a model of motivated cognition to account for the link between self-monitoring and materialism

A Model of Motivated Cognition to Account for the Link Between Self-Monitoring and MaterialismPaul Rose Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Stephanie P. DeJesus City University of New York

ABSTRACT

Drawing on previous theorizing about the development of materialis-tic values, a model of motivated cognition is proposed to account forthe positive association between self-monitoring and materialism.The model suggests that self-monitoring is associated with individualdifferences in belonging motivation, that belonging motivationshapes people’s beliefs about buying as a means of belonging withinvalued groups, and that buying-is-for-belonging beliefs shape thedegree to which people value wealth and luxury. Results from twostudies supported this model and suggested that the self-monitoringresults are not better attributed to extraversion, social self-confi-dence, or shyness. The proposed model emphasizes that traits associ-ated with a strong need to belong may predispose people towardmaterialism. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

To many people, it is perfectly obvious that much of the world has becomeincreasingly preoccupied with wealth, shopping, and luxury. Particularlywithin the United States and nations influenced by American culture,

Psychology & Marketing, Vol. 24(2): 93–115 (February 2007)Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/mar.20154

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the rise of materialism is so patent that many concerned social commen-tators have found it unnecessary to even document that it is rising. How-ever, data on the rise of materialism in the United States are abundant.In 1987, the Roper polling organization asked a representative sampleof Americans how much income the respondents and their families wouldneed to fulfill all their dreams. The median answer given to this questionin 1987 was $50,000. The median answer given to the same question in1996 was $90,000 (cited in Schor, 1998, p. 15).Although a small part of thisincrease can be attributed to inflationary adjustment, this substantialincrease over a period of only 9 years strongly points toward a change inAmerica’s financial aspirations. Evidence from representative surveys ofcollege freshmen tells a similar story. Astin, Green, and Korn (1987)observed that the percentage of American first-year college students thatreported that “being very well off financially” was a “very important” or“essential” life goal rose from 39% to 75% between 1970 and 1993 (citedin Myers & Diener, 1995, p. 12). As should be expected, many Americansare reaping the negative consequences of their materialistic values: Theaverage credit card debt in American households rose from $2,250 in 1990to almost $9,000 in 2002 (McGraw, 2003).1

WHY MATERIALISM IS PROBLEMATIC

In spite of this rising interest in wealth and luxury, existing evidencesuggests that material acquisitions contribute very little to people’s hap-piness, if they contribute at all. Reported correlations between house-hold income and life satisfaction are typically small (i.e., less than 0.20;Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Myers & Diener, 1995). But what ismore important (given that many more people aspire to be wealthy thanactually are) is that there is substantial evidence that materialistic val-ues are negatively correlated with life satisfaction (see Burroughs &Rindfleisch, 2002, and Kasser, 2002, for reviews). This negative correla-tion between materialistic values and life satisfaction seems to disap-pear for people who are roughly one standard deviation above the meanor higher in income (Nickerson, Schwarz, Diener, & Kahneman, 2003), butfor most people, materialistic values are associated with unhappiness.

Beyond the problem of personal unhappiness, a number of societaland environmental problems have also been linked to materialism. Rel-ative to nonmaterialistic people, highly materialistic people show lessinterest in their communities (Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002), are dis-satisfied with their families (Nickerson et al., 2003) and likely spend lesstime with them (Schor, 1998), devalue the protection of natural envi-

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1 Data from the United States are cited because these data were readily available and because Amer-ican culture has influenced many other cultures. It is worth highlighting, however, that althoughcross-cultural comparisons indicate that the United States ranks high in materialism relativeto other nations, several other nations (such as Romania and Singapore) rank even higher (e.g.,Ger & Belk, 1996; Swinyard, Kau, & Phua, 2001).

ronments (Clump, Brandel, & Sharpe, 2002), and, of course, take morethan their share of limited natural resources by amassing products ofquestionable necessity (Winter, 2004). Furthermore, materialistic childrendo less well in school than nonmaterialistic children (M. E. Goldberg,Gorn, Perrachio, & Bamossy, 2003), and materialistic adolescents aremore likely to use tobacco and marijuana than nonmaterialistic adoles-cents (Williams, Cox, Hedberg, & Deci, 2000).

In addition, although the widespread endorsement of materialisticvalues might seem to make the work of marketers easier, there are at leasta few ways in which spreading materialism might create marketing prob-lems. Materialistic consumers tend to be dissatisfied with their mate-rial standard of living (Sirgy et al., 1998) and ungrateful for what theyhave (McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002). Such ingratitude probablyincreases some consumers’ motivation to buy more, but as marketersattempt to fulfill the wants of ungrateful consumers, they may find theseconsumers prone to complaining and negative word-of-mouth behaviors.Moreover, materialistic consumers are more cynical than average, andconsumer cynicism has been linked to favorable attitudes toward uneth-ical retail behaviors (such as “borrowing” merchandise and then return-ing it after use with the pretense of dissatisfaction; Rosenbaum & Kuntze,2003). Furthermore, widespread materialism may be helping to create aworkforce that is increasingly dissatisfied with its earnings (cf. Keng,Jung, Jiuan, & Wirtz, 2000). One possible consequence of this is that insome organizations, business leaders may feel trapped between theincreasing demands of materialistic customers and the increasingdemands of materialistic employees.

THE ORIGINS OF MATERIALISM

So why do people adopt materialistic values? Kasser and his colleagueshave emphasized the influence of both socialization processes and unful-filled needs as causes of materialism (Kasser, Ryan, Couchman, & Shel-don, 2004). According to this view, one source of materialism is the mod-eling of values and behaviors of materialistic parents, friends, and mediacharacters. Thus, culture exerts a powerful influence on people’s valua-tion of wealth and luxury. Two findings that support this view are the pos-itive correlation between television viewing and materialism (Rahtz,Sirgy, & Meadow, 1989; Sirgy et al., 1998), and the positive correlationbetween parents’ materialism and their children’s materialism (M. E.Goldberg et al., 2003).

A less obvious source of materialism postulated by the Kasser et al.model is thwarted needs. Kasser and his colleagues argue that thwartedneeds give rise to a general sense of insecurity, and people try to quell thissense of insecurity by striving for wealth and luxury (see also Chang &Arkin, 2002). This insecurity may arise as a result of economic depriva-tion (Inglehart, 1990) or deprivation of fundamental psychological needs

SELF-MONITORING AND MATERIALISM Psychology & Marketing DOI: 10.1002/mar

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such as the needs for competence, autonomy, or belonging (cf. Deci &Ryan, 2000). In other words, many people turn to the pursuit of wealthand luxury when they are deprived of experiences that promote a senseof security and psychological fulfillment. Two findings that support theunfulfilled-needs hypothesis are that materialism scores are higheramong relatively poor adolescents than among relatively wealthy ado-lescents (Cohen & Cohen, 1996), and materialism scores are higher amongadolescents with emotionally cold mothers than among adolescents withemotionally warm mothers (Kasser, Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995; seeKasser, 2002, for a review of additional evidence).

In accordance with Kasser’s model, it is suggested that within a cul-ture in which people are exposed to many consumeristic messages, socialinsecurity, or a feeling of unfulfilled belonging, may be a particularlypowerful antecedent of materialism. One reason for this is that if peoplefeel unfulfilled in their need to belong, they ought to be more suscepti-ble to conformity pressures within a materialistic culture. Consistentwith this view, in an experiment in which participants experienced eitherinclusion with a group or exclusion from a group during an on-line game,excluded participants were subsequently more conforming than includedparticipants on a perceptual task (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). Sim-ilarly, in a culture in which advertisements, family, and friends repeat-edly convey consumeristic norms, it would be reasonable to expect peo-ple with a strong motive to gain social acceptance to be more materialistic.

SELF-MONITORING AND BELONGING MOTIVATION

But what personality traits reflect a strong need for social acceptance? Itis surprising that little research has been conducted on the possibility thathigh self-monitors—people with a knack for presenting themselves in what-ever way seems best for the social situation—have a powerful underlyingneed to gain social acceptance. Gangestad and Snyder (2000) have hintedat this possibility by noting that people who are relatively high in self-mon-itoring have greater “concern for the situational appropriateness of theirexpressive behavior” (p. 530, italics added) than people who are relativelylow in self-monitoring. Indeed, the situationally dependent nature of highself-monitors’ behavior (see Snyder & Monson, 1975; Snyder & Swann,1976; Snyder & Tanke, 1976; Tunnell, 1980) makes sense if high self-mon-itoring is characterized as a combination of both self-presentational ability(i.e., knowing how to behave in whatever way the situation demands) andthe motivation to exercise that ability (i.e., wanting to belong).

This perspective on the nature of self-monitoring emphasizes thathigh self-monitors may have stable motivations or goals even if theirbehavior varies widely across situations. Consistent with this view, theMischel and Shoda (1995) theory of the cognitive–affective personalitysystem recognizes that although behavior varies as a function of the sit-


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uation people find themselves in, people maintain an enduring and coher-ent set of cognitive and affective “units” (which include motives) thatinteract to produce behavior. It is this stable system of interacting cog-nitive and affective units that gives personality its consistency and con-tinuity. The theory suggests that different circumstances activate dif-ferent “if . . . then” sequences within the cognitive–affective system (e.g.,“if in the presence of spendthrifts, activate thoughts of spending asthrilling, feel disinhibited, and spend much”). As a result, a stable sys-tem of “if . . . then” rules within the cognitive–affective system facilitatesthe emergence of different behaviors across different situations (and sim-ilar behaviors within similar situations). Because motives are amongthe stable cognitive–affective units that constitute personality (Mischel& Shoda, 1995), it is reasonable to expect high self-monitors’ strongbelonging motivation to be relatively enduring even though their behav-ior varies across situations for the sake of fitting in.

BELONGING MOTIVATION, BUYING-IS-FOR-BELONGINGBELIEFS, AND MATERIALISM

But how might high self-monitors’ strong belonging motivation direct theirthoughts toward materialism? A long history of research documents thatamplified motives (whether they are amplified through deprivation or othermeans) alter perception in motive-consistent ways (for reviews, see Kruglan-ski, 1996; Kunda, 1990). In one classic demonstration, Bruner and Goodman(1947) showed that relatively poor children overestimate the sizes of coinsmore than relatively wealthy children do. In another, Levine, Chein, andMurphy (1942) demonstrated that participants’ food-like interpretationsof ambiguous figures increased as hours of food deprivation increased (upto 6 hours). Thus, because perception can be biased by motivation, peoplewith a strong motive to belong (such as high self-monitors) may be moreinclined than people with a weak motive to belong to construe the acquisi-tion of material goods as a means of gaining social acceptance. Of course,purchasing is an inherently social act because it involves a transactionbetween at least two parties. But if their motivations so dictate, people mayattach even greater social meaning to purchasing by construing it as a wayto gain others’ liking, spend time with close others, and so on.

This motivated construal, which can be described as buying-is-for-belonging beliefs, should give rise to greater valuation of wealth and lux-ury. A person who construes buying as a means of attaining social accept-ance attaches even greater value to goods and services than someonewho sees little social capital in the same goods and services. From the per-spective of expectancy-value theory (see Rotter, 1954, pp. 105–111), some-one who attaches both social and intrinsic value to buying should bemore materialistic than someone who construes buying as a purely eco-nomic transaction.


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THE LINK BETWEEN SELF-MONITORING AND MATERIALISM: SUGGESTIVE PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Several studies offer indirect support for a possible link between self-mon-itoring and materialism. For example, research suggests that people whoare relatively high in self-monitoring and people who are relatively mate-rialistic are both highly image conscious. DeBono and Packer (1991) haveshown that, relative to low self-monitors, high self-monitors more accu-rately recognize and respond more favorably toward image-oriented adver-tisements (see also DeBono, in press). Similarly, O’Cass (2000) has shownthat high self-monitors exhibit greater image-consciousness than low self-monitors when thinking about purchasing and wearing fashion clothing.Furthermore, Kasser’s research suggests that financial success aspira-tions (an indicator of materialism) are positively correlated with image-ori-ented aspirations (see Kasser, 2002, p. 10). One reasonable interpretationof the fact that this appealing-image orientation is shared by both high self-monitors and highly materialistic people is that both high self-monitors andhighly materialistic people strongly desire others’ acceptance (although itis possible that other motives may give rise to such an orientation).

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

In summary, the primary hypotheses are that self-monitoring should be pos-itively correlated with materialism, belonging motivation should mediatethe association between self-monitoring and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs,and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs should mediate the association betweenbelonging motivation and materialism. These hypotheses have been sum-marized in a causal model (see Figure 1), but it is worth stressing thatbecause the methods used in the present studies were correlational, thecausal relations depicted in the model are only implied.

STUDY 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to test the proposed hypotheses in data obtainedfrom college students who completed measures of self-monitoring, mate-rialism, belonging motivation, and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs.


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Figure 1. A motivated cognition model of the link between self-monitoring and materialism.

Method

Participants. One hundred six undergraduates (51 males) at a north-eastern liberal arts college participated in exchange for either credittoward a course requirement or four dollars. (The $4.00 incentive was typ-ical compensation for research participation at this college, and the dataconfirmed that this modest incentive did not attract more materialisticparticipants.) Participants’ mean age was 19.78 (SD � 2.01). Eighty-sixpercent of the sample was European American, 4% was Hispanic Amer-ican, 3% was African American, 1% was Asian American, and 6% marked“Other” in response to the ethnicity question.

Procedure. Participants assembled in small groups in classrooms tocomplete their packet of questionnaires independently.

Measures. Self-monitoring was measured using the 25-item version ofthe Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974). This older version of the scalewas selected because Study 1 was a first attempt at understanding therelation between self-monitoring and materialism, and the 25 items inthe original self-monitoring scale provided greater flexibility in com-puting and correlating scores (see footnote 3). Participants responded toquestionnaire statements such as “I would probably make a good actor”on a 7-point scale (1 � strongly disagree, 7 � strongly agree). After reverse-scoring the items that required it, the 25 items were summed to createa total self-monitoring score (alpha � .74).

The 15-item materialism scale developed by Wong, Rindfleisch, and Bur-rows (2003) was used to measure materialism. This scale is a modifiedversion (modified to use an interrogative question format) of the mostrecent version of the Material Values Scale (Richins, 2004; see also Richins& Dawson, 1992). Participants responded to a number of questions relatedto materialism on 7-point scales. For example, in response to the question“How do you feel about having a lot of luxury in your life?” participants cir-cled a number on a 7-point scale, where 1 was labeled do not enjoy and 7was labeled really enjoy. After appropriate reverse-scoring of some items,the 15 items were summed to create a total materialism score (alpha � .82).

To measure belonging motivation, the five-item Need for ApprovalScale developed by Mirels, Greblo, and Dean (2002) was used. Participantsresponded to statements such as “I often find myself trying hard to getothers to approve of who I am or what I’m doing” on a 1–7 scale, where1 was labeled strongly disagree and 7 was labeled strongly agree. Thesum of the five positively worded items constituted a total score of belong-ing motivation (alpha � .89).

There are no published measures of buying-is-for-belonging beliefs (thetendency to construe purchasing as a means of gaining social acceptance).This required the authors to design such a measure by writing eight face-valid items to represent the construct. It was expected that some itemswould perform better than others, so after Study 1 was conducted, the mea-


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sure’s internal consistency was evaluated with principal component analy-sis and an examination of item–total correlations. In the first principal com-ponent analysis, two of the original eight items yielded factor loadings below0.30 on the first unrotated factor, a factor which accounted for 40% of thevariance. (The other six items all loaded 0.60 or higher on this factor.) Thetwo low-loading items yielded item–total correlations below 0.20 (with thetotal score being the sum of all eight items).After these two items were elim-inated, the remaining six items were subjected to a principal componentanalysis.The first unrotated factor accounted for 53% of the variance.All sixitems loaded strongly on this factor (i.e., greater than 0.60) and yieldeditem–total correlations greater than 0.40. Preliminary support for the valid-ity of the scale is evident in the pattern of correlations obtained in Study 1.2

The six-item measure of buying-is-for-belonging beliefs consisted ofstatements such as “Shopping at the same places my friends shop makesus feel closer” and “The things I buy are a reflection of the people that Iprefer to associate with,” to which participants rated their level of dis-agreement or agreement on a 1–7 scale. The sum of the six positivelyworded items constituted a total score of buying-is-for-belonging beliefs(alpha � .82).

Results and Discussion

The descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between each ofthe Study 1 variables are shown in Table 1. As predicted, self-monitor-ing was positively correlated with materialism (although this correla-tion was only marginally significant—p � .06—with a two-tailed test).Self-monitoring was also positively correlated with belonging motiva-tion and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs. In addition, belonging motiva-tion was positively correlated with both buying-is-for-belonging beliefsand materialism, and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs were positively cor-related with materialism. Thus, the pattern of correlations was consis-tent with the hypothesized model.3

Although these correlations were supportive, the main purpose ofStudy 1 was to determine whether belonging motivation and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs sustain the link between self-monitoring andmaterialism. The hypothesized model (see Figure 1) required tests oftwo mediational predictions. First, it was predicted that the associationbetween self-monitoring and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs would be


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2 The measure of buying-is-for-belonging beliefs is available upon request from the first author.3 Following Briggs et al. (1980), three subscale scores from the 25-item Self-Monitoring Scale were

computed to explore whether there was additional evidence for the role of belonging motivationin maintaining the link between self-monitoring and materialism. Consistent with the modelproposed in this article, scores on the other-directedness subscale (which Briggs and Cheek,1988, identified as a measure of approval motivation) were significantly positively correlatedwith belonging motivation (r � .52), buying-is-for-belonging beliefs (r � .30), and materialism (r� 5 .20), whereas scores on the extraversion and acting subscales were not. However, only resultsfor the total self-monitoring score are discussed in this article because little is known about thepsychometric properties of the three self-monitoring subscales.

mediated by belonging motivation. Second, it was predicted that theassociation between belonging motivation and materialism would bemediated by buying-is-for-belonging beliefs. These predictions weretested by following four conditions for establishing mediation (Baron &Kenny, 1986).

Did belonging motivation mediate the association between self-mon-itoring and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs? It is evident in Table 1 thatself-monitoring significantly predicted both buying-is-for-belonging beliefsand belonging motivation. To find out whether belonging motivation pre-dicted buying-is-for-belonging beliefs independent of self-monitoring,buying-is-for-belonging beliefs were simultaneously regressed on bothbelonging motivation and self-monitoring. In this analysis, belongingmotivation was a significant predictor (unstandardized b � .32, t � 3.26,p � .01, partial r � .31) and self-monitoring was not (unstandardized b� .01, t � 1.36, p � .18, partial r � .13), which suggests that the associ-ation between self-monitoring and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs is fullyaccounted for by belonging motivation. A Sobel (1982) test confirmedthat the indirect effect of self-monitoring on buying-is-for-belongingbeliefs through belonging motivation was significant, z � 2.56, p � .01.

The second mediational prediction was that buying-is-for-belongingbeliefs would mediate the association between belonging motivation andmaterialism. Correlations in Table 1 demonstrate that belonging moti-vation significantly predicted both materialism (the outcome in this sec-ond analysis) and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs (the mediator). To findout whether buying-is-for-belonging beliefs significantly predicted mate-rialism independent of belonging motivation, materialism was simulta-neously regressed on both buying-is-for-belonging beliefs and belongingmotivation. Buying-is-for-belonging beliefs emerged as a significant pre-dictor (unstandardized b � .61, t � 3.84, p � .01, partial r � .35) whereasbelonging motivation did not (unstandardized b � .20, t � 1.26, p � .21,partial r � .12). A Sobel (1982) test confirmed that the indirect effect ofbelonging motivation on materialism through buying-is-for-belongingbeliefs was significant, z � 2.79, p � .01.

In summary, Study 1 supported the hypothesis that people who scorerelatively high in self-monitoring are more predisposed toward materialism


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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for Study 1 Variables.

M (SD) MAT BM BIFBB

S-M 99.04 (16.00) .18 .38 .26MAT 60.48 (10.89) .26 .41BM 19.54 (6.62) .37BIFBB 16.60 (6.61)

Notes: M � mean; SD � standard deviation; S-M � self-monitoring; MAT � materialism; BM � belongingmotivation; BIFBB � buying-is-for-belonging beliefs. All correlations in the table greater than 0.15 are at leastmarginally significant, p � .10. All correlations in the table greater than 0.19 are significant, p � .05. N � 106.

than people who score relatively low in self-monitoring. Mediational analy-ses uncovered the motivated cognitive process that likely sustains thisassociation. The first mediational test suggested that high self-monitors’tendency to believe that consumption increases the probability of beingsocially accepted results from high self-monitors’ strong belonging moti-vation. As previously noted, belonging motivation appears to shape themeaning people attach to purchasing, and this may be a primary reasonthat high self-monitors are more likely than low self-monitors to construeconsumption as a means of attaining social acceptance. The second medi-ational test conducted in Study 1 suggested that people with strong belong-ing motivation tend to be more materialistic because they believe morestrongly in the social-acceptance value of consumption. Thus, with theminor exception that one of the predicted correlations was only margin-ally significant, Study 1 provided good support for the proposed model.

STUDY 2

Nevertheless, several weaknesses in Study 1 necessitated a second study.In Study 1, a longer, older, and, in some ways, inferior version of the Self-Monitoring Scale was used. This 25-item version of the scale does notcapture a single latent factor of self-monitoring as well as the newer 18-item scale does (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986),and it is possible that this weakness of the 25-item scale may have atten-uated some of the self-monitoring correlations that were observed inStudy 1. One reason that the 18-item scale is superior to the longer ver-sion of the scale is that the 18-item scale consists of only items thatloaded �.15 or greater on the first unrotated factor in the Snyder andGangestad (1986) factor analysis of the original 25 items. In Study 2,therefore, the 18-item version of the scale was used with its originaltrue–false response format.

An additional weakness of Study 1 was that it did not account for sev-eral variables known to be naturally confounded with self-monitoring.Briggs and Cheek (1988) questioned whether many correlations involv-ing self-monitoring might be better attributed to extraversion, social self-confidence, or shyness. Measures of each of these constructs were includedfor control purposes in Study 2.

Method

Participants. One hundred seventeen students (65 females) at a north-eastern liberal arts college participated in exchange for either credittoward a course requirement or $4.00. Participants’ mean age was 20.04(SD � 1.40). Sixty-eight percent of the sample was European American,11% was Asian American, 8% was African American, 6% was HispanicAmerican, and 7% marked “Other” in response to the ethnicity question.


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Procedure. Participants independently completed their packet of ques-tionnaires while gathered in classrooms.

Measures. As noted, self-monitoring was measured using the 18-item ver-sion of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Partici-pants responded to statements such as “In different situations and withdifferent people, I often act like very different persons” with either a“true” or a “false” response. After appropriate reverse scoring of some ofthe items, the 18 items were summed to create a total self-monitoringscore (alpha � .64).

Materialism was measured using the 15-item version of Richins’ (2004)Material Values Scale (which is an updated form of the widely usedRichins & Dawson, 1992, Material Values Scale). Participants rated theirlevel of disagreement or agreement with statements such as “I like a lotof luxury in my life” on a 1–7 scale. After reverse scoring the items thatrequired it, the 15 items were summed to create a total materialismscore (alpha � .88).

To measure belonging motivation, the 10-item Need to Belong Scale(Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2005; see also Pickett, Gardner,& Knowles, 2004; and Cremer & Leonardelli, 2003, for examples of pub-lished work attesting to the scale’s validity) was used. Participantsresponded to statements such as “I try hard not to do things that willmake other people avoid or reject me” on a 1–7 scale, where 1 was labelednot at all true and 7 was labeled very true. After appropriate reverse-scoring of some of the items, the 10 items were summed to create a totalbelonging motivation score (alpha � .87).

Buying-is-for-belonging beliefs were measured using the same six-itemscale used in Study 1. The total score was computed, as described previ-ously, and the scale again proved to be internally consistent (alpha � .82).

One of the goals of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 whileexamining whether variables, such as extraversion, social self-confidence,or shyness, could account for the results better than self-monitoring could.Extraversion was measured using L. R. Goldberg’s (1999) 10-item meas-ure from the International Personality Item Pool. (Additional psychome-tric properties of this scale are reported in Lucas & Baird, 2004.) Partici-pants rated how accurate or inaccurate statements such as “I feelcomfortable around people” and “I don’t mind being the center of attention”were on a 1–7 scale.After appropriate reverse scoring of some of the items,the 10 items were summed to create a total extraversion score (alpha � .89).

Social self-confidence was measured using the 16-item Texas SocialBehavior Inventory—Form B (Helmreich, Stapp, & Ervin, 1974; cited inBlascovich & Tomaka, 1991, which discusses the scale’s psychometrics).Participants rated how characteristic or uncharacteristic statements suchas “I would describe myself as socially unskilled” (reverse scored) were ona 1–7 scale. After reverse scoring the items that required it, the 16 itemswere summed to create a total social self-confidence score (alpha � .86).


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To measure shyness, Cheek’s (1983) 13-item shyness measure wasused. This scale is a revised version of the Cheek and Buss (1981) meas-ure of shyness (see Hopko, Stowell, Jones, Armento, & Cheek, 2005, fordata on the revised scale’s psychometrics). Participants rated how trueor untrue statements such as “I am often uncomfortable at parties andother social functions” were of them on a 1–7 scale. The 13 items weresummed after appropriate reverse-scoring of some items to create a totalshyness score (alpha � .84).

Results and Discussion

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for each of the Study 2 variablesas well as the zero-order correlations between these variables. Consistentwith the results of Study 1, self-monitoring was significantly positivelycorrelated with materialism, belonging motivation, and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs. Furthermore, belonging motivation was significantlypositively correlated with materialism and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs.Buying-is-for-belonging beliefs were also significantly positively correlatedwith materialism.

Before presenting the results of the mediational analyses, it is worthconsidering whether the observed correlation between self-monitoringand materialism might be better attributed to extraversion, social self-confidence, or shyness. Consistent with the concerns expressed by Briggsand Cheek (1988), self-monitoring was significantly positively correlatedwith both extraversion and social self-confidence. It was not, however, sig-nificantly negatively correlated with shyness (cf. Briggs and Cheek, 1988,Table 6). Moreover, extraversion (but not social self-confidence or shyness)was significantly positively correlated with materialism.

The most plausible alternative account of the association between self-monitoring and materialism, therefore, is that this correlation is betterattributed to extraversion than to self-monitoring. To test this hypothe-


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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-order Correlations for Study 2 Variables.

M (SD) MAT BM BIFBB EXT SSC SHY

S-M 9.93 (3.24) .36 .19 .22 .36 .23 –.11MAT 56.50 (15.16) .28 .40 .24 .14 –.07BM 43.98 (11.86) .43 –.10 –.35 .40BIFBB 16.10 (6.42) .02 –.12 .20EXT 48.20 (10.47) .68 –.65SSC 79.13 (13.42) –.67SHY 41.60 (12.02)

Notes: M � mean; SD � standard deviation; S-M � self-monitoring; MAT � materialism; BM � belongingmotivation; BIFBB � buying-is-for-belonging beliefs; EXT � extraversion; SSC � social self-confidence; SHY �shyness. All correlations in the table greater than .18 and less than –.18 are significant, p � .05. Ns range from116 to 117 as a result of occasional missing data.

sis, materialism scores were simultaneously regressed on both self-mon-itoring and extraversion. This analysis showed that self-monitoring inde-pendently predicted materialism (unstandardized b � 1.50, t � 3.44, p� .01, partial r � .31), whereas extraversion did not (unstandardized b� .18, t � 1.34, p � .18, partial r � .13). An exploratory Sobel (1982) testconfirmed that the bulk of the shared variance between extraversionand materialism was accounted for by self-monitoring, z � 2.64, p � .01.

The Briggs and Cheek (1988) concerns about the measurement ofself-monitoring required consideration of whether any of the other cor-relations that were attributed to self-monitoring could be betteraccounted for by extraversion, social self-confidence, or shyness. Belong-ing motivation was significantly correlated with self-monitoring, but itwas also significantly correlated with social self-confidence and shy-ness. (Belonging motivation was not significantly related to extraver-sion.) When belonging motivation was simultaneously regressed onboth self-monitoring (unstandardized b � 1.04, t � 3.27, p � .01, par-tial r � .29) and social self-confidence (unstandardized b � –.37, t �–4.77, p � .01, partial r � –.41), self-monitoring remained an inde-pendent predictor of belonging motivation. Furthermore, when belong-ing motivation was simultaneously regressed on both self-monitoring(unstandardized b � .87, t � 2.83, p � .01, partial r � .26) and shyness(unstandardized b � .43, t � 5.14, p � .01, partial r � .44), self-moni-toring remained an independent predictor of belonging motivation.Thus, the correlation between self-monitoring and belonging motivationwas not adequately accounted for by extraversion, social self-confi-dence, or shyness.

In addition, buying-is-for-belonging beliefs were significantly corre-lated with self-monitoring but were also significantly correlated withshyness. (Buying-is-for-belonging beliefs were not significantly related toextraversion or social self-confidence.) However, when buying-is-for-belonging beliefs were simultaneously regressed on both self-monitor-ing (unstandardized b � .48, t � 2.68, p � .01, partial r � .25) and shy-ness (unstandardized b � .12, t � 2.54, p � .01, partial r � .23),self-monitoring again emerged as an independent predictor.

In summary, these initial analyses show that none of the correlationsattributed to self-monitoring in this study (see the first row of Table 2)are better attributed to the three confounding variables that were meas-ured (i.e., extraversion, social self-confidence, or shyness). In all subse-quent analyses, the focus was only on the variables posited in the pro-posed model (see Figure 1).

Did the mediational results that were obtained in Study 1 replicate inStudy 2? Although different measures of most of the key variables wereused in Study 2 (in order to assess the robustness of the findings of Study1), the model was again supported. It was already evident from the cor-relations obtained that self-monitoring predicted both belonging moti-vation and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs (see Table 2). To determine


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whether belonging motivation mediated the association between self-monitoring and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs, buying-is-for-belongingbeliefs were simultaneously regressed on both self-monitoring andbelonging motivation. In this regression, the association between self-monitoring and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs was nonsignificant,unstandardized b � .28, t � 1.62, p � .11, partial r � .15, whereas theassociation between belonging motivation and buying-is-for-belong-ing beliefs was significant, unstandardized b � .22, t � 4.73, p � .01,partial r � .41. A Sobel (1982) test confirmed that belonging motiva-tion fully mediated the association between self-monitoring and buy-ing-is-for-belonging beliefs, z � 1.93, p � .05.

The correlational results demonstrated that belonging motivationwas positively correlated with both buying-is-for-belonging beliefs andmaterialism. To determine whether buying-is-for-belonging beliefs medi-ated the link between belonging motivation and materialism, a simul-taneous multiple regression was conducted. In this regression, the asso-ciation between belonging motivation and materialism wasnonsignificant, unstandardized b � .17, t � 1.36, p � .18, partial r � .13,whereas the association between buying-is-for-belonging beliefs andmaterialism was significant, unstandardized b � .80, t � 3.60, p � .01,partial r � .32. Buying-is-for-belonging beliefs fully mediated the asso-ciation between belonging motivation and materialism, z � 2.93, p � .01.

In summary, Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 and revealedadditional support for the role of motivated cognition in sustaining thelink between self-monitoring and materialism. As was observed inStudy 1, individual differences in self-monitoring were positively cor-related with materialism, and this association seemed to be maintainedby individual differences in belonging motivation and related beliefsabout the utility of buying as a means of gaining social acceptance.

One way in which Study 2 was stronger than the first study is thata superior measure of self-monitoring was used that helped to pro-vide clearer support for the self-monitoring hypotheses tested in bothstudies. In addition, in Study 2 several variables known to be naturallyconfounded with self-monitoring were controlled. Controlling for theseconfounding variables cast doubt on several alternative explanationsfor the self-monitoring associations that were observed. In the processof conducting these analyses, it became evident that extraversion waspositively correlated with materialism, although self-monitoringseemed to fully mediate this association.4


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4 A significant correlation between extraversion and materialism emerged in Study 2 but not inStudy 1. It is likely that the near-zero correlation observed in Study 1 resulted from the factthat the extraversion subscale derived from the self-monitoring measure used in Study 1 is a poormeasure of extraversion (see Note 3). (Briggs et al., 1980, tentatively labeled one of the self-mon-itoring subscales “extraversion,” but there is no published evidence that supports the validity ofthis subscale.) Future research may clarify the nature of the association between extraversionand materialism, but for the time being, it appears that extraverts tend to be materialistic onlyto the extent that they are also high self-monitors.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

I don’t care too much for money, money can’t buy me love.—From the Beatles’ Can’t Buy Me Love

Money may not buy people the social acceptance that they crave, butthat does not stop some people from believing that it might. The resultsof the present studies suggest that people with a relatively high self-monitoring disposition (relative to those who are relatively low in self-monitoring) are more susceptible than others to adopting a material-istic lifestyle, and that this lifestyle seems to originate from highself-monitors’ strong belonging motivation and the meaning that theyattach to buying. The model proposed to account for the obtained resultshighlights a motivated cognitive process: High self-monitors valuewealth and luxury because they believe material acquisition will helpthem attain social acceptance; and the belief that material acquisitionwill help them attain social acceptance arises from their strong motiveto belong.

Why Explaining the Link Between Self-Monitoring and Materialism Matters

There are several reasons why it is important to understand the linkbetween self-monitoring and materialism. First, understanding the moti-vation and beliefs that sustain the link between self-monitoring andmaterialism is helpful in identifying other pathways to materialism. Ifbelonging motivation and buying-is-for-belonging beliefs generate mate-rialism, it is reasonable to hypothesize that many other personality vari-ables that involve an acceptance-seeking component might predisposepeople toward a materialistic lifestyle. Consistent with this view, Christo-pher and Schlenker (2004) have shown that fear of negative evaluationis positively correlated with materialism. In light of the results presentedhere, the Christopher and Schlenker (2004) findings may be interpretedas evidence that the desire to avoid rejection (and gain approval instead)motivates people in relatively materialistic cultures to perceive buyingas a means of belonging, and this gives rise to increased valuation ofwealth and luxury.

A second reason that this research is important is that it suggeststhat consumers who are not especially concerned about being sociallyaccepted (such as low self-monitors) may be more difficult to sell to thanother types of consumers. People who are not especially concerned aboutgaining others’ approval are probably less likely to conform to their peers’purchasing preferences and more resistant to influence attempts madeduring person-to-person sales (cf. Bearden, Netemeyer, & Teel, 1989).Moreover, advertisers who attempt to invoke normative pressures in thehopes of persuading consumers to conform to an apparently popular con-sumer preference may find these efforts less effective among consumers


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who are not overly concerned about social acceptance. In fact, DeBono andOmoto (1993) have directly demonstrated that that low self-monitors(who have a weaker need to belong) are less susceptible to normativepressures than high self-monitors.

In addition to the reasons outlined above, the present research isimportant because it provides much-needed clarification of past researchon self-monitoring and materialism. Chatterjee and Hunt (1996) observeda strong correlation between these two variables (r � .85 in a sample of170 undergraduates), whereas Christopher and Schlenker (2000) observeda much smaller correlation (r � .16 in a sample of 150 undergraduates).The studies presented in this article suggest that, at present, the sur-prisingly strong correlation observed by Chatterjee and Hunt (1996)should be considered an outlier. Furthermore, the present studies go wellbeyond past research on self-monitoring and materialism by providinga theoretically driven and empirically supported explanation for theassociation between these variables.

Finally, the present research is important because it highlights apoint of intervention for helping people move beyond a materialisticlifestyle. Concern about the dangers and ubiquity of materialism seemsto be rising (M. E. Goldberg et al., 2003; Kasser & Kanner, 2004; Schor,1998), and this concern prompts questions about how to diminish andprevent materialism. To this concerned audience it is important tostress that beliefs can be difficult to change (e.g., Ahluwalia, 2000; Ross,Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), but even so, attempts to change people’sbeliefs will probably be more effective than attempts to change anypersonality traits that facilitate the beliefs that are of concern (cf.McCrae & Costa, 1999). Of course, the data presented here do notdirectly suggest how materialism can be reduced; but they indirectlysuggest that if people were more skeptical of the effectiveness of buy-ing as a means of belonging, they might focus less on pursuing wealthand luxury and focus more on pursuits that directly improve well-being(cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000).

Theoretical Implications

The hypotheses presented in this article were derived, in part, from theKasser et al. (2004) model of developmental pathways to materialism.According to this model, both socialization processes and attempts tofulfill thwarted needs may cause materialism. The focus of the presentresearch was on the need to belong in particular (see Baumeister & Leary,1995), and how materialism might arise from people striving to fulfillthis need by gaining social acceptance. In the present studies, in whichall of the participants were American college students, cultural influ-ences on the participants’ materialism levels were very similar. Thus,under the assumption that these students had been exposed to thou-sands of consumeristic messages in their lifetimes, it was suggested that


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those with a stronger motive to belong would be more materialistic thanthose with a weaker motive to belong.5

Kasser and his colleagues have recognized that an unfulfilled needto belong can stimulate materialistic strivings. They noted that “largesalaries and the possession of material goods may be especially valuedif they represent an attempt to gain approval and acceptance that isotherwise felt to be lacking” (Kasser et al., 2004, p. 14). But is it safeto assume that high self-monitors feel unfulfilled in their need tobelong? It is difficult to imagine why high self-monitors would exer-cise their self-presentational skill if they didn’t have a strong desireto be accepted by others in the first place. The ability to successfullyregulate one’s self-presentations may be heritable (Gangestad & Simp-son, 1993), but the fact that some people are born with greater self-pre-sentational ability than others begs the question of why, or what moti-vation, people have to exercise their ability. Both of the present studiesrevealed that self-monitoring was positively correlated with the moti-vation to belong.

One way in which the present model diverges from that of Kasser etal. is that it allows for the possibility that a personality trait associatedwith a particular motive may be sufficient to direct a person toward amaterialistic lifestyle. Kasser’s writings (Kasser, 2002; Kasser et al.,2004) have emphasized the influence of early environments in creatingneed deprivation and a motive toward fulfilling needs. But the perspec-tive offered here emphasizes that a motive may also emerge in conjunc-tion with a biologically rooted personality trait.

A Consideration of the Model’s Causal Assumptions

Given that the designs of the present studies do not permit causal con-clusions, it is prudent to consider whether the causal relations that areimplied by the model are reasonable. Might individual differences in self-monitoring and belonging motivation cause people to believe that mate-rial acquisition is a shortcut to social acceptance? And might beliefsabout the degree to which material acquisition is a shortcut to socialacceptance determine the degree to which people are materialistic? Theimplied causal pathways seem more defensible than many alternatives.People probably have propensities toward high or low self-monitoringwell before they have propensities toward high or low materialism (cf.Gangestad & Simpson, 1993; Kasser et al., 2004), so the most reason-able assumption is that self-monitoring leads to materialism, rather thanthe other way around. It is also more reasonable to assume that motivesengendered by personality bias people’s beliefs about buying rather than


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5 If the sample had been drawn from a culture or subculture in which materialistic values werestrongly condemned, it would be reasonable to predict a negative association between the motiveto belong and materialism. But cultures that strongly and genuinely condemn materialisticlifestyles are probably hard to find (see Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004).

the reverse (see McCrae & Costa, 1999, for insights about the relationsbetween traits and beliefs).

This raises the question of whether materialism (which some mightdefine as a trait; e.g., Belk, 1985) might cause buying-is-for-belongingbeliefs rather than vice versa. It is not clear why a love of money and lux-ury would necessarily lead people to conceive of buying as a means ofattaining social acceptance. (After all, one might argue that materialistsfind money and luxury to be intrinsically rewarding.) It is reasonable,however, to assume that people with strong belonging motivation mayperceive buying as a means of obtaining acceptance. Experimental evidencesuggests that motivation biases perception in a causal fashion (for reviews,see Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990). And as William James noted, per-ception cannot be fully divorced from a person’s motives: “[the] wholefunction of conceiving, of fixing, and holding fast to meanings, has no sig-nificance apart from the fact that the conceiver is a creature with partialpurposes and private ends” (James, 1890/1983, p. 456, italics omitted).

Limitations

The conclusions drawn from the present studies are limited by the meth-ods that were used. It has already been noted that the methods used werecorrelational, and it is worth stressing that the undergraduate samplesused in both studies may limit the generalizability of the findings. Itshould also be noted that although the mediational analyses in thesestudies supported the hypotheses, it is possible that there are other medi-ators of the key associations revealed in these studies. Future research maydemonstrate that high self-monitors are materialistic for more reasonsthan just wanting to be accepted. In their review of the self-monitoring lit-erature, Gangestand and Snyder (2000) hinted at the possibility that self-monitors are concerned about the attainment of both approval and sta-tus. If this is true, it may be that status seeking also compels some highself-monitors to place greater value on wealth and luxury (cf. Veblen,1899/1994). The results of the present studies suggest, however, that sta-tus seeking is not the only motive that differentiates high and low self-monitors, nor is it the sole source of high self-monitors’ materialism.6

CONCLUSION

As evidence of the personal, societal, economic, and environmental costsof excessive materialism accumulates, it is increasingly important to


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6 Extraversion, which is related to status seeking in the form of both dominance and recognitionstriving (Costa & McCrae, 1988), was uncorrelated with belonging motivation in both studies.(Also note that the measures of belonging motivation used in both studies tapped into a “gettingalong” motivation, not a “getting ahead” motivation; see Leary et al., 2005). In fact, in both stud-ies, when extraversion was controlled, the correlation between self-monitoring and belongingmotivation persisted (both partial rs � .24, both ps � .02). This bolsters the suggestion that highself-monitors do not just desire status; they also want to be accepted.

identify the traits, motives, and beliefs that give rise to materialistic val-ues. This article has identified one trait that apparently facilitates thedevelopment of materialism. It has also identified an important moti-vation and associated set of beliefs that may facilitate this development.Consistent with other models (e.g., Kasser, 2002), the emphasis of themodel proposed in this article is that within cultures in which con-sumeristic messages abound, one major antecedent of materialism is themotivation to be socially accepted.

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Thanks to the Executive Editor, the anonymous reviewers, and Ken DeBono forhelpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to: Paul Rose, Departmentof Psychology, Campus Box 1121, Alumni Hall, Southern Illinois UniversityEdwardsville, Edwardsville, IL 62026-1121 (prosesiue.edu).


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a model of motivated cognition to account for the link between self-monitoring and materialism

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