and Delaware Bays had taken seventy American ships and privateers (London Chronicle, May 10, 1777.) The frigate Pearl fell in with the privateers Teaser, 18, and Resolution, 14, with a convoy of three merchantmen. An engagement of an hour and a half followed, when a gun on the Resolution burst and she struck. The Pearl also took two of the merchantmen, but the other and the Teaser escaped (Ibid, June 10, 1777.)

The British naval schooner Prince William, of eight guns, was captured, and her captain, writing from Boston Prison, May 13, says: "In my last I acquainted you of my success in taking American prizes, but my fortune now is quite the reverse. On the 2d of this month, falling in with the Spy, an American privateer snow of 12 guns, my vessel was taken after an engagement of three glasses and brought into this port, where myself and crew are prisoners. Boston harbor swarms with privateers and their prizes; this is a great place of rendezvous with them. The privateersmen come on shore here full of money and enjoy themselves much after the same manner the English seamen at Portsmouth and Plymouth did in the late war; and by the best information I can get there are no less than fifteen foreign vessels lately arrived in the harbour with cargoes of various articles." (Almon, v, 173; London Chronicle, July 3, 1777.)

A letter from Nantucket, dated May 15, gives this account: "The 11th inst. Capt. Simpkins, commander of the Fortune, Provincial ship of war of 22 guns, 4 cohorns, and 18 swivels, fell in with the English brig Boscawen, of 18 six-pounders, near this port, and after an engagement of upwards of an hour the latter was taken and carried for Boston. We saw the action, which was continued a considerable time very resolute by both parties and seemed to us rather doubtful. The Captain of the brig was wounded and the officer that was second in command was killed." (Almon, v, 174.)

On the 12th of July the ship Pole of Liverpool, in latitude 50° north, longitude 20° west, "fell in with the Tartar, a rebel privateer mounting 20 nine-pounders on the main deck, 8 four-pounders on the quarter-deck and 4 four-pounders on the forecastle, full of men, supposed two hundred at least . . . She bore down on the Pole under English colours, enquired from whence she came and whether she was a King's ship. Being answered in the affirmative, the captain gave orders to hoist the Thirteen Stripes and fire away, on which the engagement began and continued from five until about twenty minutes past eight, when the privateer

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sheered off. Captain Maddock [of the Pole] had two mates and a passenger wounded and supposes that near one half of the people belonging to the privateer must be killed or wounded, he having cleared their forecastle of men three different times and says he heard dreadful cries among them. The Pole had 16 six-pounders and only forty people, passengers included." (Williams, 205 (quoting a Liverpool paper). In Williams's list of Liverpool privateers (Appendix iv) the Pole is given 24 guns and 100 men.)

Many privateers cruised in the West Indies, and besides those that came out from the United States, some were fitted out at Martinique under American commanders, with French and Spanish crews and commissioned by the American naval and commercial agent, William Bingham. Prices rose in the British islands on account of the large amount of property taken by Americans. Admiral Young, commanding the British station in the Leeward Islands, reported the capture of many of these privateers (Almon, v, 141-143, 168, 171, 198, 199; Boston Gazette, June 2, October 13, 1777; London Chronicle, April 22, August 5, 1777; Williams, 200, 201.) The privateer Revenge, Captain Isaac Freeborn, sailed from Martha's Vineyard for the West Indies December 9, 1777. "About ten Days after, we fell in with a Privateer Schooner, gave her a couple of Shot and she run. About 8 Days after, we fell in with and took the Ship York, from Glasgow bound to Barbadoes, laden with dry Goods, some Provisions, &c. which was sent into Martineco. About 4 Days after, fell in with a large English Ship of 18 Guns, which was too much for us. We afterwards came across a fleet of about 100 Sail, to Windward of Barbadoes, but they being convoy'd by 5 Frigates and it blowing a hard Gale, we could do nothing with them. We then bore away for Martineco, sprung our Mast and carried away our Topmast, but luckily got in and found our Prize safe." (Boston Gazette, March 9, 1778. For further accounts of privateering in 1777, see Coll. Essex Inst., July, 1890; Continental Journal, December 25, 1777; Connecticut Gazette, July 18, 1777; London Chronicle, March 18, April 10, 1777; Pickering MSS., xvii, 50; Engagements by Sea and Land, 78, 79.)

Under orders issued March 14, 1777, by the Massachusetts Board of War the brigantines Tyrannicide, Captain Jonathan Haraden, and Massachusetts, Captain John Fisk, of the state navy, sailed together March 24 on a cruise to the coasts of Ireland, England, and France. The brigantine Freedom, Captain John Clouston, had already sailed March 8, under the same authority and for the same cruising ground. April 1, in longitude 15° west, Clouston reported having taken three prizes. He arrived at Paimboeuf May 1, having made twelve captures in all. April 2 the Massachusetts and Tyrannicide, in latitude 41° 30' north and longitude 45° west, took the ship Chaulkly, and April 8, ten degrees farther east, the Tyrannicide took the bark Lonsdale after a three hours' engagement, while the Massachusetts was chasing another vessel. Just two weeks after this, in about 48° north and 16° west, they "fell in with a fleet of 9 sail bound to the Westward, one of 60 & one of 14 Guns, British Ships of War, with 7 Transports from Plymouth for New York. Being a Fresh gale we could not bare down on them; however, finding one Brig to lay a stern, we took the liberty to take her under

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Convoy. She had on board 63 Troops, Hessens Chussers, with their accountrements compleat." (Mass. Arch., clii, 165.) The Massachusetts arrived at Nantes May 21, and Fisk reported: "I have not the pleasure to acquaint you that the Tyrannicide is here with me, but am sorry to acquaint you that on the seventeenth Instant at Nine in the Morning we gave chase to a Ship standing to the Eastward and came up fast. At three got within two miles of the ship, then saw three Sail in the N. E. bearing down to us; one of said Sail brought our chase too & hoisted English colours. I bore away and made sail from them; the Ship gave me chase. Capt. Haraden bore away also; the ship came up with us fast. At Nine at Night I haul'd my Wind; Capt. Haraden bore away before the wind. At half after nine, lost sight of Capt. Haraden and soon after, lost sight of the Ship. At ten, saw three flashes of Guns, which I suppose the Ship fired at Capt. Haraden and I am afraid the Ship took him, as I have not heard nor seen anything of him since." (lbid., 216.) Fisk had taken eight prizes since leaving Salem. He sailed for home in June, having on board four passengers, including General Pulaski. July 12, from a schooner Fisk learned of Haraden's safe arrival at Bilbao, after having been obliged to throw overboard guns and stores to escape the British ship. The Massachusetts arrived at Marblehead July 23, forty-four days from Nantes. The Freedom had arrived at Boston two weeks earlier; she had taken sixteen prizes, of which six had probably been retaken. The Tyrannicide came later, getting into Boston August 30 (Mass. Arch., cli, 415, 416, clii, 134, 135, 144, 160, 165, 178, 182, 189, 216, 220, 230, 271, 292 ; Boston Gazette, June 2, 9, July 14, September 1, 1777; Continental Journal, June 12,1777; London Chronicle, May 3, 1777; Massachusetts Mag., April, October, 1908.)

In the Massachusetts Council, August 6, 1777, the following measure was adopted: "Whereas our Enemies have several small Cruisers upon this Coast, & even in Boston Bay, which have taken several of our Coasting Vessels & greatly Obstructed our Navigation; And as the Continental & State Vessels, as also most of the Private Vessels of War, are improper to be employed for Clearing the Coast of these Vermin, therefore Resolved, That the Board of War be & they hereby are directed, without Delay, to take such Measures for taking or destroying all such Cruisers as aforesaid, as they shall judge most proper." (Mass. Arch., Revolutionary Rolls, xliv, 268.) The day before, the Board of War had instructed Captain Fisk, who had returned from France two weeks before, to cruise in the track of homeward-bound West Indiamen and "to use your utmost Endeavours to take, burn, sink & destroy all armed and other Vessels, together with their Cargoes, belonging to the Subjects of the King of Great Britain, Enemies to the United States of America & the natural Rights of Mankind." (Mass. Arch., cli, 426.) Captain Fisk soon set sail again in the Massachusetts, and on the afternoon of August 19 "saw three sail to the Eastward. We gave chase [and] at 4 found them to be two Schooners and a Ship. We soon saw the two Schooners was attacking the Ship & after a few shot they fell a stern and the Ship tack'd & made sail for us. At 5 we came up to the Ship & found she wore British Colours; we gave her a Broadside [and] she struck to the American Arms." (lbid., clii, 271.) This was the ship Johnson, bound from Liverpool to New York,

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and the schooners were the privateers Speedwell and Active of Boston. August 31, in latitude 36° 28' north, longitude 51° west, the Massachusetts fell in with a vessel bound from St. Christopher to Belfast, which had sailed with a British fleet of a hundred and thirty sail under the convoy of four men-of-war. This was probably the same fleet that the Raleigh and Alfred fell in with a few days later. At this time Captain Fisk had three Massachusetts privateers cruising with him; they were the schooner Dolphin of Marblehead and the brigantines Hampden of Salem and Gloucester of Cape Ann. In October, Fisk reported the capture of two brigs (Mass. Arch., clii, 330, 362, 391; Massachusetts Mag., October, 1908.)

The brigs Tyrannicide, Captain Haraden, Hazard, Captain Simeon Sampson, and Freedom, Captain Clouston, cruised during the fall. The Hazard had just been added to the Massachusetts navy. The brig Independence had been captured by the enemy in the spring; and in September or October the Freedom was taken by the British frigate Apollo, and Clouston was sent to the prison-ship Felicity at New York. Regulations for the government of the Massachusetts navy, based on those of the Continental navy, had been adopted in March (Mass. Arch., cli, 430, clii, 414, cliii, 2, 3, clvii, 93, 103, 113; Mass. Court. Rec., March 21, 1777; Massachusetts Mag., April, July, 1908, January, April, 1909.)

The waters about Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were a favorite cruising ground, during the Revolution, for the armed ships and privateers of Massachusetts and other New England states, and many visits were paid to the Grand Banks and to the comparatively defenseless shores of those provinces. Admiral Montagu wrote from St. John's, June 11, 1777: "The American privateers have been very troublesome on the banks and have committed great depredations among the fishermen, notwithstanding I have dispatched the men-of-war as they arrived to the different parts of the fishing bank to cruize for their protection. It gives me great concern to be obliged to inform your Lordship that the privateers cruizing in these seas are greatly superior in number and size to the squadron under my command and without a large force is sent out to me, the bank fishery is at a stand." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 69 (Montagu to Germain). The "privateers" which most worried the admiral at this time were the frigates Hancock and Boston.) In August, Commodore Collier having learned of a projected expedition against Nova Scotia from Machias, sailed for that place with the Rainbow, 44, the frigates Blonde, 32, and Mermaid, 28, and the brig Hope, 18. An important object of the enterprise was to serve as a diversion in favor of General Burgoyne, then approaching Saratoga. Collier's squadron arrived in Machias Bay on the 13th and the frigates anchored, as there was not water enough for them to ascend the river. The Hope, however, was sent up, and a contemporary account says that her commander, Lieutenant "Dawson, kept under Way till he came opposite a Breastwork thrown up about half a Mile from the Town, garrisoned with only twelve Men, when he saluted it with a Broadside which was returned from a two-Pounder and two Swivels several Rounds, when Dawson sent his Boat to go ashore, but a few of our Men being in Ambush just where they were about to Land, as soon as they came within Musket-shot an

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Indian, who desired the first Shot, fired and kill'd the Man at the Bow Oar, when they immediately put back for the Brig. After which a Number of Boats with about 300 Marines and Mariners went ashore and burnt two Dwelling Houses, two Barns full of Hay and a Grist Mill. By this Time about 150 of the Militia had Mustered, who attack'd and drove the Enemy off; on seeing which, Dawson weigh'd Anchor and was endeavoring to get down, when he luckily ran a-ground and our People attacked him, with Small Arms only, so warmly as not a Man durst shew his Head above Deck till the above Boats came to tow him off, which our People beat off, having killed upwards of 60 of the Enemy; and 'tis thought that if a very thick Fog had not arose, they would have near Kill'd all the Enemy, if not destroy'd Dawson. Our Loss was only one, Mr. James Foster, Killed, and Mr. Jonas Farnsworth Wounded, though not dangerous." (Boston Gazette, September 8, 1777.) The British reported a loss of three killed and eighteen wounded. The squadron, having accomplished little, got under way a few days later and sailed back to Halifax. Collier was much criticized for the failure of this expedition, which, according to General Massey, the commander at Halifax, "might have prevented the Misfortunes that attend'd Lt. Genl. Burgoyne's Army." Collier claimed a victory, saying that he took a fort and thwarted American designs against Nova Scotia (Almon, iv, 139, 140; Amer. Hist. Rev., x (October, 1904), 69; Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., April, 1895; Proc. Cambridge Hist. Soc., v (1910), 70, 71; N. E. Magazine, August, 1895; Engagements by Sea and Land, 108; Hist. Man. Com., Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst., ii, 156, 209 (Massey to Howe, November 26, 1777, March 15, 1778)

General Howe took possession of Philadelphia September 26, 1777, and Admiral Howe, who had brought the British fleet around from the Head of Chesapeake Bay after landing the army, arrived in Delaware Bay October 4, an advance-squadron of his fleet having preceded him. The Americans, however, still held the defenses of the river, which prevented the British fleet from approaching the city and establishing the communications necessary for supplying the British army. These defenses consisted of forts, obstructions, and vessels. On a small island near the west bank of the river just below the month of the Schuylkill was situated Fort Mifflin, and opposite, at Redbank, New Jersey, was Fort Mercer, while three or four miles below this, at Billingsport, New Jersey, was another fort; and halfway between these last two was a battery. The obstructions were planted opposite this lower fort and also between Forts Mifflin and Mercer. They were heavy frames of timber or chevaux-de-frise sunk in the bottom of the river, from which projected beams sharpened and shod with iron, pointing downstream. Of the floating defenses the Continental navy furnished the new frigate Delaware, of twenty-four guns, and the Andrew Doria, Hornet, Wasp, Fly and Racehorse, with possibly the Mosquito and Sachem; also the xebecs Repulse and Champion. The Pennsylvania navy contributed to the cause its whole fleet: the ship Montgomery and over forty smaller craft, including galleys, armed boats, floating batteries, and fireships. The frigates Washington and Effingham were up the river, above Philadelphia, were still unfinished, and could be of no service. The combined Continental and state fleet was under the command of Commodore

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John Hazelwood, of the Pennsylvania navy. The British fleet engaged comprised two ships of sixty-four guns each, one of fifty guns, one forty-four, two frigates, and a number of smaller vessels, including a ship which carried sixteen twenty-four-pounders. Howe's flagship, the Eagle, of sixty-four guns, remained below, opposite Chester.

Immediately upon occupying Philadelphia the British erected batteries along the river-front for the defense of the city. The frigate Delaware, Captain Alexander, and a number of smaller vessels promptly advanced and opened fire on the batteries before they were finished. The Delaware anchored within five hundred yards, and unfortunately, on the ebb tide, she got aground and was exposed to such a heavy fire from British field artillery that Alexander was induced to strike his flag and the frigate fell into the enemy's hands; by far the strongest American ship in the river was thus lost at the very outset. The advance-squadron of the British fleet, led by the Roebuck, 44, came up the river as far as the lower obstructions soon after October 1. On that day the fort at Billingsport, being weakly garrisoned, was abandoned by the Americans on the approach of a detachment of the enemy's army. Two days later the fort was taken possession of by the British under the fire of American galleys. Meanwhile the ships had been and continued to be attacked night and day by American fire-rafts and galleys and were forced to drop lower down the river. The log of the frigate Liverpool for October 1 says: "At 7 P.M. the Rebels sent a Large Fire Raft down the River to burn us & from their Gallies fir'd Several Shot at us; weigh'd & Dropt a Little lower Down & fir'd a number of Shot at their Gallies." The same log mentions nine fire-rafts being sent down the river under cover of galleys on the night of October 14, and other logs note frequent instances. There seems to have been little difficulty in grappling these rafts from boats and towing them ashore. Beset with such impediments the British proceeded to remove the lower chevaux-de-frise and finally succeeded in cutting away a part of it, affording a passage for their largest ships. On October 15 this passage was made seventeen fathoms wide, and on the 19th the channel through the obstruction was buoyed.

By the 22d the fleet had warped through. Late on that day three battalions of Hessians under Colonel Donop assaulted Fort Mercer at Redbank, but were repulsed with heavy loss by the garrison of six hundred men under Colonel Christopher Greene; Donop was mortally wounded. The British attempted to aid this assault by sending some of their vessels up to bombard the fort. The Augusta, 64, the Roebuck, the frigates Pearl and Liverpool, the sloop of war Merlin, and a galley "work'd up the River in order to engage the Rebel Vessels and prevent their firing on our Troops, who appear'd to be much gall'd from the Enemies Shipping; 1/2 past 5 the Rebel Galleys &c. began firing on us, which was return'd by the Roebuck, Augusta & Cornwallis Galley." (Log of the Pearl.) The British ships were checked by the American fleet, which also greatly annoyed the Hessians during their advance and retreat. During the night the Augusta and Merlin got aground. Early the next morning, October 23, Fort Mifflin

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was attacked by the British fleet and by batteries thrown up on the Pennsylvania bank of the river. Aided very effectually by the American fleet, the fort made a successful resistance. About ten o'clock the Augusta took fire, in what way is not certainly known; she blew up about noon before all her crew could be saved. The Merlin was set on fire and was also destroyed. Commodore Hazelwood, in a report to the president of Pennsylvania, says: "On the 22d, about 4 o'clock, the attack was made on the Fort at red bank, in which a part of our Galleys was engaged in flanking the Enemy round the works and was of great use there; the rest of the Galleys and floating batteries were at Billingsport some time before. The ships that came was the Augusta, a new 64, the Roebuck, 44, two Frigates, the Merlin, 18 guns, and one Galley of a 32-pounder, all of which we drove down, and in going down the Augusta and Merlin ran aground below our upper chevaux de frise, which we discovered early in the morning of the 23d. I immediately hoisted the signal to engage them and soon after, the engagement became general. We had engaged our 12 galleys and the two floating batteries and all behaved extremely well; the rest of our Fleet could not be brought timely to act with us. We had against us the Augusta of 64, who had her broadside below and aloft constantly playing on us, with the Roebuck and two Frigates and their Galley; and had the Roebuck laid fast, she would have shared the same fate, but she was drove from her station before the Augusta got on fire." (Sparks MSS., 1, 108, 109 (October 29,1777)

After this repulse the British erected more powerful batteries on the shore opposite Fort Mifflin and mounted on them heavy guns from the fleet. A second attack was made November 10. On the 15th the fleet came up for a general assault, and the armed ship Vigilant, mounting sixteen twenty-four-pounders, was brought into the narrow western channel within a hundred yards of Fort Mifflin. This stronghold was nearly destroyed by the tremendous bombardment that now followed, and during the night was evacuated by the garrison, who passed over to Fort Mercer at Redbank. Commodore Hazelwood and his officers were criticized for inefficient naval support given to Fort Mifflin. Lack of cordial cooperation between the Continental and Pennsylvania forces and between army and navy was doubtless the cause. A few days later Fort Mercer was also evacuated. The American fleet was now left entirely without protection. Several of the galleys and smaller vessels of the Pennsylvania navy ran by the city in the night and escaped up the river. All the others were destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, who now completely controlled the bay (Dawson, ch. xxix, xxx; Clark, i, 55-60; Bradford, chs. xxv, xxviii-xxxvii; Almon, v, 426-430, 499-503; Annual Register, xx (1777),133, 134, 137-139; Penn. Archives, II, i; Mag. Amer. Hist. March, 1878; United Service, September, 1890; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April, 1887, April, 1902; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, Nos. 157, 293, 548, 675, 906, 931, 1100 (lop of the Camilla, Eagle, Liverpool, Pearl, Somerset, Strombolo, and Zebra), Masters' Logs, No. 1633 (log of the Camilla); Pickering MSS., v, 60. In Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, ch. v, and in Bradford, are interesting maps.)

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In December, David Bushnell made an unsuccessful attempt to destroy some of the British fleet in the Delaware by means of floating torpedoes. In his account of the affair Bushnell says: "I fixed several kegs under water, charged with powder to explode upon touching anything, as they floated along with the tide. I set them afloat in the Delaware, above the English shipping at Philadelphia, in December 1777. I was unacquainted with the river and obliged to depend upon a gentleman very imperfectly acquainted with that part of it, as I afterwards found. We went as near the shipping as we durst venture; I believe the darkness of the night greatly deceived him, as it did me. We set them adrift to fall with the ebb upon the shipping. Had we been within sixty rods I believe they must have fallen in with them immediately, as I designed; but as I afterwards found, they were set adrift much too far distant and did not arrive until after being detained some time by the frost. They advanced in the daytime in a dispersed situation and under great disadvantages. One of them blew up a boat with several persons in it, who imprudently handled it too freely and thus gave the British that alarm which brought on the battle of the Kegs." (Amer. Philosophical Transactions, iv, 303, quoted in Clark, i, 71. See Barry, 60.) It was said that the British were apprehensive of further attempts of the same kind.

The Continental sloop Providence, Captain Rathburne, which had returned to New Bedford in August, set sail again in November and cruised off the coast of South Carolina. On a bright moonlight night a sail was seen and "in a few minutes," says Lieutenant Trevett, "she run under our lee quarter, gave us a broadside without any courtesy and run ahead of us. Capt. Rathbone ordered the boatswain to call all hands to quarters as still as he could and not use his call. The Privateer, as she proved to be, bore away and coming up again was soon alongside; we were all ready for them and as soon as they made the first flash, we gave them a yankee welcome with a handsome broadside. They up helm and ran to the eastward and not having a man hurt of any consequence, we made sail after them." The chase showed a lantern and we knew by their throwing out that signal that there was an enemy not far off and we fired no more cannon at her, but we continued the chase and found we gained on her every hour. Day appeared and the look-out man reported a large ship under the land . . . About sunrise we neared the Privateer so much that the Lieut. from the round house fired several times at us." His fire was returned, "as he made a fine mark to be shot at, standing on the round house. We had not fired more than three shot before we saw him fall and instantly the Privateer got in the wind, and we were alongside of her in a few minutes, when we boarded her and found it was her Lieutenant we had shot and he fell on the man steering at the wheel. He had a handsome brace of pistols at his side when he laid dead on deck. We found five men badly wounded on board; our shot went into one quarter and out through the other and she was badly shattered. The ship we saw to windward was a frigate and the officers of the privateer we captured were on board of her the day before and were to meet her next day off Charleston Bar. We got so far to the eastward that we stood for Georgetown." (R.I. Hist. Mag., April, 1886.) There the Providence remained until January.

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Almost interminable delay seems to have been the universal experience in fitting out American men-of-war and enlisting their crews; and the Ranger at Portsmouth was no exception. Captain Jones frequently reported his ship in most respects ready for sea, but he says that with all his industry he could not get a single suit of sails completed until the 20th of October. He had perhaps less than the usual difficulty in enlisting men, and speaks of them as "an orderly and well disciplined crew . . . of one hundred and forty odd." (Jones MSS., to Morris, October 30, 1777. For a list of the crew, see Remick, 211.) He finally set sail for France November 1. On the voyage he took two prizes which he sent into Nantes and arrived there himself December 2. In his report to the Marine Committee he says: "I found the Ranger very Crank, owing to the improper quality of her Ballast and to her being rather over Masted, to remedy which I purpose to shorten her lower Masts and Ballast with lead." Her sailing "falls short of the general expectation for the Above reasons and on account of the foulness of her Bottom, which, except a partial cleaning in July, hath not been seen since she came off the Stocks." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 137 (Jones to Marine Committee, December 10, 1777)) Jones communicated at once with the American Commissioners, Franklin, Deane, and Lee, and forwarded the dispatches of the Secret Committee of Congress (Sands, 70, 71; Jones MSS., August 17, 24, October 30, 1777, letters to Morris and Hewes; Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 133, 137, (December 5, 10, 1777, Jones to American Commissioners and to Marine Committee)

In 1777, Congress, through its Committee of Foreign Affairs, had begun to interest itself in the question of extending the activities of the navy into distant seas. The hopelessness of coping with the British navy was becoming more apparent, and visions of the wealth that might be secured from unprotected commerce appealed to the imagination. In December, 1777, the Committee of Foreign Affairs suggested to the American Commissioners in Paris that they send some of the Continental frigates from France to the Indian Ocean, with the hope of intercepting England's China trade. This project was considered impracticable by the Commissioners, who had, however, already advised and continued to urge an attack upon the British whale fishery off the coast of Brazil and in the Arctic Ocean. The whaling fleet was not only unprotected, but was manned by Americans, chiefly prisoners who had been given the choice of serving on these ships or on men-of-war. Notwithstanding these and other schemes, it does not appear that either public or private ships of war during the Revolution, with perhaps one or two unimportant exceptions, ever cruised farther from home than the West Indies and the coast of Europe (Wharton, ii, 325, 440, 673, 818, iii, 385; Archives de la Marine, B1 87, 269.)

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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER VIII

FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1777

From the beginning of the Revolution the eyes of America and of France were directed towards one another across the sea. With instructions dated March 3, 1776, Silas Deane was sent to France, where he was to seek an audience of the Comte de Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and attempt to obtain military supplies for the American army, to be paid for by Congress (Wharton, ii, 78.) In the very same month Vergennes reminded Louis XVI and his ministers of the advantages which France might derive from the quarrel between England and her colonies, and suggested the expediency of encouraging the Americans even to the extent of advancing secret loans of money and supplies. This advice on the part of Vergennes was prompted by the report of a secret agent who had been sent to America in 1775. A paper addressed to the King by Caron de Beaumarchais, an enthusiast in the American cause, also greatly influenced French policy at this time. While this policy was plainly dictated by antipathy towards England and fear of her growing power, it is nevertheless true that there was in France, more or less widespread, a warm sympathy with the cause of American freedom (Wharton, i, ch. iv; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vii, ch. i; Doniol's Participation de la France, i, chs. vii, viii; Hart's American Nation, ix, ch. xii.)

The aid advanced to the Continental Congress by the French government was sent through Beaumarchais, and to make the transactions still more secret a fictitious mercantile house, under the name of Hortalez and Company, was reputed to carry on the business. In the summer of 1776 Beaumarchais received from the French government a million francs and another million from Spain, to be employed in aid of the Americans. Ships were purchased or chartered for the transportation of military stores. Some of these vessels sailed directly for the United States and others to the West Indies, where their cargoes were discharged and exchanged for American produce, which was taken back to France. Martinique and St. Eustatius were the principal depots for this exchange in the West Indies. The chief staple in this traffic was tobacco, brought to the islands in Continental vessels which returned to the United States with the warlike supplies. A number of French officers also took passage in these ships, to volunteer in the American service. Some of the vessels were ready to sail in December, 1776, but were delayed by unforeseen obstacles. Of several ships that sailed early in 1777 the Amphitrite was perhaps the first and arrived at Portsmouth in April with a valuable cargo and several officers. Nearly all these vessels seem to have crossed the ocean safely, but one of the earlier ones was captured by the British on her return voyage. First and last, large amounts of

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clothing, artillery, including field pieces from the royal arsenals of France, and other stores of all kinds found their way to America through the medium of Hortalez and Company (Wharton, i, 369, 370, 442, 454, ii, 148, 171, 262, 276, 328; Stevens's Facsimiles, 152, 240, 263, 1445, 1552, 1559, 1752; London Chronicle, July 17, 1777; Channing, iii, 283, 284, 405-408.)

Silas Deane arrived in Paris in June, 1776, and was well received by Vergennes. He was the sole American agent in France until Arthur Lee came over from England in December, closely followed by Franklin, who arrived in the Reprisal from America. These three had been appointed by Congress commissioners for the supervision and advancement of American interests in Europe. They were instructed to purchase or hire eight line of battle ships of seventy-four and sixty-four guns; also a frigate and two cutters (Jour. Cont. Congr., October 3, 22, 1776; Wharton, ii, 176, 177.)

About the 1st of October, 1776, the letter of marque schooner Hawke, Captain John Lee, of Newburyport, arrived at Bilbao in Spain, having captured five English vessels which she sent back to America, keeping some of the prisoners. These persons entered a protest through the British consul at Bilbao. Captain Lee was accused of piracy and with his vessel and crew was detained in port. Deane having made application in his behalf to Vergennes, the French government interceded with Spain with the result that the Hawke was released. (Annual Register, xix (1776), 261; Wharton, ii, 174,175,195, 208, 379; Stevens, 587, 589, 590.) In November, 1776, a French vessel arrived at Alicante in Spain and reported having met, off the Rock of Lisbon, "a North American armed vessel which forcibly put on board of her 11 Sailors, part of crews belonging to two English vessels, which she had seized on 12th Nov. about 25 Leagues W. of said Rock. This Pirate is a sloop called the Union, belong[ing] to Cape Ann, of 10 Carriage Guns, 8 Swivels & 40 Men. Comd. by Isaac Soams, she had capt. 3 other ships, of which 2 sent to Cape Ann, another in ballast let go." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Consuls' Letters, No. 3837 (November 26, 1776.)

The commercial house of Joseph Gardoqui and Sons of Bilbao had long had business connections in the American colonies, and during the war the Revolutionists had a firm friend in Diego Gardoqui, the head of the house, who at the same time had influence with the Spanish court. His aid was apparent in obtaining loans from Spain and even more so in extending a helping hand to American ships of war and privateers cruising in European waters. He secured their friendly reception and the disposal of their prizes in Bilbao and other Spanish ports, generally with success during the earlier years of the war at least, in spite of the strenuous protests of the British ambassador at Madrid. His services were especially important and valuable at a time when the Americans most needed friends in Europe, that is, before the French alliance. No doubt he took an interest and, though keeping himself in the background, an active part in procuring the release of the privateer Hawke, detained at Bilbao (Wharton, i, 442, ii, 292, 308, 315, 405, 424, 533; Channing, iii, 283,284.)

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The Reprisal, Captain Wickes, was the first vessel of the Continental navy to arrive in European waters, although probably several privateers besides the Hawke and Union had preceded her. The prizes taken by the Reprisal on the passage over and brought into Nantes were probably the first American captures sent into French ports. The Committee of Secret Correspondence had written to the American Commissioners in Paris: "We desire you to make immediate application to the court of France to grant the protection of their ports to American men-of-war and their prizes. Show them that British men-of-war, under sanction of an act of Parliament, are daily capturing American ships and cargoes; show them the resolves of Congress for making reprisals on British and West India property, and that our continental men-of-war and numerous private ships of war are most successfully employed in executing these resolutions of the Congress; show them the justice and equity of this proceeding and surely they can not, they will not refuse the protection of their ports to American ships of war, privateers and prizes." They were also, if possible, "to obtain leave to make sale of those prizes and their cargoes." If successful in these applications, they were to "appoint some person to act as judge of the admiralty, who should give the bond prescribed for those judges, to determine in all cases agreeable to the rules and regulations of Congress." (Wharton, ii, 179.)

The arrival at Nantes of these first American prizes brought forth from Lord Stormont, the British ambassador, a vehement protest. In an interview with Vergennes, December 17, 1776, Stormont said he expected that the Reprisal's prizes would "be immediately restored to their owners; . . . that it was a clear and indisputable Principle [of the law of nations] that no Prize can be a lawful one that is not made by a ship who has either a Commission or Lettre de Marque from some sovereign Power." Vergennes replied that France must be cautious about exposing her trade to the resentment of the Americans, but that treaties with England would be observed. The Treaty of Utrecht, concluded between France and England in 1713, expressly closed the ports of either power to the enemies of the other. Stormont said that England might have to issue letters of marque, because it was "next to impossible for our Frigates alone to get the better of the numberless small American vessels with which the seas swarmed and which greatly distressed our Trade. [He] added that the Difficulty was considerably encreased by France and Spain receiving these Armateurs into their Ports, which was a step . . . never expected, as it was the General Interest of all civilized Nations to give no Refuge or Assistance to Pirates." (Stevens, 1392 (Stormont to Weymouth, December 18, 1776.) On a later occasion Vergennes asked if such letters of marque would be authorized to search neutrals, as to which Stormont was without the information necessary for a definite answer. Vergennes was apprehensive of results that might follow to French Commerce, especially the shipment of supplies to America, from the inquisitorial zeal of British privateers. A number of British agents were employed in France to collect intelligence for their government, and through them Stormont was kept advised of much that was going on. The transactions of Hortalez and Company were known to him, and the connection of the French government with that establishment was doubtless

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surmised. The delay in shipping stores to America was chiefly due to the ambassador's protests and to efforts to elude his vigilance. In reply to his complaints, January 28, 1777, about the sailing of the Amphitrite and other French vessels for America, Vergennes professed complete ignorance and promised to bring the matter to the attention of the King and his Prime Minister, the Comte de Maurepas. Soon after this Maurepas declared to Stormont that, while he had heard that some French merchants were intending to send cloth to San Domingo which Americans might perhaps purchase there, he did not believe any military stores were being shipped. It was impossible, he said, to prevent private trade, but an inquiry into the alleged transactions had been ordered (Stevens, 1418, 1427 (Stormont to Weymouth, January 29, February 5, 1777) ; Proc. U. S. Naval Institute, xxxvii (September, 1911), 937, 938.)

As soon as she could refit, after her arrival in France, the Reprisal sailed on a cruise in the Bay of Biscay and returned to L'Orient in February. On the 14th, Wickes reported to the commissioners: "This will inform you of my safe arrival after a tolerable successful cruise, having captured 3 sail of Brigs, one snow and one ship. The Snow is a Falmouth Packet bound from thence to Lisbon. She is mounted with 16 guns and had near 50 men on board. She engaged near an hour before she struck. I had one man killed. My first Lieut. had his left arm shot off above the elbow and the Lieut. of Marines had a musquet ball lodged in his wrist. They had several men wounded, but none killed . . . Three of our prizes are arrived and I expect the other two in to-morrow." (Hale's Franklin in France, i, 114.) In due time Stormont was informed of these proceedings and, February 25, he called upon Vergennes, intending to demand "the Delivery of these Ships with their Crews, Cargoes, &c."; but the French minister said "that immediately upon the Receipt of this News, a Resolution was taken to order the American Ship and her Prizes instantly to put to Sea and that orders were given in Consequence," and added that these directions had probably already been carried out. Vergennes also said that instructions had been issued "not to suffer any American Vessel to cruise near the Coast of France." (Stevens, 14, 38 (Stormont to Weymouth, February 26, 1777.) On March 4, Stormont complained that the Reprisal was still at L'Orient and that two of the prizes had been sold. Vergennes doubted the sale of these vessels and declared that the Reprisal had been ordered to sail immediately, although Captain Wickes had asked to be allowed to make necessary repairs first (lbid., 1442 (March 5, 1777.) Two weeks later Stormont sent a memorandum to Vergennes setting forth that the orders of the French government had been disregarded, that the Reprisal was still at L'Orient, careened and undergoing repairs, and that all five of the prizes had been sold and must have been sold with the knowledge and consent of the French commissary at L'Orient. The immediate departure of the Reprisal and the restoration of the prizes, which had all been sold to Frenchmen, was demanded (lbid., 1483 (Stormont to Vergennes, March 18, 1777.) Vergennes admitted that if these prizes, sailing under French colors and manned by French crews, should fall in with British cruisers, they might rightfully be taken. "Property cannot be altered by such sales; you would restore us the sailors." (Stevens, 1484

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(Stormont to Weymouth, March 19, 1777.) Through M. de Sartine, the Minister of Marine, an investigation of the affair was made, but no satisfactory explanation of the condemnation and sale of the prizes could be furnished (lbid., 1536 (Sartine to Vergennes, May 22, 1777.) Meanwhile the American Commissioners had at the outset disclaimed responsibility. February 20 they wrote: "We have ordered no Prizes into the Ports of France, nor do we know of any that have entered for any other purpose than to provide themselves with necessaries, untill they could sail for America or some Port in Europe for a Market . . . The Reprisal had orders to cruise in the open Sea and by no means near the Coast of France." If she "has taken a Station offensive to the Commerce of France, it is without our Orders or Knowledge and we shall advise the Captain of his Error." They had been informed, they said, that the cruise had been on the coast of Spain and Portugal (lbid., 644.) In April they wrote to the Committee of Secret Correspondence of Congress that bringing the prizes "into France has given some trouble and uneasiness to the court and must not be too frequently practiced." (Wharton, ii, 287. See Wickes's letters in Hale, i, 115, 119, 120.)

An early move in the direction of American expansion and the acquisition of territory beyond the seas was taken by the commissioners in Paris when in January, 1777, the following warrant was issued by them to the Baron de Rullecourt: "We the undersigned Commissioners Plenipotentiary of the United States of North America do in their Name & by their Authority take you into the Service of the sd States as Chief of a Corps which you are to raise & Command agreeable to the Plan by you delivered, respecting the Islands of the Zaffarines, understood to be disowned & deserted." The Zaffarines were off the coast of Morocco. Rullecourt was authorized to fortify and defend the islands and to raise the American flag and fight under it. He and his officers were to be naturalized as American citizens. To defeat this scheme it was proposed to the British government to induce Morocco to seize the islands, when Spain would probably interfere and they would be occupied by one or the other power. Apparently the enterprise was soon abandoned (Stevens, 4 (warrant), 54, 144 (P. Wentworth to Earl of Suffolk, March, 3, 5, 1777), 651 (map.)

Among the seafaring men who found their way from America to Europe during the Revolution and entered the service of the commissioners was Samuel Nicholson, a brother of Captain James Nicholson. He received the commission of lieutenant in the Continental navy, and later that of captain. Nicholson was directed by Franklin, January 26, 1777, "to proceed to Boulogne and there purchase, on as good terms as possible, a cutter suitable for the purpose of being sent to America. . . . Should you miss of one at Boulogne, proceed to Calais and pursue the same directions. If you fail there, pass to Dover or Deal and employ a person there to make the purchase." (Wharton, ii, 254.) In pursuance of these instructions Nicholson got to England before meeting with success. Being in London he wrote to Captain Joseph Hynson, February 9, 1777: "I came to town 12 OClock last Night, my Business are of such a nature wont bare puttg to Paper. Shall say nothing more, but expect to see you Immediately. I

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shall leave Town early the Morrow Morning, therefore begg You will not loose A Minutes time in Coming here, as I have business of Importance for you, wch must be transacted this Day." (Stevens, 9.) A week later Nicholson and Hynson were in Dover together and there evidently purchased a cutter, which was called the Dolphin and was to be used as a packet. February 17, Nicholson sailed her over to Calais. Hynson still remained in Dover, but went over to France a few days later, apparently in a sloop which sailed the 22d. Lord North was promptly advised by one of his agents of the presence in England of these two Americans. Hynson was a brother-in-law of Captain Wickes, and was employed by Silas Deane in the mercantile affairs of the commissioners. His zeal for the American cause was unquestioned, but all the while he was secretly in the service of the British government. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, an Englishman, was intimate with Hynson and drew much information from him, which from time to time he forwarded to London. A number of agents were employed who watched the movements of Wickes, Nicholson, and other captains, as well as of the American Commissioners in Paris, and reported the doings of Hortalez and Company, the arrival of American vessels, and other items of news. The Massachusetts state cruisers Freedom and Massachusetts, which arrived in the spring of 1777, were kept under observation, but as they had sent their prizes back to America, they did not so much disturb the Englishmen in France (Stevens, 9.)

William Hodge, a Philadelphia merchant who had come to France by way of Martinique with dispatches from Congress, was employed by the commissioners in the purchase of vessels for the naval service. On this errand he proceeded to Dunkirk, where in April a lugger was bought which was called the Surprise (Wharton, ii, 162, 181, 261, 283, 287, 380. Deane says the Surprise was bought in Dover; Conyngham says in Dunkirk. An socount in Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 938, based on the archives at Dunkirk, differs slightly but not essentially from the above.) Meanwhile Gustavus Conyngham, an American mariner of Irish birth, who had been sent out from Philadelphia to procure military supplies, had come to Dunkirk from Holland, having also visited London. He seems to have been recommended to the commissioners by Hodge as a capable man to take command of the Surprise. They accordingly filled out for him one of the blank commissions they had received for that purpose, signed by the President of Congress and dated March 1, 1777. The Surprise was fitted out, armed with ten guns, and got to sea about the 1st of May. In a few days she returned to Dunkirk with two prizes, one of them an English mail packet from Harwich. The British ambassador saw Vergennes and Maurepas, May 8, and they were obliged to yield to his demands. The Surprise was seized, her captain and most of his crew were put in prison, and the prizes released. Conyngham's commission was sent to Versailles and was not returned to him; it was alleged that the French ministry endeavored to persuade the American Commissioners to repudiate this document. Apparently the French were willing in this way to sacrifice Conyngham's good name in aid of their policy, which was to avoid a rupture with England until the time was ripe for it. However, they refused to deliver him in person to his enemies. Stormont recorded with satisfaction: "The Success of my

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application with regard to the Dunkirk Pirate has been highly displeasing to Franklin and Deane. They made strong Remonstrances, but were given to understand that there are some things too glaring to be winked at." (Stevens, 1533 (to Weymouth, May 14, 1777.) Vergennes wrote to the Marquis de Noailles, the French ambassador at London, that Conyngham's prizes had been restored to the British, not "for love of them, but only to do homage to the principles of justice and equity"; and that gratitude on the part of England was not to be expected (Ibid., 1546 (June 7, 1777.)) It was not long before the American Commissioners procured an order for the release of Conyngham and his crew, but so far as concerned the latter it was not at once executed for fear that the crew would disperse, and they were needed to man a cutter which Hodge had purchased at Dunkirk. This vessel was named the Revenge and carried fourteen guns. Meanwhile Stormont continued to complain that both in France and in the French West Indies vessels were fitted out and manned with French sailors under American captains, given American commissions, and then cruised against British commerce. If boarded by a British man-of-war, the crews would all talk French and show French papers and nothing could be proved against them. Vergennes promised to have these abuses corrected, and Sartine, the Minister of Marine, issued orders to prevent the fltting-out of vessels with American commissions in the French West Indies. Vergennes thought Stormont showed want of consideration in keeping spies in French ports (lbid., 159, 245, 690, 1529, 1530, 1531, 1543, 1548, 1551, 1552, 1553, 1555; Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 938-941; Almon, v, 143, 146,176; Williams, 200, 201; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biog., January, 1899; Outlook, January 3, 1903.)

The Continental brig Lexington, Captain Henry Johnson, sailed from Baltimore, February 27, 1777, and arrived in France early in April. Johnson had been captured the year before in the privateer Yankee and had escaped from a prison ship. Upon his return to America he had been given a Continental commission. The American Commissioners in Paris now planned to send the Reprisal, Lexington, and Dolphin on a cruise along the shores of the British Isles. George Lupton, one of the Englishmen in France engaged in watching the course of events, wrote May 13 to William Eden of the foreign office in London: "I have at last with some certainty discovered the intended voyage of Nicholson, Weakes & Johnson; they have all sail'd from Nantes and mean if possiable to intercept some of your transports with foreign troops, but in what place or latitude cannot say." (Stevens, 158.) It is probable that the squadron did not sail quite as early as this. The orders for the cruise issued by Wickes, who was senior officer, to Johnson and Nicholson were dated May 23. The ships were not to separate "unless we should be Chased by a Vessel of Superior Force & it should be Necessary so to do for our own preservation." In such an event "you may continue your Cruize through the Irish Channel or to the North West of Ireland, as you may Judge Safest and best, untill you Arrive off the Isles Orkney and there Cruize 5 or 6 Days for the Fleet to Come up & join you. If they do not appear in that time You may make the best of your Way back for Bilboa or St Sebastian & there Refit as fast as possible for Another Cruize, informing the Honourable

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Commissioners of your Safe Arrival and the Success of your Cruize." Prizes were to be sent into Spanish or French ports, all the prisoners having been taken out. "The Prize Master must not Report or Enter her as Prize, but as An American Vessel from a port that will be most likely to gain Credit according to the Cargo she may have on board . . . Be Very Attentive to your Signals and if you should be taken, you must take Care to Distroy them . . . Take care to have all the Prisoners properly Secured, to prevent their Rising & taking your Vessel, & if you meet a Dutch, French, Dean, Sweed, or Spainish Vessel, when you have a Number of Prisoners on board, I think it would do well to put them on board any of those Vessels, giving as much provision and Water as will serve them into Port. If any of your prizes should be Chased or in danger, they may Run into the first or most Convenient Port they Can reach in France or Spain, prefering Bilboa, St Sebastians, L'Orient, or Nantz. . . . If you take a prize that you think worth Sending to America, you may dispatch her for Some of the Northern Ports in the Massechusets States." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 41, 7, 145.)

The squadron cruised a month, and while they missed the linen ships which they had hoped to capture, several prizes were made in the Irish Sea, and the Dolphin took a Scotch armed brig after a half-hour's engagement. Upon his return to France Wickes wrote to the Commissioners from St. Malo, June 28, informing them of his "safe arrival at this port yesterday, in company with Capt. Samuel Nicholson of the sloop Dolphin. We parted from Capt. Johnson the day before yesterday, a little to the east of Ushant. Now for the History of our late cruise. We sailed in company with Captains Johnson and Nicholson from St Nazaire May 28th, 1777. The 30th fell in with The Fudrion [Foudroyant, 84,] about 40 leagues to the west of Bellisle, who chased us, fired several guns at the Lexington, but we got clear of her very soon and pursued our course to the No West in order to proceed round into the North Sea." The squadron fell in with several French, Portuguese, and Dutch vessels, and on the 19th of June, off the north of Ireland, they took their first prizes - two brigs and two sloops. During the following week they cruised in the Irish Sea and made fourteen additional captures, comprising two ships, seven brigs, and five other vessels. Of these eighteen prizes eight were sent into port, three were released, and seven were sunk, three of them within sight of the enemy's ports. June 27 "at 6 a. m. saw a large ship off Ushant; stood for her at 10 a.m. [and] discovered her to be a large ship of war standing for us; bore away and made sail from her. She chased us till 9 p. m. and continued firing at us from 4 till 6 at night; she was almost within musket shot and we escaped by heaving our guns overboard and lightening the ship. They pay very little regard to the laws of neutrality, as they chased me and fired as long as they dared stand in, for fear of running ashore." (Hale, i, 122.) One of the prizes, taken in the Irish Sea and released, had been sent into Whitehaven full of prisoners, including a hundred and ten seamen besides a number of women and children. During the exciting chase described by Wickes the Dolphin sprung her mast, but also got safely into St. Malo, and the Lexington into Morlaix. Lupton wrote to Eden, July 9: "These three fellows have three of the fastest Sailing Vessell in the employ of the Colonies and its impossiable to take them unless it

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Blows hard." (Stevens, 179.) The squadron required refitting and the Reprisal a new battery (Hale, i, 120-124; Almon, v, 174,175; Wharton, ii, 379, 380; Boston Gazette, October 6, 1777; Stevens, 61, 154, 175, 178, 680, 703, 1437, 1521, 1539.)

An earlier visit of American cruisers to the coast of Ireland was reported in a letter from Galway: "Two American privateers [the Rover and Montgomery], mounting 14 guns each and as many swivels, put in here to procure some fresh provisions and water. On being supplied with such necessaries as they wanted, for which they paid in dollars, they weighed anchor and sailed, after being in the bay Only 24 hours. During the short time the Captains were on shore they behaved with the greatest politeness . . . The crews that came on shore with them were dressed in blue uniforms with cockades and made a genteel appearance, but were all armed with pistols, &c. They had been out from Philadelphia ten weeks and had taken only four prizes, which they had sent to America." (Boston Gazette, June 2, 1777; London Chronicle, March 29, 1777.) Another letter, from Kinsale, says: "Two fishing boats, who came in here yesterday, brought on shore the crew of a ship taken by an American privateer off Bristol Channel. The privateer made a signal to the fishing boats, which they thought signified their want of a pilot . . . and accordingly went on board them, having sent the vessel the day before for France. The privateers' people behaved very well to the fishermen, paid them for what fish they took, and the Captain gave them a cask of brandy for their trouble in coming on board. She was called the Resolution, mounted fourteen guns and had one hundred and ten men when she left New England, but at that time not above eighty, on account of the number they had put on board their prizes, having taken five already." (Almon, v, 174.)

The presence of American armed vessels in British waters caused apprehension among the English. In April, while Wickes's squadron was fitting out, Stormont had information, which he believed reliable, that eight or ten French ships under American commanders were preparing for descent upon Great Britain and that Glasgow was likely to be attacked (Stevens, 1519.) "It is true," says a contemporary chronicler, "that the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland were insulted by the American privateers in a manner which our hardiest enemies had never ventured in our most arduous contentions with foreigners. Thus were the inmost and most domestic recesses of our trade rendered insecure, and a convoy for the protection of the linen ships from Dublin and Newry was now for the first time seen. The Thames also presented the unusual and melancholy spectacle of numbers of foreign ships, particularly French, taking in cargoes of English commodities for various parts of Europe, the property of our own merchants, who were thus seduced to seek that protection, under the colours of other nations, which the British flag used to afford to all the world." (Annual Register, xxi (1778), 36.) Insurance rose very high, which of course was one inducement for English merchants to ship their goods in foreign bottoms. In July, 1777, the British Admiralty stationed four ships in the Irish Sea for the protection

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of the coasts of England and Ireland (Wharton, ii, 168, 254, 391; Williams, 209. For rates of in. surance, see Channing, iii, 389, note.)

The British ambassador in France was fully informed of the purchase and fitting-out of the Revenge at Dunkirk and made strenuous efforts to have the proceeding stopped. It was necessary, therefore, to use circumspection in managing the affair, and this Hodge did by making a fictitious sale of the vessel to an Englishman, who guaranteed that she would go to Norway on a trading voyage. Nevertheless Captain Conyngham and his crew of a hundred and six men, including sixty-six French, and, according to English report, "composed of all the most desperate fellows which could be procured in so blessed a port as Dunkirk," (Almon, v, 173.) were put on board. The Revenge then hastily put to sea, before she could be detained in port or stopped off the harbor by an English captain who had threatened to seize and burn her. Conyngham had been given a new commission, dated May 2, 1777, and instructions "not to attack, but if attacked, at Liberty to retaliate in every manner in our power - Burn, Sink & destroy the Enemy." The Revenge sailed July 16, and the next day, the captain says, was "attackd, fired on, chased by several british frigatts, sloops of War & Cutters." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biog., January, 1899, Conyngham's narrative.) She escaped, however, and made a cruise in the North Sea, Irish Sea, and Atlantic, taking many prizes. One of these was recaptured by the British, who found on her a prize crew of twenty-one, including sixteen Frenchmen.

Conyngham landed on the coast of Ireland for water and sailed for the Bay of Biscay, putting into Ferrol. From here and from Coruna he cruised successfully the rest of the year, sending his prizes into Spanish ports (Penn. Mag., January, 1899; Outlook, January 3, 1903; Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 941, 942; Stevens, 200, 274, 1556, 1560, 1569, 1575, 1582,1589,1593,1594.)

The cruises of the Reprisal, Lexington and Dolphin, and of the Revenge, brought forth renewed protests from Stormont and more or less lame excuses and promises of increased vigilance from Vergennes. The latter reproached the American Commissioners for failure to keep their cruisers away from French ports. They expressed concern at the continued presence of these vessels in forbidden waters, and explained that they had been driven in by the enemy's men-of-war. Hodge was arrested and thrown into the Bastile, where he was confined several weeks. He was well treated, however, and finally released at the solicitation of the Commissioners. The Reprisal, Lexington, and Dolphin were ordered to be sequestered and detained until sufficient security could be obtained that they would return directly to America. But in regard to captures Vergennes was indisposed to yield too far, and represented to the King that if he should consent "to compel the surrender, without examination, of the prizes that American privateers may bring into his ports, to the owners who may have been despoiled of them, it will have the effect of declaring them and their countrymen to be pirates and sea-robbers." (Stevens, 706 (August 23, 1777.) The account of England against France was to a slight degree offset by the case of an American

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sea captain in Cherbourg who was enticed on board a British vessel in the harbor. and then seized and carried off a prisoner (Ibid., 180, 701, 1562, 1574, 1578, 1588, 1591, 1594, 1596, 1597, 1646, 1654, 1694; Wharton, ii, 364, 365, 375, 377, 381, 406; Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 942-947; Adams MSS., William McCreery to Adams, Nantes, September 29, 1777. See Almon, ix, 201-241.)

After being driven into port at the end of their cruise around Ireland, Captains Wickes and Johnson were employed several weeks in refitting their damaged vessels, the Reprisal at St. Malo and the Lexington at Morlaix. The Dolphin was converted into a packet, for which service she had been purchased in the first place. Stormont's demands became too insistent to be longer evaded, and in July the commissioners issued peremptory orders for the Reprisal and Lexington to proceed directly to America and to cruise no longer in European waters (See Wickes's letters in Hale, i, 125-128.) In September the ships were ready for sea. Wickes wished to make the voyage in company with Johnson, but they did not meet, and each sailed forth alone, marked out for disaster. The Reprisal, homeward bound, was lost on the Banks of Newfoundland and all on board, except the cook, it is said, went down with her. Wickes was one of the best officers in the Continental navy and his loss was irreparable. The Lexington, on September 19, two days out of Morlaix, fell in with the British ten-gun cutter Alert, Lieutenant Bazeley, who says in his report: "I gave chace at five in the Morning and came up with him at half past seven, had a close Engagement till ten, when He bore up and made Sail; as soon as I got my Rigging to rights, again gave Chace and came up with him at half past one, renewed the Action till half past two, when he Struck." (Stevens, 1695.) The Lexington lost seven killed and eleven wounded; the Alert, two killed and three wounded, one of them mortally. According to the log of the Alert, the Lexington carried fourteen four-pounders, two sixes, twelve swivels, and eighty-four men. The Alert carried ten four-pounders, ten swivels, and sixty men. Apparently on the authority of Richard Dale, an officer on the Lexington, it is said that she was short of ammunition, which would account for her striking to an inferior force. Several letters were captured on the Lexington, but the most important papers, including dispatches to Congress, were thrown overboard before the surrender. A report, fortunately untrue, that Captain Johnson had been killed in the action, added to the depressing effect of the ship's loss upon Franklin and other Americans in France (lbid., 181, 703, 1572,1583, 1654,1677,1685, 1686, 1699,1708; Almon, v, 362; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 51 (log of Alert); Boston Gazette, January 12,1778; Port Folio, June 1814.

Captain Hynson's service in the American cause came to an end in the fall of 1777. During several previous months various plans for sending him to America with cargoes of stores and dispatches had been made by Deane, and plots for intercepting him and turning his employment to the advantage of the British had been laid by Colonel Smith. Hynson was to have sailed as a passenger in March, and Smith made arrangements to have his vessel captured soon after leaving port. Stormont feared that Hynson was too much under Deane's influence to be

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trusted. Owing to various circumstances the different plans made during the spring and summer fell through. In October, Deane sent to Hynson a packet containing dispatches for Congress which were to be conveyed to America by a vessel commanded by Captain John Folger of Nantucket, about to sail from Havre. Hynson delivered the parcel to Folger as instructed, having first, however, removed the dispatches, which were turned over to British agents. In due time this transaction became known to Deane, who expressed his opinion of it in appropriate terms in a letter to Hynson. Upon his arrival in America, Folger was suspected of the theft, which was then first discovered, and he was kept in prison about six months. Deane was suspected by Arthur Lee, and this circumstance may have served to protect Hynson. These intercepted letters, together with those captured on the Lexington, gave the British a good deal of information about the American Commissioners' plans. Shortly before this another vessel with dispatches from Congress to the commissioners had narrowly escaped capture and the dispatches had been thrown overboard (Stevens, 51, 52, 53, 64, 165, 166, 167, 181, 193, 203, 205, 208, 269, 472; Wharton. ii, 468; Lee MSS., October 7, 1777, January 5,12,17, April 18,1778.)

The Continental sloop Independence, Captain Young, arrived at L'Orient late in September and disposed of two prizes before the English had time to interfere. She was followed shortly after by the Raleigh and Alfred. The Randolph came in December. These vessels do not seem to have cruised in European waters, presumably on account of the necessity, which the French government felt, of pacifying England. Stormont protested against their remaining in port, and they sailed for home early in the following year. The Ranger also arrived in December. Captain Jones had hoped to be the first to bear the glorious tidings of Burgoyne's surrender, but he was forestalled by a special messenger in a swift packet (Stevens, 204, 274, 1708, 1799, 1808 Wharton, ii, 428.)

American privateers were very active in foreign waters during the year 1777, and displayed boldness and enterprise in pursuing the enemy close to his own shores. They cruised all about the British Isles, in the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay, and in the West Indies. The British stationed men-of-war in the English Channel for the protection of commerce (Stevens, 47; Almon, v, 144.) The Americans were well rewarded for their activity and sent in many a rich prize. Captain Lee of Newburyport, who had been charged with piracy at Bilbao the year before, sent safely into port a vessel which was said to be the most valuable prize taken during the war up to that time (Boston Gazette, September 8, 1777.) On the other hand, the risks were great, and many of these predatory American cruisers were captured by the British (lbid., August 18, 1777; London Chronicle, April 12, 22, July 22, 26, 31, August 5, 1777; Almon, v, 168.) The Republic, 24, was wrecked on the Orkney Islands and all hands were lost (Boston Gazette, December 22, 1777; Continental Journal, December 25, 1777.) Until summer probably all the American privateers in European seas came out from home with commissions. In December, 1776, the Committee of Secret Correspondence had written to the commissioners in Paris that "Congress approve of armed vessels

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being fitted out by you on continental account, provided the court of France dislike not the measure, and blank commissions for this purpose will be sent you by the next opportunity. Private ships of war or privateers cannot be admitted where you are, because the securities necessary in such cases to prevent irregular practices cannot be given by the owners and commanders of such privateers." (Wharton, ii, 231.) But by the following May the views of Congress in this regard had undergone a change, and in response to a request of Franklin and his associates, "commissions for fitting out privateers in France" were sent (Wharton, ii, 249, 314. )

Every visit of an American armed vessel to a port of France was brought to the attention of the French government by the British ambassador. A letter from Guernsey, June 5, says: "An American privateer of twelve guns came into this road yesterday morning, tacked about on the firing of the guns from the Castle, and just off the Island took a large brig bound for this port, which they have since carried into Cherburgh. She had the impudence to send her boat in the dusk of the evening to a little island off here . . . and unluckily carried off [two officers] who were shooting rabbits for their diversion. Two gentlemen of consequence are gone to Cherburgh to demand them." (Almon, v, 143.) The prize, being ordered away on her arrival at Cherbourg, was sold outside the harbor (Stevens, 1599.) In July the General Mifflin, a twenty-gun ship from Boston commanded by Captain Daniel McNeill, sailed into the harbor of Brest and saluted the French admiral. After a consultation of the admiral with his officers, this salute was returned and naturally became the subject of complaint and international correspondenee (Almon, v, 203; Stevens, 1599; Wharton, ii, 381.) Vergennes wrote to Noailles, August 16, that the General Mifflin had been allowed to put into Brest on account of a leak and that he had not heard of the salute; and he added that French cruisers were employed in keeping "off all privateers from our latitudes and . . . we have at the mouth of the Garonne a frigate whose only duty is to protect there English commerce." (Stevens, 1651.) Stormont also complained of the General Mercer and Fanny, which had brought two Jamaicamen into Nantes; these prizes were afterwards given up for having been falsely declared as American vessels (lbid., 1661, 1664, 1801; Wharton, ii, 381, 496.) The privateer Civil Usage took a French ship from England with a Spanish cargo, for which the commissioners apologized to the King of Spain, and in other instances, such as the seizure of a Dutch vessel, irritation was caused (Stevens, 1745; Wharton, ii, 429, 430, 431, 435; Lee MSS., Gardoqui to Lee, October 27, 1777.) Consequently the commissioners sent a circular letter, dated November 21, to the captains of American armed vessels: "Complaints having been brought to us of violences offered by American vessels armed in neutral nations, in seizing vessels belonging to their subjects and carrying their flag and in taking those of the enemy while they were under the protection of the coasts of neutral countries, contrary to the usage and custom of civilized nations; these presents are to request you not to commit any such violations contrary to the right of nations, but to conform yourselves to the express powers in your commissions, which is to limit yourselves to the capture of such vessels at such times as they

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shall not be under the protection of a port, river, or neutral coast, and confine yourselves only to seizing such ships as shall have on board soldiers, ammunition, provisions, or other contraband merchandizes destined for the British armies and vessels employed against the United States. In all other cases you will respect the rights of neutrality as you would yourselves expect protection, and treat all neutral vessels with the greatest regard and friendship, for the honour of your country and that of yourselves." (Almon, v, 509. See Appendix IV.)

The privateer brig Oliver Cromwell, Captain William Cole, of Beverly, carried sixteen guns and a hundred men and cruised in the Bay of Biscay. August 4, 1777, and again on the 6th, she was chased by a sixty-gun ship, and not only escaped, but during the chase captured two brigs, one of which "was formerly an American Privateer called the Montgomery, mounting 18 Guns, taken & carried into Gibralter, Capt. Fibby Commander. She had Several Laidys on Board boun to Lisbon, whom we determined to take on Board us &, together with all our other Prisoners, land them (as they were effectionately desireous of it) on the British Shore. But at 3 P.M. saw 2 Brigs which we bore away for, and not knowing what they might prove to be, ordered Capt. Gray to keep away from us on a westward Course. Out Oars (being a small Breeze) & rowed towards them. They kept near each other & hove too and formed in a Posture of Battle to receive us. Every Thing being prepared for Battle, we advanced; one of them gave several Sho[t], which we took no Notice of till we came nigh enough to give her 2 Broad Sides, She continuing her Fire. By our well directed Fire She was compelled to strike to us & earnestly beg of us to desist our Fire on her. Our Capt. then ordered to bear away for the other Brig, which orders were immediately complyed with. We then charged the other with an incessant Fire for almost 3 Glasses. She returned our Fire for some Time with Spirit, but being disanabled, wore off. The other which fell a Stern & notwithstanding she had fairly struck to us, yet seeing her Partners Fire, she worried us with her Bow Chacers, but did us no Damage. But now our Officers began to think of the Man of War, which had been in Chace all Day & was now reasonably expected to be near up with us; therefore being dark, they rightly judged it best to give over the Assault for this Night, least falling in between three of them we must be obliged to submit, & so altered our Course." Two days later the Oliver Cromwell fell in with a fleet of British transports convoyed by three men-of-war. August 16 she took three prizes, and a week later was at Bilbao, where she found the Civil Usage and another American privateer. The Cromwell returned to America by a southerly route, and by the middle of October was not far from the Canary Islands. On the 16th she saw a sail which gave chase. "Discovered her to be a Frigate. Now she began to fire at us; many of her Shot went over us. Several struck our Hull & Sails. We hove our Guns overboard & stove some Water & by that means got a little from her." The next day, "the Man of War in Chace hard by. We Rowed & kept at a Distance." October 18, "lost sight of the Man of War." (Essex Inst. Coll., July, 1909; Boston Gazette, December 15, 1777; London Chronicle, September 2, 1777. See further, for movements of American privateers in foreign waters, Boston Gazette,

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October 6, 13, 1777; London Chronicle, July 24, August 5, 1777; Almon, v, 171, 176; Stevens, 1551, 1650.)

The American Commissioners in Paris endeavored to carry out the instructions of Congress, which called for ships of the line and other vessels to be built, purchased, or hired in France, but met with difficulties. The French government positively refused to sell or loan eight ships of the line, on the ground that they could not be spared from their navy, as the possibility of trouble with England made any reduction of their defensive force inadmissible at that time. This was a great disappointment, as it had been confidently believed that the British blockade of the American coast could be successfully broken by these heavy ships together with the thirteen Continental frigates, all of which it was hoped would soon be at sea. The project was formed of procuring three ships in Sweden, of fifty or sixty guns each, but no move appears to have been made to carry it through. In addition to purchasing and fitting out the Dolphin and Surprise, whose service was very temporary, and the Revenge, the commissioners provided for three larger vessels during the year 1777. A frigate was built at Nantes, of five hundred and fifty tons and designed to carry twenty-four twelve-pounders, eight fours, and two sixes. This vessel was called the Deane, and when finished was commanded by Captain Samuel Nicholson. While she was under construction the Dolphin was kept at Paimboeuf, according to information furnished to Stormont, serving as a receiving ship, on board of which Nicholson held about seventy men, including a number of Englishmen, ready to be transferred to the Deane when finished; but this was denied by Sartine. Another vessel, somewhat smaller, was purchased, fitted out as a twenty-eight-gun frigate, and called the Queen of France. The commissioners also began the construction in Holland of a forty-gun ship called the Indien, but owing to international complications she was sold to the King of France (Wharton, ii, 176, 177, 230, 277, 284, 285, 433; Stevens, 187, 493, 683, 1658, 1766, 1826; Lee MSS., January 21, 1778, May 2, 1779.)

Attempts were made to interest other European nations in the American cause and to obtain the privilege of entering their ports, refitting armed vessels in them and disposing of prizes. Arthur Lee visited Spain and Prussia with hopes of securing concessions of this sort, but he found both these powers very desirous of maintaining amicable relations with England. The same cautious attitude marked the policy of Holland. In Spain, however, owing largely to the influence of Gardoqui, powerful though unobserved, the Americans found less difficulty, for a time at least, in refitting their cruisers and disposing of their prizes than in France. The disposition of Spain is indicated in a letter, dated October 17, 1777, from Count Florida Blanca, the Prime Minister, to the French ambassador at Madrid, in which he says that a long duration of the American war would be "highly useful" to Spain and France. "We should sustain the Colonists, both with effectual aid in money and supplies," and with "prudent advice"; at the same time England should be kept pacified (Stevens, 1725.)

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The situation of the United States from a naval point of view at the end of 1777 was not altogether encouraging. The bright hopes of the year before were in large degree unrealized. Of the thirteen frigates which were to dispute the naval supremacy of England in American waters, or at least to keep open some of the principal harbors and bays, only four, the Hancock, Boston, Raleigh, and Randolph had yet got to sea; and one of these, the Hancock, had been taken by the enemy. Of the remaining nine, the Delaware, together with several smaller vessels, had been lost in the unsuccessful defense of the Delaware River. Philadelphia in addition to New York had fallen into the hands of the enemy, whose occupation of these two cities made impossible the escape of four other frigates; in consequence of which, two of these vessels, the Congress and Montgomery in the Hudson, had already been destroyed in October, while the Washington and Effingham in the Delaware were awaiting the same fate. This still leaves four, of which the Warren and Providence were blockaded in Narragansett Bay and the Virginia in the Chesapeake, while the Trumbull continued to lie in the Connecticut River, unable to pass over the bar. Of the more important smaller Continental vessels, the Andrew Doria had been destroyed in the Delaware River, the Cabot and Lexington had been captured by the enemy, and the Reprisal had been lost at sea. The only naval vessel captured during the year, the frigate Fox, had been retaken by the British.

To offset, though only partially, these heavy losses, the navy had made a few acquisitions. In addition to the frigates just mentioned and the vessels procured in Europe, the Ranger and sloop Surprise (Not to be confounded with Conyngham's lugger Surprise) were in active service, and a brigantine called the Resistance went into commission about the end of the year. Of two of the three ships of the line authorized by Congress in 1776, something is learned from information furnished to Admiral Howe by a prisoner at Boston, who says "that he saw the Keel and Floor-Timbers laid for a 74 Gun Ship, building at North End in Boston, The Scantlings whereof appeared scarce sufficient for a Frigate; And only 12 Men were at work upon her. He was informed another Ship of the same Class [the America] was building at Portsmouth in New Hampshire, but did not hear any further particulars concerning her. By another person released from Portsmouth and arrived about the same time at New York, this last Ship is said to be covered in as high as the Lower Deck and proposed to be finished in next May." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488. Intelligence received December 25,1777.) Work on the Boston seventy-four was probably soon abandoned, and the third ship of this class, which was to have been built at Philadelphia, may never have been begun. Sixty-nine letters of marque were issued to private vessels of war by the Continental Congress in 1777 and probably a still larger number of privateers were commissioned by the individual states; and many were fitted out in the West Indies.

In 1777 the British navy had in commission two hundred and fourteen vessels, besides ships in ordinary and under repair, the whole manned by forty-five thousand seamen and marines. It is difficult to state the exact force in American

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waters. The figures furnished by Admiral Howe's returns and by other authorities vary slightly and of course the number of ships was changing from time to time. There were about eighty vessels of all classes on the North American Station in 1777. About half the fleet consisted of frigates and rather less than a quarter of ships mounting sixty-four, fifty or forty-four guns, the rest being sloops of war and smaller vessels. There was also a squadron at Newfoundland and a fleet of nearly twenty in the West Indies. Altogether, therefore, more than a hundred vessels were stationed in American waters. Many privateers were sent out of New York (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, January 15, No. 4, June 8, 1777, No. 30: Disposition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in North America; Schomberg, i, 436, iv, 324-331; Beatson, iv, 291.)

Although the Americans inflicted so little injury upon the British navy, the activity of some of the smaller Continental cruisers and of the state navies and numerous privateers had dealt a heavy blow at English commerce. Four hundred and sixty-four vessels were taken from the British during the year 1777, of which seventy-two were recaptured, twelve destroyed, and nine released (Almon, v, 76, 108, 405, 513, vi, 39; Clark, i, 62, ii, 169. These lists are doubtless inaccurate and incomplete.) The Continental navy alone made over sixty captures of merchantmen (Neeser, ii, 286.) The British may have made about as many captures as the Americans, but doubtless a large proportion of their prizes were small coasting vessels of little value (Almon, v, 168, 231; London Chronicle, July 15, 1777; Annual Register, xxi (1778), 36. The lists cover only a part of the year, See table of captures in Clowes, iii, 396, evidently based on incomplete data.) It is impossible from available data to make a correct statement of actual or comparative losses by capture.

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER IX

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1778

Notwithstanding the reverses of the Americans on land and sea during the previous year, it is evident that the British, about the beginning of 1778, were finding the subjugation of their revolted colonies a serious undertaking, and were apprehending a still more stubborn resistance on the part of the rebels encouraged by their one notable success at Saratoga. The French alliance with the United States, which soon followed, must have increased this feeling and have emphasized the need of energetic measures. A little later Lord George Germain, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent to General Clinton, who had succeeded Howe, these secret instructions, dated March 8, 1778: "If you shall find it impracticable to bring Mr. Washington to a general & decisive

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Action early in the Campaign, you will relinquish the Idea of carrying on offensive Operations within Land & as soon as the Season will permit, embark such a Body of Troops as can be spared from the Defence of the Posts you may think necessary to maintain, on Board of Transports under the Conduct of a proper Number of the King's Ships, with Orders to attack the ports on the Coast from New York to Nova Scotia," and to destroy all ships and other property alongshore wherever practicable, "so as to incapacitate the Rebels from raising a Marine or continuing their Depredations upon the Trade of this Kingdom." Two armaments were recommended, one from New York, the other from Halifax, to attack Connecticut and New Hampshire and then unite against Boston (Stevens, 396, 1062; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 96; Sparks's Washington, v, 549.) The services of the army seem to have been required on land, and the commerce and privateering of New England were spared the annihilation which a rigorous prosecution of this plan must have entailed. The project plainly indicates a keen appreciation on the part of the British ministry of the telling effect upon their commercial interests of American privateering. About the middle of March, as soon as the British government had been officially notified of the treaty of alliance, Lord Stormont was recalled from Paris and war with France became inevitable, although it was delayed a few months and then began without formal declaration. Orders were sent to the British army to evacuate Philadelphia and fall back on New York.

Meanwhile the Americans were striving to make the most of their slender resources upon the sea. Another expedition to New Providence was undertaken early in 1778, this time by a single ship, the sloop Providence, which had visited the place two years earlier as one of Commodore Hopkins's squadron. The Providence was now commanded by Captain John P. Rathburne and carried a crew of about fifty men. About the middle of January she sailed from Georgetown, South Carolina, where she had put in early in the winter. The next morning after getting to sea, says Lieutenant Trevett, "at daylight saw a sail to the eastward and then saw two more; they proved to be British, a ship, brig and sloop. They gave chase and the ship gained on us fast; by two P.M. we could see her tier of guns. Night coming on and very dark, we took in all sail and put out our lights and in a few hours, being lighter, we could see her and she passed us and when she was out of sight we altered our course and in the morning could not discover a single sail. We had hove over so much of our wood, water, &c., in order to lighten ship, that we concluded to make all sail for Abaco. We had a short passage, came to anchor and went to work making a scaling ladder. In two days after, we stood over to New Providence, having sent down our topmast and topsail yard and housed our guns ; we also kept all our men out of sight. About midnight we got abreast of the harbor with a light air of wind off the land." A force of twenty-eight men under Trevett's command was sent ashore. "We took nothing with us to eat or drink, but filled our pockets with ball cartridges. We landed about a mile from the Fort and got our scaling ladder and all things ready." The sentinels having been taken by surprise, the landing party soon had possession of Fort Nassau. Several guns were found loaded, with matches

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burning by them. Two British ships were in the harbor. "We employed the remainder of the night in placing some of the heavy pieces of cannon to point on the different streets of the town and on the ships. When daylight appeared we set our thirteen stripes flying at the fort." (R.I. Hist. Mag., July, 1886.) Upon requisition a breakfast was provided for the party and an officer and two men were sent to take possession of Fort Montague at the eastern end of the town, four miles distant. This was accomplished and the guns were spiked. A midshipman and four men were then sent in a boat, seized for the purpose, to one of the English vessels, a sixteen-gun ship, and to this small force the officer in command, seeing the American flag on the fort and the guns pointing at him, surrendered with his crew of forty-five. Five other vessels in the harbor, prizes brought in by the British, were recaptured. The report had been concocted for the occasion and disseminated among the inhabitants that the Providence was merely one of an American fleet at Abaco, and the number landed was also greatly exaggerated; this made easier the exploits of the very small detachments sent out by Trevett. An armed force of about two hundred of the inhabitants collected with the purpose of attacking the fort, but they were induced to desist by the threat of the Americans to burn the town.

A British sloop of war appeared off the harbor, but being warned away by signals and fired upon by the fort, she stood out again to sea, remaining in the offing. On the morning of January 30 the prizes were manned and the expedition sailed away, taking off thirty Americans released from prison and valuable military stores, including sixteen hundred pounds of powder. In this affair no blood was shed and no private property on the island was disturbed. Two of the prizes, being of little value, were burned; the others were sent into port. The ships sailed north and soon became separated. Having joined company again, the Providence and the armed prize ship went into New Bedford together early in March (R. I. Hist. Mag., July, October, 1886; Clark, i, 74; Almon, vi, 99; Boston Gazette, March 9, 1778; Pap. Cont. Congr., 44, 10, 17, 21, 23 (January 29, February 21, May 11, 1778); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 143 (April 22, 1778).)

The frigate Randolph, after a very short stay in France, returned to America about the first of the year, apparently sailing directly for South Carolina, whence she had so recently come. A squadron was organized at Charleston, with Captain Biddle in command, composed of the Randolph and four vessels of the South Carolina navy, three of them being privateers taken temporarily into the state service. These four vessels were the ship General Moultrie, 18, and the brigs Notre Dame, 16, Polly, 16, and Fair American, 14. One hundred and fifty South Carolina troops served on the squadron as marines. According to the statements of British prisoners in Charleston the Randolph carried twenty-six twelve-pounders, six six-pounders, four coehorns in each top, and upwards of three hundred men, one third of them tolerable seamen; the General Moultrie carried twelve short and six long six-pounders, and eighty men; the Notre Dame, sixteen sixes and a hundred and twenty men; the Fair American, twenty guns and a hundred and twenty men (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, February 13,1778;

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Stevens, 811; Paullin, 430.) This armament put to sea February 12, 1778, in search of a number of British vessels that had been cruising along the coast, but it was soon found that the enemy had departed. The squadron then sailed for the West Indies and cruised several days to the eastward of Barbadoes, taking one small schooner. On the 7th of March, in the afternoon, the Randolph, in company with her consorts and prize, sighted a large man-of-war to windward, which turned out to be the British sixty-four-gun ship Yarmouth. This vessel came down before the wind and when within hail, about eight P.M., was first discovered to be a two-decker. The Randolph in reply to her hail hoisted her colors and gave the Yarmouth a broadside. Early in the engagement Captain Biddle was wounded in the thigh, but continued in command, seated in a chair on deck. The General Moultrie took part in the action, but being to leeward and near the Randolph, fired into her by mistake, and it was thought possible that Biddle was wounded by one of her shot. The other vessels were not engaged. The Randoph's fire was rapid and accurate. According to a letter of Captain Hall of the Notre Dame, she handled the Yarmouth "so roughly for 12 or 15 minutes that the British ship must shortly have struck, having lost her bowsprit and topmasts and being otherwise greatly shattered, while the Randolph had suffered very little; but in this moment of glory, as the Randolph was wearing to get on her quarter, she unfortunately blew up." (Independent Chronicle, August 13, 1778.) Captain Vincent of the Yarmouth reported March 17 to Admiral Young, at Barbadoes, that "on the 7th instant at half past five P.M. discovered six sail in the S.W. quarter, on a wind standing to the northward; two of them ships, three brigs and a schooner. We were then 50 leagues due east of this island. We immediately bore down upon them and about nine got close to the weather quarter of the largest and headmost ship. They had no colours hoisted and as ours were then up, I hailed her to hoist hers or I would fire into her; on which she hoisted American and immediately gave us her broadside, which we returned, and in about a quarter of an hour she blew up. It was fortunate for us that we were to windward of her; as it was, our ship was in a manner covered with parts of her. A great piece of a top timber, six feet long, fell on our poop; another large piece of timber stuck in our fore top-gallant sail, then upon the cap. An American ensign, rolled up, blown in upon the forecastle, not so much as singed. Immediately on her blowing up, the other four dispersed different ways. We chased a little while two that stood to the southward and afterwards another that bore away right before the wind, but they were soon out of sight, our sails being torn all to pieces in a most surprising manner. We had five men killed and twelve wounded. But what I am now going to mention is something very remarkable. The 12th following, being then in chase of a ship steering west, we discovered a piece of wreck with four men on it waving; we hauled up to it, got a boat out, and brought them on board. They proved to be four men who had been in the ship which blew up and who had nothing to subsist on from that time but by sucking the rain water that fell on a piece of blanket which they luckily had picked up." (London Chronicle, May 26,1778; Almon, vi, 143; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 1091 (log of the Yarmouth) ; Port Folio, October, 1809.) The rest of the squadron with the prize arrived safely in port. The loss of another frigate was a severe blow to the

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Continental navy and to the country, but the loss of Captain Biddle was far more serious. While only in his twenty-eighth year, he had given strong indications of ability as a seaman and officer, and of character as a man. Having served as a midshipman in the British navy in his youth, he had the military and naval training which was lacking in nearly all the American seamen of that period. With the exception of John Paul Jones, it is probable that Biddle had no superior in the service. If four men as good as these two and Wickes and Conyngham had been given constant employment throughout the war in ships like the Randolph or Hancock, perhaps the history of the Continental navy might have been different.

The frigates Raleigh and Alfred, having made the voyage to France together in the fall of 1777, set sail in company December 29, homeward bound. When it had become evident to the American Commissioners at Paris that the times were not propitious for the cruising of Continental ships in European waters, they had addressed a letter of advice, dated November 25, 1777, to Captain Thompson of the Raleigh, suggesting a circuitous passage back to America. "As it is by no means safe to return into the ports of France, you will calculate your stores so as to have a sufficiency for your cruise, which we cannot indeed be particular in the direction of. It has been suggested that one or more of the India ships returning may be intercepted, that part of the West India homeward-bound ships may be expected about this time, as well as transports returning from New York and elsewhere in America, and that by cruising in the proper latitudes you may meet with them; that the British factories and commerce on the African coast at this time lie without any force sufficient to protect them, and that by running along that coast you may greatly annoy and distress the enemy in that quarter and afterwards go for the West Indies. As you and Captain Hinman have already considered these several plans for a cruise, we leave with you to determine which to prefer and the manner in prosecuting either, or any other that may appear more likely to answer the design of your commission. We are happy in observing the harmony and confidence which subsists between you and Captain Hinman and hope the same prevails between your officers and men, which we are certain you will cultivate through the whole of your expedition, in which we recommend to you to avoid giving any offense to the flags of neutral powers and to show them proper marks of respect and friendship . . . Whenever you judge it prudent to dismiss prisoners subjects of his Britannic Majesty, we advise you to take from them in writing an acknowledgment of their having been your prisoners, their quality, place of residence, and that they are dismissed by you in confidence that an equal number of the subjects of the thirteen United States of the same rank, that now are or may hereafter be prisoners to his said Britannic Majesty, will be set at liberty. You are also to deliver a copy of such writing to the prisoners, enjoining them to deliver the same on their arrival in Britain to the lords of the British admiralty, and by the first opportunity enclose a duplicate to the committee or board of marine in Boston and another to us, with an account of your proceedings." (Wharton, ii, 428; Lee MSS., November 25, 1777; Independent Chronicle, April 9,1778.) The commissioners' hopes in regard to the exchange of prisoners were doomed to disappointment.

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The Raleigh and Alfred sailed for the West Indies by way of the coast of Africa, and captured a British vessel off Senegal. By March 9, 1778, according to Captain Thompson's report, they had reached latitude 16° 31' north, longitude 55° 40' west, and at Six A.M. two Sail to the west northwest were seen from the Raleigh. At half-past seven she hove to for the Alfred; the strange ships were then standing to the north, close-hauled. Captain Thompson directed Captain Hinman to run down and observe the sternmost ship. At ten o'clock, being within five or six miles, it was plainly seen that the strangers were armed. The Raleigh and Alfred then hauled on the wind on the same tack with the other ships, which were to leeward. Thompson thought that this manoeuvre would give him more time to discover their force and rate of sailing. The strange ships then tacked, ,trying to work up and get our wakes." The Raleigh sailed as well as they, while the Alfred fell off to leeward and astern. "As the weathermost ship pass'd under the Alfred's lee, standing to the Southward on the third tack, Capt. Hinman hoisted his colours and fired several shot, which were returned under English colours. They were then two miles apart and the other ship four miles to leeward of her consort; the Alfred was about three miles astern of us." The Raleigh was about to tack and stand towards the Alfred, so as to attack the weathermost ship in company with her, before the other could get up; but just then, half-past twelve, the Alfred stood off before the wind, which was light from the east northeast, and set all her light sails in the effort to escape. The Raleigh had an equal chance to attack one or to escape from both ships, but "the Alfred was neither able to engage one nor to escape by sailing." Thompson regretted that the Alfred attempted to escape, as it was evident that the leeward ship, then bearing southwest, would cut her off before she could pass her or the Raleigh give assistance. The Raleigh did not go about, but hauled up her courses, thinking the windward ship would stand for her; but "they both made towards the Alfred. I then ordered the master to veer and make sail towards the Alfred and run between her and the other ship, to take off her fire and give the Alfred an opportunity to escape." The Alfred at first seemed to gain on the British, "but in a few minutes the two got up and began a furious fire, which was return'd by the Alfred as fast as they could. Just as we had got studdingsails hoisted we had the mortification to see the Alfred haul down her colours. It was then one o'clock; the firing lasted about ten minutes. We were then within three miles of the ships." There was nothing then left for the Raleigh, in the captain's opinion, but to escape from a superior force, and she hauled to the north. The sea being smooth the British soon finished taking possession of the Alfred and began to chase the Raleigh, and gained on her. When night came she edged away and set all her light sails. The British chased all night by a bright moon. At daylight they were four or five miles away and at seven o'clock seemed to be gaining. The Raleigh, by throwing overboard all she could spare and starting her water, was lightened about thirty-five tons and began to gain. At ten o'clock the British gave up the chase, after nineteen hours. One of them sailed faster than the other, but would not come up alone, often heaving to and waiting for her consort (Continental Journal, April 30, 1778.)

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These British ships were the Ariadne, 20, and the Ceres, 16. Captain Pringle of the Ariadne reported to Admiral Young: "The two strangers at first shewed a disposition to attack us, but in consequence of the King's ships having brought the stern-most to close action about noon, the other made off. The ship in action, after having given to and received from the Ariadne and Ceres some broadsides, struck; and proved to be the rebel ship Alfred, of 20 nine-pounders and 180 men. Her consort was the Raleigh of 82 guns." (London Chronicle, May 26,1778; Almon, vi, 144; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 4141 (log of the Ceres.)

The Raleigh arrived at Portsmouth early in April. Captain Thompson's report no doubt put his conduct in the most favorable light, but did not save him from severe censure. By proper management it was believed that not only should the Alfred have been saved from capture, but both the British vessels, so inferior in force, should have been taken. Captain Hinman's judgment might reasonably be questioned on two points: first, his running off to leeward in a vain attempt to escape, thereby removing himself from the support of the Raleigh; second, his surrender after such a very brief resistance, while there was a chance of the Raleigh's coming to the rescue. As to the subsequent conduct of the Raleigh, it is not inspiring to think of her precipitate flight from two small ships mounting about the same number of guns that she did and probably lighter ones. Captain Thompson was doubtless a good seaman, not lacking in physical courage, and zealous in the cause; but without military sense and unequal to the responsibilities of the situation.

Early in March the Frigate Warren, Captain John B. Hopkins, blockaded in the Providence River, escaped through the British fleet in Narragansett Bay. John Deshon, of the Eastern Navy Board, wrote to the other members of the board, March 9: "Respecting the Ship Warren I am happy She so well Succeeded in geting out of this river. Every Circumstance Combined in her Favour that She might Clear of the Enemy; the night was Exceeding Dark, and there was but little wind untill the Crittecal time of Passing the Greatest Danger, when the wind Shifted very Suddenly into the N.W. and blowd Exceeding hard, so that the Enemy Could not without the Greatest Difficulty Get under Sail and Persue. I was at Warrick Neck and up the Most part of the Night when the Warren Passed and am Very Sure it was Imposable for Captn Hopkins to gain the Port of N. London, there being So much wind and the weather so Severe Cold. There [were] on board the Warren abt 170 men, manny of which had not a Second Shift of Cloaths, therefore it will be Very Difficult as well as Teadius for Captn Hopkins to beat this Courst at this Severe Season; the Orders Given him by me you have with you, which Gives him not the least Encouragement to Cruise. Nevertheless Should the Ship Keep out this three weeks, I Shall not be in the least uneasy abt her; well Knowin the men in no Condission to Beat a Winters Courst, we have Succeeded beyound Expectation in Geting her out and I have not the least Doubt but She will in due time Return with honor to the Commander and his Compy." After a short cruise the Warren put into Boston, March 23. Two days later William Vernon wrote from Providence: "This moment several of the Ship Warrens Men

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came to Town from Boston, who inform me they Arrived There last Monday; and in passing the Enemys Ships in this River . . . they sustained some damage, their Mizen Yard shot away, Main yard wounded, several shot passed through their Hull, one Man only sleightly wounded. The Wind blowing and continueing fresh at N.W., the Crew badly Clothed and Weather extreem Cold, were under the Necessity of standing to the Southward in warmer Weather under easie sail far as the Latt. 24°, where they fell in with the Ship Neptune, Capt. Smallwood, from Whitehaven bound to Phila., Loaded with Salt and dry Goods." This ship and another prize were taken and the Warren then sailed for Boston. The Columbus also tried to escape from Narragansett Bay, but was chased ashore on Point Judith and burned (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 214 (March 9, 1778), 215, 229 (March 25, 1778), 230, 231, 233; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, Nos. 55, 57, March 16, April 23, 1778; Continental Journal, March 26, 1778; Independent Chronicle, April 9, 16, 1778.)

The next vessel to attempt the perilous feat of blockade-running was the frigate Providence, and she succeeded. William Vernon wrote to John Adams: "The 30th of April we sent down the Providence, Capt. Whipple, having on board about 170 men, who was ordered to the flrst Port in France he cou'd make, to be under the direction of the Commissioners, where we hope she is safe Arrived. No dispatches was sent by this ship, as she was to pass a dangerous passage; however, in a brisk Wind & dark Night she got out safe, receiveing a heavy fire from the Lark, wch was the uppermost ship, who's Fires he returned with Spirit & good effect, Kill'd a Number & Wounded many Men, much disabled the Ship; the lower-most Ship by this alarm was prepared to receive the Providence, who was obliged to pass her very near, gave her their Fire, that was returned with good success." (Adams MSS., May 20, 1778.) Having reached the open sea, the Providence sailed for France. The frigate Trumbull, unable to pass over the bar at the mouth of the Connecticut River, remained in the river during the whole year. William Vernon wrote, March 25, 1778, that "she must be intirely stript of her Yards and Top Mast and all her Story, even to a Swept Hole, that if possible to bring her to 9 or 10 feet Water." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 212, 214, 229, 230, 231, 232; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 136, 147, 148 (April 6, May 8, 9, 1778)

The frigate Virginia, Captain James Nicholson, which had been repeatedly ordered to sea, and had been waiting nearly a year for a chance to run the blockade in Chesapeake Bay, finally got away from Annapolis, Maryland, March 30, in company with a brig which had on board a pilot in whom Nicholson had confidence. At three o'clock the next morning, however, the frigate ran on a shoal. She was forced over, but lost her rudder and was thereupon anchored, leaking badly. At daylight two British men-of-war were discovered, one of them only two gun-shots distant. Nicholson and nine men, with the ship's papers, went ashore in a boat and the Virginia was then surrendered to the enemy. Nicholson afterwards went aboard one of the British vessels in order to parole his officers. He was not court-martialed for the loss of his ship, but Congress instituted an inquiry and acquitted him of blame (Penn. Packet, April 15, 1778; Mar. Com.

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Letter Book, 124, 129, 138, 150 (January 28, March 4, April 8, May 16, 1778) Barney, 65, 66.)

Captains John Barry and Thomas Read had in 1776 been appointed to command the frigates Effingham and Washington, which since the occupation of Philadelphia by the British had been bottled up in the Delaware River above the city. The officers and men, therefore, unable to get to sea, had been employed on shore and on the river in cooperation with the army and in the defense of Delaware Bay in the fall of 1777. January 29, 1778, Barry was ordered by the Marine Committee to command a boat expedition down the river and bay, for the purpose of annoying the enemy, capturing or destroying their transports if possible, and cutting off their supplies and diverting them to the use of the Continental army, then in desperate straits at Valley Forge. Owing to a quarrel between Barry and the Navy Board of the Middle District, his selection for this duty was opposed, but finally, after nearly a month's delay, the matter was arranged. Towards the end of February, Barry, having manned four of the frigates' boats, it is said with only twenty-seven men, ran down the river and past the city at night; below he was joined by five other boats, half-manned. He then occupied himself with destroying everything along the banks of the river that could be of use to the enemy and that could not be conveyed to the American army. On March 7, while at Port Penn on the Delaware shore of the bay, he captured two ships, one of them armed with six four-pounders, and a schooner "mounting Eight double fortified four Pounders & Twelve four Pound" howitzers; the schooner was acting as convoy. The ships were transports, each with a crew of fourteen men, bringing forage and supplies from Rhode Island to the British army in Philadelphia; the schooner was manned by a crew of thirty-three. A day or two later a number of British vessels came up the bay and Barry was obliged to burn the transports to prevent recapture. He attempted to take the schooner into Christiana Creek, but being hard-pressed was compelled to run her ashore and scuttle her. The Marine Committee had hoped to take her into the naval service, and had given orders for her equipment and employment as a lookout vessel off the capes. Most of the cargoes of all the vessels were saved and were purchased for the army, yielding a good amount of prize money. Barry reported his exploit to General Washington and received a congratulatory letter in reply. He continued to harass the enemy on the river for another month (Barry, ch. vii; Boston Gazette, April 6, 1778; Hist. Mag., July, 1859; Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 223; Amer. Cath. Hist. Res., April, 1904; Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, app., 197 (December 19, 1777), 152, 2, 367 (March 9, 1778) ; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 125, 126 (January 29, 1778), 134, 135 (March 11, 26, 1778), 143 (April 24, 1778.)

In addition to the frigates Washington and Effingham, a large number of smaller vessels, including several galleys of the Pennsylvania navy, were blockaded in the Delaware River above Philadelphia. It had long been feared that the British would come up the river and capture or destroy these vessels, and General Washington advised that they be stripped and sunk. The two frigates had already been sunk and raised again and a number of the smaller vessels were prepared

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for sinking at short notice. On May 7 the expected British expedition, of seven hundred men, came up the river, and apparently only a part of the galleys were sunk in time to be saved. The British force, under Captain Henry, came up in a brig, a schooner, four galleys, four gun-boats, and eighteen flatboats carrying the soldiers of the party. Captain Henry says in his report: "At noon we were abreast of White-hill, where the gallies, armed vessels and gun-boats were placed to cover the landing of the troops, which was performed without opposition. At this place the Washington and Effingham rebel frigates, the former pierced for thirty-two and the latter for twenty-eight guns, were set on fire and consumed, together with a brig and sloop. The troops then marched, took possession of Borden-town and destroyed a battery of 3 six-pounders; whereupon the gallies, armed vessels, &c. proceeded to that place, where they burnt two new ships, one of which was pierced for 18 guns, one privateer sloop for 10 guns, with ten sail of brigs, schooners and sloops." (Almon, vi, 149.) Farther up the river many other vessels were burned as well as a large amount of public property on shore. "The whole number of vessels destroyed was forty-four sail." The expedition returned to Philadelphia May 9. Fifty-eight guns of these sunken and destroyed vessels were afterwards raised by the Americans (Ibid., 148-150; Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 488, May 10, 1778; Hist. Mag., July, 1859; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's Narrative; Barry, ch. viii.)

Thus a series of misfortunes befell the Continental navy during the early months of 1778, the effect of which must have been depressing and naturally caused some loss of confidence in the commanding officers. Colonel Timothy Pickering wrote to his brother, April 26, from York, Pennsylvania, the temporary seat of the Continental Congress: "Our naval affairs have been conducted shockingly. You will see by the papers how foolishly the Virginia was lost. The Randolph, Capt. Biddle, has been blown up in an engagement with a large ship in the West Indies. This misfortune is deeply to be regretted, for Biddle was an excellent & amiable man and accomplished naval commander. From all that I can learn the conduct of the other commanders of our frigates has been generally shamefully bad." (Pickering MSS., v, 76.) One of Pickering's correspondents, in recommending Captain Fisk of the Massachusetts navy for the command of a Continental frigate, wrote: "I am confident he wd. not give her away like a Coward as perhaps has been the case with some others, nor lose her like a blockhead as M ... did his." (lbid, xvii, 128 (March 30, 1778). Doubtless Manley is meant.) Another says: "All the men that is got home from the Alfred sayes if Capt. Thomson had come down they would have Taken ye Two English Ships in one hours engagement." (lbid., xvii, 147 (May 4,1778.) William Ellery wrote from York, April 25, to William Vernon: "The Enemies ships do indeed swarm in the Seas of America and Europe; but hitherto only one of our Frigates hath been captured on the Ocean. Two have been burned in North River, two sunk in Delaware, one captured there, and one in Chesapeak. The Alfred we are just informed was taken on her passage home by two frigates in sight of the Rawleigh. The particulars of this capture and why she was not supported by the Rawleigh we are ignorant of. I hope Capt. Thompson is not culpable. I entertain a high opinion

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of him. The Columbus is a trifling Loss and I should not much lament the Loss of the Alfred, if her brave Captain, Officers and men were not in the hands of a cruel enemy. Our little fleet is very much thinned. We must contrive some plan for catching some of the Enemy's Frigates to supply our Losses; but we must take care not to catch tartars. It is reported that Capt. Biddle of the Randolph, in an engagement with a sixty-gun ship, was blown up. We have been so unfortunate that I am apt to believe almost any bad news; but this report I cannot believe." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 237.) William Story, clerk of the Navy Board at Boston, wrote to Vernon, April 29: "The doctr. of the Alfred has been at the Board and gives a particular Accot. of Capt. Thompson's behaviour; he is Condemned by every One and they are Crying out why don't your board turn him out and hang him, &c, &c. I am Sorry the Service Suffers by the Misconduct of the officers in the navy. I want the board should be together to determine concerning Capt. Thompson." (lbid., 240.) Captain Manley, who had been a prisoner in New York since his arrival there after the capture of the Hancock in July, 1777, was finally released and returned to Boston April 21. He was tried by a court-martial in June for the loss of his ship, and acquitted. Captain McNeill of the Boston was tried for not properly supporting the Hancock, and was dismissed from the navy. Captain Thompson was court-martialed and was also dismissed (lbid., 246, 247; Massachusetts Spy, April 30, 1778; Penn. Packet, July 14,1778; Clark, i, 53; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 143, 147, 165 (April 28, May 8, July 24, 1778); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 163 (January 15, 1779) ; Jones MSS., September 4, November 15, 17, 1778; Wolcott MSS., June 16, 1778.)

The Continental brigantine Resistance was purchased for the navy in 1777, and was fitted out at New London. Captain Samuel Chew was given command of her in June of that year, but she seems first to have got to sea early in 1778. She mounted ten four-pounder guns, and while cruising in the West Indies, fell in with a twenty-gun British letter of marque, March 4. After a hard-fought battle, in which Chew and one of his lieutenants were killed, the vessels parted and the Resistance returned to Boston. The new sloop of war General Gates got to sea during the summer and captured two prizes; in the action with one of them, Captain Skimmer of the Gates was killed (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 92, 93, 94 (June 17,1777), 143 (April 28,1778); New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 9; Adams MSS., October 2, 1778, Vernon to Adams; Jour. Cont. Congr., September 14, 1778.)

Captain Barry was appointed, May 30, 1778, to command the frigate Raleigh, Captain Thompson having been relieved. Barry was ordered, August 24 and again on the 28th, to sail to the southward in the Raleigh in company with the brigantine Resistance, now commanded by Captain William Burke, formerly in command of the schooner Warren, of Washington's fleet at Boston in 1776. The Raleigh and Resistance were at Boston. The Marine Committee apparently had in mind two other frigates for service in southern waters, with these vessels or independently. These were the Warren, at Boston, and the Deane, which, after her completion at Nantes, had come over to Portsmouth under the command of

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Captain Samuel Nicholson, arriving in May. The instructions sent to Barry provided for a cruise on the southern coast of the United States, but they were not carried out; other orders to Barry, issued after he had sailed, also related to a southern cruise. The Resistance must have sailed before the orders of August 24 reached Boston. She was sent out to look for the fleet of Admiral D'Estaing, which was expected to arrive soon, but missed it; and then cruising to the southward she ran into Admiral Howe's fleet and was captured (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 131 (March 6, 1778), 147, 148, 153, 154 (May 8, 9, 30, 1778), 173, 174 (August 24, 28, 1778), 175, 179a (September 14, 28, 1778); Independent Chronicle, May 7, 1778; Almon, vi, 195; Amer. Cath. Hist. Res., April, 1904; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 255; Adams MSS., October 2, 1778.)

The Raleigh sailed from Boston September 25 alone, except for two vessels under her convoy, which apparently soon dropped astern. The wind was fresh from the northwest, but seems to have died down before night; the Raleigh's first course was east by south. At noon two sail were sighted at a distance of fifteen miles to the southeast. The Raleigh hauled to the north, and the strange vessels, which were the British fifty-gun ship Experiment and the Unicorn of twenty-two guns, followed in pursuit. The chase continued nearly sixty hours before a shot was fired, off the coast of Maine. On the morning of September 27 the ships were not in sight, but reappeared about half-past nine in the forenoon. The wind blew fresh from the west, and the Raleigh, running off at a speed of eleven knots, drew away from her pursuers, but in the afternoon, the wind having diminished again, the Unicorn gained on her. The narrative of two of the Raleigh's officers says: "At half past four P.M. tacked and stood to the S. westward in order to discover the headmost ship's force; at the same time saw several islands, but could not tell the name of either. Our ship being cleared for action and men at their quarters, about five P.M. coursed the headmost ship [the Unicorn], to windward athwart her fore foot, on which we hoisted our colours, hauled up the mizzen sail and took in the stay sails; and immediately the enemy hoisted St. George's ensign. She appearing to be pierced for twenty-eight guns, we gave her a broadside, which she returned; the enemy then tacked and came up under our lee quarter and the second broadside she gave us, to our unspeakable grief, carried away our fore top-mast and mizzen top-gallant-mast. He renewed the action with fresh vigor and we, notwithstanding our misfortune, having in a great measure lost command of our ship, were determined for victory. He then shot ahead of us and bore away to leeward. By this time we had our ship cleared of the wreck. The enemy plied his broadsides briskly, which we returned as brisk; we perceiving that his intentions were to thwart us, we bore away to prevent his raking us, and if possible, to lay him aboard, which he doubtless perceived and having the full command of his ship, prevented us by sheering off and dropping astern, keeping his station on our weather quarter. Night coming on we perceived the sternmost ship gaining on us very fast, and being much disabled in our sails, masts and rigging and having no possible view of escaping, Capt. Barry thought it most prudent, with the advice of his officers, to wear ship and stand for the shore, if possible to prevent the ship's falling into the enemy's hands by running

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her on shore. The engagement continuing very warm, about twelve midnight saw the land bearing N.N.E. two points under our bow. The enemy, after an engagement of seven hours, thought proper to sheer off and wait for his consort, they showing and answering false fires to each other." (Pennsylvania Post, October 19, 1778, quoted in Barry, 94, 95.)

The Experiment soon came up and joined in the fire, and the British tried to cut off the Raleigh from the shore. "Encouraged by our brave commander, we were determined not to strike. After receiving three broadsides from the large ship and the fire of the frigate on our lee quarter, our ship struck the shore, which the large ship perceiving poured in two broadsides, which was returned by us; she then hove in stays, our guns being loaded gave us a good opportunity of raking her, which we did with our whole broadside and after that she bore away and raked us likewise, and both kept up a heavy fire on each quarter, in order to make us strike to them, which we never did. After continuing their fire some time they ceased and came to anchor about a mile distant." (Barry, 96.)

According to the Experiment's log, at quarter before six P.M. on the 27th, the "Unicorn came to close Action with the Chace, the first Broadside carried away the Enemys foretopmast and Main top-gallant Mast, at 7 a violent fireing on board both Ships, 1/2 past 9 the fireing ceased 1/2 an Hour, on which we fired several Signal Guns & was answered by the Unicorn with Lights & false Fires bearing N 1/2 E 3 miles, at 10 the Unicorn still in Action, at 11 spoke her & found the chace close by her, soon after got alongside the Chace, she gave us a Broadside & we riturned it, she then run upon the Shore, we being close to the Rocks, tacked & Anchored about 1/2 a Gun Shott from her, as did the Unicorn in 20 fathoms Water; at 5 A.M. the Enemy still on shore on a small barren Island called Seal Island, the Rebel Colours still hoisted, at 7 weighed and Anchored near her, fired several Guns & hoisted out all our Boats, Manned & Armed, sent a Boat ahead with a Flag of Truce to offer them Quarters, on discovering which she hawled down her Colours, her first Lieutenant and One Hundred & thirty-three Men were got ashore on the Island, but surrendered on a Summons by Truce." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 331; also No. 1017 (log of the Unicorn).)

The Raleigh had run on a rocky island in or near Penobscot Bay, the identity of which seems not to have been perfectly established. Barry had at once proceeded to land his crew, intending to destroy his ship, and before morning he and eighty-five of his men had escaped in boats to the mainland; but through negligence or treachery the combustibles prepared for firing the ship were not ignited. The British soon took possession of the frigate and made prisoners of those of her crew who had not yet left her. The Raleigh lost twenty-five killed and wounded. The Unicorn had ten killed and many wounded, and was much injured in her hull and rigging. Captain Barry with those of his crew who escaped found their way back to Boston, where they arrived in about two weeks. The British hauled the Raleigh off the rocks and took her into their service. Barry's reputation did not suffer from this mishap and he was held blameless by a court of inquiry.

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In November he was appointed to command a fleet of galleys to be employed in an expedition against East Florida, but this project was never carried out (Barry, ch. ix; Dawson, ch. xlii; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 184, 191 (October 25, November 20, 1778); Boston Gazette, October 5,1778; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, October 28,1778.)

The Massachusetts state brigs Tyrannicide, Captain Hamden, and Hazard, Captain Sampson, sailed late in 1777 on a cruise in the West Indies. Early in their voyage they took three prizes, but after arriving upon their cruising ground they had little success. One of the few vessels they saw, wrote Sampson from Martinique, March 5, 1778, was "a Frigate that we fell in with a few days before we Arrived here, wch after we boar away for her and discovered her to be a Six & thirty Gun Frigate and we not thinking proper to engage her, Sheard from her, wch shee Perseving, gave us Chase, but we soon Run her out of sight ... The Hazard proves to be a very good Sea-boat & is as Excellent Sailor and works kindly every way." (Massachusetts Mag., July 1908.) They sailed home March 30, and arrived in May. The brig Massachusetts, Captain Lambert, was ordered on a cruise to the coasts of England, Spain, and Portugal. In June, Captain Fisk was appointed to command the Hazard, which Sampson had given up on account of ill health. Fisk declined the appointment, saying that he would not "go to sea untill I can git a ship that is able to make some defence against a British frigate." (Mass. Archives, cliii, 73.) The Hazard was then given to Captain Williams and he was ordered to cruise for West Indiamen. In August, Captain Hallet, who succeeded Haraden in the Tyrannicide, was ordered to cruise off Long Island, but owing to the proximity of the English fleet after the French fleet had gone to Boston, he "stood away to the Northwd." He fell in with and cruised a few days with the Continental frigate Warren. Hallet says that on September 25 he saw a sail standing towards him, which "hove out an English Ensign. I gave her a Bow Chace and English Colours; hail'd her, was answered from St George's Bay bound to Jersey. I order her to heave out her boat & come on board me, which she did. I sent a Prize Master who sent the Capt. with his Papers on board me. I then hoisted an American Jack & ordered her to strike to the United States, which was complied with." (Mass. Archives, cliii, 110.) The prize was a British letter of marque brig called the Juno. Early in the year 1778 a moderate building programme had been planned for the Massachusetts navy, but was only partially carried out (Mass. Court Rec., January 17, April 21, June 23, 1778; Mass. Archives, cli, 440, 442, 449, cliii, 73, 110,114; Massachusetts Mag., April, July, October, 1908.)

In Boston Harbor March 23, 1778, were the ships Defence and Oliver Cromwell of the Connecticut navy; the former, which had previously been rigged as a brig, carried eighteen six-pounders; the Cromwell, twenty nine-pounders. There were also in port at the same time three privateer ships, the General Mifflin and Minerva, of twenty guns each, and the Hancock, of eighteen guns (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, No. 57, April 23, 1778, intelligence collected for Admiral Howe.)

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Late in March the Defence, Captain Samuel Smedley, and. the Oliver Cromwell, Captain Timothy Parker, sailed from Boston on a cruise. Near the Bahamas, April 15, they fell in with and captured the British ships Admiral Keppel, 18, and Cygnus, 16. A seaman on the Oliver Cromwell wrote in his journal: "We gave chase under a moderate sail. At 9 o'clock came up with them. They at first shew French colors to decoy us. When we came in about half a mile, they ups with the English colors. We had Continental colors flying. We engaged the ship Admiral Kepple as follows: When we came in about twenty rods of her, we gave her a bow gun. She soon returned us a stern chase and then a broadside of grape and round shot. Captain orders not to fire till we can see the white of their eyes. We get close under their larboard quarter. They began another broadside and then we began and held tuff and tuff for about two glasses, and then she struck to us. At the same time the Defence engaged the Cyrus, who as the Keppel struck, wore round under our stern. We wore ship and gave her a stern chase, at which she immediately struck. The loss on our side was one killed and six wounded, one mortally, who soon died. Our ship was hulled nine times with six-pound shott, three of which went through our berth, one of which wounded the boatswain's yeoman. The loss on their side was two killed and six wounded. Their larboard quarter was well filled with shott. One nine-pounder went through her main-mast. Employed in the afternoon taking out the men and manning the prize." (New London Hist. Soc., II, i, 50, IV, i, 38, 41. The quotation is from the logbook of Timothy Boardman.) In May the Defence had small pox on board and put into Charleston, South Carolina. A letter from that place, dated June 26, says: "On receiving intelligence of several of the Enemy's privateers being on our coast & annoying our trade with impunity, Capt. Smedley (notwithstanding he was at the time performing quarantine for the small pox), on an application from His Excellency our President, fitted out the Defence immediately, being assisted by Commodore Gillon [and other officers of the South Carolina navy], and last friday sailed over our Bar in quest of them, having in Company with him a French Armed Sloop called the Volant, commanded by Capt. Daniel, who voluntarily offered his service on the occasion. Before night they fell in with Three privateer Sloops, two of which they took" (Trumbull MSS., viii, 149) and brought into Charleston. The third sloop escaped. These vessels were from St. Augustine, a place much frequented by British privateers. The Defence, in company with the Volant, returned to Boston in August, and in December was sent on another cruise with the Oliver Cromwell (lbid., xx, 182, xxvi, 42, 46; Independent Chronicle, August 6, 1778.)

In January, 1778, the American privateer brig General Sullivan, carrying fourteen guns and a hundred and thirty-five men, had an engagement in the West Indies with the sixteen-gun Liverpool privateer Isabella, said to have had a crew of only fifty. They fought two hours and a half yardarm and yardarm and then separated. The British report says: "The engagement was hot and I believe fatal to them, for we could see them falling out of the tops and hear their shrieks and groans. It falling dark and our rigging cut to pieces, we could not work our ship and so lost our prize." The Sullivan seems to have suffered most severely, having eleven

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killed and twenty-three wounded, many of them dangerously. The Isabella lost two killed and ten wounded, one mortally (Williams, 214, 215.)

On the morning of May 26, some distance off the Delaware capes, the British ship Minerva, carrying sixteen six-pounders, ten coehorns, and forty men, fell in with an American brigantine mounting fourteen guns, sixes and fours, six coehorns, and twenty-four swivels. The British account says: "At eight o'clock he came up with us, it blowing then easy; he kept his head toward us, so that we could not see his whole force, and we suspected his attempting to board, on which we fired a cohorn and hoisted our colours. He still keeping his station, we fired on board of him and opened our stern ports; on seeing this he run up abreast and gave us a broadside, hoisting the 13 stripes. We returned his broadside and the action continued for one hour and 57 minutes, having obliged him to sheer off at ten o'clock. We were in no condition to follow him, 16 of our crew being killed and wounded, our scuppers on both sides running with blood, I may say, of as brave men as ever faced an enemy, our sails and rigging being mostly cut and destroyed and all our masts very severely wounded. Our greatest distance from the privateer during the engagement did not exceed the length of our ship and we were often yard arm and yard arm, scarce clearing one another's rigging. Our topmast stay-sail, which continued set during the action, had 180 shot through it, 9 great shot besides small ones through our ensign, 1 through our pendant, 13 shot in our mizen-mast, our main-mast shot through and our fore-mast greatly damaged. I believe that the rebel was as much damaged in rigging as ourselves and his loss of men must have been very considerable, be being quite crowded with them; he carried six swivels in his tops and great quantities of their shot consisted of old iron cut square, old pots, old bolts, &c. About the middle of the engagement an alarm was raised that our ship was beginning to sink; on this a number of the men deserted their quarters, and among them the person who was at the helm. The captain rallied them instantly, took the helm himself, and while standing there a ball went through his hat." The report that the ship was sinking "arose from some of the enemy's shot having gone through and through, which staved 14 puncheons of rum between decks." "Such resolution was then shewn that had the ship been in a sinking condition, I am convinced she would have gone to the bottom with the colours standing, every one on board being determined to sell his life as dear as he could. The rebel hailed us to strike, but we could spare no time to answer him." The Minerva lost seven killed and nine wounded. She was much crippled, and with the help of a British frigate got into New York four days later (London Chronicle, October 8, 1778, reprinted in Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April 1889.)

Four Connecticut fishermen were captured by the British at sea in September, 1778, and taken to Jamaica, where they were impressed on board the sloop Active, bound to New York. During the voyage the four Americans rose upon the crew of the Active, fourteen in number, and confined them below. Although the British were armed and made many desperate attempts to regain possession of the sloop, they were finally subdued after a two days' struggle. The Active was

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then headed for port, but was seized by a Pennsylvania state cruiser and a privateer, who claimed her as a prize and took her into Philadelphia. The conflicting claims of the Connecticut fishermen and the last captors, for prize money, led to long and important litigation, involving the question of state sovereignty (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1893; Jameson's Essays in Constitutional History U. S., 17.)

The twenty-gun ship General Hancock, Captain Hardy, a privateer of Boston, on the 19th of September fell in with the British letter of marque Levant, of thirty-two guns, and they fought three hours, beginning at one o'clock in the afternoon. Both ships hoisted their colors and after firing a few shot the Levant came alongside the General Hancock; then the action began. At half-past two Captain Hardy received a severe wound, which proved fatal. The ships exchanged broadsides at short range until four o'clock, when the Levant blew up, part of the wreck falling on board the American ship. The Hancock's boats were immediately lowered and eighteen of the Levant's crew of about a hundred were saved. The American loss included four killed, besides the captain (Almon, vii, 168; Continental Journal, September 24, 1778. The Levant is called a frigate in the account of the affair. Further accounts of privateers and prizes in 1778 are given in N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg., xxiii (1869), 47, 181, 289; London Chronicle, January 15, February 24, June 16, August 29, September 29, 1778; Royal Amer. Gazette (New York), March 19, 1778; Boston Post, October 7, December 5, 1778; Penn. Packet, July 24, 1778; Boston Gazette, August 24, September 14, 21, October 12, 1778; Massachusetts Spy, June 25, November 5, 1778; Independent Chronicle, December 24, 1778.)

The recall of the British ambassador from France in March, 1778, was followed by preparations for war between the two nations. The French collected a fleet at Brest under the command of the Comte d'Orvilliers and another at Toulon under the Comte d'Estaing. The Brest fleet fought an indecisive engagement off Ushant in July with the British fleet of Admiral Keppel. It was intended that the Toulon fleet should cross the Atlantic and blockade Admiral Howe in Delaware Bay. The overwhelming preponderance of sea power on the side of the British had hitherto given them nearly complete control of the American coast; and they had been free to move their troops and supplies from place to place with little hindrance, except the occasional loss of a transport which had become separated from its convoy. There was now a prospect of the Americans being able, with the help of French fleets, to dispute the naval supremacy of England, at least along their own shores. Disappointments were in store for them, however, and began with the dilatoriness which marked the preparation of this Toulon fleet from the beginning, and all its subsequent movements. D'Estaing sailed from Toulon April 13, taking with him as passengers M. Gerard, the first minister plenipotentiary of France to the United States, and Silas Deane, who had been recalled by Congress and was returning home to explain his transactions in France. The fleet passed Gibraltar more than a month later and appeared off the Delaware capes July 7. It was said that this exceptionally long voyage was due to time spent in

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drills and to unnecessary delays, but D'Estaing himself says it was caused by the extreme slowness of some of his vessels and the necessity of keeping his fleet together. At any rate, he was too late to accomplish the first great object of the expedition, which was to close the Delaware before the British left it. Howe had sailed June 22, passed out of the bay on the 28th, and arrived off Sandy Hook two days later. The evacuation of Philadelphia by the British had been ordered early in the spring and was carried out June 18. Howe's fleet had on board all the stores and baggage of the army, which marched overland through New Jersey. If the British fleet had been caught in the Delaware, it is possible that a victory as decisive as that of Yorktown three years later might have been the result; for the British army, without their fleet to transport them from the lower bay of New York to the city, might have fared badly. D'Estaing, moreover, having captured Howe's fleet, could have taken New York. Howe on July 12 had six ships of sixty-four or more guns, three fifties, two forty-fours, and four frigates. Another British fleet under Admiral Byron was coming to reinforce him. D'Estaing had eight ships of seventy-four or more guns, three sixty-fours, one fifty, and five frigates (Almon, vi, 122; Schomberg, iv, 331, 338; Sands, 75, 311; Mahan, 350, 359, 360; United Service, October, 1905, "D'Estaing's campaign"; Stopford- Sackville MSS., 110; Channing, iii, 288,298.)

D'Estaing soon sailed for New York with the intention of entering the harbor and attacking Howe. He arrived off Sandy Hook July 11, but did not go inside. He was told by all the pilots he consulted that his heavier ships could not pass over the bar. He offered a hundred and fifty thousand francs to any pilot who would take him inside, but no one volunteered. Thus a second opportunity to annihilate the British fleet was lost. The French policy perhaps did not favor an early and decisive triumph of the American cause, and possibly D'Estaing was less strenuous in his efforts than he would have been if he had been fighting for his own country alone. This would have been reasonable from the French point of view and consistent with the admiral's instructions, which called for the performance of some "action beneficial to the Americans, glorious for the arms of the king, fit to manifest immediately the protection that His Majesty accorded to his allies." (United Service, October, 1905.)

D'Estaing remained off Sandy Hook eleven days, and is said to have captured during that time twenty British vessels bound into New York. July 22 he sailed for Newport, having been requested by Washington to cooperate with General Sullivan in an attack on that town. On the 29th the French fleet appeared off Newport and a few days later occupied the eastern and western channels of Narragansett Bay. Four British frigates and two sloops of war were destroyed, either by the French or by the English themselves, to prevent capture. Unfortunately Sullivan did not get ready for the movement against Newport until August 8. D'Estaing then ran into the central channel of the bay, under fire from the batteries at the entrance, and anchored the main body of his fleet north of the harbor. The attack was planned for the 10th. On the 9th the British fleet appeared off Point Judith, where it anchored. Howe had sailed from New York August 1,

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having been reinforced by several ships of Admiral Byron's fleet, which had been scattered by a storm on its passage from England. Howe now had with him one seventy-four, seven sixty-fours, five fifties, two forty-fours, six frigates, and several small vessels. Although his force was thus considerably increased, he was still somewhat weaker than his adversary, and seems to have had no intention of attacking. Under the circumstances, however, D'Estaing preferred the open sea, and early the next morning, August 10, the wind having shifted to the north during the night, he cut his cables and ran out of the bay. Upon observing this movement of the French, Howe got under way, and the two fleets spent the next twenty-four hours manoeuvring for the weather-gauge, or, according to D'Estaing's account, the British fleet fled before the wind, attempting to get back to New York, with the French in pursuit. This continued until late on the afternoon of the 11th, and the leading French ships were just overhauling the British rear, when the wind, which had been increasing, became a violent gale, which soon scattered the vessels of both fleets, each ship being engaged in a struggle with the elements. "At half-past three in the morning" of the 12th, says D'Estaing in his report, "the bowsprit broke, then the foremast, then the main-top, then the mizzenmast; finally the mainmast fell. Our rudder broke next. This last misfortune was the greatest of all. We were now only a floating mass with nothing to steady us and nothing to guide us." (United Service, October, 1905.) This was the plight of the admiral's flag-ship, the Languedoc, of ninety guns. The storm continued unabated until the afternoon of the 13th, when it subsided. Before night the Languedoc and another dismasted French ship were attacked by two British ships, but darkness put an end to the encounter. The next day most of the French fleet came together and anchored for temporary repairs. The British made their way back to New York. D'Estaing, having completed necessary repairs, bore away for Rhode Island August 17, and appeared again before Newport on the 20th. It was then decided that the fleet could be thoroughly refitted at no place nearer than Boston, and D'Estaing therefore sailed again on the 22d, to the great disappointment of Sullivan, who was forced to abandon his campaign against Newport. The French arrived in the lower harbor of Boston August 28, and four days later Howe's fleet, having refitted at New York, appeared in sight. On his way to Boston, Howe had captured the Continental brig Resistance, which had been sent out to look for the French fleet. Finding D'Estaing's position too strong to be attacked, Howe soon departed, returning to New York. D'Estaing remained at Boston over two months, finally sailing for the West Indies November 4. He arrived at Martinique December 9 (Mahan, 359-365; Clowes, iii, 397-411; United Service, October, 1905; Almon, vii, 27-50,106-112; Doniol, iii, ch. vii; Chevalier's Marine Francaise, ch. iii; Clark, i, 83, 84; Schomberg, iv, 338, 339 ; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 255. For Dr. Samuel Cooper's account of D'Estaing, see Hale, i, 183.)

Shortly after the final departure of D'Estaing from Rhode Island, the British frigate Carysfort, Captain Fanshawe, with a considerable fleet and a detachment of the army under General Grey, made a raid, September 4, upon American shipping in Buzzard's Bay and at Martha's Vineyard. The expedition was sent by Admiral

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Gambier, who about this time succeeded Howe in command of the North American station. At New Bedford, Fair Haven, and Holmes's Hole about twenty vessels of some size, besides seventy smaller ones and many boats, were destroyed; also twenty-six storehouses and other public property. Major Silas Talbot of the Continental army reported to General Sullivan that the British fleet comprised forty-five sail, great and small, bringing four thousand troops, to oppose whom the Americans mustered one thousand militia. Talbot said that besides destroying nearly all the shipping at New Bedford, they burned twenty shops and twenty-two houses in the town. A few weeks later Gambier sent out another marauding expedition, to Egg Harbor, New Jersey (Almon, vii, 36-38, 47-49,154-156; Stevens, 1157; Sparks MSS., September 7, 1778, Talbot to Sullivan.) These transactions were in line with the policy advocated earlier in the year by Germain, whose under-secretary, William Knox, wrote October 31: "What a proof is the Bedford enterprize of the propriety of the orders so repeatedly given for attacking the rebel sea ports, and what a reflection is it upon Lord Howe's character that Gambier, in his short absence, has done more to subdue the Rebellion than his lordship during the whole of his command. It was always clear in speculation that the Militia would never stay with Washington or quit their homes, if the coast was kept in alarm, but the experiment having now been made, the effect is reduced to a certainty. Surely somebody will askLord Howe why he has never attempted any thing of the kind." "I much fear [D'Estaing] will go to the West Indies, . . . but perhaps Byron's enterprizing turn may discover the practicability of burning his fleet and the town of Boston together, and then everything will succeed withus." (Hist. Manuscripts Com., Various Collections, vi, 153. For other contemporary opinions of Howe, see Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., November, 1910.)

General Sullivan evacuated Rhode Island by passing over to the mainland at Tiverton August 29. The British fortified the eastern channel of Narragansett Bay, or Sakonnet River, by batteries on the shore and by a two-hundred-ton schooner named the Pigot, armed with eight twelve-pounders, manned by a crew of forty-flve men and moored near the mouth of the river. Major Talbot fitted out at Providence a small sloop called the Hawke with two three-pounders and manned her with a detachment from the army afterwards reinforced, it is said, to the number of sixty in all. Talbot proceeded to Mount Hope Bay where he waited for a favorable wind. On the night of October 28 he dropped down the river and passed the batteries unseen, drifting downstream under bare poles. "At half-past one," he says in his report, "got sight of the schooner Pigot, but a small distance from her was hailed by her and fired upon by her marines from the quarter-deck, but reserved our fire till we had run our jibb boom through her fore shrouds, then threw in such a volley of musketry loaded with bullets and buckshot and some cannon, that the seamen that were on deck immediately ran below begging for quarters and them that were below never made their appearance upon deck, the consequence of which was, my men run out upon our jibb boom and boarded her without the loss of a man. We came to sail. with her and run into this harbor [Stonington], where my men are all landed and on their march to Providence."

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(Almon, vii, 337.) For this exploit Major Talbot was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Continental army and was afterwards made a captain in the navy (Continental Journal, November 19, 1778; Boston Post, November 28, 1778; Tuckerman's Life of Talbot, ch. iii.)

In Boston Harbor about the middle of December were the Continental frigates Warren, Providence, Boston, Deane, and Queen of France. All except the first of these vessels had come from France during the year. There was likewise in port the new frigate Alliance, built at Salisbury on the Merrimac River and fitting out for her first voyage. One or two state cruisers and about ten large privateers were also lying in Boston Harbor at this time. Of the frigates the Deane was fully manned and ready for sea: the others would have been nearly so, if privateering had not made it practically impossible, without great delay, to get men for their crews (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 255, 256; Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 489, No. 19, December 20, 1778, intelligence collected for Admiral Gambier.) These six frigates represented almost the entire strength of the Continental navy in commission in American waters at the end of 1778.

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

CHAPTER XEUROPEAN WATERS IN 1778

Captain John Paul Jones brought the Ranger to France in December, 1777, eager to carry the war upon the enemy's shores. He wrote to the Marine Committee: "It is my hearts first and favorite wish to be employed in Active and enterprizing Services where there is a prospect of Rendering such Services Useful and Acceptable to America. The Singular Honor which Congress hath done me by their generous approbation of my past Conduct hath inspired me with Sentiments of Gratitude which I shall carry with me to my Grave; and if a life of Services devoted to America can be made instrumental in securing its Independence, I shall regard the Continuance of such approbation as an honor far Superiour to the Empty Peagentry which Kings ever did or can bestow." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 137 (December 10, 1777).

During the first two months after his arrival, Jones spent much time in Paris, conferring with the American Commissioners. While there he suggested the cruise of a French fleet to America, which a little later was carried out by D'Estaing. As to his own plans, the command of the Indien, building at Amsterdam, had been intended for him, but this vessel had been transferred to the French government for political reasons. In being deprived of this fine ship, Jones met with one of the most trying of his many disappointments. A cruise in

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the Ranger was then proposed. Jones had already stated to the commissioners (In his letter of December 5, 1777) his views of sound American policy, which was to attack defenseless seaports of the enemy and to cruise, in squadrons if possible, against his commerce in his own waters, where it was concentrated, rather than attempt to cope with an overwhelming naval power; to destroy the greatest amount of property in the shortest time, striking quickly and unexpectedly, rather than attempt to send in prizes at too great risk of recapture. This policy was less pleasing to those under him, whose first thought was of prize money (Sands, 72-76, 311.)

Early in February, 1778, Jones returned to his ship, which, having been thoroughly refitted, dropped down the Loire to Quiberon Bay, where lay a French fleet under Admiral La Motte Picquet. The Continental brig Independence, Captain Young, was also in the bay. Jones negotiated with the admiral through William Carmichael, secretary to Silas Deane, in regard to a salute of thirteen guns which he proposed to give to the French flag. He afterwards wrote to the Marine Committee: "I am happy in having it in my power to congratulate you on my having seen the American flag for the first time recognised in the fullest and completest manner by the flag of France. I was off their bay the 13th and sent my boat in the next day to know if the Admiral would return my salute. He answered that he would return to me, as the senior American continental officer in Europe, the same salute which he was authorized by his court to return to an Admiral of Holland or of any other Republic, which was four guns less than the salute given. I hesitated at this, for I had demanded gun for gun. Therefore I anchored in the entrance of the bay, at a distance from the French fleet; but after a very particular inquiry on the 14th, finding that he had really told the truth, I was induced to accept his offer, the more so as it was in fact an acknowledgment of American Independence. The wind being contrary and blowing hard, it was after sunset before the Ranger got near enough to salute La Motte Picquet with thirteen guns, which he returned with nine. However, to put the matter beyond a doubt, I did not suffer the Independence to salute till the next morning, when I sent the Admiral word that I should sail through his fleet in the brig and would salute him in open day. He was exceedingly pleased and returned the compliment also with nine guns." (Sands, 77 (February 22, 1778.)

This was the most authoritative salute up to that time given to the American flag by a foreign power. Although Jones says that neither he nor La Motte Picquet knew of the alliance that had been concluded a week before, it is probable that the admiral had received some intimation of the propriety of returning an American salute. The acknowledgment of the Andrew Doria's salute at St. Eustatius in 1776, the first notice taken of a Continental vessel, was disavowed by the Dutch government, and the response to that of the privateer General Mifflin at Brest in 1777 was not admitted by the French government. The salute to the Ranger's flag was, as Jones says, a formal recognition of American independence and was a natural sequence of the treaties of commerce and of alliance which had been signed February 6 by representatives of the United

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States and France (Sands, 76-78; Sherburne, 216; Memoires de Paul Zones, 24; Dr. Green's Diary, February 13,14,15, 1778; Jones MSS., letters of Carmichael and Picquet, February 13,14,1778; Sparks MSS., xlix, 12 (Jones to Deane, February 26,1778); Log of Ranger, February 14, 1778 ; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 100.)

An outcome, presumably, of this episode in Quiberon Bay was a discussion some weeks later of the general subject of international salutes among high naval officials of France and on board D'Estaing's fleet. On his voyage to America the admiral conferred with his distinguished passenger Gerard, minister to the United States, and in June a council of officers was held on the flagship at which the project of an agreement between the United States and France, relating to this subject, was drawn up. It provided that ships of either power entering ports of the other should salute first, in recognition of territorial sovereignty; that between ships commanded by officers of equal rank, the American should salute first, thereby acknowledging the precedence of the French crown, but in other cases the inferior should fire the first salute; and finally, that all salutes should be returned by an equal number of guns (Archives de la Marine, B4 141, 303-313.)

The brig Independence sailed for America in the spring. By Jones's advice Captain Young attempted to get into Ocracoke Inlet, North Carolina, but unfortunately his ship was wrecked on the bar (Jones MSS., Capt. Bell to Jones (November 3, 1778), Jones to Bell (November 15, 1778), and to Young (November 18,1778); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 146, 157, 158 (to Young and to Navy Board, May 6, June 18, 1778).)

From Quiberon Bay the Ranger proceeded to Brest, arriving below the town March 8. The fleet of Admiral d'Orvilliers was at that time lying in the harbor of Brest. In this vicinity the Ranger remained a month and again saluted the French flag, receiving eleven guns in return for thirteen. April 10 she sailed on a cruise in British waters. On the 14th, between Scilly and Cape Clear, a brigantine was taken and sunk, and on the 17th, off Dublin, a ship was captured which Jones sent back to Brest. The events of the following week, during which the Ranger cruised about the Isle of Man and the adjacent shores of England, Scotland, and Ireland, the neighborhood of Jones's early life, added much to his naval reputation (For this cruise of the Ranger, see Sands, 79-98; Sherburne, 44-64; Green's Diary; Scribner's Mag., July, 1898; Jones MSS.; Log of Ranger.)

Towards evening of April 17, Jones "stood over from the Isle of Man, with an intention to make a descent at Whitehaven. At 10 o'clock," he says in his report to the commissioners, "I was off the harbor with a party of volunteers and had everything in readiness to land, but before eleven the wind greatly increased and shifted, so as to blow directly upon the shore ; the sea increased of course, and it became impossible to effect a landing. This obliged me to carry all possible sail

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so as to clear the land and to await a more favorable opportunity." (Sherburne, 45 (Jones to American Commissioners, May 27, 1778)

During the next few days a revenue cutter was chased and a schooner and sloop were sunk. Adverse winds prevented an attempt being made to destroy a number of vessels at anchor in a bay on the Scotch coast. "The 21st, being near Carrickfergus, a fishing boat came off, which I detained. I saw a ship at anchor in the road which I was informed by the fisherman was the British ship-of-war Drake, of 20 guns. I determined to attack her in the night. My plan was to overlay her cable and to fall upon her bow, so as to have all her decks open and exposed to our musketry, &c.; at the same time it was my intention to have secured the enemy by graplings, so that had they cut their cables they would not thereby have attained an advantage. The wind was high and unfortunately the anchor was not let go so soon as the order was given, so that the Ranger was brought up on the enemy's quarter at the distance of half a cable's length. We had made no warlike appearance, of course had given no alarm; this determined me to cut immediately, which might appear as if the cable had parted and at the same time enable me, after making a tack out of the Lough, to return with the same prospect of advantage which I had at the first. I was, however, prevented from returning, as I with difficulty weathered the lighthouse on the lee side of the Lough, and as the gale increased. The weather now became so very stormy and severe and the sea so high that I was obliged to take shelter under the south shore of Scotland (Sherburne, 46; Sands, 80.)

"The 22d introduced fair weather, though the three kingdoms as far as the eye could reach were covered with snow. I now resolved once more to attempt Whitehaven, but the wind became very light, so that the ship could not in proper time approach so near as I had intended. At midnight I left the ship with two boats and thirty-one volunteers. When we reached the outer pier the day began to dawn. I would not, however, abandon my enterprise, but despatched one boat under the direction of Mr. Hill and Lieutenant Wallingsford, with the necessary combustibles, to set fire to the shipping on the north side of the harbor, while I went with the other party to attempt the south side. I was successful in scaling the walls and spiking up all the cannon in the first fort. Finding the sentinels shut up in the guard house, they were secured without being hurt. Having fixed sentinels, I now took with me one man only (Mr. Green), and spiked up all the cannon on the southern fort, distant from the other a quarter of a mile. On my return from this business I naturally expected to see the fire of the ships on the north side, as well as to find my own party with everything in readiness to set fire to the shipping in the south. Instead of this, I found the boat under the direction of Mr. Hill and Mr. Wallingsford returned and the party in some confusion, their light having burnt out at the instant when it became necessary. By the strangest fatality my own party were in the same situation, the candles being all burnt out. The day too came on apace, yet I would by no means retreat while any hopes of success remained. Having again placed sentinels, a light was obtained at a house disjoined from the town and fire was kindled in the steerage of a large ship

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which was surrounded by at least an hundred and fifty others, chiefly from two to four hundred tons burthen and laying side by side aground, unsurrounded by the water. There were besides from seventy to an hundred large ships in the north arm of the harbor aground, clear of the water, and divided from the rest only by a stone pier of a ship's height. I should have kindled fires in other places if the time had permitted. As it did not, our care was to prevent the one kindled from being easily extinguished. After some search a barrel of tar was found and poured into the flames, which now ascended from all the hatchways. The inhabitants began to appear in thousands and individuals ran hastily towards us. I stood between them and the ship on fire with a pistol in my hand and ordered them to retire, which they did with precipitation. The flames had already caught the rigging and began to ascend the mainmast. The sun was a full hour's march above the horizon and as sleep no longer ruled the world, it was time to retire. We re-embarked without opposition, having released a number of prisoners, as our boats could not carry them. After all my people had embarked I stood upon the pier for a considerable time, yet no persons advanced. I saw all the eminences around the town covered with the amazed inhabitants (Sherburne, 47.)

"When we had rowed a considerable distance from the shore, the English began to run in vast numbers to their forts. Their disappointment may easily be imagined, when they found at least thirty heavy cannon, the instruments of their vengeance, rendered useless. At length, however, they began to fire, having, as I apprehend, either brought down ship guns or used one or two cannon which lay on the beach at the foot of the walls dismounted, and which had not been spiked. They fired with no direction and the shot falling short of the boats, instead of doing us any damage, afforded some diversion, which my people could not help showing by discharging their pistols, &c. in return of the salute. Had it been possible to have landed a few hours sooner, my success would have been complete. Not a single ship out of more than two hundred could possibly have escaped, and all the world would not have been able to save the town. What was done, however, is sufficient to show that not all their boasted navy can protect their own coasts, and that the scenes of distress which they have occasioned in America may be soon brought home to their own door." (Sherburne, 48.)

An English account says: "Att 4 o'Clock a Privateer of Eighteen Guns & one hundred & twenty Men landed about thirty Men in our Harbour & set a Vessel on Fire & distributed Combustibles in several Others; the Privateer is yet standing on & off & as we just now hear is stretching with Wind at East to the W.N.W." (Whitehaven Customs Letter Book, 96.) According to another letter from Whitehaven, "the privateer's people who landed here this morning were all armed with pistols and cutlasses. and retired to their boats about four o'clock . . . They had on their first landing spiked up several of the cannon, in order to secure their retreat. A number of people flocking to the fort, some shot were fired at the boats, but without doing any execution. After the boats reached the privateer, she stood over to the Scotch side, and as large columns of smoke have been seen on the

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Scotch shore this afternoon, it is feared he has done some mischief there." (London Chronicle, April 30, 1778.)

Having reached the Scotch shore, Jones landed about noon on St. Mary's Isle, "with one boat only and a very small party." Here was the estate of the Earl of Selkirk, very near Jones's birthplace. The plan was to seize the earl and carry him to France, to serve as a hostage for the better treatment of American prisoners in England or to secure the release of a number of them in exchange. Unfortunately for the success of the project, Selkirk was absent. The officers and men with Jones, who thus far had had little prospect of prize money, now demanded the privilege of bringing away some booty from the estate. The raids of the British in America, in which private property was not respected, were fresh in their minds. Jones unwillingly consented that they might demand and take such of the family plate as might be delivered to them. This was done, the men behaving in an orderly manner and not entering the house. Jones afterwards purchased this plate, worth several hundred pounds, at his own expense, and restored it to Selkirk, from whom he received full acknowledgment (Sherburne, 48, 51-58.)

The week's cruise in the Irish Sea ended with a notable event in our early naval history, which Jones relates in his letter to the commissioners at Paris. "On the morning of the 24th I was again off Carrickfergus and would have gone in had I not seen the Drake preparing to come out. It was very moderate and the Drake's boat was sent out to reconnoitre the Ranger. As the boat advanced I kept the ship's stern directly towards her and, though they had a spy glass in the boat, they came on within hail and alongside. When the officer came on the quarter-deck he was greatly surprised to find himself a prisoner, although an express had arrived from Whitehaven the night before. I now understood what I had before imagined, that the Drake came out, in consequence of this information, with volunteers against the Ranger. The officer told me also that they had taken up the Ranger's anchor. The Drake was attended by five small vessels full of people who were led by curiosity to see an engagement. But when they saw the Drake's boat at the Ranger's stern they wisely put back. Alarm smokes now appeared in great abundance, extending along on both sides of the channel. The tide was unfavorable, so that the Drake worked out but slowly. This obliged me to run down several times and to lay with courses up and main-topsail to the mast. At length the Drake weathered the point and, having led her out to about mid-channel, I suffered her to come within hail. The Drake hoisted English colors and at the same instant the American stars were displayed on board the Ranger. I expected that preface had been now at an end, but the enemy soon after hailed, demanding what ship it was? I directed the master to answer, 'the American Continental ship Ranger, that we waited for them and desired that they would come on; the sun was now little more than an hour from setting, it was therefore time to begin.' The Drake being astern of the Ranger, I ordered the helm up and gave her the flrst broadside. The action was warm, close, and obstinate. It lasted an hour and four minutes, when the enemy called for quarters, her fore and

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main- topsail yards being both cut away and down on the cap, the top-gallant yard and mizengaff both hanging up and down along the mast, the second ensign which they had hoisted shot away and hanging on the quarter-gallery in the water, the jib shot away and hanging in the water, her sails and rigging entirely cut to pieces, her masts and yards all wounded, and her hull also very much galled. I lost only Lieutenant Wallingsford and one seaman, John Dougall, killed, and six wounded, among whom are the gunner, Mr. Falls, and Mr. Powers, a midshipman, who lost his arm. One of the wounded, Nathaniel Wills, is since dead; the rest will recover." (Sherburne, 48, 49.) Jones estimated the British loss at forty-two killed and wounded, but it was probably less; the captain was killed and the lieutenant mortally wounded.

The Drake's armament consisted of twenty four-pounders, the Ranger's of eighteen six-pounders. According to different accounts, the Drake's crew numbered one hundred and fifty to one hundred and ninety and was probably little in excess of the lower figure. It consisted partly of volunteers and raw recruits and the ship had only one lieutenant. On the whole she does not appear to have been well prepared for battle. The Ranger also was at a disadvantage, her crew of one hundred and twenty-three being at this time in a dissatisfied and even mutinous state of mind, under the influence of the first lieutenant, Thomas Simpson (Sherburne, 49; Sands, 95; Scribner's Mag., July, 1898.) While the Ranger's capture of a vessel of inferior force could hardly be regarded as a remarkable achievement, it was still highly satisfactory to have taken a regular man-of-war of the enemy in his own waters.

The day after the battle both ships were employed in repairing injuries. A brigantine was captured at this time. When ready to sail, the Ranger and Drake passed out to sea by the North Channel, owing to a shift of the wind, and returned to Brest by way of the west coast of Ireland. May 6, Lieutenant Simpson, in command of the Drake, having disregarded the Ranger's signals, was put under arrest by Jones for disobedience of orders. Both vessels arrived safely at Brest May 8. An American at that place, writing home, says: "It was a pleasure to see the English flag flying under the American stars and stripes." (Boston Gazette, July 6, 1778.) About two hundred British prisoners were confined on the Drake, awaiting exchange. Meanwhile six British men-of-war had been ordered to cruise for the Ranger in St. George's Channel, and it was reported in England that both she and the Drake had been captured by a British frigate (Wharton, ii, 581, 582; Sherburne, 63; London Chronicle, May 2, 5, 9, 14, 1778.)

The arrest of Simpson was the outcome of an unfortunate state of affairs on board the Ranger. For a number of reasons there had been discontent among the crew, which had been encouraged by Simpson, who, it was charged by Jones, had gone so far as to incite mutiny before the battle with the Drake, when Jones had intended to go in and attack that vessel, if she had not come out. According to Jones, Simpson on that occasion "held up to the crew that being

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Americans fighting for liberty, the voice of the people should be taken before the Captain's orders were obeyed" (Sands, 95); and the captain says that if the capture of the Drake's boat had not brought about a change in the men's temper, a dangerous mutiny might have been the result. Jones also held Simpson in some degree responsible for the failure of his plans at Whitehaven. Simpson having come out from America in the Ranger, with the expectation of taking command upon Jones being given a larger ship, was dissatisfied. He was popular with the crew; whereas Jones, owing to his severe discipline, to his violent temper, and perhaps to other personal traits, and partly to his indifference to prize money, was disliked by his men. This was particularly unfortunate because undeserved, for in his letters he shows constant solicitude for their interests. The American Commissioners in Paris, lacking authority, were obliged to refuse payment on Jones's drafts for the daily support and sustenance of his crew, which caused him great annoyance. They also regretted Simpson's arrest, especially as there were not enough American officers in Europe to convene a court-martial, and it would be necessary to send him to America for trial. The result was that, with the approval of Jones, though he afterwards repented it, Simpson was released from custody and put in command of the Ranger. Surgeon Green says in his diary, July 27: "This day Thomas Simpson, Esqr. came on board with orders to take command of the Ranger, to the joy and satisfaction of the whole Ships company." Not long after this the Ranger sailed for America (Sherburne, 60-62; Sands, 94-96, 99-104, 117, 118, 123-126; Wharton, ii, 597.)

The frigate Boston, Captain Samuel Tucker, early in February, 1778, was anchored in Nantasket Roads. William Jennison, lieutenant of marines, records in his journal, February 13, that "Capt. Tucker went to Braintree in his Barge and brought the Honble John Adams and suite on board." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April, 1891.) This distinguished passenger had been appointed commissioner to France in place of Silas Deane; he had with him his son John Quincy Adams, then eleven years old. February 15 the frigate sailed with a wind from the west southwest; on the 20th it began to blow. "A clap of thunder with sharp lightning broke upon the mainmast just above the upper moulding, which burnt several of the men on deck. A most terrible night. The captain of the mainmast was struck with the lightning, which burnt a place on the top of his head about the bigness of a Quarter Dollar - he lived three days and died raving mad." (Ibid. This casualty is not mentioned in the ship's log.) Meanwhile the Boston was being chased by a British thirty-six-gun frigate, but fortunately escaped. "Capt. Tucker had instructions not to risque the ship in any way that might endanger Mr. Adams, and was ordered to land him safe in France or Spain." (Ibid.) Moreover the ship was short-handed. March 10, "at 11 A.M. discovered a vessel to windward; gave chase and came alongside at noon. She fired three guns at us, one of which carried away our mizen yard. We returned a few shots and hoisted American colors, upon which she struck her colors. Our boats were got out immediately, but a heavy squall prevented them getting to the ship before they had thrown overboard the mail, which sunk not more than a

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boat's hook length before our boats reached the ship. She was named the Martha, carried 16 nine-pounders and was . . . bound from the Thames for New York." (Penn. Mag., April, 1891.) Hezekiah Welch, one of the frigate's lieutenants, was put on board the Martha as prize-master and she was sent back to Boston. According to the invoice her cargo was worth ninety-seven thousand pounds sterling. Tucker wrote to the Navy Board of the Eastern District: "I hope to pay for the Boston, as I told your honnours before Sailing. I am but Poorly mand to my Sorrow; I dare not attack a 20 gun Ship." (Tucker MSS., March 11, 1778.) A few days after the capture of the Martha, the first lieutenant of the Boston, William Barron, was fatally injured by the bursting of a gun. After a very stormy passage the frigate anchored in the Garonne River, March 31, and the next day went up to within three miles of Bordeaux (Life of Tucker, ch. iv, and appendix, log of the Boston; Archives de la Marine, B8 14.)

After careening and thoroughly refitting his ship and enlisting a number of Frenchmen for his crew, which required several weeks, Captain Tucker dropped down the river. On June 6, the Boston sailed in company with a French frigate and a fleet of merchantmen. She then made a short cruise in the Bay of Biscay and along the French coast, during which four prizes were taken. The Boston went into L'Orient July 3 and remained nearly a month. Tucker had trouble with his crew; June 19 he wrote to the Navy Board that the situation with respect to his people was very disagreeable and had been since he left Boston, and that there had been "a Consparicy carried to a great Length, but fortunately discovered it the day before sailing from Bourdeaux, which I wrote the Honble Commissioners at Paris. I had the Confederates of Bourdeaux imprisoned and believe they will be Banished if not hung." (Tucker MSS.) A spirit of insubordination persisted to some extent, and July 28, Tucker ordered one of the crew "to be brought to the gangway and receive twelve stripes on his naked back. His crime was talking among the people and making them believe that the officers on board had embezzled some part of the prizes, cargo, and other abuse." (Tucker, 303, log of the Boston.) Meanwhile forty-seven of the French sailors enlisted at Bordeaux had been arbitrarily taken out of the ship by a French general at L'Orient. The prisoners taken in the prizes also became restless, and on learning that an uprising among them was being planned, Tucker ordered twenty-three of them to be put in irons. The first of these recent prizes of the Boston having been sent to America, the other three were sold at L'Orient. August 1 the Boston sailed, and on the 3d anchored at St. Nazaire (Tucker, ch. v, and appendix; Adams MSS., April 10, 11, 22, 1778; Tucker MSS., July 3, 7, 12, 13, 1778.)

The frigate Providence, Captain Whipple, was then at Paimboeuf, and a few days later came down the river and joined the Boston. The Providence, after escaping from the blockade of Narragansett Bay May 1, sailed directly for France, arriving at Paimboeuf on the 30th; she was to procure guns for Continental vessels under construction. On the voyage she captured a prize which was recaptured and then again taken by a French ship. August 8 the Providence and Boston with a small

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convoy, with Whipple in command, sailed for Brest, where they arrived in six days and found the Ranger. There was also a large French fleet at Brest. August 22 the Providence, Boston, and Ranger sailed for America. September 26 they were on the Banks of Newfoundland, and on the 15th of October they arrived at Portsmouth, having taken three prizes on the passage from France (Tucker, ch. v, and appendix; Archives de la Marine, B7 459 (letter of Whipple, May 31, 1778); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 157, 159 (June 10, 19,1778); Tucker MSS., August 24, September 15, 1778; Granite Monthty, November, 1881, log of the Ranger; Boston Gazette October 5, November 2,1778; Boston Post, October 24, 1778.)

The Continental cutter Revenge, Captain Conyngham, cruised with success during 1778, usually out of Spanish ports. The Spanish people were generally friendly to the American cause and treated with hospitality the vessels which visited their ports. Early in the year the Revenge sailed from Bilbao and cruised to the Straits of Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, taking several prizes. Her arrival in Cadiz is mentioned by an officer on the British ship Monarch, who complains of the unfriendly feeling of the Spaniards towards the English. The Monarch sent a boat ashore "to get what is termed product," but was unsuccessful; it was refused many times. "Judge of the situation of our spirited commander, who is a true British seaman, when during the time we lay there - seven days being detained by the wind - we had the mortification to see the usual honours paid to two Dutch frigates and above all to the Revenge, American privateer commanded by Cunningham, who came swaggering in with his thirteen stripes, saluted the Spanish Admiral, had it returned and immediately got product, the Spaniards themselves carrying on board wood, water, fruit and fresh provisions; all which we were eye witnesses of, as she anchored directly under our stern, within two cables length." (London Chronicle, May 7, 1778; Boston Gazette, October 12, 1778.) There were eleven other American vessels lying in Cadiz at this time. Conyngham relates an incident not mentioned in the English officer's letter. "An English ship of the Line & two frigatts were laying in Cadiz on our arrival; in their usual & diabolick mode of Warfare had determined in the Night by their boats to set the revenge on fire. A Good french man on board one of them Gave notice to the french Consul of their designe, who advised us of. Consequently was prepared for them, they did appeare in the dead of the night, but took Care to Keep their distance; the spanish admirall had thiss notice & he politely offered a 74 Gun ship to protect us. We acknowledge the favor, but was noways apprehensive of any danger; to the Contrary it was our wish they would make the Attempt." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899, Conynghams narrative.)

The Revenge returned to the north of Spain and went into Ferrol. She fitted out there and then cruised among the Azores and Canary Islands, taking several prizes, some of which were destroyed and others sent to American or to European ports. "Those seas covered by British Cruzers of every description and [with] orders from their Govermt to follow the revenge into any harbour she might

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be in & destroy her." Conyngham then returned to Coruna, but found the Spanish less hospitable; the protection of the government had been withdrawn. This, Conyngham says, was due to British influence at court. He was allowed to refit at a small neighboring port, however, and then sailed for the West Indies (Ibid.)

About the end of September, which was perhaps a little before Conyngham returned to Coruna after his cruise among the Western Islands, the privateer Vengeance arrived at that place. The Vengeance was a twenty-gun brig from Newburyport commanded by Captain Newman; she sailed from Cape Ann August 16. About two weeks after leaving port the Vengeance ran into a West India fleet and was chased out again by two frigates. "On the 17th of September," says Captain Newman, "in Latt. 49 N. and Long. 20 West, fell in with the Ship Harriot Packet, of sixteen guns and forty-five men, Capt. Sampson Sprague, from Falmouth bound to New York, which, after a small resistance, struck. I man'd her and ordered her for Newbury-Port. And on the 21st of the same month fell in with the Snow Eagle Packet, from New York bound to Falmouth, Commanded by Edward Spence, mounting fourteen carriage guns and sixty men including some officers of the British army, which, after an engagement of about twenty minutes, was obliged to strike to us, which I likewise ordered for Newbury-Port. Col. Howard of the 1st Regiment of Guards was killed and several other officers, and a number wounded. Lucky for me, not one man killed or wounded except myself, by a musket ball in my thigh . . . Among the passengers was four Colonels, three Majors, one Cornet of dragoons . . . I have delivered my prisoners to the British Commissary residing here, taking his receipt for the same, obligating him to return a like number of American prisoners of equal rank." (Boston Post, January 9, 1779.) This letter was dated October 4 at Coruna. Possibly the feeling aroused over the arrival of these prisoners of rank in the British army and protests made to the Spanish government may have had something to do with Conyngham's inhospitable reception about the time (Boston Gazette, January 11, 1779; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 227 (August 16, 1779); Hist. Man. Com., Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst., i, 807 (October 1, 1778, declaration of British consul at Coruna as to Newman's prisoners.)

Up to the time of her arrival in the West Indies, the Revenge, according to a letter from Martinique dated December 10, had captured sixty British vessels, twenty-seven of which were sent into port and thirty-three sunk or burned. She cruised several weeks out of Martinique among the Windward Islands. Conyngham received instructions, October 26, from William Bingham, the American naval agent in the West Indies. A month later Bingham wrote to Conyngham: "As the defensive Alliance entered into between France & the United States of America will point out to you one Common Object as the Motive that our Conduct is mutually to be regulated by that of annoying and circumventing the Designs of the Enemy, I must seriously recommend to you not to lose sight of it." He was to be on the lookout for D'Estaing, expected soon to arrive in the West Indies from America; and also for "a Frigate with Transports under her Convoy of a great Number of Troops from France," and acquaint them, as far as possible, with the

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movements of the British fleet. A set of French signals was furnished him. "Another grand object that must attract your attention is the endeavouring to capture some of the Transports that have sailed from New York bound for the English West India Islands. It appears that they have suffered by a Gale of wind & have lost their Convoy, so that perhaps they will fall an easy Prey. No recompense could requite the services you would render your Country by capturing some of those that have Troops on board, as it might perhaps hinder the success of any of their operations in these Seas." (MS. Letter, November 29,1778.) The Revenge made several prizes in the West Indies, including two British privateers, and had an engagement with a twenty-eight-gun cutter. This cruise continued until midwinter (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899; Boston Gazette, February 15,1779.)

The Continental navy, already greatly reduced, was further depleted in the year 1778 by the loss of the frigates Washington, Effingham, Randolph, Virginia, and Raleigh, and the Alfred, Columbus, Independence, and Resistance. Of the original thirteen frigates there now remained only the Boston, Warren, Providence, and Trumbull. Among the ships lost before they had ever been in service mus be counted the fine large frigate Indien, which passed from the American to the French flag. To replace these severe losses the frigates Deane and Queen of France, the sloop of war General Gates, and the prize schooner Pigot had been added to the navy; also a brigantine called the Retaliation, whose service seems to have been brief and uneventful. The frigate Alliance might be included in the list, but she did not cruise until the following year. The frigates Warren and Providence had begun their active careers during the year 1778, and concerning two frigates built in Connecticut a letter of William Vernon, written December 17 to John Adams, says: "The ship building at Norwich is given to Capt. Seth Harding and call'd the Confederacy, near ready to sail; she is a fine Frigate, it is said exceeds the Alliance if possible. The Trumbul remains in Connecticut River, perhaps may never be got out, unless Camels are built to carry her out." In regard to the America, Admiral Howe had written in March: "According to the latest Information obtained from some of the well-affected Inhabitants in the New England Provinces, the Two-decked Ship building at Portsmouth is not expected to be finished before the Autumn." The America had to wait much longer than that for her completion. If to the vessels here mentioned as ready for service we add the sloop Providence, the Ranger and the Revenge, the list of the Continental navy in commission at the end of 1778 is full. The prize sloop of war Drake would have been a valuable cruiser and might have been acquired for the Continental service, but was not, probably owing to lack of available funds and of authority on the part of the American Commissioners at Paris (Paullin, 516, 517; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc.. viii, 256; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, No. 55, March 16, 1778.)

The navy therefore showed a gradual falling away, and its condition at the end of the year 1778 was by no means satisfactory. The state navies also seemed to be steadily dwindling. Privateering, however, continued active, and British

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commerce suffered severely from American enterprise of this kind. The Continental Congress issued one hundred and twenty-nine commissions to privateers in 1778, an increase of sixty over the previous year, and doubtless large numbers continued to be commissioned by the different states (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495, list of Continental letters of marque.)

At the beginning of 1778 the British navy comprised three hundred and ninety-nine vessels of all classes, of which two hundred and seventy-four were in commission; a year later the figures were four hundred and thirty-two and three hundred and seventeen respectively (Hannay, ii, 211.) Eighty-nine vessels were on the North American station in January, and the same number in September, but the fleets on these two dates were differently constituted. Nearly half the first were frigates and fifteen were ships mounting sixty-four, fifty, or forty-four guns; the September fleet, which included Byron's squadron, contained fewer frigates, but seven seventy-fours, six sixty-fours, five fifties, and three forty-fours (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, January 5, September 11, 1778, Disposition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in North America.) There were also about fifteen vessels at Newfoundland and thirty or forty in the West Indies. The total force of the navy in men was sixty thousand (Hannay, ii, 212; Schomberg, i, 440, iv, 56-59; Almon, vii, 249.) A list of New York privateers, September 8, 1778, to March 8,1779, contains one hundred and twenty. one names (Trumbull MSS., xxiii, 116.)

Information in regard to captures and losses is scanty and unsatisfactory, and the few available lists and figures are doubtless inaccurate and incomplete; and estimates are perhaps sometimes exaggerated. The Continental navy made fewer captures than in the previous year, while presumably the privateers made more. According to one calculation, made in February, 1778, they had then taken seven hundred and thirty-nine British vessels since the beginning of the war. Another estimate places the British loss for the year at three hundred and sixty-four, of which eighty-seven were recaptured or ransomed; but this list includes captures by the French. According to the same authority the British took two hundred and forty-eight vessels from their enemies. A contemporary newspaper gives a list of two hundred and twenty-two American vessels captured on the West Indian station within a few weeks. Another list, that of American vessels taken on the North American station between October, 1777, and April, 1778, contains only five names; while between May, 1778, and February, 1779, seventy-nine prizes were brought in by New York privateers (Hannay, ii, 220; Clowes, iii, 396; London Chronicle, September 17, November 7, 1778; Almon, vii, 190; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, No. 57, April 23, 1778, list of vessels seized or destroyed since October 25, 1777; A. D. 489, No. 27, February 27, 1779.

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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XI

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1779

Taking into account the heavy losses of the last two years, the Continental navy still showed vigor at the opening of 1779 and rendered valuable service during the year. The British, in spite of their naval superiority, were not free from solicitude as to the possibilities of the American sea forces. Admiral Gambier reported that there were at Boston December 6, 1778, fifteen vessels of war, including five Continental frigates, and January 10, 1779, he wrote: "A Report prevails that one 40, four 32, one 28, and two 20 Gun Ships of the Rebels sailed about ten days ago from Boston; this Circumstance if true is very alarming, not only on Account of the probability of their falling in with our victuallers, but on Account of the present reduced numbers of our Ships, and they much divided, the Coppered Frigates could not without the greatest danger from Ice have been kept on this part of the Coast during the Winter Season." He wrote later, on the authority of a privateer, that three frigates had sailed from Boston January 18, "in order to Cruise off the Chesepeak," and that they had been seen ten days later, off the Delaware capes (Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 489, Nos. 19, 22, 25, December 20, 1778, January 10, February 3, 1779.) His information in regard to both these sailings was obviously incorrect.

A few new Continental vessels went into commission or into active service, the most important of which were the frigates Alliance and Confederacy, of thirty-two guns each; the first was built in Massachusetts, the other in Connecticut. The Confederacy was a hundred and thirty-three feet long, with an extreme breadth of thirty-five feet, six inches, and was designed to carry twenty-eight guns on the main deck, six on the quarter deck, and two on the forecastle. These ships, which had been authorized by Congress two years or more before, encountered the usual difficulties and delays in getting ready for sea. The Marine Committee in their efforts to expedite matters issued many orders which, owing to slow communication and uncertainty as to the condition of vessels and the state of affairs in distant ports, were frequently modified or changed. On February 10th it was arranged that the Confederacy, Captain Harding, then at New London, should make a short cruise in Long Island Sound with two vessels of the Connecticut navy. Later she was to join the Queen of France in a cruise along the Atlantic coast, in which the Ranger was to take part. Captain Olney of the Queen of France, the senior officer, was ordered to "sweep in the first place this coast from the Southward of Cape May to the Bar of Charles Town and afterwards to Cruize in such Latitudes and Longitudes which are best calculated to give the greatest aid and protection to the Trade of Delaware, Chesapeake and Charles Town, and as often as circumstances and the safety of your Ships will admit of it, you are to enter the mouths of Delaware and Chesapeake for the

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purpose of destroying the small Armed Vessels from New York that lurk about the Capes to the certain destruction of almost every Merchantman that sails; you are at the same time to be extreamly cautious in continuing in any of these places so long as to render yourself a certain Object for the pursuit of the enemy. If in the Course of this Cruize you should meet with the Deane or the Confederacy or both of them, it is our orders that you and they proceed on this Cruize in Company, under the command of the Superior Officer, to execute these Orders; and least you should be seperated by Storms or other circumstances, it would be advisable to establish such Private Signals that when the Ships meet again they may be known to each other as friends. The great delay, expence and trouble in manning the Ships for Sea has induced this committee to direct and Order you to continue this Cruize as long as your Provisions and other circumstances will admit . . . The superiority of the Naval force of the enemy on this Coast and the misfortunes that have heretofore happened to some of our Ships will, we trust, make you extreamly vigilant and active; the confidence we repose in your fidility, courage and good conduct gives us every reason to hope for a successful Cruize. Most of the Armed Vessels from New York are inferior in force to yourself, which will put it in your power to aid the Trade of the Southern States by destroying many of them and thereby to render not only essential service to the Public, but to add to the honor and reputation of your own character. You are to keep these Instructions a profound secret and when the state of your Provisions requires, you will return into the Port of Philadelphia or some convenient one in the Bay of Chesapeake." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 195, 196, 197 (to Olney, to Governor Trumbull, to Harding, and to Navy Board, Boston, all dated February 10, 1779). The measurements of the Confederacy are taken from Wolcott MSS., February 12,1777.)

A little later, orders were sent to the Navy Board at Boston to get the frigate Providence ready for sea immediately and again for her to cruise on the Atlantic coast. Then these orders were transferred to the Warren, and later still the committee decided to hold the Warren in port and fit out the Providence for a four months' cruise; and then to send the Boston to the southern coast. Apparently in accordance with this last order, the Navy Board at Boston instructed Captain Tucker, April 6, to proceed with his ship, the frigate Boston, in company with the sloop Providence, on a ten days' cruise in Massachusetts Bay and along the Maine shore and then to go south. It does not appear that any of these instructions were, at the time at least, carried out precisely according to the intentions of the Marine Committee. The delay in fitting out the Confederacy was so great that the committee determined to relieve Captain Harding from command, should he be found responsible. That frigate did not get to sea until the end of April (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 200, 201, 204, 206, 210 (February 21, 26, March 9, 21, 26, April 27, 1779, to Navy Board, Boston), 207 (April 17, 1779, to Harding), 211 (April 27, 1779, to Deshon); Tucker MSS., April 6,1779; Boston Post, May 8,1779.)

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Meanwhile the frigates Deane, Captain Nicholson, and Alliance, Captain Landais, sailed together from Boston January 14. Pierre Landais was a French naval officer of experience, having sailed around the world with the famous navigator Bougainville; he had embarked in the American cause and on the recommendation of Silas Deane had been appointed a captain in the Continental navy. The Alliance was bound to France and parted with her consort on the third day out (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 258; Wharton, ii, 387; Stevens, 1552.) The Deane soon captured an armed ship of the enemy which was sent back to Boston. "Last Thursday," February 4, a newspaper announces, "arrived in this Harbour the ship Viper, taken by Capt. Samuel Nicholson, in the Continental Frigate Deane; she is a letter of Marque fitted out at Liverpool, mounting 16 Guns and 75 Men . . . Capt. Nicholson took and burnt a ship belonging to London in ballast from New York to Cadiz." The Deane cruised about four months, most of the time in the West Indies. While there she fell in with the Continental ship General Gates, which had sailed from Boston in December and had taken several prizes. The Deane returned to the United States and went into Philadelphia April 17 (Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 258, 259; Boston Post, February 6, May 1, 1779; Adams MSS., April 10, 1779, Vernon to Adams.)

The Ranger sailed from Portsmouth for BostonFebruary 24 and the same evening anchored in Nantasket Roads. The frigates Warren, Commodore John B. Hopkins, and Queen of France, Captain Olney, and the Ranger, Captain Simpson, having finally got ready for sea, sailed from Boston March 13. The log of the Ranger, under date of April 6, says: "At 6 A.M.," being sixteen miles east of Cape Henry, "saw 2 sails, gave Chase to one of them; at 1/2 past 6 the Warren and Queen of France hois'd English Colours and fired a gun to Leeward, as did we, which she answered and bro't too at 7. We brought too, found her to be the Hibernia, a Schooner of 10 guns, a british Privatier; sent 2 of Our People on Board to help man her and now She remains in Concord with us." The next morning, ,at 1/2 past 5 saw a Fleet of 9 sails to the N. E., at 6 made sail and gave Chase, at 8 Tack'd Ship [by] Signal and made all the Sail we could, alow and aloft; found we gained on the Fleet, our Consort the Warren out sailing us all." In the afternoon: "Pleasant gales and fair weather. The Warren, Queen of France & Our Selves in Chase of the Fleet; at 4 P.M. came up with" them. Hopkins reported to the Marine Committee April 18 that on the 6th "we fell in with the armed schooner Hibernia from New York, with 45 men, which we took; and on the 7th at 4 o'clock A.M. in latitude 36.40 discovered two fleets, one to leeward consisting of ten sail, the other to windward, of nine sail. We gave chace to the windward-most, and at about two o'clock took seven sail, consisting of the following vessels, viz.: Ship Jason, Capt. Porterfield, mounting 20 nine and six pounders, 150 men, convoy to the fleet bound from N. York to Georgia, having passengers on board as per the enclosed list; Ship Meriah, a letter of marque mounting 16 six pounders, 84 men, very richly laden with provisions, dry goods and accoutrements for a regiment of horse; Brig Patriot, brig Prince Ferdinand, brig John, brig Batchelor, schooner Chance, laden with provisions and goods for the army, to a very large amount. As soon as they were manned

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we thought best to stand to the eastward, having had intelligence of a large number of armed vessels being off Chesapeak and Delaware Bays." Among the passengers on board the Jason were a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, two captains and two lieutenants. The Ranger's log for the 9th says: "Jogging under easy sail, to keep our little Fleet together." April 10: "The Patriot being a heavy Sailer, the Warren at 7 took her in tow." Hopkins's report continues: "On the 16th instant I arrived in this port [Boston], having parted with the fleet on the 11th in a thick fog. The next day the Jason arrived, which is a very fine ship; also the schooner at Portsmouth, which is a very valuable vessel. Several vessels are now in sight, which I hope is some of the fleet. By the activity of Captains Olney and Simpson we manned the fleet in four hours." (Penn. Gazette, April 28,1779.) The Queen of France arrived in Boston several days after the Warren and Jason, bringing in with her the Maria, Hibernia, and three brigs. The other two prizes were taken into Portsmouth April 21 by the Ranger. The Jason and Hibernia were afterwards fitted out as privateers and made successful cruisers. The Ranger returned to Boston harbor in June and anchored again in Nantasket Roads (Boston Gazette, April 19, 26, 1779; Boston Post, May 22, July 31, 1779; Log of the Ranger.)

The Marine Committee were greatly pleased with the results of this cruise, sent a congratulatory letter to Hopkins, and proposed to purchase the Jason and Hibernia and take them into the naval service; but a more thorough knowledge of all the circumstances caused a change of sentiment. May 20, the committee wrote to the Navy Board at Boston: "Since ours of the 4th instant we are favoured with yours of the 28th Ultimo, whereby we find there is reason to conclude that Captain Hopkins has violated his Orders by returning into Port when he should have continued to Cruize and by not sending the Prizes he took into the nearest Port; and we find also that Captain Olney has acted contradictory to your Orders by comeing up to Boston when you had expressly required him to remain with his Ship in [Nantasket] road. We now direct that you immediately order a Court of Inquiry to inquire into the Conduct of those Two commanders during their late Cruize, and afterward if necessary a Court Martial. lf you find the prosecution of that business will produce any delay in getting the Ships again to Sea, it is our desire that you suspend the said Commanders and put in others, and in that case we recommend Captain Saltonstal and Captain Rathbourne to be appointed in their room. We deem it highly necessary for the good of the service that the orders of your Board should be obeyed by all Officers of the Navy under your direction, and we desire that you will cause Courts of enquiry to be held, when it is your Opinion the good of the service requires it, on the conduct of such Officers as may disobey your Orders or in any other manner may misbehave. We highly disaprove of Captain Hopkins sending an Officer to this place with a Letter contrary to the Orders of your Board, which disobedience of Orders in this as well as in other instances were unknown to us when we wrote him a Letter of approbation; and we consider it very injurious to the service for the Officers to get themselves appointed Agents for their men as well as dishonorable to such Officers." As a result of this exercise of discipline Captains Hopkins and Olney

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were suspended from the navy and they seem never again to have held any command in the Continental service. Captains Saltonstall and Rathburne were appointed to command the frigates Warren and Queen of France. The sequel will suggest a doubt as to whether the change in the case of the Warren was to the advantage of the country (Mar. Com. letter Book, 213 (to Hopkins, May 4, 1779), 210, 213, 215, 216, 222 (to Navy Board, Boston, April 27, 30, May 20, 26, June 21, 1779); Adams MSS., May 25, 1779, Vernon to Adams.)

After a successful cruise in the West Indies the Continental cutter Revenge, Captain Conyngham, sailed north and arrived at Philadelphia February 21, 1779. Here the Revenge was sold, but the purchaser fitted her out as a privateer and Conyngham was put in command again, under his Continental commission of May 2,1777. In April the Revenge was captured by the British frigate Galatea and taken into New York. Conyngham was sent to England in irons and treated with great severity. He was accused of piracy on the ground that his cruise in the Surprise in the spring of 1777 preceded the date of his commission. His first commission, dated March 1, 1777, had been taken from him at Dunkirk and sent to Versailles. Search was made for this earlier commission, but without success (This commission has come to light within a few years and is in the possession of James Barnes, Esq., of New York.) Franklin's assurance, however, that it had existed apparently resulted in some amelioration of Conyngham's treatment. He was removed to Plymouth and in November, 1779, after several unsuccessful attempts, he escaped from Mill Prison with about fifty others. He proceeded first to London and thence found his way to Holland (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899; Outlook, January 3, 1903; Hale, i, 342-350; Almon, viii, 340; Maryland Journal, March 2, 1779; Penn. Gazette, August 4, 1779; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 201, 217 (March 10, June 2, 1779); Archives de la Marine B8 16 (Avril, Novembre, 1779)

About the first of the year the sloop Providence, Captain Rathburne, took five prizes, all of which seem to have arrived safely in port. One of these was a ship from Glasgow which had been taken by an American privateer, retaken by the British, and then captured again by the Providence. Early in April the Providence was ordered to make a short cruise in Massachusetts Bay and along the coast of Maine in company with the frigate Boston. Later she was sent south of Cape Cod. May 7, at nine o'clock in the morning, while cruising off Sandy Hook, the Providence, now commanded by Captain Hacker, was seen from the British brig Diligent, whose captain, testifying at his court martial, says that about noon, "as soon as I had taken measures for fighting him on the Larboard side, the side his Boom was of, he Gibed & luffed across." The Diligent luffed and received two broadsides and two volleys of musketry before returning the fire of the Providence. "Not an officer except myself unhurt, being deserted by the remains of my Crew except seven, five of them wounded . . . Masts, Rigging & Hull cut all to pieces," was forced to surrender to the Providence. The Diligent carried twelve three- pounders and fifty-four men; the Providence, according to this English captain, six six-pounders, six fours, two twos, and eighty-three men. The

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Americans lost four killed and ten wounded; the British, eleven killed and nineteen wounded. The Diligent was taken into the Continental naval service (Boston Post, January 16, 1779; Independent Chronicle, January 21, 1779 ; Penn. Packet, May 25, 1779; Maryland Journal, June 1, 1779; Adams MSS. April 10, May 25,1779; Tucker MSS., April 6, 1779; Brit, Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5311 (August 21, 1779)

In the spring the frigate Boston, Captain Tacker, in response to the instructions of March 26, came south to Chesapeake Bay and on April 27 was ordered to Delaware Bay. The Confederacy, after long delay, sailed from New London April 29, and a month later was in Delaware Bay. Meanwhile the Deane had arrived at Philadelphia from the West Indies April 17. The plans of the Marine Committee, which required frequent modification to suit the exigencies of changing circumstances, were defined for the moment in their letter of May 20 to the Navy Board at Boston. "We have lately had sufficient reason to lay asside the expedition intended against the enemys force on the Coast of Georgia, and the service the frigate Providence was intended for, is supplied by another Ship; therefore it is now our intention to place our collected Naval force in such a manner as to accomplish the double purpose of intercepting the enemies outward bound Transports for New York from Great Britain and Ireland & the homeward bound West India Ships. But if the Providence & Ranger should be ready for Sea more than a fortnight before the other Ships, that then you order those Ships to proceed to Cruize for the above purpose, marking out to them their Cruizing ground in such a manner as there may be the greatest possible certainty of being joined by the other Ships as soon as they shall be ready." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 206,215 (to Navy Board, Boston, March 26, May 20, 1779), 209 (April 21, 1779), 211 (to Tucker, April 27, 1779); Boston Post, May 8, 1779.)

The Deane, Boston, and Confederacy being all in Delaware Bay by the end of May, a cruise along the Atlantic coast was planned for them by the Marine Committee. Instructions for the Boston and Confederacy were dated June 2. To Tucker the committee wrote: "The Ship Boston which you command and the Frigate Confederacy, Captain Harding, being now ready for Sea, they are directed to Sail in company with each other on a Cruize upon this Coast from the Latitude of Forty to thirty-five degrees and to take, burn, sink or destroy as many of the enemys Ships or Vessels of every Kind as may be in their power. The Prizes you will Order into the nearest and safest Ports, addressed to the Continental Agents in those Ports. And as this Committee have received authentic intelligence that a number of the enemys Privateers are Cruizing near the Latitude of 36, in expectation of falling in with a fleet of Merchant Vessels bound from the West Indies . . . it is their first Object to frustrate the designs of the enemy by Capturing or destroying their Vessels and to afford every aid and assistance in their power to the inward bound Merchantmen." They were also to give their attention to two British frigates said to have been sent out from New York "to cruize upon this Coast . . . and we need not remind you how greatly it would redound to your reputation and the honor of the American flag to capture

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or destroy these ships. You are to continue cruizing for the space of three weeks from your Departure from the Capes of Delaware," and then return to Delaware Bay for further orders. "As the Object of this Cruise is to take or destroy the enemys Privateers or small ships of war and give every aid and assistance to the Merchant men, the Committee direct you to confine yourself strictly to the Latitudes above mentioned and to such Longitudes as are best calculated to answer that purpose. But if from circumstances it should happen that the Public Service necessarily requires you to exceed those Limits, then you are at liberty to do it. The Ship General Greene, Captain Montgomery, belonging to the State of Pennsylvania, now in this Bay, will have Orders from His Excellency President Reed to act in conjunction with you during this Cruize. Captain Harding will be furnished with a Copy of these Instructions and will be directed to Obey your Orders as Senior Officer. It is expected that before you put to Sea you will fix with him a proper System of Signals for the Ships under your command. The Confidence we repose in your Courage and good Conduct gives us every reason to hope for a Successful Cruize." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 218 (to Tucker), 219 (to Harding, June 2, 1779) Ten days later, the frigate Deane being ready for sea, essentially the same orders were sent to Captain Nicholson. In case he should fall in with the Boston and Confederacy, he was to cruise in company with them, returning to the Delaware capes by July 1. "When joined to those Ships, you, being the Senior Officer, will have under your direction three fine frigates, which we doubt not will be judiciously managed and we recommend to you to cultivate strict harmony with the Commanders of those Ships as being essentially necessary for the Public good." (lbid., 221 (to Nicholson, June 12,1779) Few details of this short cruise have been preserved. A number of captures seem to have been made, the most important of which was the British privateer ship Pole of twenty-four guns, taken by the Boston (Tucker, ch. vi; Penn. Gazette, June 16, 1779; Boston Gazette, July 5, 1779; Tucker MSS., June 28,1779, Nicholson to Tucker.)

On the 18th of June the frigates Providence, Commodore Whipple, and Queen of France, Captain Rathburne, and the Ranger, Captain Simpson, sailed from Boston on a cruise to the eastward. The log of the Ranger records the capture of a vessel July 20 and another the next day; they were both from Jamaica. A midshipman on the Queen of France gives an account of falling in with a Jamaica fleet of a hundred and fifty sail one morning about the middle of July near the Banks of Newfoundland in a dense fog. Nothing could be seen, but the sound of signal guns and ships' bells indicated the presence of a fleet. When the fog lifted, about eleven o'clock, the Queen of France found herself close by a large merchant ship from whom it was learned that the fleet was under convoy of a seventy-four and several frigates and sloops of war. Under the pretense of being a British frigate the Queen of France sent a boat to the English ship and quietly took possession of her, and then took another ship in the same manner. Commodore Whipple at first feared discovery and capture by the convoy, but was induced to remain in the fleet all day with his squadron. No alarm was excited among the Englishmen, and eleven ships were taken in this way by the

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Americans. They succeeded in getting away at nightfall without arousing any suspicion. Andrew Sherburne, a seaman on the Ranger, gives a somewhat different account of this affair. He says: "Our little squadron was in the rear of the fleet and we had reason to fear that some of their heaviest armed ships were there also ... No time was to be lost. Our commodore soon brought to one of their ships, manned and sent her off. Being to windward, he edged away and spoke to our Captain. We were at this time in pursuit of a large ship. The Commodore hauled his wind again and in the course of an hour we came up with the ship, which proved to be the Holderness, a three decker mounting 22 guns. She struck, after giving her several broadsides. Although she had more guns and those of heavier metal than ourselves, her crew was not sufficiently large to manage her guns and at the same time work the ship. She was loaded with cotton, coffee, sugar, rum and alspice. While we were employed in manning her, our Commodore captured another and gave her up to us to man also. When this was accomplished it was nearly night; we were, however, unwilling to abandon the opportunity of enriching ourselves, therefore kept along under easy sail. Some time in the night we found ourselves surrounded with ships and supposed we were discovered. We could distinctly hear their bells, on which they frequently struck a few strokes, that their ships might not approach too near each other during the night. We were close on board one Of their largest armed ships and from the multitude of lights which had appeared, supposed that they had called to quarters. It being necessary to avoid their convoy, we fell to leeward and in an hour lost sight of them all. The next day the sky was overcast and at times we had a thick fog. In the afternoon the sun shone for a short time and enabled us to see a numerous fleet a few miles to windward, in such compact order that we thought it not best to approach them. We were however in hopes that we might pick up some single ship. We knew nothing of our consorts, but were entirely alone. Towards night we took and manned out a brig. On the third morning we gained sight of three ships, to which we gave chase and called all hands to quarters. When they discovered us in chase, they huddled together, intending as we supposed to fight us. They however soon made sail and ran from us; after a short lapse of time we overhauled and took one of them, which we soon found to be a dull sailer. Another, while we were manning our prize, attempted to escape, but we soon found that we gained upon her. While in chase a circumstance occurred which excited some alarm. Two large ships hove in sight to windward running directly for us under a press of sail. One of them shaped her course for the prize we had just manned. We were unwilling to give up our chase, as we had ascertained from our prize that the two other ships were ... unarmed. We soon came up with the hindmost, brought her to and ordered her to keep under our stern, while we might pursue the other, as our situation was too critical to allow us to heave to and get out our boat. The stranger in chase of us was under English colors; we however soon ascertained by her signal that she was the Providence frigate, on board of which was our commodore. This joyful intelligence relieved us from all fear of the enemy and we soon came up with our chase . . . We now ascertained that the strange ship, which was in chase of our first prize, was another of our consorts, the Queen of France." Three of the

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eleven prizes taken from the Jamaica fleet were afterwards recaptured, but the other eight, worth with their cargoes over a million dollars, were brought safely into port when the squadron returned to Boston about a month later. Whipple received the congratulations of the Marine Committee (Clark, i, 94; Memoirs of Andrew Sherburne, 21-23; Boston Gazette, September 27, 1779; Log of the Ranger; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 229, 233, 234 (August 24, September 7, 1779), 238 (to Whipple, September 19,1779)

The Massachusetts brigs Tyrannicide, Captain Hallet, and Hazard, Captain Williams, did most of the cruising on behalf of their state in 1779, and with some success. The Hazard was in the West Indies early in the year, and on March 12 sailed from Martinique in company with the Continental ship General Gates, Captain Waters. On the 16th, off St. Thomas, the Hazard captured the privateer brigantine Active, from Antigua, after a "smart action for 35 minutes, yard arm and yard arm." (Independent Chronicle, April 8, 1779.) The Active carried eighteen four-pounders and ninety-five men; she lost thirteen killed and twenty wounded. The American loss was three killed and eight wounded. The prize arrived safely in port. The Hazard also fought with a British ship of fourteen guns and eighty men, but did not succeed in capturing her. After having taken several prizes in all, Captain Williams returned to Boston in April. The General Gates returned about the same time and soon afterwards was sold out of the Continental service (Mass. Archives, cli, 271, cliii, 133, 150, 167, 208; Boston Gazette, February 22, April 12, 1779; Clark, i, 90; Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 259; Massachusetts Mag., July, 1908; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 208, 219 (April 19, June 7, 1779)

Meanwhile the Tyrannicide had sailed from Nantasket Roads, March 9, for Martha's Vineyard, but encountered a gale off Cape Cod and ran off to the southward. March 29, in latitude 28° 30' north, longitude 68° 25' west, the British privateer brig Revenge of Grenada, carrying fourteen carriage guns, six- and four-pounders, four swivels and two coehorns, and sixty men, was seen "at 4 o'clock P.M. about 4 leagues to windward coming down upon us. Upon which," says Captain Hallet, "I cleared ship and got all hands to their quarters ready for action, then stood close upon the wind, waiting for her till about half past six P.M., when she came up and hailing me, asked where I was from. I told them from Boston. I asked them where they were from and was answered, they were a British cruiser from Jamaica. I immediately reply'd that I was an American cruiser, upon which they ordered me to strike, but finding me not disposed to gratify their desires, they run up under my lee and saluted me with a broadside. Without loss of time I returned the compliment and dropping astern got under their lee, where our fires were so warm from below and from our tops and the shots so well directed, we dismounted two of their guns, drove the men from their quarters, and compelled them to strike to the American flag. The engagement lasted one hour and a quarter, during which we were not half pistol shot distant and some part of the time our yards were locked in with theirs." (Boston Gazette, April 19, 1779.) "I had Eight men wounded, only two of which are Bad; amongst the

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wounded are my first Lieut. & Master. I intended to man her and keep her as a Consort during the Cruise, but having twenty wounded Men on board, of my own men & prisoners, I thought it Best to send her home, with all the wounded men on board under the Care of the Sergeon's Mate." (Massachusetts Mag., April, 1908.) The Revenge lost eight killed and fourteen wounded. She arrived safely in Boston and the Tyrannicide followed April 25, having captured two other vessels, one of them a fourteen-gun ship (Mass. Rev. Rolls, xliv, 408; Boston Gazette, April 19, 26,1779; Roston Post, May 1, 1779; Clark, i, 91.)

Captain Williams, on his return to Boston in the Hazard, was met with certain charges brought against him by the Board of War, the nature of which is not stated. He was exonerated, however, by a joint committee of the General Court, and a few days later that body passed a resolve renouncing all claim on the part of the state to the privateers Active and Revenge "in testimony of their approbation of the spirit and good conduct of the said" Williams and Hallet and their officers and men. The Active was purchased by order of the General Court and taken into the Massachusetts navy. She was put under the command of Captain Hallet and in June was ordered on a cruise (Mass. Court Rec., April 20, 23, June 11, 1779; Boston Gazette, April 26, 1779; Massachusetts Mag., October, 1909.)

In May the Hazard and the Tyrannicide, now commanded by Captain John Cathcart, were ordered to cruise in company alongshore, "first in the Vineyard Sound, then round the Island of Nantucket . . . to clear the Coast of the Picaroons that infest them." (Mass. Archives, cli, 467, 468.) A party of British and tories had recently raided along the south shore of Cape Cod, and Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket; in September a proclamation was issued by British officers threatening the people of Nantucket with hostilities if they did not observe strict neutrality. In the Sound the Massachusetts vessels fell in with the Continental sloop Providence and brig Diligent and early in June, in Buzzard's Bay, were joined by the Continental sloop Argo, Captain Talbot. June 15, Cathcart wrote to the Board of War that at half past eight that morning the Tyrannicide and Hazard chased a ship and brig, which "hove too for us & hauld up their Courses, upon which I spoke Capt. Williams & we agreed to Engage them, he to take the Ship & I the Brig, upon which I pass'd the Ship & gave her two Broadsides & then ran along side the Brig & after exchanging 6 or 7 Broadsides she struck, the Ship in the mean time having struck to Captain Williams." (Mass. Archives, cliii, 229.) The brig was a letter of marque mounting twelve six-pounders; she got safely into New Bedford. The ship was a recapture, having been taken by two British privateers. Meanwhile, in order to insure continuous protection, the General Court had, on June 11, directed the Board of War to arrange a series of cruises in rotation by the different vessels of the state navy along the eastern and southern shores of the state (Mass. Court Rec., April 15, June 11, 1779; Mass. Archives, cliii, 219, 224, 229, 230; Boston Post, April 10, 1779; Independent Chronicle, April 15, 1779; Boston Gazette, October 11, 1779; Almon, viii, 268-271; Clark, i, 92.)

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The Connecticut navy lost its two most important vessels in 1779. In March the Defence was wrecked on the shore of her native state. The Oliver Cromwell, Captain Parker, sailed from New London June 3. On the morning of the 6th, Parker saw a sail and gave chase. Half an hour later he saw four other sail, three of them large ships. He then hauled close and one of the ships chased the Cromwell, the others soon joining in on signal from the first. They showed English colors and gained fast. "We found," says Parker's report, "that Fighting would be Inevitable. Therefore ordered the Ship to be Cleared and all hands to Quarters in good Season. Att about half after Ten A.M. we Began to play upon the Enemy with our Stern Chases and as She Closed up with us verry fast, in order the better to make use of our lee guns, we Shortened Sail by halling Down the Stay Sails and keeping before the wind. A pretty warm Action Ensued for about the Space of one hour, in which we had two men killed and one Mortally wounded, Two Slightly wounded. The Consequence of our keeping before the wind while Engaging (a Circumstance that could not be avoided) Brought the Enemies other Ships Close up with us verry fast; and as we found we had Considerably Disabled our Antagonist By Shooting away his main Topmast, we again halled our wind to the Northward, Thinking thereby to out sail him so much, before he could Repair his Damages, as to bring on night and if we could not avoid him, we hoped at least to have Seperated him from his other Consorts." The Cromwell drew away from her antagonist, but by half-past two in the afternoon the English ship had repaired damages and renewed the chase. She gained fast and soon came up under the Cromwell's lee quarter. Meanwhile the other ships had also gained. "We were under the Necessity of Shortening our Sail and keeping before the wind again, in order to Enable us to fight our lee guns. The Action began again about 3 P.M. and Continued till a little after 4 Do. In this last action we had two men wounded; one had his Right arm and Collar bone broke by a Splinter, the other a flesh wound in the thigh by a nine pound shot. The Damages Done to the Ships Hull were Inconsiderable. She had her main and fore Stays Shott away, with one or two of her main & Mizen Shrouds, her main and fore Braces, and a nine pound shot through the head of her Mizen mast. By which time the Delewar Frigate and Union Privateer were closing up with us so fast, we found no Possibility of avoiding a Contest with Treble our force. Both officers and men appeared to be Brave and undaunted. I had a short Consultation with my Principal Officers. We hoped we had Done our Duty, we hoped we had Done Enough to Convince our Enemies as well as Others that we Dare oppose them and, as we then thought, with Spirit too, though on Disadvantageous Terms." (Trumbull MSS., ix, 237.) The Oliver Cromwell then lowered her colors. She was taken into the British service and her name was changed to Restoration (Trumbull MSS., ix, 93, 95, 237; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 39, 41, 42; Boston Gazette, September 20, 1779.)

Lieutenant-Colonel Silas Talbot, after his capture of the Pigot in 1778, was employed in protecting the Rhode Island coast from the ravages of the enemy's privateers, which did great damage along shore. The Pigot was taken into the Continental service and seems to have sailed in company with Talbot, who

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commanded a sloop called the Argo, mounting twelve six-pounders. He captured six privateers, some of them of superior force to the Argo, and a number of merchantmen. One of his prizes was taken from him by three brigantines from Philadelphia. A letter from Providence, dated August 10, says: "This moment an express arrived from New London with an account of the gallant, intrepid Talbot's taking [the] infamous villain Stanton Hazard, in a Brig of 14 guns out of Newport, after a short action. Talbot was in a small sloop [the Argo] of 12 guns, and had an inferior number of men on board to the Tory privateer, which was fitted out on purpose to attack & take Talbot's sloop." (Boston Gazette, August, 16, 1779.) Hazard was a loyalist, a native of Rhode Island, who had made himself obnoxious to the people of that vicinity. September 17, Congress made Talbot a captain in the Continental navy (lbid., September 6, 20, 1779; Boston Post, October 2, 1779; Talbot, ch. iv; Pap. Cont. Congr., 37,193,197, 201, 209 (November 4, 11, 1779, February 28,1780) ; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 256 (January 25, 1779)

Oliver Pollock, the commercial agent of Congress at New Orleans, had supervision of naval affairs on the Mississippi River and was authorized to commission both vessels and officers for the Continental service and for privateers. In commissioning and fitting out vessels and in otherwise executing the orders of Congress, Pollock was encouraged and assisted by the Spanish governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Galvez, who was very friendly to American interests. In 1778, Pollock purchased the ship Rebecca, one of several prizes taken on the Mississippi by a party of Americans under Captain James Willing, who had come down the river from Ohio. A year later this vessel, renamed the Morris, had been armed with twenty-four guns, fully manned, under the command of Captain William Pickles, and ready for sea, when she was unfortunately destroyed by a hurricane, August 18, 1779, and eleven of her crew were lost. Governor Galvez then provided an armed schooner for the use of the Americans; this vessel seems also to have been called the Morris, or Morris's tender. Pickles cruised in this schooner and "Captur'd in Septr. a Vessell of very superior force in Lake Ponchetrain, after a very severe conflict." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 50, 9 (September 18, 1782) ; Sparks MSS., xli, 42.) The prize was a British sloop called the West Florida. She was fitted out by Pollock and under the command of Pickles cruised on Lake Pontchartrain during the fall and captured a British settlement. The surrender of the British posts on the Mississippi to Galvez soon followed. Later the West Florida assisted the governor in the capture of Mobile and then proceeded to Philadelphia, where she was sold out of the service (Pap. Cont. Congr., 19, 5, 193 (July 10, 1780), 37, 251, 535, 537, 541 (January 20, June 7, November 20, December 5, 1780), 50, 1-13, 66, 77-81, 97, 120-125; Jour. Cont. Congr., July 10, December 8,1780; Sparks MSS., xli, 7, 10, 16, 22, 23, 36, 41, 42; Penn. Gazette, June 7, 1780; Almon, ix, 359-365; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 122; Paullin, 307-311.)

Through Commodore Collier, commanding a squadron in Chesapeake Bay in the spring of 1779, came the intelligence that "Capt. Henry, R. N., Senior Officer in

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Georgia, reports in letter dated April 16, 1779, from Savannah, Ga., that 2 Rebel Galleys, Called Congress and Lee, former of 1 18 Pounder and one 12 in her Prow, two 9 pdr and 2 Sixes in her Waste & manned with 100 Men; the other with 130 French & carrying one 12 and one 9 Pdr. in her Prow, 2 fours and 2 one Pounders besides swivels in her Waste, attacked H. M. S. Greenwich & Galleys Comet, Thunder & Hornet off Yamasee Bluff, & that action ended with Capture of Rebel galleys." This was a death-blow to the Georgia navy, and its revival was made impossible by British control of the waters of that state until the end of the war (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Letters, No. 1612, 2 (May 22,1779); Almon, viii, 298; Paullin, 461.)

Admiral Gambier sailed for England April 5, and the day before his departure, Collier "received a commission as Commodore and Commander-in-Chief of the King's fleet in America." Of the condition of this fleet he complained, saying that "the weak enfeebled state of the ships, both in point of numbers and of men, give me the most painful sensations. I ardently wish to prove myself deserving of the great trust I am honoured with, by the most spirited exertions." These exertions were first directed towards Virginia, "the province which of all others gives sinews to the rebellion from its extensive traffick. (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 125, 126 (Collier to Germain.) The British fleet, which sailed May 5 from New York for Chesapeake Bay under Collier's command, consisted of the sixty-four gun ship Raisonable, the Rainbow of forty-four guns, "the Otter, Diligent and Haerlem, sloops, and Cornwallis galley, together with several private ships of war and twenty-two transports having on board" about two thousand troops under General Mathew. The Diligent must have been captured before the squadron arrived in Chesapeake Bay. "At sunrise" on the 10th, says Collier, ,we saw some rebel ships and vessels in Hampton Road with their sails loose, who, as soon as the tide admitted of it, got under weigh and ran up Elizabeth and James rivers; our fleet also weighed and the Raisonable anchored shortly after in Hampton Road, her great draught of water not admitting of her going further with conveniency. I immediately shifted my broad pendant to the Rainbow and proceeded with the fleet up Elizabeth river, till a contrary wind and the ebb tide obliged us to anchor. The next morning being calm prevented the ships from moving with the flood, on account of the narrowness and intricacy of the channel." The troops advanced, however, nearly to Portsmouth, supported by a galley and two gunboats; and a breeze springing up, the ships soon followed. The American fort on the river was evacuated. Much property was destroyed and many vessels were seized by the British, others being saved from the same fate by destruction at the hands of the Americans. The Otter and a number of other small vessels were sent up the Chesapeake. "The movements of this little squadron were so judicious that the enemy were much harrassed and distressed; they destroyed many vessels and captured others." (Almon, viii, 290, 291, 293 (Collier to Clinton, May 16, and to Stephens, May 17, 1779) In a later report Collier says: "The fort was raz'd, the season'd timber for ship building burnt, the buildings and storehouses of the finest yard on this continent underwent the same fate; the sufferings of individuals I endeavoured to prevent all in my power

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and in general happily succeeded, and by it I hope have procured many friends to the royal cause." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 129.) Collier wished to remain longer and to keep possession of this valuable naval station, but General Mathew insisted that their orders required their return to New York. The two large men-of-war and the transports thereupon sailed out of the bay, leaving the others to continue their depredations. A hundred and thirty American vessels were destroyed or taken as well as a vast amount of property on shore (Almon, viii, 289-295; Penn. Gazette, June 9, 1779; Town's Detail of Particular Services in America, 76-87.) Richard Henry Lee, writing June 26 to William Whipple of the Marine Committee, says of the operations of these smaller vessels, left in the bay: "They have already burnt several private houses and one public warehouse with between 2 & 300 hhds of Tobo. and carried off much plunder & many negroes. Soon as they see the Militia gathering they embark and go to another unguarded place. They have 6 Vessels: Otter, 16, Harlem, 12 Guns, King's Vessels; Dunmore, 16, Schooner Hammond, 14, Lord North, 12 Guns, & Fin Castle, 2 three pounders. The 4 last are [Goodrich's] Pirates. They say the orders are to burn and destroy all before them; an Eastern Man whom they had captured . . . escaped from them when they were burning the Warehouse and gave us the above account of their force, which is confirmed by others. They land between 60 & 70 men when they mean to do mischief." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899.) Lee requests the Marine Committee to send two frigates into the bay, a force sufficient, he says, to destroy the enemy's fleet. The Marine Committee had already issued orders for the purpose. As early as the previous November and again in January they had expressed a desire to capture or destroy "the infamous Goodrich," and June 25, Captain Nicholson of the Deane was "directed to proceed in company with the Frigate Boston from the Capes of Delaware into Chesapeake Bay and on your arrival there, at Hampton or any Other way, endeavour to Obtain the best intelligence if any of the enemies Ships of war or Privateers are in the Bay, and if you find there are and of such force as you are able to encounter, you are to proceed up and attack them . . . taking or destroying as many of the said Vessels as may be in your power." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 223.) The Confederacy was ordered up to Chester to prepare for other service, but on July 2 was directed to cruise ten days longer with the Deane and Boston. Accounts of this service in Chesapeake Bay are lacking, but that it was performed may be inferred from Lee's letter of August 8 to Whipple, saying: "We are much obliged to the Marine Committee for their attention. I see the frigates have taken and sent in two prizes, vessels of war." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 187, 193 (to Navy Board, Boston, November 16, 1778, January 9, 1779), 223, 224, 225 (to Nicholson and to Harding, June 25, July 2, 1779); Penn. Gazette, August 4, 1779.)

Upon the return to New York, May 29, of the British fleet from Chesapeake Bay, says Collier, "I found Sir Henry Clinton on the point of setting off on an expedition up the North River and I immediately determin'd on assisting in it, carrying with me the Raisonable, Camilla, Vulture, three row galleys and two gunboats with the transports and troops." This excursion up the Hudson resulted in the capture of

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Stony Point and other successes, which induced Collier to observe: "I hope I may now say with some confidence that rebellion is thrown on its back and that this campaign will be the last of this unnatural civil war." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 129 (Collier to Germain, June 15, 1779) Stony Point, however, was very soon recaptured by the Americans. About this time also the British sloop Haerlem was captured by an American privateer. The attention of the British was next directed towards Connecticut, where their trade in Long Island Sound was harassed by small privateers and armed boats. "The land forces," says Collier's report of his expedition against them, "consisting of 2600 men commanded by Major-general Tryon, I caused to be embarked in transports, and sending the Renown, Thames, Otter and two armed vessels to block up New-London and the East entrance of the Sound, I proceeded on the 3d [of July] from New York by the way of Hell Gates with his Majesty's ships Camilla, Scorpion, Halifax brig and Hussar galley, together with the transports, and on the 5th landed the army in two divisions at the town of Newhaven, which after an irregular resistance from the rebels, was taken possession of by us together with a small fort at the entrance of the harbour, which latter we destroyed, after spiking up the guns, as also many warehouses filled with stores &c. together with several vessels and whale boats. The number of killed, wounded and missing on our side amounted to fifty-six; that of the rebels we are unacquainted with, but suppose the numbers considerable. We embarked the troops without loss and two days afterwards our flat boats, covered by the galley and gun boats, landed near Fairfield, though opposed by the militia and some continental troops; the rebels firing from the windows and tops of houses occasioned the band of loyal refugees to set several of them on fire, which communicating to others, burnt the whole town and also several whale boats. The troops embarked from thence without molestation and the third day following they were landed again in three divisions at the town of Norwalk, which, for the treacherous conduct of the rebels in murdering the troops from windows of houses after safeguards were granted them, was destroyed, together with five large vessels, two privateer brigs on the stocks and twenty whale boats." The small town of Greenfield was treated in the same manner (Almon, viii, 295, 296, 299, 355, 356; Town, 90-98; Clark, i, 110.)

The instructions of the Marine Committee, of June 25, required Nicholson, after disposing of the enemy in Chesapeake Bay, to sail at once with the Deane and Boston "on a Cruize in which you are to Choose such Station as you think will be best to Accomplish the double purpose of intercepting the enemies outward bound Transports for New York from Great Britain and Ireland and the homeward bound West India Ships. We are of Opinion that between the Latitudes of 36 and 41, and 100 Leagues to the Eastward of the Island of Bermuda will be your best Cruizing ground, but in this we do not mean to restrict you, leaving you to exercise your own Judgment, which probably may be assisted by information Obtained in your Cruise." This was to continue until the middle of September, or longer if their provisions lasted, and then they were to return to Boston. "We have ordered the Continental frigates at the Eastward to Cruise for the same purposes you are now going on and we think it very probable that you will fall in with them.

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In that case you or they or any of them are hereby directed to Cruise in Company under the command of the Senior officer, and should you be joined by any of those frigates and find by any intelligence you may Receive of the situation of the enemys Sea force at Bermuda that it will be adviseable to make an attempt on their Shipping, we recommend your undertaking it . . . We now wish to draw your attention to the execution of the business before you. The great Expence and dificulty that attends the fitting and manning of our Ships must make you and every Commander in Our service fully sensible how much they Should exert themselves to employ them usefully while at Sea. This consideration we hope will have due weight in your mind and will call forth such active and prudent behavior as will be of Essential Service to your Country and add to your own reputation and the honor of our Flag." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 223.)

The Deane and Boston sailed out of Chesapeake Bay, July 29, in company with two ships of the Virginia navy and a convoy of merchantmen, from whom they soon parted. A successful cruise of about five weeks was made by the two frigates, during which they captured eight prizes, including four New York privateers; but the most important were the ships Sandwich and Thorn, each of sixteen guns. The former was a packet carrying as passengers a number of army officers; the Thorn was a sloop of war. The frigates arrived at Boston, September 6, with two hundred and fifty prisoners, including a lieutenant-colonel, a major, and three naval captains. Nicholson received the congratulations of the Marine Committee (Boston Post, September 11, 1779; Boston Gazette, September 13, 1779; Penn. Gazette, September 22, 1779; Tucker, 119-121 ; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 237, 238 (to Navy Board, Boston, and to Nicholson, September, 18, 19, 1779)

On September 21 and 22, the Marine Committee instructed the Navy Board at Boston to fit out the Deane, Boston, and Queen of France as quickly as possible for important service at Charleston, South Carolina. Shortly afterwards Admiral Arbuthnot at New York received information from Boston which led him to believe that these vessels were fitting out for an attack on the British post in Penobscot Bay (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 147 (Arbuthnot to Germain, October 10,1779) November 10, orders were sent for the frigates to sail at once. The Deane, perhaps because she could not be made ready in time, was subsequently detached from this duty, and the squadron, as finally made up under the orders of the Eastern Navy Board, November 20, consisted of the frigates Providence, Boston and Queen of France, and the Ranger, with Commodore Whipple in command. They set sail from Nantasket Roads, November 23, and cruised to the eastward of Bermuda. An officer on board the Providence wrote home that three days out from Boston they "met with a severe gale of wind, which lasted about 30 hours, in which time we sprang our mizen-mast; the Ranger shared the same fate and the Boston sprang the head of her mainmast. On the 5th [of December] we took a privateer brig of 12 guns called the Dolphin." (Independent Chronicle, February 24, 1780.) The destination of the squadron was not made known until they had passed Bermuda. They finally arrived at Charleston December 23 (Mar.

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Com. Letter Book, 239, 245 (to Navy Board, Boston, September 21, 22, November 10, 1779); Tucker MSS., November 20, 1779; Log of Ranger; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April 1891, journal of Lieutenant Jennison; Tucker, ch. vii.)

On August 24 the frigate Confederacy was ordered on a short Cruise off the Delaware capes, keeping a lookout for the privateer Eagle of Philadelphia, expected from St. Eustatius. September 3 the Confederacy was again ordered up to Chester, and on the 17th received instructions for a voyage to France, taking as passenger the French minister, Gerard. The Eagle was a ten-gun brigantine sailing under a Continental commission in the West Indies. Whether or not she returned to Philadelphia at this time is perhaps uncertain, but she was in the West Indies in November and on attempting to get into St. Eustatius was headed off and chased by six British privateers. She took refuge under a fort on the Dutch island of Saba, but was cut out and captured by the privateers, taken to Nevis and condemned by a British admiralty court, in violation of the neutrality of Saba (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 230, 231, 235 (to Harding, August 24, September 3, 17, 1779) ; Pap. Cont. Congr., 44, 325-397 (June 12, November 13, 16, 25, 30, December 14, 1779, January 18, 20, March 21, 23, 1780); Massachusetts Spy, February 10, 1780.)

In the orders of September 17, sending the Confederacy to France, Captain Harding was instructed to make the best of his "way to any Port which the Minister may think proper to direct and on your passage you are carefully to avoid coming to action with any vessel of equal or superior force. Your Ship being entirely designed for the Accomodation of the Minister, yon are in all things, as far as may be, to comply with his wishes and to treat him with the respect due to his character." On his arrival in France he was to report to "his Excellency Benjamin Franklin, Esqr., Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of Versailles." After refitting his ship, he was to take on board "such Stores for the use of these States as may be offered by the Agents in France, so as not to incommode your vessel as a Ship of war, and when you have received the Orders of our Minister, you are immediately to make the best of your way back to this port or into Chesapeake Bay . . . If you can procure A Set of good 18 Pounders when in France and you are of Opinion that the Confederacy can bear them, you are at liberty to mount them and put those you have now on Deck into your hold. We desire you will be careful of the Confederacy, her Materials and Stores and that you will not delay any time unnecessarily in France, but be diligent for dispatch." Under the same date the committee wrote to Franklin of the expected visit of the Confederacy to France (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 235, 236.) October 17, the Confederacy still lying at Chester, Harding received orders to take on board another distinguished passenger, John Jay, with his family. Jay had been appointed minister to Spain (lbid., 242.)

The Confederacy sailed soon after this and cleared the Delaware capes October 26. In relating the story of this eventful voyage, Harding says that on November 7 at five o'clock in the morning, in latitude 41° 3' longitude 50° 39', "the ship

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unfortunately lost her Bow Sprit, Fore Mast, Main Mast and Mizen Mast," in a gale. Six hours were passed in cutting away the wreck of spars, sails, and rigging, "after which all hands were imployed in clearing the Ship and preparing to get up Jury Masts, which would have been done with the Assistance of my Officers, who behaved themselves exceedingly well on the Occasion, in a Very short time, but the next day about 7 Oclock A.M. in addition to our misfortune found the Rudder to be gone, at least the head of it Wrung in such a manner that rendered it entirely useless, in which situation we lay Tossing and Drifting with the Wind and Current, making use of every Opportunity to secure the Rudder and Refit the Ship in order to proceed on her intended Passage till the 23d November." During this time the ship had drifted eastward to longitude 48° 28'. "I, with the advice of Mr. Jay and Mr. Gerard, Call'd a Council of my Officers Relative to the Ship's proceeding on her intended passage, who unanimously agreed that it would be very imprudent to approach the Coast of Europe in the situation she was then in; that it would be impossible for the Rudder to survive a hard Gale of wind without increasing the Leake very much, which was Occationed by the Rudder's Striking against her Stern post; that if we should be Necessitated to part with it, should undoubtedly be thrown into Various Difficultys, in Consequence of which the Ship might Founder; that if we should be attacked by a Gale of Wind inshore, we must inevetably be Cast on Shore, and perhaps the greater part of us if not the whole fall a sacrifice to our own folly; and that if we should loose any of Sparrs or Rigging we had none to Replace them; that in the situation the ship was then in, thought it most prudent to proceed to the West Indias. After which I Consulted Mr. Jay & Mr. Gerard the latter declining to give any Opinion on the Subject, the former gave his Opinion that the sentiments of the Officers Corresponded with his and that their advice ought in his opinion to be followed." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 487 (Harding to President of Congress, December 30, 1779)) Thereupon the ship was brought to Martinique, arriving at St. Pierre December 18. The two ministers continued their passage to France in a French frigate (Boston Post, February 19, 1780; Boston Gazette, February 21, 1780; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 61.)

In the fall of 1779 a change was made in the administration of Continental naval affairs by placing them in charge of a smaller executive board. John Brown, secretary of this new body, in a letter to the Navy Board at Boston says: "Congress having dissolved their Marine Committee did by A Resolve bearing date the 28th of October ... Constitute a Board of Admiralty and Appointed three Commissioners not members of Congress, together with two Members of Congress and A Secretary, to whose management All Affairs Relative to the Continental Navy are committed, subject nevertheless to the controul of Congress." Instructions and suggestions concerning various matters are given in the letter. "As to the Continental Armed Vessels still remaining at Boston, you are hereby authorized and directed to send them out on a cruize in such Latitudes as you may think will be most likely to annoy the enemy by Captures." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 249 (December 10, 1779)

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Captain Manley, after his release from imprisonment and acquittal by court martial for the loss of the frigate Hancock, took command of a Boston privateer, the twenty-gun ship Cumberland. In December, 1778, he sailed for the West Indies, but after a short cruise was captured by a British frigate and taken into Barbadoes. With other prisoners he soon escaped, seized a sloop, got to Martinique and thence to Boston in April, 1779. In June he took command of the ship Jason, recently captured by a Continental squadron and fitted out as a privateer with eighteen six-pounders and a hundred and twenty men. The Jason sailed June 19 and off the Isles of Shoals was chased and nearly captured by a British frigate and brig. She was saved by a violent thunder squall, which, although it dismasted her, drove the British vessels out to sea. A seaman on the Jason wrote in his journal: "When the squall struck us it hove us all aback, when we clued down. In ten seconds the wind shifted on our starboard beam and shivered our sails. In a few seconds more the wind shifted on the starboard quarter and struck us with such force that hove us on our beam ends and carried away our three masts and bowsprit. She immediately righted and the squall went over." (Narrative of Joshua Davis, 4.) The crew then insisted upon going into port to repair damages, but Manley, having quelled the mutinous, succeeded in having masts stepped and the ship completely re-rigged at sea in thirty-six hours; the new masts he procured at Portsmouth. He then continued his cruise. Off Sandy Hook, July 23, he fell in with two British privateer brigs of sixteen and eighteen guns. "The enemy hove upon the wind with his larboard tacks on board, run up his courses, hoisted his colours and gave us a broadside. Our Captain ordered the sailing master to get the best bower anchor out, so that the bill of it should take into the fore shrouds of the enemy. It was quickly done. The Captain ordered the helm hard a-port, which brought us along side. The anchor caught their fore rigging. Our Captain then said: 'fire away, my boys.' We then gave them a broadside which tore her off side very much and killed and wounded some of them. The rest all ran below, except their captain who stood on the deck like a man amazed." The brig was then boarded and quickly captured. "When we got disentangled we bore away for the other privateer, that began to run from us. We gave her a few shot from our bow chasers and she hove too." (Narrative of Joshua Davis, 6, 7.) The second brig then also surrendered. The British lost thirty killed and wounded; the Jason three wounded, one of them mortally. The prizes were brought safely into Boston Harbor. Fearing that his men would desert if he went up to the town, Manley procured stores at Hull and then continued his cruise. After escaping a British frigate off Nantucket Shoals with a large fleet of merchantmen under convoy, which he ran into in a fog, Manley cruised to the eastward. Off Newfoundland he captured an English brig. Here the Jason was chased by the British frigate Surprise, of twenty-eight guns and two hundred and thirty men. The frigate overhauled the Jason about eleven o'clock in the evening of September 30 and fired a broadside. "Our captain would not let us fire until they got abreast of us. They gave us another broadside, which cut away some of our running rigging and drove some of our men from the tops. We gave them a broadside which silenced two of her bow guns. The next we gave her cut away her maintopsail and drove her maintop-men out of it. Both sides continued the

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fire until one o'clock. Our studding sails and booms, our sails, rigging, yards, &c. were so cut away that they were useless. Lanterns were hung at the ship's side, between the guns, on nails, but they soon fell on deck at the shaking of the guns; which made it so dark that the men could not see to load the guns. They broke the fore hatches open and ran below. Our captain sent the sailing master forward to see why the bow guns did not keep the fire up, but he never returned. The captain then sent the master's mate on the same errand and he never returned. It was therefore thought needless to stand it any longer and the captain took the trumpet and called out for quarters." (Davis, 11, 12.) The Surprise lost fifteen killed and thirty wounded, the Jason five killed and a few wounded. Manley was taken to St. John's, Newfoundland, and afterwards sent to Mill Prison, England, where he remained more than two years (Independent Chronicle, March 4, 1779; Boston Gazette, March 8, November 29,1779; Boston Post, July 31, 1779; Essex Inst. Coll., January, 1909.)

The private armed ship Hampden, of twenty-two guns, Captain Thomas Pickering, of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the early spring of 1779 was returning from a cruise in European waters, having sent four prizes into France, when on March 7, at ten o'clock in the morning, in latitude 47° 15' north, longitude 28° 31' west, a sail was sighted. The Hampden gave chase. At five in the afternoon both vessels showed their colors. The stranger was a large ship carrying twenty-six nine-pounders and eight fours; at dusk she was lost sight of, but at daylight was seen again. "At 7 A.M. came under her lee quarter within hail, hoisted continental colours and gave her a broadside. She kept all her guns hous'd till just before we fired, altho' we could tell her ports thirteen of a side, a very great distance apart; she return'd the broadside without any damage, with twenty-four nine pounders and eight four pounders and had the advantage of a spar deck to cover her men. Being a beautiful large ship with two tier of cabin windows we knew her to be an East Indianian and of much superior force, but supposing they were badly mann'd, were determined to fight her as long as we could. The engagement continued till half past Ten, close alongside, when finding our three masts and bowsprit very badly wounded, our starboard main shrouds totally gone, our rigging and sails cut to pieces, our double headed shott expended, and near twenty of our men killed and wounded, were obliged to our grief to leave her a mere wreck, her masts, yards, sails and rigging cut to pieces. Having ourselves only the foresail which we could set to get off with, the sheets being cut away, were obliged to use our tacks. During the action our brave and worthy commander, Capt. Pickering, was killed." One other man was killed and seventeen wounded, two of them mortally. The Hampden arrived at Portsmouth April 20 (Continental Journal, April 20, 1779; Independent Chronicle, April 22,1779.)

The ship General Mifflin, Captain McNeill, after cruising more than a year in European waters, returned in February to Boston, having taken thirteen prizes. She was also successful in home waters during the year and fought an engagement with a sloop of war (Boston Gazette, February 15, October 25,

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1779; Boston Post, February 20, 1779.) The sixteen-gun ship General Pickering, Captain Haraden, of Salem, cruised successfully all the year, many of her prizes being armed vessels; among them a fourteen-gun brig named the Hope. In a letter to Timothy Pickering, dated Cape Henlopen, October 1, 1779, Haraden says: "I left the Capes at Sundown on Tuesday last and at Sunrising on Wednesday Morning I discovered Two sail to the windward. The Winds being light I hove out two Draggs to keep my Ship from going ahead and made all the Sail I could, as though I was running from them. They both gave Chace and at 5 p.m. they got nigh enough to discover that I was a Cruising Vessel. They both hove about and haul'd their Wind, I immediately hove about after them, they crowded all the Sail they could and Rowed at the same time. At sundown the Wind breezed up a little and as Night came on, I kept Sight of them with my Night Glass; at 8 P.M. they parted, one stood to the Northward & the other to the Southward. I kept in chace of the largest and at 9 P.M. She Hove about, being to the Windward; as she past me I hail'd her, but had no answer. Then I gave her a Broadside, but without any effect that I could perceive; then I Tackt Ship and gave her another Broadside and hail'd her. She answered from N. York. I Order'd her to haul down the Colours, which they Obey'd instantly; very peaceable people, like the Hope, though they Had 14 6 & 4 pounders and 38 Men. She proves to be the Royal George Cutter, a Letter of Marque out of New York last Tuesday Morning bound to the West Indies and was in Company with a Sloop of 8 Carriage Guns from the same place, she being Clean & a Fast Sailor got off clear, while I was in Chase of the Cutter." (Pickering MSS., xxxix, 179.) In October, off Sandy Hook, the Pickering engaged three letters of marque at once - a fourteen-gun ship, a ten-gun brig, and an eight-gun sloop. After an action of an hour and a half she captured all three and took them into port (Penn. Gazette, September 29,1779; Maryland Journal, December 7, 1779; Boston Post, December 18, 1779; Boston Gazette, December 20, 1779.)

The sloop Eagle of New London with other privateers captured three vessels early in the year and in May she took several more. Having manned these prizes, the prisoners on board the Eagle outnumbered her crew and took possession of her. They then murdered all the crew, except two boys, and took her into Newport (Boston Gazette, May 17, 31, 1779; Boston Post, May 22, 1779; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 10.)

The British sloop of war Thorn, brought into Boston as a prize by the frigates Deane and Boston in September, was fitted out as a privateer; she was ship rigged and carried eighteen six-pounders. Captain Daniel Waters of the Continental navy, who had served in Washington's fleet in 1776, was put in command of the Thorn; there were too few regular ships to give employment to all the Continental officers and it was common for them to sail in privateers. The Thorn sailed on a cruise in December. The journal of the first lieutenant relates that on the 24th at four o'clock in the afternoon, the wind being light, two armed brigantines were seen about four miles to windward. The Thorn stood off "in order to draw them within shot. At 7 P.M. almost calm, our ship in order, men at

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their quarters and in high spirits for engaging. Calm all night. The next morning, December 25, at 6 A.M. the two brigs were on our larboard beam about two miles distant, light breezes from the west; they, to appearance, were making preparations for engaging. At 9 A.M. the wind sprung up from the S. W.; made sail for them in as good order as circumstances would admit. At 10 A.M. Came up with the sternmost, as she was the heaviest, and he hailed: From White Hall, and ask'd Capt. Waters what right he had to wear the 13 stars in his pendant. Capt. Waters answered: I'll let you know presently; then shifted our ensign and gave her a broadside within pistol shot, which she returned, as did the other brig on our weather bow. A warm engagement commenced on both sides for about two glasses, when the largest brig laid us on board on our weather quarter, whilst the other amused us on our weather bow, who kept up a regular fire; but she upon our quarter was soon convinced of her error, receiving such a warm and well directed fire from our marines and seeing his men running about deck with pikes in their backs instead of their hands, were undoubtedly glad to get off again. But soon shot alongside again and renew'd his cannonade with surprising spirit, but after two or three broadsides, was obliged to haul down what remained of his colours. There must have been great slaughter, as the blood was seen to run out of the scuppers. The other brig seeing her consort had struck, made what sail she could to make her escape, but they found us as ready to follow as she was to run, after Capt. Waters had ordered the captured brig to follow. This engagement lasted about four glasses. Capt. Waters received a wound in his right knee about one glass before the first struck. At 3 P.M. came up with the other, after firing several chace shot thro' her quarter, when with reluctance they hauled down their colours. Capt. Waters ordered me on board to send the officers on board the Thorn & immediately make sail for the other brig, which was making from us. Fresh breezes and cloudy weather. At 8 P.M. the Thorn hove to, losing sight of the chace." (Boston Gazette, February 21, 1780.) The next morning she was nowhere to be seen, but many oars, spars, and other wreckage were discovered floating and it was supposed that she had sunk. Subsequently it was learned that under cover of the night she had managed to escape. These two brigs were privateers from New York; one, the Governor Tryon, which escaped, carried sixteen guns - twelves, sixes, and fours - and eighty-six men; the other, the Sir William Erskine, carried eighteen six- and four-pounders, and eighty-five men. The Thorn lost eighteen killed and wounded, the Erskine twenty. Upon learning of this exploit, John Adams, then in Paris, sent to the French "minister a Boston Gazette of 21st February, in which is a relation of a glorious combat and cruise of my countryman Captain Waters, of the Thorn . . . There has not been a more memorable action this war, and the feats of our American frigates and privateers have not been sufficiently published in Europe. It would answer valuable purposes, both by encouraging their honest and brave hearts and by exciting emulations elsewhere, to give them a little more than they have had of the fame they have deserved. Some of the most skillful, determined, persevering and successful engagements that have ever happened upon the seas have been performed by American privateers against the privateers from New York, and have seldom been properly described and published even there."

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(Wharton, iii, 650, Adams to Genet, May 3,1780.) January 13, 1780, the Thorn fell in with the British ship Sparlin of eighteen guns, bound from Liverpool to New York, and captured her after an action of forty minutes. The American loss was one killed and two wounded, the British lost three killed and ten wounded. The Thorn brought the Erskine and Sparlin safely into Boston, arriving in Nantasket Roads February 17, 1780 (Boston Post, February 19,1780; Boston Gazette, February 21, 1780. For further information about privateers and their prizes in 1779, see Boston Gazette, January 18, February 15, March 8, 22, April 26, June 14, August 2, September 27, October 4, 18, November 29, December 13, 20, 1779; Boston Post, February 6, April 10, May 1, 22, July 3, 10, October 2, 1779; Independent Ledger, May 10, October 11, 1779; Penn. Gazette, May 12, September 29, October 6, 1779 ; Penn. Packet, May 20, August 10, October 14, December 25, 1779 ; Maryland Journal, January 12, 1779; New York Packet, October 21, 1770 ; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 9-16; Proc. U. S. Nav. Inst., June, 1911; Maclay's Moses Brown, chs. vi, vii, viii ; Barney, 77-80 ; Clark, i, ch. vii; Williams, 245; Pickering MSS., xvii, 267. For cruise of a Now York privateer, see Amer. Hist. Rev., January, 1902.)

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XII

THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION, 1779

For the third time within a century a military expedition of importance and magnitude, considering the resources of the community, was fitted out at Boston for service against a foreign enemy. In 1690 the forces of the colony under Phips attempted the conquest of Quebec; in 1745, led by Pepperell, they captured Louisburg (Expeditions against Acadia under. Colonels Church and March in 1704 and 1707 might also be mentioned.); and now in 1779 the citizens of Massachusetts assumed, practically alone, the burden of a new enterprise, an effort to repel an invasion of their territory. About the middle of June eight hundred or more British troops from Halifax, convoyed by three sloops of war under the command of Captain Mowatt, entered Penobscot Bay and took possession of the peninsula of Maja-bagaduce or Bagaduce, now called Castine. The object of this move was the establishment of a new province, furnishing a home for many of the numerous loyalists under British protection in Nova Scotia and elsewhere and at the same time serving as a bulwark for British possessions farther east and as an advanced military post convenient for operating against New England (Hist. Man. Com., Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst., i, 284 (Germain to Clinton, September 2, 1778), 381 (Clinton to General McLean, February 11, 1779), 393, 415, 436, 440 (correspondence relating to proposed seizure of

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Penobscot), 452-462 (letters of McLean, Mowatt, etc., from Penobscot, June, 1779)

When the news of the British occupation reached Boston the General Court was in session, and it was soon determined to drive out the enemy, if possible, before he had had time to strengthen his position. Preparations were made with energy and a military and naval force was soon organized, although the full number of militia called for could not be obtained. Application was made to the Continental Congress for the services of three national vessels at that time in Boston Harbor and they accompanied the expedition. New Hampshire contributed one vessel. All the rest of the force was made up and the expense borne by Massachusetts (The principal original authorities for the Penobscot Expedition are: Mass. Archives and Rev. Rolls; General Lovell's Journal, published by Weymouth Hist. Soc., 1881; Journal of the Privateer Ship Hunter, printed in Hist. Mag., February, 1864; various papers in Wheeler's History of Castine; letters published by the State of Massachusetts in Proceedings of the General Assembly relating to the Penobscot Expedition, 1780; contemporary newspapers, e.g., Boston Gazette, August 9, September 27, December 27, 1779, March 18, 25, April 1, 8, 15, 1782; Boston Post, July 10, 1779; Continental Journal, January 6, 1780; London Chronicle, September 25, 28, 1779; Brit. Adm. Records, Captains' Letters and Cptains' Logs; Almon, viii, 352-359. See also Town, 102-115.)

The fleet organized for this enterprise consisted of nineteen armed vessels and twenty or more transports. The Continental vessels were the frigate Warren, 32, Commodore Saltonstall, the brig Diligent, 14, Captain Brown, and the sloop Providence, 12, Captain Hacker. The state navy furnished the brigs Hazard, Active and Tyrannicide of fourteen guns each, commanded by Captains Williams, Hallet, and Cathcart. The Diligent and the Active had recently been taken from the British. In addition to these six vessels, twelve privateers were taken into the service of the state, the owners being guaranteed against loss. Four of these privateers carried twenty guns each and four others eighteen guns, while of the remaining four there was one sixteen, two fourteens, and one eight. Eight of the privateers were ship-rigged. One vessel was furnished by New Hampshire, the twenty-gun ship Hampden, a privateer temporarily taken into the service of that state. The fleet carried over two hundred guns, a large proportion of them probably light ones, and more than two thousand men; Saltonstall was in command. The military force on board the transports it had been intended to recruit to the number of fifteen hundred men, but owing to hurried preparations, less than a thousand apparently embarked on the fleet; and they, according to the testimony of the officers, were a very inferior set of men, even for militia. These troops were under the orders of General Solomon Lovell, with General Peleg Wadsworth second in command and Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Revere in charge of the artillery (Court Records, June 24, 1779.)

On June 25, the General Court made provision for "Nine tons of Flour or Bread, Nine Tons of Rice, Eighteen Tons of Salt Beef, six hundred Gallons of Rum, six

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hundred Gallons of Molasses, Five hundred stand of Fire Arms." (Court Records.) On July 13, Commodore Saltonstall was instructed by the Board of War "to take every measure & use your utmost Endeavours, to Captivate, Kill or destroy the Enemies whole Force both by Sea & Land, & the more effectually to answer that purpose, you are to Consult measures & preserve the greatest harmony with the Commander of the Land Forces, that the navy & army may Cooperate & assist each other." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 39.) It would have been well if this injunction had been strictly heeded. Lack of cooperation between army and navy, a cause that has brought disaster upon many a joint expedition, was to have its baleful effect on this. Another source of weakness was Saltonstall's incompetency. It was also unfortunate that the necessity for prompt action, with a view to forestalling reinforcements of the enemy, made it impracticable to enlist the number of men that had been considered essential for the success of the enterprise. Moreover, for the important and difficult work in prospect, that of assaulting fortifications, a fair proportion at least of regular troops should have been incorporated with the force. The fleet sailed from Boston July 19. They proceeded first to Townsend (Boothbay Harbor), the appointed rendezvous, where it had been expected that the full complement of men would be made up, but the general was disappointed. Unwilling to delay, he set sail again on the 24th (Weymouth Hist. Soc., 1881, Sketch of Lovell, ch. vii.)

Information of the departure of this expedition reached English ears no earlier perhaps than might have been expected. Commodore Collier wrote from New York July 28: "I received this morning certain intelligence that an armament sailed from Boston on the 21st instant to attack his Majesty's new settlement in Penobscot River . . . I intend putting to sea at daylight tomorrow," (Almon, viii, 356.) in pursuit. While the sloop Providence was fitting out at Boston, Lieutenant Trevett, who had long served on board that vessel, decided to remain at home and attend to his private business, saying that he had "no particular inclination to go to Penobscot, for I think the British will get information either at New York or Newport before our fleet can get ready to sail and if they do, I know that three or four large British ships can block them in and that will be the last of all our shipping." (R. I. Hist. Mag., October, 1886.) The fleet arrived in Penobscot Bay July 25, in the afternoon. There were three British sloops of war in the harbor, the North, of twenty, and the Albany and Nautilus of eighteen guns each. Nine of the American ships, in three divisions, stood towards these vessels, hove to and engaged them. There was a brisk fire for two hours without much effect. In a report to the President of the Massachusetts Council, dated three days later, General Lovell says: "I the same evening attempted to make a lodgment on Majorbagaduce, but the wind springing up very strong, I was obliged to desist, lest the first division might suffer before they could be supported by the second. On the 26th I took possession with the marines, supported by General Wadsworth's division, of an island in the harbour, beat them off, took 4 pieces of artillery and some ammunition." (Boston Gazette, August 9, 1779.) The landing was made on Nautilus Island, also known as Banks Island. Captain Cathcart of the Tyrannicide says of this affair that "on the 26th July a Council was held on

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board the Warren, where it was agreed that each Ship or Armed Vessel should furnish such a Number of Marines to take possession of Banks's Island on the South side of the Entrance of Bagaduce River under cover of the Sloop Providence, Brig Pallas & Defence." (Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 113.) An officer on board the ordnance brig, presumably Revere, gives another account of this episode, dated July 29, saying that "the marines attacked an island where the enemy had a battery of 2 guns; they were commanded by Captain Welsh of the Warren. I sent one field piece to support them; they landed under cover of three vessels. The enemy quitted it with precipitation, left their colours flying and four pieces of cannon, two of them not mounted. We immediately built a battery there and mounted two 18 and one 12 pounder. This island is directly opposite to the enemy and commands the mouth of the harbour." (Boston Gazette, August 9, 1779.) This battery forced the British ships to shift their anchorage further up the harbor (Hist. Mag., February, 1864; Wheeler, 293, Journal of John Calef; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, Nos. 23 and 630, logs of the Albany and Nautilus.)

On the 27th there seems to have been lack of harmony between the military and naval commanders and a misunderstanding about the landing of the marines in an attack on the peninsula of Bagaduce. The importance of prompt and energetic action was appreciated by some of the subordinate naval officers, who presented to the commodore on that day a petition in which they "Would Represent to your Honour that the most spedy Exertions should be used to accomplish the design we came upon. We think Delays in the present Case are extremely dangerous, as our Enemies are daily Fortifying and Strengthening themselves & are stimulated so to do, being in daily Expectation of Reinforcement"; they did not wish to advise or censure, but only "to express our desire of improving the present Opportunity to go Immediately into the Harbour & Attack the Enemy's Ships." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 50.) It was the opinion of these officers that the capture of the British post at Bagaduce would be greatly facilitated and hastened by removing the ships which supported it. By evening arrangements had been made for landing the marines on the peninsula. At three the next morning the commodore ordered Cathcart "to begin to fire into the Woods with an Intent to scower them of the Enemy, which was Immediately obey'd." (Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 113.)

Early on July 28 the attack was made on Bagaduce. The Warren engaged the British ships at long range and they moved still farther up the harbor, to escape the fire of the battery on Nautilus Island. Lovell says: "This morning I have made my landing good on the S. W. head of a Peninsula which is 100 feet high and almost perpendicular, very thickly covered with bush and trees. The men ascended the precipice with alacrity and after a very smart conflict we put them to the rout. They left in the woods a number killed and wounded and we took a few prisoners; our loss is about 30 killed and wounded. We are within 100 rods of the enemies main fort, on a commanding piece of ground. I hope soon to have the satisfaction of informing you of the capture of the whole army." (Boston Gazette, August 9, 1779.) "We landed in three divisions," says Colonel Revere,

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"the marines on the right, Col. Mitchell on the left, and Col. Mc. Cobb, the volunteers and my corps in the centre. The land being so mountainous and full of wood that our cannon could not play, I landed with my small arms, the whole force under cover of two ships and three brigs, who drew near the shore and kept up a constant fire into the woods till we began to land. The enemy's greatest strength lay upon our right, where the marines landed; they had three hundred in the woods. As soon as the right landed they were briskly attacked. The enemy had the most advantageous place I ever saw; it is a bank above three hundred feet high and so steep that no person can get up it but by pushing himself up by bushes and trees, with which it is covered. In less than 20 minutes the enemy gave way and we pursued them. They left twelve dead on the spot, 8 wounded and about 10 prisoners. We lost about 35 killed and wounded. We took possession of a height near their fort and are now building a battery to play upon them. I expect to put two 18 pounders, one 12, two 4, and a howitz on shore this day. I am in hopes that if the ships go into the harbour today [July 29], as it is said they will, and take their ships, we shall have an easy conquest. In the afternoon we took another battery of three 6 pounders, upon which they abandoned it and went into their fortress." (Boston Gazette, August 9, 1779.) Another officer puts the American loss at ten killed and twenty wounded (lbid.; Wheeler, 295 ; Hist. Mag., February, 1864.)

On the 29th, according to Cathcart, it was agreed that the ships should go in and attack the enemy's squadron, but the next day, at a council of war on board the Warren, Saltonstall said there was no sufficient reason for the ships' going in. At this time, July 30, a galley arrived from Boston and three days later was sent back with Lovell's dispatches. Frequent councils were held on the Warren, but with little result. The marines gave some assistance to the army, but with this exception the navy was of little service. The commodore, upheld by the privateer captains, remained inactive day after day, apparently incapable of coming to a decision. He seems to have feared the exposure of his ships to the fire of the fort while attacking the enemy's ships and to have insisted that the fort should be captured first; whereas Lovell's force was insufficient to justify an assault on the stronghold supported as it was by the British ships. Meanwhile the army erected batteries at different points for the reduction of the fort, if possible, and for the annoyance of the little squadron, which it would seem might easily have been captured, destroyed, or driven away at the outset of operations by the vastly superior American fleet. August 6, Lovell notes in his journal: "I wrote a Letter to the Commodore desiring an answer whether he wou'd or whether he wou'd not go in with his Ships & destroy the Shipping of the Enemy, which consist only of three Sloops of war, when he returned for answer, if I wou'd storm the fort he wou'd go in with his Ships, upon which I called a Council, the result of which was that in our present situation it was impracticable, with any prospect of Success." A simultaneous attack by army and navy might have succeeded. Lovell. himself, perhaps, was moved by excess of prudence; but he lacked confidence in his men.

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Notwithstanding the steadiness with which the militia, with the help of the marines, carried the precipitous heights of Bagaduce on July 28, part of their subsequent behavior convinced the general of their unreliable character. He continued to urge more naval activity and wrote to the commodore August 11: "The destruction of the Enemy's ships must be effected at any rate, although it might cost us half our own." (Wheeler, 310; Lovells Journal; Rev. Rolls, xxxix, , 113; Hist. Mag., February, 1864.)

Meanwhile the commodore had had a somewhat ridiculous adventure August 7, described in Lovell's journal: "A Boat from the Hazard with Comr Saltonstall, Capts Waters, Williams, Salter, Holmes & Burke were a reconnoitering up a Cove nigh the Enemy's Ships; on their discovering them they immediately sent 8 Boats armed, to hem them in. They so far succeeded that they made a prize of the Boat, but the Gentlemen took to the Bush and escaped being made prisoners." After a circuitous tramp through the woods the naval officers rejoined their friends.

Immediately after the council of war on August 6 another express had been sent to Boston with dispatches from the general, but with no report from the commodore. The Navy Board of the Eastern District noticed this omission in a letter to Saltonstall dated August 12, in which they went on to say: "We have for sometime been at a loss to know why the enemy's ships have not been attacked, nor does the result of this Council give us any satisfaction on that head; it is agreed on all hands that they are at all times in your power. If, therefore, your own security or the more advantageous operations of the army did not require it, why should any business be delayed to another day, that may as well be done this? Our apprehensions of your danger have ever been from a reinforcement to the enemy; you can't expect to remain much longer without one. Whatever, therefore, is to be done, should be done immediately, both to prevent advantages to the enemy and delays if you are obliged to retreat. As we presume you would avoid having these ships in your rear while a reinforcement appears in front, or the necessity of leaving them behind when you retire yourself; with these sentiments we think it our duty to direct you to attack and take or destroy them without delay, in doing which no time is to be lost, as a reinforcement are probably on their passage at this time. It is therefore our orders that as soon as you receive this you take the most effectual measures for the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, and with the greatest dispatch the nature and situation of things will admit of." (Proc. of Gen. Assembly, 26.) These urgent instructions, signed by William Vernon and James Warren, might possibly have produced some effect, had they been issued and forwarded several days earlier; but it was too late, as was also an application to General Gates for aid, which had recently been made by the Massachusetts Council.

By the time the American forces had been in Penobscot Bay between two and three weeks the fort on Bagaduce peninsula, which at first had been a mere breastwork, was becoming stronger every day and was already a formidable

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structure. At last, August 13, when General Lovell, hoping for succor from Boston, was still besieging this work and preparing for a possible assault, the enemy's reinforcements appeared. The Active and Diligent since July 30 had been cruising off "the Mouth of the Bay in order to make the earliest Discoveries of an Enemy's Approach," when "on the 13th Inst. 2 P.M. Discovered five Sail Standing into the Bay." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 207.) Two others came in sight, making a force of one ship of the line, five frigates and a sloop of war. The Diligent ran in at once to notify the commodore and the Active joined the fleet the next day. There was a disposition at first, no doubt encouraged by the more resolute commanders, to make a stand with the fleet, and the ships were drawn up in the form of a crescent, but at another council it was decided that the British fleet was too strong to engage and that the only alternative must be adopted, which was to run up the river. The captains evidently had no confidence in their leader and little hope of his making a determined resistance.

Meanwhile, upon first receiving information of the approach of British reinforcements, the army had hastily embarked on the transports and the whole fleet made every effort to get as far up the river as possible. All but two of the vessels escaped capture, yet only to be destroyed by their crews after landing, to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. The New Hampshire privateer Hampden and the ship Hunter, one of the largest and best of the Massachusetts privateers, were taken by the British. The Hunter was run ashore and her crew escaped before capture. Captain Salter of the Hampden says that when the fleet got under way the enemy was a league and a half astern and that he set all sail, but "my Ship Sailing heavey the enemy Soon came up With me, three frigetes, and fiered upon [me] one after ye outher, & cutt away my rigen & Stages &c, and huld me Sundrey times & wounded Sum of my men. I found it Emposable to Joyane our fleet again; was obliged to Strik, all thou Contray to my well." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 44; Wheeler, 302 (Calef's journal)

The British squadron that caused this reverse of fortune for the American arms consisted of the sixty-four-gun ship Raisonable, two thirty-two-gun frigates, the Blonde and Virginia, the Greyhound of twenty-eight guns, and the Camilla and Galatea of twenty guns each, and the fourteen-gun sloop Otter, and was under the command of Commodore Collier. He received information of the expedition July 28, and sailed from Sandy Hook August 3. According to the log of the Blonde, at half-past twelve in the afternoon of August 15, "the Rebel fleet got under weigh & formed a Line of Battle, we, the Galatea & Virginia being the Headmost ships, the Reisonable, Greyhound & Camilla about 6 or 7 miles a starn." At half-past one "saw the Rebels forming a Line of Battle; us together with the Virginia & Galatea pursued the 21 sail of Rebels & Drove them before us without the Return of a single shot. At 3 two Ships & a Brigg hauld round to the S. W., trying to get Down the western passage of Long Island; us & the Galatea hauld close to the North End & cut off their Retrait. They then wore & stood after the Body of the fleet; the Galatea Pursued the Brigg & Drove her on shore, we then standing after the Ships & fired several shot at them. At 4 one of the Ships

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run on shore, ye Galatea sent her 2 Boats to Board her, but finding the Rebels to be armed on the Beach, returned on bd & made sail after us, leaveing them to the Command of our Rere, the Albany, Nautilus & North Just Coming out of Magebacduce River. At 1/2 past 4 fired several shot at the other ship & Huld Her, as did the Virginia. At 5 she struck to us; sent a Boat with an Officer to board Her, which she did, & made sail after us. At 6 upewards of 20 sail of small Vessels run on shore, the most of them they set fire to, which Oblig'd us to anchor." At seven o'clock the Greyhound got into shoal water and anchored. About the same time the Americans set fire to a sloop and sent her down the river. "Sent 2 Boats man & armed, Cut her Loose & twod Her on shore; sent 3 Boats to Board a schooner & bring her to Anchor, she proved to be Laden with provisions. At 10 saw the Skyrocket on fire, at 1/2 pst saw the Greyhound afloat again; Virginia anchord with the Greyhd 1/2 a mile below us. At 8 Discovered Numbr of small boats passing to & fro from the small Craft to the shore Forts; a Broadside of Round & Grape shot at them. At 9 the Boats returned from ye prize Hamdon of 22 Guns. At 5 A.M. made sigI for all Lieuts that the Boats mand & armed to attack the small Vessels. At 11 made the Signal & weighd, But the wind falling cam, . . . sent the pinnace to Reconnitre the Enemys Vessels." The next day the Blonde with other British vessels continued the pursuit up the river; they saw the Warren on fire two miles above, "heard the Explosation & saw the smoke of several Vessels on fire above her." The loss on board the Albany, North, and Nautilus during the siege was trifling: four killed, nine wounded, and eight missing (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Letters, No. 1612, 2 (Collier, August 20,1779), No. 2121, 16 (Mowatt, September 19, 1779), Captains' Logs, Nos. 23, 118, 157, 420, 630 (logs of the Albany, Blonde, Camilla, Greyhound and Nautilus)

The British fleet, although carrying fewer men and fewer but doubtless much heavier guns than the American, was far too powerful for an irregular, heterogeneous armament, made up mostly of undisciplined privateers to engage, with any hope of success. Unity of action and mutual support in an emergency could not be expected of such a force. The committee of the Massachusetts General Court, which inquired into the affair, reported, October 7, that the total destruction of the fleet was occasioned principally by "the Commodore's not exerting himself at all at the time of the retreat in opposing the enemy's foremost ships in pursuit." With the pursuing British extended over a long line, a resolute and skillful commander, backed by disciplined and subordinate captains, might have struck a blow of some effect at the enemy; but probably under the circumstances the best course was followed in depriving them of a number of valuable prizes. The fault lay in the earlier, inexcusable inaction. Collier sailed from Sandy Hook August 3. Before that date, if the small British squadron in the bay had been disposed of at the outset and if proper support had been given to the army, General Lovell should have been able to carry the half-finished fort and would probably have been in possession of the whole region, even with his inadequate force. The legislative committee of inquiry expressed the opinion that if Lovell had "been furnished with all the men ordered for the service or been properly supported by the Commodore, he would probably have reduced the

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enemy"; and added that the naval commanders in the service of the state "behaved like brave, experienced, good officers throughout the whole expedition." (Boston Gazette, December 27,1779; Proc. of Gen. Assembly, 27-29.)

The need of reinforcing Lovell had been appreciated and when the Massachusetts Council applied to General Gates, August 8, a regiment of the Continental army, of four hundred men, was detailed for this service. They did not get away from Boston, however, until after the disaster at Penobscot. Upon receiving information of this, August 19, they at once put into Portsmouth in the fear of falling in with some of Collier's ships (lbid., 21; Thacher's Military Journal, 166-168.) If the inadequacy of Lovell's force had been realized in the beginning and the reinforcement had been asked for at once, it would have reached the Penobscot in time. The whole affair is a record of blunders and lack of foresight.

Leaving the wrecks of their fleet strewn along the banks of the river, the unhappy soldiers and sailors of the Penobscot expedition found their way back to Boston through the wilderness. The disaster had a depressing effect in Massachusetts. A heavy debt, estimated at seven million dollars, was imposed upon the state, but the humiliation of the affair was felt even more keenly. As General Sullivan said of it, the expense was "not so distressing as the disgrace." (Sparks MSS., xx, 2.) It has been held that this enterprise was not only mismanaged and doomed to failure, but was ill-conceived and would have been comparatively useless, at least not justifying the cost, even if successful; but another view may perhaps with some reason be entertained. In the first place the establishment of a hostile post within striking distance of Boston naturally caused apprehension and its removal was an object worth considering. Moreover, success justifies much, and more than material advantage is to be considered. In this case victory would have brought prestige to the American arms and would in some degree have inspired confidence in the ultimate happy conclusion of the war, with animating effect on the supporters of the patriotic cause, who had met with much discouragement.

The end of Saltonstall's career in the Continental service was near. The committee of inquiry reported that the principal reason for the disaster was "want of proper spirit and energy on the part of the Commodore." (Boston Gazette, December 27, 1779.) It is an interesting question for speculation whether a more "proper spirit and energy " would have been displayed by Captain Hopkins, who had recently been displaced by Saltonstall in command of the frigate Warren, and who otherwise would doubtless have led the American fleet into Penobscot Bay. A few weeks after the report of the committee, Saltonstall was tried by court martial on board the frigate Deane in Boston Harbor and was dismissed from the navy.

The British held Bagaduce until the end of the war, but they were not entirely unmolested. Just within a year the sting of defeat was in a slight measure

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alleviated, according to the following account of a small but successful expedition: "A few days ago a detachment from the troops under General Wadsworth went up Penobscot-river, having pass'd the fort in whale-boats in the night, and took two sloops which had been weighing up some of the cannon lately belonging to our privateers which were burnt there. They had got 8 cannon on board and were coming down the river, little expecting to be conducted by our people; but Capt. Mowat had the mortification to see them passing down by the fort, out of his reach however, in triumph. They fired at the fort to vex the enemy and got safe away. Mowat followed them to Campden, but General Wadsworth having drawn up his men and made a breastwork to frighten the enemy, he and his ship were obliged to meach back again, and we are in full possession of the vessels which were intended to invest our coasts. General Wadsworth has taken 40 prisoners, including the men who were on board these vessels." (Boston Gazette, July 10, 1780; Almon, x, 227.)

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XIII

A CRUISE AROUND THE BRITISH ISLES, 1779

The frigate Alliance, Captain Landais, with Lafayette on board, arrived at Brest February 6, 1779, after a passage of twenty-three days from Boston. The voyage had not been without incident. Two vessels were captured and the frigate lost her main topmast in a storm. February 2 a mutiny was discovered among the English and Irish sailors on board. The difficulty of recruiting ships' crews for the regular naval service, chiefly due to the superior attractions of privateering, had led to the practice in some cases of enlisting British prisoners, who were willing in this manner to escape confinement. In the case of the Alliance the disinclination of Americans to sail under a French captain had increased the difficulty and accordingly many British subjects were taken. The unreliable character of such crews is illustrated in this instance. Among the ringleaders of the conspiracy were John Savage, master-at-arms, and William Murray, sergeant of marines. Murray confessed, saying "that Savage and he, with 70 more, had agreed to take the ship and carry her into some part of England or Ireland, and force one of the Lieutenants to take command of her. He said the plan they had laid to take her was, that they were to divide themselves into four divisions, the first to take the magazine, the other three at the same time to force the cabbin, wardroom, and quarter deck, then to take command of the arm-chests, and in case of opposition, they were to point the fore-castle guns aft and fire them, the guns being 9 pounders and all loaded. The party that was to go to the magazine were to kill the Gunner, Carpenter and Boat-swain; the other punishments for the other officers and French gentlemen were thus: Captain Landais was to be put in irons

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and sent in the cutter, without victuals or drink; the Lieutenants were to walk overboard on a plank from the ship side, unless they would take charge of her and navigate the ship into England; the marine officers and the Doctor were to be hanged, quartered, and hove overboard; the sailing Master was to be tied up to the mizzen-mast, scarrified all over, cut to pieces, and hove overboard." (Independent Chronicle, April 29, 1779, Murray's testimony under oath, vouched for by an officer of the ship.) Lafayette was to be put in irons and sent to England. Thirty-eight of the mutineers were confined in irons on shore to await trial. The disposition of these prisoners caused embarrassment, for there were not enough American naval captains in France to organize a court martial for their trial and it would be inconvenient and expensive to send them back to America. Franklin suggested exchanging them for Americans as prisoners of war. The Marine Committee, however, could "think of no better method of disposing of them than Sending them out to this Continent by different Vessels, proportioning the number to each Vessel, so as not to render it dangerous or inconvenient: and upon their Arrival, if Sufficient evidence can be had, it is our intention to bring them to trial by Court Martial (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 236 (September 17, 1779, letter to Franklin); Wharton, iii, 188; Boston Gazette, April 19, 26,1770; Independent Chronicle, April 22, 29, 1779 ; Archives de la Marine, B8 16 (Fevrier, 1779.)

After his return to Brest in May, 1778, with his prize the Drake, Captain Jones spent more than a year on shore, perhaps the most trying year of his life, beset with every sort of vexation and disappointment. To begin with, his drafts on the American Commissioners, for the support of his crew and prisoners and the refitting of his ship, were dishonored for lack of funds. Jones had never received any pay for his own services and he now made himself personally responsible for these necessary expenses. There was great and apparently unnecessary delay in disposing of the Ranger's prizes, so that the officers and men were kept waiting indefinitely for their prize money. At this time, too, began the long and weary wait for another and larger ship. There still seemed a chance that through the French Minister of Marine, de Sartine, Jones would get the Indien after all, and it was proposed by Franklin that he should man her partly with French and partly with American prisoners received in exchange for those he had taken on his cruise. But on account of the outbreak of hostilities between France and England, which soon followed, the Dutch government, anxious to maintain neutrality, would not allow the Indien to leave Holland. Other schemes were proposed, among them the command of a squadron of French ships under the American flag to cruise in the Baltic, but owing to the natural jealousy of French officers, and other causes, every plan fell through. After nearly endless correspondence without result, Jones determined to go himself to Versailles and personally urge his claims, taking the advice, it is said, given in "Poor Richard's Almanac," and hoping that by direct solicitation something might be accomplished. This hope was realized, for Sartine took more interest in his affairs and the result was the purchase, in January, 1779, of an East Indiaman called

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the Duc de Duras (Sands, 96-149; Sherburne, 66-86; Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 179, 183, 185, 203, 207.)

This vessel was fourteen years old, unsound, and a dull sailer, but though Jones had insisted on the necessity for his purpose of a fast-sailing ship, he accepted the Duras and at once entered upon the work of converting her into a man-of-war. With the consent of Sartine and in honor of Poor Richard and of his faithful friend and benefactor, Franklin, Jones called his ship the Bonhomme Richard. She was at L'Orient and several American seamen were enlisted there. Months were spent in preparation for a cruise against the enemy. The Alliance, which was to have returned directly to America, was detained by Franklin and put under Jones's orders; and three French vessels also, making in all a respectable squadron. The agent of the French government in the arrangements was M. de Chaumont, a zealous adherent of the American cause who had given his house at Passy free of rent to the American Commissioners. It was intended that Lafayette should accompany the expedition with a considerable military force and an attack on Liverpool, Lancaster, Bristol, Bath, and Whitehaven was contemplated; it was proposed to take nearly fifteen hundred infantry besides a small body of cavalry and six pieces of light artillery. This project, however, was abandoned and Lafayette did not go. Later, an invasion of England was planned, for which a large French and Spanish fleet was collected, and Jones was to make a diversion in the north, but the main part of this scheme also was given up. It remained now for the American squadron to cruise independently. The ships were finally ready for sea about the middle of June, 1779. There was trouble on board the Alliance which caused Jones annoyance and perplexity, not knowing at first where to place the blame. It was owing to lack of harmony between the captain of the frigate and his officers and crew. Landais had a temperament which made impossible anything like efficient cooperation between himself and either superiors or inferiors (Sands, 149-158; Sherburne, 86-94; Archives de la Marine, B4 172, 99-102, 128.)

The Bonhomme Richard was not well adapted for purposes of war, being clumsily built, slow-sailing, and structurally weak. There was discussion as to the number and weight of guns she should carry. Jones wished a main battery of twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and they were ordered to be cast, but the ship was not strong enough to bear the strain and lighter guns were deemed necessary. The only ones that could be obtained in time for the cruise were old French guns, many of which had been condemned. On the gun-deck were mounted twenty-eight twelve-pounders, and on the forecastle and quarter deck six or eight nines, while in the gun-room on the after part of the deck under the main battery six eighteen-pounders were placed, ports having been cut for them, too close to the surface of the water to be of use in a moderately rough sea. Jones had as first lieutenant, at the outset, Robert Robinson, who was soon succeeded, however, by Richard Dale, an excellent officer who had served in the Virginia navy and the Continental navy and had twice escaped from Mill Prison. The crew of the ship was heterogeneous. Out of two hundred and twenty-seven

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officers and men (This list of 227 in Sherburne is of a later date and evidently incomplete, some of the French officers and all the marines being omitted. A reprint of the original muster-roll, dated July 26, 1779, is contained in The Logs of the Serapis, Alliance, Ariel, edited by Captain John S. Barnes, New York, 1911; this list, comprising 254 names, differs considerably from Sherburne's, which is accounted for by many changes soon afterwards made in the personnel.) there were seventy-nine Americans, mostly exchanged prisoners, eighty-three English, Irish, and Scotch, including Jones himself, a few Scandinavians, and nearly thirty Portuguese; the nationality of most of the others is not stated. Besides these there were a hundred and thirty-seven French soldiers acting as marines. The Alliance, by far the best ship in the squadron, carried twenty-eight twelve-pounders and eight nines, and rather more than two hundred men. The Pallas, Captain Cottineau, was a merchantman or privateer fitted out as a thirty-two-gun frigate; her battery consisted of twenty-six nines and six fours, and her crew of about two hundred and fifty men. The Cerf, Captain Varage, was an eighteen-gun cutter and a fine vessel of her class. The Vengeance, Captain Ricot, was a twelve-gun brigantine (Sherburne, 95, 100, 133-144, 221; Sands, 156,157; Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 215, 225-239, B1 91, 51, B4 158, 143, 184, B4 172,128.)

Jones's ideas about the kind of service he was now to enter upon are expressed in a memorandum he had drawn up January 21, 1779, while waiting for the orders of the minister to take command of the Bonhomme Richard. "I am but a young Student in the Science of Arms and therefore wish to receive instruction from Men of riper Judgement and greater experience, but to me the grand Object of Partizan War is, when a fair opening presents itself, to strike an unexpected Blow, which being well directed must in the nature of things be severly felt. The Man who is to be entrusted with the Chief Command of such enterprizes, ought to be worthy of confidence, and if he is, too much cannot be shown him. It seems to be his province to adopt such enterprizes as circumstances may throw him in the way of, with a prospect of success, and which being effected will tend the most to distress and distract the Enemy. A principal object or Enterprize may with propriety be thought of long before it is executed, but ought not to be committed to writing nor communicated to any person other than the commander in chief, and by him only to his Officers and Men at a proper time and Place. To effect anything of consequence, it may be necessary to embark a Body of 400 heigh Spirited and well disciplined Troops exclusive of the compliment of Seamen and Marines. Five Ships may be of infinite Service. I would recommend two small ones rather than one larger size, as more objects than one may present themselves. But Tho' in some cases large Vessels may not be necessary for Five Ships, yet the small ones ought to sail very fast, that they may hold way with the Principal Ship or Ships on which they are to attend. The passage will thus be performed in the shortest space of time that is possible and these five Ships may be made useful as light Cruizers, should a Variety of the Enemies Ships be met with at any one time on the Passage. One fast sailing Cutter or other Vessel of Eight or Ten Guns might be of much Utility, as well in a Partizan War to cover the

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Troops in landing and in retreat as in Cruizing against the Enemies Commerce on the Ocean. No Cruizing Frigate with unlimited orders ought to be sent to Sea without being attended by one of these Vessels, and the Bottoms should be sheathed with Copper. If I have the Ministers Authority, I will send a trusty person or two to enquire into on the spot and view the exact strength & Situation of a place or two of great Importance. It will be proper to be provided with Two light Field pieces and a number of Scaling Ladders, &ca . . . But the Commanding Officer of the Troops will be better able to Judge of the Articles necessary for any land Operation, and his Opinion may easily be obtained without telling him why it is Asked. It will be a necessary caution to Suffer no person concerned in the preparation of the Five Ships to know for what services they are prepared and with which Ships they are to act. Some false Idea may be whispered to them as a Secret." (Jones MSS.)

Jones had general instructions from Franklin, who was always moved by humane considerations. The concluding passages are: "As many of your officers and people have lately escaped from English prisons, either in Europe or America, you are to be particularly attentive to their conduct towards the prisoners which the fortune of war may throw into your hands, lest the resentment of the more than barbarous usage by the English in many places towards the Americans should occasion a retaliation and imitation of what ought rather to be detested and avoided for the sake of humanity and for the honour of our country. In the same view, although the English have wantonly burnt many defenceless towns in America, you are not to follow this example, unless when a reasonable ransom is refused, in which case your own generous feelings as well as this instruction will induce you to give timely notice of your intention, that sick and ancient persons, women and children may be first removed." (Sands, 152-154 (April 27,1779) Shortly before sailing, de Chaumont, who seems not always to have been discreet, required Jones and the other captains to sign an agreement or concordat, which gave the subordinate commanders a degree of independence and freedom of action incompatible with strict discipline and efficient cooperation (lbid., 165; Sherburne, 94; Mackenzie's Life of Paul Jones, i, 153. For the Concordat, see Archives de la Marine, B4 158, 144, Sherburne, 200, and Appendix VIII.)

The squadron sailed, June 19, from Groix Roads, near L'Orient, with a convoy, which was escorted to Bordeaux and other ports. On the night of the 20th the Bonhomme Richard and Alliance fouled each other, carrying away the Richard's jib-boom and the Alliance's mizzen-mast. Jones considered Landais responsible for this accident, but Lieutenant Robinson of the Richard was court-martialed and dismissed (Jones MSS., August 8,1779.) The next evening the Cerf captured a fourteen-gun sloop, but was obliged to abandon the prize on the approach of a superior force. June 29, the Bonhomme Richard fell in with two frigates. Jones says: "They appeared at first earnest to engage, but their courage failed and they fled with precipitation, and to my mortification outsailed the Bon homme Richard and got clear. I had, however, a flattering proof of the martial spirit of my crew

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and am confident that had I been able to get between the two, which was my intention, we should have beaten them both together." (Sherburne, 96.) In spite of Jones's good opinion of his crew, serious mischief on board his ship was brewing at this time. An incipient mutiny among the British sailors was discovered, the design being to take possession of the ship and send Jones a prisoner to England. Many of these undesirable persons were discharged early in August and forty-three Americans, who had recently arrived in a cartel from English prisons, were recruited. The Portuguese contingent in the crew was also enlisted at this period. Most of the month of July seems to have been spent in preparing for an extended cruise. According to the instructions of Franklin, dated June 30, 1779, which had been virtually dictated by Sartine, the squadron was to cruise to the north of the British Isles and at the end of about six weeks put into the Texel, whence it was to convoy vessels from Holland to France (Sands, 158-163; Sherburne, 94-102; Jones MSS., July 28, 29, 1779, Jones to Gourlade & Moylan and to Lieutenant Lunt, and courts martial of Robert Towers and others; Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 270, B1 91, 178, B4 158, 132, 184.)

A few days before sailing, Commodore Jones issued instructions to his captains requiring careful attention to his signals and obedience to his orders. They were to keep their stations and "never to chase so as to lose company with the squadron." Sealed orders were given them appointing rendezvous at different places in case of separation. The squadron sailed from Groix Roads August 14, 1779, on a cruise which became famous. Two French privateers, Le Monsieur, 38, and La Grandville, 12, had joined the expedition, but they soon dropped out. On the 23d, the squadron was off Cape Clear. Two prizes had been taken since leaving port and sent back to L'Orient. A third was now taken by boats, there being no wind. In the evening, as it was still calm, Jones sent his barge ahead to tow the Bonhomme Richard, fearing she might be swept by the tide into a dangerous position. "Soon after sunset," says the commodore, "the villains who towed the ship, cut the tow rope and decamped with my barge. Sundry shots were fired to bring them to without effect; in the meantime the master of the Bon homme Richard, without orders, manned one of the ships boats and with four soldiers pursued the barge, in order to stop the deserters. The evening was clear and serene, but the zeal of that officer, Mr. Cutting Lunt, induced him to pursue too far, and a fog which came on soon afterwards prevented the boats from rejoining the ship, although I caused signal guns to be frequently fired. The fog and calm continued the next day till towards evening. In the afternoon Capt. Landais came on board the Bon homme Richard and behaved towards me with great disrespect, affirming in the most indelicate manner and language that I had lost my boats and people through my imprudence in sending boats to take a prize. He persisted in his reproaches, though he was assured . . . that the barge was towing the ship at the time of elopement and that she had not been sent in pursuit of the prize. He was affronted because I would not the day before suffer him to chase without my orders and to approach the dangerous shore I have already mentioned, where he was an entire stranger and when there was not sufficient wind to govern a ship. He told me he was the only American in the

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squadron and was determined to follow his own opinion in chasing when and where he thought proper, and in every other matter that concerned the service, and that if I continued in that situation three days longer, the squadron would be taken." (Sherburne, 109, 110; Sands, 166-168.)

The Cerf was sent in to look for the lost boats, but she too disappeared. She was unable to overtake the boats, lost sight of the squadron, sprung her mainmast in a gale a few days later, was chased by a vessel of superior force, and finally returned to France, arriving at Paimboeuf September 4. Meanwhile the Bonhomme Richard remained a short time near the place where these occurrences had taken place. It was afterwards learned that Lunt was taken prisoner. Besides him the Richard lost by this mishap another officer and twenty of her best seamen. A gale on the night of the 26th compelled the flagship to stand off and the next morning only the Vengeance was in sight. Jones thought that Landais purposely kept out of the way. The Bonhomme Richard and Vengeance kept to the northward and on September 1 were off Cape Wrath, where they fell in with the Alliance and a prize she had taken. The same day a British letter of marque was captured. Contrary to Jones's orders these two prizes were sent by Landais to Bergen in Norway, where they were given up to the British consul by the Danish authorities; they became a loss to the captors for which Denmark refused to make restitution. Landais continued to behave in an insubordinate manner. September 2, the Pallas appeared. The squadron cruised a few days between the Orkney and Shetland Islands and some unimportant prizes were taken. September 5, a gale came on which blew four days and was followed by contrary winds, so that land was not again seen until the 13th, when the Cheviot Hills were sighted. Jones had with him the Pallas and Vengeance, the Alliance having again disappeared. Two colliers were taken on the 14th (Sands, 169-171, 245-247; Sherburne, 110-112; Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 274, B4 158, 150, 186, B8 16 (Aout, Septembre, 1779)

Jones now planned an important enterprise. In his report to Franklin, dated October 3, 1779, he says: "Knowing that there lay at anchor in Leith road an armed ship of 20 guns, with two or three fine cutters, I formed an expedition against Leith, which I purposed to lay under a large contribution, or otherwise to reduce it to ashes." (Sherburne, 112.) He prepared a summons addressed to the magistrates of Leith, in which he tells them: "I do not wish to distress the poor inhabitants; my intention is only to demand your contribution towards the reimbursement which Britain owes to the much injured citizens of America." (lbid., 106.) This is an allusion to the depredations committed by the British in Chesapeake Bay, Long Island Sound, and elsewhere.

His report continues: "Had I been alone, the wind being favorable, I would have proceeded directly up the Firth and must have succeeded, as they lay there in a state of perfect indolence and security, which would have proved their ruin. Unfortunately for me, the Pallas and Vengeance were both at a considerable distance in the offing, they having chased to the southward; this obliged us to

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steer out of the Firth again to meet them. The captains of the Pallas and Vengeance being come on board the Bon homme Richard, I communicated to them my project, to which many difficulties and objections were made by them; at last, however, they appeared to think better of the design, after I had assured them that I hoped to raise a contribution of 200000 pounds sterling on Leith, and that there was no battery of cannon there to oppose our landing. So much time, however, was unavoidably spent in pointed remarks and sage deliberation that night, that the wind became contrary in the morning. We continued working to windward up the Firth without being able to reach the road of Leith, till on the morning of the 17th, when being almost within cannon shot of the town, having everything in readiness for a descent, a very severe gale of wind came on, and being directly contrary, obliged us to bear away, after having in vain endeavored for some time to withstand its violence. The gale was so severe that one of the prizes that had been taken on the 14th sunk to the bottom, the crew being with difficulty saved. As the alarm by this time had reached Leith by means of a cutter that had watched our motions that morning, and as the wind continued contrary (though more moderate in the evening), I thought it impossible to pursue the enterprise with a good prospect of success, especially as Edinburgh, where there is always a number of troops, is only a mile distant from Leith; therefore I gave up the project." (Sherburne, 112; Sands, 171-175.)

The cutter spoken of by Jones as having watched his motions was one of several revenue cutters specially fitted out and armed for service against the American squadron, some of them having been placed under the orders of the admirals commanding various naval stations. As early as August 19 the alarm excited by the approach of Jones had caused orders for hasty preparations to watch his movements and to check them as far as possible. This particular cutter, having been sent out to reconnoitre, sailed at daybreak, September 17. The captain reported that he "found himself within Pistol Shot of the fifty Gun French Ship, upon which he tacked about and afterwards retook a prize they had taken in the Mouth of the Firth, but a French twenty four Gun Frigate immediately made up and obliged him to abandon the Prize . . . The French Squadron consists of a fifty Gun Ship, a twenty four Gun Frigate and a Brig mounting ten Guns. The Ships sail ill and they say they are determined to come up to Leith Road. The Commander of the fifty Gun Ship is said to be acquainted with the Coast. Both the fifty Gun Ship and Frigate are painted Black. The fifty Gun Ship has a White Bottom and very clumsy mast head." (Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs, 197.) This information was immediately sent to the Commissioners of the Treasury (Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs, 191-198, 205, 206; Minutes of the Irish Board of Customs, 23, 24, 33, 36. See also Sands, 173, 174, notes; London Chronicle, September 14, 18, 1779; British Admiralty Records, Captains' Letters, No. 2305, 1 (September 20, 23,1779)

Jones could not excite the interest of his French captains in other plans. They were getting uneasy at his remaining so long on the coast and threatened to desert him. Therefore the squadron sailed south and in the course of a few days

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several prizes were taken. September 21, they were off Flamborough Head. Two brigs were captured and a fleet of vessels was chased, one of which ran ashore, but night put an end to operations. The next day a fleet appeared coming up from the south, but put back upon seeing the Bonhomme Richard. On signal two pilots came aboard the Richard and informed Jones that 'a king's frigate lay there in sight, at anchor within the Humber, waiting to take under convoy a number of merchant ships bound to the northward. The pilots imagined the Bon homme Richard to be an English ship of war and consequently communicated to me the private signal which they had been required to make. I endeavored by this means to decoy the ships out of the port, but the wind then changing and with the tide becoming unfavorable for them, the deception had not the desired effect and they wisely put back. The entrance of the Humber is exceedingly difficult and dangerous and, as the Pallas was not in sight, I thought it not prudent to remain off the entrance; I therefore steered out again to join the Pallas off Flamborough Head. In the night we saw and chased two ships until three O'clock in the morning, when being at a very small distance from them, I made the private signal of recognizance which I had given to each captain before I sailed from Groaix; one half of the answer only was returned. In this position both sides lay to till daylight, when the ships proved to be the Alliance and the Pallas." (Sherburne, 113, 114; Sands, 176-180. For another account of the cruise up to this time, see Life of Nathaniel Panning, 33-43.)

The events of the memorable day that followed are best told in the words of Jones himself: "On the morning of that day, the 23d . . . we chased a brigantine that appeared laying to to windward. About noon we saw and chased a large ship that appeared coming round Flamborough Head from the northward, and at the same time I manned and armed one of the pilot boats to send in pursuit of the brigantine, which now appeared to be the vessel that I had forced ashore. Soon after this a fleet of forty-one sail appeared off Flamborough Head, bearing N. N. E. This induced me to abandon the single ship, which had then anchored in [Bridlington] Bay; I also called back the pilot boat and hoisted a signal for a general chase. When the fleet discovered us bearing down, all the merchant ships crowded sail towards the shore. The two ships of war that protected the fleet, at the same time steered from the land and made the disposition for the battle. In approaching the enemy I crowded every possible sail and made the signal for the line of battle, to which the Alliance showed no attention. Earnest as I was for the action, I could not reach the commodore's ship until seven in the evening, being then within pistol shot, when he hailed the Bon homme Richard; we answered him by firing a whole broadside." The English ships were the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough. Jones says that at dusk they had tacked with a view to running under Scarborough Castle, but that he had headed them off. The pilot boat, which had been sent away and then recalled, contained sixteen of the Richard's best men under the second lieutenant, Henry Lunt. The boat was unable to get back before dark and Lunt then deemed it imprudent to go alongside. So the ship lost the services of these men when they were most needed (Sherburne, 114; Sands, 180, 181. Jones's report to Franklin, dated

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October 3, 1779, is supplemented by the journal of his campaigns presented to Louis XVI, Jones MSS., January 1, 1786 (quoted in Sands)

Jones took his station on the quarter-deck, while on the poop was a French volunteer officer with twenty marines. Richard Dale, first lieutenant, was in charge of the gun-deck. The tops, commanded by midshipmen, were manned by marines and sailors, twenty in the main, fourteen in the fore, and nine in the mizzen-top. They were armed with swivels, coehorns, and muskets and were ordered to clear the enemy's tops before turning their fire upon his decks (Fanning, 43, 45.)

The report goes on: "The battle being thus begun was continued with unremitting fury. Every method was practised on both sides to gain an advantage and rake each other, and I must confess that the enemy's ship, being much more manageable than the Bon homme Richard, gained thereby several times an advantageous situation, in spite of my best endeavors to prevent it. As I had to deal with an enemy of greatly superior force, I was under the necessity of closing with him, to prevent the advantage which he had over me in point of manoeuvre. It was my intention to lay the Bon homme Richard athwart the enemy's bow, but as that operation required great dexterity in the management of both sails and helm and some of our braces being shot away, it did not exactly succeed to my wishes. The enemy's bowsprit, however, came over the Bon homme Richard's poop by the mizen mast and I made both ships fast together in that situation, which by the action of the wind on the enemy's sails, forced her stern close to the Bon homme Richard's bow, so that the ships lay square alongside of each other, the yards being all entangled and the cannon of each ship touching the opponent's side.

"When this position took place it was eight o'clock, previous to which the Bon homme Richard had received sundry eighteen pounds shot below the water and leaked very much. My battery of 12-pounders, on which I had placed my chief dependance, being commanded by Lieut. Dale and Col. Weibert and manned principally with American seamen and French volunteers, were entirely silenced and abandoned. As to the six old 18-pounders that formed the battery of the lower gun-deck, they did no service whatever; two out of three of them burst at the first fire and killed almost all the men who were stationed to manage them. Before this time too, Col. De Chamillard, who commanded a party of twenty soldiers on the poop, had abandoned that station after having lost some of his men; these men deserted their quarters. I had now only two pieces of cannon, 9-pounders on the quarter deck, that were not silenced, and not one of the heavier cannon was fired during the rest of the action. The purser, Mr. Mease, who commanded the guns on the quarter deck, being dangerously wounded in the head, I was obliged to fill his place and with great difficulty rallied a few men and shifted over one of the lee quarter-deck guns, so that we afterwards played three pieces of 9-pounders upon the enemy. The tops alone seconded the fire of this little battery and held out bravely during the whole of the action, especially the

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main top where Lieut. Stack commanded. I directed the fire of one of the three cannon against the main-mast with doubleheaded shot, while the other two were exceedingly well served with grape and canister-shot to silence the enemy's musketry and clear her decks, which was at last effected.

"The enemy were, as I have since understood, on the instant of calling for quarters, when the cowardice or treachery of three of my under officers induced them to call to the enemy. The English commodore asked me if I demanded quarters and, I having answered him in the most determined negative, they renewed the battle with double fury. They were unable to stand the deck, but the fire of their cannon, especially the lower battery, which was entirely formed of 18-pounders, was incessant. Both ships were set on fire in various places and the scene was dreadful beyond the reach of language. To account for the timidity of my three under officers, I mean the gunner, the carpenter, and the master-at-arms, I must observe that the two first were slightly wounded, and as the ship had received various shots under water, and one of the pumps being shot away, the carpenter expressed his fear that she would sink and the other two concluded that she was sinking, which occasioned the gunner to run aft on the poop, without my knowledge, to strike the colors. Fortunately for me, a cannon ball had done that before by carrying away the ensignstaff ; he was therefore reduced to the necessity of sinking, as he supposed, or of calling for quarter and he preferred the latter.

"All this time the Bon homme Richard had sustained the action alone and the enemy, though much superior in force, would have been very glad to have got clear, as appears by their own acknowledgments and their having let go an anchor the instant that I laid them on board, by which means they would have escaped, had I not made them well fast to the Bon homme Richard. At last, at half past nine o'clock, the Alliance appeared and I now thought the battle at an end, but to my utter astonishment he discharged a broadside full into the stern of the Bon homme Richard. We called to him for God's sake to forbear firing into the Bon homme Richard, yet he passed along the off side of the ship and continued firing. There was no possibility of his mistaking the enemy's ship for the Bon homme Richard, there being the most essential difference in their appearance and construction; besides, it was then full moonlight and the sides of the Bon homme Richard were all black, while the sides of the prizes were yellow. Yet, for the greater security, I showed the signal of our reconnoissance by putting out three lanthorns, one at the head (bow), another at the stern (quarter), and the third in the middle, in a, horizontal line. Every tongue cried that he was firing into the wrong ship, but nothing availed; he passed round firing into the Bon homme Richard's head, stern, and broadside, and by one of his vollies killed several of my best men and mortally wounded a good officer on the forecastle.

"My situation was really deplorable. The Bon homme Richard received various shots under water from the Alliance, the leak gained on the pumps, and the fire increased much on board both ships. Some officers persuaded me to strike, of

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whose courage and good sense I entertain a high opinion. My treacherous master-at-arms let loose all my prisoners without my knowledge and my prospect became gloomy indeed." The prisoners were much frightened, believing that the ship was sinking, and were at once put to work at the pumps; otherwise, by reinforcing the enemy, they would surely have turned the scale in his favor. "I would not, however, give up the point. The enemy's main-mast began to shake, their firing decreased, ours rather increased, and the British colors were struck at half an hour past ten o'clock." (Sherburne, 115-117; Sands, 181-186; Memoires, de Paul Jones, 76-104, which differs in details from the report of October 3; MacKenzie, i, ch. viii; Scribner's Magazine, August, 1898, article by Captain Mahan; Jones MSS., September 24, 1779; Log of Bonhomme Richard; Independent Chronicle, February 17, 1780.)

Lieutenant Dale, who was in command of the gun-deck, gives further details. He says that the Bonhomme Richard's first broadside was instantly returned by the Serapis. "Our position being to windward of the Serapis, we passed ahead of her and the Serapis coming up on our larboard [starboard ?] quarter, the action commenced abreast of each other. The Serapis soon passed ahead of the Bon homme Richard and when he thought he had gained a distance sufficient to go down athwart the fore foot to rake us, found he had not enough distance and that the Bon homme Richard would be aboard him, put his helm a-lee, which brought the two ships on a line, and the Bon homme Richard having headway, ran her bows into the stern of the Serapis. . . . As we were unable to bring a single gun to bear upon the Serapis, our topsails were backed, while those of the Serapis being filled, the ships separated. The Serapis wore short round upon her heel and her jibboom ran into the mizen rigging of the Bon homme Richard; in this situation the ships were made fast together with a hawser, the bowsprit of the Serapis to the mizenmast of the Bon homme Richard, and the action recommenced from the starboard sides of the two ships. With a view of separating the ships, the Serapis let go her anchor, which manoeuvre brought her head and the stern of the Bon homme Richard to the wind, while the ships lay closely pressed against each other. A novelty in naval combats was now presented to many witnesses, but to few admirers. The rammers were run into the respective ships to enable the men to load, after the lower ports of the Serapis had been blown away to make room for running out their guns . . . Neither the repeated broadsides of the Alliance, given with the view of sinking or disabling the Bon homme Richard, the frequent necessity of suspending the combat to extinguish the flames which several times were within a few inches of the magazine, nor the liberation by the master-at-arms of nearly 500 prisoners (As there were but four hundred and seventy-two prisoners altogether, after the cruise (Pap. Cont., Congr., 193, 211, December 16, 1779), there were probably less than two hundred on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time of the battle), could change or weaken the purpose of the American commander. At the moment of the liberation of the prisoners, one of them, a commander of a 20 gun ship taken a few days before, passed through the ports on board the Serapis and informed Captain Pearson that if he would hold out only a little while longer, the

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ship alongside would either strike or sink, and that all the prisoners had been released to save their lives." (Sherburne, 121, 122; Sands, 190-194. See also Fanning, 46-56.)

Nathaniel Fanning, a midshipman on the Bon homme Richard stationed in the maintop, says that the enemy's tops had been silenced within an hour, and it was not long after that before "the topmen in our tops had taken possession of the enemy's tops, which was done by reason of the Serapis's yards being locked together with ours, that we could with ease go from our main top into the enemy's fore top; and so on, from our fore top into the Serapis's main top. Having knowledge of this, we transported from our own into the enemy's tops, . . . hand granadoes, &c, which we threw in among the enemy whenever they made their appearance." (Fanning, 50.) In the course of time the quarter-deck of the Serapis was entirely cleared, largely by this fire from the tops; and their execution extended below decks. In serving the main battery of the Serapis, many eighteen-pounder cartridges had accumulated on the gun-deck, which led to a catastrophe. Fanning says: "A single hand granado having been thrown by one of our men out of the main top of the enemy, designing it to go among the enemy who were huddled together between her gun decks, it on its way struck on one side of the combings of her upper hatch-way and rebounding from that, it took a direction and fell between their decks, where it communicated to a quantity of loose powder scattered about the enemy's cannon." The hand grenade, upon bursting, ignited the powder and the cartridges, the fire running from one to another, and "made a dreadful explosion." (Fanning, 53.) "The effect," says Dale, "was tremendous; more than twenty of the enemy were blown to pieces, and many stood with only the collars of their shirts upon their bodies." (Sherburne, 122.) This disaster doubtless hastened the end of the battle.

In his report of October 6, 1779, to the British Admiralty, Captain Pearson of the Serapis says, "that on the 23d. ult. being close in with Scarborough, about eleven o'clock, a boat came on board with a letter from the Bailiffs of that corporation, giving information of a flying squadron of the enemy's ships being on the coast and of a part of the said squadron having been seen from thence the day before, standing to the southward. As soon as I received this intelligence I made the signal for the convoy to bear down under my lee and repeated it with two guns; notwithstanding which, the van of the convoy kept their wind, with all sail stretching out to the southward from under Flamborough head, till between twelve and one, when the headmost of them got sight of the enemy's ships, which were then in chace of them. They then tacked and made the best of their way under shore for Scarborough &c., letting fly their top-gallant sheets and firing guns; upon which I made all the sail I could to windward, to get between the enemy's ships and the convoy, which I soon effected. At one o'clock we got sight of the enemy's ships from the masthead and about four we made them plain from the deck to be three large ships and a brig; upon which I made the Countess of Scarborough's signal to join me, she being in shore with the convoy. At the same time I made the signal for the convoy to make the best of their way. . . .

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"At half past five, the Countess of Scarborough joined me, the enemy's ships then bearing down upon us with a light breeze at S. S. W. At six, tacked and laid our head in shore, in order to keep our ground the better between the enemy's ships and the convoy, soon after which we perceived the ships bearing down upon us to be a two-decked ship and two frigates, but from their keeping end on upon us, on bearing down, we could not discern what colours they were under. At about 20 minutes past seven, the largest ship of the three brought to on our larboard bow, within musket shot. I hailed him and asked what ship it was; they answered in English, the Princess Royal. I then asked where they belonged to; they answered evasively, on which I told them, if they did not answer directly I would fire into them. They then answered with a shot which was instantly returned with a broadside, and after exchanging two or three broadsides, he backed his topsails and dropped upon our quarter within pistol shot, then filled again, put his helm a-weather, and run us on board upon our weather quarter and attempted to board us, but being repulsed he sheered off; upon which I backed our topsails in order to get square with him again, which as soon as he observed, he then filled, put his helm a-weather and laid us athwart hawse. His mizen shrouds took our jib boom, which hung him for some time, till at last gave way and we dropt along side of each other head and stern, when the fluke of our spare anchor hooking his quarter, we became so close fore and aft, that the muzzles of our guns touched each others sides. In this position we engaged from half past eight till half past ten, during which time, from the quantity and variety of combustible matters which they threw in upon our decks, chains, and in short into every part of the ship, we were on fire not less than ten or twelve times in different parts of the ship and it was with the greatest difficulty and exertion imaginable at times that we were able to get it extinguished. At the same time the largest of the two frigates kept sailing round us the whole action and [raking] us fore and aft, by which means she killed or wounded almost every man on the quarter and main decks.

"About half past nine, either from a hand grenade being thrown in at one of our lower deck ports, or from some other accident, a cartridge of powder was set on fire, the flames of which running from cartridge to cartridge all the way aft, blew up the whole of the people and officers that were quartered abaft the main-mast, from which unfortunate circumstance all those guns were rendered useless for the remainder of the action, and I fear the greatest part of the people will lose their lives. At ten o'clock, they called for quarters from the ship alongside and said they had struck. Hearing this, I called upon the Captain to know if they had struck, or if he asked for quarters, but no answer being made, after repeating my words two or three times, I called for the boarders and ordered them to board, which they did; but the moment they were on board her, they discovered a superior number laying under cover with pikes in their hands, ready to receive them; on which our people instantly retreated into our own ship and returned to their guns again until half past ten, when the frigate coming across our stern and pouring her broadside into us again, without our being able to bring a gun to bear on her, I found it in vain and in short impracticable, from the situation we were in,

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to stand out any longer with the least prospect of success. I therefore struck." (Almon, ix, 46; Sherburne, 124; British Admiralty Records, Captains' Letters, No. 2305.1 (October 6,1779)

The Bonhomme Richard carried eight nine-pounders on her quarter-deck and forecastle, twenty-eight twelve- pounders on the gun-deck and six eighteens on the lower deck. Her broadside weight of metal, therefore, was two hundred and fifty-eight pounds. The loss of her eighteens at the very outset at once reduced this to two hundred and four pounds. The Serapis was a fine, new, double decked ship, rated a forty-four, but carrying fifty guns: twenty eighteens on the lower gun-deck, twenty nines above, and ten sixes on the quarter-deck and forecastle, giving her a broadside of three hundred pounds to the Richard's two hundred and four. This statement, however, does not fully express her superiority, as heavy guns are far more effective in proportion than light ones; that is to say, two eighteens can do much more execution than three twelves. The number of men on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time of the battle, allowing for desertions and those absent in prizes and in the two boats of Henry and Cutting Lunt, was probably not much over three hundred; Jones makes it three hundred and twenty-two and thinks that a further deduction should be made on account of the men blown up by the bursting of the eighteen-pounders at the first fire (Mem. de Paul Jones, 97.) The crew of the Serapis appears to have been of very nearly the same size, but more homogeneous and reliable in character. The number of casualties was very large in both ships. Jones estimates his loss at a hundred and fifty killed and wounded, without specifying the proportion of each (Sherburne, 174.) Pearson states that the Serapis had forty-nine killed and sixty-eight wounded, but that the list is incomplete (Almon, ix, 48.) Both ships suffered severely. "With respect to the situation of the Bon homme Richard," says her commander, "the rudder was cut entirely off the stern frame and the transums were almost entirely cut away; the timbers, by the lower deck especially, from, the mainmast to the stern, being greatly decayed with age, were mangled beyond my power of description." Both sides of the ship for a great distance were wholly shot away, leaving little support for the upper deck, and projectiles passed through without hitting anything. Dead and wounded were lying in heaps. "A person must have been an eyewitness to form a just idea of the tremendous scene of carnage, wreck and ruin that everywhere appeared. Humanity cannot but recoil from the prospect of such finished horror and lament that war should produce such fatal consequences." (Sherburne, 117.) The mainmast and mizzen-topmast of the Serapis fell overboard immediately after her surrender and she was otherwise much injured.

It was Jones's indomitable determination not to yield that won this battle. Pearson, in surrendering to what he considered a superior force, did so before that force, through the added weight of the Alliance, had become more than a merely potential one. That the Serapis, moreover, so greatly superior in sailing qualities, so much more manageable, even with the disadvantage of her leeward

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position, should have allowed the clumsy Bonhomme Richard to get alongside and grapple her, does not indicate the best seamanship.

There seems to have been a prevalent belief in England just after the battle, expressed in a letter of Lord North, that the Serapis succeeded in beating off the Bonhomme Richard and was then obliged to strike to the Alliance (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 145.) It is certain that Pearson greatly exaggerated the part taken by Landais in the engagement. It is established by the overwhelming weight of testimony that the Alliance fired just three broadsides, all of them after the two chief contestants were lashed together; and that these broad-sides damaged the Bonhomme Richard more than they did the Serapis. Many shot-holes found on the port side of the Richard must have been made by the fire of the Alliance, for that side was never turned towards the Serapis. Many officers of the squadron, both American and French, suspected Landais of treachery, and according to their testimony he admitted that he would have been well pleased at the surrender of the Richard, which would have given him an opportunity to enter the contest, capture both ships and reap the glory (Sherburne, 156-171.)

Meanwhile the Pallas and the Countess of Scarborough had fought an engagement. It was supposed on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time that it was the Alliance that engaged the Scarborough ( Log of the Bonhomme Richard.) Of this action Jones says in his report of October 3: "Captain Cottineau engaged the Countess of Scarborough and took her after an hour's action, while the Bon homme Richard engaged the Serapis. The Countess of Scarborough is an armed ship of 20 six-pounders and was commanded by a King's officer. In the action the Countess of Scarborough and the Serapis were at a considerable distance asunder, and the Alliance, as I am informed, fired into the Pallas and killed some men. If it should be asked why the convoy was suffered to escape, I must answer that I was myself in no condition to pursue and that none of the rest showed any inclination, not even Mr. Ricot [in the Vengeance], who had held off at a distance to windward during the whole action ... The Alliance too was in a state to pursue the fleet, not having had a single man wounded or a single shot fired at her from the Serapis, and only three that did execution from the Countess of Scarborough at such a distance that one stuck in the side and the other two just touched and then dropped into the water. The Alliance killed one man only on board the Serapis. As Captain de Cottineau charged himself with manning and securing the prisoners of the Countess of Scarborough, I think the escape of the Baltic fleet cannot so well be charged to his account." (Sherburne, 119.)

Captain Piercy of the Countess of Scarborough, in his report to Captain Pearson, has left the only detailed account of the fight between his ship and the Pallas. "About two minutes," he says, "after you began to engage with the largest ships of the enemy's squadron, I received a broadside from one of the frigates, which I instantly returned and continued engaging her for about twenty minutes, when she dropt astern. I then made sail up to the Serapis, to see if I could give you any assistance, but upon coming near you I found you and the enemy so close

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together and covered with smoke that I could not distinguish one ship from the other; and for fear I might fire into the Serapis instead of the enemy, I backed the main-top-sail in order to engage the attention of one of the frigates that was then coming up. When she got on my starboard quarter she gave me her broadside, which, as soon as I could get my guns to bear (which was very soon done), I returned and continued engaging her for near two hours, when I was so unfortunate as to have all my braces, great part of the running rigging, main and mizen top-sail sheets shot away, seven of the guns dismounted, four men killed and twenty wounded, and another frigate coming up on my larboard quarter." Piercy then surrendered (Almon, ix, 48.)

Captains Pearson and Piercy were subsequently tried by a court martial, the verdict of which was that they and their officers and men "have not only acquitted themselves of their duty to their country, but have in the execution of such duty done infinite credit to themselves by a very obstinate defence against a superior force." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5315 (March 10, 1780).

These contests attracted much attention on shore and many spectators viewed the scene from Flamborough Head and Scarborough. Bright moonlight made objects visible at a distance and the spectacle must have been impressive. A letter from Scarborough says: "Soon after our arrival on Thursday evening we were told there was an engagement at sea; I immediately threw up the sash of the room I was in and we had a fair view of the engagement, which appeared very severe, for the firing was frequently so quick that we could scarce count the shots." (London Chronicle, September 30, 1779. See also Hist. Man. Com., Report xiv, App. i, 21.)

After the battle the Bonhomme Richard was on fire in several places and was leaking rapidly. There was five feet of water in the hold, one pump had been shot away, and the three others were barely able to keep the water from gaining, in a smooth sea. "The fire broke out in various parts of the ship," says Jones, "in spite of all the water that could be thrown to quench it and at length broke out as low as the powder magazine and within a few inches of the powder. In that dilemma I took out the powder upon deck, ready to be thrown overboard at the last extremity, and it was 10 o'clock the next day, the 24th, before the fire was entirely extinguished . . . After the carpenters, as well as Capt. de Cottineau and other men of sense, had well examined and surveyed the ship (which was not finished before five in the evening), I found every person to be convinced that it was impossible to keep the Bon homme Richard afloat so as to reach a port if the wind should increase, it being then only a moderate breeze. I had but little time to remove my wounded, which now became unavoidable and which was effected in the course of the night and next morning. I was determined to keep the Bon homme Richard afloat and if possible to bring her into port. For that purpose the first lieutenant of the Pallas continued on board with a party of men to attend the pumps, with boats in waiting ready to take them on board in case the water should gain on them too fast. The wind augmented in the night and the next day,

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on the 25th, so that it was impossible to prevent the good old ship from sinking. They did not abandon her till after 9 o'clock; the water was then up to the lower deck and a little after ten I saw with inexpressible grief the last glimpse of the Bon homme Richard. No lives were lost with the ship, but it was impossible to save the stores of any sort whatever. I lost even the best part of my clothes, books and papers; and several of my officers lost all their clothes and effects." (Sherburne, 117,118; Sands, 186-189. See Fanning, 61, for a description of the sinking of the Bonhomme Richard.)

Just after the action seven Englishmen of the Richard's crew stole a boat from the Serapis and escaped ashore, where they gave an account of the cruise and battle and of Jones's intentions as they understood them (London Chronicle, September, 28, 30, 1779; Boston Gazette, January 3, 1780.) The eye-witness at Scarborough says that the day after the engagement "six sail were seen about two leagues off at sea, much shattered, one of which, a large ship, had lost her mainmast; they kept their station all that day. Yesterday morning [September 25] they were gone to the northward, as is supposed, for the wind would not suit for any other quarter." (London Chronicle, September 30, 1779.) They had apparently drifted off before the wind, as they were not yet in a condition to make sail.

The situation of the squadron on the British coast was becoming dangerous, and yet before flight was possible a vast amount of work was to be done in repairing the injuries to the Serapis sufficiently to make her seaworthy. Jones took command of her when the Bonhomme Richard sank and after strenuous exertions, at 1 A.M. September 28, according to her journal, "Gott up a Jury Main Mast." By evening the squadron was ready to sail and the commodore signalled to stand to the westward, and a few hours later, to the eastward. Meanwhile on the very day of the battle Admiral Hardy, commanding the Channel fleet, who had received orders to send a strong force in search of the American squadron, dispatched five ships on that duty (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 95, September 23,1779.) A letter from Bridlington, September 24, says that in the opinion of the sailors who had escaped ashore "Jones's plan was to destroy Scarborough, Bridlington and Hull, with some other places; and that he intended landing at Flamborough yesterday morning, but the sea ran too high." (London Chronicle, September 30, 1779.) It was reported from Hull, September 26, that the squadron was still visible from Flamborough Head that morning steering north, and that it was scarcely out of sight when four British vessels appeared in pursuit (London Chronicle, September 30, 1779.) The correspondent who had been watching events from Scarborough says that on the same morning "eight of our ships of war appeared in sight, and which are gone in search of Jones."

The state of mind along the east coast of England at the time is reflected in a letter of the Marquis of Rockingham, written to Lord Weymouth September 28. Speaking of the defenses of Hull he says: "I shall not hesitate to say that from an Attack by Frigates or Ships of War it was entirely without defence; the Artillery in

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the Fort - its only defence - were unserviceable both from the Carriages being entirely rotten and also from most of the Guns which carried any Weight of Metal being honeycombed and dangerous to Use . . . A ship of 60 Guns can lay, even at low Water, within less than 400 Yards of the Town. In Paul Jones's Squadron the largest Vessel was a 40 Gun Ship, so that whatever Force he had could have come up. It appeared to me that not only from the Information of a Man who had been put by Paul Jones into a prize and who had assisted very principally in securing the men and bringing her in with the Assistance of a Hull Pilot, but also from the Size and Number of Ships in Paul Jones's Squadron, that there could not be any Number of Soldiers or Marines on Board," or that any force could be landed which could not be repelled by the militia of the neighborhood, insuring the safety of Hull and its shipping. "I conceived very differently in regard to an attempt being made by the Squadron coming up Humber. I therefore pressed as much as I possibly could that every Effort should be made to prepare Batteries and get what Artillery could be had . . . At the Meeting on Friday Morning Intelligence came that the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough had been seen shortening sail, covering the Baltic Fleet and waiting for Paul Jones "; and later "that the Engagement was begun, but it growing dark, the Event of a very Warm Action was not known . . . The Unfortunate Event of their being Captured after a most Severe Engagement came to our Knowledge at Hull on Friday Evening, when the Mayor immediately called a Meeting, and at which the Proposition of preparing Batteries was unanimously adopted." (Amer. Hist. Review, April, 1910.)

The British ships in search of Jones did not find him, although he was "tossing about to and fro in the North Sea for ten days in contrary winds and bad weather, in order to gain the port of Dunkirk, on account of the prisoners." Notwithstanding the instructions governing the cruise named the Texel as the port of destination, Jones wished to put into Dunkirk, so as to place his prizes and prisoners at once under French jurisdiction, and it would have saved him much annoyance had this been possible. The other captains, however, insisted upon carrying out the letter of the instructions and bore away for the Texel. Jones was forced to follow or to proceed alone to Dunkirk and he chose the former alternative. The squadron anchored off the Texel October 3, 1779 (Sands, 200; Sherburne, 120. Fanning, 64-66, says they were chased into the Texel by a British squadron, which remained outside the bar.)

The commodore spent nearly three months at the Texel refitting his ships and then waiting for an opportunity to get away, being blockaded by a British squadron cruising outside. The purpose of the French Minister of Marine in making the Texel the objective point of the cruise was that a convoy might be furnished for a number of vessels loaded with naval and military stores which it was desired to bring to France. Also it was hoped that the Indien might be taken into a French port, and the French ambassador to Holland, to whom Jones reported on his arrival, wished to obtain from the Dutch government authority for the sale of the ship to some merchant who could place her under a neutral flag. Nothing of this sort, however, was accomplished, and the only useful purpose

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served by the presence of the squadron in neutral waters was increasing the estrangement between England and Holland which ultimately led to war, manifestly to the advantage of the United States. If Jones could have gone directly to the French port of Dunkirk, much vexation and embarrassment would have been saved and he could readily have disposed of his prizes and prisoners. The British ambassador at the Hague, upon the arrival of the squadron, made a vehement protest to the Dutch government, and demanded ,that these ships and their crews may be stopped and delivered up, which the pirate Paul Jones of Scotland, who is a rebel subject and criminal of the state, has taken." (Sherburne, 129.) The Dutch, however, moved slowly in the matter and refused to commit themselves as to the legality of the captures. Jones was allowed time to refit his ships and was permitted to land his wounded, so that they might be cared for in a fort which was placed at his disposal. He entered into an agreement with Captain Pearson, according to which the wounded prisoners were to be guarded and cared for at the expense of the United States and later exchanged for Americans (lbid., 128-133,174; Sands, 200-218; Wharton, iii, 356, 397; Archives de la Marine, B1 91, 188, B4 158, 175.)

In consequence of the charges against him Captain Landais was ordered back to Paris by Franklin, October 15. With respect to these charges, twenty-five in number, and formally drawn up October 30, there was a practical unanimity of opinion among the officers of the squadron as to the reprehensible conduct of Landais during the cruise. Four officers of the Alliance, including the first lieutenant, attested that several people on board that ship "told Captain Landais at different times that he fired upon the wrong ship; others refused to fire." (Sherburne, 156-171.) Sometime after the departure of Landais, Jones took command of the Alliance, all the other vessels having been put under the French flag to avoid complications with Holland. Arrangements were made for the exchange of prisoners and the disposal of prizes. The squadron had taken more than enough prisoners to procure the release by exchange of all the Americans confined in England. The plan adopted was to exchange Jones's prisoners for French at the Texel, France agreeing to give the same number of English in France for the Americans in England. Jones was offered a French commission, which would further have facilitated matters, but he resolutely refused it and saved the Alliance from being also placed under the French flag. His situation was daily growing more uncomfortable, as the Dutch were unwilling longer to disregard the importunity of the British ambassador. He was at last peremptorily ordered by the Dutch admiral to depart with the first favorable wind. He was ready to sail December 1, and then waited nearly four weeks for an opportunity. On the 13th, he wrote to Franklin: "We hear that the enemy still keeps a squadron cruising off here, but this shall not prevent my attempts to depart whenever the wind will permit. I hope we have recovered the trim of this ship, which was entirely lost during the last cruise, and I do not much fear the enemy in the long and dark nights of this season. The ship is well manned and shall not be given away. I need not tell you I will do my utmost to take prisoners and prizes in my way from hence." (Sands, 239; Wharton, iii, 425.) About this time Captain

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Conyngham, who had escaped from prison in England and had crossed over to Holland, came aboard the Alliance. At last, with a favoring east wind, the ship got away from the Texel December 27, 1779, and succeeded in running the blockade of the British squadron outside (Sands, 218-243; Sherburne, 145-152, 174-184, 219; Wharton, iii, 378, 379, 424, 425, 430, 431, 535; Archives de la Marine, B4 172,140.)

With her best American colors flying, the Alliance "passed along the Flemish banks and getting to windward of the enemy's fleets of observation in the North Sea," ran through the Straits of Dover in full view of the British fleet in the Downs. During the night of December 28 several vessels were seen and the next morning the frigate passed "the Isle of Wight, in view of the enemy's fleet at Spithead, and in two days more got safe through the channel, having passed by windward in sight of several of the enemy's large two-decked cruising ships." (Sands, 243, 244.) Jones then cruised a week or more to the southward and off Cape Finisterre. January 8, 1780, he captured a brig which he sent to America. He went into Coruna January 16, where he was well received by the Spanish. Conyngham left the Alliance here and joined a ship bound to America. Jones sailed again, January 28, for another cruise off Cape Finisterre, but meeting with no success, put into Groix Roads February 10. At L'Orient, Jones found the Serapis awaiting condemnation. She and the Countess of Scarborough and Pallas had gone from the Texel to Dunkirk, whence the Serapis had proceeded to L'Orient. She was eventually sold there, and the Countess of Scarborough at Dunkirk (Sherburne, 184-190, 219; Fanning, 76-79; Log of the Alliance; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899; Jones MSS., February 10, 12, 1780, Jones to Gourlade & Moylan and to Franklin; Archives de la Marine, B1 93, 33, 36, 97, 99, B4 172, 145, 152, B8 16 (Janvier, 1780)

The situation of the United States respecting naval conditions at the end of 1779 was relatively better than in the two previous years; the falling off was proportionately less. The heavy annual loss in frigates was less heavy; there were fewer frigates to lose, and the Warren was the only one dropped from the list. The loss of the sloop Providence was keenly felt because of her very useful and successful career. Other small vessels that passed away were the sloop of war General Gates, the brig Diligent, the cutter Revenge and the sloop Argo. Of the original thirteen frigates there still remained the Providence, Trumbull, and Boston; the Trumbull had at last made her escape from the Connecticut River, but was not yet ready for sea. The Deane, Queen of France, and Ranger also remained; and two prime thirty-two-gun frigates, the Alliance and Confederacy, first went into active service in 1779. Vessels still under construction were slowly progressing towards completion. The four vessels fitted out in France to cruise under the American flag were for temporary service only. Unfortunately the prize ship Serapis was not procured for the Continental navy; no money was available for her purchase. The achievements of the navy during the year were gratifying. The several successful cruises in American waters and the brilliant exploits of Jones added reputation to the service. The Penobscot expedition was chiefly a

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local affair and the gloom produced by the disaster did not, in its full intensity at least, overspread the whole country.

In 1779, privateering played a still more important part in naval warfare than before. Two hundred and nine commissions were granted by the Continental Congress to private armed vessels, eighty more than the number of the previous year. The enterprise of the separate states also in this mode of sea-service continued to develop and increase. Greater activity was likewise displayed by the English. From August, 1778, to April, 1779, one hundred privateers were fitted out in Liverpool, aggregating more than twenty-four thousand tons, mounting sixteen hundred and fifty guns and with crews numbering more than seventy-four hundred men. A list of British privateers fitted out at New York, published in April, comprised one hundred and twenty-one vessels, including two of thirty-six guns each, one thirty, one twenty-eight, and thirty others of twenty or more guns, the whole manned by about ninety-six hundred men. Another list, compiled for Admiral Gambier, February 27, "of Private Ships and Vessels of War belonging to the Port of New York, now at Sea," contains sixty-nine names. Many American vessels were taken by these privateers, of which, however, many in turn were captured (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495, list of Continental letters of marque; London Chronicle, April 1, 29, 1779; Massachusetts Spy, April 29, June 3, 1779; Boston Post, March 13, 27, 1779; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, February 27, 1779.)

During the year 1779, the British navy increased, in the total number of ships, from four hundred and thirty-two to four hundred and eighty-one; ships in commission, from three hundred and seventeen to three hundred and sixty-four. Seventy thousand men manned the navy. On the North American station a smaller fleet was maintained than during the two preceding years. With enemies on the continent of Europe to provide against, a larger part of the naval force was kept at home or employed in other seas. Only about sixty vessels were stationed in North America and less than half of these were frigates or larger ships. A powerful fleet was held in the West Indies (Hannay, 211; Schomberg, i, 453; Almon, viii, 314, 315, Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, April 3, A. D. 486, August 30, 1779, lists of ships employed under Admirals Gambier and Arbuthnot.)

It is stated that in 1779, five hundred and sixteen vessels, of which twenty-nine were privateers and the others merchantmen, were captured from the British by their enemies; how many of them by Americans does not appear. One hundred and eleven of these were retaken or ransomed. During the same time the British took two hundred and sixty-nine vessels from their enemies, of which thirty-one were privateers, and five were recaptured (Clowes, iii, 396.) Other lists cover too short a period of time to be of value and presumably have been included in the above compilation (Almon, ix, 343, 350, 351, 3540 358.) The Continental navy captured forty-four vessels, including three regular men-of-war and several privateers, letters of marque, and armed transports (Neeser, ii, 28, 30, 288.)

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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XIV

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1780

South Carolina and Georgia, far from the seat of the Continental government and from the headquarters of the army, were peculiarly exposed to attack, yet for more than two years after the unsuccessful attempt of the British to take Charleston in 1776, they were not seriously menaced. In December, 1778, however, the English got possession of Savannah, and during the next year they determined upon another effort to capture the whole lower South. Admiral D'Estaing spent more than half of 1779 in the West Indies, where, with the exception of the conquest of Grenada, he reaped little glory in his encounters with the British. Up to this time the actual assistance he had rendered to the American cause was slight and there was general dissatisfaction with the meagre results thus far derived from the French alliance. D'Estaing's aid being now requested in frustrating the British designs on the South, he appeared off the coast of Georgia, September 1, 1779, with a powerful fleet, although he had been ordered back to France, and joined General Lincoln in an attempt to recapture Savannah. Through delay, however, the opportunity was lost and their assault when made was unsuccessful. D'Estaing then sailed for France and Lincoln fell back on Charleston. General Clinton sailed from New York for South Carolina late in December, 1779 (Mahan, 365-376; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, 519-524; Stevens, 1203, 1238, 1246, 1247, 2010, 2011, 2023; Almon, vii, 244-248, viii, 182, 298, ix, 65; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 146-149; Channing, iii, 300.)

The full extent of the benefit derived from the French alliance was not appreciated at that early day in America. Its effect on the British imagination and the potential weight of the French fleet, its mere presence on the ocean, were not inconsiderable. An intercepted letter from General Clinton to Lord George Germain, dated Savannah, January 30, 1780, captured on a British packet by an American privateer, gives a view of the military situation as seen by English eyes and discloses a state of mind not free from apprehension. Clinton seems to have been impressed by the strength of Washington's army and of its position and devoted his energies before going South to strengthening the defenses of New York. "The violent demonstrations of the rebels," he wrote, "which threatened a determined attack on the post at New York in conjunction with a large naval and land armament under Count d'Estaing, then directing itself against the garrison at Savannah, necessarily turned our whole endeavours to defeat so alarming a combina tion.... Not a moment was to be lost in such a critical conjuncture, for every moment was important and expected to come with the account of d'Estaing's appearance before our harbour." Washington not only had a superior position in the Highlands, but likewise along the shore to the east, where "every advantage of water was also in his power by the Sound and, under protection of

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the French fleet, exposed us to the most perplexing embarrassments. Assailable in so many points and every instant expecting d'Estaing, we had but time to look towards and take measures for our own defence and the occasion required us to put forward our best exertions. I do not reckon among the lesser misfortunes of the last year the operations of d'Estaing on the American coast, the vast relief thereby given to the Rebel trade and the injury which it brought upon our's, the impression it carried home to the minds of the people, of our lost dominion of the sea, and the disposition of the French to give them every assistance reconcileable with the general objects of the war, to compleat our ruin on the Continent." (Almon, x, 36, 37, reprinted from Pennsylvania Journal, April 8, 1780. See Channing, iii, 300, 301.)

Commodore Whipple's squadron, consisting of the frigates Providence, Boston, and Queen of France, and the Ranger, arrived at Charleston December 23, 1779. An officer of the Providence wrote home: "On our arrival here we found our designs against the enemy frustrated, as they had not attempted nor is it probable they will attempt any thing against this town this season." This was written January 8, 1780. Three days later he added: "Since writing the above, we have received an account that the enemy are building flat boats and making preparations for another expedition against this town, which they say is to commence as soon as their reinforcement arrives from New York. If they should attempt it, I believe it will terminate as much to their dishonour as their cause and actions deserve, as the town and river are well fortified." (Independent Chronicle, February 24, 1780.) January 24, the Providence and Ranger went to sea for a short cruise. The same officer says: "On our way to Tybee in Georgia we captured 3 transports, a brig of 14 guns and two armed sloops, which were loaded with cloathing, some military stores, a few infantry, about forty light dragoons of Lord Cathcart's legion, 7 or 8 officers, as many passengers, two horses, and military furniture for forty others, which they were obliged to throw overboard in some heavy gales on their passage. By these vessels we learn that 140 sail left New-York about 4 weeks before, under convoy of 6 or 7 ships of the line and several frigates, with troops destined for Savannah. Then we proceeded to Tybee, at the bar of which we saw a very considerable number of ships at anchor (five of them appeared to be above 36 guns) and a variety of smaller vessels, &c. The object of our voyage was to take some of their transports, that we might gain intelligence of their strength and make what discoveries we could with respect to their situation at Tybee; this being done we returned on Thursday [January 27]. The force of the enemy must be great, considering the number of vessels employed to transport them. Some say that Sir Henry Clinton commands in person, others Lord Cornwallis. Let it be who it may, I believe we shall have a pretty serious affair of it. There can be no doubt but their intention is to carry this town." (Independent Chronicle, April 6, 1780.) General Lincoln had about four thousand men at Charleston and the defenses of the city were strengthened as far as possible. General Clinton landed, February 11, south of the town and advanced upon it and invested it on the land side with ten thousand troops, while a British fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot, consisting of one fifty-gun ship, two forty-

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fours, and four thirty-twos, with smaller vessels, lay outside. On account of shallow water inside the bar, there was no practicable anchorage from which the American vessels could operate to advantage in defense of the channel and dispute the passage of the bar by the British. To inquiries of General Lincoln on this point a board of three naval captains and five pilots replied, February 27, that there was no anchorage within three miles of the bar. "In the place where the ships can be anchored, the bar cannot be covered or annoyed . . . Our opinion is that the ships can do most effectual service for the defence and security of the town, to act in conjunction with Fort Moultrie, which we think will best answer the purpose of the ships being sent here . . . Our reasons are that the channel is so narrow between the fort and the middle ground, that they may be moored so as to rake the channel and prevent the enemy's troops being landed to annoy the fort." (Tucker, 132-134.) The sinking of hulks or other obstructions in this narrow part of the channel was apparently not attempted. The Americans destroyed the lighthouse and ranges; also Fort Johnson, on the south side of the harbor, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. This work was done by Captain Tucker of the Boston. In addition to the Continental ships the South Carolina navy furnished four vessels for the defense of Charleston, two of which, the Bricole, 44, and the Truite, 26, had been purchased from France; the other two were the General Moultrie, 20, and the Notre Dame, 16. Two French ships in the harbor, L'Aventure, 26, and Polacre, 16, also took part.

In his report of May 14 to the British Admiralty, after telling of landing the army, Admiral Arbuthnot says: "Preparations were next made for passing the squadron over Charles-town bar, where [at] high water spring tides there is only nineteen feet water. The guns, provision and water were taken out of the Renown, Roebuck, and Romulus, to lighten them, and we lay in that situation on the open coast in the winter season of the year, exposed to the insults of the enemy for sixteen days, before an opportunity offered of going into the harbour, which was effected without any accident on the 20th of March, notwithstanding the enemy's galleys continually attempted to prevent our boats from sounding the channel . . . The rebel naval force . . . made an appearance of disputing the passage up the river at the narrow pass between Sullivan's island and the middle ground, having moored their ships and galleys in a position to make a raking fire as we approached Fort Moultrie, but on the squadron arriving near the bar and anchoring on the inside, they abandoned that idea, retired to the town, and changed their plan of defence. The Bricole, Notre Dame, Queen of France, Truite and General Moultrie frigates, with several merchant ships, fitted with chevaux de frize on their decks, were sunk in the channel [of the Cooper River] between the town and Shute's Folly; a boom was extended across, composed of cables, chains and spars, secured by the ship's masts, and defended from the town by strong batteries of pimento logs, in which were mounted upwards of forty pieces of heavy cannon. . . . As soon as the army began to erect their batteries against the town I took the first favourable opportunity to pass Sullivan's Island, upon which there is a strong fort and batteries, the chief defence of the harbour; accordingly I weighed at one o'clock on the 9th [of April] with the Roebuck,

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Richmond, Romulus, Blonde, Virginia, Raleigh, and Sandwich armed ship, the Renown bringing up the rear, and passing through a severe fire, anchored in about two hours under James Island, with the loss of twenty- seven seamen killed and wounded." The total loss of the British fleet during the operations about Charleston was twenty-three killed and twenty-eight wounded. "The Richmond's foretop-mast was shot away and the ships in general sustained damage in their masts and rigging; however, not materially in their hulls. But the Acetus transport, having on board a few naval stores, grounded within gun-shot of Sullivan's Island and received so much damage that she was obliged to be abandoned and burnt." (Almon, x, 45, 46.)

To prevent the British passing up the Cooper River the Americans sunk eleven vessels, including those mentioned in Arbuthnot's report. Possibly these vessels, or others less valuable than some of them, might have been sunk to better advantage in the channel below Fort Moultrie, before the British crossed the bar. It might also with some reason be maintained that the squadron should have made a more vigorous defense of the channel at that point in conjunction with the fort; when by a lucky chance a few broadsides might have been able to cripple one or more of the British ships while they were passing through the narrowest places under a raking fire and in a disadvantageous position. Instead of that, the Americans retired up the river, which they attempted to block. The Ranger and two galleys were stationed above the obstructions while the guns and crews of the other naval vessels were sent ashore to reinforce the batteries. The British lines gradually drew closer to the town and American batteries on the north side of the Cooper River were taken. A bombardment began April 12. A few entries in the log of the Ranger tell the story of the closing days of the siege. April 15: "Enemy Kept up A Constant Cannonading." May 7: "At 6 A.M. we could plainly discover that Our people had Evacuated Fort Moultrie & that the enemy had taken Possession of it; at 7 they hoisted their flag on it." May 8: "This morning the Enemy sent in a Flag of truce, Which Caused a Total cessation of arms." May 9: "At 9 P.M. the enemy began A most Desperate Cannonading, Throwing Shells, and firing of small arms, [which] Continued all night, with very little loss on our side." May 10: "The enemy still Keeping A constant firing of Cannon, Throwing of Shells, Carcases, &c." Here the record abruptly ends. Lincoln capitulated May 11 and Whipple's squadron fell into the hands of the enemy. The Providence, Boston, and Ranger were taken into the British service, the two latter under the names Charlestown and Halifax. The officers were paroled and sent to Philadelphia (Tucker, ch. vii; Almon, x, 38-53; Andrew Sherburne, 26-29; Log of the Ranger; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 162 (Arbuthnot to Germain, May 15, 1780) ; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April, 1891, Journal of Lieutenant Jennison; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 263, 264 (February 22, 1780); Boston Gazette, April 17, July 10, 1780 ; Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1780; Dawson, ch. lix; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, 524-527; Channing, iii, 317, 318.)

The frigate Trumbull, which was launched in 1776, remained in the Connecticut River where she was built until 1779, unable to pass over the bar at the mouth of

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the river. It is said that at the suggestion of Captain Hinman she was finally floated over by means of a number of casks full of water placed along her sides, held together by ropes passing under the keel and then pumped out, which lifted the ship sufficiently to carry her over the bar. She was taken to New London and fitted for sea. Meanwhile another frigate, the Bourbon, was being built on the Connecticut River. It was hoped that she would soon be at sea and Captain Thomas Read was ordered to command her, but for lack of money it was necessary to suspend work on her and she was not finished in time to take part in the war. Captain James Nicholson was appointed to command the Trumbull, September 20, 1779, but it was not until April 17, 1780, that cruising orders were sent to him. The Board of Admiralty, which had succeeded the Marine Committee in the administration of naval affairs, intended that the Trumbull should cruise in company with other Continental ships, but not with privateers; of such joint expeditions the board disapproved. Meanwhile, apparently awaiting an opportunity to get a number of vessels together, the orders of April 17 were repeated May 22 ; they prescribed a cruise for the Trumbull alone until the end of June (Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 47; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 238, 240, 241, 243, 252, 274, 276, 280, 285, 288 (September 20, October 6, 12, 21, December 18, 1779, April 7, 11, 17, May, 12, 22, 23, 1780)

The Trumbull sailed from New London late in May and had not been long at sea when she fell in with the British letter of marque Watt and was soon engaged in one of the hardest-fought naval actions of the war. In Nicholson's account of the battle he says: "At half past ten in the morning of June [1st], lat. 35. N. long. 64 W. we discovered a sail from the mast-head and immediately handed all our sails, in order to keep ourselves undiscovered until she came nearer to us, she being to windward. At eleven we made her to be a large ship from the deck, coming down about three points upon our quarter; at half past eleven we thought she hauled a point more astern of us. We therefore made sail and hauled upon a wind towards her, upon which she came right down upon our beams; we then took in our small sails, hauled the courses up, hove the maintop-sail to the mast, got all clear for action, and waited for her.

"At half past eleven we filled the main-top (the ship being then about gun-shot to windward of us) in order to try her sailing, also that by her hauling up after us we might have an opportunity of discovering her broadside. She immediately got her main tack out and stood after us; we then observed she had thirteen ports of a side, exclusive of her briddle ports, and eight or ten on her quarter deck and forecastle. After a very short exhortation to my people they most chearfully agreed to fight her; at twelve we found we greatly outsailed her and got to windward of her; we therefore determined to take that advantage. Upon her observing our intention she edged away, fired three shot at us and hoisted British colours as a challenge; we immediately wore after her and hoisted British colours also. This we did in order to get peaceably alongside of her, upon which she made us a private signal and upon our not answering it she gave us the first broadside, we then being under British colours and about one hundred yards

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distant. We immediately hoisted the Continental colours and returned her a broadside, then about eighty yards distance, when a furious and close action commenced and continued for five glasses, no time of which we were more than eighty yards asunder and the greater part of the time not above fifty; at one time our yard-arms were almost enlocked. She set us twice on fire with her wads, as we did her once; she had difficulty in extinguishing her's, being obliged to cut all her larboard quarter nettings away.

"At the expiration of the above time my first Lieutenant, after consulting and agreeing with the second, came aft to me and desired I would observe the situation of our masts and rigging, which were going over the side; therefore begged I would quit her before that happened, otherwise we should certainly be taken. I therefore most unwillingly left her, by standing on the same course we engaged on; I say unwillingly, as I am confident if our masts would have admitted of our laying half an hour longer alongside of her, she would have struck to us, her fire having almost ceased and her pumps both going. Upon our going ahead of her she steered about four points away from us. When about musquet shot asunder, we lost our main and mizen topmast and in spite of all our efforts we continued losing our masts until we had not one left but the foremast and that very badly wounded and sprung. Before night shut in we saw her lose her maintopmast. I was in hopes when I left her of being able to renew the action after securing my mast, but upon inquiry found so many of my people killed and wounded and my ship so much of a wreck in her masts and rigging, that it was impossible. We lost eight killed and thirty one wounded; amongst the former was one lieutenant, one midshipman, one serjeant of marines, and one quarter gunner; amongst the latter was one lieutenant, since dead, the captain of marines, the purser, the boatswain, two midshipmen, the cockswain, and my clerk, the rest were common men, nine of which in the whole are since dead. No people shewed more true spirit and gallantry than mine did; I had but one hundred and ninety-nine men when the action commenced, almost the whole of which, exclusive of the officers, were green country lads, many of them not clear of their sea-sickness, and I am well persuaded they suffered more in seeing the masts carried away than they did in the engagement.

"We plainly perceived the enemy throw many of his men overboard in the action, two in particular which were not quite dead; from the frequent cries of his wounded and the appearance of his hull, I am convinced he must have lost many more men than we did and suffered more in his hull. Our damage was most remarkable and unfortunate in our masts and rigging, which I must again say alone saved him; for the last half hour of the action I momently expected to see his colours down, but am of opinion he persevered from the appearance of our masts. You will perhaps conclude from the above that she was a British man of war, but I beg leave to assure you that it was not then, nor is it now my opinion; she appeared to me like a French East-Indiaman cut down. She fought a greater number of marines and more men in her tops than we did, the whole of which we either killed or drove below. She dismounted two of our guns and silenced two

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more; she fought four or six and thirty twelve pounders, we fought twenty-four twelve and six sixes. I beg leave to assure you that let her be what she would, either letter of marque or privateer, I give you my honour that was I to have my choice tomorrow, I would sooner fight any two-and-thirty gun frigate they have on the coast of America, than to fight that ship over again; not that I mean to degrade the British men of war, far be it from me, but I think she was more formidable and was better manned than they are in general." (Almon, x, 225-227.)

Some further details are given in a letter of Gilbert Saltonstall, captain of marines on the Trumbull. "As soon as she discovered us she bore down for us. We got ready for action, at one o'clock began to engage, and continued without the least intermission for five glasses, within pistol shot. It is beyond my power to give an adequate idea of the carnage, slaughter, havock and destruction that ensued. Let your imagination do its best, it will fall short. We were literally cut all to pieces; not a shroud, stay, brace, bowling or any other of our rigging standing. Our main top-mast shot away, our fore, main, mizen, and jigger masts gone by the board, two of our quarter-deck guns disabled, thro' our ensign 62 shot, our mizen 157, main-sail 560, foresail 180, our other sails in proportion. Not a yard in the ship but received one or more shot, six shot through her quarter above the quarter deck, four in the waste, our quarter, stern, and nettings full of langrage, grape and musket ball. We suffered more than we otherwise should on account of the ship that engaged us being a very dull sailer. Our ship being out of command, she kept on our starboard quarter the latter part of the engagement. After two and a half hours action she hauld her wind, her pumps going; we edged away, so that it fairly may be called a drawn battle." (Independent Chronicle, July 6, 1780.)

In another letter, of June 19, Saltonstall says: "Our troubles ceased not with the engagement. The next day, the 2nd, it blew a heavy gale of wind, which soon carried away our main and mizen masts by the board, the fore topmast followed them and had it not been for the greatest exertions, our foremast must have gone also, it being wounded in many places, but by fishing and propping it was saved. . . . We remained in this situation till the next day, the 3rd, our men having got a little over the fatigue of the engagement and the duty of the ship; the gale abating we got up jury masts and made the best shift. In the night the gale increased again and continued from that time till we got soundings on George's Banks in 45 fathoms of water the 11th instant. We got into Nantasket the 14th, the day following into the harbor." (Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 55.)

The Watt, greatly shattered, got into New York June 11. The accounts of her force vary somewhat. She seems to have mounted twenty-six twelve-pounders and from six to ten sixes. Her crew was reported to number two hundred and fifty, but one New York paper made it one hundred and sixty-four. Her commander, Captain Coulthard, describing the action, says: " Saw a large ship under the lee bow, bearing N. W. by W., distant about three or four miles; supposed her to be a rebel vessel bound to France and immediately bore down

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upon her. When she perceived we were standing for her she hauled up her courses and hove too. We then found her to be a frigate of 34 or 36 guns and full of men and immediately hoisted our colours and fired a gun; she at the same time hoisted Saint George's colours and fired a gun to leeward. We then took her for one of his Majesty's cruizing frigates and intended speaking to her, but as soon as she saw we were getting on her weather quarter, they filled their topsails and stood to the eastward. We then fired five guns to bring her to, but she having a clean bottom and we foul and a cargo in, could not come up with her. Therefore, finding it a folly to chace, fired two guns into her and wore ship to the westward; at the same time she fired one gun at us, loaded with grape shot and round, and wore after us. Perceiving this, we immediately hauled up our courses and hove too for her.

"She still kept English colours flying till she came within pistol shot on our weather quarter; she then hauled down English colours and hoisted rebel colours, upon which we instantly gave her three cheers and a broadside. She returned it and we came alongside one another and for above seven glasses engaged yard arm and yard arm; my officers and men behaved like true sons of Old England. While our braces were not shot away, we box-hauled our ship four different times and raked her through the stern, shot away her main topmast and main yard and shattered her hull, rigging and sails very much. At last all our braces and rigging were shot away and the two ships lay along-side of one another, right before the wind; she then shot a little ahead of us, got her foresail set and run. We gave her t'other broadside and stood after her; she could only return us two guns. Not having a standing shroud, stay or back- stay, our masts wounded through and through, our hull, rigging and sails cut to pieces, and being very leaky from a number of shot under water, only one pump fit to work, the other having been torn to pieces by a twelve pound shot, after chasing her for eight hours, lost sight and made the best of our way to this port. We had eleven men killed, two more died the next day, and seventy-nine wounded." (Almon, x, 142, 143; Massachussetts Spy, August 17, 1780; Boston Gazette, June 5, 19, July 24, August 28, 1780; Independent Chronicle, July 6, September 7, 1780; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 51-56; Williams, 273.)

The Board of Admiralty continued to develop plans for a cruise by a squadron under Nicholson, who was the senior captain of the navy. The Confederacy, Captain Harding, which had been temporarily repaired at Martinique after her dismasting and had returned to Philadelphia about May 1, the Deane, Captain Samuel Nicholson, brother of the commodore, and the Saratoga, a new eighteen-gun sloop of war commanded by Captain Young, were, with the Trumbull, to make up the squadron. These ships were all that remained of the Continental navy, in commission at this time, except the Alliance. The Deane had made a successful cruise early in the year, taking a number of prizes. She and the Saratoga were ready for sea in June, but the Confederacy and Trumbull were in need of extensive repairs. Nicholson received a Letter from the Board of Admiralty, dated June 30, congratulating him upon "the gallantry displayed in the

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Defence" of his ship in his recent action with the Watt and urging "exertions in Speedily refitting" her. The long-looked-for reinforcement from France, consisting of five thousand troops under General Rochambeau, sailed from Brest May 1, convoyed by seven ships of the line commanded by Admiral de Ternay, and arrived at Newport July 12; this place had been evacuated by the British in October, 1779. It was intended by Congress that the Continental squadron should keep a lookout for an expected second division of the French fleet from Brest and warn them of the situation of the British fleet, and should also cooperate with De Ternay; this was in accordance with the wish of General Washington, but no union of these forces took place. All the French ships were blockaded by the British - the second division in Brest, and De Ternay in Newport by a superior force under Arbuthnot, who had returned from Charleston (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 259, 262, 266, 281, 284, 285, 298, 312, 815, 322 (January 31, February 15, 28, May 2, 12, June 30, August 11, 14, 28, 1780) ; Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 12, 5 (February 4, 1780), 37, 223, 287, 311 (April 11, August 1, 6, 1780); Boston Post, April 20, 1780; Boston Gazette, May 1, 1780; Mahan, 382, 383.)

The Mercury, a packet in the employ of Congress which had been stationed in Delaware Bay, set sail in August for Holland under the command of Captain Pickles, having on board as passenger Henry Laurens, who was sent on an important mission to the Dutch government. The Mercury was convoyed for a short distance by the Saratoga and early in September was captured by a British frigate off the Banks of Newfoundland. The dispatches, including a draft of a treaty with Holland, were thrown overboard, but unfortunately did not sink and were recovered by the British. Laurens was confined about a year in the Tower of London (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 295, 311, 315 (June 19, August 11, 14,1780); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 431 (July 18,1780); Stevens, 930, 931.)

Many instructions were issued for the movements of the Continental squadron. August 11, the Trumbull was ordered on a two weeks' cruise off the coast, in a letter which required of Commodore Nicholson that "all such prizes as you may take and send into this port are to be directed to the care of the Board of Admiralty, the prizes which you may be Obliged through necessity to send into Other Ports you are to direct to the care of the Continental Agent of the district. You are always to Observe that you are to give the preference to this port as a place to which you are to direct your prizes when winds, weather and Other circumstances will admit of it without being more hazardous than elsewhere. The Deane and Saratoga will Sail in Company with you and under your Orders; you will therefore prepare and give to the Captains or commanding Officer of each of those Ships such instructions as may be necessary for regulating the Cruize . . . You will also when at the Capes employ some of your Crew in catching Fish, which will Afford a healthful variety of food to them and save your flesh Provisions. You are to see that the Ships company of the little fleet under your command frequently are disciplined in the exercise of the great Guns and Small Arms, to render them more expert in time of Battle, and that OEconomy, frugality,

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neatness and good Order are punctually Observed." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 312.) August 19, the Saratoga was ordered to sea with sealed instructions "of a Secret Committee of Conferrence with the Minister of France," which the Board of Admiralty surmised might take her to the West Indies. On the 29th the Trumbull was ordered on a three weeks' cruise on the Atlantic coast with the Deane, and two weeks later this cruise was extended and the Saratoga was to endeavor to join them. Renewed instructions as to cooperation with the French were included in nearly all the board's letters. As late as August 31, the Confederacy was still unfit for active service, being "the only Continental frigate now within Harbour, but neither manned Or victualed for the Sea." The Deane made a three weeks' cruise off the coast of South Carolina in September, but "without taking anything worth naming," according to Richard Langdon, son of the president of Harvard College, who was on board. This caused disappointment, for success had been depended upon "to equip three quarters of our navy, which is now in this river, viz: the Confederacy, Trumbull and Deane frigates." (Independent Chronicle, January 25, 1781.) The Saratoga took four valuable prizes, at least one of which was more heavily armed than herself ; they were all recaptured, however. The ships were in port a large part of the time preparing for sea under difficulties which caused endless delay. These difficulties as might be expected were mostly financial and not only hindered repairs on the vessels in commission, but prevented the completion of those under construction, the frigate Bourbon in the Connecticut River and the seventy-four-gun ship America still on the stocks at Portsmouth. The Board of Admiralty appealed to the governors of the New England States and to other persons of influence for help, but at this period of the war money had become the scarcest of all commodities. William Vernon, of the Eastern Navy Board, writing, November 10, about naval matters to William Ellery, then a member of the Board of Admiralty, says that Captain Samuel Nicholson had recently "arrived from Phila. having leave of absence . . . to come to Boston, his younger Brother John Nicholson being appointed to the Command of his ship the Deane Frigate, which he is to resume the Command of at the end of her present Cruise; he further informs that all the Continental Ships were to sail from the Delaware in consequence. That it was reported, when their Cruise was up, they were to go into the Chesapeake to recruit their Stores and Men; this message he verily believes was agreed upon. Which if true we are extreem sorry to hear, not that we as a Board can receive any injury, on the contrary shall get clear of a great deal of Trouble and Fatigue, but are fearful the Public are in much danger of Looseing the small remains of their Navy, at least of their being rendered useless for a Time, as it certainly cannot be difficult for British ships of superior Force to block up if not Capture them; moreover if this should not be the case, can stores of every kind be supplied in Virginia or Maryland, can Men be obtained to Mann the Deane and Trumbul, whose Time must be expired at their Arrival in the Chesapeake ? Indeed we think they were entitled to their discharge upon their Arrival in the Delaware from their last Cruise; they certainly were shiped for a Cruise only, upon no other Terms have we at any Time been able to Mann our ships. If we do not keep faith with the Seamen, our expectations are at an end of

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even Manning the Ships. I speak in regard to the Trumbul and Deane; perhaps it may be otherwise with the Confederacy and Saratoga, they may be shiped upon the New invitation of Entering for 12 Months. I have given you these hints not officially, meerly as my private opinion and that of my Colleage and make no doubt they will have their proper weight with you and that upon your joining the board of Admiralty at Phila., will suggest to them what shall in your judgment appear consonant to the benefit and Interest of the Public." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 268.) Another matter taken up by the Board of Admiralty in 1780 was the systematic attempt to obtain, through navy boards and other agents, all the information possible as to the numbers, character, and movements of the British naval forces at all points between Newfoundland and the West Indies (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 265, 289, 290, 291, 294, 300, 303, 304, 308, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322, 331 (February 22, May 30, June 16, July 7, 21, August 4, 11, 14, 19, 22, 29, 31, September 14,1780); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 265, 269, 273, 517 (July 21, November 6, 1780); Penn. Packet, October 24, 1780; Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 264-269; Barney, 84-86.)

The Massachusetts navy, which had lost all of its vessels in commission in the ill-fated Penobscot expedition, was about this time reinforced by the largest and most powerful ship in the state service during the Revolution. This was the twenty-six-gun frigate Protector, which was built on the Merrimac River and launched in 1779, but not ready for sea until the spring of 1780. In December, 1779, she narrowly escaped destruction by a fire at the wharf where she was moored. March 21, 1780, the following action was taken by the Massachusetts General Court: "Whereas it is absolutely necessary to increase the Naval Force of this State to defend the Trade and Sea Coasts thereof, Therefore Resolved, that the Board of War be and they are hereby directed to procure and fit for the Sea with all possible dispatch Two Armed Vessels to carry from Twelve to Sixteen Guns each." Under this and supplementary acts a ship called the Mars was purchased in April and another was built and named the Tartar; the latter, however, was not finished until 1782. Captain Williams was put in command of the Protector; among her midshipmen was Edward Preble, who afterwards became famous. In January it had been intended to send her to Europe, but in May, after having made a short cruise, Williams was ordered by the Board of War on another, as far east as the Banks of Newfoundland and south to the thirty-eighth parallel and to the track of vessels from the West Indies, meanwhile making occasional visits to the coast of Maine. Captain Sampson was appointed to command the Mars, and in June was ordered to Nantes for goods needed by the army; he sailed early in August. On June 22, the General Court expressed disapproval of robberies said to have been committed along the Nova Scotia shore by Massachusetts privateers and resolved that in the future privateers must give bonds for the abolition of such evils (Mass. Court Rec., March 15, 21, April 20, May 5, June 22; Mass. Archives, cli, 506, cliii, 320, 345; Massachusetts Mag., July, October, 1910; Amer. Hist. Rev., x, 69; Boston Post, April 20, 1780.)

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On her cruise to the eastward the Protector fought a hard battle on the Banks of Newfoundland of which the captain gives an account in his journal. "Friday, June 9, 1780, wind W. S. W. At 7 A.M. saw a large ship to windward bearing down for us under English colours; she hauled up her courses in order for action. At 11 A.M. we came along-side of her under English colours, hail'd her; she answered from Jamaica. I shifted my colours & gave her a broadside. She soon returned us another. The action was heavy for near 3 glasses, when unfortunately she took fire and soon after blew up; got out our boats to save the men, took up 55 of them. Among them was the 3d mate and the only officer sav'd; the greatest part of them very much wounded and burnt. She was called the Admiral Duff, a large ship of 32 guns, commanded by Richard Stranger, from St. Kitts and St. Eustatia laden with sugar and tobacco, bound to London." (Boston Gazette, July 24, 1780.) The Protector lost one killed and five wounded out of her complement of two hundred.

This event was narrated in greater detail many years later by Luther Little, a midshipman on the Protector and brother of the first lieutenant, George Little. The midshipman says that on the morning of the battle there was a fog and when it "lifted, saw large ship to windward under English colors, standing down before the wind for us, we being to leaward. Looked as large as a 74. Concluded she was not a frigate. All hands piped to quarters. Hammocks brought up and stuffed in the nettings, decks wet and sanded &c . . . We stood on under cruising sail. She tried to go ahead of us and then hove to under fighting sail. We showed English flag. She was preparing for action. We steered down across her stern & hauled up under her lee quarter, breeching our guns aft to bring them to bear. Our first It. hailed from the gangboard . . . Our capt. ordered broadside and colors changed. She replied with 3 cheers and a broadside. Being higher, they overshot us, cutting our rigging. A regular fight within pistol range. In a hf hour a cannon shot came thro' our side, killing Mr. Scollay, a midshipman who commanded the 4th 12-pounder from the stem. His brains flew over my face and my gun, which was the third from the stern. In an hour all their topmen were kld by our marines, 60 in no. and all Americans. Our marines kld the man at their wheel & the ship came down on us, her cat-head staving in our quarter galley. We lashed their jib-boom to our main shrouds. Our marines firing into their port holes kept them from charging. We were ordered to board, but the lashing broke & we were ordered back. Their ship shooting alongside nearly locked our guns & we gave a broadside, wh. cut away her mizen mast and made gt havoc. Saw her sinking and her maintopgallantsail on fire, wh run down her rigging and caught a hogshead of cartridges under her quarter deck and blew it off. A charge of grape entered my port hole. One passed between my backbone and windpipe and one thro' my jaw, lodging in the roof of my mouth & taking off a piece of my tongue, the other thro' my upper lip, taking away part, and all my upper teeth. Was carried to cockpit; my gun was fired only once after. I had fired it 19 times. Thinking I was mortally wounded they dressed first those likelier to live. Heard the surgeon say 'he will die.' The Duff sunk, on fire, colors flying. Our boats had been injured, but were repaired as well as possible & sent to pick up the

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swimmers; saved 55, one half wounded. Then first It confided to me that many were drowned rather than be made captives. Some tried to jump from the boats. Our surgeons amputated limbs of 5 of them. One was sick with W. India fever and had floated out of his hammock between decks. The weather was warm and in less than 10 days 60 of our men had it. Among those saved were 2 American captains & their crews, prisoners on board the Duff. One of the Am. captains told us that Capt. Strang had hoped we were a Continental frigate, when he first saw us." (Manuscript in Harvard College Library.) While cruising off Nova Scotia with a great deal of sickness on board, the Protector fell in with the Thames, a British frigate of thirty-two guns. After a running fight of several hours the Protector escaped. She returned to Boston August 15. In the fall she made another cruise, first running to the eastward and then to the West Indies (Mass. Archives, cliii, 385; Boston Gazette, July 17, 24, August 21, 1780; Adventures of Ebenezer Fox, ch. iv, v; Clark, i, 102,103; Sabine's Life of Preble, ch. i.)

Captain Elisha Hart, of the private armed sloop Retaliation, ten guns and fifty men, wrote from New London, September 29, 1780, to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, that he had sailed on the 22d along the south side of Long Island to Sandy Hook and towards the Narrows, in New York Harbor. Several sloops were seen coming down from New York. The Retaliation chased them and overhauled one that was standing for Staten Island. "I discovered She Had no Guns," says Hart, "but appeared full of Men Elligantly Dressed. I then Supposed her to be a Pleasure Boat from the fleet, which I then Saw Lying In the Narrows and was within One League of them and in full View of the City and More than a League within the Guard Ships." Captain Hart got out sweeps, came up fast on the chase and hailed her, but her commander was very suspicious and refused to come on board the Retaliation. "I then ordered Down my English Colours, Ran out my Bow Guns and Told him if He did not Come on Board I would Sink Him Immediately. He then Hove out his Boat and Come on Board. I Immediately Man'd the Prize and Took out the Prisoners." They were forty-seven in number, including a captain, a lieutenant, and two sergeants; they were a captain's guard, sent to relieve guard at the lighthouse. An armed sloop from near the guardship approached, but bore away upon the Retaliation's heaving to for her. The prize was brought safely into New London (Trumbull MSS., xiii, 41 ; Continental Journal, October 5, 1780; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 18.)

Alexander Murray, who was afterwards a lieutenant in the Continental navy, commanded the letter of marque Revenge in 1780; she carried eighteen six-pounders and fifty men and was fitted out at Baltimore for a voyage to Holland. Having collected a convoy of fifty sail in Chesapeake Bay, some of them armed, Murray attempted to get to sea, but upon the appearance of a squadron of British privateers, consisting of an eighteen-gun ship, a sixteen-gun brig, and three schooners, his convoy, with the exception of two vessels, deserted him and fled. The Revenge alone engaged the ship and brig with both broadsides, lying between them, and beat them both off after a hard-fought action of more than an hour. The two vessels with him kept the three schooners occupied until the

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convoy had time to escape into Hampton Roads. Murray returned to port to repair damages and then once more set sail. On the Banks of Newfoundland he captured a letter of marque brig. He pursued his voyage, but unluckily fell in with a large British fleet of men-of-war and transports, was chased by a frigate and captured. Not long afterwards Murray was exchanged (Clark, i, 117; Port Folio, May, 1814. For further accounts of privateering and prizes in 1780, see Boston Gazette, March 6, 20, May 1, July 3, 24, 31, September 4, November 6, 1780; Massachusetts Spy, August 17, 1780; Continental Journal, October 19, 1780; Penn. Gazette, July 19, 1780; London Post, May 1, August 4, 1780; Pickering MSS., xxxiii, 280; Almon, x, 55, 60, 265-267; Clark, i, 116,119; Virginia Hist. Register, July, 1853; Tucker, ch. viii; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 16; R. I. Hist. Mag., July, 1884.)

A source of embarrassment to British naval administration during the war was jealousy and ill feeling among the officers of the navy. One instance was a bitter quarrel between Admirals Keppel and Palliser in 1778. Admiral Rodney came out to the West Indies early in 1780 and remained there most of the time until 1782. His relations with other officers seem seldom to have been pleasant, and lust of prize money interfered at times with the discharge of duty. His first exploit was an encounter with a French fleet under the Comte de Guichen, which led to contentions with his captains due to misunderstanding about signals. In September, Rodney went to New York for a short stay, arriving just in time to fall into a large amount of prize money, which came to him as senior officer on the station and would otherwise have gone to Admiral Arbuthnot. This occasioned a disagreeable quarrel between them. In a letter dated October 19, 1780, Rodney says to Arbuthnot: "I am honoured with your letter of the 16th Instant and am sorry that my Conduct has given you offence; none was intended on my part ... It was not inclination or Choice that brought me to America; it was the Duty I owed my King and Country. I had flattered myself it would have met with your approbation. I am sorry it has not, but I own I have the vanity to think it will meet with His approbation whose it is the greatest Honor a Subject can receive. Your Anger at my partial interfering (as you term it) with the American War not a little surprises me. I came to Interfere in the American War, to Command by Sea in it and do my best Endeavours towards the putting an end thereto. I knew the Dignity of my own Rank and the power invested in me by the Commission I bear entitled me to take the supreme Command, which I ever shall do on every Station . . . unless I meet a Superior Officer ... Your having detached the Raisonable to England without my knowledge, after you had received my orders to put your self under my command, is I believe unprecidented in the Annals of the British Navy." (Brit. Adm m. Rec., A. D. Leeward Islands, vii.)

On October 30, Rodney wrote to the Admiralty: Vice Admiral Arbuthnot having taken it into his head to be highly Offended at me for doing what I thought my duty to His Majesty and the Public and acquainting me by letter dated the 16th Instant that he would remonstrate to their Lordships against my Conduct, I think it a duty I owe myself to transmit to the Admiralty Board Copies of My Orders and

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Letters to Mr. Arbuthnot with his answers to Me (His Superior officer), that their Lordships may Judge which of us has most cause to trouble them with Complaints. . . . That I have been extremely tender in issuing Orders to Vice Admiral Arbuthnot and been attentive towards paying him every respect due to his Rank, the inclos'd letters I am sure will convince their Lordships. If in his Answers to me his letters have not been penn'd with that Cordiality which ought to pass between Officers acting in the Public Service, I am sorry for him, they effect not Me. I am ashamed to mention what appears to Me the real cause and from whence Mr. Arbuthnot's chagrene proceeds, but the proofs are so plain that Prize Money is the Occasion that I am under the necessity of transmitting them . . . On my arrival at New York I found it necessary . . . to give Mr. Arbuthnot Orders to put himself under My Command, not only for the better carrying on the Public Service, but likewise to prevent any Litigious Suits relative to Prize Money, which Mr. Arbuthnot had given me but too much reason to expect . . . I can solemnly assure their Lordships that I had not the least conception of any other Prize Money on the Coast of America but that which would be most honourably obtain'd by the destruction of the Enemy's Ships of War and Privateers, but when Prize Money appear'd predominant in the mind of my Brother Officer, I was determin'd to have my Share of that Bounty so graciously bestow'd by His Majesty and the Public . . . I flatter'd myself I should have had the honour even of Mr. Arbuthnot's approbation of my Conduct. I am sorry I have not, but if I am so happy as to meet with that of their Lordships, it will more than fully compensate." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. Leeward Ids., vii; Mahan, 377-382; Hannay, ii, 226-229, 244-251; Belcher, i, 293, 301, 302; Channing, iii, 824; Nav. Rec. Soc., iii, 1, 2. For Arbuthnot's complaints against Rodney, see Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 486, September 30, October 29, 1780.) Rodney returned to the West Indies in December.

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XV

EUROPEAN WATERS IN 1780

After his arrival at L'Orient in February, 1780, Captain Jones had to endure another long period of waiting on shore, but was occupied for some time in giving the Alliance a thorough overhauling; for lack of money this was less complete than he had hoped. In the first place the ship had been put out of trim by the arrangement of the ballast, which, Jones says, "Captain Landais has extended along the ceiling from the stern-post to the stem; an idea that I believe he may without vanity call his own." Besides correcting this, repairs were necessary and Jones proposed to have the ship coppered. Another object of his desire was the purchase of the Serapis, and he says in the same letter, which was written to Franklin, February 13 : "I wish she could be made the property of America." (Sherburne, 186.) He seems to have had an idea that the French government

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would bear the cost of repairs on the Alliance. Franklin wrote to him, February 19: "As to refitting your ship at the expense of this court, I must acquaint you that there is not the least probability of obtaining it, and therefore I cannot ask it. I hear too much already of the extraordinary expense you made in Holland to think of proposing an addition to it, especially as you seem to impute the damage she has sustained more to Capt. Landais's negligence than to accidents of the cruize. The whole expense will therefore fall upon me and I am ill provided to bear it, having so many unexpected calls upon me from all quarters. I therefore beg you would have mercy upon me, put me to as little charge as possible and take nothing that you can possibly do without. As to sheathing with copper, it is totally out of the question. I am not authorised to do it, if I had money; and I have not money for it, if I had orders. The purchase of the Serapis is in the same predicament . . . Let me repeat it, for God's sake be sparing, unless you mean to make me a bankrupt or have your drafts dishonored for want of money in my hands to pay them." (Sherburne, 189, 190.) In spite of difficulties, however, the ship was in fine condition by the middle of April. Jones took on board of her twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and twelve nines, the guns that had been made for the Bonhomme Richard, but were not ready in time; besides which it had been decided that eighteens were too heavy (lbid., 221; Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 225. Probably these guns were to be transported to America, not mounted on the Alliance.) Jones expected to return to America in the Alliance, but wished before he left France to settle his own and his men's affairs. His prizes had not yet been sold and his crew were without wages, without prize money, and without clothes. In order to expedite matters, Jones made another trip to Paris and obtained the promise of an early sale. Franklin advanced a sum of money to supply the immediate needs of officers and men. The French government loaned the ship Ariel of twenty guns to accompany the Alliance to America and assist in transporting a large amount of clothing and military supplies for the Continental army. Many exchanged American prisoners arrived from England who would be available for her crew. Jones was received in Paris with marked distinction and was presented by the King with a gold-hilted sword and the cross of the Order of Military Merit; the latter in the following year, after having obtained the approval of Congress (Sands, 247-262; Sherburne, 185-197; Archives de la Marine, B1 93, 45, 283, 285, B4 172, 176.)

About this time the project of another cruise to the north, under the command of Commodore Jones, was formed. It is outlined in the following paper drawn up by Jones and dated June 10: "It is understood that a considerable Number of the King's Frigates are likely to remain unarmed and unemployed in the Ports, through the Scarcity of French Seamen. To Man these the Government might ask of Congress the Services of Commodore Jones and of a sufficient Number of American Officers and Sailors, of which there are about 500 now Prisoners in England, whose exchange will naturally take place in two or three Months and who being arrived here might easily be engaged and retained for that purpose. Commodore Jones is now bound for America, from whence with the permission of Congress he might return in about four Months with the Alliance and probably

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with one or two other American Frigates, on board of which and of such Merchant Ships as would gladly put themselves under his Convoy he could embark and bring over a considerable number of chosen Supernumerary officers and Seamen to be joined with those expected from England and to such others as might be collected in France, and the whole employed in manning the French Frigates in Question, which during Commodore Jones's absence might be put in some degree of readiness. Should the Serapis be bought by the King, it would be advisable to employ her in this Service. In this way a squadron of Frigates from America and of fast sailing French Frigates, sloops &c. manned by Americans might be easily formed, capable of rendering very essential services to the Common Cause, by destroying the Enemies Commerce, alarming their Coasts, taking their Towns &c. &c. It would be expedient to embark a few hundred of good French Troops on board the different Vessels of War, to serve as Marines and to assist in making descents &c. Commodore Jones can and at any time will point out to Government many desirable undertakings for the Armament in Question, but as the utmost secrecy is necessary to render them successful and as changes of Winds and a variety of circumstances may render it expedient to change the operations of this Force, he would desire and expect to be left at full Liberty to act according as situations and circumstances may in his own opinion appear for the best." This proposition was favorably received by the French Ministry, but apparently owing to the inability of Congress to take the necessary steps on their part and to other circumstances, it came to nothing (Archives do la Marine, B4 172, 188, 199; Sherburne, 208-211.)

During Jones's absence from L'Orient, Landais, instigated by Arthur Lee, encouraged a spirit of discontent almost amounting to mutiny among the crew of the Alliance. The men were led to believe that Jones was responsible for their not receiving the prize money due them, and they demanded the restoration of Landais to the command of the ship. Apparently Jones here again, as on the Ranger, suffered from the lack of a warm personal regard for him on the part of his men, who, repelled by his demeanor, never understood his devotion to their interests. The former officers and men of the Bonhomme Richard, however, stood by him. Lee expressed the opinion that as Landais's commission had not been revoked, nor had he been relieved by order of Congress, he was still legally in command of the Alliance. Jones wrote to Robert Morris: "I am convinced that Mr. Lee has acted in this matter merely because I would not become the enemy of the venerable, the wise and good Franklin, whose heart as well as head does and will always do honor to human nature." (Wharton, iii, 821; Sands, 278.) In regard to the legality of Landais's commission, the Board of Admiralty in a report to Congress a few months later observed that "Captain Landais regained command of the Alliance by the advice of Mr. Lee, notwithstanding his suspension by Dr. Franklin, who by the direction of the Marine Committee had the sole management of our marine affairs in Europe." (Sands, 321.) John Adams, however, believed that the Marine Committee lacked authority to confer upon Franklin the power to remove the commander of a ship. Commodore Gillon of South Carolina, at that time in France, also took the part of Landais. The

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French ministry declined to take sides in the controversy. June 13, after Jones's return from Paris but during his temporary absence from the ship, Landais went on board and took command. To avoid trouble which might be serious and lead to bloodshed, Jones relinquished his claim to the command (Ibid., 262-280; Sherburne, 197-207; Hale, ch. xvii; Archives de la Marine, B4 172, 166, 197, 198, 204-210, 231, 237-242, 244, 245, 248, 255, 261.)

About the 1st of July the Alliance sailed for America with Arthur Lee on board as passenger, but without the clothing so much needed by the army. The conduct of Captain Landais became so erratic during the voyage that the safety of the ship, crew, and passengers seemed imperiled. After vain appeals to him it became necessary to relieve him forcibly of the command, which devolved upon the first lieutenant. This was on August 10, in latitude 41° 30' north, longitude 59° west. The ship was then taken into Boston, where she arrived, August 16. Captain Barry was appointed to command the Alliance September 5. She remained in Boston Harbor during the rest of the year and on board of her was convened the court martial, of which Barry was president, for the trial of Captain Landais and his first lieutenant, James Degge. As a result, they were both dismissed from the navy (Pap. Cont. Congr., 193, 451-595, 597, 599, 631, 639, 655, 679, 705, 757, 773 (August 10, September 22, November 10, 29, 1780, January 5, 6, 25, 1781); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 328 (September 5, 1780); Lee MSS., August 5, 10, December 20, 1780; Boston Gazette, August 21, 1780; Archives de la Marine, B8 16 (Juin, 1780)

After the departure of the Alliance from France, Jones was occupied in getting ready for his own return to America. "He obtained a crew for the Ariel, that was ordered by government to be fully armed and equipped. He embarked such a quantity of arms and powder as with provision for only nine weeks filled the ship even between decks. He hoped to make the passage in a favourable season of the year, but was detained by contrary and stormy winds in the road of Groix from the 4th of September till the 8th of October. He then sailed with a fair wind and pleasant weather, but the next night the Ariel was driven by a violent tempest close to the rocks of the Penmarque, a terrible ledge between L'Orient and Brest. The ship could show no sail, but was almost buried under the water, not having room to run before the wind and having several feet water in the hold. Finding the depth of water diminish fast, Captain Jones in the last extremity cast anchor, but could not bring the ship's head to the wind. Sometimes the lower yard-arms touched the water. Captain Jones now had no remedy left but to cut away the foremast. This had the desired effect and the ship immediately came head to the wind. The main-mast had got out of the step and now reeled about like a drunken man. Foreseeing the danger of its either breaking off below the gundeck or going through the ship's bottom, Captain Jones ordered it to be cut away. But before this could be done, the chain-plates gave way and the main-mast breaking off by the gun- deck carried with it the mizen-mast; and the mizen-mast carried away the quarter-gallery. In that situation the Ariel rode in the open ocean to windward of perhaps the most dangerous ledge of rocks in the world for two days and near

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three nights, in a tempest that covered the shore with wrecks and dead bodies and that drove ships ashore from their anchors even in the port of L'Orient. It was perhaps fortunate that the Ariel lost her masts, since no anchors could have held her so long had the masts stood. By the help of jury-masts, erected after the gale, the Ariel returned to L'Orient." (Sands, 294, journal prepared for the King.) It then took several weeks to refit the Ariel, and Jones made an unsuccessful effort to obtain a better ship. During this time he made further arrangements in regard to the prize money due himself and officers and men, which had not yet been paid. Franklin wrote to him, December 4: "I shall strongly solicit the payment of the prize money, which I understand is not yet received from the king. I hope soon to see an end of that affair, which has met with so many unaccountable obstructions. I enclose despatches for Congress, which are to be sunk in case of danger. I wish you to make the best of your way to America and that you may have a prosperous voyage." (Sands, 299.) The Ariel sailed December 18 (lbid., 294-300; Sherburne, 211-213; Archives do la Marine, B4 172, 271-274, 277.)

The account of this voyage is given in Jones's journal. "After a variety of rencounters he, in the latitude 26° north and longitude of Barbadoes, met with a remarkably fast sailing frigate belonging to the enemy's navy. Captain Jones endeavoured to avoid speaking with that ship and as night approached, he hoped to succeed, notwithstanding her superior sailing. He was, however, mistaken, for the next morning the ships were at a less distance asunder than they had been the evening before, although during the night the officers of the watch had always informed Captain Jones the sail continued out of sight. An action now became unavoidable and the Ariel was prepared for it. Every thing was thrown overboard that interfered with the defence and safety of the ship. Captain Jones took particular care, by the management of sails and helm, to prevent the enemy from discovering the force of the Ariel, and worked her so well as not to discover any warlike appearance or preparation. In the afternoon the Ariel fired now and then a light stern-chaser at the enemy from the quarterdeck and continued to crowd sail as if very much alarmed. This had the desired effect and the enemy pursued with the greater eagerness. Captain Jones did not suffer the enemy to come close up till the approach of night, when having well examined his force, he shortened sail to meet his approach.

"When the two ships came within hail of each other they both hoisted English Colours. The person whose duty it was to hoist the pendant on board the Ariel had not taken care to make the other end of the halliards fast, to haul it down again to change the Colours. This prevented Jones from an advantageous manoeuvre he had intended and obliged him to let the enemy range up along the lee-side of the Ariel, where he saw a battery lighted for action. A conversation now took place between the two ships, which lasted near an hour, by which Captain Jones learned the situation of the enemy's affairs in America. The captain of the enemy's ship said his name was John Pindar. His ship had been constructed by the famous Mr. Peck of Boston, built at Newburyport, owned by Mr. Tracy of that place, Commanded by Captain Hopkins, the son of the late

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Commodore Hopkins, and had been taken and fitted out at New York and named the Triumph by Admiral Rodney. Captain Jones told him he must put out his boat and come on board and show his commission, to prove whether or not he really did belong to the British navy. To this he made some excuses, because Captain Jones had not told him who he was, and his boat he said was very leaky. Captain Jones told him to consider the danger of refusing. Captain Pindar said be would answer for twenty guns and that he himself and every one of his people had shown themselves Englishmen. Captain Jones said he would allow him five minutes only to make his reflection. That time being elapsed, Captain Jones backed a little in the weather-quarter of the enemy, ran close under her stern, hoisted American Colours, and being within short pistol shot on the lee-beam of the enemy, began to engage.

"It was past seven o'clock and as no equal force ever exceeded the vigorous and regular fire of the Ariel's battery and tops, the action while it lasted made a glorious appearance. The enemy made a feeble resistance for about ten minutes. He then struck his Colours. The enemy then begged for quarter and said half his men were killed. The Ariel's fire ceased and the crew, as usual after a victory, gave cries of joy. To 'show themselves Englishmen,' the enemy filled their sails and got on the Ariel's weather-bow, before the cries of joy had ended on board the Ariel. Captain Jones, suspecting the base design of the enemy, immediately set every sail he could to prevent her escape, but the enemy had so much advantage in sailing that the Ariel could not keep up and they soon got out of gun shot. The English captain may properly be called a knave, because after he surrendered his ship, begged for and obtained quarter, he basely ran away, contrary to the laws of naval war and the practice of civilized nations. A conspiracy was discovered among the English part of the Ariel's crew immediately after sailing from France. During the voyage every officer and even the passengers had been constantly armed and kept a regular watch, besides a constant guard with fixed bayonets. After the action with the Triumph the plot was so far discovered that Captain Jones confined twenty of the ringleaders in irons till his arrival. Captain Jones arrived at Philadelphia on the 18th February, 1781, having been absent from America three years, three months and eighteen days." (Sands, 300-302; Sherburne, 213, 214; Boston Gazette, March 12,1781.)

Among the American privateers in France commissioned by Franklin was one owned by Frenchmen in Dunkirk named the Black Prince, a small cutter armed with sixteen three- and four-pounders and thirty-two swivels, which proved such a prizetaker that the owners obtained from the American minister a commission for another, which they called the Black Princess. The latter at first carried eighteen two-, three-, and four-pounders and twenty-four swivels, but later a much heavier armament. These two vessels, manned chiefly by English and Irish smugglers with a few Americans, cruised with remarkable success during 1779 and 1780. There were disadvantages in giving commissions to vessels owned by foreigners and likely to be manned by the refuse of the seafaring population, but as Franklin said, "The prisoners brought in serve to exchange our countrymen,

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which makes me more willing to encourage such armaments, though they occasion a good deal of trouble." (Wharton, iii, 364.) The Black Prince was commanded, for a time, at least, by Captain Stephen Merchant, who, after leaving her, returned to America, arriving in Boston about March 1, 1780. According to Merchant, "this ship was fitted out at Dunkirk under a Continental commission and colours . . . She went round the coasts of Britain and Ireland and in less than three months took 37 prizes; three of them were retaken, 4 burnt after taking out what was valuable, all the rest were either ransomed or arrived safe in port, by which the lowest men have made a little fortune. By instructions from Dr. Franklin the Captain was prohibited doing mischief above high water mark. This generous prohibition he punctually observed, though he had it frequently in his power to land and distress the inhabitants of Britain on their remotest coasts. He had not heard of their burning Fairfield in Connecticut, of which State he is a native, or he would have been strongly tempted to have transgressed his orders by a just retaliation. Being once in want of water and some refreshments on the coast of Scotland, he sent his boat to a small town and demanded a supply, promising security to the inhabitants and their property in case his demand was complied with. It was refused; upon which he approached the town with his ship and saluted it with a broadside. A white flag was immediately displayed by the inhabitants and the Black Prince was not only supplied with water, but with cattle, sheep, poultry and every refreshment the place could afford and the commander chose to receive." (Independent Chronicle, March 9, 1780.)

The Black Prince was afterwards commanded by Captain Dowlin, and in April, 1780, captured a Dutch ship called the Flora with an English cargo. Franklin at once ordered the removal and condemnation of the cargo and the release of the vessel with payment of damages, giving his reasons in a letter to Vergennes, dated June 18. It was just at this time that Russia and other maritime powers were forming the Armed Neutrality for the protection of their commerce from the interference of belligerents by enforcing the doctrine that "free ships make free goods," always most obnoxious to England. This principle had been incorporated in a treaty which the United States was trying to negotiate with Holland, but which the Dutch had hitherto failed to accept. Franklin, therefore, felt justified in acting under the old law of nations, although he was well known to be a strong advocate of the principles of the Armed Neutrality.

In his letter to Vergennes he explains his position on the subject of privateering and especially of vessels fitted out by Frenchmen under the American flag. ,I beg leave to observe," he says, "that by the express words of the commission granted to them they are directed to submit the prizes they shall carry into any port in the dominions of a foreign state to the judgment of the admiralty courts established in such ports or states, and according to the usages there in force. Several of our first prizes brought into France were, if I mistake not, so judged; and it was not upon any request of mine that such causes were afterwards referred to me, nor am I desirous of continuing to exercise that jurisdiction. If

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therefore the judgment I have given in the case of the Flora is not approved and the Council of Prizes will take the trouble of re-examining and trying that cause and those of all other prizes to be brought in hereafter by American cruisers, it will be very agreeable to me and, from the very terms above mentioned of the commission, I think it will also be agreeable to the Congress. Nor do I desire to encourage the fitting out of privateers in France by the King's subjects with American commissions. I have had many applications of the kind which I have refused, advising the owners to apply for the commissions of his majesty. The case of the Black Prince was particular. She had been an old smuggler on the coasts of England and Ireland, was taken as such and carried into Dublin, where her crew found means to break prison, cut their vessel out of the harbor and escaped with her to Dunkerque. It was represented to me that the people, being all English and Irish, were afraid to continue their smuggling business, lest if they should be again taken they might be punished as British subjects for their crime at Dublin, and that they were willing to go a privateering against the English; but speaking no other language, they imagined they might, if taken, better pass as Americans if they had an American commission than as Frenchmen if under a French commission. On these grounds I was applied to for a commission, which I granted believing that such a swift vessel with a crew that knew so well all parts of the enemy's coasts might greatly molest their coasting trade. Her first success occasioned adding the Black Princess by the same owners, and between them they have taken and sent in or ransomed or destroyed an amazing number of vessels; I think near eighty. But I shall continue to refuse granting any more commissions except to American vessels; and if, under the circumstances above represented, it is thought nevertheless inconvenient that the commissions of the Black Prince and Princess should continue, I will immediately recall them." (Wharton, iii, 802.)

Franklin wrote to the President of Congress, August 10, that these two vessels had taken in eighteen months nearly a hundred and twenty prizes. In the summer of 1780 the Black Prince was wrecked on the French coast, but the Princess, under the command of Captain Edward Macatter, continued cruising, and between June 20 and July 10 made twenty-eight captures. Vergennes advised the recall of these privateers' commissions. Franklin replied, August 15, that he had already recalled them and added: "I have had no other interest in those armaments than the advantage of some prisoners to exchange for my countrymen." (lbid., iv, 33.) These two vessels were the only ones owned and fitted out in France that had been granted commissions by Franklin. In August it was ordered by the King that the prizes of American privateers should be judged by the French Council of Prizes (lbid., iii, 364, 682, 801-803, iv, 26, 33; Continental Journal, March 9, 1780; London Post, July 21, 1780; Proc. U. S. Naval Inst., xxxvii (September, 1911), 954-960; Hale, ch. xvi; Williams, 278.)

The ship Mars of the Massachusetts navy sailed from Boston for Nantes about the 1st of August. On September 13, Captain Sampson reported to the Board of War: "I have the pleasure of informing you of my safe arrival at the Entrance of

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the River Loyer in the Ship Mars the 10th Inst., after a Passage of Forty-four days, and embrace the earliest opportunity to acquaint you of the same. During my Passage I had favourable Winds untill abt the Twentieth of Augt, when I had got as far to the Eastwd as the Long. 20.0 W., then taking the Winds to the Southd & Eastwd & having a very Strong Northwardly Current and my ship very foul and after trying her trim everyway, found her to sail very Indifferently; was drove to the northward of Ushant, wch greatly Retarded my Passage. During my passage I gave Chase to several Vessels wch I had every reason to believe them to be English, but to my great mortiflcation could not speak with any of them. On the 7th Augt I spoke a Dutch Ship from Curiso bound to Amsterdam and on the 11th with a Dean from St. Croix bound to Copenhagen. On the 31st, in Latt. 49.40 N., Long. 11. W., I gave chase to a Brig, who seeing me in Chase of her, hove too. She proved to be ... from St. Jube bound to Cork loaded with Salt, Commanded by a Portugue. The Capt. came on board with his Portugue papers and told me his cargo belonged to himself. I sent an Officer on board him to search for more papers, who found concealed in the Captain's State Room a number of Letters directed to Merchants in Cork [containing] Sufficient Papers to prove her Cargo was Consigned to [one of these merchants]; upon which I took the Captain & Seven Portugue out and sent [a prize master in her] to proceed for Boston. My Reasons for sending her to America was that her Cargo would not have been Valuable in Europe but would be in Great Demand in America ... On the 8th Inst. at 25 Leagues to the Westward of Belle Isle at 10 A.M. I saw several Sail to the S. W. and a Ship and a Sloop under my Lee; I kept on my Cruise to the S. E. The ship & sloop Standing by the wind in order to speak to me, I perseved the Sloop to come up with me very fast. At 5 p.m. the Sloop, which was an English Cutter mounting twenty-two Guns, came along side of me and at 5 minutes past 5 P.M. the action began wch lasted One hour & 5 minutes, but my Ship being very foul and very heavy to work and not more than half Mand & a very large Swell running, gave the Cutter every advantage possible during the action, as she could sail round me at her pleasure, but after her engaging me rather better than an hour she thot proper to shear of to the Ship, & I having my Crotchet yard shot away and imagining her consort the ship to be an English Privateer and knowing it Impossible to come up with the Cutter, did not think proper to give her chase. During the Action my Officers and men behaved with great Spirit; my loss during the action was two men killed, viz. Mr. Nathan Haskell, Lt. Marines, and Thoms Ransford." (Massachusetts Mag., October, 1910; Mass. Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 215; Mass. Archives, cliii, 400.) The Mars returned to Boston later in the year.

The Portuguese ambassador at Paris having complained of the seizure by the Mars of the vessel belonging to one of his countrymen and of alleged ill treatment, Franklin advised sending the claim to America, and wrote to the President of Congress, December 3, saying: "I hope the Congress may think flt to take some notice of this affair and not only forward a speedy decision, but give orders to our cruisers not to meddle with neutral ships for the future, it being a practice apt to produce ill blood and contrary to the spirit of the new league,

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which is approved by all Europe; and the English property found in such vessels will hardly pay the damages brought on us by the irregular proceedings of our captains in endeavoring to get at such property." (Wharton, iv, 180.) Congress had already, on October 5, "Resolved, That the board of admiralty prepare and report instructions for the commanders of armed vessels commanded by the United States conformable to the principles contained in the declaration of the Empress of all the Russias on the rights of neutral vessels. That the ministers plenipotentiary from the United States, if invited thereto, be and hereby are respectively empowered to accede to such regulations conformable to the spirit of the said declaration as may be agreed upon by the Congress expected to assemble in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial majesty." (Wharton, iv, 81.)

The privateer General Pickering of Salem, a ship of a hundred and eighty tons commanded by Captain Haraden, carrying sixteen six-pounders and forty-seven men, on a voyage to Spain fell in with a twenty-gun British cutter, May 29, 1780, and beat her off after an action of an hour and three quarters. Three days later, in the Bay of Biscay, the Pickering captured a schooner called the Golden Eagle with fourteen nine-pounders, eight fours, and fifty-seven men. June 4, while proceeding towards Bilbao, she fell in with the British privateer Achilles armed with twenty-two nine-pounders and eighteen other guns and with a crew of a hundred and thirty men. She was a very much larger ship than the Pickering. They fought nearly three hours at close range and the Achilles then sheered off and sailed away, the Pickering being unable to follow. This battle was fought close to the Spanish coast and was watched by a multitude of people (Independent Chronicle, August, 10, 17, 1780; Hunt's Merchants, Mag., February, 1857; Clark, i, 114.)

During the year 1780 the Continental navy suffered the loss of nearly half its fleet at the fall of Charleston: the Providence, Boston, Queen of France, and Ranger. Of the thirteen frigates provided for in 1775, the Trumbull alone remained at the end of the year, and this ship with the frigates Alliance, Confederacy, and Deane and the sloop of war Saratoga comprised the whole navy in commission, except the Ariel loaned by France and only temporarily on the list. The America and Bourbon were still far from completed and were destined never to go to sea in the Continental service. Little had been accomplished by the navy during the year; few prizes of any considerable value or importance had been taken. The hotly contested action of the Trumbull with the Watt enhanced somewhat the reputation of a service that had suffered from the shortcomings of zealous and brave but untrained officers.

As the navy dwindled, privateering continued to thrive and grow. The number of private armed vessels commissioned by the different states doubtless increased considerably, though figures are not accessible. The Continental Congress issued three hundred and one letters of marque in 1780, ninety-two more than in 1779 (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495.) Although it is evident that privateers

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were increasing in numbers, there seem to be fewer accounts of their cruises than in previous years.

The increase in the total number of ships of the British navy during 1780 was from four hundred and eighty-one to five hundred and thirty-eight; of these, three hundred and ninety-six were in commission at the end of the year, as compared with three hundred and sixty-four twelve months earlier. The navy employed eighty-five thousand seamen and marines, an increase of fifteen thousand. In the fall there were fifty-nine vessels of all classes on the North American station, including two of ninety guns each, eleven seventy-fours, five sixty-fours, three forty-fours, and fourteen frigates. Earlier in the year the number seems to have been considerably smaller. There were eleven vessels at Newfoundland and a strong fleet in the West Indies (Hannay, ii, 211 ; Schomberg, ii, 1, iv, 353-364; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 486, September 30, 1780, List of Ships and Vessels Employed under the orders of Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot.)

According to the table of losses and captures, already cited for previous years, the enemies of England in 1780 took five hundred and ninety-six of her vessels, of which fifteen were privateers and the rest merchantmen; of these, two hundred and sixty-two were retaken or ransomed. During the same time the British captured from their enemies two hundred and thirty-seven vessels including thirty-four privateers; of this total only four were recaptured (Clowes, iii, 390.)

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XVI

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1781

The frigate Alliance, Captain Barry, was made ready at Boston for another voyage to France as soon as the court martial of Captain Landais was over. There was the usual delay and difficulty in recruiting a crew for the ship and application was made to the state government for authority to impress seamen and to enlist soldiers. The former request was denied, but permission was obtained to enroll volunteers from the guard at the castle and it was again necessary to take a considerable number of British prisoners. A turbulent ship's company was the consequence and a sanguinary brawl on Long Wharf with the crews of two French frigates was an early result. Some distinguished passengers were taken, including Colonel John Laurens and Thomas Paine. Several others obtained passage on condition that if necessary they should serve against the enemy or in quelling mutiny. Laurens was a son of Henry Laurens, still a prisoner in England, and was bound on an important mission to France. He was the bearer of a letter, dated January 15, 1781, from General Washington, addressed to himself (Laurens), discoursing on the objects of his mission; it was afterwards submitted to Vergennes. In this letter, first of all, the imperative need of money to

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carry on the approaching campaign was urged. Washington then says: "Next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority on these coasts is the object most interesting. This would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive and, by removing all prospect of extending their acquisitions, would take away the motives for prosecuting the war. Indeed, it is not to be conceived how they could subsist a large force in this country, if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid in money, would enable us to convert the war into a vigorous offensive. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both nations, nor how infinitely it would facilitate our supplies. With respect to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points, and it appears too to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from the immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to America. The number of ports friendly to them, hostile to the British, the materials for repairing their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet, are circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the contest of these seas." (Washington, ix, 106.) The Alliance sailed from Boston, February 11, 1781. On the voyage a small British privateer was taken and her prize, a Venetian ship, was released. The frigate arrived at L'Orient March 9 (Barry, ch. xii; Wharton, iv, 249, 250, 252, 279, 826; Has,. Court Rec., January 29,1781; Mass. Acts and Resolves, February 6, 1781; Boston Gazette, January 1, 1781.)

The two main objects of Washington's desire, indispensable at this critical period, were realized. Money was obtained and a French fleet soon set sail for America. March 29, the Alliance got under way for her return voyage in company with a large French letter of marque called the Marquis de Lafayette, loaded with military stores. Soon after sailing, a mutiny was discovered on the Alliance. John Kessler, mate of the frigate, who wrote a narrative of her voyages, says that "on March 30th an Indian, one of the forecastle men, gave Captain Barry information of a combination among the crew for the purpose of taking the ship, and pointing out three who had strove to prevail on him to be concerned therein. The three men were immediately put in irons and all the officers, with such of the crew as could be confided in, were armed and required to remain all night on deck. On the next morning all hands were called and placed on the forecastle, booms, and gangways, excepting the officers and such part of the crew in whom Captain Barry confided, who, armed, strongly guarded the quarter deck, the steerage, and the main deck, to keep the remainder of the crew together on the forecastle and boom. The three designated men were brought out of their irons on the quarter and, being stripped and hoisted by the thumbs to the mizzen stay, underwent a very severe whipping before either would make any confession. The names of 25 of their accomplices were obtained from them before the whipping was discontinued. As their accomplices were disclosed, they were called to the quarter deck, stripped and tied to the ridge-rope of the netting and the whipping continued until it was thought all were disclosed that could possibly be obtained, which proved to be. That it was intended to take the ship on her passage out by killing all the officers in the middle watch of the night, except the second Lieutenant, P. Fletcher, who was to navigate her to some port in Ireland, or on

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failure, to be destroyed. A quartermaster, one of the mutineers, was to have command. They had all been bound by an oath on the Bible administered by the Captain's assistant cabin steward, and had also signed their names in a round robin so-called, but that they found no good opportunity on the outward passage and intended to accomplish the taking of the ship as aforesaid immediately on leaving France. But on coming out of L'Orient we lost a man overboard who was one of the chief ringleaders and they considering that as a bad omen, threw the round robin overboard and relinquished their designs. The three principles were placed securely in irons and the remainder, after being admonished by Captain Barry and on their solemn declaration to conduct themselves well, were permitted to return to ship's duty." (Barry, 133.) The three principals were afterwards tried and sentenced to death, but this penalty was not exacted.

Kessler further relates that "on April 2nd, 1781, two brigs gave us chase and were permitted to come up. One ran close on board of us and without any hail fired the whole broadside at us and immediately every one run off her deck. We had commenced firing, but on discovering their retreat the firing ceased and we boarded them. She proved to be a brig with flush deck and 20 twelve pounders, two six pounders and 14 [four-pound coehorns], with 112 men, called the Mars and belonging to the Guernsey. The crew were taken aboard the Alliance and all put in irons without distinction, Captain Barry considering them as not meriting other treatment in consequence of their firing on us with no intention of bravely fighting. The other brig was a Jersey called the Minerva, of 10 guns and 55 men. She was taken possession of and manned by the Marquis de Lafayette, our consort. Soon after, in a gale of wind, we parted with our consort and the prizes." (Barry, 134.) A month later two other prizes were taken. May 16, the Alliance was struck by lightning, which shattered her main topmast and burned several men.

An action was fought, May 29, with the British ship Atalanta and brig Trepassey in about north latitude 40° and west longitude 63°, which is described by Kessler. "Towards evening [of the 28th] discovered two sail on the weather bow standing for us and which after coming near enough to be kept in sight, hauled to wind and stood on our course. Towards day it became quite calm. After it became light it appeared that they were an armed ship and brig, about a league distant. At sunrise they hoisted the English colors and beat drum . At the same time the American colors were displayed by the Alliance. By little puffs of wind we were enabled to get within short hailing distance." At eleven o'clock the ships hailed each other. "The firing then began, but unfortunately there was not wind enough for our steerage way and they being lighter vessels, by using sweeps got and kept athwart our stern and on our quarters, so that we could not bring one-half our guns, nay, oft time only one gun out astern to bear on them, and thus laying like a log the greatest part of the time. About two o'clock Captain Barry received a wound by a grape shot in the shoulder. He remained, however, on the quarter deck until by the much loss of blood he was obliged to be helped to the cock-pit. Some time after, our colors were shot away and it so happened that at the same time such guns as would bear on them had been fired and were then loading,

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and which led the enemy to think we had struck the colors, and manned their shrouds and gave three cheers; by that time the colors were hoisted by a mizen brail and our firing again began. A quartermaster went to the wheel in place of one just killed there. At the moment a small breeze of wind happening, a broadside was brought to bear and fired on the ship and then one on the brig, when they struck their colors at three o'clock." (Barry, 135, 136.)

Captain Edwards of the Atalanta, testifying at his court martial, said of the Alliance that when "about two cables lengths to leeward she hoisted Rebel colours and fir'd a Shot across us. I immediately hoisted our colours, when she fired her broadside, wore, and as soon as on the other tack and her Guns woud bear, kept a constant Fire on us; our Firing began on her, but being at too great a distance, I ceast our Fire and endeavour'd to get nearer to her, which having effected she haild us, said she was the Alliance continental Frigate and desired we would strike." Edwards tried to keep up a conversation until the Trepassey could get up, but the Alliance began the action again. The Trepassey was so anxious to get up that she passed under the stern of the Alliance "with too much way and in hauling under her Quarter, shot abreast of her; in this situation she received two broadsides." The Atalanta was then brought under the frigate's stern and got between her and the Trepassey. The Atalanta continued the action an hour and a half longer, nearly three hours in all; she was then so greatly disabled in masts, yards, sails, and rigging as to be unmanageable. It was accordingly necessary to strike and the Trepassey, unable to get away, struck also. The Atalanta's mainmast soon went over the side."(Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5319 (October 15,1781) The master of the Trepassey, describing the battle, says that the Alliance, at a distance of half a mile to leeward, "hoisted rebel colours and gave the Atalanta and us a broadside, we being then very nigh to each other; we then 'bore up close alongside of her, the Atalanta on the starboard and the Trepassey on the larboard quarter, and began to engage. About an hour after the action began Capt. Smith of the Trepassey was killed." (Almon, xii, 160.)

The Atalanta, which carried sixteen guns and a hundred and twenty-five men, lost six killed and eighteen wounded ; the Trepassey, with fourteen guns and eighty men, lost six killed, including the captain, and eleven wounded. The Alliance mounted twenty-eight twelve-pounders and eight nines; her crew was reduced by manning prizes and weakened by disaffection and sickness. Her loss was five killed, including the lieutenant of marines, and twenty-two wounded, three of them mortally. Captain Edwards and a few other officers were sent on board the Alliance; also some of the wounded. Captain Barry agreed with the British to send the Trepassey as a cartel to Halifax with all his other prisoners, about two hundred and fifty in number, to be exchanged for Americans; before entering upon this service the Trepassey's guns were thrown overboard. She arrived in due time at Halifax. The Atalanta, which had been dismasted in the engagement, was fitted with jury masts and put in charge of Hezekiah Welch, second lieutenant of the Alliance as prize master. Some weeks later, in the Vice-

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Admiralty Court at Halifax, Welch testified that he was ordered by Captain Barry "to take possession of the Atalanta and proceed with her to Boston, New England; that on their passage thither the 7th June last, being near Cape Cod, they fell in with His Majesty's ships of War the Assurance, Charlestown, Amphitrite and Vulture, which retook the said sloop Atalanta, put a British officer & Seamen on board her & sent her safe into this Port of Halifax." (Essex Inst. Coll., January, 1909.) The Marquis de Lafayette, letter of marque, which parted from the Alliance in April, was also unlucky. She fell in with the enemy's Jamaica fleet under a strong convoy and after a hard fight of three hours was captured by a greatly superior force. The Alliance arrived at Boston, June 6. During the summer she was sheathed with copper on Barry's recommendation (Barry, chs. xiii, xiv; Almon, xii, 158-160; Boston Gazette, June 11, July 9, 1781; London Chronicle, August 7, 1781; Lee MSS., July 15, 1782, report on loss of the Lafayette.)

The presence in Massachusetts Bay of the British squadron which recaptured the Atalanta, and which the Alliance had the good fortune not to meet with, is explained in a letter of Admiral Arbuthnot to the Admiralty, dated off Sandy Hook, July 4, 1781 : "The rumours that had been abroad for a considerable time past, that a reinforcement of troops was daily expected from France, induced me to send a squadron into Boston Bay of superior force, as the enemy's guard was reported to be only two frigates; the Assurance, Charles-Town, Amphitrite, Vulture, and Savage are employed on this service, and the Royal Oak, on her way to Halifax, was directed to take that route. I have since, by the channel of the Rebels, received intelligence that a few recruits and some storeships have notwithstanding got into Boston, with a French fifty gun ship and two frigates; but Captain Duncan of the Medea, which arrived from Halifax on the 30th ult., informs me that his Majesty's sloop the Atalanta, which had been taken after a very gallant action by the rebel Frigate Alliance, of 40 guns, was retaken by that detachment in Boston Bay, and that he took a store-ship of near 800 tons, also a prize, on her entrance into the port of Halifax as he came out. It is believed that they have been much more successful, but I have no authentic advices of their operations . . . The Medea on her return captured two privateers from Salem, the ship Rover, of 18 six pounders and 140 men, and the sloop Revenge of 10 guns." (Almon, xii, 158,159.)

The frigate Trumbull, Captain James Nicholson, spent the first half of the year 1781 fitting out at Philadelphia for a cruise, under the accustomed difficulties imposed by lack of money and scarcity of seamen. The Deane, Captain Samuel Nicholson, the Confederacy, Captain Harding, and the Saratoga, Captain Young, cruised in the West Indies during the winter and early spring. They sailed, March 20, from Cape Francois bound north in company with a French frigate and a large convoy of American and French merchantmen. The Deane arrived at Boston about the middle of April. The Confederacy, on April 15, fell in with the British ships Roebuck, 44, and Orpheus, 32. In the face of so superior a force, and with the working of his ship hindered by a large cargo of military supplies,

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Captain Harding considered resistance useless and promptly struck his flag. Thus ended the brief and unlucky career in the Continental service of this fine frigate. She was taken into the British navy under the name of Confederate. Several of the convoy were also taken. It would appear that the Saratoga, after parting from her consorts, was lost at sea, for she was never heard of again (Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 355, 411, 471, 475, 505 (February 7, April 28, May 5, June 6, 1781) ; Boston Gazette, January 29, March 19, April 16, 30, May 14, 1781; Continental Journal, March 22, April 19, 26, 1781; Independent Chronicle, May 4, 10, 1781; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 62; Navy Rec. Soc., vi, 109; Barney, 86.)

The Trumbull got to sea at last and took her departure from the Delaware capes August 8; among her lieutenants were Richard Dale and Alexander Murray, a volunteer. She sailed in company with a twenty-four-gun privateer, a fourteen-gun letter of marque and a convoy of twenty-eight merchantmen. The same day three sail were discovered to the eastward, two of which gave chase to the convoy. Night came on rainy and squally and the Trumbull carried away her fore-topmast and main-topgallantmast. She was obliged to run before the wind and the rest of the fleet left her. Captain Nicholson reported: "The wreck of the topmast with the yard and rigging laying aback of the foresail and over the bows, the topsail yard arm came through the foresail and on the forecastle, so that with our utmost exertion we could not clear ourselves of the wreck until one of the ships came alongside and the other in sight. Immediately all hands were called to quarters; instead of coming, three quarters of them ran below, put out the lights, matches, &c. With the remainder and a few brave officers we commenced an action with the Iris for one hour and thirty-five minutes, at the end of which the other ship came up and fired into us. Seeing no prospect of escaping in this unequal contest, I struck, having my first and third lieuts. and Capt. Murray, a volunteer, with eight others wounded and 5 killed. My crew consisted of 180 men, 45 of whom were taken out of the new gaol - prisoners of war; they through treachery and others from cowardice betrayed me, or at least prevented my making the resistance I would have done. At no time of the engagement had I more than 40 men upon deck." (Continental Journal, September 13, 1781.) The British thirty-two-gun frigate Iris had formerly been the American frigate Hancock, captured by the Rainbow in 1777. Her consort was the eighteen-gun ship General Monk, also a prize, having been originally an American privateer called the General Washington. The Trumbull was almost a wreck and was towed into New York by the Iris. She was not taken into the British service. A few weeks after this the Iris and another British frigate were captured by the French (Port Folio, May, 1814; Clark, i, 124; Almon, xii, 259, 260; Independent Ledger, October 8,1781; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 57, 58.)

In the summer of 1781 the Board of Admiralty ceased to exist and the management of naval affairs passed under the control of Robert Morris as Agent of Marine. He issued orders for a cruise together of the Alliance and Deane, which were now the only Continental vessels in commission. He wrote to Captain

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Barry, September 21: "When these ships are ready you will proceed to sea. The Ships are both under your command, the Captain of the Deane being instructed to obey your orders, wherefore you had best to furnish him a copy of these instructions, giving such in addition as you shall judge necessary for Keeping Company, respecting Signals, Places of Rendevous in case of Separation and all other things that tend to promote Success and Glory or secure Safety against superior force. It is my intention that you should go upon a cruize and therefore you will be ready to sail from the Harbour of Boston and use your best Efforts to disturb the Enemy. Such prizes as you may take you will send into the Port which you will find endorsed, a list of Persons in several Ports to whom to apply in Case you go yourselves or send your Prizes thither . . . I do not fix your cruizing ground nor limit the length of your cruize, because I expect you will know the most likely course and will be anxious to meet such events as will do honor to the American flag and promote the general interest. When you want provisions, I think it will be best that you should enter the Delaware and send up as far as New Castle, to which place they can best be sent in shallops. The latitude I have given precludes both the necessity and propriety of more particular instructions. Let me hear from you by every convenient opportunity and don't fail to transmit to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of our Army, as well as to me, any intelligence that you may obtain which you think may in any wise affect his operations." (Barry, 151.) October 17, the Deane not being ready, Morris sent orders to Barry to cruise alone in the Alliance, but the fall of Yorktown soon after this caused a change of plans and both ships remained in port (lbid., 150-154; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 273.)

The quarrels of Jones and Landais in France in 1780, the failure of the Alliance to bring over the clothing and stores so much needed by the army, and other circumstances led to much dissatisfaction in and out of Congress, and in March, 1781, soon after his return to America in the Ariel, Jones was called upon to explain his conduct. The Board of Admiralty propounded a list of forty-seven questions covering all his movements since taking command of the Ranger in 1777. Jones answered these questions promptly and fully, and his replies cleared up all doubts as to his various transactions in Europe, naval, political, and financial. Influenced by the good impression he made in this matter and by the honors paid him in Europe, Congress resolved, April 14, 1781, "That the thanks of the United States in Congress assembled be given to Captain John Paul Jones, for the zeal, prudence and intrepidity with which he has supported the honor of the American flag, for his bold and successful enterprises to redeem from captivity the citizens of these States who had fallen under the power of the enemy, and in general for the good conduct and eminent services by which he has added lustre to his character and to the American arms; that the thanks of the United States in Congress assembled be also given to the officers and men who have faithfully served under him from time to time for their steady affection to the cause of their country and the bravery and perseverance they have manifested therein." (Sherburne, 225.) A few weeks after this a special committee of Congress recommended Jones's promotion to the rank of rear-

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admiral, but, owing to the jealousy and opposition of other officers, no action was taken. The Ariel was sent back to France in the summer or early fall of 1781 (lbid., 214-226; Sands, 321-328; Wharton, iv, 288-297; Logs of Serapis, Alliance, Ariel, 125; Barry, 149; Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 401, 405; Royal Gazette, July 10, 1782.)

The Massachusetts ship Mars remained in the river Loire about three months and then returned to Boston, arriving February 28, 1781, with a prize. The frigate Protector, during the early part of the year, cruised in the West Indies, part of the time in company with the Continental frigate Deane, and with some success. In the Massachusetts House of Representatives, March 3, the following action was taken: "Whereas by recent Advices received by express from the Eastward it appears that the Enemy with a Number of Armed Vessels are daily committing the most horrid Depredations and Cruelties on the Inhabitants who reside on or near the Sea Coasts in the County of Lincoln," it was resolved to request the French admiral at Newport to send one or two frigates, to fit out the ship Mars immediately, and to grant bounties to privateers which should capture the enemy's vessels (Mass. Court Rec.) On May 19, it was resolved to send an armed vessel with provisions for the relief of the garrison at Machias, and to reinforce the garrison. Conditions along the Maine coast continued to be a source of chronic irritation at the seat of the state government in Boston and strongly worded resolves were from time to time adopted in the General Court. Notwithstanding the Penobscot disaster of two years before, the possibility of driving out the British remained, with the more sanguine, a practical question. The Mars, under the command of Captain Nevins, and apparently unaccompanied by the French frigates asked for, cruised during the spring and took two prizes. The new ship Tartar seems to have met with great delay in building and it was proposed to sell her, but this was not done at the time; she was not ready for service until the following year. The sale of the Mars was also considered. In the summer a sloop called the Defence was added to the Massachusetts navy and made one cruise, after the return to port of the Mars and under the same captain, James Nevins. Another severe blow came to the Massachusetts navy in 1781, in the loss of its most powerful vessel, the Protector, which was captured, May 5, by the British ship Roebuck and frigate Medea (Boston Gazette, March 5, 19, April 30, May 14, July 2, 1781; Independent Chronicle, May 4, 1781; Massachusetts Mag., July, October, 1910, January, 1911, January, 1912; Mass. Court Rec., February 14, March 3, 6, 7, May 19, 1781 ; Mass. Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 45; Mass. Archives, clviii, 212; Fox, 79-88.)

The frigate Indien, which had been built at Amsterdam for the Continental navy and then sold to the King of France, later became the property of the Chevalier Luxembourg, who leased her in 1779 or 1780 to Commodore Alexander Gillon of the South Carolina navy. Gillon had been in Europe since 1778, employed in furthering the naval and commercial interests of his state. He made enemies and his reputation has suffered from statements concerning his financial transactions.

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He changed the name of the Indien to South Carolina, manned her largely with American sailors from English prisons, and armed her with twenty-eight thirty-six-pounders (Thirty-nine-pounders, according to the British account, Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 490, January 18, 1783.) and twelve twelves. He moved her from Amsterdam to the Texel during the summer and fall of 1780, the passage being much obstructed by shoal water. While on the way the South Carolina was joined by Lieutenant Matthewman, who had been engaged as master. This officer gives an account in his "Narrative " of conditions on board the frigate during his stay. "In Rotterdam," he says, "I saw Commodore Gillon, the commander of the ship, who gave me his directions. On my arrival on board the ship, then laying about half way between Amsterdam and the Texel, everything was in confusion, three of the Lieutenants were under arrest, and the ship like a mere wreck, her crew then about 250 men mostly Americans, who had made their escape and had got on board under pretence of giving them a passage to America; where they were near a twelve month . . . and were never allowed the liberty of slipping over the ship's side. I myself was seven months on board, though master of the ship. On some disagreement I quit the ship and returned to Amsterdam." (Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878.) The South Carolina remained at the Texel until August, 1781, when she was finally ready for sea. She had a crew of five hundred and fifty, including three hundred French marines. She cruised first in the North Sea, and on August 25, captured and burned a prize. September 1, she was off the Shetland Islands and on the 3d her log records: "Hove the Corps of a French Mareen over Aboard at 8 P.M." On the 7th, she captured a sixteen-gun Liverpool privateer; the same day, "Put 2 French Mereens in Irons for Insulting Lieut. White." By the middle of the month the South Carolina was making a southerly course, and on the 24th, "Mored att Carone in Spain." October 17, she sailed from Coruna, and on the 21st, in latitude 37° 52', "Brought Tew A Brigg; She Pruved to Be A Brigg from Newfound Land Called the Venus." On the 31st, the South Carolina was off Teneriffe. She made a short cruise in the West Indies, then sailed north, and, December 31, was off Charleston. The next day, however, she "Bore Away for the Havannah." (Log of the South Carolina; Paullin, 436-438 ; Wharton, iv, 546, 547; So. Carolina Hist. and Gen. Mag., January, April, 1900; Boston Gazette, November 19, 1781; Independent Chronicle, November 22, 1781; Royal Gazette, July 10, 1782; Lee MSS., July 5, 1779, June, 1780; Adams MSS., March 8, September 26, October 26, 1781.)

In a letter, dated September 23, 1781, Captain Stirling reported the capture of his ship, a sixteen-gun sloop of war of the British navy, by an American privateer. "It is," he says, "with the most poignant grief I acquaint your Excellency of the capture of his Majesty's sloop Savage, late under my command . . . Early in the morning of the 6th instant, 10 leagues East of Charles-town, we espied a ship bearing down on us, who when about four miles distant, hauled her wind to the Eastward, showing by her appearance she was an American cruizer; her force could not be so easily distinguished. I therefore gave way to the pleasing idea that she was a privateer carrying 20 nine-pounders, whom I had intelligence was cruizing off here, and instantly resolved either to bring her to action or oblige her

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to quit the coast, for which purpose we gave chase, but were prevented continuing it long by her edging down, seemingly determined to engage us. Conscious of her superiority in sailing and force, this manoeuvre coinciding with my wishes, I caused the Savage to lay by till we perceived on her nearer approach she was far superior to what we imagined and that it was necessary to attempt making our escape, without some fortunate shot, in the course of a running fight we saw inevitable, admitted our taking advantages and bring on a more equal conflict. At half past ten she began firing bow chacers and at eleven, being close on our quarter, the action commenced with musquetry, which after a good deal of execution was followed by a heavy cannonade on both sides. In an hour's time I had the mortification to see our braces and bow-lines shot away and not a rope left to trim the sail with, notwithstanding every precaution had been taken; however, our fire was so constant and well-directed that the enemy did not see our situation, but kept alongside of us till accident obliged him to drop astern. The Savage was now almost a wreck, her sails, rigging and yard so much cut that it was with the utmost difficulty we could alter our position time enough to avoid being raked, the enemy lying directly athwart our stern for some minutes. This was the only intermission of great guns, but musquetry and pistols still aid execution and continued till they opened again, which was not till both ships were almost on board each other, when the battle became more furious than before. Our quarter-deck and forecastle were soon now nearly cleared, scarce a man belonging to either not being killed or wounded, with three guns on our main-deck rendered useless. In this situation we fought near an hour with only five six-pounders, the flre from each ship's guns scorching the men who opposed them, shot and other implements of war thrown by hand doing execution, when our mizen-mast being shot away by the board, our main-mast tottering with only three shrouds standing, the ship on fire dangerously, only 40 men on duty to oppose the foe who was attempting to board us in three places, no succour in sight or possibility of making further resistance, I was, necessitated at a quarter before three P.M. to surrender to the Congress, a private ship of war belonging to Philadelphia, who carried 215 men and mounted 20 twelve pounders on her main-deck and 4 sixes above, fourteen of which were fought on one side. She lost during the action eleven men and had near thirty wounded, several of them mortally; her masts, her sails and rigging were so much damaged that she was obliged to return to port, which partly answered my wishes prior to the action, as a great part of the Carolina trade was daily expected on the coast and this privateer we saw sailed remarkably fast. Three days were employed putting her in a condition to make sail and five for the Savage, who was exceedingly shattered. Indeed it is astonishing more damage was not done, as the weather was fine, the water remarkably smooth, and the ships never 30 yards asunder." (Almon, xiii, 48, 49; Ann. Reg. (1781), 251.) Stirling reported a loss of eight killed and twenty-six wounded. The Congress was commanded by Captain Geddes and her loss was eight killed and thirty wounded. The Savage was recaptured by the British frigate Solebay (Clark, i, 125; Penn. Gazette, September 19, November 28, 1781; Brit. Adm. Rec., Instance and Prize Records, 44, 401. See further on privateering in 1781, Clark, i, 120, 127; Tucker, ch. viii; A. Sherburne,

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37-49; Mil. and Nav. Mag. U. S., July, 1833; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 20; Massachusetts Mag., January, 1908; Boston Gazette. February 19, April 9, 16, 30, May 7, June 4, 25, July 2, August 6, September 10, 1781; Continental Journal, February 1, May 24, 1781; Conn. Courant, August 7, 1781; Freeman's Journal, May 16, 1781; London Chronicle, May 10, 1781.)

In addition to privateering upon the sea, active maritime warfare was carried on during the Revolution by means of boats alongshore and in harbors, inlets, and bays. Whaleboats, barges, and other small open craft were employed, with eight or more oars, sometimes as many as twenty-four, and also carrying sail, and with a swivel or heavier gun mounted in the bow. Their crews numbered from less than a dozen to thirty or more. A flotilla of four or five such boats made a formidable armament. Sometimes by surprise at night and sometimes by direct attack, they captured merchantmen, transports, and supply ships, and occasionally armed vessels of considerable force. Nantucket and Vineyard Sounds, Long Island Sound, Chesapeake Bay, and, most of all, the New Jersey shore and lower New York Bay were the waters chiefly frequented by these whaleboat privateersmen. The British and loyalists employed the same sort of boats in their predatory warfare along the shores of Chesapeake Bay and Long Island Sound; and boat expeditions were sent out from British men-of-war for the same kind of work. The most famous of the American flotillamen was Adam Hyler of New Jersey, who bore a commission from his state. He and others began their operations after the occupation of New York by the British in 1776. They cruised between Egg Harbor and Staten Island. Sometimes their boats were destroyed by parties sent from the British fleet, but new ones were soon built to replace them. Hyler was most active in 1781 and 1782 (Naval Mag., November, 1836 ; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, March, 1882 ; N. Y. Gen. and Biogr. Rec., April, 1891 ; Clark, i, 113, 120; Boston Post, October 17, 1778, January 23, February 6, 1779, May 11, 1782; Penn. Packet, May 2, 1780, May 29, 1781; Independent Chronicle, May 17, 1781, January 9, 1783; Freeman's Journal, April 25, December 26, 1781, June 26, 1882 ; Salem Gazette, August 15, 1782; Boston Gazette, March 31, 1783 ; Pickering MSS., xliv, 162 ; Almon, xiv, 35; N. Y. Eve. Post, July 18, 1883, quoted in Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc., January, 1884.)

Several marauding expeditions in Chesapeake Bay were conducted by the British during the Revolution. That of Collier and Mathew in 1779 has been noticed. In the fall of 1780, General Leslie, with about three thousand men and a naval force consisting of the Romulus of forty-four guns, the frigate Blonde, and some smaller vessels, including one of John Goodrich's, seized Portsmouth, Virginia. December 30, the expedition of Benedict Arnold with sixteen hundred men, which had sailed from New York on the 12th with several frigates, arrived in Chesapeake Bay. During the early part of January, 1781, Arnold raided up the James River as far as Richmond and destroyed much property. Governor Jefferson of Virginia made strenuous efforts in the defense of his State. Arnold soon retired to Portsmouth where he remained until spring. Meanwhile, in February, a French sixty-four-gun ship and two frigates captured the Romulus

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and several small vessels of Arnold's fleet. Another raid was made in April and May by twenty-five hundred men under Generals Phillips and Arnold. The expedition left Portsmouth April 18, fell down to Hampton Roads, and thence proceeded up the James and Chickahominy Rivers. April 27, the British met with firm resistance on the part of the Virginia navy on the James River; the most important of these vessels were the ships Tempest and Renown of sixteen guns each and the fourteen-gun brigantine Jefferson. This force, however, the invaders finally overcame, capturing a number of vessels that the Americans had not time to destroy. This nearly put an end to the Virginia navy. Phillips died May 13, leaving Arnold in command. Soon after this, upon the arrival of Cornwallis in Virginia, Arnold returned to New York (Almon, xi, 157, 322, xii, 60; Jefferson, ii, 391-410; Boston Gazette, March 5, 1781 ; Navy Rec. Soc., vi, 93-102; Dawson, ch. lxxx; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, 546; Virginia Hist. Reg., July, 1848, July, 1849, October, 1851; So. Lit. Messenger, June, 1839, March, 1857.)

When the American and French armies marched south in August, 1781, General Clinton sought to divert them from their purpose by sending Arnold on another marauding expedition, this time to Connecticut. Having collected a force on the Long Island shore at a point about thirty miles from New London, Arnold weighed anchor early in the evening of September 5. He had about seventeen hundred men on board twenty-four vessels. Captain Bazeley was in command of the fleet. They appeared off New London early the next morning. The force was landed in two divisions, nine hundred men on the west side of the Thames River and eight hundred on the east. Arnold led the western division and had little difficulty in taking New London; the town was burned. Fort Griswold, at Groton, on the east side of the river, made a strong resistance, but it was finally captured by the British and loyalists and a massacre of the garrison followed. A very large amount of property on shore was destroyed; also all the shipping, except a few vessels that escaped up the river. The expedition then returned to New York (Almon, xiii, 53,58; Dawson, ch. xcviii; Narr. and Crit. Hist, vi, 562.)

The most important naval event of 1781 was the culmination of the struggle for naval supremacy in American waters on the part of the French and British, which decided the outcome of the war. In December, 1780, war between Holland and England was declared, and in February, 1781, Admiral Rodney, the British naval commander-in-chief in the West Indies, seized the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, with a vast amount of property both public and private, thereby breaking up a depot for the supply and transshipment of goods and military stores, which had been during the war of great importance to the Americans and an invaluable aid to their cause. After the capture, through the very questionable expedient of leaving Dutch colors flying, Rodney was able greatly to increase the amount of booty by decoying into the roadstead many unsuspecting vessels. He wrote to Germain, March 26: "I may speak within bounds when I say that since taking this island upwards of two hundred thousand pounds in value of tobacco has fell into our hands." The spoils were sent home to England in thirty-four ships, most of which were fortunately captured by the French in the English Channel. Before the

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end of the year, St. Eustatius also was captured by the French (Mahan, 382; Channing, iii, 323-327; Almon, xi, 260, xiii, 119; Amer. Hist. Rev., viii (July, 1903), 699-708; London Chronicle, March 15, 1781; Boston Gazette, April 2, 1781 ; Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 123-126; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 202, 207 (Rodney to Germain, March 4, 26, 1781); Letters of Lord Rodney. Rodney's letters disclose the vindictiveness which marked his conduct at St. Eustatius.)

The French fleet in Newport, now commanded by Commodore Destouches, sailed for Chesapeake Bay early in March, closely followed by Arbuthnot from Gardiner's Bay, who by superior sailing arrived off the capes in time to head off the French. A battle followed in which Destouches had the advantage and yet he ran out to sea, allowing Arbuthnot to enter the bay undisturbed and form a junction with Arnold. Reinforcements under Phillips were then sent from New York to the army in Virginia. The operations of these officers on the James River, already mentioned, then took place. Late in March the Comte de Grasse with a powerful fleet sailed from Brest for the West Indies. Rodney being still occupied at St. Eustatius, the French on their arrival late in April had to deal only with Rear-Admiral Hood, whose force was inferior. If Rodney had been less intent on prize money he could, perhaps, have given De Grasse a reception that might possibly have upset French and American plans. He would neither go out himself to meet the French nor allow Hood to do so. De Grasse did not make full use of his advantage, however, and beyond releasing four blockaded French ships at Martinique he accomplished little. He anchored at Cape Francois late in July (Mahan, 382-387; Almon, xi, 310-315; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 207 (March 28, 1781) ; Navy Rec. Soc, iii (Hood's Letters), 15-18; Rodney's Letters, 58-62.)

Meanwhile Washington and Rochambeau, having united their forces near New York, were prepared to move on that place or against Cornwallis in Virginia, according to whether the one or the other movement could most advantageously be supported by the French fleet. Having been apprised of this situation upon his arrival at Cape Francois, De Grasse decided on the Chesapeake and promptly dispatched a frigate to notify the generals. They at once moved the allied army to the head of Chesapeake Bay and thence by transports to the York Peninsula, where Cornwallis in his camp at Yorktown was soon invested. De Grasse sailed north, August 5, and anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just inside the capes of the Chesapeake, on the 30th. There was no English naval force in the bay at this time. Arbuthnot had departed long before, returning to England on leave, and a few days before, Hood, sent north from the West Indies by Rodney, had passed the capes, and seeing no French had kept on to New York, where he joined Admiral Graves, now in command of the North American station. August 31, Graves sailed with the whole force for the Chesapeake, and upon arriving off the capes, September 5, saw De Grasse inside. The English had nineteen ships of the line, the French twenty-four. De Grasse got under way and ran out to sea to meet his adversary, and five days were spent in manoeuvring and desultory flghting. This gave an opportunity for another French fleet to get into the bay. This was the Newport fleet, now commanded by Commodore De Barras with a

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convoy of transports carrying siege artillery for the use of the array before Yorktown, which it was most important to conduct in safety. Graves, overmatched, was obliged to return to New York. De Grasse again entered the bay, where he found De Barras safely anchored. The action of September 5 was a subject of controversy among British officers. Graves fought the battle under a new system of instructions, and believed that his want of success was due to the failure of his captains, bound by tradition to the old system, to interpret his signals intelligently. Hood sharply criticized the management of the fleet and has been charged with purposely failing to get into action and with a willingness to see Graves blunder (Mahan, 387-400; Almon, xii, 283, xiii, 33-48, xiv, 36; Boston Gazette, October 1, 1781 ; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 212-215; Navy Rec. Soc., iii, 24, 28-36, 40, 44, vi, 111-127, xxix, 213, xxxii, 120, 121, 124, 125, 129, xxxv, 53-55, 260, 261; Clowes, iii, 488-502; Channing, iii, 334-339, 345; Doniol, iv, chs. xiii, xiv; Chevalier, ch. viii. See article on Rochambeau, by J. J. Jusserand in Harvard Graduates' Mag., December, 1912.)

The naval supremacy of France at the seat of war was now complete, the sea power so much desired by Washington had been won for the allies. The situation of Cornwallis seemed hopeless, although if he had held out a few weeks longer, it is possible that Clinton's efforts to relieve him might have been successful. He considered his position untenable, however, and surrendered to the allies, October 19.

Before the end of 1781, the Continental navy was reduced to the lowest point it reached during the war. Three vessels had been lost within the year: the frigates Confederacy and Trumbull and the sloop of war Saratoga. The Trumbull was the last of the original thirteen frigates of 1775. The frigates Alliance and Deane now constituted the whole strength of the navy in commission. The America of seventy-four guns and the frigate Bourbon were still on the stocks, with no likelihood of their being finished for a long time to come. On the list of officers were twenty-two captains and thirty-nine lieutenants, and of marine officers twelve captains and twelve lieutenants (Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 473. This list is dated September, 1781, and is doubtless inaccurate.) The great majority of these officers were either unemployed or serving on board privateers; several were prisoners of war. The administration of naval affairs continued to be in charge of Robert Morris as Agent of Marine until after the end of the war.

Five hundred and fifty letters of marque were issued to private armed vessels by the Continental Congress in 1781, a much larger number than in any other year and an increase over the figures for 1780 of two hundred and forty-nine (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495.) This indicates a decided activity and enterprise on the part of American privateers. A correspondent of John Adams wrote to him early in the following year: " It is true that a large number of our private armed ships to the Eastward have been taken in the course of the last season, but in every other respect we have been successful. And indeed we have captured a

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number of valuable ships belonging to the enemy." (Adams MSS., January 18, 1782.)

During the year 1781 the number of vessels of all classes in the British navy increased from five hundred and thirty-eight to five hundred and fiftyone, a much smaller growth than in the previous years of the war. The number in commission reached three hundred and ninety-eight at the end of the year, an increase of only two over the figures for the first of January. The number on the North American station seems to have varied considerably and to have been largest in October, when Graves had forty-five in his fleet; there were about forty in the West Indies. The total number of seamen and marines in the navy was ninety thousand (Hannay, ii, 211; Schomberg, ii, 36, iv, 376-384.)

According to the table of losses and captures before referred to, the British lost six hundred and twenty-five vessels, of which thirty-eight were privateers and the others merchantmen; of these, two hundred and seventeen were recaptured or ransomed. England took from her enemies three hundred and seventeen, including forty privateers, and ten of them were recaptured (Clowes, iii, 396.) Another correspondent of John Adams, writing from Boston, says: 11 The British frigates have done more damage to Our trade the last Season than any time since the Warr; that confounded Penobscot is a handy resort." (Adams MSS., January 23, 1782.)

John Paul Jones wrote to Washington, May 7, 1781: "Our Navy has been badly conducted; it has ever been without a head and is now almost entirely lost . . . I have pointed out many desirable operations that promised success and would have taught the barbarous Britains humanity, but my voice has been as a cry in the desert. The importance and necessity of a marine establishment does not appear sufficiently impressed on the minds of our Legislature." (Sparks MSS., xii, 247)

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XVII

THE END OF THE WAR, 1782 AND 1783

Although the surrender of Cornwallis virtually put a stop to military operations on land, hostilities on the sea continued until the conclusion of peace. Notwithstanding the fact that the naval resources of the country were nearly exhausted, cruising was actively carried on by the few Continental and State ships still remaining, while privateersmen, lured by the hope of prize money, did not cease fitting out their craft and sending them to sea as long as there were enemies to pursue.

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After the victory at Yorktown it was deemed necessary to send the Alliance again to France with Lafayette, and the cruise which had been planned for her by the Agent of Marine was accordingly abandoned. Washington wrote to Lafayette, November 15, 1781, once more strongly urging the importance of sea power. If De Grasse had remained a few weeks longer on the American coast, the English forces in the Southern States, in Washington's opinion, would have suffered "total extirpation." He says: "As you expressed a desire to know my Sentiments respecting the operations of the next Campaign, before your departure for France, I will without a tedious display of reasoning declare in one word, that the advantages of it to America and the honor and glory of it to the allied arms in these States must depend absolutely upon the naval force which is employed in these Seas and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act decisively unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority; nor can more than negative advantages be expected without it . . . It follows then, as certain as that night succeeds day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it everything honorable and glorious. A constant naval superiority would terminate the war speedily; without it I do not know that it will ever be terminated honorably." (Washington, ix, 406, 407.) The magnitude of the advantage gained at Yorktown and the temper of the enemy were evidently not appreciated in America at this time. As it turned out, the British were in no need of a further exhibition of force to dispose them to thoughts of peace. In fact they were so in fear of another great disaster that orders, dated April 4, 1782, were issued to General Carleton, who was sent to relieve General Clinton, to evacuate New York at once, or even to capitulate, if beset by a force so formidable as to render evacuation without heavy loss impracticable. For lack of transports, however, evacuation was impossible, and the tide soon turned somewhat in England's favor. The defeat of De Grasse by Rodney in the West Indies, in April, 1782, revived the spirits and restored the confidence of the British. Nevertheless, efforts to procure transports for removing the troops from New York continued, but as a sufficient number could not be collected to embark the whole army at once, the matter rested until at length the cessation of hostilities removed the supposed hazard of the situation. The British state of mind after Yorktown was of course unknown in America (Sparks MSS., Iviii, 145-149; Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 73, 77-80.)

Lafayette proceeded to Boston and on board the Alliance. Several other passengers accompanied him. Morris issued minute instructions, dated November 27, 1781, in which Captain Barry was directed to give special attention to the comfort of his passengers. "Let it be done with discretion; remember that we are not rich enough to be extravagant, nor so poor as to act meanly." The importance of landing these distinguished persons safely was such that it would be necessary to avoid all vessels, it being the sole object "to make a quiet and safe passage to some port in France." The Alliance was to remain in Europe until about the 1st of March, cruising "where you can promise yourself of the best chance of Success "; she was then to set sail from L'Orient on her return voyage, taking as many prizes on the way as possible and finally putting into the most

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convenient American port, preferably Philadelphia, there to await further instructions. The frigate's crew was finally made up. A number of French sailors were obtained through the efforts of the French minister and some of the Deane's crew were transferred to the Alliance. She sailed December 23, 1781, and in spite of her orders to avoid all vessels, she made a prize of a large ship from Jamaica which was sent into Boston. The frigate arrived at L'Orient, January 18, 1782 (Barry, 153-161; Independent Chronicle, January 24, 1782.)

The Alliance made a short and unsuccessful cruise in February, and on March 16 set sail on her homeward voyage. She was again unfortunate in the matter of taking prizes and fell in with no vessel of the enemy until off the Delaware capes, May 10, when a British sixty-four-gun ship appeared and gave chase. The Alliance succeeded in eluding her and ran for New London, where she arrived, May 13, and remained until August (Barry, ch. xv; Boston Post, May 11, 1782; Independent Chronicle, May 23, 1782; Independent Ledger, June 10, 1782.)

The General Court of Massachusetts, on February 25, 1782, resolved to allow Captain Nicholson, who had unwillingly given up some of his crew to the Alliance, to enlist not more than twelve men from the garrison of the Castle in Boston Harbor, for the frigate Deane. This ship sailed from Boston in March on a two months' cruise in the West Indies. She captured two ships, a brig, and a schooner, three of them armed vessels. She returned to Boston in May with many prisoners on board, also several cases of fever. She remained in Boston Harbor four or five months (Mass. Court Rec., February 25, 1782; Boston Gazette, May 13, July 29, 1782, Independent Chronicle, May 23, 1782.)

The frigate South Carolina, Commodore Gillon, arrived at Havana, January 12, 1782. Here it was learned that the Spaniards were making plans for an expedition against New Providence, under General Cagigal, the governor of Cuba. Gillon joined forces with them, taking command of the fleet consisting of fifty-nine vessels, presumably mostly Spanish. The next three months were spent in fitting out this armada. April 22, the expedition sailed, and May 5 the whole fleet lay before New Providence. Several outlets at the north side of the island were blocked by some of the American vessels, while others were stationed in the offing. The South Carolina stood off and on until five o'clock, then took a position as near the bar of the harbor as possible, within gunshot of Fort Nassau, in order to draw attention that way while the transports prepared to land the troops. General Cagigal sent a flag to the governor asking on what terms he would surrender the Bahama Islands to Spain. Meanwhile Gillon directed the transports to follow a leading vessel, which repeated his signals for anchoring before the town, that the general might debark when he saw fit. The next day at nine o'clock the British governor sent proposals on board the South Carolina which were not accepted. All the American vessels continued as near their stations as wind, shoals, and circumstances allowed. The Spanish transports, with armed vessels and galleys, kept anchoring as ordered, and at three o'clock Cagigal with the Spanish officers on the South Carolina departed in order to

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make preparations for debarking the troops. At five o'clock another flag was sent to the governor and returned the next day, having agreed on a capitulation. On the following day, May 8, Cagigal landed the army and took possession of the forts and town. This made the third capture of New Providence during the Revolution. Gillon thought that the success of the expedition was due to the captains of the American armed vessels, who led the fleet against head winds through difficult passages among the islands and reefs, a route so unfrequented and unexpected by the enemy that they had made no preparations to obstruct or defend it (Royal Gazette, June 19, 1782, Gillon's report to the governor of South Carolina (May 15, 1782); Penn. Packet, March 5, June 4, October 19, 1782; Log of the South Carolina; Almon, xiv, 148-151.)

The South Carolina then sailed north and arrived at Philadelphia May 28. Here she remained nearly six months. Gillon was displaced from the command of the ship by an agent of the owner, Chevalier Luxembourg, the exact reason for which does not appear. The command was given to Captain John Joyner of the South Carolina navy. In November the frigate sailed from Philadelphia having three vessels under convoy, bound to Europe. Apparently she did not clear the capes for about a month, as she had not gone far when, on the night of December 19, she fell in with three British men-of-war, the forty-four-gun ship Diomede and the frigates Quebec and Astrea of thirty-two guns each. A chase of eighteen hours ensued, during which two of the convoy were captured by the British and found to be a ship and brig from Philadelphia; the third, a schooner, got away. "Prisoners inform'd us," says the Astrea's log "the large Ship was the South Carolina Frigate, 40 Guns ... At 3 [P.M., December 21] the Carolina fir'd several stern chace Guns at the Diomede & Quebec ... At 1/2 past 3, the Quebec hauld up for the South Carolina's Weather Quarter. The Diomede continued standing on & Fir'd her Bow Chace Guns at the South Carolina; she ret'd her stern Chace Guns. At 45 Min. past, the Diomede bore up and fir'd her Starbd Guns at the Chace. At 50 Min. past 4 the Chace struck her Colours & hove too." The prize was sent into New York. Soon afterwards a survey of the South Carolina was made which furnishes a description of this interesting ship, which might have done so much and really did so little for the American cause. Her length on the upper deck was one hundred and seventy feet, on the keel one hundred and forty-four feet and one inch; extreme breadth, forty-three feet and three inches. She measured fourteen hundred and thirty tons burden. "She appears to be about Five Years Old, Built in Holland; had on board when taken, 28 No. (about) Thirty-Nine Pounders on the Upper Deck, 10 No. Twelve Pounders on the Quarter Deck, and 2 No. Nine Pounders on the Fore Castle." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 490, January 18, 1783; Captains' Logs, Nos. 23 and 749 (logs of the Astrea and Quebec); Boston Gazette, September 16, 1782; Independent Chronicle, November 29, 1782, January 9, 1783; Penn. Packet, December 31, 1782; Almon, xv, 227; Clowes, iv, 91.)

Two new vessels were added to the Massachusetts navy early in 1782, the Tartar and the sloop Winthrop. The Tartar had been under construction nearly

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two years and was only just ready for service; she was a ship of four hundred tons and carried eighteen nine-pounders and two sixes. These vessels seem to have cruised together in June for a short time. In a letter, dated July 1, William Vernon says: "The State Ship Tartar and Sloop of 12 Guns went out the last Week, in quest of the Bermuda Brigt., but they were soon drove in by the appearance of a Ship wch they supposed to be of 50 Guns and proved to be only a Sloop of War of 18, much to the discredit of Capt. Cathcart, I think." (Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 274.) Cathcart, however, apparently retrieved his good name and later in the season the Tartar took several prizes. She was sold before the end of the year 1782 and was fitted out as a privateer, still under Cathcart's command. After cruising a short time in 1783, she was captured by the British frigate Bellisarius and taken into New York. The Winthrop, Captain George Little with Edward Preble as lieutenant, was employed on the Maine coast. She came into Boston, September 16, 1782, after a short cruise in which she took five prizes, including two privateers and a brig which was cut out of her anchorage under the fort in Penobscot Bay. "Much Praise is due to the Bravery and good Conduct of Capt. Little and his Crew for this spirited Enterprise and for the great Service they have rendered this Commonwealth in captivating the above Privateers, that have for a long Time infested this Coast and taken many valuable Vessels from us." (Boston Gazette, September 23, 1782.) In February, 1783, the governor, in a message relating to the employment of Little and the Winthrop, said: "I considered that he had most essentially prevented the Depredations on that coast by Capturing & sending into this Port near the whole of the Arm'd force they possess'd at Penobscot." (Mass. Archives, clviii, 274.) The Winthrop made two cruises in 1783, the last one ending in June. She was the last ship of the Massachusetts navy in commission and was sold soon after her return to port (Mass. Acts and Resolves, May 2, November 12, 1782, March 26, June 4, 1783; Mass. Archives, clviii, 238, 274; Boston Post, August 10, October 12, November 23, 1782; Boston Gazette, September 23, October 14, November 11, 1782, March 17, 1783; Continental Journal, October 3, 1782; Independent Chronicle, November 7, 1782; Massachusetts Mag., January, April, 1911.)

In the winter and early spring of 1782, Delaware Bay was infested with privateer barges and other small craft, fitted out by loyalists, which preyed upon the commerce of Philadelphia and ravaged the shores of the bay. The merchants of the city applied to the state government for protection and as a result, provision was made for fitting out a number of armed vessels for the defense of the bay. This action was taken April 9. On the 29th, the Philadelphia merchants appealed to the Continental Congress, more especially, however, in behalf of American shipping in general. Robert Morris reported on this memorial that the Continental navy was unable to give sufficient protection to commerce and recommended calling upon the navies of France and Spain for assistance. Meanwhile conditions in Delaware Bay were too acute to admit of waiting for the slow progress of legislation and in March the merchants of Philadelphia had purchased on their own responsibility and fitted out as a privateer under a Continental commission a ship called the Hyder Ally. She was armed with four

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nine-pounders and twelve sixes and manned by a crew of a hundred and twenty. The command was given to Joshua Barney, a lieutenant in the Continental navy, who had recently returned from a long imprisonment in England (Barney, 303; Pap. Cont. Congr., 41, 6, 283 (April 29, 1782), 28, 241, 243a (May 2, 4, 1782), 137, 1, 435 (May 4, 1782).)

On April 7, the Hyder Ally with a convoy of merchantmen dropped down the bay to Cape May Road. Here they were seen towards evening by the British frigate Quebec and the sloop of war General Monk, formerly the American privateer General Washington, which anchored outside the capes. At daylight the next morning the General Monk entered the Cape May Channel in pursuit of the Americans, while the Quebec stood up the Henlopen Channel to cut off their retreat to Philadelphia. The General Monk was joined by a New York sixteen-gun privateer called the Fair American. At noon these two vessels came into Cape May Road. The American fleet got under way, stood up the bay, and dispersed. One of them ran ashore and another struck to the General Monk. The Fair American then got aground, and the Monk continued the chase alone. An English account says: "We soon came up with the Hyder Ally, notwithstanding she cut her boat adrift and did everything else to get away. We meant to have run upon her quarter and board her at once, but after firing two of our bow chaces when at 100 yards distance, she put her helm a-port and stood right athwart us, therefore we did the same, to prevent being raked, when the action began and we edged towards her till within close pistol-shot. We with great concern soon found our short guns (carronades) to become totally unmanageable and that two-thirds of the shot we fired did not strike the hull of our antagonist. After having sustained the action for ten minutes with musketry only, the decks full of killed and wounded (among the former the Lieutenant and Master, two brave Officers), our rigging so much shot as to render it impossible to haul off, and lastly, seeing no prospect of assistance from the Fair American, Captain Rogers was under the mortifying necessity of striking his Majesty's colours to the Hyder Ally, of 18 long nine and six pounders and between 130 and 140 men, belonging to the state of Philadelphia." (London Chronicle, September 10, 1782.) The General Monk, according to the same authority, was armed with eighteen nine-pounder carronades and two sixes; her crew numbered a hundred and ten. Her loss was eight killed and thirty-two wounded, four of them mortally; the Hyder Ally lost four killed and eleven wounded. The time of the action was about half an hour. It is very doubtful if, as the English asserted, Barney tried to escape at the outset of the engagement. This impression may have arisen from the fact that he shouted his orders in a manner intended to deceive the enemy. The capture of the Monk produced great satisfaction in Philadelphia. A dispatch from that place says: "Capt. Barney with the officers and men of the State ship Hyder Ally have received the thanks of the honorable House of Assembly of Pennsylvania as a mark of the high sense which they entertain of their bravery and intrepid conduct in the above action; and have also ordered that an elegant sword be presented to Capt. Barney." (Boston Gazette, May 6, 1782.) Some time after her capture, the General Monk was purchased by the national government and taken into the

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Continental navy under her original name of General Washington. Barney was given command of her and she was used as a packet (Barney, 112-117, 304-308; Freeman's Journal, April 10, 1782; Penn. Gazette, April 17, 1782; Boston Gazette, April 22, May 6, 1782; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's narrative; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 490, May 10, 1782.)

The brig Holker of Philadelphia was one of the most famous privateers of the Revolution. She began her career in 1779, and cruised three years or more under different commanders. In the winter of 1782, a squadron of American privateers made their rendezvous at Martinique and planned an attack on Tortola, one of the Virgin Islands. Besides the Holker there were four ships and a sloop, with about five hundred men; only four vessels, however, finally took part in the expedition. They left Martinique about March 1, and were seen off Tortola on the 4th. They intended to anchor off the forts and cover a landing party at night, but were delayed and the movement was deferred. They were seen standing into the harbor by moonlight and the alarm was given, so the attack was postponed until morning. Three brigantines attempting to escape from the harbor were chased and one of them was captured by the Holker. Several letters of marque at St. John came out to meet the American squadron and an action of half an hour's duration followed. A few days later the British sloop of war Experiment, coming in from a cruise, had an engagement with the Holker and the Junius Brutus, one of the other American vessels. The Experiment succeeded in beating them off and went into Antigua. The American squadron then cruised a few days and captured a rich prize. The attempt on Tortola was abandoned. The Holker returned to Philadelphia, May 11, having taken fourteen prizes (Boston Post, September 11, October 2, 1779, May 25, 1782; Penn. Packet, August 21, 1779; Boston Gazette, January 14, 1782, March 10, 1783; Independent Chronicle, May 30, 1782; Royal Gazette, June 5, 1782; Clark, i, 112, 119, 120, 129.)

Captain Mowatt, the British commander at Penobscot, in March, 1782, sent a fourteen-gun brig to cruise off Cape Ann. She captured a fishing-boat, put twenty-five men on her and sent her into Gloucester. There it was found that a ship with a valuable cargo was about to go to sea. At half-past four the next morning, April 1, the boat ran in, boarded the ship and brought her out. The ship Polly, pierced for twenty guns, was on the ways at Gloucester, with her topmasts struck and otherwise unprepared. Work was began on her at seven o'clock and at eleven she got to sea with a hundred volunteers on board. She chased the brig, fishing-boat, and prize ship on their way to Penobscot and at twelve o'clock recaptured the prize. She then chased Mowatt's brig, but night came on and she escaped (Salem Gazette, April 11, 1782.)

One hundred and fifty-eight private armed vessels, with about two thousand guns and six thousand men, were sent out of Salem during the Revolution. They captured nearly four hundred and fifty vessels, nine tenths of which safely reached port. One of the most noted of these Salem privateers was the ship

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Grand Turk, of three hundred tons, built in 1781. She was armed with twenty-two guns and carried a crew of a hundred and ten men. She was actively and successfully employed as long as the war continued. She cruised off the coast of Europe and in the West Indies (Hunt's Mag., February, 1857; Coll. Essex Inst., xliv (1908), 214-218; Boston Gazette, October 22, 1781, May 6, 1782; Independent Chronicle, January 24, 1782; Boston Post, April 5, 1783. A list of 196 Salem privateers is given in Paine's Ships and Sailors of Old Salem.)

The privateer Jack of Salem, a sloop of twelve guns and sixty men, fought a long and severe engagement off Halifax with the British sloop of war Observer, carrying twelve guns and a hundred and seventy-three men. At nine in the evening, May 28, 1782, the Observer came alongside the Jack. William Gray, the first lieutenant of the privateer, says: "It was our misfortune to have our worthy commander, Capt. Ropes, mortally wounded by the first broadside. I was slightly wounded at the same time in my right hand and head, but not so as to disable me from duty. The action was maintained on both sides, close, severe and without intermission, for upwards of two hours, in which time we had 7 killed, several wounded, and many abandoned their quarters. Our rigging was so destroyed that not having command of our yards, the Jack fell with her larboard bow foul of the brig's starboard quarter, when the enemy made an attempt to board us, but they were repulsed by a very small number compared with them. We were engaged in this position about a quarter of an hour, in which time I received a wound by a bayonet fixed on a musket and which was hove with such force as, entering the fore part of my right thigh and passing through close to the bone, entered the carriage of a bow gun, where I was fastened, and it was out of my power to get clear till assisted by one of the prize masters. We then fell round and came with our broadsides to each other, when we renewed the action with powder and balls, but our match rope, excepting some which was unfit for use, being all expended and being to leeward, we bore away, making a running fight. The brig being far superior in her number of men, was able to get soon repaired and completely ready to renew the action, indeed had constantly kept up a chasing fire, for we had not been out of reach of her musketry. She was now close alongside of us again with 50 men picked out for boarding. I therefore called Mr. Glover and the rest together and found we had but 10 upon deck and two of them besides myself wounded. I had been repeatedly desired to strike, but I mentioned the sufferings of a prison ship and made use of every other argument in my power for continuing the engagement. All the foreigners however deserted their quarters every opportunity. At 2 o'clock P.M. on the 29th I had the inexpressible mortification to deliver up the vessel." (Salem Gazette, July 11, 18, 1782; Boston Post, June 15, 1782; Hunt's Mag., February, 1857.)

Four Massachusetts privateers engaged in an enterprise on the Nova Scotia coast which is described in the newspapers of the time. "Captains Babcock of the Hero, Stoddard of the Scammel, Woodbury of the Hope, and Tibbets of the Swallow, having determined to surprize and possess themselves of Lunenburgh, an elegantly situated Town, ten Leagues West of Halifax, landed Ninety Men two

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Miles below it, under the Command of Lieut. Barteman, on Monday the first Day of July Instant at half after Seven o'Clock A.M. This gallant Corps with amazing Rapidity reached the Town, and amidst many heavy Discharges of Musquetry from the Enemy, burnt the commanding Officer's House, a Blockhouse in the North West Part of the Town, spik'd up two 24 pounders, and forc'd the Enemy into the South Blockhouse, from whence they kept up a brisk and animating Fire and declared their Intention to hold out to the last Extremity. But their Animation subsided upon the Receipt of a few 4-pound Shot from the Hero and they reluctantly surrendered themselves Prisoners of War. The victorious Party with a natural and pleasing Vivacity fell to plundering, and quickly emptied the Stores of a Variety and considerable Quantity of Dry Goods, twenty Puncheons of good West-India Rum and the King's Beef, Pork and Flour. Upon the near Approach of the Combined Fleet, two 18 pounders were spiked up and dismounted and the Royal Magazine was safely deposited in the Hold of the Scammel. The strictest Decorum was observed towards the Inhabitants and their Wearing Apparel and Household Furniture inviolably preserv'd for their Use. The Town was ransomed for a Thousand Pounds Sterling and Colonel Creighton with some of the principal Inhabitants were shipped on board the Scammel. On the Side of the brave Sons of Liberty, three were wounded slightly, one dangerously; on the Part of the Abettors of Oppression and Despotism, the Number of slain and wounded unknown, only one of their slain being found." (Boston Gazette, July 15, August 5, 1782 ; Massachusetts Spy, August 8, 1782.)

Thomas Truxtun, who afterwards became a famous commodore of the reestablished navy, was one of the successful privateersmen of the Revolution. He cruised throughout the whole war, most of the time in West Indian and European waters. In 1780, at L'Orient, he incurred the displeasure of Paul Jones by hoisting in his presence a broad pennant, contrary to a rule established by Congress Sands, 298; Hist. Mag., April, 1857; Jones MSS., Jones to Truxtun (October 24, 1780).

In 1782, he was in command of the ship Commerce of Philadelphia, in the West Indies; she carried fourteen guns and fifty men. November 15, she fell in with a brig of sixteen six-pounders and seventy-five men and a schooner, fourteen sixes and eighty men. The Commerce engaged these vessels at a distance of thirty yards for twenty minutes. Her loss was one killed and two wounded; the brig lost five killed and thirteen wounded and the schooner ten killed and eleven wounded. The Commerce was then driven off by a British ship and brig which appeared in time to rescue the thoroughly beaten vessels (Boston Gazette, January 6, 1783; Port Folio, January, 1809.)

At the end of November, 1782, a desperate battle of barges took place in Chesapeake Bay off Tangier Islands, near the boundary between Maryland and Virginia on the eastern shore of the bay. Four Maryland barges and one from Virginia set out to attack six barges drawn up off the islands, manned by tories, refugees, and sailors from the British fleet. The Virginia barge got aground and

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the leading Maryland barge, the Protector, flagship of Commodore Whaley, being far in advance, engaged the British flotilla unsupported. An explosion took place on the Protector and in the confusion which ensued the other barges retreated. Whaley was killed, but the fight was kept up by the Protector alone under Colonel Cropper of Virginia, a volunteer, until he was forced to surrender. Out of a crew of sixty-five the Protector lost twenty-five killed or drowned and twenty-nine wounded, some of them mortally (So. Lit. Messenger, March, 1857.)

The letter of marque brig Iris, eight six-pounders and forty-two men, sailed from Havana for Virginia, January 23, 1783, and off the capes of the Chesapeake, February 7, was chased by a British frigate and a New York privateer called the Admiral Digby, with fifty-four men, fourteen four-pounders and four nines. The Iris struck on a sand-spit at Cape Charles, and shortly afterwards the Admiral Digby also grounded within pistol-shot. The two vessels lay parallel to each other and fought two hours and a half, the American loss being four wounded and the British four killed and twelve wounded. A high wind and heavy surf came up in the night and both vessels were lost. The crews got safely ashore (Salem Gazette, April 17,1783.)

Privateers from the United States continued to cruise in European waters at a late period of the war, sending their prizes into France (London Chronicle, May 9, 1782; Boston Gazette, January 6, 1783.) Furthermore, the services of American privateers commissioned and fitted out in France were important and some of them have already been mentioned. Most of them sailed under the French flag. Dunkirk seems to have been the home port of many if not of the greater part of these vessels. During the war seventy-eight Dunkirk privateers were commanded by Americans, six of them under American commissions; of these six, it would appear that two only, the Black Prince and Black Princess, were owned by Frenchmen. These French-American privateers fought many hard engagements; they greatly annoyed the enemy's shipping in the English Channel and visited the shores of the British Isles. One of them, a twenty-gun ketch called the Franklin, in 1781 captured two of the vessels sent to England by Admiral Rodney, loaded with plunder from St. Eustatius. Captain William Fall, in the Sans Peur of nineteen guns, bombarded the town of Arbroath, which had refused to pay ransom, and a few days later captured two British privateers of sixteen and eight guns after a sharp action within close range of batteries on the Scotch coast (U. S. Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxvii (September, 1911), 935, 964-972.)

The conduct of these privateers fitted out in France seems sometimes to have been much less orderly than that of American ships in general. The crews were recruited from the heterogeneous seafaring population of the French ports and their commanders were not always able to control them. Respect for private property and for neutral flags was occasionally lacking. The cutter Eclipse was commanded during the latter part of her career by Nathaniel Fanning, who had served as a midshipman on board the Bonhomme Richard. The Eclipse was manned by a crew of a hundred and ten, just half of whom were Americans; the

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other half was made up of French, English, Irish, Dutch, Flemish, Germans, Italians, Genoese, Maltese, Turks, Tunisians, and Algerines. She sailed from Dunkirk under the French flag and cruised in the English Channel and in British waters. She took many prizes, including several of decidedly superior force, which were sent into French ports. In the summer of 1782, the Eclipse boarded a Danish vessel in the English Channel and the personal property of some French passengers was plundered. Fanning had given special orders to the boarding officer to respect private property, and that the robbery occurred seems to show loss of control over his men,, to say the least. As the result of an investigation and trial at the order of the French Minister of Marine, the judges of the admiralty sentenced Thomas Potter, the officer of the Eclipse who had boarded the Danish vessel, "to be hanged to a gallows erected for the purpose on the quay of this port and strangled by the executioner of high justice until he is dead," and two other men "to be whipped and flogged naked by said executioner of high justice and then branded on the right shoulder by a red-hot brand bearing the letters G A L and then conducted to the gallies of his Majesty, where they shall be made to serve during three years, their effects to be seized and confiscated "; they also declared "the aforesaid Nathaniel Fanning duly guilty and convicted of having failed to maintain subordination among his crew and of not having supervised that which was done during the search of neutral vessels, which gave rise to the aforesaid thefts, in punishment for which we declare him incapable during three years of any command as captain of vessels within the realm, and we enjoin him to be more circumspect for the future under penalty of the law." The three chief culprits being absent, "our present judgment will be executed in effigy by the attachment of figures to the aforesaid gallows and scaffold." (U. S. Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxvii, 982.) These three men had absconded before the trial, which was conducted without any defense on their part. In the fall of 1782, before the legal proceedings just narrated, Fanning cruised in a small cutter called the Ranger, in which he took one prize and was then himself captured by the British. He very soon escaped, however, and in a few days was again in Dunkirk (Ibid., 972-983; Fanning, 132-137, 141-144, 174-181, 197-229, 240-242. Privateering continued until the spring of 1783 was well advanced and prizes were still being tried as late as December. See Clark, i, ch. x; A. Sherburne, ch. v; Boston Gazette, January 28, February 11, 18, 25, March 11, April 8, 22, June 3, July 1, 8, August 5, September 2, 30, December 2, 16, 1782, May 5, Angust 4, December 22, 1783; Independent Chronicle, April 4, June 6, 1782, January 9, 1783; Boston Post, June 8, 29, July 6, 20, October 26, 1782, March 1, April 5, 1783; Freeman's Journal, January 23, February 6, 1782; Penn. Packet, May 11, 14, July 30, August 6, 1782. For privateering throughout the war, see Maclay's American Privateers; Weeden's New England, ch. xx; Coll. Essex Inst., xlii-xlv, letters of George Williams to Timothy Pickering.)

The prize ship General Washington, formerly the General Monk, was not purchased by the Continental government until September, 1782, but in May she was loaned by the owners to Robert Morris, who sent her to the West Indies in June under the command of Joshua Barney. She sailed down the bay with a

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convoy which returned upon seeing a British squadron outside. The General Washington managed to elude the enemy and got to sea. Upon approaching Cape Francois she fought an action with a British privateer and captured another vessel which she sent into port. At Cape Francois, Barney learned of Rodney's victory over de Grasse and found the remnant of the French fleet under the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who a little later took his ships to Boston. The letters of Robert Morris, which Barney had with him, procured for him the escort of a French sixty-four-gun ship, to insure the safety of his mission, which was the shipment of a large quantity of specie from Havana to the United States. All this was accomplished, and the Washington again ran by the British fleet off the Delaware capes, and, after destroying a number of the enemy's barges in the bay, returned to Philadelphia, July 17 (Barney, ch. x; Freeman's Journal, July 24, 1782; Independent Chronicle, August 8, 1782; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's narrative.) Under orders of Morris, dated October 7, 1782, the General Washington sailed for France with dispatches for Franklin; after a short passage she arrived at L'Orient before the end of the month. In January, 1783, she sailed on the return voyage and arrived at Philadelphia, March 12 (Barney, ch. xi; Barry, 184; Boston Gazette, March 24, 1783; Adams MSS., December 18, 1782, Barney to Adams.)

The Alliance sailed from New London, August 4, 1782, on a cruise. Soon after leaving port she recaptured a prize brig. Barry sent home a narrative of this cruise, dated L'Orient, October 18, saying that he "proceeded as fast as possible off Bermudas; in my way I took a schooner from that place for Halifax. After cruizing off there for twelve or fifteen days, I retook a sloop from New London and sent her for Cape Francois. Finding the prizes I had taken of little value either to myself or country and in all likelihood should be obliged to return into port soon for want of men, was determined to alter my cruizing ground. I therefore thought it best to run off the banks of Newfoundland. In my way there I fell in with a whaling brigantine with a pass from admiral Digby; I mann'd her and sent her for Boston. A few days after, off the banks of Newfoundland, I took a brigantine from Jamaica bound to London, loaded with sugar and rum, and sent her for Boston; by this vessel I found the Jamaica fleet were to the eastward of us. I then carried a press of sail for four days; the fifth day I took two ships that had parted from the fleet. After manning them and having a fresh gale westwardly, I thought best to order them for France; a day or two after, I took a snow and a ship belonging to the same fleet. Being short of water and a number of prisoners on board, the westwardly winds still blowing fresh, and in expectation of falling in with some more of them, I thought it best to proceed to France, with a determined view to get those I had already taken in safe, and after landing the prisoners, to put out immediately; but meeting with blowing weather and a high sea, I lost the rails of the head and was in great danger of losing the head, which accident obliged me to put in here where I arrived yesterday with the above four prizes. After repairing the damages and getting what the ship may want, I shall put to sea on a cruize. I have likewise to inform you that the Ramilies, admiral Graves' ship, foundered, but all the crew were saved, several

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of which were on the prizes I took." (Freeman's Journal, December 18, 1782.) Some days later the Continental packet General Washington, Captain Barney, came into L'Orient. Captain Henry Johnson of the Continental navy, who had been in command of a privateer, was in Bordeaux at the same time. Several officers of the Alliance, being dissatisfied at not having received their pay, refused obedience to the captain and Barry ordered them under arrest. He was unable to obtain others to take their places, and was obliged to sail with inexperienced lieutenants promoted from the lower grades (Barry, chs. xvi, xvii; Boston Gazette, August 12, 1782; Mass. Spy, January 2, 1783.)

The Alliance sailed from L'Orient, December 8, on a cruise. January 8, 1783, she arrived at Martinique, where Barry found orders to proceed to Havana. On the way thither he was chased by a British fleet and again by a seventy- four and a frigate. At Havana he found the twenty-gun ship Due de Lauzun, which had been purchased by Morris for the Continental navy. Barry's orders were to sail at once for the United States with this vessel in company and with a quantity of specie for the use of Congress. After a delay of about three weeks, owing to the fact of the port of Havana being closed by an embargo, the Alliance and the Due de Lauzun, Captain Green, sailed March 6. On the 10th, they saw three sail, which gave chase. The strangers turned out to be the British frigates Alarm and Sybil, and the sloop Tobago. The headmost, which seems to have been the Alarm, got within gunshot of the Alliance and they exchanged fire, while the other two were fast coming up with the Lauzun. She was a dull sailer and Barry feared that if he stood by her, both American ships would be captured. He advised Green to heave his guns overboard and ran off before the wind, and all but two or three of them were accordingIy thrown over. Another sail soon appeared which was recognized as a French ship of fifty guns that had been seen at Havana. Barry was thereupon encouraged and looked for help from this ship. At this time the Alliance had dropped astern, nearer the Lauzun, and the Alarm shortened sail and held off from them. The Sybil got within gunshot of the Lauzun and opened fire with her bow chasers, which was returned by the Lauzun with stern chasers. Barry ran between them in order to give Green a chance to get away. The other two British ships kept at a distance to windward; the French ship also lay to. Kessler, the mate of the Alliance, says: "Captain Barry went from gun to gun on the main deck, cautioning against too much haste and not to fire until the enemy was right abreast. He ordered the main topsail hove to the mast, that the enemy (who had already fired a Bow gun, the shot of which struck into the cabin of the Alliance) might come up as soon as he was abrest, when the action began and before an half hour her guns were silenced and nothing but Musketry was fired from her. She appeared very much injured in her hull. She was of 32 guns and appeared very full of men, and after an action of 45 minutes She sheered off." (Barry, 223.) The Alliance lost ten wounded, one of them mortally; the Sybil, two killed and six wounded.

The log of the Sybil records that the American vessels were sighted at half-past five in the morning and the British then gave chase; at eleven the Alliance

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showed Continental colors. At half-past eleven "the Comr (Commodore, evidently meaning the Alarm.) fired two or three broadsides at the large ship, who returned it; we were at this time about 3 miles astern of the Comre. The Tobago was abreast of us carrying a press of sail to get up." Twenty minutes later the Sybil got into action with the Alliance and received considerable injury to sails and rigging. At half-past twelve "a large ship bore down to the ship we Engaged, wch obliged us to sheer off." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Ships' Logs, No. 875.) Kessler's story continues: "As soon as the ship which we had engaged hove from us, her consorts joined her and all made sail, after which the French ship came down to us and Captain Barry asked them why they did not come down during the action. They answered that they thought we might have been taken and the signal known and the action only a sham to decoy him. His foolish idea thus perhaps lost us the three frigates." (Barry, 224.) They then chased the British, but the French ship was slow and the pursuit was abandoned. The voyage was then continued. The Alliance and Due de Lauzun became separated off Cape Hatteras. Finding two British cruisers off the Delaware capes, the Alliance bore away for Newport, arriving there March 20. The Lauzun got into Philadelphia on the 21st. The Alliance a few days later went up to Providence, where in due time the crew were paid off and discharged (Barry, ch. xviii; Independent Chronicle, February 27, 1783; Continental Journal, February 27, 1783.)

After the return of the frigate Deane from her cruise in the spring of 1782, Captain Nicholson was relieved of his command, for what reason is not clear; he was tried by a court martial in September, 1783, and honorably acquitted. Meanwhile, in September, 1782, the name of the ship was changed to Hague and "on Monday 11th instant John Manly, Esq., Captain in the American navy was appointed to the command of the Continental frigate Hague in this harbour, agreeable to an order from the Hon. Robert Morris, Esq., principal Agent of Marine, investing said command in the senior officer resident in the department. Capt. Manly, at 2 P.M. of the same day, repaired on board, attended by his principal officers, and was welcomed with united acclamations; 13 guns were fired in honor of the appointment, the ship beautifully decorated with colours and every possible demonstration of joy expressed a general satisfaction." (Independent Chronicle, September 26, 1782.) Manley had recently returned from a long imprisonment in England. The Hague made a cruise in the West Indies and took several prizes. In January, 1783, she was chased by a British ship and ran aground near Guadaloupe. Manley wrote, January 26: "I have already acquainted you that I have been drove on shore, after a 36 hours chace, by a 50 gun ship, and lay at the mercy of her incessant fire for two days, who with the assistance of a 74 and two other sail of the line to back her, were not very sparing of a heavy and brisk cannonade. However, without a man killed and only one slightly wounded and my damages repaired in hull, masts, &c. &c., it is with pleasure I look to the prospect of getting out to-morrow for Martinico, Fort Royal, for heaving down." (Independent Chronicle, February 27, 1783.) The Hague returned to Boston not long after and was soon put out of commission (Boston Post, December 14, 1782, November 8, 1783; Boston Gazette,

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December 16,1782, January 27, February 3, March 3, 1783; Essex Inst. Coll., January, 1909.)

After his return to America in the Ariel, in February, 1781, Captain Jones spent another long period on shore, waiting for an important command and again doomed to disappointment. Before be left France, Jones received an intimation that the America, seventy-four, would be reserved for him (Jones MSS., November 8,1780), and June 26, 1781, he was appointed to command her by a unanimous vote of Congress. In August, he went to Portsmouth to superintend the completion of the ship. This work had previously been conducted by Captain Barry. Instead of being nearly ready to launch, as Jones had been led to expect, he found her only partly built. He calls her the largest seventy-four in the world, one hundred and eighty-two feet, six inches long on the upper gun deck, a hundred and fifty feet on the keel, and with an extreme breadth of fifty feet, six inches; she measured nineteen hundred and eighty-two tons. She was to mount thirty eighteen-pounder's on the lower gun-deck, thirty-two twelves on the upper deck, and fourteen nines on the quarter-deck and forecastle, all long guns. Her full complement would have been six hundred and twenty-six officers and men. Jones remained in Portsmouth more than a year, scarcity of money causing the accustomed delay in the construction of the ship. Delay and other difficulties, however, also resulted from lack of experience, among those employed on the work, in building so large a ship. In constant fear of parties landing from the enemy's squadron, for the purpose of destroying the ship, it was necessary to keep a guard of workmen and citizens at night for her protection. Several times the enemy's boats appeared in the river at night, and twice, coming close, were fired upon. August 13, 1782, the Magnifique, a ship of the line belonging to the French fleet of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, at that time entering Boston Harbor, ran aground on Lovell's Island and was lost. September 3, the Continental Congress, being "desirous of testifying on this occasion to his Majesty the sense they entertain of his generous exertions in behalf of the United States: Resolved, That the agent of marine be and he is hereby instructed to present the America, a 74 gun ship, in the name of the United States, to the Chevalier de la Luzerne for the service of His Most Christian Majesty." So Jones again lost a fine ship. He remained at Portsmouth, however, until after the launch of the America, which took place November 6, 1782. The ship remained less than four years in the French service, being condemned as unseaworthy in 1786, and broken up. Immediately after the launching, Jones returned to Philadelphia. With the consent of Congress be made a cruise to the West Indies in Vaudreuil's fleet. Upon news of the conclusion of peace be again returned to Philadelphia, and later was sent by Congress to France in order to prosecute claims for prize money, still unpaid and due for the capture of the Serapis and other vessels (Sherburne, 227-238; Sands, 328-352; Almon, xv, 24; U. S. Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxiv (June, 1908), 573-580; Amer. Cath. Hist. Res., April, 1904; Boston Gazette, August 19, November 11, 1782; Independent Chronicle, November 14, 1782; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 244, 245 (November 6, 1779); Archives de la Marine, B4 185, 304-307, 310-316,

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318, 319. For the prosecution of the prize claims, see Paullin's Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, ch. i.)

One of the latest naval exploits of the war was the capture of a British privateer in Long Island Sound by a detachment of forty men from the army. Colonel Tallmadge, in a report to General Washington, dated Greenfield, Connecticut, February 21, 1783, says: "Yesterday the Enemy's Vessel was discovered near Stratford Point, when at 2 o'Clock P.M. the troops were embarked in a fast sailing Vessel prepared for that purpose, which was commanded by Capt. Hubbel, and at 4 P.M. they came up with her, when she gave a discharge of her Cannon followed by her Swivels and Musketry (our troops being concealed) till both Vessels met, when the troops rose, gave the Enemy one discharge of Musketry and boarded them with fixed Bayonets. The Captain of the Privateer was killed and only three or four of his Men were wounded, two of them supposed mortally wounded. Tho' Captain Hubbel's Vessel was much damaged in her Hull, Spars & Rigging, Yet not a man on board was killed or wounded. Captain Brewster, who commanded the Troops, as well as the other Officers and Soldiers on board, deserve Commendation for the Spirit and Zeal with which this Service has been performed. The Privateer is called the Three Brothers, was commanded by Captain Johnstone, mounting eleven Carriage Guns, four Swivels and twenty-five Stand of small Arms, and navigated by twenty-one men." (Pap. Cont. Conqr., 152, 11, 87.)

The battle between the Alliance and the Sybil was doubtless the last naval action of the Revolution, with the possible exception of some privateering exploit. Provisional articles of peace had been signed at Paris, November 30, 1782, and January 20, 1783, an armistice had been arranged. In compliance with this, dispatches were sent to belligerents on land and sea proclaiming the cessation of hostilities. In the newspapers appeared the following order signed by Robert Morris: "To all Captains, Commanders, Masters and other officers of armed vessels, commissioned by the United States in Congress assembled, and to all others whom it shall or may in any wise concern: According to the orders of the United States in Congress unto me given on the 24th day of this present month of March, I do hereby recall all armed vessels cruising under commissions from the United States of America, whereof you will please to take notice. Done in the Marine Office of the United States of America, this twenty-fifth day of March, in the Year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three." (Mass. Spy, April 17, 1783.) The signing of the definitive treaty, September 3, 1783, and its ratification by Congress, January 14, 1784, were the remaining steps necessary for the establishment of peace.

In the spring of 1783, there were five vessels remaining of the Continental navy: the frigates Alliance, Hague, and Bourbon, the first two only in commission, and the ships General Washington and Duc de Lauzun. In 1782, three hundred and eighty-three letters of marque were granted by the Continental Congress to

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private armed vessels; in 1783, the number dropped to twenty-two (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495.)

The British navy increased during 1782 from five hundred and fifty-one vessels of all classes to six hundred and eight; vessels in commission from three hundred and ninety-eight to four hundred and thirty. In 1782, there were seventy vessels on the North American station, and in January, 1783, there were sixty- two, besides more than twice as many in the West Indies. The total number of seamen and marines was one hundred thousand in 1782 and in the following year there were ten thousand more (Hannay, ii, 211; Schomberg, ii, 68, 124, iv, 418, 420; Clowes, iii, 327, 328.)

In the last two years of the war England lost five hundred and fifteen vessels taken by her enemies, and recaptured or ransomed a hundred and thirteen of them; she captured one hundred and eighty-six, of which only three were retaken. According to the same authority the total number of merchantmen and privateers captured from the British during the whole war was thirty-one hundred and seventy-six, eighty-nine of them belonging to the latter class; of this total eight hundred and ninety-three were retaken or ransomed. From her enemies England took during the war thirteen hundred and fifty-one, including two hundred and sixteen privateers; of all these only twenty-eight were recaptured (Ibid., 396. Unfortunately, in these tables Americans cannot be distinguished from other enemies, after 1777.) Of the regular navy of England there were taken, destroyed, burnt, foundered or wrecked daring the war, two hundred and three vessels; of those captured, eighteen were retaken (Ibid., iv, 109-113. For other estimates, see Almon, xvi, 190, 191; Schomberg, v, 41-43.)

The ships of the Continental navy were gradually disposed of, their crews disbanded, and this interesting organization passed into history. The Duc de Lauzun was loaned to the French minister, converted into a transport, and sent to France, where she was sold. The Bourbon was launched at Middletown, Connecticut, July 31, 1783, and in September was advertised for sale. Meanwhile the Hague had been advertised in August; she was described as being of five hundred and seventeen tons burden, ninety-six feet long on the keel and thirty-two feet wide. These two vessels soon passed into private hands. The General Washington was employed as a packet until the summer of 1784, when she also was sold. The Alliance was retained a year longer. There was a strong sentiment in favor of keeping this ship permanently in the national service, and on January 15, 1784, a committee of Congress reported that the honor of the flag and the protection of the coast required her repair. Many felt, however, that all naval expenditure should cease. The question was deliberated from time to time until May 23, 1785, when considerations of economy prevailed and a committee of Congress recommended the sale of the frigate. She was accordingly sold in August, 1785 (Barney, 148; Barry, 258; Independent Chronicle, August 7, 1783; Boston Post, August 30, September 13, 1783; Pap. Cont. Congr., 26, 441, 443 (April 11, 18, 1783), 28, 213, 221, 225 (January 15, March 30, 1784, May

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23,1785), 137, 2, 677 (July 22, 1783); Jour. Cont. Congr., April 21, 1783, June 3, 1785.)

Adequate naval protection was needed at the close of the Revolution and has been ever since, and will be, until international arbitration has taken the place of war. Even before the sale of the Alliance, the Algerines began their aggressions upon American commerce. With this frigate as the flagship of a small squadron, with John Paul Jones in command, the insolence of the Barbary pirates might have been checked at the outset, saving much blood and money and avoiding humiliation. It may be affirmed with confidence that with a suitable naval force our troubles with France and England during the wars of the French Revolution and Empire might have been prevented. In the summer of 1782 there was published a newspaper letter "On the Subject of an American Navy"; it was signed "Leonidas." It pointed out the importance of commerce and naval protection and recommended a fleet of five ships of the line and ten frigates (Independent Chronicle, September 5, 1782, from the Penn. Gazette.) In a report on the condition of the navy, July 31, 1783, Robert Morris urged the need of a fleet, but advised against taking any steps until funds should be obtained. Lack of money was necessarily the determining factor (Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, 2, 725. For John Adams's views of sea power in general and of American needs, see Wharton, iii, 542, 543, 833, 834.)

Captain Jones was a close student of naval science and his opinions, freely expressed, are of interest and value. In 1777, he prepared "A Plan for the Regulation and Equipment of the Navy, drawn up at the request of the Honorable the President of Congress." He proposed to establish a dockyard for building and fitting out ships in each of three sections of the country, the eastern, middle, and southern, and to divide the navy into three squadrons, one to rendezvous at each dockyard. The qualifications and duties of the officers at these yards were set forth in detail. The chief officers, or Commissioners, one from each yard, were to hold yearly conferences at Philadelphia with the Board of Admiralty, to whom they were to report on conditions at the yards. "The Authority of the Commissioners must by no means extend to the destination of Ships or their internal Government, it being their Province only to keep the Navy in fit Order for Sea service and it being the Province of Commanders in the Navy to govern their Ships according to the Rules and Regulations established by the supreme Power of Congress and to follow the Instructions which they may Receive from the board of Admiralty or their deputies, or from Senior or Flag Officers. Consequently Commanders of Squadrons or of single Ships have a right to call on the Commissioners or Agents for supplies whenever they are in want of them, being always accountable to Senior Officers in their division for their Conduct, but more especially so to the Board of Admiralty. As the extent of the Continent is so great that the most advantageous Enterprize may be lost before Orders can arrive within the eastern and Southern districts from the board of Admiralty, it will perhaps be expedient to appoint deputies for executing the Office of High Admiral within these extreme districts, to continue in Office only during the

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Pleasure and at all times accountable to the Board of Admiralty. Perhaps one deputy to the Eastward and another to the Southward may be found equal to the Business, but the number in each department ought not to exceed three. They ought to be Men of inviolable Secrecy, who inherit much discernment and Segacity and are endowed with consummate Knowledge in Marine Affairs. Besides pointing out proper Services for single Ships and for Squadrons, it may be the duty of the deputies, with the assistance of three or more of the most Judicious commanders of the Fleet who may be named by the board of Admiralty, to examine the abilities of Men who apply for Commissions, and make report to the Board, also to examine divers Persons who now bear Commissions in the Service and whoe's Abilities and accomplishments are very suspicious and uncertain; the board may do the same within the middle district . . . It may also be expedient to establish an Academy at each Dockyard under proper masters, whoe's duty it should be to Instruct the Officers of the Fleet when in Port in the Principles and Application of the Mathematicks, Drawing, Fencing and other manly Arts and Accomplishments. It will be requisite that young Men serve a certain time in Quality of Midshipmen or Master's mate, before they are examined for Promotion. And the necessity of Establishing an Hospital near each Dockyard, under the care of Skilful Physicians, is self evident." (Jones MSS., April 7, 1777.)

Writing to Robert Morris, September 22, 1782, Jones says: "I have many things to offer respecting the formation of our navy, but shall here limit myself to one, which I think a preliminary to the formation and establishment of a naval constitution suitable to the local situation, resources and prejudices of the Continent. The constitution adopted for the navy in the year 1775 and by which it has been governed ever since, and crumbled away I may say to nothing, is so very defective that I am of opinion it would be difficult to spoil it. Much wisdom and more knowledge than we possess is, in my humble opinion, necessary to the formation of such a naval constitution as is absolutely wanting . . . We are a young people and need not be ashamed to ask advice from nations older and more experienced in marine affairs than ourselves . . . My plan for forming a proper corps of sea officers is by teaching them the naval tactics in a fleet of evolution . . . When in port the young officers should be obliged to attend at the academies established at each dock-yard, where they should be taught the principles of every art and science that is necessary to form the character of a great sea officer; and every commission officer of the navy should have free access and be entitled to receive instruction gratis at those academies. All this would be attended with no very great expense and the public advantage resulting from it would be immense. I am sensible it cannot be immediately adopted and that we must first look about for ways and means, but the sooner it is adopted the better . . . In time of peace it is necessary to prepare and be always prepared for war by sea." (Sherburne, 232, 233.)

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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XVIII

NAVAL PRISONERS

The lot of the prisoner of war has always been an unhappy one at best; in early times put to the sword, at a later day enslaved, and even in modern wars sometimes unavoidably subjected to most unfavorable conditions in the exigencies of a campaign. Civilized countries have at times permitted a treatment of prisoners unnecessarily harsh and even cruel. At the outset of a civil war the question arises whether or not the rebel shall be dealt with as a traitor and criminal, but fear of reprisals soon forces the virtual if not explicit recognition of belligerent rights. Lord George Germain, writing to General Howe, February 1, 1776, in regard to some American officers captured on a privateer by the British, says: "It is hoped that the possession of these prisoners will enable you to procure the release of such of his majesty's officers and loyal subjects as are in the disgraceful situation of being prisoners to the rebels; for although it cannot be that you should enter into any treaty or agreement with rebels for a regular cartel for exchange of prisoners, yet I doubt not but your own discretion will suggest to you the means of effecting such exchange without the king's dignity and honor being committed or His Majesty's name used in any negotiation for that purpose." (Hist. Mag., March, 1862.) Here may be noted an intimation of the bitterness commonly exhibited in civil strife, which is sometimes conveniently visited upon the helpless prisoner. This should impose upon governments and officers of rank an increased sense of responsibility for the acts of subordinates. The accounts of the treatment of prisoners in New York, unquestionably authentic though perhaps colored by privation, are difficult to reconcile with the undoubted humane character of some of the British officers in command. The situation of the British at that place and their resources could hardly have been such as to prevent the proper care of prisoners.

At New York many buildings were converted into prisons and several prison-ships were moored in the harbor, especially in Wallabout Bay, where the Navy Yard at Brooklyn now is. Most of the prisoners taken at sea were confined in these hulks. There were probably prison-ships in most British harbors frequented by cruising vessels, and other ships were at times temporarily used for the purpose. The best known places in England where Americans were confined were Mill Prison at Plymonth and Forton Prison at Portsmouth.

The treatment of American prisoners by the British gave rise to much discussion in Congress and to a voluminous correspondence between commanding officers and commissaries of prisoners. January 18, 1777, General Washington wrote to Admiral Howe "on the subject of the cruel treatment which our officers and men in the naval department, who are unhappy enough to fall into your hands, receive

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on board the prisonships in the harbour of New York." To General Howe on the same day he wrote: "Those who have been lately sent out give the most shocking account of their barbarous usage, which their miserable, emaciated countenances confirm . . . Most of the prisoners who have returned home [by exchange] have informed me that they were offered better treatment provided they would enlist into your service. This I believe is unprecedented; and what, if true, makes it still more unnecessary for me to apologize for the freedom of expression which I have used throughout this letter." (Washington, v, 166,169,170.) Washington threatened retaliation. Admiral Howe replied, January 17, that the reports of ill treatment were exaggerated, that some prisoners having escaped, less liberty was allowed than formerly and crowding made necessary, that the prisoners had the same ration and medical attendance as British sailors. May 28, Washington wrote to the President of Congress that many of the prisoners released by the British were unfit for exchange by reason of the severity of their treatment and that a deduction should be made on their account. This was before the Jersey, a dismantled sixty-four-gun ship, was brought to New York and moored in Wallabout Bay, and became the most notorious of all the prison- ships. In 1779, there was an improvement on board these ships at New York, acknowledged by Washington and confirmed by a letter from one of the prisoners. This was only temporary, however, and a year or two later conditions were at their worst, although an attempt at reform seems to have been made by Admiral Graves in 1781 (Jour. Cont. Congr., resolves: December 7, 1776, June 10, 1777, April 21, 1780, September 4, 18, 1781; committee reports: December 7, 1776, January 7, 9, 1777; Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 505, 4, 113 (Howe to Washington, January 23, April 21,1777), 5, 221 (Washington to Howe, November 23, 1777), 10, 233 (Affleck to Washington, August 30, 1781); Washington, v, 170, 394, 423, vi, 193, viii, 121, 338, ix, 119; Boston Gazette, September 17,1781.)

In addition to the practice, alluded to by Washington, of tempting prisoners to enlist in the British service by promises of better treatment, they were sometimes impressed, and on board cruising ships also, at times, they were forced to bear arms against their countrymen. In 1776, William Barry, a prisoner on the Roebuck in Delaware Bay, and Elisha Cole, an American shipmaster on the frigate Milford, were compelled to do this, and both afterwards made depositions to the fact. In retaliation Congress authorized Captain Biddle to take British prisoners from jail to fill his complement. There are several accounts, however, of humane treatment on board British cruising ships and on prison-ships at Halifax and elsewhere. Captain Daniel Lunt of Newburyport was well treated on board the British cruiser Lively, which captured him off Cape Ann in 1776, although afterwards, when transferred to the Renown, he and other shipmasters were robbed of their money and put at hard labor. Joshua Barney was treated with marked kindness on three different cruising ships and with an equal degree of severity on two others. Nathaniel Fanning, who was several times a prisoner, was robbed and maltreated on two British vessels, but on other occasions fared very well. In 1777, Captain Stephen Hills was well treated on a prison-ship at

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Halifax, and in 1782 eighty-one Americans at the same place, and others in a hospital there, had the best of care. In 1781, Captain Tucker of the privateer Thorn escaped from the Island of St. John's (Prince Edward Island) and reported that he had been very kindly treated there. The same year some prisoners who. arrived in Salem from Newfoundland acknowledged "the very humane and benevolent treatment which they received from Admiral Edwards." The next year nearly three hundred Americans were brought home from there in a cartel (Am. Arch. IV, v, 759, vi, 809, V, ii, 538; Pap. Cont. Congr., 19, 3, 581 (December 7, 1776) ; Barney, 51, 66, 70, 86; Fanning, 14-18, 144-148, 229-238; A. Sherburne, 49-76; Tucker, 163; Boston Gazette, September 30, 1776, July 28, 1777; Mass. Spy, September 11, 1776; Independent Chronicle, February 5, 1778 ; Continental Journal, August 23, 1781; Salem Gazette, November 15, 1781, July 18, October 17, 1782.; Boston Post, July 20, 1782; Hunt's Mag., February, 1857.

Many years after the war Nathaniel Bowditch told the following Revolutionary anecdote, which had been related to him by his father: "Capt. Tuck of Manchester in a small privateer was taken by a British vessel of war, & his crew was carried on board & detained as prisoners. Cruising afterwards on the eastern shore, the vessel struck on a sunken ledge at some distance from a small island then in sight and soon bilged. Their situation soon became extremely dangerous, the greatest confusion prevailed on board, and the British seamen finding that none of the stores on board the ship could possibly be saved, procured from the store room considerable quantities of rum & drank so freely that they soon became incapable of doing their duty, and in getting out the boats bilged & lost them. Their situation now became desperate, they seemed to have no chance of saving their lives, as the crew were so disorderly and incompetent of doing their duty. Capt. Tuck then proposed to the British commander to make a raft out of the spars, yards, &c. of the ship and offered his services in doing it, provided he could have it under his own direction, with none to assist except the American prisoners, most of whom were free from intoxication. This offer was cheerfully accepted & he made out to get the crew safely ashore without losing a man, but before anything else could be got from the ship, she went to pieces. The British Commander on the Halifax Station liberated Capt. T. and his crew without parole or exchange, on account of his services." (Pickering MSS., xxx, 415.)

In June, 1778, Robert Sheffield, a shipmaster of Stonington, Connecticut, made his escape from one of the New York prison-ships after a confinement of only six days. There were three hundred and fifty men on board confined below, although it is to be presumed that they were allowed on deck in the daytime, as was the custom. Sheffield says the heat was "so intense that they were all naked . . . Their sickly countenances and ghastly looks were truly horrible, some swearing and blaspheming, some crying, praying and wringing their hands and stalking about like ghosts, others delirious, raving and storming; some groaning and dying, all panting for breath; some dead and corrupting, air so foul at times that a lamp could not be kept burning, by reason of which the boys were not missed till they had been dead ten days." There were five or six deaths a day (Conn.

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Gazette, July 10, 1778, quoted in Onderdonk's Revolutionary Incidents, 227, 228.) Captain John Chester wrote to General Webb, January 17, 1777: "The inhuman treatment our prisoners met with while in New York is beyond all description. Humanity cannot but drop a tear at sight of the poor, miserable, starved objects. They are mere skeletons, unable to creep or speak in many instances. One vessel lost 27 in her passage from New York to Milford [Connecticut], and 7 died the night they were put ashore; and they are dying all along the road." (Correspondence of General Webb, i, 184.) According to a report from Boston, February 4, 1779, "a cartel lately brought 136 prisoners from prison-ships in N.Y. to N. London. Such was the condition in which these poor creatures were put aboard the cartel, that in this short run 16 died on board and 60, when they landed, were scarcely able to move, and the remainder greatly emaciated." (Onderdonk, 229.) The most favorable account comes from Daniel Stanton, who writes from Stonington, August 28, 1779: "I was taken with a number of others on or about the 5th of June last in the ship Oliver Cromwell, carried into New York and put on the Prison Ship Jersey. There was nothing plundered from us, we were kindly used by the Captain and others that belonged to the ship. Our Sick were attended by Physicians who appeared very Officious to recover them to health. Our Allowance for Subsistance was wholesome and in reasonable Plenty, including the Allowance by the Continental Congress sent on Board. About three or four weeks past we were removed on board the Prison Ship Good Hope, where we found many sick; there is now a hospital ship provided, to which they are removed and good Attention paid, and doubt not the same Hospitality is used towards those of the Enemy, where the Fortune of War has cast into our hands. On the whole we were as humanely treated as our Condition and the Enemy's Safety would admit." (Conn. Gazette, September 1, 1779, quoted in Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 44.) Another good account is given by Captain Thomas Dring and others who escaped from the Good Hope (N. J. Gazette, October 12, 1779, quoted in Onderdonk, 230.) According to Joshua Barney, a prisoner in 1778, Admiral Byron during his short stay on the station took great pains to improve as far as possible the conditions on New York prison-ships (Barney, 74.) These conditions probably varied from time to time according to the characters of different officers and subordinates in charge, and according to the weather and other circumstances, especially the number of prisoners on board. The Continental Congress provided the means for supplying the prisoners at New York with extra food and appointed a merchant named Pintard as agent to look after them (Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 322 (October 6, 1780).)

Philip Freneau, the poet, was a passenger on the armed ship Aurora of Philadelphia, which was captured after an hour's engagement by the British frigate Iris, May 26, 1780, and taken to New York. Freneau was sent on board the prison-ship Scorpion in the North River, where he was "almost suffocated with the heat and stench." He relates that on the night of June 4 "about thirty-five of our people formed a design of making their escape, in which they were favored by a large schooner accidentally alongside of us . . . We were then

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suffered to continue upon deck, if we chose, till nine o'clock. We were all below by that time except the insurgents, who rushed upon the sentries and disarmed them in a moment," and drove them into the cabin. "When the sentries were all silent they manned the ship's boat and boarded the schooner, though the people on board attempted to keep them off with hand-spikes. The wind blowing fresh at south and the flood of tide being made, they hoisted sail and were out of sight in a few minutes . . . As soon as the sentries got possession of the vessel again, which they had no difficulty in doing, as there was no resistance made, they posted themselves at each hatchway and most basely and cowardly fired fore and aft among us, pistols and musquets, for a full quarter of an hour without intermission. By the mercy of God they touched but four, one mortally." The next morning "all that were found wounded were put in irons and ordered to lie upon deck, exposed to the burning sun. About four o'clock P.M., one of the poor fellows who had been wounded the night before died. They then took him out of irons, sent him on shore, and buried him. After this no usage seemed to them severe enough for us. We had water given us to drink that a dog could scarcely relish; it was thick and clammy and had a dismal smell. They withdrew our allowance of rum and drove us down every night strictly at sunset, where we suffered inexpressibly till seven. o'clock in the morning, the gratings being rarely opened before that time. Thus did I live with my miserable companions till the 22d of June. When finding myself taken with a fever, I procured myself to be put on the sick list, and the same day was sent with a number of others to the Hunter hospital-ship, lying in the East River. Here was a new scene opened. The Hunter had been very newly put to the use of a hospital-ship. She was miserably dirty and cluttered. Her decks leaked to such a degree that the sick were deluged with every shower of rain. Between decks they lay along, struggling in the agonies of death, dying with putrid and bilious fevers, lamenting their hard fate to die at such a fatal distance from their friends; others totally insensible and yielding their last breath in all the horrors of light-headed frenzy." (Freneau's Capture of the Aurora, 15-41.)

In the fall of 1780, Captain Silas Talbot was confined on the Jersey. There were then about eleven hundred prisoners on board, with no berths to lie in nor benches to sit on; many were almost without clothes. Dysentery and fever prevailed. The scantiness and bad quality of the provisions, the brutality of the guards, and the sick pining for comforts they could not obtain, altogether furnished one of the greatest scenes of human distress ever beheld. The weather was cool and dry, with frosty nights, so that the number of deaths was reduced to an average of ten a day, which was small compared with the mortality for three months before. The human bones and skulls still bleaching on the shore of Long Island as late as 1803, and daily exposed by the falling of the high bank on which the prisoners were buried, was a shocking sight (Historical Sketch of Silas Talbot, 106-109.) A few years after that these bones were collected and buried and a monument erected over them.

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Ebenezer Fox, describing the Jersey as she was in 1781, says: "Her external appearance was forbidding and gloomy. She was dismantled; her only spars were the bowsprit, a derrick that looked like a gallows, for hoisting supplies on board, and a flagstaff at the stern. The port-holes were closed and secured. Two tiers of holes were cut through her sides, about two feet square and about ten feet apart, strongly guarded by a grating of iron bars." (Fox, 96.) Fox and his shipmates upon their arrival "were ordered to ascend to the upper deck of the prison ship. Here our names were registered . . . Each of us was permitted to retain whatever clothing and bedding we had brought, after having been examined" for weapons and money; "and then we were directed to pass through a strong door on the starboard side, down a ladder leading to the main hatchway. I now found myself in a loathsome prison, among a collection of the most wretched and disgusting looking objects that I ever beheld in human form. Here was a motley crew, covered with rags and filth, visages pallid with disease, emaciated with hunger and anxiety, and retaining hardly a trace of their original appearance." (Fox, 99.) "The various messes of the prisoners [of six men each] were numbered, and nine in the morning was the hour when the steward would deliver from the window in his room, at the after part of the ship, the allowance granted . . . Each mess received daily what was equivalent in weight or measure, but not in quality, to the rations of four men at full allowance; that is, each prisoner received two thirds as much as was allowed to a seaman in the British navy. Our bill of fare was as follows: on Sunday, one pound of biscuit, one pound of pork and half a pint of peas; Monday, one pound of biscuit, one pint of oatmeal and two ounces of butter; Tuesday, one pound of biscuit and two pounds of salt beef; Wednesday, one and a half pounds of flour and two ounces of suet. Thursday was a repetition of Sunday's fare, Friday of Monday's and Saturday of Tuesday's. If this food had been of a good quality and properly cooked, as we had no labor to perform, it would have kept us comfortable, at least from suffering. But this was not the case. All our food appeared to be damaged." (Fox, 101-102.) "The cooking for the prisoners was done in a great copper vessel that contained between two and three hogsheads of water, set in brick work. The form of it was square and it was divided into two compartments by a partition. In one of these the peas and oatmeal were boiled; this was done in fresh water. In the other the meat was boiled in salt water taken up from alongside the ship. The Jersey, from her size and lying near the shore, was imbedded in the mud . . . All the filth that accumulated among upwards of a thousand men was daily thrown overboard and would remain there till carried away by the tide. The impurity of the water may be easily conceived; and in this water our meat was boiled." (Fox, 105-106.)

"In the morning the prisoners were permitted to ascend the upper deck, to spend the day till ordered below at sunset. A certain number, who were for the time called the 'working party,' performed in rotation the duty of bringing up hammocks and bedding for airing, likewise the sick and infirm and the bodies of those who had died during the night; of these there were generally a number every morning. After these services it was their duty to wash the decks. . . . About two hours

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before sunset, orders were given to the prisoners to carry all their things below, but we were permitted to remain above till we retired for the night. . . . At sunset our ears were saluted with the insulting and hateful sound from our keepers, of 'Down, rebels, down,' and we were hurried below, the hatchways fastened over us and we were left to pass the night amid the accumulated horrors of sighs and groans, of foul vapor, a nauseous and putrid atmosphere, in a stifled and almost suffocating heat. The tiers of holes through the sides of the ship were strongly grated, but not provided with glass, and it was considered a privilege to sleep near one of these apertures in hot weather ... But little sleep, however, could be enjoyed even there, for the vermin were so horribly abundant that all the personal cleanliness we could practise would not protect us from their attacks." When the dead, sewn in blankets, were taken ashore, some of the prisoners went with them, "under a guard, to perform the labor of interment . . . Here in a bank near the Wallabout a hole was excavated in the sand, in which the body was put and then slightly covered, the guard not giving time sufficient to perform this melancholy service in a faithful manner. Many bodies would, in a few days after this mockery of a burial, be exposed nearly bare by the action of the elements." (Fox, 109-111.)

Thomas Andros was also on the Jersey in 1781, and says: "When I first became an inmate of this abode of suffering, despair and death, there were about four hundred prisoners on board, but in a short time they amounted to twelve hundred. And in proportion to our numbers the mortality increased." (Andros, Old Jersey Captive, 12.) Dysentery, smallpox, and yellow fever were prevalent. "Now and then an American physician was brought in as a captive, but if he could obtain his parole he left the ship, nor could we much blame him for this. For his own death was next to certain and his success in saving others by medicine in our situation was small. I remember only two American physicians who tarried on board a few days. No English physician or any one from the city ever to my knowledge came near us." (Andros, 15.) "Our water was good, could we have had enough of it; our bread was bad in the superlative degree. I do not recollect seeing any which was not full of living vermin; but eat it, worms and all, we must or starve." (Andros, 17.) Andros eventually escaped. Attempts to escape from the prison-ships were frequent and not uncommonly successful. The crew of the Jersey consisted of a captain, two mates, a steward, a cook, and about a dozen sailors, besides a guard of ten or twelve invalid marines and about thirty soldiers. By eluding the vigilance of these guards, or perhaps bribing a sentry, it was sometimes possible to get away from the ship in a boat or by swimming. Upon reaching shore, however, fugitives had many difficulties to encounter, especially the unfriendliness of the tory population of Long Island (lbid., 24 et seq.; Fox, ch. viii. For other experiences of prisoners, see Dring's Recollections of Jersey Prison Ship; Taylor's Martyrs in the Prison-Ships; A. Sherburne, ch. v; Hist. Mag., July, 1866 (Suppl.); Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's narrative.)

The method of exchange for the relief of the prisoners' sufferings was not as generally applicable as could have been wished, partly because the supply of

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British in the hands of the Americans was inadequate. British prisoners were released in large numbers by their American captors, especially privateersmen, because they had no means of supporting them, often, apparently, neglecting to take their paroles. Washington stated his views on the subject in a letter to the President of Congress, February 18, 1782, saying: "Mr. Sproat's proposition of the exchange of British soldiers for American seamen, if acceded to, will immediately give the enemy a very considerable reinforcement and will be a constant draft hereafter upon the prisoners of war in our hands. It ought also to be considered that few or none of the naval prisoners in New York and elsewhere belong to the Continental service. I however feel for the situation of these unfortunate people and wish to see them released by any mode which will not materially affect the public good. In some former letters upon this subject I have mentioned a plan by which I am certain they might be liberated nearly as fast as captured. It is by obliging the captains of all armed vessels, both public and private, to throw their prisoners into common stock, under the direction of the commissary-general of prisoners. By these means they would be taken care of and regularly applied to the exchange of those in the hands of the enemy. Now the greater part are dissipated and the few that remain are applied partially." (Washington, ix, 444. See negotiations for a general cartel for the exchange of prisoners, in Webb, ii, 19-85.) Washington corresponded with various British naval commanders during the last two years of the war and received replies from Admiral Arbuthnot, Captain Affleck, and Admiral Digby, expressing concern at the prisoners' plight and a purpose to apply remedies. General Carleton also made plans in 1782 to correct abuses. The American and British commissaries of prisoners, Abraham Skinner and David Sproat, also corresponded freely on the subjects of treatment and exchange of prisoners. Whether or not as a result of these efforts, conditions seem to have improved in June, 1782, according to the report of six American shipmasters on parole, "that they had been on board the prison and hospital ships to inspect the state of the American naval prisoners and found them in as comfortable situation as it is possible for prisoners to be on board ships and much better than they had an idea of." This report was published about two weeks after a letter from Washington to Digby on the subject (Almon, xiv, 262, 263; Onderdonk, 233-235, 240-244; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 261, 262; Mass. Spy, August 8, 1782.)

The Americans captured in European waters and many also from this side of the ocean were sent to prisons in England. The American Commissioners in Paris began early to interest themselves in the welfare of these prisoners, and Franklin especially, until the end of the war, was untiring in his efforts to mitigate their hardships. February 23, 1777, began a correspondence of the commissioners with Stormont, the British ambassador, in regard to the exchange of prisoners, which defined the positions of the two nations on the subject at that time. They wrote: "Captain Wickes of the Reprisal frigate, belonging to the United States of America, has now in his hands near one hundred British seamen, prisoners. He desires to know whether an exchange may be made for an equal number of American seamen now prisoners in England? We take the liberty of proposing

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this matter to your Lordship and of requesting your opinion (if there be no impropriety in your giving it) whether such an exchange will probably be agreed to by your Court. If your people cannot be soon exchanged here, they will be sent to America." (Sparks's Franklin, ix, 166.)

No reply was received to this and on April 2 they wrote again: "We did ourselves the Honour of writing some time since to your Lordship on the Subject of Exchanging Prisoners. You did not condescend to give us any Answer and therefore we expect none to this. We however take the Liberty of sending you Copies of certain Depositions, which we shall transmit to Congress, whereby it will be known to your Court that the United States are not unacquainted with the barbarous Treatment their People receive, when they have the Misfortune of being your Prisoners here in Europe. And that if your Conduct towards us is not altered, it is not unlikely that severe Reprisals may be thought justifiable, from the Necessity of putting some Check to such abominable Practices. For the sake of Humanity it is to be wish'd that Men would endeavour to alleviate as much as possible the unavoidable Misseries attending a State of War. It has been said that among the civilized Nations of Europe the ancient Horrors of that State are much diminished, but the Compelling Men by Chains, Stripes & Famine, to fight against their Friends and Relations, is a new Mode of Barbarity which your Nation alone has the Honour of inventing. And the sending American Prisoners of War to Africa and Asia, remote from all Probability of Exchange and where they can scarce hope ever to hear from their Families, even if the Unwholesomeness of the Climate does not put a speedy End to their Lives, is a manner of treating Captives that you can justify by no Precedent or Custom, except that of the black Savages of Guinea." (Smyth's Franklin, vii, 36.) The following message, unsigned and undated, was received in reply: "The King's Ambassador receives no applications from rebels but when they come to implore His Majesty's Mercy." The commissioners then closed the correspondence: "In answer to a letter which concerns some of the most material interests of humanity and of the two nations, Great Britain and the United States of America, now at war, we received the inclosed indecent paper as coming from your Lordship, which we return for your Lordship's, more mature consideration." (Sparks, ix, 167.)

Stormont sent copies of the letter of April 2 and his unsigned reply to Lord Weymouth and with them the following: "I send your Lordship a Copy of a very Extraordinary and Insolent Letter, that has just been left at my House by a Person who called himself an English Gentleman; I thought it by no means Proper to appear to have received and kept such a Letter, and therefore, My Lord, instantly sent it Back by a Savoyard, seemingly unopened, under Cover to Mr. Carmichel, who I discovered to be the Person that had brought the Letter." (Stevens, 1507; Smyth, vii, 36.) Weymouth wrote to Stormont April 11: "I entirely approve of the note Your Excellency sent to Mr. Carmichael with the Letter you returned to him. The Style and Subject deserved no other treatment." (Stevens, 1503, 1507, 1515; Almon, v, 371, 372, 511; Hale, i, 194-198.)

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The brig Dalton of Newburyport was taken in December, 1776, by the sixty-four-gun ship Raisonable. The crew were sent to Plymouth, England, where after a while they were transferred to the Burford of seventy guns, Captain George Bowyer. Here their fortunes, which had been hard, made a great change for the better. Each man was given an outfit of clothes and bedding, provided by the captain at his own expense. They were well fed and kindly treated. This was also the case in the hospital on shore, where the sick had the best care. After several weeks on the Burford they were transferred to another ship and early in June, 1777, to Mill Prison, near Plymouth, which had been prepared for them. They were committed on the charge of high treason, to await trial, and could only be released on receiving the King's pardon. Two members of the Dalton's crew, Charles Herbert and Samuel Cutler, kept journals in prison. Cutler says the ration "is 3/4 lb. beef, 1 lb. bread, 1 qt. very ordinary beer, and a few greens per man for 24 hours. The beef when boiled weighs about 6 oz. This is our allowance daily, except Saturday, when we have 6 oz. cheese instead of the beef. To sleep upon, we have a hammock, straw bed and one very thin rug . . . We are allowed every day to walk in the airing ground from 10 to 12, then locked in till 3 o'clock, then we are let out again till 7 o'clock, then in and locked up for the night." (N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg., April, 1878.)

Herbert wrote, August 31: "Many are strongly tempted to pick up the grass in the yard and eat it and some pick up old bones in the yard that have been laying in the dirt a week or ten days and pound them to pieces and suck them. Some will pick up snails out of the holes in the wall and from among the grass and weeds in the yard, boil them and eat them and drink the broth . . . Our meat is very poor in general; we scarcely see a good piece once in a month. Many are driven to such necessity by want of provisions that they have sold most of the clothes off their backs for the sake of getting a little money to buy them some bread." (Livesey's Prisoners of 1776, 65, 66.) Some of the prisoners were able occasionally to earn a few shillings with which to buy extra food and other necessities. Andrew Sherburne, who was in Mill Prison in 1782, says there were between eight hundred and a thousand men confined there at that time (A. Sherburne, 85. For an English account, see Annual Register, xxi (1778), 78.)

In September, 1777, an improvement began and continued for more than a year. This was due to outside causes and did not indicate any relaxation of severity on the part of the government or prison authorities. The sympathies of charitable people in London and elsewhere had been aroused and a fund was subscribed which furnished extra food and clothing (Livesey, 68, 70, 91, 92, 96.) Jonathan Archer wrote to his parents from Mill Prison, September 25, 1778: "The time seems long and teagous to me; I shall embrace every opportunity of writing. We have plenty of provisions; the gentlemen have raised a large sum of money for the relief of the Americans." (Essex Inst. Coll., June, 1864.) Letters of Franklin to correspondents in England also did much to excite interest in the prisoners (Wharton, ii, 409, 410, 448, 492.) When the money that had been raised for their benefit had become exhausted, about the end of 1778, the old conditions

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returned. The prisoners hunted for rats, and if a dog strayed in, he was immediately killed and eaten. To be put upon half allowance, as many frequently were for punishment, was to be reduced nearly to the last extremity. Nevertheless, the health of the prisoners as a rule was good, and the death rate, at least for the first two years, compared with that of the New York prison-ships, was very low. Early in 1782, however, there was much sickness (Livesey, 109, 123, 166, 175, 186, 196, 201, 203, 207, 216, 218; A. Sherburne, 91.)

After France, Spain, and Holland had become involved in the war, the prisoners from those countries were better treated than the Americans, whose allowance of bread was a third less than theirs. In the House of Lords, July 2, 1781, an effort was made to place the Americans on an equality in this respect with the French, Spanish, and Dutch, but the proposal was defeated by a vote of forty-seven to fourteen. In the course of the debate on the question it was argued "that the diet of prisoners, as persons in a state of inactivity, ought to be sparing, and that just enough to sustain life ought to be the measure of it; for that if more than enough was allowed, it would render the prisoners unhealthy by producing gross humours if they eat it, or if they sold what was superabundant, it was probable they would buy spirits with it and thereby render themselves unhealthy and unhappy." (Almon, xii, 222, 223; Mag. Amer. Hist., June, 1882.) Very touching was this solicitude of the Lords for the health of the American prisoners. Their old enemies, the French and Spanish, might be encouraged to ruin their digestions by overeating, but in the case of their kinsmen from across the sea, it was not to be thought of.

Captain Conyngham's experiences in captivity have been alluded to. After his escape he wrote to Franklin from the Texel, December 1, 1779: "I shall acquaint you of the many favours I received since I became a captive. 1st, in New York, that Sir George Collier ordered irons on my legs, with a centry on board the ship. Mr. Collier going on an expedition ordered me to jaole, there put me into the condemned room. The first night a cold plank my bed a stone for a pillow. 2d night allowed a something to lay on; in this horrid room was kept for eight days without the least morsel of bread, or anything but water, from the keeper of the prison ... After expostulating of the impropriety of such treatment, [the jailer] told me he had such orders, but would take it upon himself to release me on my giving him my strongest assurances I would not make my escape. I readily consented, it not being in the power of man to get out of the condemned room . . . In the prison of New York I continued till that tyrant Collier returned ... Then I was told to get ready to go on board the prison-ship . . . Then a pair of criminal irons put on my legs, weight 50 pounds; at the door, put into the hangman's cart, all in form as if bound to the gallows. I was then put into a boat and took alongside the Raisonable . . . to be sent to England in the packet. In those Irons I was brought to Pendennis Castle. Then not contented, they manacled my hands with a new fashioned pair of ruffels fitted very tite. In this condition I was kept there 15 or 16 days, then brought to Plymouth and lodged in the black hole for eight days, before they would do me the honour of committing

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me on suspicion of high treason on his majesties high seas; then put into Mill prison, where we committed treason through his earth and made our escape. This, Sir, is an account of their favors, insults excepted. I must acquaint your excellency that the poor unfortunate prisoners in Plymouth are in a most distressed situation." (Hale, i, 349; Almon, viii, 340.)

Attempts to escape from Mill Prison were numerous, sometimes by climbing over the walls, sometimes by burrowing under them, and sometimes by bribing sentries, the last generally by officers who had money. Among the officers confined at this place were Captains Manley, Talbot, Johnson, and O'Brien, and Lieutenants Dale and Barney. Of these the last four escaped, besides Conyngham; Manley and Talbot made several attempts. Most prisoners' efforts in this direction failed, but in the aggregate a large number got off and made their way to Holland and France. At Paris they found a good friend in Franklin, who gave them money and assistance to the extent of his ability. Those who were caught after escaping were brought back, confined forty days in a dungeon called the "black hole," and put upon half allowance of food (Livesey, 56-60, passim, 209-213; Barney, 87-102; O'Brien, 180-183; Port Folio, June, 1814; N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg., October, 1878; Essex Inst. Coll., January, 1909; Lee MSS., February 28, 1778; Adams MSS., July 16, 1780, June 5, 1781.) Some escaped by entering the British service, yielding to inducements constantly held out to them. Those doing so were comparatively few in number, and most of them were foreigners who had served on American ships. In December, 1778, over a hundred men in Mill Prison signed an agreement to remain loyal to their country and under no circumstances to enter the British service (Livesey, 161, 163, 177, 183, 208, 221.) In June, 1778, rumors of exchange began to be heard, which for many months seemed only to hold out false hopes. In September, the American Commissioners in Paris wrote to their countrymen in English prisons that they had at last "obtained assurances from England that an exchange shall take place." They added: "We have now obtained permission of this government to put all British prisoners - whether taken by continental frigates or by privateers - into the king's prisons, and we are determined to treat such prisoners precisely as our countrymen are treated in England, to give them the same allowance of provisions and accommodations and no other. We therefore request you to inform us with exactness what your allowance is from the government, that we may govern ourselves accordingly." (Wharton, ii, 729, 730.) It was not until March 15, 1779, that hopes of release were realized and ninety-seven of the inmates of Mill Prison embarked on a cartel bound for France (Livesey, 139, 141, 179, 182, 199, 200, 219, 223, 224, 233; Wharton, iii, 188. For another account of conditions on board a receiving-ship in Plymouth Harbor and in Mill Prison, see A. Sherburne, 76-100; see also journal of William Russell in Ships and Sailors of Old Salem, chs. vii, viii.)

The brigantine Rising States sailed from Boston, January 26, 1777, and on April 15 was captured in the English Channel by the Terrible, 74, though only after a spirited resistance. Two weeks later the Terrible arrived at Spithead and the

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prisoners remained on board until June 14, harshly treated and on three quarters allowance. They were then removed to Forton Prison, near Portsmouth, being the first Americans to occupy it. Their experiences are told in the journal of Timothy Connor, one of the crew of the Rising States. The prison ration was three quarters of a pound of beef, a pound of bread, and a quart of small beer for twenty-four hours, and some cabbage every other day. Prisoners in the black hole, for trying to escape or other misdemeanor, had six ounces of beef, half a pound of bread, and a pint of beer. Five days after entrance the prisoners "made a large hole through the wall of the prison and eleven made their escape," two of whom were caught and brought back. During the first six months more than sixty escaped, about half of whom were retaken. December 25, Connor says: "Now the people begin to use humanity throughout England . . . They begin to use us better. There are subscription books opened in many parts of England for our relief." (N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg., July, 1876.) The officers were given five shillings a week each and the men two shillings. The Reverend Thomas Wren of Portsmouth took a great interest in the prisoners and visited them daily. David Hartley, M.P., one of Franklin's English correspondents and an old friend of his, also visited the prison. Besides the fund raised in England, Franklin sent over what money he could spare, to be used for the benefit of the prisoners. Much of this was entrusted to an American merchant in London named Digges, who a few years later turned out to be a British spy and a defaulter and who embezzled nearly all the money he had received for the use of the prisoners (Wharton, ii, 492, iii, 523, iv, 623, 645; Hale, i, ch. xi; Adams MSS., July 10, 1778.) May 12, 1778, Connor wrote in his journal: "Nothing to eat these two days but stinking beef. All the men in the prison, or at least best part of them, carried their beef back and threw it into the cook's window, and left and went without any." The next day the bad meat was served again, "but by the Agent's orders it was sent back again and we got a little cheese in the room of it." (N.E. Hist and Gen. Reg., July 1876) Captain Hinman of the Alfred and his officers were brought to Forton Prison in July, 1778, and in less than a week he and several other officers escaped. September 8, fifty-eight prisoners escaped. In March, 1779, there were two hundred and fifty-one Americans at Forton. July 2, one hundred and twenty of them were released by exchange (lbid., April, 1876, to July, 1878; Essex Inst. Coll., April, 1889; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's narrative; Wharton, iii, 363. For another account of Forton Prison, see Fanning, 20-28.)

John Howard, the English prison reformer, wrote of Forton: "At my visit, Nov. 6, 1782, I found there was no separation of the Americans from other prisoners of war, and they had the same allowance of bread, viz: one pound and a half each. There were 154 French, 83 Dutch and 133 Americans. Of these, 12 French, 25 Dutch and 9 Americans were in the hospital. The wards were not clean. No regulations hung up. I weighed several of the 6 lb. loaves and they all wanted some ounces in weight." (Essex Inst. Coll., April, 1889, quoting from Howard's History of Prisons.)

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In the West Indies the unhealthfulness of the climate doubtless added to the tribulations of prisoners and increased the death rate. In 1782, the privateer brig New Broom of New London was captured by a British sloop of war and taken into Antigua. One of the brig's crew, in a narrative of the cruise, says: "We were all put on board of a prison-ship, which lay in a cove on one side of the harbor, where the heat was so severe as to be almost insupportable. We were allowed here but barely enough to sustain nature, and the water they gave us was taken out of a pond a little back of the town, in which the cattle and negroes commingled every sort of impurity, and which was rendered, on this account and from the effect of the heat upon it, so nauseous that it was impossible to drink it without holding the nostrils. I soon found that life was to be supported but for a short time here and set myself therefore about contriving some way to effect my escape from this floating place of misery and torment. The doctor came on board every morning to examine the sick, and three negro sextons every night, to bury the dead. Early one morning I swallowed tobacco juice and was so sick by the time the doctor came, that I obtained without difficulty a permit from him to go on shore to the hospital. I was soon ready to disembark, for I had been previously robbed of everything except what I had on. After arriving at the hospital, I was conducted into a long room where lay more than two hundred of the most miserable objects imaginable, covered with rags and vermin. I threw myself down on a bunk and after suffering extremely for some time from the effects of the tobacco, went to sleep, but was soon waked by a man-nurse, who told me that there was physic for me and immediately went off to another. I contrived unperceived to throw my dose out of the window and was not again disturbed, except during the following night, when I was waked several times by the carrying out of the dead. The sickness occasioned by the tobacco having now ceased, it was still necessary to keep up the deception, and accordingly the next morning I feigned lameness." A few days later this prisoner escaped with two others; getting possession of a boat they found their way to Guadeloupe (Hist. Mag., November, 1860.) In 1779, the Marine Committee had called attention to the harsh treatment of prisoners at Antigua and urged efforts for their exchange (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 243 (October 26,1779).)

There appears to be less available material for a study of the treatment of British prisoners by the Americans. Before France became involved in the war the disposal of prisoners taken by American cruisers in European waters was attended with difficulties, because the French government would not allow them to be brought into the ports of that country, regarding it as a violation of neutrality to receive them. It was, therefore, often necessary to release them. Franklin and Deane advised the commanders of American ships to take from their prisoners, before letting them go, a signed acknowledgment of the fact that they had been captured. They hoped to secure in return the release of an equal number of American prisoners, but the British government would not admit any obligation in such cases, and indeed refused to honor formal paroles, except under certain circumstances. After France had begun hostilities, American vessels could bring their prisoners into port, but there was no provision for their reception until, after

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long delay, they were admitted into French prisons. Meanwhile it was necessary to keep them on shipboard under conditions of great discomfort, if not of actual suffering. The prisoners brought into Brest by the Ranger in May, 1778, were confined many months on one of her prizes and made bitter complaints of their situation. Captain Jones exerted himself as far as possible for their welfare, but was very unwilling to release them without exchange. Franklin supplied as well as he could the wants of the British prisoners in France. In February, 1780, he wrote to one of his English correspondents, enclosing the account of his agent at L'Orient, "for clothing one hundred and thirteen English prisoners last April," and adding: "Not that I expect anything from your government on that account towards clothing such of our people with you as may be in want of it. The refusal of compliance with the paroles of prisoners set at liberty have taught me to flatter myself no more with expectations that a thing may be done because it is humane or equitable, and reasonable that it should be done. I only desire it may be considered as a small but grateful acknowledgment, all hitherto in my power, for the kindness shown by your charitable subscriptions to our poor people. It may perhaps be some satisfaction to those subscribers to know that, while they thought only of relieving Americans, they were at the same time occasioning some relief to distressed Englishmen." (Wharton, iii, 522.) When the exchange of prisoners had become an established procedure, the number of English in France must have been comparatively small and their stay short, for the British policy was to keep many American prisoners in England, bringing them from New York 9lbid., ii, 428, 581, 724, iii, 73, 488, 491, 535, 536, iv, 410; Hale, i, 351-362; Sands, 104, 105, 148; Mass. Spy, January 4, 1781.)

The Continental vessels Reprisal, Lexington, and Dolphin made a cruise in the English Channel and Irish Sea in 1777 and took several prizes. According to a dispatch from Whitehaven, June 26, 1777, "the people in general speak in the warmest terms of the humane treatment they met with from the commanders of the Reprisal and Lexington, both of whom endeavored to make the situation of their prisoners as easy as their circumstances would admit." (Boston Gazette, October 6, 1777.)

Quite different from this was the treatment of Captain Richard Cassedy of the British ship Priscilla by a prize crew put on board his vessel from the American privateer General Mifflin, which captured the Priscilla off the Irish coast in July, 1777. All his men having been transferred to the Mifflin, he was left alone at the mercy of a brutal prize crew. "These sons of freedom seized all the captain's clothes that were worth anything and £88 in cash." He was "bound hand and foot and put into confinement. In this miserable situation he remained until the 19th of July, when his vessel was retook by the Union, letter of marque, of London . . . Captain Cassedy was in a very poor state of health ... and not able to stand, through the cruel treatment he received. His remaining so long bound occasioned his flesh to swell to a shocking degree. All his prayers and intreaties were in vain; the inhuman tyrants had no compassion." (Liverpool paper quoted in Williams, 210.)

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The treatment of British prisoners in America varied according to place and circumstances. There were prison-ships at Boston, New London, and doubtless other towns, and jails on shore were used (Boston Post, June 15, 1782; Mass. Court Rec., January 20, 1778; Mass. Rev. Rolls, viii, ix, xliv.) Captain Henry Barnes and his crew, captured with his vessel on the passage from Barbadoes to England by the American privateer Montgomery in 1776 and taken to Rhode Island, were "treated with the greatest kindness and civility." (Almon, iv, 159,160.) A letter from Boston, in 1777, says: "Hard as my case may appear to be, I bear it with patience. From the 3d day of my captivity I have, with near ninety others, been confined a close prisoner in a jail at this place lately erected, called the New-prison. The Americans treat us very cavalierly. The provisions we are allowed is barely sufficient to subsist on. My effects, to the amount of upwards of £300. have been taken from me and the bed I lie on is a bundle of straw." (London Chronicle, September 2, 1777.) A letter from New London, a few months later, says: "They behave very well to us." (lbid., January 6, 1778.) A better reputation is given to Boston by an English shipmaster who had been exchanged. He writes: "The treatment of the English prisoners there is exceedingly humane and kind." (lbid., January 8, 1778.)

The situation of British marine prisoners at Philadelphia was possibly not always what it should have been, though as a rule not bad; their treatment was perhaps at times, but only in special instances, governed by a spirit of retaliation for the distress of Americans on the New York prison-ships. Admiral Arbuthnot wrote to John Jay, President of Congress, August 30, 1779, complaining that two British officers were "in close and cruel confinement at Philadelphia. I request that you will assign satisfactory reasons for this treatment, that no improper retaliation may take place here on our part." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 1, 313 (August 30, 1779) Congress investigated the case of these two officers and found the reports of their ill-treatment untrue. Just at this time, on account of the barbarous persecution of Conyngham in New York, the Marine Committee ordered against another British officer retaliatory measures which had recently been voted in Congress, after a vain appeal to Commodore Collier (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 230 (August 31, 1779); Almon, viii, 340, 341; Jour. Cont. Congr., July 17, 29, September 17, 1779.) Arbuthnot wrote to Washington, April 21, 1781, again complaining of the treatment of British naval prisoners, saying: "Permit me now, Sir, to request that you will take the proper steps to cause Mr. Bradford, your commissary, and the jailor at Philadelphia, to abate that inhumanity which they exercise indiscriminately upon all people, who are so unfortunate as to be carried into that place. I will not trouble you, Sir, with a catalogue of grievances further than to request that the unfortunate may feel as little of the severities of war as the circumstances of the time will permit; that in future they may not be fed in winter with salted clams and that they may be afforded a sufficiency of fuel." (Washington, ix, 120, 121. No further information relating to the treatment of British prisoners has been discovered.)

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At last, in the spring of 1782, Franklin was able to inform Jay that the British Parliament had passed "an act for exchanging American prisoners. They have near eleven hundred in the jails of England and Ireland, all committed as charged with high treason. The act is to empower the king, notwithstanding such commitments, to consider them as prisoners of war, according to the law of nations, and exchange them as such. This seems to be giving up their pretensions of considering us as rebellious subjects and is a kind of acknowledgment of our independence. Transports are now taking up to carry back to their country the poor, brave fellows who have borne for years their cruel captivity, rather than serve our enemies, and an equal number of English are to be delivered up in return." (Wharton, v, 326.) The British ministry now ordered the exchange of all American prisoners. A year later, April, 1783, came proclamations of the Continental Congress and the British commanders in New York, the latter a day or two in the lead, for the suspension of hostilities and the release of all prisoners of war 9lbid., 439, 512, 548, 556, vi, 369, 375, 377.)

A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONCHAPTER XIX

NAVAL CONDITIONS OF THE REVOLUTION

In the study of so closely contested a struggle as the American Revolution, where even a comparatively trivial circumstance might have turned the scale, it is interesting to examine the factors which may have affected the result. In the events that took place on the sea perhaps many such factors will be found. Such conclusions regarding them as may be drawn from the preceding chapters, will be more clearly brought out if presented in the condensed form of a summary.

Both the Americans and the British, while favored in some ways, were burdened with encumbrances of various sorts. The preponderance of the British naval forces in American waters during the early years of the war was so great that for the colonists in rebellion to overcome it was out of the question; annoyance only was possible. Their control of the sea was complete until challenged by the French in 1778. The British had much larger ships than the Americans, which meant that they not only carried more guns, but far heavier ones; the thirty-two-gun frigate was the largest we had in commission. Ship for ship also we were overmatched by the British with their ships more fully manned and their officers and men thoroughly trained. The raw material for their crews was certainly no better and probably not as good as that furnished by the fishermen and seafaring population of New England and other colonies, but the immense advantage of organization, of centuries of military discipline, of naval tradition and esprit de corps, was theirs.

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The British, however, were embarrassed with difficulties which in large degree offset their superiority in force. Operating in a hostile country, their naval stations, even those most securely and permanently held, as New York, were unable to furnish sufficient stores and supplies; and these necessities had to be brought from England, subject to capture by American cruisers and privateers and requiring the diversion of a considerable part of their armed force for convoy. Owing to the incompetency or indolence of some of the British fleet commanders, their available offensive force was used with less effect than might have been the case. Jealousy and quarrels among the admirals also contributed to this result. Official corruption in British dockyards and naval stations, defective organization, and the waste of money and supplies interfered seriously with efficient naval administration. The navy lost large numbers of men through desertion and death from disease. It will thus be seen that the circumstances surrounding the British navy during that period were sufficiently complicated. The entry of other powers into the conflict naturally increased very much the perplexities of England's situation (See Channing, iii, 279-283, 340-342.)

Turning to our own side, there was little to help out the slender resources of the Americans beyond the advantage of operating in home waters and along shores inhabited by a friendly people and of a general aptitude for the sea, no greater, however, than that of their adversaries. The poverty of the Continental government, if not of the country, precluded anything like a strong naval organization, and the weakness of Congress, together with lack of experience, made efficient administration practically impossible. For want of money and of available workmen the construction and repair of ships was painfully slow. On this account they were frequently kept idle in port months at a time, nearly a whole season, perhaps, while cruises planned for them were prevented, postponed, or only partially carried out. The obstacles encountered in manning the Continental ships were equal to those which hindered their fitting out. The needs of the army and the attractions of privateering, especially the latter, drew so heavily on the seafaring population that capable men for the regular naval service were scarce. The result was that after almost interminable delay a ship would be obliged to go to sea with a crew deficient both in numbers and in quality, made up of material in large part not only inferior, but sometimes dangerous, if, as was often the case, it included British prisoners who were willing to enlist. In such ships' companies a mutinous spirit prevailed, with occasional serious effects. Furthermore the officers of the navy, while generally good seamen and not lacking in courage, were without military training, and thus apt to be deficient in martial qualities and incapable of rising to the occasion at critical moments. The responsibility of an independent command, even of a single vessel on an important service, was often too much for such men. It is hardly necessary to add, however, that there were some notable exceptions.

As a consequence of these impediments the Americans never possessed a regular naval force capable of acting offensively against the enemy in any effective way. The Continental navy, therefore, naturally resorted to the readiest

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means of injuring the enemy, that is, by preying upon his commerce. The state navies and privateers were of course engaged in the same pursuit; and this, with convoy duty upon occasion, formed the chief occupation of the entire sea force, public and private, of the country. Engagements with regular British men-of-war were exceptional and commonly accidental.

The futility of commerce destroying as a military measure of flrst importance has been pointed out by naval authorities. "It is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion." (Mahan, 539. See also Proc. U. S. Naval Inst., xxiii (1897), 472.) The injury inflicted upon England, though large in the aggregate, was not disabling. Part of this predatory warfare consisted in the interception of the enemy's transports, conveying troops and warlike supplies, which were a godsend to our army and the loss of which was severely felt by the British; this perhaps was of too nearly a military nature to be classed as ordinary commerce destroying. During the early years of the war especially, such captures were of the utmost value to the American cause.

There were probably more than two thousand American vessels employed in privateering during the Revolution. Privateers accomplished much independently in scouring the sea, but were ill adapted for cruising in squadrons and failed in nearly all attempts at cooperation with regular ships or with each other. One half the men, money, and energy absorbed in privateering, if it could have been put into a strong, well-organized Continental navy, would have provided a force able to act offensively against the British navy to some purpose. The other half, devoted to privateering, would have been able to accomplish more in destroying commerce than all the privateers actually did, and would have suffered fewer losses, because of the protection afforded by a strong, regular navy against British cruisers. Speculating as to what might have been has a practical interest and value when a choice of alternatives depends upon an accident or train of circumstances which might have happened otherwise. In the case under discussion, however, the fundamental conditions were such as to put any such rearrangement of naval power as that suggested so entirely out of the question that there remains no room for regret on the score of mistakes which could have been rectified. It is necessary to look at the events of the past from the point of view of the time and the persons concerned. In this case the temperament of the people, private interests, the sentiment of local independence and fear of centralized military power, the lack of authority on the part of Congress, the hopelessness of raising the necessary money, are at once evident to the student of this period of our history. Privateering, moreover, was thoroughly believed in as a means of striking at the enemy's vitals. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that a small, weak navy was one of the necessary conditions of the war and that a vigorous offense upon the sea was not in the nature of things.

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When it is once admitted that an aggressive policy, aimed at the British fleets in American waters with any reasonable chance of gaining naval supremacy, was not to be expected, we are better prepared to understand and to accept philosophically the gradual dwindling of the Continental navy, always in the presence of a superior force, the loss of ship after ship, the almost inevitable recurrence of disaster; a dismal record, to be sure, but not discreditable, and relieved by a few successes and brilliant episodes. At the same time we can better appreciate what was actually accomplished by the American marine as a whole, how much it really contributed to the cause of independence. The injury to British commerce was sufficiently serious to aid materially in rendering the war unpopular in England; insurance rates rose to an unprecedented figure, and the available sources from which revenue might be derived by taxation were nearly exhausted. The shores of the British Isles were harassed as never before or since by the repeated visits of American naval cruisers and privateers, and the seacoast population alarmed. An active and regular commerce was carried on between the United States and continental Europe, providing the latter with American products and furnishing the new nation with much-needed money and supplies. Communication was kept open with France, diplomatic correspondence maintained, and public men of both countries crossed and recrossed the ocean repeatedly, Henry Laurens being the only one of prominence to be captured. All this intercourse, moreover, prevented the isolation of America, and kept alive the interest and sympathy of Europe. Continental ships aided this traffic by furnishing convoy through the danger zone off the American coast and also by taking an active part in it. Many a cargo of tobacco from America and of military stores from France, and many ministers and diplomatic agents, were conveyed in Continental frigates.

A rigorous blockade of the American coast from the beginning of the war, as was recommended by Lord Barrington, might have suppressed this commerce, and would probably have strangled the rebellion of the colonists in its infancy, without the help of the army. If at any time during the early years the English had been alert, enterprising, and aggressive in the use of their great naval resources, they should have been able to crush or at least greatly to cripple this traffic. Presumably the main reason for its comparative immunity is to be sought in the supineness of British admirals and in administrative vices of the Admiralty.

Although the fortunes of our American marine chiefly concern us, a glance at the general naval war of 1778 is essential to the completeness of the subject. With her control of the sea threatened, the policy for England to adopt was a matter of vast importance. A foremost naval authority has said: "The key of the situation was in Europe, and in Europe in the hostile dockyards." England's "one hope was to find and strike down the enemy's navy. Nowhere was it so certainly to be found as in its home ports; nowhere so easily met as immediately after leaving them." (Mahan, 525. For discussion of this subject, see lbid., 416-418, 527-535.) But the opportunity was lost, and it was necessary for England to pursue her enemy to distant seas, leaving an inadequate force in home waters. Luckily for

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England, the European allies failed to take advantage of her mistakes. Instead of using their superior force for a vigorous offense, they seemed ever bent on a defensive attitude; justified, perhaps, and certainly so from their point of view, by ulterior strategic considerations. However that may be, the French and Spanish, through lack of cooperation, through dilatory tactics, and for various reasons, either avoided their enemy or failed to seize opportunities as they occurred. Their plans for the invasion of England came to nothing, and their operations in America and the West Indies were generally disappointing and abortive, because of their failure to seek out and strike the enemy (Ibid., 535-539; Proc. U. S. Naval Inst., xxii (1896), 578; Channing, iii, 297.) Their naval supremacy, therefore, was most of the time potential only, although by no means for that reason without effect. It finally became actual and decisive at one critical juncture, when a fortunate train of circumstances secured the control of Chesapeake Bay. Fortunate, indeed, was this event for the American cause, for whose success the temporary possession of sea power was indispensable.

To revert, in conclusion, to the maritime achievements of the Revolutionists, it would appear that keeping open the intercourse with Continental Europe, especially France, and the diversion of supplies from the British to the American army, were the most valuable services performed by the American armed forces afloat, public and private, during the war; the injury done to the British navy being almost negligible, and to British commerce far from disabling, to say the least, although not without effect in the general result. It is certain that the Revolution would have failed without its sailors. In spite of its shortcomings, the record of the American marine daring this critical period was an honorable one. Many officers, through the experience of naval warfare acquired on board regular cruisers and privateers, were qualified to enter the national service a few years later, upon the reestablishment of the Navy.

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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

APPENDIXI. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

This list includes most of the authorities consulted. The abbreviations used in the footnotes are here indicated. Other works, cited only once or twice, are also referred to in footnotes.

Documents

Journals of the Continental Congress. Edited by Worthington C. Ford and Galliard Hunt. Washington, 1904-1912. [Jour. Cont. Congr.] Contain much naval information.

American Archives. Compiled by Peter Force. Series IV, vols. ii to vi, and V, vols. i to iii. Washington, 1837. [Am. Arch., IV, ii, etc.] A very important source, containing a vast amount of material for the years 1775 and 1776. In transcribing documents, occasional errors have crept in.

The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Edited by Francis Wharton. Washington, 1889. [Wharton.] Useful for operations in European waters.

B. F. Stevens's Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783. London, 1889-1895. [Stevens.] Correspondence of French and British ministers and others relating to neutrality, American naval cruisers and privateers, etc.

Extracts Relating to the Origin of the American Navy. Compiled by Henry E. Waite. Boston, 1890. Documents and letters chiefly relating to Washington's fleet in Massachusetts Bay.

The Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts in 1774 and 1775, and of the Committee of Safety. Boston, 1838.

Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1775-1783. Contemporary print.

The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay. Vol. v. Boston, 1886.

Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1780-1783. Boston, 1890.

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Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. Providence, 1856-1865.

Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut. Hartford, 1890.

Public Records of the State of Connecticut. Hartford, 1894.

Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New York. Albany, 1842.

Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series. Vol. i. Harrisburg, 1874.

Pennsylvania Colonial Records. Philadelphia, 1852.

Maryland Archives. Baltimore, 1883-1901.

The Remembrancer, or Impartial Repository of Public Events. [Annual. Edited by J. Almon.] London, 1775-1783. [Almon.] Contains many official reports and letters; a very useful source.

A History of All the Engagements by Sea and Land that happened in America and Europe and the East and West Indies during the American Revolution. Manchester, 1787. Made up chiefly of reports of British officers.

Historical Manuscripts Commission. Fourteenth Report, Appendix I, Duke of Rutland. 1894. American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution. Vol. i. 1904. Various Collections. Vol. vi. 1909. Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville. Vol. ii. 1910. [Hist. Man. Com.] These British collections of manuscripts, printed in recent years, contain many references to American naval affairs.

A Calendar of John Paul Jones Manuscripts in the Library of Congress. Compiled by Charles Henry Lincoln. Washington, 1903. Full outline of letters, with extracts.

Calendar of the Correspondence of George Washington. Prepared from the Original Manuscripts in the Library of Congress by John C. Fitzpatrick. Washington, 1906.

Naval Records of the American Revolution [Calendar], prepared from the Originals in the Library of Congress by Charles Henry Lincoln. Washington, 1906. Contains a list of nearly 1700 letters of marque issued by Congress, giving the name of each vessel, with other information. These calendars, as an aid in consulting the manuscripts in the Library of Congress, are indispensable.

Histories

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Narrative and Critical History of America. Edited by Justin Winsor. Vols. vi and vii. Boston, 1887, 1888. [Narr. and Crit. Hist.] Contains an extensive bibliography, with critical discussion of authorities.

The American Nation. Edited by Albert Bushnell Hart. Vol. ix. The American Revolution. By C. H. Van Tyne. New York, 1905.

A History of the United States. By Edward Channing. Vol. iii. The American Revolution. New York, 1912. [Channing.] Contains the results of the latest researches in the Revolutionary period.

Statistical History of the Navy of the United States. By Lieutenant George F. Emmons, U.S.N. Washington, 1853. Lists of Continental navy, of captures, and of privateers.

A Contribution to the Bibliography of the History of the United States Navy. Compiled by Charles T. Harbeck. The Riverside Press, 1906.

Statistical and Chronological History of the United States Navy. 1775-1907. By Robert Wilden Neeser. New York, 1909. [Neeser.] Contains a most exhaustive bibliography and lists of captures.

Naval History of the United States. By Thomas Clark. Philadelphia, 1814. [Clark.] The author derived some of his information directly from actors in the scenes described.

United States Naval Chronicle. By Charles W. Goldsborough. Washington, 1824. Gives lists of officers and other data.

Battles of the United States by Sea and Land. By Henry B. Dawson. New York, 1858. [Dawson.] Official reports and very copious references.

History of the Navy of the United States of America. By J. Fenimore Cooper. London, 1839.

Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. By Benson J. Lossing. New York, 1850.

The Navy of the American Revolution. By Charles Oscar Paullin. Chicago, 1906. [Paullin.] Gives an exceedingly valuable account of the organization and administration of the Continental navy and of the state navies, with full references. It contains a vast amount of information hitherto practically inaccessible and is indispensable for the student of this subject.

Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers. By Charles Oscar Paullin. Baltimore, 1912.

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The Influence of Sea Power upon History. By Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N. Boston, 1890. [Mahan.]

Naval Strategy. By Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N. Boston, 1911.

The Annual Register. London, 1775-1783.

The First American Civil War. By Henry Belcher. London, 1911. [Belcher.]

England under the Hanoverians. Ry G. Grant Robertson. New York, 1911.

Naval Chronology. By Isaac Schomberg, R.N. London, 1802. [Schomberg.] Gives valuable statistics.

Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain. By Robert Beatson. London, 1804.

Naval Battles of Great Britain. By Charles Ekins, Rear Admiral. London, 1828.

Battles of the British Navy. By Joseph Allen, R.N. London, 1868.

The Royal Navy. By William Laird Clowes. Chapter xxxi. By A. T. Mahan. Chapter xxxii. By H. W. Wilson. Boston and London, 1898. [Clowes.]

A Short History of the Royal Navy. By David Hannay. London, 1909. [Hannay.] Gives much information respecting British naval administration and conditions in the navy.

Publications of the Navy Records Society. Vol. iii, Hood's Letters. Vol. vi, Journal of Rear-Admiral James. Vols. xxix and xxxv, Instructions and Signals. By J. S. Corbett. Vols. xxxii and xxxviii, Barham Papers. London, 1895-1911. [Nav. Rec. Soc.) These volumes contain much original material of great value.

Histoire de la Marine Francaise pendant la Guerre de l'Independance Americaine. Par E. Chevalier. Paris, 1877. [Chevalier.] Contains extracts from official letters and ships' journals.

Histoire de la participation de Ia France a I'etablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Par Henri Doniol. Paris, 1886. [Doniol.]

Franklin in France. By Edward Everett Hale and E. E. Hale, Jr. Boston, 1887. [Hale.]

A History of American Privateers. By Edgar Stanton Maclay. New York, 1899.

Rhode Island Privateers and Privateersmen. By W. P. Sheffield. Newport, 1883.

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History of the Liverpool Privateers. By Gomer Williams. Liverpool, 1897. [Williams.] Contains letters and extracts from contemporary newspapers.

Economic and Social History of New England. By William B. Weeden. Boston, 1890.

Revolutionary Incidents of Suffolk and Kings Counties with an Account of the British Prisons and Prison Ships at New York. By Henry Onderdonk, Jr. New York, 1849. [Onderdonk.] Contains extracts from contemporary letters and newspapers.

Martyrs to the Revolution in the British Prison-Ships in the Wallabout Bay. [By George Taylor]. New York, 1855.

Some Account of the Capture of the Ship Aurora. By Philip Freneau. New York, 1899.

History of Castine, Penobscot, etc. By George Augustus Wheeler. Bangor, 1875. [ Wheeler.] Documents relating to the Penobscot Expedition.

Detail of Some Particular Services performed in America, 1776-1779, compiled from journals kept aboard the Ship Rainbow. By Ithiel Town. New York, 1835. [Town.]

Biographies

Writings of George Washington. Collected and Edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford. New York, 1889. [Washington.]

The Works of John Adams. By Charles Francis Adams.Boston, 1853. [Adams.]

The Writings of Benjamin Franklin. Edited by Albert Henry Smyth. New York, 1905.

Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Collected and Edited by Paul Leicester Ford. New York, 1892. [Jefferson.]

Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones. [ByR. Sands.] New York, 1830. [Sands.]

Life and Character of John Paul Jones. By John HenrySherburne. New York, 1851. [Sherburne.]

The Life of Paul Jones. By Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, U.S.N. New York, 1846. [Mackenzie.]

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Memoire de Paul Jones, ecrits par lui-meme en anglais et traduits sous ses yeux par Ie citoyen Andre. Paris, 1798.

Paul Jones, Founder of the American Navy. By Augustus C. Buell. New York, 1900. Mentioned only for the purpose of warning the reader of naval history against it as a fabrication. Made up largely of spurious documents ingeniously concocted by the author, it has deceived many, although often exposed by various investigators.

Publications of the Naval History Society. Vol. i. The Logs of the Serapis, Alliance, Ariel under the Command of John Paul Jones. Edited by John S. Barnes. New York, 1911. Contains biographical matter. Ile Society's second volume (1912), under the same editorship, is a reprint of the life of Nathaniel Fanning, listed below. Vol. iii is the Despatches of Molyneux Shuldham, Vice-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Ships in North America, January - July, 1776. Edited by Robert W. Neeser. New York, 1913.

Memoirs of the Life of Captain Nathaniel Fanning, an American Naval Officer. New York, 1808. [Fanning.]

Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Navy. By Edward Field. Providence, 1898. [Hopkins.]

Commodore John Barry. By Martin I. J. Griffin. Philadelphia, 1903. [Barry.]

The Life of Samuel Tucker, Commodore in the American Revolution. By John H. Sheppard. Boston,1868. [Tucker.]

Life of Silas Talbot. By Henry T. Tuckerman. NewYork, 1850. [Talbot.]

An Historical Sketch to the End of the Revolutionary War of the Life of Silas Talbot. New York, 1803. Published the same year in London under a different title.

Life of Captain Jeremiah O'Brien. By Rev. Andrew M.Sherman. Morristown, 1902. [O'Brien.]

Biographical Memoir of the late Commodore Joshua Barney. By Mary Barney. Boston, 1832. [Barney.]

Moses Brown, Captain, U.S.N. By Edgar Stanton Maclay. New York, 1904.

The Adventures of Ebenezer Fox in the RevolutionaryWar. Boston, 1847. [Fox.]

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Memoirs of Andrew Sherburne, a Pensioner of the Navy of the Revolution. By Himself. Providence, 1831. [A. Sherburne.]

The Old Jersey Captive, or a Narrative of the Captivityof Thomas Andros. Boston, 1833. [Andros.]

The Prisoners of 1776. A Relic of the Revolution. By Rev. R. Livesey. Compiled from the Journal of Charles Herbert. Boston, 1854. [Livesey.]

Captain Thomas Dring. Recollections of Jersey Prison Ship. Morrisania, 1865.

Narrative of Joshua Davis. Boston, 1811. [Davis.]

The Original Journal of General Solomon Lovell, kept during the Penobscot Expedition, 1779. Published by the Weymouth Historical Society, 1881.

Diary of Ezra Green, M.D., Surgeon on board the Continental Ship-of-War Ranger. Edited by Commodore G. H. Preble, U.S.N. Boston, 1875. Reprinted from the New England Historical and Genealogical Register.

Colonel William Bradford, the Patriot Printer of 1776. By John William Wallace. Philadelphia, 1884. [Bradford.]

Correspondence and Journals of Samuel Blachley Webb. Edited by Worthington C. Ford. New York, 1893.

Letters from Sir George Brydges, now Lord Rodney, to His Majesty's Ministers. London, 1789.

Periodicals(Some of the more notable articles are mentioned.)

Collections and Proceedings of the Maine Historical Society.

Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society.

Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society. January, 1901. Papers of William Vernon and the Navy Board.

Rhode Island Historical Magazine. July, 1885 - January, 1887. Journal of John Trevett, U.S.N.

Historical Collections of the Essex Institute. January, 1909. The Naval Career of Captain John Manley of Marblehead. By Robert E. Peabody. January-October, 1909. Records of the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

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Records and Papers of the New London County Historical Society.

New England Historical and Genealogical Register.

New Hampshire Genealogical Record.

Collections of the New York Historical Society.

New York Genealogical and Biographical Record.

Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography.

Virginia Historical Register.

Virginia Magazine of History and Biography.

South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine.

The American Historical Review. July, 1903. St. Eustatius in the American Revolution. By J. Franklin Jameson. October, 1904. Nova Scotia and New England during the Revolution. By Emily P. Weaver.

Historical Magazine.American Historical Record.

Magazine of American History.

Magazine of History.

American Catholic Historical Researches.

Military and Naval Magazine of the United States, 1833-1836.

Naval Magazine, 1836.

United States Naval Institute Proceedings. No. 79 (1896) Howe and D'Estaing. A Study in Coast Defense. By Commander C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N.; No. 83 (1897) The Sailor in the Revolution. By Commander C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N.; No. 99 (1901) The Coast in Warfare. By Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Sears, U.S.N.; No. 126 (1908) The True Story of the America. By Robert W. Neeser; No. 139 (1911) American Privateers at Dankerque. By Henri Malo. Translated by Stewart L. Mims.

The United Service. July, 1895. Letters of Paul Jones. October, 1905. Campaign of Vice-Admiral D'Estaing. By G. Lacour-Gayet. Translated by Chaplain T. G.

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Steward, U.S.A. The earlier numbers of this magazine contain several biographical sketches of naval officers.

The Port Folio. Biographical sketches of naval officers.

Southern Literary Messenger. January - April, 1857. The Virginia Navy of the Revolution.

Hunt's Merchants' Magazine.

Atlantic Monthly. September and October 1861, Journal of a Privateersman, 1741 [Edited by Charles Eliot Norton]; December, 1887, Paul Jones and the Armed Neutrality. By John Fiske.

The Century Magazine.

New England Magazine.

Scribner's Magazine. February, July, and August, 1898. Articles by Captain Mahan on Lake Champlain and John Paul Jones.

Granite Monthly. 1881 and 1882. Log of the Ranger.

The Outlook. January 3. 1903. James Barnes on Conynghams Lost Commission.

Massachusetts Magazine. 1908-1912. The Massachusetts Navy. By F. A. Gardner.

Newspapers

The Boston Gazette and Country Journal (Watertown and Boston).

The New England Chronicle; name changed in September, 1776, to Independent Chronicle (Cambridge and Boston; had formerly been the Essex Gazette of Salem).

The Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser (Boston).

The Independent Ledger and American Advertiser (Boston).

The Evening Post and General Advertiser (Boston).

The Massachusetts Spy, or American Oracle of Liberty (Worcester).

The Salem Gazette.

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The Connecticut Courant and Hartford Weekly Intelligencer.

The Connecticut Gazette and Universal Intelligencer (New London).

The Royal Gazette (New York).

The Royal American Gazette (New York).

The New York Packet and American Advertiser (Fishkill).

The Pennsylvania Gazette.

Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet, or the General Advertiser.

The Pennsylvania Evening Post.

The Freeman's Journal, or North American Intelligencer (Philadelphia).

The Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser.

The London Chronicle.

Lloyd's Evening Post and British Chronicle (London).

Manuscript Sources

Navy Department. All the following are copies: Logbooks and journals of the Ranger, November 26, 1777, to May 18, 1778; of the Bonhomme Richard, May 8 to September 24, 1779; of the Serapis, September 26 to November 21, 1779; of the Alliance, November 22, 1779, to June 12, 1780; of the Ariel, June 16 to October 14,1780; of the South Carolina, August 4, 1781, to May 21, 1782; and of the letter of marque ship Queen of France, August 20 to September 9, 1782. Letter-book of John Paul Jones, March, 1778, to July, 1779. Miscellaneous material, including the court martial of Captain Pearson and letters of Admiral Rodney (1780) criticizing Admiral Arbuthnot.

Library of Congress. Papers of the Continental Congress, containing much correspondence relating to naval affairs, reports of officers, etc. Marine Committee Letter Book, containing the instructions of the Marine Committee and Board of Admiralty to officers of the navy, letters to the navy boards, etc. Letters to Washington relating to naval affairs. John Paul Jones manuscripts in eleven volumes. Miscellaneous papers, including a list of officers in the Continental navy and marine corps. This material in the Library of Congress is of the utmost importance and is described more in detail in the bibliography of Paullin's Navy of the American Revolution. The Library has also acquired transcripts of the Admiralty Records in the British Archives.

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Massachusetts State Library, Archives Division. Records of the Great and General Court, beginning July 26, 1775. Records of the Honorable the Council. Massachusetts Archives and Revolutionary Rolls Collection. In volumes v to ix, xxviii, xxxv ii to xl, xliv, xlv, Iii, Iiii, cxxxix, cxlv, cxlviii to cliii, clvii, clviii, clix, clxiv to clxxii a large amount of information will be found, including bonds and commissions of privateers, correspondence about prisoners, prize cases, letters, orders and minutes of the Board of War, reports of officers of the state navy, rolls, documents relating to the Penobscot Expedition, and miscellaneous papers.

Massachusetts Historical Society. Papers of Colonel Timothy Pickering. Papers of Governor Trumbull of Connecticut. Papers of Oliver Wolcott of Connecticut.

Essex Institute. Miscellaneous papers. Most letters of interest have been printed in the society's collections.

Harvard College Library. Sparks Papers. Arthur Lee Papers. Commodore Tucker Papers. Miscellaneous papers, including Luther Little's narrative of the battle between the Protector and the Admiral Duff.

Private Collections. Papers of John Adams, deposited in the library of the Massachusetts Historical Society, examined through the courtesy of Charles Francis Adams, Esq. Copies of four letters kindly furnished by Charles T. Harbeck, Esq., viz.. Hopkins's sailing orders to his captains, dated February 14, 1776, two letters of the Marine Committee, and a Jones letter of November 1, 1776. James Barnes, Esq., kindly sent a copy of a letter of William Bingham to Captain Conyngham. The Log of the Ranger (August 24, 1778, to May 10, 1780) was sold by the estate of E. P. Jewell, Esq. and an opportunity to copy extracts from it was obtained. This log, down to March 2, 1779, was published in the Granite Monthly.

Archives de Ia Marine aux Archives Nationales a Paris. Campagnes; Pays Etrangers, Commerce et Consulate; Travail du Roi et du Ministre; Ordres et Depeches; etc.

British Archives. Public Record Office. Admiralty Records: Admirals' Despatches, Captains' Letters, Consuls' Letters, Courts Martial, Captains' and Masters' Logs. Transcripts of the British Admiralty Records and of the French papers from the Archives de Ia Marine, indispensable for a comprehensive study of Revolutionary naval history, were very kindly furnished by Robert W. Neeser, Esq. Customs House: Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs; Irish Minute Books; Whitehaven Customs Letter- Book. Dr. Charles 0. Paullin kindly allowed the use of his transcripts of these Custom House papers.

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In quoting from documents, newspapers, manuscripts, etc., pains have been taken to avoid changes from the original except in punctuation, which has been amended when so doing has seemed essential to clearness.

II. RULES FOR THE REGULATION OF THE NAVY OFTHE UNITED COLONIES

The Commanders of all ships and vessels belonging to the thirteen United Colonies are strictly required to shew in themselves a good example of honor and virtue to their officers and men, and to be very vigilant in inspecting the behaviour of all such as are under them, and to discountenance and suppress all dissolute, immoral, and disorderly practices, and also such as are contrary to the rules of discipline and obedience, and to correct those who are guilty of the same, according to the usage of the sea.

The Commanders of the ships of the thirteen United Colonies are to take care that divine service be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon preached on Sundays, unless bad weather or other extraordinary accidents prevent it.

If any shall be heard to swear, curse, or blaspheme the name of God, the Commander is strictly enjoined to punish them for every offense by causing them to wear a wooden collar, or some other shameful badge of distinction, for so long time as he shall judge proper. If he be a commissioned officer, he shall forfeit one shilling for each offense, and a warrant or inferior officer six pence. He who is guilty of drunkenness, if a seaman, shall be put in irons until he is sober, but if an officer, he shall forfeit two days' pay.

No Commander shall inflict any punishment upon a seaman beyond twelve lashes upon his bare back with A cat of nine tails; if the fault shall deserve a greater punishment, he is to apply to the Commander in chief of the Navy, in order to the trying of him by a courtmartial, and in the mean time he may put him under confinement.

The Commander is never by his own authority to discharge a commission or warrant officer, nor to punish or strike him, but he may suspend or confine them, and when he comes in the way of a Commander in chief, apply to him for holding a court-martial.

The Officer who commands by accident of the Captain's or commander's absence (unless he be absent for a time by leave) shall not order any correction but confinement, and upon the captain's return on board he shall then give an account of his reasons for so doing.

The Captain is to cause the articles of war to be hung up in some public places of the ship, and read to the ship's company once a month.

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Whenever a Captain shall inlist a seaman, he shall take care to enter on his books the time and terms of his entering, in order to his being justly paid.

The Captain shall, before he sails, make return to, and leave with the Congress, or such person or persons as the Congress shall appoint for that purpose, a compleat list of all his officers and men, with the time and terms of their entering; and during his cruize shall keep a true account of the desertion or death of any of them, and of the entering of others, and after his cruize and before any of them are paid off, he shall make return of a compleat list of the same, including those who shall remain on board his ship.

The men shall, at their request, be furnished with slops that are necessary by the Captain or purser, who shall keep an account of the same, and the Captain, in his return in the last mentioned article directed to be made, shall mention the amount delivered to each man, in order to its being stopped out of his pay.

As to the term "inferior Officer," the Captain is to take notice that the same does not include any commission or any warrant officer, except the second master, surgeon's mate, cook, armourer, gun-smith, master at arms and sail maker.

The Captain is to take care when any inferior officers or volunteer seamen are turned over into the ship under his command from any other ship, not to rate them on the ship's books in a worse quality, or lower degree or station, than they served in the ship they were removed from; and for his guidance he is to demand from the commander of the ship from which they are turned over, a list, under his hand, of their names and qualities.

Any officer, seaman, or others, intitled to wages or prize money, may have the same paid to his assignee, provided the assignment be attested by the Captain or Commander, the master or purser of the ship, or a chief magistrate of some county or corporation.

The Captain is to discourage the seamen of his ship from selling any part of their wages or shares, and never to attest the letter of attorney of any seaman, until he is fully satisfied that the same is not granted in consideration of money given for the purchase of his wages or shares.

When an inferior officer or seaman dies, the Captain is forthwith to make out a ticket for the time of his service, and to send the same by the first safe conveyance to the Congress, or agents by them for that purpose appointed, in order to the wages being forthwith paid to the executors or administrators of the deceased.

A convenient place shall be set apart for sick or hurt men, to which they are to be removed, with their hammocks and bedding, when the surgeon shall advise the

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same to be necessary, and some of the crew shall be appointed to attend and serve them, and to keep the place clean.

The cooper shall make buckets with covers and cradles if necessary, for their use.

All ships furnished with fishing tackle, being in such places where fish is to be had, the captain is to employ some of the company in fishing; the fish to be distributed daily to each persons as are sick or upon recovery, provided the surgeon recommend it, and the surplus by turns amongst the messes of the officers and seamen without favour or partiality and gratis, without any deduction of their allowance of provisions on that account.

It is left to the discretion of Commanders of squadrons to shorten the allowance of provisions according to the exigencies of the service, taking care that the men be punctually paid for the same.

The like power is given to Captains of single ships in cases of absolute necessity.

If there should be a want of pork, the Captain is to order three pounds of beef to be issued to the men, in lieu of two pounds of pork.

One day in every week shall be issued out a proportion of flour and suet, in lieu of beef, for the seamen, but this is not to extend beyond four months' victualling at one time, nor shall the purser receive any allowance for flour or suet kept longer on board than that time, and there shall be supplied, once a year, a proportion of canvas for pudding-bags, after the rate of one ell for every sixteen men.

If any ships of the thirteen United Colonies shall happen to come into port in want of provisions, the warrant of a Commander in chief shall be sufficient to the Agent or other instrument of the victualling, to supply the quantity wanted, and in urgent cases, where delay may be hurtful, the warrant of the Captain of the ship shall be of equal effect.

The Captain is frequently to order the proper officers to inspect into the condition of the provisions, and if the bread proves damp, to have it aired upon the quarter deck or poop, and also examine the flesh casks, and if any of the pickle be leaked out, to have new made and put in, and the casks made tight and secure.

The Captain or purser shall secure the cloaths, bedding, and other things of such persons as shall die or be killed, to be delivered to their executors or administrators.

All papers, charter parties, bills of lading, passports, and other writings whatsoever, found on board any ship or ships, which shall be taken, shall be

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carefully preserved, and the originals sent to the court of Justice for maritime affairs, appointed or to be appointed by the legislatures in the respective colonies, for judging concerning such prize or prizes; and if any person or persons shall wilfully or negligently destroy or suffer to be destroyed, any such paper or papers, he or they so offending shall forfeit their share of such prize or prizes, and suffer such other punishment as they shall be judged by a court-martial to deserve.

If any person or persons shall embezzle, steal or take away any cables, anchors, sails, or any of the ship's furniture, or any of the powder, arms, ammunition, or provisions of any ship belonging to the thirteen United Colonies, he or they shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial shall order.

When in sight of a ship or ships of the enemy, and at such other times as may appear to make it necessary to prepare for an engagement, the Captain shall order all things in his ship in a proper posture for fight, and shall, in his own person and according to his duty, heart on and encourage the inferior officers and men to fight courageously, and not to behave themselves faintly or cry for quarters, on pain of such punishment as the offence shall appear to deserve for his neglect.

Any Captain or other officer, mariner, or others, who shall basely desert their duty or station in the ship and run away while the enemy is in sight, or, in time of action, or shall entice others to do so, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as a court-martial shall inflict.

Any officer, seaman, or marine, who shall begin, excite, cause, or join in any mutiny or sedition in the ship to which he belongs, on any pretence whatsoever, shallsuffer death, or such other punishment as a court-martial shall direct. Any person in or belonging to the ship, who shall utter any words of sedition and mutiny, or endeavour to make any mutinous assemblies on any pretence whatsoever, shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial shall inflict.

None shall presume to quarrel with or strike his superior officer on pain of such punishment as a courtmartial shall order to be inflicted.

If any person shall apprehend he has just cause of complaint, he shall quietly and decently make the same known to his superior officer, or to the captain, as the case may require, who shall take care that justice be done him.

There shall be no quarreling or fighting between shipmates on board any ship belonging to the thirteen United Colonies, nor shall there be used any reproachful or provoking speeches, tending to make quarrels and disturbance, on pain of imprisonment and such other punishment as a court-martial shall think proper to inflict.

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If any person shall sleep upon his watch, or negligently perform the duty which shall be enjoined him to do, or forsake his station, he shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial shall judge proper to inflict, according to the nature of his offence.

All murder shall be punished with death.

All robbery and theft shall be punished at the discretion of a court-martial.

Any master at arms who shall refuse to receive such prisoner or prisoners as shall be committed to his charge, or having received them, shall suffer him or them to escape, or dismiss them without orders for so doing, shall suffer in his or their stead, as a court-martial shall order and direct.

The Captain, officers, and others shall use their utmost endeavours to detect, apprehend, and bring to punishment, all offenders, and shall at all times readily assist the officers appointed for that purpose in the discharge of their duty, on pain of being proceeded against and punished by a court-martial at discretion.

All other faults, disorders, and misdemeanours, which shall be committed on board any ship belonging to the thirteen United Colonies, and which are not herein mentioned, shall be punished according to the laws and customs in such cases at sea.

A court-martial shall consist of at least three Captains and three first lieutenants, with three Captains and three first lieutenants of Marines, if there shall be so many of the Marines then present, and the eldest Captain shall preside.

All sea officers of the same denomination shall take rank of the officers of the Marines.

The sentence of a court-martial for any capital offence, shall not be put in execution, until it be confirmed by the Commander in chief of the fleet; and it shall be the duty of the president of every court-martial to transmit to the Commander in chief of the fleet every sentence which shall be given, with a summary of the evidence and proceedings thereon, by the first opportunity.

The Commander in chief of the fleet for the time being, shall have power to pardon and remit any sentence of death, that shall be given in consequence of any of the aforementioned Articles.

There shall be allowed to each man serving on boardthe ships in the service of the thirteen United Colonies, a daily proportion of provisions, according as is expressed in the following table, viz.

Sunday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. beef, 1 lb. potatoes or turnips.

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Monday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, 1/2 pint peas and four oz. cheese.

Tuesday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. beef, 1 lb. potatoes or turnips, and pudding.

Wednesday, 1 lb. bread, two oz. butter, four oz. cheese and 1/2 pint of rice.

Thursday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, and 1/2 pint of peas.

Friday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. beef, I lb. potatoes or turnips, and pudding.

Saturday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, 1/2 pint peas and four oz. cheese.

Half a pint of rum per man every day, and discretionary allowance on extra duty and in time of engagement.

A pint and half of vinegar for six men per week.

The pay of the officers and men [per calendar month] shall be as follows:

Captain or commander, 32 dollarsLieutenants, 20 dollarsMaster, 20 dollarsMates, 15 dollarsBoatswain, 15 dollarsBoatswain's first mate, 9 1/2 dollarsBoatswain's second mate, 8 dollarsGunner, 15 dollarsGunner's mate, 10 2/3 dollarsSurgeon, 21 1/3 dollarsSurgeon's mate, 13 1/3 dollarsCarpenter, 15 dollarsCarpenter's mate, 10 2/3 dollars.Cooper, 15 dollarsCaptain's or Commander's clerk, 15 dollarsSteward, 13 1/3 dollarsChaplain, 20 dollarsAble seamen, 6 2/3Captain of marines, 26 2/3 dollarsLieutenants, 18 dollarsSerjeants, 8 dollarsCorporals, 7 1/3 dollarsFifer, 7 1/3 dollarsDrummer, 7 1/3Privates [of] marines, 6 2/3 dollars

III. INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMANDERS OF PRIVATEERS

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Continental Congress, April 3, 1776:

I. You may, by force of arms, attack, subdue and take all ships and other vessels belonging to the inhabitants of Great Britain, on the high seas, or between high water and low water mark, except ships and vessels bringing persons who intend to settle and reside in the United Colonies; or bringing arms, ammunition, or war-like stores, to the said colonies, for the use of such inhabitants thereof as are friends to the American cause, which you shall suffer to pass unmolested, the commanders thereof permitting a peaceable search and giving satisfactory information of the contents of the ladings and destinations of voyages.

II. You may, by force of arms, attack, subdue and take all ships and other vessels whatsoever, carrying soldiers, arms, gunpowder, ammunition, provisions, or any other contraband goods, to any of the British armies or ships of war employed against these colonies.

III. You shall bring such ships and vessels, as you shall take, with their guns, rigging, tackle, apparel, furniture, and ladings to some convenient port or ports of the United Colonies, that proceedings may thereupon be had in due form, before the courts which are or shall be appointed to hear and determine causes civil and maritime.

IV. You, or one of your chief officers, shall bring or send the master and pilot and one or more principal person or persons of the company of every ship or vessel by you taken, as soon after the capture as may be, to the judge or judges of such court as aforesaid, to be examined upon oath, and make answer to the interrogatories which may be propounded, touching the interest or property of the ship or vessel and her lading; and, at the same time, you shall deliver, or cause to be delivered to the judge or judges, all passes, sea-briefs, charter-parties, bills of lading, cockets, letters and other documents and writings found on board, proving the said papers by the affidavit of yourself or of some other person present at the capture, to be produced as they were received, without fraud, addition, subduction or embezzlement.

V. You shall keep and preserve every ship or vessel and cargo by you taken, until they shall, by a sentence of a court properly authorized, be adjudged lawful prizes; not selling, spoiling, wasting, or diminishing the same, or breaking the bulk thereof, nor suffering any such thing to be done.

VI. If you, or any of your officers or crew, shall, in cold blood, kill or maim, or by torture or otherwise, cruelly, inhumanly, and contrary to common usage and the practice of civilized nations in war, treat any person or persons surprized. in the ship or vessel you shall take, the offender shall be severely punished.

VIII. You shall, by all convenient opportunities, send to Congress written accounts of the captures you shall make, with the number and names of the

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captives, copies of your journal from time to time, and intelligence of what may occur or be discovered concerning the designs of the enemy and the destination, motions and operations of their fleets and armies.

VIII. One-third, at least, of your whole company shall be landsmen.

IX. You shall not ransom any prisoners or captives, but shall dispose of them in such manner as the Congress, or, if that be not sitting, in the colony whither they shall be brought, as the general assembly, convention, or council, or committee of safety, of such colony shall direct.

X. You shall observe all such further instructions as Congress shall hereafter give in the premises, when you shall have notice thereof.

XI. If you shall do anything contrary to these instructions, or to others hereafter to be given, or willingly suffer such thing to be done, you shall not only forfeit your commission and be liable to an action for breach of the condition of your bond, but be responsible to the party grieved for damages sustained by such malversation.

Additional articles, April 7, 1781:

1. You are to pay a sacred regard to the rights of neutral powers and the usage and customs of civilizednations; and on no pretence whatever, presume to take or seize any ships or vessels belonging to the subjects of princes or powers in alliance with these United States [with certain exceptions] . . . under the pains and penalties expressed in a proclamation [See Appendix IV] issued by the Congress of the United States, the ninth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight.

2. You shall permit all neutral vessels freely to navigate on the high seas or coasts of America except such as are employed in carrying contraband goods or soldiers to the enemies of these United States.

3. You shall not seize or capture any effects belonging to the subjects of the belligerent powers on board neutral vessels, excepting contraband goods; and you are carefully to observe, that the term contraband is confined to those articles which are expressly declared to be such in the treaty of amity and commerce, of the sixth day of February, 1778, between these United States and his most Christian majesty, namely: arms, great guns, bombs, with their fusees and other things belonging to them, cannon-balls, gun-powder, matches, pikes, swords, lances, spears, halberts, mortars, petards, grenadoes, salt-petre, muskets, musket-ball, bucklers, helmets, breast-plates, coats of mail, and the like kind of arms proper for arming soldiers, musket-rests, belts, horses with their furniture, and all other warlike instruments whatever.

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IV. A PROCLAMATION

Whereas Congress have received information and complaints, 'that violences have been done by American armed vessels to neutral nations, in seizing ships belonging to their subjects and under their colours, and in making captures of those of the enemy whilst under the protection of neutral coasts, contrary to the usage and custom of nations": to the end that such unjustifiable and piratical acts, which reflect dishonour upon the national character of these states, may be in future effectually prevented, the said Congress hath thought proper to direct, enjoin and command, and they do hereby direct, enjoin and command, all captains, commanders and other officers and seamen belonging to any American armed vessels, to govern themselves strictly in all things agreeably to the tenor of their commissions, and the instructions and resolutions of Congress; particularly that they pay a sacred regard to the rights of neutral powers and the usage and custom of civilized nations, and on no pretence whatever presume to take or seize any ships or vessels belonging to the subjects of princes or powers in alliance with these United States, except they are employed in carrying contraband goods or soldiers to our enemies, and in such case that they conform to the stipulations contained in treaties subsisting between such princes or powers and these states; and that they do not capture, seize or plunder any ships or vessels of our enemies, being under the protection of neutral coasts, nations or princes, under the penalty of being condignly punished therefor, and also of being bound to make satisfaction for all matters of damage and the interest thereof by reparation, under the pain and obligation of their persons and goods. And further, the said Congress doth hereby resolve and declare, that persons wilfully offending in any of the foregoing instances, if taken by any foreign powers in consequence thereof, will not be considered as having a right to claim protection from these states, but shall suffer such punishment as by the usage and custom of nations may be inflicted upon such offenders.

Given in Congress at York, in the state of Pennsylvania, this ninth day of May, Anno Domini 1778.

V. VESSELS IN THE CONTINENTAL SERVICE

The dates indicate the period of active service, or, where no service was performed during the war, the date of launching is given. The Serapis is included for the reason that she served temporarily as Commodore Jones's flagship, replacing the Bonhomme Richard.

Continental Navy

Alfred, 24, ship, 1775-1778Columbus, 20, ship,1775-1778Andrew Doria, 14, brig, 1775-1777Cabot, 14, brig, 1775-1777

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Providence, 12, sloop, 1775-1779Hornet, 10, sloop, 1775-1777Wasp, 8, schooner, 1775-1777Fly, 8, schooner, 1775-1777Lexington, 16, brig, 1776-1777Reprisal, 16 brig, 1776-1777Hampden, 14, brig, 1776-1777Independence,10, sloop, 1776-1778Sachem, 10 sloop, 1776-1777Mosquito, 4 sloop, 1776-1777Raleigh, 32 frigate, 1777-1778Hancock, 32 frigate,1777Warren, 32, frigate,1777-1779Washington, 32, frigate, 1777Randolph, 32, frigate, 1777-1778Providence, 28, frigate, 1777-1780Trumbull, 28 frigate, 1777-1781Congress, 28, frigate, 1777Virginia, 28, frigate, 1777-1778Effingham, 28, frigate, 1777Boston, 24, frigate, 1777-1780Montgomery, 24, frigate, 1777Delaware, 24, frigate, 1777Ranger, 18, ship, 1777-1780Resistance, 10, brigantine, 1777-1778Surprise, sloop, 1777Racehorse, 10, sloop, 1777Repulse, 8, xebec, 1777Champion, 8, xebec, 1777Indien, 40, ship, 1777Deane (later Hague), 32, frigate, 1777-1783Queen of France, 28, frigate, 1777-1780Dolphin, 10, cutter, 1777Surprise, 10, lugger, 1777Revenge, 14, cutter, 1777-1779Alliance, 32, frigate, 1778-1785General Gates, 18, ship, 1778-1779Retaliation, brigantine, 1778Pigot, 8, schooner, 1778Confederacy, 32, frigate, 1779-1781Argo, 12, Sloop, 1779Diligent, 12, brig, 1779Bonhomme Richard, 42, ship, 1779Pallas, 32, frigate, 1779Cerf, 18, cutter, 1779Vengeance, 12, brig, 1779

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Serapis, 44, ship, 1779Axiel, 20, ship, 1780-1781Saratoga, 18, ship, 1780-1781America, 74, ship of the line, 1782General Washington, 20, ship, 1782-1784Due de Lauzun, 20, ship, 1782-1783Bourbon, 36, frigate, 1783Packets : ActiveBaltimoreDespatchEnterpriseFameGeorgia PacketHorn SnakeMercuryPhoenix

Washington's Fleet, 1775-1776

Hannah, schoonerLynch, schoonerFranklin, schoonerLee, schoonerHarrison, schoonerWarren, schoonerWashington, brigantineHancock, schoonerGeneral Schuyler, sloopGeneral Mifflin, sloopLady Washington, galley

Lake Champlain, 1776

Enterprise, 12, sloopRoyal Savage, 12, schoonerRevenge,8, schoonerLiberty, 8, schoonerNew Haven, 3, gondolaProvidence, 3, gondolaBoston, 3, gondolaSpitfire, 3, gondolaPhiladelphia, 3, gondolaConnecticut, 3, gondolaJersey, 3, gondolaNew York, 3, gondola

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Lee,6, galleyTrumbull,8, galleyCongress, 8, galleyWashington, 8, galleyGates, 8, galley

Mississippi River, 1778-1779

Morris, shipWest Florida , sloopMorris, schooner

VI. OFFICERS IN THE CONTINENTAL NAVY ANDMARINE CORPS

A list of Revolutionary officers was compiled in 1794. It is "formed from the Minutes of the Marine Committee and Navy Boards, and from the Rolls of the several Vessels; many of the Officers served only for a Cruize" (Miscellaneous Naval Papers, March 18, 1794, in the Library of Congress). A previous list had been given out by the Board of Admiralty in September 1781 (Papers of the Continental Congress, 37, 473), which is an incomplete register of the officers of that date. The following list has been made up from these two (see also Paullin's Navy of the Revolution, Appendix B). A very few unimportant attempts at emendation in spelling, etc., that seemed warranted by other authority, have been made. The names of captains which are numbered comprise those appointed October 10, 1776, in the order of rank; the numbered lieutenants were commissioned October 12, 1776. The same officers generally had earlier commissions, which are also indicated when known; these commissions were superseded in October, 1776. A number of other dates of commission, taken from the 1781 list and other sources, are also given. Annexed to the main list will be found a number of names, not included in either of the old lists, comprising officers commissioned in France and others (see Journals of the Continental Congress, April 17, June 6, 1776, June 14, 1777, September 8, 1779; Calendars of Naval Records and of Jones Papers - indices; Goldsborough's Naval Chronicle, p. 8; Field's Life of Hopkins, p. 186); some of them were doubtless never regularly commissioned. To make a wholly complete and accurate list would be impossible.

CONTINENTAL NAVY

Captains and Commanders

Esek Hopkins, commander-in-chief, December 22, 1775.

1. James Nicholson, June 6, 1776.2. John Manley, April 17, 1776.

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3. Hector McNeill, June 15, 1776.4. Dudley Saltonstall, December 22, 1775.5. Nicholas Biddle, December 22, 1775.6. Thomas Thompson, June 6, 1776.7. John Barry, June 6, 1776.8. Thomas Read, June 6, 1776.9. Thomas Grinnell, June 15, 1776.10. Charles Alexander, June 6, 1776.11. Lambert Wickes.12. Abraham Whipple, December 22,1775.13. John Burrows Hopkins, December 22, 1775.14. John Hodge, August 22, 1776.15. William Hallock.16. Hoysted Hacker.17. Isaiah Robinson.18. John Paul Jones.19. James Josiah.20. Elisha, Hinman, August 13, 1776.21. Joseph Olney.22. James Robinson.23. John Young.24. Elisha Warner.John Nicholson, November 19, 1776. Samuel Nicholson, December 10, 1776. Henry Johnson, February 5, 1777. John Peck Rathburne, February 15, 1777. Gustavus Conyngham, March 1, 1777. Samuel Tucker, March 15, 1777. Daniel Waters, March 17, 1777. John Green, February 11, 1778. William Burke, May 1, 1778. Pierre Landais, June 18, 1778. Seth Harding, September 23, 1778. Silas Talbot, September 17, 1779. John Ayres. Peter Brewster. Samuel Chew. Benjamin Dann. John Hazard. William Pickles. Thomas Simpson. John Skimmer. William Stone.

Lieutenants

313

1. Peter Shores, July 22,1776.2. Robert Harris.3. Jonathan Maltbie, August 22, 1776.4. John Brown, June 15, 1776.5. Ezekiel Burroughs, December 22, 1775.6. Luke Matthewman.7. George House.8. Thomas Albertson.9. John Baldwin.10. Simon Gross.11. David Phipps, August 22, 1776.12. John Sleymaker.13. Joshua Barney.14. Jonathan Pritchard.15. Adam W. Thaxter.16. Benjamin Handy.17. Joseph Greenway.18. Benjamin Page.19. Hopley Yeaton.Rhodes Arnold, December 22, 1775.Jonathan Pitcher, December 22, 1775.Benjamin Seabury, December 22, 1775.Thomas Weaver, December 22, 1775.John McDougal, December 22, 1775.Daniel Vaughan, December 22, 1775.Joseph Doble, June 6, 1776.John Wheelwright, July 22, 1776.Josiah Shackford, July 22, 1776.William Barnes, August 17, 1776.Thomas Vaughan, August 17, 1776.Hezekiah Welch, October 19, 1776.Patrick Fletcher, November 20, 1776.Blaney Allison, December 20, 1776.Elijah Bowen, February 5, 1777.Robert French, March 25, 1777.Robert Martin, April 22, 1777.Elijah Hall, June 14, 1777.Matthew Tibbs, June 17, 1777.John Rodez, August 6, 1777.John Fanning, August 10, 1777.William Mollison, August 12,1777.Arthur Dillaway, September 19, 1777.Joseph Vesey, November 13, 1777.Silas Devol, January 28, 1778. Muscoe Livingston, July 27, 1778. Stephen Gregory, August 4, 1778.

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Michael Knies, August 7, 1778. Samuel Cardal, August 15, 1778. Peter Deville, August 25, 1778. Benjamin Bates, December 4, 1778. Richard Dale, August, 1779. Alexander Murray, July 20, 1781. Joseph Adams. Robert Adamson. John Angus. James Armitage. Josiah Audibert. Benjamin Barron. William Barron. Goerge Batson. Daniel Beam John Bellenger. Christopher Bradley. Jacob Brooks. Philip Brown. Isaac Buck. Charles Bulkley. Edward Burke. George Champlin. John Channing. Seth Clarke. David Cullam. James Degge. William Dennis. Marie Sevel Doris. William Dunlap.William Dupar. Joshua Fanning. Wilford Fisher. William Gamble. Nicholas E. Gardner. William Grinnell. James Grinwell. William Ham. James Handy. Abraham Hawkins. John Hennessey. Stephen Hill. Christopher Hopkins.Esek Hopkins, Jr. William Hopkins. Robert Hume.

315

Aquilla Johns. John Kemp. John Kerr. Benjamin Knight. William Leeds. Edward Leger. John Lewis. George Lovie. Cutting Lunt. Henry Lunt. John McIvers. John Margisson. Richard Marvin. John Moran. William Moran. William Morrison. Isaac Olney.James Pine. Robert Pomeroy. David Porter. William Potts. Benjamin Reed. Peter Richards. James Robertson. John Robinson. Peter Rosseau. Robert Saunders. John Scott. Robert Scott. John Scranton. Nicholas Scull. James Sellers. Daniel Starr. James Stephens. John Stevens. David Welch. Jacob White. Richard Wickes. James Wilson. Robert Wilson. Samuel York.

MARINE CORPS

Major

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Samuel Nicholas, June 25, 1776.

Captains

Matthew Parke, May 26, 1776. Andrew Porter, June 25, 1776. Samuel Shaw, June 25, 1776.Benjamin Deane, June 25, 1776. Robert Mullen, June 25, 1776. John Stewart, June 25, 1776. Gilbert Saltonstall, June, 1776. Richard Palmer, July 7, 1776. George Jerry Osborne, July 22, 1776. Seth Baxter, October 10, 1776. James Disney, October 22, 1776. Joseph Hardy, October, 1776. Dennis Leary, June 21,1777. William Morris, June, 1777. William Jones, March 4, 1778. Edward Arrowsmith, October 20, 1778. William Nicholson, September 6, 1781. Abraham Boyce. Isaac Craig. John Elliott. Robert Elliott. John Hazard. William Holton. William Matthewman. Miles Pennington. - Rice. Joseph Shoemaker. - Spence. John Trevett. Elihu Trowbridge. John Welch.

Lieutenants

Daniel Henderson, June 25, 1776. David Love, June 25, 1776. Franklin Reed, June 25, 1776.Peregrine Brown, June 25, 1776. James McClure, June 25,1776. William Gilmore, June 25,1776. Abel Morgan, June 25, 1776. Hugh Montgomery, June 25, 1776.

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Thomas Pownal, June 25,1776. Richard Harrison, June 25, 1776. Stephen Meade, July 22, 1776. Nathaniel Thwing, July 22, 1776. Benjamin Thompson, July 22,1776. Alpheus Rice, August 24,1776. Jacob White, October 16, 1776. Thomas Plunkett, December 9, 1776. William Jennison, February, 1777. William Waterman, March 4,1778. Thomas Elwood, August 24,1778. Peter Green, September 25, 1778. Abraham Vandyke, July 24, 1779. William Barney. Henry Becker. Peter Bedford. David Bill. Gurdon Bill. Benjamin Catlin. Seth Chapin. John Chilton. James Clarke. James Cokely. James Connolly. William Cooper. David Cullam. Robert Cummings. Robert Davis.Henry Dayton. John Dimsdell. Stephen Earle, Thomas Elting. Panatier de la Falconier. Zebadiah Farnham. William Fielding. Thomas Fitzgerald. John Fitzpatrick. Samuel Gamage. John Guignace. Roger Haddock. James Hamilton. Jonas Hamilton. William Hamilton. John Harris. Samuel Hempstead. Samuel Holt.

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Benjamin Huddle. William Huddle. Robert Hunter. Hugh Kirkpatrick. Daniel Longstreet. Eugene McCarthy. Richard McClure. Charles McHarron. Robert McNeal. Peter Manifold. Jonathan Mix. William Morris. Alexander Neilson. James Gerald O'Kelly. Avery Parker.Samuel Powars. Samuel Pritchard. William Radford. Jerry Reed. Nathaniel Richards. Jabez Smith. Walter Spooner. Edmund Stack. Daniel Starr. I. M. Strobach. George Trumbull. Thomas Turner. Louis de la Valette. Zebulon Varnam. - Wadsworth. Samuel Wallingford. James Warren. James H. Wilson. Jonathan Woodworth.

SUPPLEMENTARY LIST

Captains

Isaac Cazneau, April 17, 1776. Samuel Tomkins, June 6, 1776. Christopher Miller, June 6, 1776. Henry Skinner. John Roach. Ralph Moor. Denis Nicolas Cottineau.

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Joseph Varage. Philippe Nicolas Ricot.

Lieutenants

Eli Stansbury, December 22, 1775. Israel Turner, June 6, 1776. Mark Dennet, June 6, 1776.-Plunkett, July 20, 1781. Peter Amiel. Robert Robinson. John Buckley. James Linda. Henri le Meignen. Pierre Magonet. Beninge Mischateau. Armand la Coudrais. Pierre de Nantes. Nicolas de St.Valery.

Captains of Marines

John Grannis. Maurice O'Connell. Antoine Felix Wybert. Paul de Chamillard.

Lieutenants of Marines

George Stillman. Barnabas Lothrop.

VII. CONTINENTAL PRIVATEERS

A list of the private armed vessels to which letters of marque were issued by the Continental Congress has been printed by the Library of Congress in the Calendar of Naval Records of the American Revolution, published in 1906. With the name of each vessel are given the state where owned, the rig, the number of guns and of men, the amount of the bond furnished, and the names of the commander, the bonders, and the owners. The bonds are contained in sixteen volumes of the papers of the Continental Congress (No. 196). The most important of the statistics compiled from them are given below. The numbers of guns and of men in these tables are smaller than they should be, for the reason that in several cases (thirty of the former - eighteen of the latter) the numbers are not stated.

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By type:Ships 301Brigs and brigantines 541Schooners, sloops, etc. 751Boats and galleys 104Total 1697

By State:New Hampshire 43Massachusetts 626Rhode Island 15Connecticut 218New York 1,New Jersey 4Pennsylvania 500Maryland 225Virginia 64South Carolina 1 Total 1697

By year:1776 341777 691778 1291779 2091780 3011781 5501782 3831783 22Total 1697

Number of guns, 14,872. Number of men, 58,400

VIII. CONCORDAT

Agreement between Messieurs John Paul Jones, captain of the Bonhomme Richard; Pierre Landais, captain of the Alliance; Denis Nicolas Cottineau, captain of the Pallas; Joseph Varage, captain of the Stag; and Philippe Nicolas Ricot, captain of the Vengeance; composing a squadron that shall be commanded by the oldest officer of the highest grade and so on in succession in case of death or retreat. None of the said commanders, whilst they are not separated from the said squadron by order of the minister, shall act but by virtue of the brevet which they shall have obtained from the United States of America, and it is agreed that the flag of the United States shall be displayed.The division of the prizes to the superior officers and crews of the said squadron

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shall be made agreeable to the American laws, but it is agreed that the proportion of the whole coming to each vessel in the squadron shall be regulated by the Minister of the Marine Department of France and the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

A copy of the American laws shall be annexed to the present agreement, after having been certified by the commander of the Bonhomme Richard, but as the said laws cannot foresee nor determine as to what may concern the vessels and subjects of other nations, it is expressly agreed that whatever may be contrary to them should be regulated by the Minister of the French Marine and the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

It is likewise agreed that the orders given by the Minister of the French Marine and the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States shall be executed.

Considering the necessity there is of preserving the interests of each individual, the prizes that shall be taken shall be remitted to the orders of Monsieur le Ray de Chaumont, honorary intendant of the Royal Hotel of Invalids, who has furnished the expenses of the armament of the said squadron.

It has been agreed that M. le Ray de Chaumont be requested not to give up the part of the prizes coming to all the crews, and to each individual of the said squadron, but to their order, and to be responsible for the same in his own and proper name.

Whereas the said squadron has been formed for the purpose of injuring the common enemies of France and America, it has been agreed that such armed vessels, whether French or American, may be associated therewith by common consent, as shall be found suitable for the purpose, and that they shall have such proportion of the prizes which shall be taken as the laws of their respective countries allow them.

In case of the death of any of the before mentioned commanders of vessels, he shall be replaced agreeably to the order of the tariff, with liberty however for the successor to choose whether he will remain on board his own vessel and give up to the next in order the command of the vacant ship.

It has moreover been agreed that the commander of the Stag shall be excepted from the last article of this present agreement, because in case of a disaster to M. de Varage, it shall be replaced by his second in command and so on by the other officers of his cutter the Stag.

J. P. JONES. P. LANDAIS. DE COTTINEAU. DE VARAGE.

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P. RICOT.Le RAY DE CHAUMONT.

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