a joint magazine for us field artillerymen march-april 2005 · a joint magazine for us field...

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March-April 2005A Joint Magazine for US Field Artillerymen

March-April 2005 Field Artillery22

A Joint Magazine for US Field Artillerymen

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Editor:Patrecia Slayden Hollis

Art Director:Fred W. Baker III

Managing Editor:Reta L. Rogers

Assistant Editor:Vacant

David P. ValcourtMajor General, United States ArmyField Artillery School Commandant

Official:

March-April 2005 HQDA PB6-05-2

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DISCLAIMER: Field Artillery—is published bimonthly byHeadquarters, Department of the Army, under the auspices of theUS Army Field Artillery School (Building 758), Fort Sill, OK. The viewsexpressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defenseor its elements. Field Artillery's content doesn't necessarily reflectthe US Army's position and doesn't supersede information in otherofficial Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neitheraffirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsements.

PURPOSE: (as stated in the first Field Artillery Journal in1911): To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledgeand furnishing information as to the Field Artillery's progress, devel-opment and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms,a common understanding of the power and limitations of each; tofoster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and ofhearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between theregular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects areworthy and contribute to the good of our country.

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION: US Army and Marine CorpsActive and Reserve Components FA units: seven copies to corpsartillery, division artillery, brigade and regimental headquarters; 13copies to battalions; and seven copies to separate batteries ordetachments. In addition, other Department of Defense or govern-ment agencies that work with Field Artillery or fire support personnel,issues, material, doctrine, training, organization or equipment mayrequest a limited number of free copies of the magazine. Theseinclude, but are not limited to, other coordination and support units,training centers and branch schools, recruiting commands, readi-ness groups, libraries and education centers, program/project man-agers, military arsenals and laboratories, state adjutant generals,liaison officers, military academies, ROTCs, major command head-quarters, military attaches and public affairs offices.

PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Those ineligible for Official Dis-tribution may subscribe through the US Field Artillery Association,P.O. Box 33027, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0027 or www.fieldartillery.org.Telephone numbers are (580) 355-4677 or FAX (580) 355-8745 (noDSN). Dues are $20 per year to US and APO addresses. Theinternational rate is $55 for a one-year subscription.

SUBMISSIONS: Mail to Editor, Field Artillery, P.O. Box33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Telephone numbers are DSN 639-5121/6806 or commercial (580) 442-5121/6806 or FAX 7773 withDSN or commercial prefixes. Email is [email protected]. Materialis subject to edit by the Field Artillery staff.

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ADDRESS CHANGES: Field Artillery (ISSN 0899-2525)(USPS 309-010) is published bimonthly. Periodicals postage is paidby the Department of the Army at Lawton, OK 73501 and anadditional mailing post office. POSTMASTER: send address changesto Field Artillery, P.O. Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.

Front Cover: An aerial view of Fallujah, Iraq. Fallujah is roughly 40 kilometers westof Baghdad on the Euphrates River. Its population is about 250,000 people. The Battleof Fallujah was conducted from 8 to 20 November 2004 with the last fire mission on17 November. The battle was fought by an Army, Marine and Iraqi force of about15,000 under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), sweeping from north to south.

SANDRA R. RILEYAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army, 0432802

Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

ARTICLES

DEPARTMENTS

4 So You Want to Be a Maneuver Brigade Commander?CTF Thunder in Afghanistan

By Colonel Gary H. Cheek

9 M777 Starts Fielding in the 11th MarinesBy Captain Waco Lane, USMC

10 Maneuver and Other Missions in OIF—1-37 FA, 3/2 SBCTBy Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa

16 Call-for-Fire Trainer and the Joint Fires ObserverBy Colonel Stephen D. Mitchell

18 1st ID in Iraq: The New JFEC and TargetingBy Colonel Richard C. Longo, Majors Marty P. Chavers, Steven W.Nettleton, and Michael D. Goains, and Captain Jonathan G. Bleakley

22 The Fight for FallujahTF 2-2 IN FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah

By Captain James T. Cobb, First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour andSergeant First Class William H. Hight

29 B/377 PFAR: Platoon-Based Fires in AfghanistanBy Captain Shane P. Morgan, First Sergeant Robert H. Levis andLieutenant Colonel Harry G. Glenn III, IN

34 1st ID in OIF II—The Role of the TAB in Radar OperationsBy Captains John J. Neal and Adam C. Wojcik andMajor Mark N. Roder, MNARNG

37 CMO in Baghdad: 3-82 FA Red Dragons Hit the StreetsBy Captain Evans A. Hanson

42 The S5 NCO and CMO Project ManagementBy Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Kelly III

44 NFCS—Naval Fire Control SystemBy Master Sergeant (Retired) Gregory T. Kollar, USMC

1 Crossed Cannons on Your Collar

3 Incoming

(Photo courtesy of DigitalGlobe)

Click on the title of the article you would like to access.

Field Artillery March-April 2005 1

Issues and Updates:FFA HQ, FA Units as “Truck

Companies,” Training and Others

I n this column, I deal with some tough issues facing the FA and the Army and provide updates on train-

ing initiatives and other opportunitiesin the FA.

Force FA Headquarters (FFA HQ).With the most recent transfer of author-ity (TOA) in Iraq between the land com-ponent headquarters of III US Corpsand XVIII US Corps, we are remindedof both the differences and the sharedcapabilities of our nation’s military com-bat power. Focusing on the two corpsartillery headquarters involved in thisTOA, you readily see the extreme valueand capability of the FFA HQ.

The role of this headquarters is notsimply to enforce and enable subordi-nate artillery formations to continuouslyfollow and precisely master the fiverequirements for accurate predicted fire.The FFA HQ does much more thanenable the traditional gunnery team so-lution; in this fight, it also serves as thecritical core of effects coordination forthe MultiNational Corps-Iraq’s (MNC-I’s) Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC)teamed with the MNC-I’s Air SupportOperations Group (ASOG) and infor-mation operations (IO) elements. Full-spectrum, lethal and nonlethal and to-tally joint in design and in effects capa-bility, this organization is truly the “go-to place” and synergizer for effects plan-ning, coordination and execution.

Given the structure of the FFA HQfunction in a corps artillery of a mere 55(+/-) Field Artillerymen, it would seemreasonable that as we move forwardinto modularity that we recognize thisrelatively small headquarters as a truejoint “bargain.” At the three-star UExlevel, we cannot afford not to include anFFA HQ. At the two-star UEx level,clearly it appears the Fires Brigade willhave the responsibility of the FFA HQ.

Being a FFA HQ requires both sci-ence and art. The science is readilycovered by “cutting edge” technologies

and modernized equipment in the handsof trained, disciplined Artillery Soldiers.The art is based on the personal rela-tionship, mutual trust and mutual confi-dence that the effects coordinator, orECOORD, (read Fires Brigade com-mander) establishes with his UEx com-mander as part of that commander’sinner circle of advisors, decision-mak-ers and executers.

Given the decision to resource sixFires Brigades in each of the ActiveComponent (AC) and Reserve Compo-nent (RC) formations, 12 total, it be-comes obvious that the FFA functionwill be a geographical challenge as wemove into modularity at the UEx level.We will have to work this hard. It’s notabout command relationships but aboutrelationships among commanders.

It is reasonable to expect that FiresBrigades will be an early and integralsupporting brigade for the UEx in everydeployment and fight. The task andpurpose of this UEx commander is notonly to fight the UEx deep in the preci-sion strike fight with UEx-level sensorsand responders, but, most importantly,to shape and set conditions that enableits brigade combat team (BCT) fight tobe overwhelmingly successful. In theunit life cycle management system aswe set the teams, train and certify themfor deployment, and then commit them,it traditionally has been the experiencedeye of an FA colonel that best can assessand certify for the BCT commandersthat their FFA HQ and Fires Battalionsare ready.

Not having a FFA HQ led by an Artil-lery 06 at each UEx station is not a “redstar cluster” or an indicator that “the skyis falling”; however, as we “see our-selves,” it is critical we continue tocreate the relationships of trust and con-fidence with our maneuver command-ers. As Artillerymen, we must alwaysensure our Soldiers and the joint firesformation are, indeed, trained and ready

to exactingly high standards. We will“roll up our sleeves” on this one and getto the hard work.

Let me hear what you think. Sound offwith letters to the editor and (or) to meat email [email protected].

Deploying “Re-Missioned As”Rather Than for “In Lieu of” Mis-sions. Make no mistake, the decide,detect, deliver and assess (D3A) cyclecontinues to be executed daily in bothAfghanistan and Iraq. Don’t believeeverything you see on the television orread in the papers. Lethal, kinetic firescontinue to occur virtually everyday inboth theaters. Knowing that the thun-derous devastation of precisely aimedand responsive cannon fires are lessthan two minutes away is a point ofhighest confidence and insurance to theguys on the ground doing the “heavylifting” in those theaters.

That said, a continued source for theArmy for trained combat arms Soldiersis our Artillery formations. Recentlyredeployed from Operation Iraqi Free-dom (OIF) II, the Soldiers from the 2dBattalion, 147th Field Artillery (2-147FA), South Dakota Army NationalGuard, did not serve on their guns but inthe non-traditional FA role of provid-ing fixed-site security, safeguardingcaptured enemy ammunition (CEA) anddriving truck convoys.

We all recognize that the most vulner-able mission in Iraq today is executingground convoys, and FA battalions arereadily trained to execute this challengingmission. In my view, the mission is clearly


acceptable and a mission-essential tasklist (METL) task in most FA formations.

No question about it—give an FAbattalion the mission to “serve in lieuof” a 300-Soldier truck formation andthe same leadership and tenacity thatputs 95-pound projectiles accurately andresponsively on the heads of the badguys also will get the truck formationfrom point A to point B.

Under the current plan, some corpsartillery formations will deploy to Iraqas truck units. What is concerning isthat we may separate the FA battalionleadership, retrain the battalion and thenre-mission these artillery formations todeploy as truck companies rather thanas artillery batteries assigned to executean “in lieu of” mission. This is a trou-bling issue. We have situational aware-ness of this and are working it hard.

Some Training Updates. Fort Sill re-cently was designated as one of the Army’sfour Basic Officer Leader’s Course PhaseII (BOLC II) sites. BOLC II is expected tobegin the Second Quarter of FY06 and bea six-week resident Training and Doc-trine Command (TRADOC) common-core course attended by officers from allbranches following commissioning. Thismeans it’s likely that some FA lieutenantswill attend BOLC II at a site other thanFort Sill.

After completing BOLC II, FA offic-ers will attend BOLC III at Fort Sill,which will instruct branch core compe-tencies for assignments as FA platoonleaders, fire support team (FIST) chiefsand fire direction officers (FDOs) in a15-plus week curriculum.

Our second Joint Fires and EffectsCourse will be 4 to 16 April at Fort Silland is in high demand with all seatstaken. The next course will be in Au-gust. Seats are available through theArmy Training Requirements and Re-sources System (ATRRS) or by con-tacting the Fort Sill G3 at DSN 639-2199/5124 or (580) 442-2199/5124 orthe Joint and Combined Integration(JACI) Directorate at DSN 639-1701/8671 or (580) 442-1701/8671.

TRADOC’s pilot Tactical IO Course,focusing on IO and effects-based op-erations at the brigade level and below,is scheduled for 25 April through 13May at Fort Sill. This will be a terrificcourse for NCOs, warrants and officerswho serve in JFECs coordinating thelethal and nonlethal effects of IO at theBCT level and below. Seats are avail-able through ATTRS or by calling theG3 at DSN 639-2199/5124 or (580)

442-2199/5124.The pilot FA Master Gunner’s Course

is scheduled for 27 July. Its target is E7Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)13B Cannoneers and 13M Missileerswho will receive Additional Skill Iden-tifiers (ASIs) A7 and A9, respectively.This four-week technical course willcover training management, mainte-nance and advanced gunnery. Thosesenior NCOs who want to attend thecourse should email [email protected].

Training Joint Fires Observers (JFOs)remains a priority task for all FA units.For those units preparing to deploy,training JFOs with simulations is thenext best thing to live-fire conducted athome station or at the Combat TrainingCenters (CTCs).

Most units have a guard unit armorydevice, full-crew interactive simulationtrainer (GUARDFIST). GUARDFISTenables basic fire mission processing,but it lacks the ability to train close airsupport (CAS), has a marginal capabil-ity for training fires in urban terrain anddoes not have state-of-the-art technol-ogy and granularity.

Many of you have read about and mayhave seen the Joint Fires and EffectsTrainer System (JFETS) now at FortSill that has the Call-for-Fire Trainer(CFFT) imbedded in it, including in theurban terrain module. (See the article“CFFT and the JFO” in this edition.)The great news is that the CFFT willreplace the GUARDFIST and close thetraining gaps.

However in the near term, JFETS withthe CFFT is found only in Fort Sillcourses and in a Special Operations Com-mand (SOCOM) course. For FA unitsnot at Fort Sill with immediate pre-deployment training needs, there aresome very good commercial indirectfire trainers available for CAS training.Units can obtain information about thesesimulators from the General ServicesAdministration (GSA) catalog. TheArmy will field both Active and Guardunits with CFFTs beginning the latterpart of FY05 and into the FY06.

Trainees in Basic Combat Training atFort Sill now are conducting convoylive fire as part of Warrior Ethos train-ing. Mounted in trucks with modifiedcenter row seating, Artillery Soldiersengage enemy insurgents in both openand then closed ambush scenarios.

Also, every trainee now has had to go“eyeball to eyeball” with an opponent incombative scenarios, including timed

bouts. They arrive at their units under-standing the basic moves and techniques.

Additionally, our Field Artillery Train-ing Center cadre now uses the weaponimmersion concept of issuing each newSoldier a personal weapon (not a “rub-ber duck”) immediately following theSoldier’s first basic rifle marksmanshiptraining. The Soldier maintains theweapon along with a magazine of blankammunition during all training and inthe barracks. This technique teacheseach trainee better weapon’s disciplineand responsibility as well as instillsbetter muzzle awareness.

Consider Becoming an Artillery War-rant Officer. Given the expansion of FAmodularity, there is plenty of room togrow and serve your branch in the techni-cal specialties of FA warrants. The skillset required to be successful as a 131ATargeting/Radar Warrant tracks mostclosely with the skills found in our MOS13F Fire Support Specialist and 13RFirefinder Radar Operator NCOs, but themost important “ingredients” are leader-ship coupled with a penchant for atten-tion-to-detail found today in all our FANCO ranks.

I encourage leaders in every forma-tion to talk about this career opportu-nity with promising promotion poten-tial for our Soldiers. In mid-May, ChiefWarrant Officer Four Walter G. Ayer,Fort Sill’s Senior Targeting WarrantOfficer, will discuss FA branch warrantofficer opportunities in a video streamon our Fires Knowledge Network siteon Army Knowledge Online (AKO).Check this out, and give it some thought.

“Sad Face” for Fort Sill and “SmileyFace” for our Army. No Soldier likesto lose a Battle Buddy, and that goesdoubly if you are the FA Commandant.Recently our senior enlisted Field Artil-lery NCO, Command Sergeant MajorTommy A. Williams, was selected todepart Fort Sill to assume new duties asthe CSM of America’s Corps, I Corps,at Fort Lewis, Washington. Truly FortSill’s loss is a win for the FA as we allrecognize the tremendous honor of hav-ing an FA leader serve as a corps-levelCSM. Fort Lewis and I Corps Soldiersare gaining a leader of the highest order.

And we know that CSM Williams willkeep a close eye on the summer crop ofWarrior Forge ROTC Cadets while atFort Lewis as well as the Stryker Bri-gade Combat Team (SBCT) Redlegs atFort Lewis to ensure our branch re-mains strong and maintains the highestof standards. Create the Thunder!


As an institution, we, the FA,always seem fearful that the Armywill “move out without us.” Thisfear may be justified, given someof the recent deployments and theredesign of the Army’s formations.With this in mind, and with reflec-tion on my year in Iraq command-ing an FA battalion that was chal-lenged with many missions, mostlynonstandard missions, I believethe Field Artillery should embarkon a new path to ensure relevance.

I propose the FA reassess its ca-pabilities, ensuring it always canprovide fire support and formally tak-ing on a secondary mission of fightingas infantry.

In 2003 as units attacked north fromKuwait into Iraq, they relied on thefirepower of all weapons at their dis-posal and did so with realistic rules ofengagement. This allowed the FA toimpact many battles significantly untilthe fall of Baghdad. From DS [directsupport] 105-mm to GS [general sup-port] ATACMS [Army tactical missilesystem] fires, all fires were responsiveand, from the reports I read, quite dev-astating. However, with a relativelyshort campaign at the higher end of thespectrum of warfare, this opportunity toemploy our trade was short comparedto the current operational pace and in-tensity in Iraq.

As the Army continues the long haulin Iraq, it is challenged with an ex-tremely large battlespace and a com-plex insurgency that continuously chal-lenges the number of “boots on theground” conducting offensive opera-tions and SASO [stability and supportoperations]. Many Field Artillery, En-gineer, Cavalry, and Armor units findthemselves in unique roles that differsignificantly, in many cases, from theirMETLs [mission-essential task lists].Many are performing as infantry anddoing so admirably, given their train-ing, level of resourcing and design. Theyare successfully filling the gaps to ex-tend the Army’s presence on the groundand providing economy-of-force fortheir higher headquarters.

Why should the FA change its mission

to include a secondary ability to “fightas infantry?” Serving as infantry is thereality on the ground in Iraq for mostFA units. Daily these units performmaneuver tasks that truly provide aneconomy-of-force for the effort. Unitsare taking advantage of the rapid field-ing initiative (RFI) to overcome se-lected shortcomings in equipment. Thetraining has been, thus far, conductedon their own with assistance coming attimes from maneuver units in their bri-gades. The problem is that many FAbattalions have not been formally trainedor resourced for this fight.

Based on the reality of both the opera-tions in Iraq and the capabilities of non-infantry units performing them, a uniquething is happening in the force. TheMETLs of FA battalions are being al-tered to include maneuver tasks. As theArmy continues to modularize its bri-gade combat teams [BCTs] into units ofaction (UAs), this trend is likely tocontinue. However, I also would like topoint out that as the METLs of these FAunits change, so must the training baseoutside of the battalion. We must insti-tutionalize changes to support the em-ployment of these units.

Some may argue that this is a uniquemoment in time, that the current use ofartillery as maneuver will be short-lived.I disagree. I believe that future opera-tions could prove just as challengingonce the higher intensity of combat isover. The Artillery needs to be able toshift gears from fire support to maneu-ver. I do not propose FA battalionsseize terrain; however, they can cer-

tainly hold, control and shape itonce it has been seized, as they aredoing now

The Field Artillery should use thereality of the current array of forceson the ground in Iraq for a justifica-tion to fight for additional resourcesfrom the Army. The Soldiers in Ar-tillery battalions should have theequivalent individual and crew-served weapons systems, optics (bothday and night vision) and com-munications equipment for small-unit actions as their Infantry breth-ren. We must continue the fight to

get this kit into the hands of Redlegs andinto the schoolhouse at Fort Sill.

With that said, Fort Sill also must lookinward and adjust its training at everylevel within the schoolhouse. This ischallenging, given current resources,but it must happen. It must begin withan Artillery-Infantry mindset as soon asnew Soldiers arrive and be fully inte-grated into all courses of instruction.

I find it disappointing and concerningthat some GS units have been earmarkedfor future operations in Iraq as transpor-tation units. Without a doubt, we, as abranch, are going to provide whateveris required for the current fight; how-ever, I ponder the difference these sameunits could make if they were deployedto fight on the ground conducting ma-neuver tasks and controlling battlespace.

I look at this period as one of incred-ible opportunity for the branch. Whatbrigade or higher commander wouldever propose leaving his artillery athome if he were assured his artillerycould provide the force a secondaryrole and preserve options?

We have proved much in Iraq as abranch serving as maneuver and en-joyed much success; however, much ofthat success is still limited by the base oftraining and physical resources. I pro-pose changing the mission and the train-ing while continuing to fight for Soldierequipment now. Once this is accom-plished, relevance will never be ques-tioned again.

LTC Steven A. Sliwa, FAFormer Cdr, 1-37 FA, 3/2 SBCT

Fort Lewis, WA

Artillery and Maneuver—Relevance and Reality

Soldiers of 1/37 FA practice clearing a building in Iraq.

March-April 2005 Field Artillery4 C/2-27 IN patrols in Terwa, Afghanistan, on 20 December 2004.(Photo by SSG Bradley Rhen, Public Affairs (PA) NCOIC, CTF Thunder)


As one might expect, deploy-ment orders sending the 25thInfantry Division (Light) (25th

ID), Tropic Lightning, into combat forthe first time since the Vietnam Warcaused great excitement all across themilitary community at Schofield Bar-racks, Hawaii. Unfortunately, eventhough the division would deploy intotwo theaters, Afghanistan and Iraq, theDivision Artillery was not on the origi-nal troop list—we would, it seemed, beleft behind.

However, that all changed on 21 Feb-ruary 2004 when the Department of theArmy tasked the division to source asecond maneuver brigade headquartersin Afghanistan. Our commanding gen-eral tapped the division artillery (DivArty) for this mission; we, ultimately,were known as Combined Task Force(CTF) Thunder. Suddenly we were onthe team; we were elated with the chanceto make a contribution to our nation’sGlobal War on Terrorism, albeit in anon-traditional role.

In just over 90 days, we deployed toAfghanistan to direct operations in Re-gional Command East as a provisionalinfantry brigade responsible for 16 prov-inces in the eastern region of Afghani-stan.

After eight months of a yearlong tour

in theater, this article examines the ex-perience of the 25th Div Arty in Af-ghanistan and offers some thoughts onmaneuver brigade command for FieldArtillerymen and combined arms war-riors everywhere.

Understanding the Conflict in Af-ghanistan. Sun Tzu’s maxim to “knowthe enemy and know yourself” is soundadvice for any conflict; the war in Af-ghanistan is no exception. Add to thisthe people, weather, terrain, culture,regional neighbors and a host of foreigninterests, and Sun Tzu’s words take onincredible complexity.

Yet understanding the operationalconstruct is fundamental to efficientlyapplying resources and operations toachieve the effects necessary to accom-plish the mission and, ultimately, winthe conflict. This was one of our firstendeavors as a brigade headquarters:examine the conflict and commit our-selves to an overarching construct thatwould serve as the foundation for ouroperations.

“Seeing the enemy” might seem simpleat first—Taliban, Al Qaeda and the otherinsurgent elements we faced in Afghani-stan. Yet, what is the enemy center ofgravity? Does one exist with so many

CTF Thunder in AfghanistanBy Colonel Gary H. Cheek factions? Does it matter?

In our assessment, we determined theenemy’s center of gravity to be his radi-cal ideology—a binding force that cen-ters on hatred of the West and serves tomotivate combatants, attract recruitsand, significantly, gain the sympathyand support of the general population.We were careful to differentiate be-tween the violence, Jihad and intoler-ance of the various terrorist groups, thediscriminators that made these actorsand their ideology “radical,” and themore moderate and mainstream inter-pretations of Islam by other groups.

Identifying this center of gravity driveshome that this war is larger than justkinetic operations against insurgents andtheir leadership; it is also about theAfghan people. To be victorious wemust win their trust and confidencethrough our actions, reconstruction oftheir infrastructure and informationoperations (IO) that advocate moderateIslam for the people with a peaceful andprosperous future for their children.

I would argue that getting this right isessential to success—misunderstand-ing the enemy drives you to operationsthat may do little to further your causeand, in the end, could even be counter-productive.

“Seeing yourself” also would seem



simple enough—perhaps just layingdown the order ofbattle for our ownforces and those ofour allies. Yet,what stands out asthe center of grav-ity?

At first blush, wemight look for com-bat force, someaspect of our abilityto strike the enemyor some asymmetri-cal advantage wehave over our adver-sary, such as airpower. However,our assessment isthat the AfghanGovernment is thefriendly center ofgravity. This, again,is important, as it directs us to do morethan combat operations against theinsurgents—it directs us to continuouslystrengthen the Afghan Governmentwhile attacking those forces that seek todisrupt or destroy it—be they enemy orsome aspect of the environment.

As the government gains strength andwins the trust and confidence of thepopulace, the people will, in turn, denysanctuary, support and manpower tothe enemy. The people’s support is justas essential to success as understandingthe enemy.

As for the environment, CTF Thundercommands the eastern portion of Af-ghanistan, 16 provinces in an arearoughly the size of the state of Iowa.The terrain ranges from rolling highdesert in the southeast to rugged moun-tains in the west and mountainous re-gions in the north with low-lying rivervalleys and sparse forests. Overall, theregion is arid, hampered by droughtover the past several years. Tempera-tures are significantly impacted by alti-tudes: lower areas have hot summersand mild winters while the high desertsacross the mountain ranges have hotsummers and cold winters.

Paved roads are rare—some provinceshave none. Riverbeds are the typicalroad networks, and such conditionsmake for slow road traffic.

Afghan society is tribal, with strongvillage structures and elder influencesand a host of alliances, feuds and disputesthat have been around for generations.

The tribal society, compartmentalized

terrain and size of the area of operations(AO) mandates distributed operationsover a nonlinear battlefield. It placesenormous trust in company- and pla-toon-level commanders as each mustoperate independently with great re-sponsibility.

This construct is the basic foundationfor our operations in Afghanistan: de-feat the insurgents, strengthen the gov-ernment and win the trust and confi-dence of the population. Our goals fol-low the doctrinal basis for counterin-surgency warfare where you seek toseparate guerillas from the population.

We offer the Afghans tremendous ad-vantages over our adversaries: apromise of security, good governance,reconstruction of the war-torn infra-structure and, above all, a peaceful andprosperous future. Our adversaries of-fer threats, destruction of property, op-pression of various groups and a virtualguarantee that violence will continuethrough many generations. It is a compel-ling difference, one that gives us enor-mous credibility with the Afghan peopleas they see the genuine sincerity of Ameri-can policy through our actions.

CTF Thunder: A Study in Diver-sity. Matched to this operational con-struct is CTF Thunder’s rather uniquetask organization. It consists of three USinfantry battalions: 2d Battalion, 27th In-fantry (2-27 IN), 25th Division, the Wolf-hounds; 3-3 Marines from Marine CorpsBase Hawaii, America’s Battalion; and3-16 IN, 29th Infantry Division (Light),Virginia Army National Guard, Norm-

andy. We also havethree Afghan Na-tional Army infan-try battalions: the 2dand 3d Kandak Bat-talions and the 23dKandak Battalion.This is an infantryfootprint that mayincrease as timegoes on.

In addition, wehave eight Provin-cial ReconstructionTeams (PRTs) thatare interagency or-ganizations fo-cused on recon-struction and goodgovernance at vari-ous locations with-in our AO.

We have severalother attachments,

but one element we lack is a directsupport (DS) Field Artillery battalion—although we share two of the four firingbatteries from our sister brigade to thesouth.

That we can bring these diverse unitstogether and be successful is a tributenot only to our headquarters, but also toour incredible teamwork and the versa-tility of our military.

In addition, we host a variety of otherunits and agencies throughout our AO,each with its own missions, capabilitiesand chain of command. While on thesurface one would see unity of com-mand issues from such a structure, muchof this is obviated by continuous coor-dination and unity of effort toward com-mon goals. It takes continuous empha-sis to bring units together and continu-ous oversight of all operations to ensurethe effects generated by any operationcontribute to the overall strategy for theregion.

Key Lessons. Against this backdropof a diverse organization thrust into acomplex operating environment, whatare the key lessons I learned?

War really is an extension of politics.In a counterinsurgency conflict, such asthe one in Afghanistan, the politicalaspects of operations are perhaps moreimportant than the combat operations.All company-level leaders must devoteconsiderable energy to engaging a hostof local informal and formal leaders, toinclude those who are part of the gov-ernment as well as tribal elders andreligious mullahs. Influential leaders

COL Gary H. Cheek, Commander of Combined Task Force (CTF) Thunder, and CPT TageRainsford, Commander of C Company, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, listen to village elderson 20 December 2004 in Waza Khwa, Afghanistan.

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who support coalition efforts contrib-ute to our overarching goal to separateinsurgents from the population andstrengthen support for the Afghan Gov-ernment.

IO takes continued, well organizedand synchronized efforts as well as posi-tive and continuous relations with bothlocal and international press. It meansbeing sensitive to the Afghan culture,adapting to changes in the environmentand, above all, being forthright and hon-est in everything we do.

An additional benefit of working ex-tensively with the local population isthat it builds relationships between theSoldier and the people, one that engen-ders a desire within the Soldier to helpthe people through both combat opera-tions and humanitarian assistance. TheAfghan conflict, in essence, is a humanbattlefield where the objectives are nothills or towns, but rather the peoplethemselves.

Commit yourself to an operational con-struct. Through our military schooling,we are well versed in the orders processand such mundane, but essential, tasks asmission analysis and the military deci-sion-making process (MDMP).

Many times leaders are reluctant toventure into identifying the operationalcornerstones upon which they will buildtheir plans. This is largely because noleader wants to suffer the embarrass-ment of fixating on a “center of gravity”only to be shown that his intellectual“sword” has a fewdings on the edge.

However, com-mitting yourself tothis endeavor reapssome veiled ben-efits that can great-ly enhance opera-tions. For exam-ple, supporting na-tional electionsmight seem an oddfit for a militaryforce, and somemight say that elec-tions rightly be-long in the domainof the State De-partment or UnitedNations. Yet, byviewing the Af-ghan Governmentas our center ofgravity, we saw theelections as a forc-ing function to ac-

celerate the growth and strength of gov-ernment leaders and their security ap-paratus.

Keeping your eye on the center ofgravity keeps your mind open to oppor-tunities that might otherwise be hiddenin less sophisticated thinking. In thecase of Afghan Presidential Elections,the successful elections elevated theprestige of the government, increasedthe confidence of the local police andthe Afghan National Army and greatlyaccelerated the growth of all. The elec-tions were a decisive win with lastingpositive results.

Write terms of reference for seniorleaders. While this is always a goodpractice, it is particularly important forcombat deployments where inevitablythere will be a lot of non-standard re-quirements and command relationships.

For example, we were blessed with adeputy commanding officer (DCO), anInfantry officer pre-positioned for bat-talion command. While there could beconcerns that adding a DCO would causefriction between him and the executiveofficer (XO) or even the S3, havingwritten terms of reference for key lead-ers—the DCO, XO, S3 and commandsergeant major (CSM)—helped clarifytheir roles and responsibilities.

In the end, personalities make a bigdifference, but our DCO became thestaff synchronizer and planner, leavingthe XO to focus on logistics and baseoperations and the S3 to focus on cur-

rent operations and near-term planning.My experience has shown me the valueof writing terms of reference as well asthe extraordinary value-added a DCOprovides.

Build teams and relationships for thefuture. While this may seem obvious atfirst glance, building teams is key tosuccess and must start as early as pos-sible. Continuous, positive contact withprovincial leaders at all levels is likefinancial investments—some will paybig dividends while others bear no fruit.Likewise, establishing positive and co-operative relations with other units re-duces friction when circumstances re-quire working together.

The key is that you have to buildrelationships to have them when youneed them. A great example of this waswhen we had three non-combatantdeaths in one of our provinces. Therelationship the battalion commanderhad established with the governor ofthat province proved to be key in defus-ing a very difficult situation. Withoutthat positive relationship, the governormight have aggravated the situation toadvance his own interests.

The same holds true with joint andcombined combat operations. Welcom-ing other units into your tent, contribut-ing forces to their operations, providingsupport for their operations and sharingintelligence all pay off when you needto include their capabilities in your op-erations. Such was the case in one par-

ticular operation inKunar Province thatincluded forces andassets from no lessthan eight separateorganizations.

Commanders andleaders can’t waituntil they need helpto build relation-ships—by that time,it’s too late.

Be positive in allcommunications—up and down. Awise commandershared an interest-ing philosophy withme: “‘Bad mouth’no one.” His pointwas nothing goodcomes from criticalor cynical com-ments about otherunits, leaders orSoldiers. To that

Marines from 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, part of CTF Thunder, leap from a CH-47Chinook helicopter onto the snowy hills of Korangal, Afghanistan, during Operation Spursin January.

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end, we established two philosophieswithin the Thunder Brigade: First loveyour higher headquarters, and secondensure our own headquarters is addingvalue to the operations of subordinates.

Loving our higher headquarters wasnot difficult as its guidance, policiesand products were all great assets to ouroperations and its various staff sectionshad superb talent. Positive relations withour higher headquarters fostered in-creased productivity based upon healthyrelationships between the various staffprincipals and their counterparts.

Likewise, our relationships with our11 subordinate units had to be foundedon actions—not words. We were deter-mined not to be a headquarters thatfocused simply on deadlines and re-ports. We listened patiently to the needsof our subordinate units and pushedhard to remedy every issue they had.Our S4 section was a particularly heroicsection, meticulously tracking everymaterial request and following it upuntil completion.

Positive communications facilitatecooperation and, in the end, enhanceoperations to the benefit of all.

Trust everyone—but keep your pow-der dry. Conducting brigade-level op-erations in an AO the size of Iowa is abit larger than our doctrine suggests.The size of the AO mandates decentral-ized operations with a clear understand-ing that neither you nor your forces canbe everywhere at once. Brigade-leveloperations synchronizing multiple bat-talions in our AO are rare. We executevirtually all operations by allocatingresources and giving guidance. Thisplaces a premium on trust—afforded atevery level of command.

Battlefield circulation became key, andit is how I “keep my powder dry,”ensuring subordinates are executingoperations within our intent and that ofthe Combined Joint Task Force 76(CJTF-76) Commanding General. Ilearned that our subordinates are mag-nificent in execution and that I gainedmore from my experiences with themthan they could have gained from any“pearls of wisdom” or corrective ac-tions from me.

In nonlinear operations, a commanderunaccustomed to trusting his subordinateswill stifle initiative and, while he mayensure perfection of a few missions, he’llget far less done than he would by givingguidance, providing resources and trust-ing his subordinate leaders to accomplishmultiple missions at once.

I learned to trust my instincts as well,placing myself in operations where Ifelt my personal presence would be acombat multiplier.

Keep the fire in your eye! Spending ayear deployed is a long time. As withany operation of this duration, it is im-portant to continuously challenge theorganization and its subordinate ele-ments. The commander should neverbe content with the status quo and shouldalways be looking for a way to improveoperations and the efficiency of theorganization. Just as important, he mustrecognize those Soldiers and leaderswho take up the challenge and find newways to do business.

Interestingly, innovation is one of thetrue virtues of a yearlong deployment.It took us several months to really un-derstand the battlefield as well as thecomplexities of our operations. By con-stantly pushing innovation, we movedforward in virtually every area—mea-suring effects, battle tracking, counter-strike, intelligence fusion, reconstruc-tion, good governance, communicationssystems, Soldier quality of life, air-ground integration, public affairs—thelist is unending.

Challenging Soldiers, Sailors, Airmenand Marines to “keep the fire in theireye” ensures your unit always movesforward and, just as important, keepsyour joint troopers excited about thecontributions they are making to themission.

Some Thoughts on Maneuver Bri-gade Command. In the movie CoolHand Luke, the warden admonishedLuke, telling him “A man’s got to knowhis limitations.” That’s pretty sage ad-vice that certainly speaks to me as aField Artillery officer commanding anInfantry brigade in combat. No officerhas perfect experience; all are missingsome job, some experience that wouldmake them a better leader. Not being anInfantryman might be enough for manyto say I am not qualified for my currentposition. Fair enough.

But I would say that it begs the ques-tion: Must an officer be an Infantrymanor tanker to be qualified to command acombined arms formation at the bri-gade level? I’ll leave the answer to theArmy’s leadership—but I will offer toour younger audience some thoughtsabout my experience and what hashelped me the most as an FA maneuverbrigade commander that might helpthem in the future.

Service in DS units. I have served in

both general support (GS) and DS FAunits. My DS experience included op-erations with armored cavalry, mecha-nized infantry and armor units. Oddlyenough, it did not include light infantry.But, my experience with five differentbrigade-level commanders and intimateworkings with the staffs at the fieldgrade level were essential to my abilityto direct a maneuver brigade staff.

For all Field Artillery officers, I wouldadvocate service in DS units. Withoutthis experience, you simply will not fullyunderstand the complexity and natureof maneuver operations.

The School of Advanced Military Stud-ies (SAMS) and the Advanced StrategicArts Program (ASAP). SAMS at FortLeavenworth, Kansas, added an intel-lectual edge to my experience base,giving depth to my understanding ofcurrent operations in the crucible ofmilitary history and theory. Spending ayear studying the profession of armsenlightened me in the art and science ofwar, and the follow-on year as a divi-sion planner helped me understand theMDMP and the complexities of warplans, exercises and operational plan-ning. These experiences enabled me tobetter understand the complex environ-ment of Afghanistan and lead our staffthrough the campaign planning processfor our yearlong deployment.

I also was fortunate enough to attendASAP at the Army War College, CarlisleBarracks, Pennsylvania. This programfocused on strategic planning and jointand combined operations. In addition,it introduced me to emerging warfight-ing concepts, such as effects-based op-erations (EBO).

Taken together, these programs offerofficers opportunities to challenge them-selves intellectually and provide a baseof knowledge for analysis and deci-sion making.

Observer/Controller (O/C) at the Na-tional Training Center (NTC), Fort Ir-win, California. It is hard to beat thetactical skills you develop as an O/C atany of our Army’s training centers. Ageneral officer once told me, “I thoughtI was a pretty damn good battalioncommander until I went to be an O/C atthe NTC and found out how little I knewabout our profession.” Truer words havenever been spoken as O/Cs stay im-mersed in tactics, techniques and pro-cedures (TTPs).

Having spent two years after battalioncommand as Wolf 07, I was amazed athow much I learned about warfighting


and the synchronization of combinedarms warfare on the battlefields of theNTC. There is, perhaps, no greater pro-fessional experience for both officersand NCOs than to serve as O/Cs at oneof our Combat Training Centers (CTCs).

So you want to be a maneuver bri-gade commander? It is a great honor toserve our nation at a time when we facesuch an enormous threat. I am gratefulfor the opportunity to be part of thisfight in any capacity, and my time as aDiv Arty commander leading an infan-try brigade in combat is the highlight ofmy career. Our experiences in Afghani-stan are rich in their lessons and reward-ing in accomplishments.

While there is some uncertainty in thefuture of Redlegs’ brigade commandopportunities, I encourage all Field Ar-

tillery officers to “stay the course” andchoose the path that will make them thebest combined arms leaders possible.

From the observation post (OP) to thebattlefield coordination detachment(BCD), Field Artillerymen are theArmy’s integrators of joint fires andeffects, duties that keep us intimatelyinvolved in combined arms operations.As the Chief of Field Artillery said inhis January-February column, FieldArtillerymen have a “feel for the battle—a deep understanding that we share in-stantly at every level … Field Artillery-men, quite simply, ‘get it.’”

The experiences and training you re-ceive today are what ensure that youwill “get it” and will be essential to yourdevelopment as a leader in the future—perhaps of a maneuver brigade.

Colonel Gary H. Cheek commands the 25thInfantry Division (Light) Artillery out ofSchofield Barracks, Hawaii. He deployed toAfghanistan for Operation Enduring Free-dom in June 2004 to command the 25thDivision’s Combined Task Force Thunder,an Infantry brigade, for 12 months. He alsoserved as the Senior Fire Support Trainer(Wolf07) at the National Training Center,Fort Irwin, California. Other assignmentsinclude commanding the 1st Battalion, 9thField Artillery (1-9 FA), 3d Infantry Division(Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia; andserving as Executive Officer of the 1-41 FAand G3 Plans Officer, both in the 24th Infan-try Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart;and Exchange Officer in the Canadian FieldArtillery School at the Canadian Forces BaseGagetown, New Brunswick, Canada. Hecommanded A/2-28 FA, part of the 210thField Artillery Brigade, VII Corps, Germany.

The new M777 light-weight 155-mm towedhowitzer will beginfielding in May to the3d Battalion, 11th Ma-rines at TwentyninePalms, California.

The M777 is replac-ing the aging 155-mmtowed M198 howitzer.Some of the M777’sgreatest improvementsare in its mobility, trans-portability, survivabil-ity and lethality. TheM777 can be emplacedand ready to fire in lessthan two minutes, whichis significantly faster thanthe M198.

The new weapon canbe rapidly displacedwithin two to three min-utes, allowing the bat-tery to shoot and move before theenemy can return fire. Its light weight(less than 10,000 pounds) and inde-pendent suspension allow theweapon to travel over rougher ter-rain (worldwide, that amounts toabout 30 percent more terrain) andbe sling-loaded under more aircraftthan the M198.

It fires all current and planned 155-mm munitions. Although its maxrange is still 30,000 meters with cur-

rent rocket-assisted projectiles, thatrange will extend to more than 37,000meters when firing the new global posi-tioning system/inertial navigation unit(GPS/INU) precision-guided Excaliburmunition. The max rate of fire is fourrounds per minute while the sustainedrate is two rounds per minute.

Within a year of the initial M777 de-liveries, both the Marine Corps andArmy will start taking delivery of theM777A1, which adds a digital fire con-

M777 Starts Fielding in the 11th Marines

Current Fielding Schedule for the M777

Legend:EEAP = Enhanced Equipment Allowance Pool

M-NET = Maintenance New Equipment TrainingO-NET = Operations New Equipment TrainingSBCT = Stryker Brigade Combat Team

MarineUnitFY0511th11thFY06EEAP11th10th10th10thFY0710th5th SBCT

M-NET

May 05Aug 05

Feb 06May 06Jun 06Jul 06Sep 06

Oct 06Dec 06

O-NET

May 05Aug 05

N/AMay 06Jun 06Aug 06Sep 06

Oct 06Dec 06

Location

29 Palms, CACamp Pendleton, CA

29 PalmsCamp PendletonCamp Lejeune, NCCamp LejeuneCamp Lejeune

Camp LejeuneSchofield Barracks, HI

trol system (DFCS). TheDFCS provides the howit-zer highly accurate self-lo-cation and directional con-trol. With the introductionof DFCS, the battery onlyrequires survey control pointsto initialize the system.

The section chief will havea navigational aid inside thecab, and the weapon has anonboard single-channelground and airborne radiosystem (SINCGARS) andamplifier for digital commu-nications. This providesgreater flexibility for thehowitzer, which no longerwill be tied to wire commu-nications.

The M777A1 providescommanders greater flex-ibility in getting to the fight,carrying out their missionsand quickly moving to safe

locations to carry out subsequent mis-sions.

If units have questions, they cancall me at the M777 New EquipmentTraining Team (NETT) at Fort Sill,Oklahoma: Commercial (580) 442-4418/5301; the DSN prefix is 639.Units can email me with their ques-tions: [email protected].

Capt Waco Lane, USMCXO, M777 NETT, Fort Sill, OK


1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery(1-37 FA), the FA battalion as-signed to the Army’s first Stryker

Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), con-ducted combat operations in Iraq fromNovember 2003 to October 2004. Thedeployment of 3d Brigade, 2d InfantryDivision (2/3 SBCT) to Iraq was thefirst operational deployment of an SBCTto combat.

During this yearlong effort in Iraq,1-37 FA conducted many operations insupport of the brigade—conductingcounterfire and civil military operations(CMO), securing key assets, process-ing detainees, training the Iraqi Na-tional Guard as well as conducting ma-neuver operations in 1-37 FA’s bat-tlespace. The battalion proved flexibleand capable of meeting the demandsand preserved options for the brigadecommander by serving as an economy-of-force maneuver unit.

Just as other FA battalions before andFA battalions currently serving in amaneuver task force (TF) role in Iraq,1-37 FA had to grow in terms of honingnew skill sets, deliberately reorganiz-ing its structure and preparing for manyunknowns. Most challenging for thebattalion and its leadership was servingin the role of infantry—maneuveringand controlling an area of operations.But, like other FA units, 1-37 FA provedit was fully capable of serving in thiscapacity.

Tough Decisions and Breaking NewGround. During the final months ofpreparation for deployment, the battal-

By Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa

Soldiers from 1-37 FA train at Forward Oper-ating Base (FOB) Endurance at QayarrahWest Airbase, Iraq.(Photo by SPC Gretel Sharpee, 139th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)


ion conducted a mission analysis andcreated a training plan to set up thebatteries and Soldiers for success. Im-mediately, we established communica-tions with FA battalions in Iraq to har-vest current tactics, techniques and pro-cedures (TTPs) and enemy trends, build-ing a better understanding of the operat-ing environment and the unique mis-sions being performed by fellow Red-legs. This was a “real-time” source ofdata from the theater and the basis ofour training.

We altered the current battalion mis-sion-essential task list (METL) and fo-cused resources on skills that previ-ously had not been at the forefront (seeFigure 1). Additionally, the task of mass-ing battalion fires was eliminated fromtraining plans. We realized that, giventhe small-unit decentralized operationsin Iraq, it was unlikely there would be ademand for massed fires or that thethree batteries would be in position andready to fire simultaneously. Instead,the battalion ensured each firing batterywas proficient in providing fires. Thebattalion also developed standing oper-ating procedures (SOP) for small-unitdismounted military operations in ur-ban terrain (MOUT).

Then the battalion focused on indi-vidual and small-unit tasks to bringSoldiers to a new level of confidence inweapons proficiency and battle drillsthat platoons and batteries could ex-ecute in support of the missions wethought we would be assigned. Thebatteries were organized into flexibleorganizations consisting of two platoons(built by dividing the four, 10-man how-itzer sections) and a headquarters de-tachment (created from the fire direc-tion center, or FDC, and remaining bat-tery personnel).

Another tough decision for 1-37 FAwas to train without all its assignedequipment to have additional high-mo-bility multipurpose wheeled vehicles(HMMWVs) modified into “SpecialForces-like gunships.” This later wouldprove to be one of the best moves wemade; these vehicles were the mainstayof our force and operations.

Finally, we had to change the mindsetof the battery leadership and Soldiers.This was challenging as we had no wayto plan and rehearse for specific mis-sions before deploying. Both the bri-gade and battalion missions were un-clear. For example, not until 3/2 SBCThad conducted operations in theater didwe know we would replace the 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault). Basedon our analysis and feedback from unitsin Iraq, we took a very broad approachto training on dismounted skills to covera spectrum of potential operations.

Operation Arrowhead Blizzard inSamarra. The unit’s first combat expe-riences were during Operation Arrow-head Blizzard in Samarra. 3/2 SBCTconducted operations with the 3d Bri-gade, 4th Infantry. During this opera-tion, TF 1-37 FA conducted a myriad oftasks in support of the brigade. (SeeFigure 2.)

C Battery task organized with sappersfrom C/1092 EN and constructed andoperated a forward detainee-process-ing center to relieve the forces operat-ing in Samarra of the task of processingand transporting detainees. Using itsfirebase construction skills, the batteryestablished a small strongpoint on theoutskirts of Samarra that also providedsecurity for several retransmission teamsand a forward medical treatment facil-ity.

The task force provided 24/7 routesecurity along the two major lines ofcommunication (LOCs) that led fromthe brigade base of operations on For-ward Operating Base (FOB) Pacesetter,approximately 35 kilometers fromSamarra. B Battery secured the north-ern route using our HMMWV gunships.

Figure 1: 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery (1-37 FA) Modified Mission Statement andMission-Essential Task List (METL) Approved July 2003. The last three tasks in the METLwere added for deployment training.

Legend:AOR = Area of OperationsCSS = Combat Service Support

Notes:1. Tasks receive reduced level of training (based

on information at the time).2. Basically a full-time implied task—was placed

on METL to provide additional focus.3. Based on the likelihood of having to secure

FOBs, entry points, fixed sites, etc.

METL:• Deploy/redeploy.• Coordinate and control battalion

moves.• Conduct counterfire operations.1

• Control delivery of fires.1

4. Based on the likelihood that 155-mm fireswould not be used extensively but thatsurvey and Met would still be required formortars and radar intelligence always wouldbe required.

Mission Statement:On order, 1-37 FA deploys rapidly by land, sea or air to any AOR and provideslethal, nonlethal and joint effects to the SBCT. Be prepared to establish nodesecurity, force protection and stability and support operations (SASO) in orderto provide economy-of-force to the SBCT.

Met = MeteorologicalSBCT = Stryker Brigade Combat Team

• Coordinate/monitor CSS operations.• Conduct force protection.2

• Conduct node security.3

• Provide survey, Met and radar sup-port.4

HSB (-)CRT, 296 BSBFFT, 296 BSB

A Battery (-)B Battery (-)C Battery

1/HSB/1-37 FA1/1/A/1-37 FA1/C/1092 EN

C/52 IN (9 ATGMs and 1 Fire Sup-port Stryker Vehicles)1/1/B/1-37 FA

C/1092 EN (-), WVARNG (CorpsWheeled EN Battalion MTOE)

Legend:ATGMs = Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

BSB = Brigade Support BattalionCRT = Combat Repair Team

EN = EngineersFFT = Field Feeding TeamHSB = Headquarters and Services

BatteryIN = Infantry

MTOE = Modified Table ofOrganization and Equipment

WVARNG = West Virginia Army NationalGuard

Figure 2: Task Force (TF) 1-37 FA Task Or-ganization—Samarra. The key tasks inSamarra were to provide counterfire; se-cure lines of communications (LOCs) toSamarra from FOB Pacesetter; hold, pro-cess and transport detainees; and providea FOB quick-reaction force (QRF).


Equipped with the anti-tank guidedmissile (ATGM) variant of the Strykervehicle, C/52 IN secured the more dan-gerous southern route. C/52 IN wastasked-organized with a howitzer sec-tion from B Battery for greater haulcapacity for barrier materials to con-struct traffic control points (TCPs). Thesection also provided the additional menrequired for this mission.

A Battery provided a 6400-mil firingcapability on FOB Pacesetter. Threeplatoons of two howitzers were laid andset on different azimuths to decreaseshift time. The FDC directed the pla-toon to the required set of howitzersduring fire missions.

This paid off one night as rocketsattacked the FOB. The Q-36 Firefinderradar, also located on the FOB, ac-quired the attack, and A Battery ex-ecuted counterfire, preventing 21 addi-tional rockets from being fired at theFOB.

The missions during this phase of thebattalion’s deployment were markedby dispersed and independent opera-tions at the battery and company level.Command and control was challengingbut made easier via the use of ForceXXI battle command brigade and be-low (FBCB2).

As a new maneuver commander, Irelied on my observations of the bri-gade commander during many trainingevents and my experiences as a firesupport officer (FSO) at the company,battalion and brigade levels to lead theoperations. I positioned myself forwardat the detainee site because it allowedme to best influence the majority of thetask force. This was a departure fromthe traditional positioning I had experi-enced—“snaplinked” to the brigadecommander.

Mosul and Relief in Place (RIP) withthe 101st. After operations in Samarra,the brigade moved north away from theSunni Triangle and executed an RIPwith the 101st Division. The SBCTtook over the battlespace of a divisionand was stretched across an area ap-proximately 137 miles by 165 miles. Inother terms, our 5,000 troops replacedthe 25,000 troops in the division and itsattachments.

As 1-37 FA arrived in Mosul, its mis-sion was yet to be assigned, based onthe complexities of the RIP with the101st. Analyzing the area of responsi-bility (AOR) and the capabilities of hisunits, the brigade commander did notassign a mission to 1-37 FA until late

into the RIP. This proved challengingfor the battalion. However, our earlierexperiences with ambiguity allowed usto remain “steady in the harness” andfocus on improving force protection tovehicles and Soldier living areas.

1-37 FA’s assignment eventually be-came securing a large area of opera-tions (AO) encircling Mosul (approxi-mately 1,700 square miles). This al-lowed the brigade commander to placehis infantry battalions in Mosul andestablish an economy-of-force on theouter periphery of the city.

TF 1-37 FA was quartered in Mosuland maneuvered through the city to getto anywhere in the AO. This built aunique proficiency among the platoonsthat navigated daily in the built-up terrain.

C Battery had the mission to secureFOB Freedom, the home of the brigadeheadquarters and TF Olympia, thebrigade’s higher headquarters. C Bat-tery maintained this security missionuntil the battalion redeployed

During this phase of the operation, TF1-37 FA reorganized, losing C Batteryand some engineers and gaining a targetacquisition battery (TAB) (A/151 TAB)from the Minnesota Army NationalGuard. In Mosul, TF 1-37 FA securedthe AO and a large fuel transport point,built Iraqi institutions, mentored theIraqi Police and facilities protectionservices force (FPSF), and improvedthe Iraqi infrastructure.

It was in this phase that 1-37 FA gainedits “sea legs” in conducting “cordonand knocks” as well as combined op-erations with the Iraqi Police. Addition-ally, the battalion standard was to con-duct dismounted patrols and “flash”TCPs during every mission in the AO toincrease both maneuver proficiency andour local presence. During these opera-tions, 1-37 FA captured weapons deal-ers, counterfeiters and several armscaches and responded to a number offights within the battlespace.

1-37 FA also prosecuted an intensiveCMO campaign to build up the legiti-macy of 10 Iraqi city councils as thecountry approached Transfer of Sover-eignty. Based on the lack of civil affairsteams (CATs), Redleg officers executedthe CA tasks.

In Mosul, the battalion’s depth of lead-ership was put to the test. Due to aunique tailoring of forces and person-nel shortages, I left TF 1-37 FA in thecapable hands of the battalion execu-tive officer (XO), Major Rodney L.Olson, to take command of TF Sykesfor six weeks. This TF was at FOBRegulars (later named Endurance) atQayarrah West Airbase, approximately45 miles south of Mosul. The assign-ment included a battlespace of about6,360 square miles (slightly larger thanConnecticut).

TF Sykes was a unique TF (see Figure3) consisting of units that remained inthe vicinity of Qayarrah. Its parent head-quarters (5-20 IN) was successfullyexecuting convoy security operationsto reopen LOCs south of Balad andBaghdad previously interdicted by theenemy.

This was an awesome task—a Redlegcommanding a TF with an ad hoc staffand no FA units. Additionally, I had oneIraqi National Guard (ING) battalion

HQs Plt/HHC 5-20 IN*LST, 296 BSB445 CAT, CAARNG136 THT, 1-14 Cav, 3/2 SBCT

(DS)333 THT, 310 MI Bn (DS)335 THT, 310 MI Bn (GS)

(TACON)C/52 IN (9 ATGMs and 1 Fire

Support Stryker Vehicles)C/1-14 Cav (9 Reconnaissance,

2 Mortar, 1 Fire Support and 1Medical Evacuation StrykerVehicles)

C/276 EN (-), VAARNG (DS)(Corps Wheeled EN BattalionMTOE)

Legend:CAARNG = California Army National

GuardCAT = Civil Affairs TeamCav = CavalryDS = Direct SupportGS = General Support

HHC = Headquarters andHeadquarters Company

ING = Iraqi Army National GuardLST = Logistic Support Team

MI = Military IntelligenceOPCON = Operational Control

Plt = PlatoonSBCT = Stryker Brigade Combat

TeamTACON = Tactical Control

THT = Tactical Human Intelligence(HUMINT) Team

VAARNG = Virginia Army NationalGuard

Figure 3: TF Sykes—Qayarrah. The taskforce’s key tasks were to secure the area ofoperations (AO), command and control (C2)the FOB at Qayarrah West Airbase, trainIraqi Army National Guard and secure Am-munition Supply Point (ASP) Jaguar.

102d ING Battalion (OPCON)*5-20 IN provided convoy security from April through

June 2004.


under the operational control (OPCON)of the TF. I relied on my experiencesgained during operations in the periph-ery of Mosul and placed my faith in thestaff and units that had a thoroughknowledge of the AO as I became fa-miliar with the AO and situation.

I matured during this experience, interms of decision making. This situa-tion forced me to rely on sound reason-ing linked to plans and operations be-cause I was not familiar with the per-sonalities, talents, strengths or weak-nesses of the commanders, staff or Sol-diers in the task force. Learning to liveoutside of one’s comfort zone can betaxing, but, in the end, it was very worth-while.

Change of Mission and Link Up. InJune, 1-37 FA handed over its AOaround Mosul to two Infantry battalionsand moved south to Qayarrah where Iwas already in command. The brigadehad accomplished its security and CMOtasks in Mosul and shifted its effort tosecure a new AO and train and integratethe ING. This would be the final set forTF 1-37 FA in an AO the size of RhodeIsland (see the task organization in Fig-ure 4).

Conditions in the Tigris River Valleyand the vicinity of the FOB becamemore challenging and dangerous as TF1-37 FA arrived. The situation requiredthe task force to execute many cordonand knocks and cordon and searches,conducting many with the ING forces ithad trained.

Other missions included securing amass gravesite in the vicinity of AlHadr. This site was where large num-bers of Kurds were systematically mur-dered. It was identified as a crime scenethat could provide evidence againstSaddam Hussein. We also secured alarge former Iraqi ammunition storagepoint, where munitions were being de-stroyed by US contractors, and thebrigade’s retransmission site.

Not withstanding the offensive opera-tions mentioned earlier, one of the mostdemanding missions was conductingING training. The TF trained two andone-half battalions of ING on the FOB.During one of its most intensive train-ing periods, the TF trained 13 platoonsof ING on the FOB while meeting itsother security and operational require-ments.

Additionally, force protection of theFOB remained challenging. Responsi-bility for protecting the FOB with twotask forces and many US and Iraqi per-

sonnel kept the command and staff fullyemployed and ever vigilant.

Relief in Place. In October 2004, 2-8FA, 1/25 SBCT, replaced 1-37 FA. 2-8FA conducted a unique mission-for-mission exchange. It deployed with onlyits personnel and individual weaponsand gear and fell in on 1-37 FA’s equip-ment.

Before 2-8 FA deployed, we estab-lished communications with the battal-ion and transferred TTPs and knowl-edge of the battlespace and missions.This allowed 2-8 FA to prepare with agreater focus back at Fort Lewis. Thebattalion arrived aggressive, confidentand fit—the torch was passed to an-other outstanding FA battalion.

On 3 November 2004, 1-37 FA re-turned to Fort Lewis with all its Sol-diers. With the battalion’s capabilitiesfully realized, the brigade conducted afinal after-action review (AAR) and re-viewed the battalion’s METL. 1-37 FA’s

METL, including maneuver tasks, wasconfirmed and approved (see Figure 5on Page 14).

Lessons Learned. I learned severallessons that may be helpful for otherunits deploying to Iraq.

Force Protection. This is everyone’sbusiness and needs the leaders’ con-stant attention. There is always someway to improve the protection or safetyof Soldiers—where they eat and sleepor how they operate.

One goal of 1-37 FA was to placeSoldiers where they could sleep rela-tively assured of safety. As I learnedfrom a fellow battalion commander,sleep is a “weapon” and is key to betterperformance. Our goal was to put Sol-diers under concrete, whenever pos-sible, or under sand bags, often sacrific-ing comfort for protection.

The availability of funds and otherresources allowed for creative forceprotection measures. Concrete and steelobtained locally often provided extraprotection to positions and vehicles.

The leadership must inspect daily andmaintain discipline to continuouslyimprove the level of force protection.The unit must follow through with vigi-lance and never lose momentum bygiving in to a “good enough” attitude.

The chain of command must chal-lenge Soldiers to offer their ideas forforce protection; many of our best ideascame from young Soldiers who thoughtof methods to improve force protection.

Effects Coordinator (ECOORD) ver-sus TF Commander. During operationsin Iraq, balancing the responsibilities asthe ECOORD and TF commander waschallenging. I quickly learned that atthe pace of operations on that distrib-uted battlefield, the deputy effects co-ordinator (DECOORD) could handlethe mission with limited oversight themajority of the time.

This was a dramatic change from whatI experienced at the training centers.However, I believe that, at the lowerend of the spectrum, the FA commandercan make more of a difference as a TFcommander than by serving the sametime only as the ECOORD.

Every Move is a Combat Operation.You must plan, resource and battle drillevery move to ensure the safety of ev-eryone in the convoy. Pre-combatchecks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) are a must. Criteria for successmust be met before the move. Soldiersmust be empowered to identify defi-ciencies without the fear of repercus-

HSB (Q-36 and Q-37 in Mosul)*CRT, 296 BSBFFT, 296 BSBLST, 296 BSB445 CAT, CAARNG136 THT, 1-14 Cav, 3/2 SBCT (DS)333 THT, 310 MI Bn (DS)335 THT, 310 MI Bn (GS)

(TACON)A BatteryB BatteryC/52 IN (9 ATGMs and 1 Fire

Support Stryker)A/131 FA TAB (-) TXARNG (in

Mosul with 3 x Q-36)C/276 EN (-) VAARNG (DS)

(Corps Wheeled EN BattalionMTOE)

1/266 OD Company, WIARNG(OPCON)

102d ING Battalion (OPCON)107th ING Battalion (OPCON)

Figure 4: TF 1-37 FA—Qayarrah. The taskforce’s key tasks were to secure the AO;command and control FOB Qayarrah WestAirbase; train ING; secure the brigade re-transmission site, ASP Jaguar and a massgrave site in the vicinity of Al Hadr; inte-grate ING into combined operations; andbe prepared to provide fires.

Legend:OD = Ordnance Corps

TAB = Target Acquisition BatteryTXARNG = Texas Army National

GuardWIARNG = Wisconsin Army National

Guard

*C/1-37 FA, also in Mosul, was OPCON to

3/2 SBCT to secure FOB Freedom.


sions to maintain a positive program ofsuccess.

Cultural Awareness and Understand-ing. 1-37 FA’s understanding of theIraqi culture never got very deep—de-spite working closely with Iraqis bymentoring mayors and city councils andtraining and joint operations with theING. No unit can spend the amount oftime it takes to really understand thecomplex and unique peoples in its AO(tribes, religion, etc.).

To improve understanding, unitsshould employ interpreters not onlyduring operations, but also as languageteachers in classes. The focus should beon key words and phrases Soldiers arelikely to encounter or will require dur-ing operations. Often we relied solelyon interpreters and assumed the addi-tional risk of our Soldiers not trulyunderstanding. Additionally, interpret-ers can be outstanding instructors of theculture in a given AO or of Iraqis ingeneral.

Weapons Proficiency. Confidence inweapons is a must. Soldiers must beproficient in their weapons and capableon all other weapons. This is gainedthough ranges, close quarters marks-manship (CQM) and hands-on opera-tions. Weapons proficiency and properclearing procedures prevent accidentaldischarges and minimize risk to theforce.

ING Training and Integration. Work-

ing closely with Iraqi security forces ischallenging and takes patience and flex-ibility. As relationships develop, trust isbest built through the actions of bothUS forces and the Iraqis.

It is easy for those working closelywith Iraqis to become frustrated andtired over time due to the languagebarrier, the levels of competence of theIraqis in their new roles and missions,and cultural differences. Those who trainor liaise with Iraqis must be rotated ona schedule that does not sacrifice expe-rience but preserves morale.

Communications with Like Units. 1-37 FAwas able to communicate with units inIraq before training for deployment.The digital age allows units to “talk” toeach other as never before.

Much of the success of the RIP be-tween 1-37 FA and 2-8 FA was due toopen communications at all levels be-tween the units well before the RIP.Additionally, 2-8 FA had a unique op-portunity with support at Fort Lewis toreach into our Army battle commandsystem (ABCS) and see our missions,products, orders, etc. The battalion hadthe information to plan in detail as wellas train for the missions with a greaterfidelity.

Although not all units will have thiscapability, it’s essential to use whatevermeans are available to obtain the real-time information on enemy TTPs, con-ditions in specific AOs or anything else

pertinent to operations.Radar Management. Although oper-

ating as a maneuver unit, TF 1-37 FAconsistently managed more than its or-ganic radars (a Q-36 and Q-37) once itmoved to Mosul. The radar deploymentorders (RDOs) of the six radars in ourbrigade—four Q-36, one Q-37 and onelightweight countermortar radar(LWCMR)—were developed by thebrigade’s joint fires and effects cell(JFEC) and the DECOORD.

However, because the TAB and or-ganic radars are under the control of theFA battalion commander, he must en-sure a level of oversight and analysis sothe counterfire intelligence performs atan adequate level. To ensure the prior-ity areas were covered, we established adetailed plan for conducting mainte-nance during the periods when the en-emy did not routinely fire. Trend analy-sis also was key to orienting the rightradars at the right time as well as allow-ing the brigade to focus on specificareas and times to patrol. Finally, aradar “play book” was developed withplans to execute if any one or moreradars went down due to attacks orunexpected repair requirements.

Maneuver Lessons. These are les-sons I learned while serving as a ma-neuver commander.

Tactical Patience—Allowing Subor-dinates to Develop the Situation. Thiswas challenging and only came withexperience while conducting many op-erations. The commander must fightthe urge for constant updates duringchallenging missions. This will allowthe men to conduct their tasks withcomplete focus. When things don’t goas planned, reports come fast and steady.

Fewer but better reports come whenthe commander asks the right questionsand allows subordinates to regain situ-ational awareness rather than asking formany reports that are distracting fromthe most important thing at that mo-ment: the mission.

Rehearsals. All operations must berehearsed—from convoys to cordon andsearches. The rehearsal identifies defi-ciencies and allows leaders to makedecisions that mitigate risks at the pointsof friction or danger. Battle drills formovement, recovery, hasty recovery,contact—all must be rehearsed. Unitsmust maintain a program or SOP re-garding rehearsals to ensure compla-cency is defeated and Soldiers are pro-ficient at the key tasks during an opera-tion.

Notes:1. To control terrain—does not imply “seize” terrain.

Figure 5: 1-37 FA Mission Statement and METL Approved January 2005

Mission Statement:1-37 FA deploys rapidly by land, air or sea to a designated AOR and providesfull-spectrum fires in support of the Arrowhead BCT. Be prepared to conductarea security operations as part of a brigade economy-of-force mission.

Howitzer Battery• Deploy.• Provide indirect fires.• Conduct tactical moves.• Defend battery area and ma-

terials.• Be prepared to establish

TCPs.2

• Be prepared to conduct cor-don and search.2

METL:Battalion• Deploy.• Conduct counterfire opera-

tions.• Conduct delivery of fires.• Conduct CSS operations.• Execute battle command.• Be prepared to conduct

area security.1

HSB• Deploy.• Perform CSS operations.• Conduct tactical moves.• Defend battery areas and

materials.• Prepare for combat.• Be prepared to establish

TCPs.2

2. Based on experience in Iraq.

Legend:BCT = Brigade Combat Team TCPs = Traffic Control Points


It is the detailed rehearsal for offen-sive operations that allows Soldiers tovisualize their physical positioning andactions in relationship to the other Sol-diers of the team, squad or platoon. Thisbuilds Soldiers’ confidence in the plan,enables them to understand their role inaccomplishing the mission and empow-ers them to make smart decisions attheir levels.

Risk, Safety and Leadership. Thereare times when a leader needs to “gowith his hunch” and stop actions whenthe conditions are not set to mitigaterisk. Operations that a unit plans typi-cally are set to be executed on that unit’splanning timeline. Rather than just ad-here to a timeline, commanders have torecommend and enforce abort criteriafor operations. Leaders must cancel ordelay any operation that does not re-quire an immediate response when theconditions have not been met for suc-cessful and safe execution.

Positioning on the Battlefield. I grewto realize the importance of position-ing. This is not a new lesson for sea-soned maneuver commanders; however,it was for me. The key was my positionneeded to be where I best could influ-ence operations. There were times whenmy position forward with the unit pro-vided more to the fight where I couldbetter understand the situation and ap-ply additional resources, if required.

When multiple and dispersed opera-tions were taking place, as much as I didnot like it, the best location for meproved to be in the tactical operationscenter (TOC) where communicationswere the best. This allowed me to bal-ance the needs of several units with theadded power of the staff.

Task Organization—Below the Pla-toon Level. A key lesson in task organi-zation was simply overcoming theunits’/sections’ resistance to mixing andmatching their capabilities. We do nottask organize very often in the FieldArtillery—much less below the platoonlevel. However, when conducting themissions as a task force, our reorganiza-tion often occurred below the platoonlevel. This resulted in more flexible andtalented organizations for specific mis-sions. When task organizing at that level,we needed more time for training andrehearsals to build the team.

Planning for All Assets Available. Thecommander and staff had to learn toemploy and synchronize multiple bri-gade assets in support of our own opera-tions. The use of fire support in all

forms (USAF, Army Aviation, howit-zers and mortars) won’t be lost on anycommander who has served as an FSO.However, the inclusion of tactical hu-man intelligence (HUMINT) teams(THTs) and unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) and the positioning of adjacentunits all provided added capabilitiesand must be included in the staff’s mis-sion analysis.

We can do it! The greatest lesson Ilearned was that maneuver skills arelearned skills. Redlegs are fully capableof executing Infantry tasks. We are onlylimited by our time to train, the size ofour organizations and the equipmentcurrently issued.

As currently trained, equipped andmanned, I am convinced that Artillerybattalions are not the choice to seizeterrain and that when terrain must beseized, nothing does it better than thecombined arms team led by maneuver.However, once that terrain is seized andthe larger battles are won, there remainsa myriad of maneuver skills required tomaintain security. This has been thecase in Iraq, and Artillery units havebeen instrumental in maintaining thatsecurity.

Final Thoughts. Serving as a maneu-ver battalion in Iraq was demanding for1-37 FA. It wasn’t easy on the leader-ship in terms of experience, and it wasn’teasy for the Soldiers in terms of initialtraining. 1-37 FA was successful in Iraqdue to the discipline and flexibility of

its Soldiers and leaders at every level.Its ability to grow into missions while incontact proved this. As great as thelearning curve was for the unit, its ac-complishments were just as great.

Any Soldier or unit in the US Armycan accomplish any mission or taskwith adequate training and resourcing.With foresight, flexibility and a “can-do” mindset, any Artillery unit canachieve outstanding results with anymission in Iraq.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa, untilrecently, commanded the 1st Battalion, 37thField Artillery (1-37 FA), 3d Stryker BrigadeCombat Team (SBCT), 2d Infantry Division,at Fort Lewis, Washington. He commanded1-37 FA during the process of certifying theArmy’s first SBCT as well as during itsyearlong deployment to Iraq. Currently, heis the Assistant G3 for I Corps at Fort Lewis.In his previous assignment, he was a Stra-tegic Planner in the Directorate for Strategyand Policy, J5, Joint Staff, at the Pentagon.Among other assignments, he was the Bri-gade Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1stBrigade and Executive Officer (XO) of 3-6FA, both in the 10th Mountain Division (LightInfantry) at Fort Drum, New York. He par-ticipated in Operation Desert Storm in theGulf with the 3d Armored Division and inOperation Uphold Democracy in Haiti withthe 25th Infantry Division (Light). He hasbeen selected as a National Security Fellowat the JFK School of Government at HarvardUniversity.

C/52 IN patrolling in the snow in Mosul.


C45, this is C71, SEAD [suppressionof enemy air defenses] Polar, over. Sup-pression, Direction 1820, Distance3000; Mark, Direction 1860, Distance3500, over. SA-6 dug-in, Q, illumina-tion mark continuous.

CAS [close air support] TOT [time-on-target] 1011, over.

Viper 7, this is C71; are you preparedto copy 9-line?

This commo cut was captured duringtraining in the Army’s newest and moststate-of-the-art simulator, the call-for-fire trainer (CFFT). The CFFT is a leapahead of the old training set fire obser-vation (TSFO) and guard unit armorydevice, full-crew interactive simulationtrainer (GUARDFIST). Instead of us-ing pictures, it uses high-resolution ter-rain databases accurate to better thanone meter on the ground.

The CFFT trains all the required tasksof the joint fires observer (JFO), includ-ing FA, mortar, naval gunfire and CAS.Units can tailor it to train against avariety of opposing forces (OPFORs),from “technicals” in pick-up trucks to amassive attack that one might see in the

mountains of Korea. Observers can picktheir observation points (OPs) to bestcover their zones or sectors from any-where in the terrain database.

This gives the field a cutting-edgetrainer to teach and maintain observerskills throughout the force and, becauseof the pressing need, fielding has beenpushed to the right. In fact, Fort Sillteamed with the Program ExecutiveOffice for Simulation, Training and In-strumentation (PEO-STRI) to push thisprogram through, from writing the re-quirements document to first produc-tion models, in less than two years—atremendous success story.

The first CFFT pre-production mod-els are on the ground now and beingused in training at Fort Sill for the Mili-tary Occupational Specialty (MOS)13F Fire Support Specialist NCO Edu-cation System (NCOES) courses, thecaptain’s career course (CCC) and of-ficer basic course (OBC) plus the Spe-cial Operations Command (SOCOM)

Special Operations Terminal AttackController (SOTAC) course. Forty per-cent of SOTAC training is conductedon the CFFT simulator.

CFFT represents a major advance incapabilities, technological fidelity andinteroperability in the joint trainingarena. As Operations Iraq Freedom(OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF)continue to shape defense requirements,the Department of the Army recognizedthe CFFT as a Tier 0 (must fund) Armypriority.

CFFT Capabilities. The CFFT in-corporates the Army’s new one semi-automated force (OneSAF) construc-tive simulation as a force generationtool capable of creating any type offriendly, enemy or neutral force thecommander or instructor desires. TheSAF mission profiles can be saved asscenario files to be used repeatedly aswell as modified to suit any number ofoperational and training requirements.CAS, naval gunfire and mortars are justsome of the CFFT’s joint fires training;it is flexible enough to create SAF air-craft as well as combat surface vessels.

By ColonelStephen D. Mitchell

Pho

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Call-for-Fire Trainerand the Joint Fires Observer

Call-for-Fire Trainerand the Joint Fires Observer


The range of current and programmedweapons and munitions establishesCFFT as a major player in training jointfires. It incorporates the recognition ofcombat vehicles (ROC-V), enhancingthe JFO’s ability to identify vehicles incombat. The high level of fidelity inmunitions effects and accurate simula-tion are great improvements over formerobserved fire training systems.

Use of simulated military equipment,such as the lightweight laser designatorrangefinder (LLDR), increases thestudent’s ability to replicate tasks sel-dom allowed in a field environment.Other simulated military equipmentunder development include the Viperlaser range-finding binoculars and themini eye-safe laser infrared observa-tion set (MELIOS).

The flexibility in simulated militaryequipment allows a unit to tailor itsCFFT to reflect its table of organizationand equipment (TOE).

The CFFT has three basic configura-tions: 1:4, 1:12 and 1:30. The first num-ber represents the number of instructorsrequired, and the second represents thenumber of Soldier/student stations. The1:4 and 1:12 systems are fully deploy-able and take about 20 minutes for anexperienced operator to set up in anyclassroom.

The Windows-based CFFT supportsopen architecture protocols and virtu-ally unlimited connectivity to othertraining and command, control, com-munications, computers and intelligence(C4I) systems. Specifically, CFFT isinteroperable with other training sys-tems such as the Soldier-combined armstactical trainer (S-CATT), virtual emer-gency response training system (VERTS),close combat tactical trainer (CCTT),unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) simula-tor, digital battle staff trainer (DBST) andother distributive interactive simulation(DIS) and high-level architecture (HLA)compliant systems.

We recently had one connected to anengagement skills trainer 2000 (EST2000) where the observer in the CFFTwas supporting a direct fire engage-ment. The effects of the fires called inthe CFFT were seen in the EST 2000and vice versa. This connectivity willgive trainers a tool that is only limitedby their imagination.

Another exciting capability is the re-quirement for each CFFT to be shippedwith three-plus-one terrain databases.Joint Forces Command’s experimentJoint Urban Warrior has demonstrated

the opportunities for simulation to leadthe way in training urban operations ina joint and combined environment.CFFT is positioned to provide the toolsneeded to train joint fires in the urbanfight.

The Night Vision and Electronic Sen-sors Directorate, at Fort Belvoir, Vir-ginia, currently is developing the Bagh-dad terrain database. This effort willgive the instructor a realistic urban en-vironment using a high-fidelity geo-specific building topography.

Terrain databases are being generatedto accommodate a wide range of opera-tional and training requirements, in-cluding open terrain, urban terrain andmultiple canopy terrain. The standardthree terrain databases shipped with eachCFFT will be the National TrainingCenter (NTC) for that open, rollingdesert training environment; Fort Sill,for some open and compartmented ter-rain; and Baghdad.

The “plus-one” terrain database willbe defined by the unit’s location. Forinstance, units in Korea will want aterrain database of the area they aremost likely to fight in. This capabilitywill give units the ability to do virtualmission rehearsals on virtual terrain theywill later train or fight on.

The CFFT program is also leveraginganother simulation that was initiallydesigned for SOCOM to incorporatefuture capabilities—the Special Opera-tions Forces (SOF) air-ground interfacesimulator (SAGIS).

The Field Artillery School and PEO-STRI are working to leverage technolo-gies in the two simulations to achievethe best of each system. The inclusionof voice recognition and non-voice digi-tal input capabilities will continue toincrease CFFT’s ability to accuratelytrain the JFO.

Fort Sill and the University of South-ern California Institute of Creative Tech-nology (ICT) joined in an initiative todevelop the Joint Fires and EffectTrainer System (JFETS). Fort Sill andICT have incorporated movie industryspecial effects into JFETS and createdan immersive training environment.This year the beta version CFFT wasintegrated into the open terrain module(OTM) of JFETS.

FY05 JFETS initiatives include de-veloping a fully immersive state-of-the-art CAS trainer. Once complete, theCFFT will be the Army’s only systemcapable of training the full suite of CASmissions.

CFFT Pre-Pro Models and Field-ing. The CFFT is not a future system.The JFETS and SOTAC courses areusing pre-production CFFTs, and theProject Manager for Ground CombatTactical Trainers (PM GCTT) currentlyis fielding an additional 13 pre-produc-tion CFFTs to selected Army Reserveand National Guard (ARNG) units. Aftera successful Milestone C decision inApril for full-rate production, the PMplans to begin fielding the productionCFFT in late Third Quarter FY05.

Units that need the trainer now andcan’t wait for the Army to field themcan order from a limited number of pre-production models. To order, units goto the Fires Knowledge Network onArmy Knowledge Online (AKO) andhit the link for the CFFT. There theywill find instructions on how to order apre-production model.

There are advantages in buying a CFFTover some other system. It is warrantedby the Army and any repairs or mainte-nance are paid for. Also, with softwaredrops, units will get all the updates ofthe production modules as they are de-veloped.

Finally, units will get a trainer de-signed to meet the rigid requirementsdeveloped by the Field Artillery School,which also provides scenarios, trainingsupport packages (TSPs) and new equip-ment training (NET) to get unit trainersup and running.

The CFFT is the training simulator forthe FA’s future that the school willcontinue to develop to train all JFOs forjoint interdependency.

Colonel Stephen D. Mitchell is the Directorof the Training and Doctrine Directorate(DOTD) and G3 of the Field Artillery Centerand Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He was the SeniorFire Support Observer/Controller (O/C) atthe Combat Maneuver Training Center(CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany, and a Rein-forcing Artillery Battalion Trainer and S3Operations Trainer at the National TrainingCenter (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. He com-manded the 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery,(2-82 FA), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood,Texas, and C/2-9 FA (Pershing), 56th FACommand in Germany. Among other as-signments, he was the Division ArtilleryExecutive Officer and Deputy Fire SupportCoordinator in the 2d Armored Division,also at Fort Hood. He holds two master’sdegrees, including a Master of StrategicStudies from the Army War College atCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania



By Colonel Richard C. Longo,Majors Marty P. Chavers,Steven W. Nettleton and

Michael D. Goains,and Captain Jonathan G.

Bleakley

The New JFEC and Targetingthat synchronized lethal and nonlethalfires, projects and funding to shape thedivision’s operating environment. Inthe next few paragraphs, we provide anoverview of the JFEC and its battlerhythm, processes and products and ofthe methods employed for measuringsuccess.

The JFEC and Its Battle Rhythm.Comprised of primary, special and per-sonal staff members, the JFEC serves asa bridge between current operations andfuture plans, focusing one month out.See Figure 1. JFEC operations are over-seen by the division artillery (Div Arty)commander/fire support coordinator(FSCOORD) and executed with the com-bined efforts of the deputy FSCOORD,division information operations (IO) of-ficer and the division targeting officer.

The division targeting officer servesas the key enabler of the day-to-dayoperations of the JFEC. He gathers datafrom the major subordinate commands(MSCs), writes initial draft orders re-sulting from the work of the JFEC andconducts all the legwork to ensure thatinformation continually flows fromlower to higher echelons.

I n preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, the leadership of Task Force (TF) Danger, 1st

Infantry Division (1st ID), realized itneeded to transform its conventionaltargeting team. Many of the partici-pants in the joint fires and effects cell(JFEC) normally train for and operatein high-intensity conflict conditions aspart of a deep operations coordinationcell (DOCC), planning 24, 48 and 72hours out. The DOCC had to evolveinto a counterinsurgency-focused ele-ment that concentrated on effects-basedoperations (EBO) planning and execu-tion up to several months out.

The division applied similar proce-dures during several deployments tothe Balkans. Many of the problems en-countered in Iraq are similar to those inthe Balkans, but the complexity of those

problems and the violence resultingfrom them were clearly more intenseand presented the 1st ID new chal-lenges. The combination of the sheersize of the battlespace, multiple ethnicfault lines, severe economic ruin andcomplexity of full-spectrum operationsagainst a violent insurgent required a

different approach.Considering the problemsand seeking to solvethem within the con-structs of ends, waysand means led to a dy-namic and adaptableprocess that enabled usto mass combat powerand many combat en-ablers simultaneously.The 1st ID transformedthe DOCC into a JFEC


Three key venues comprise the delib-erate process that serves to coordinatethe JFEC’s actions: the Working Group,the Nomination Board briefing and theDivision Commander/Commanding Gen-eral’s (CG’s) Update. The JFEC Work-ing Group meets three times weekly toconduct detailed analysis and developproducts. At mid-month, the JFEC briefsthe CG at the Nomination Board, a pre-sentation of the proposed prioritizationof effects for the next 30 to 45 days.

The results are published in a divisionfragmentary order (FRAGO), titled theeffects tasking order (ETO). The ETOincorporates themes and messages thatsupport taskings to staff and subordi-nate units. It is based on input from allinvolved and staffed through the G3and chief of staff. The CG edits it,ensuring his intent is met.

The CG’s Update occurs at the begin-ning of the month and focuses on as-sessing the previous month’s effects.

Additionally, the JFEC may convenea crisis action team at unscheduled timesin response to certain critical situationsto help synchronize a specific currentoperation. The team was instrumentalin the division’s response to the com-plex situation in Samarra during theAugust and September 2004 timeframe,integrating lethal and nonlethal effectsas well as funding and projects support-ing full-spectrum operations in that city.

In addition to our internal meetings,there are three primary forums by whichthe 1st ID leadership garners input andconveys important messages to the Ira-qis: the biweekly Iraqi Senior AdvisoryCouncil, the monthly Sheiks’ Counciland the monthly Governors’ Confer-ence. The JFEC is responsible for theseforums and ensures the themes and mes-sages articulated at them are nested withthose published in the ETO. The discus-sions that occur at these forums enablethe CG to increase his understanding ofthe cultural, security, economic and po-litical environment across the area ofoperations (AO) and address thedivision’s themes and messages.

The Iraqi Senior Advisory Council iscomprised of sheiks, imams, business-men, academicians, government lead-ers and former military commanders.These participants represent all ethni-cities from each of the four provinces inthe AO. The CG briefs them on issuescurrently needing attention; the suc-cesses the division has achieved in spe-cific areas; and the progress on efforts,such as preparations for the upcoming

elections. The Iraqi Senior AdvisoryCouncil also breaks down into eco-nomic, political, cultural and securitysubcommittees to discuss key aspectsof the issues at hand in pursuit of useful

input from community leaders.The Iraqi Senior Advisory Council

enabled the CG and staff to see solu-tions to complex problems through Iraqieyes.

The Sheiks Council enables tribal lead-ers in TF Danger’s four provinces tobring to light issues affecting them andtheir tribal constituents. It is also an-other chance for the CG to engage themwith themes and messages that supportthe effects outlined in the ETO.

The Governors’ Conference brings to-gether provincial governors and bri-gade combat team (BCT) commanderswith the CG and his staff. When as-sembled, this group works to develop acommon understanding of political andmilitary issues in the AO and recom-mends courses-of-action (COAs) formeeting those needs.

Targeting Transformed. The funda-mental targeting process of decide, de-tect, deliver and assess (D3A) is thefoundation of the JFEC. Although doc-trine laid the groundwork for develop-ing TF Danger’s JFEC, non-doctrinaltactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) had to be developed and modi-fied to fit the operational environmentand promote lethal/nonlethal effects-based targeting.

During the decide phase, the CG’s

Legend:ACE = Analysis Control ElementALO = Air Liaison Officer

CA = Civil AffairsFSE = Fire Support Element

IO = Information OperationsLNOs = Liaison OfficersPAO = Public Affairs OfficePCO = Projects Coordination OfficePMO = Provost Marshal’s Office

POLAD = Political AdvisorPSYOP = Psychological Operations

SJA = Staff Judge AdvocateSWO = Staff Weather Officer

• G3• G3 Plans• G2• PCO• ALO• SWO• G3 Air• ACE• SJA• IO• PSYOP

• CA• G4• G5• G6• PMO• PAO• FSE• Chaplain• POLAD• LNOs

Figure 1: Roll Call—1st Infantry DivisionJoint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC)

1st ID Commander Major General John R. S. Batiste and Task Force Danger Chief of StaffColonel Keith Cooper with sheiks representing the tribes in Area of Operations Danger.Ms. Suzanne Inzerillo, US State Department Political Adviser, is on the left, back row.


intent; the MultiNational Corps-Iraq(MNC-I) lines of operations, MNC-Ieffects; specified tasks; and the predic-tion of the future operating environ-ment based on the mission, enemy, ter-rain, troops, time available and civil-ians (METT-TC) in the AO all are usedto develop effects, tasks, resources andmeasures of effectiveness (MOEs).

The desired effects are then priori-tized, becoming the high-payoff effectslist (HPEL). See Figure 2 for an ex-ample of a HPEL.

Once the HPEL is established, theJFEC wargames critical capabilities andvulnerabilities to determine the optimalassets and resources to detect targetsand deliver the effects. A holistic con-sideration of all available assets is es-sential—be it a guided bomb unit-32(GBU-32), an infantry company con-ducting cordon and search operations, acivil affairs (CA) team rebuilding aschool, a public affairs (PA) teamspreading a message to the populace orany combination of these and othermethods.

The key to understanding effects-basedtargeting is an expansion in our tasklexicon. Fire supporters and maneuvercommanders are very familiar with doc-trinal tasks, such as “deny, limit, disruptand destroy.” However, we must nowconsider the entire joint publication tasklist (JPTL), paying special attention toIO-centric tasks (influence, inform, de-grade, deceive, exploit, etc).

For example, the JFEC may have todevelop tasks that support a modifica-tion to a populace’s behavior or an

increase in the operational effective-ness of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Often agencies from echelons abovedivision (EAD), such as the Depart-ment of State or Special Forces, areapproaching the same problems andproducing their own solutions. Theseentities must be incorporated into theteam. Ensuring effective employmentof nonlethal assets can be just as impor-tant as applying lethal combat power.

Figure 2: October High-Payoff Effects List(HPEL). This is an example of TF Danger’sHPEL that guides production of the effectstasking order (ETO).

1. The credibility and capability ofthe Iraqi Security Force (ISF) andJoint Coordination Center (JCC)continue to improve to achieveIraqi control.

2. Iraqi populace accepts the re-sults of the elections and sup-ports the elected officials.

3. The effects of improvised ex-plosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and spec-tacular attacks are minimizedthroughout MultiNational Divi-sion-North Central (MND-NC).

4. Perceptions of continuity and en-during commitment are main-tained by the Iraqi populace dur-ing relief-in-place (RIP) or transferof authority (TOA) between thedivisions.

5. The attacks against infrastruc-ture are reduced in the MND-NC.

Effect 1: The credibility and capability of the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) and JointCoordination Center (JCC) continue to improve to achieve Iraqi control.

Method: Exploit ISF training and operations with media coverage.

Target Category: ISF, JCC & Populace

Unit/Agency

DivisionISF Cell &PAO

Local: 24US: 12International: 19

Radio: 16 Local/4 Int’lTV: 5 Local/9 Int’lPrint: 19 Local/8 Int’lInternet: 7 Local/4 Int’l

24 News ArticlesSupporting theCredibility of the ISF

Figure 3: Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). MOEs are gathered from staff and subordinateunits and help determine what effects will be tasked in the future.

Task

PAO: Informlocal andinternationalmedia aboutthe upcom-ing MediaDay at ISF.

MOEs

Number of Local andInternational MediaAttendees

Number & Type ofLocal and InternationalBroadcast and Pub-lication Representatives

Number of PressReleases SupportingISF Published in theLocal Media

Status

The weight of decisions, such as thoseregarding the allocation of funding orexploitation of media assets internal toand separate from the division, cannotbe taken lightly.

Incorporating these agencies and fac-tors into the JFEC planning and imple-mentation is vital to ensure unity ofeffort, coordination and integrationthroughout the AO.

The assess phase is the most difficultand, in this environment, requires anespecially high degree of patience. Thedivision frequently engages in long-term effects that take time to observeand measure, possibly months or years.

To quantify the results, the JFEC de-termines MOEs and measures of per-formance (MOPs) associated with eachtask. (See Figure 3 for sample MOEsfor a specific task.)

These MOEs and MOPs enable thedivision to gauge success or failure.MSCs and their liaison officers (LNOs)provide empirical data to help measuresuccess or failure. This is essential indetermining what actions are needed toachieve the desired effects: sustainedattack by the same means, re-attackusing another means or terminate thetask if the desired effects were achieved.Additionally, the MOEs and MOPs arethe basis for the CG’s Updates.

Twelve months of combat have giventhe 1st ID JFEC vital insight into whatit takes to synchronize and deliver ef-fects to support the CG’s intent. The 1stID JFEC has learned to synchronize,integrate and achieve lethal and nonle-thal fires and effects, projects and fund-ing that shape the division’s operatingenvironment.

The proficiency that has resulted fromthese months of combat experience mustbe sustained while at home station toensure the 1st Infantry Division’s readi-ness for the next operation. At the sametime, the key warfighting tasks theDOCC doctrinally accomplishes can-not fall by the wayside.

In OIF II, TF Danger quickly learnedthat the transition from high-intensityconflict to full-spectrum operations, orvice versa, can occur in a matter ofhours. The agility required of units toquickly and effectively make that tran-sition only can come with practice—beit through realistic training or a deploy-ment, such as OIF II.

In working to accomplish its tasks andseeking to improve its organization, theJFEC continues to enable TF Danger toachieve the unity of effort necessary to


gain irreversible momentum toward thesafety of and security for the Iraqipeople. As our TTPs develop and so-lidify, the people of Iraq will be the truewinners.

Colonel Richard C. Longo commands the1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artilleryand deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom(OIF) II. He was previously the Chief of TaskForce XXI in Training Command; G3, IIICorps Artillery; and Commander of the 1stBattalion, 14th Field Artillery (1-14 FA), 214thFA Brigade, also in III Corps Artillery, all atFort Sill, Oklahoma.

On Iraq’s election day, I spentfrom 0330 until 2230 on the streetsin our armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV)or at election centers from Tikrit toBaqubah. Baqubah is one of the mostdangerous cities that we patrol.

It was great to see all the peoplevoting. There were very few poll-ing sites that Iraqis were afraid togo to—all others were filled to ca-pacity. One polling site in a nicerneighborhood next to a police sta-tion had 5,000 voters by 1400.

During our patrolling that day,there were some attacks. We dis-covered three improvised explo-sive devices (IEDs), heard gun-shots all around us and listened tounits in and around our sector onthe radio fighting it out with smallpockets of insurgents. We alsoheard explosions and were prettyclose to a couple of mortar attacks.

But the voters never fled duringthose attacks. They just stayed tovote—it was really cool.

The Iraqi soldiers in the picturewith me were very proud of whatthey were doing. They kept tellingme that the people at the pollingsite they were guarding did nothave to worry because “I shoot AliBaba!” (They call all bad guys and

Major (Promotable) Marty P. Chavers is theDeputy Fire Support Coordinator and Chiefof the Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC) forthe 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) while de-ployed for OIF II. He also served as theOperations Officer for 1-7 FA, deployingwith the battalion as part of the KosovoForce (KFOR) 4B, and Brigade Fire SupportOfficer (FSO) for 2d Brigade Combat Team(BCT), both in Germany in the 1st ID. Hecommanded B/1-319 AFAR, 82d AirborneDivision, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Major Steven W. Nettleton is the Informa-tion Operations Officer in the 1st ID JFECwhile deployed for OIF II. He formerly com-manded B/2-4 FA, 214th Field ArtilleryBrigade at Fort Sill. He is a graduate of theCommand and General Staff College, FortLeavenworth, Kansas.

the enemy “Ali Baba.”) They were proudto show me their well maintained weap-ons and proud they were there to helpsecure their people’s vote.

It was a great experience to be out onthe streets on election day in one of themost dangerous towns in the 1st Infan-try Division’s sector and see that the

Major Michael D. Goains is the InformationOperations (IO) Field Support Unit Com-mander and IO Targeting Officer for the 1stID while deployed for OIF II. He also servedas the IO Chief for KFOR 3B/4A and IOTargeting Officer for the Combatant Com-mand Field Support Unit in support ofNorthern Command (NORTHCOM). Hecommanded D/3-112 AR of the Texas ArmyNational Guard in Stephenville, Texas.

Captain Jonathan G. Bleakley is a TargetAnalyst in the 1st ID JFEC while deployedfor OIF II. He was the Mobile SubscriberEquipment (MSE) Platoon Leader in the121st Signal Battalion, 1st ID, and CompanyFSO for 1-18 IN, 1st ID, both in Germany. Heholds a Bachelor’s Degree in History fromColorado State University.

Iraqi people were not intimidated,that they were going to vote, even ifthey had to go to other neighbor-hoods to do it. I am proud to havehelped make that happen.

CPT Jonathan G. BleakleyTarget Analyst, 1st ID, JFEC

FOB Danger, Tikrit, Iraq

Election Day in Iraq, 30 January 2005. Captain Bleakley stands between two Iraqisoldiers who were in Baqubah with him to guard a polling site. The site was in 1stBattalion, 6th Field Artillery’s sector.

A Redleg on Patrol in a Tough NeighborhoodIraq’s Election DayIraq’s Election Day


Above, Highway10 crosses theEuphrates River.


Photo courtesy ofDigitalGlobe


MEMORANDUM FORRECORD: FSE, TF 2-2 IN,3d Brigade Combat Team

(BCT), 1st ID, Operation Iraqi Free-dom (OIF) II, Forward Operating Base(FOB) Normandy, Muqdadiyah, IraqAPO AE 09392 (AETV-BGR-FSE),1 December 2004.

Subject: After-Action Review(AAR) for the Battle of Fallujah

1. Background and Mission. TheBattle of Fallujah was conductedfrom 8 to 20 November 2004 withthe last fire mission on 17 Novem-ber. The battle was fought by anArmy, Marine and Iraqi force of about15,000 under the I Marine Expedi-tionary Force (IMEF), sweeping fromnorth to south. The joint and com-bined force cordoned the city andsearched door-to-door, clearing build-ings and engaging insurgents in thestreets—reputedly the most fierce ur-ban fighting for Marines since theBattle of Hue City in Vietnam in1968.

Fallujah is roughly 40 kilometers

west of Baghdad on the Euphrates River.Its population before the battle was about250,000 people; however, TF 2-2 INencountered few civilians in its attacksouth.

TF 2-2 IN’s mission initially was toattack south to Phase Line (PL) Fran(Highway 10) from the northeasternedge of the city to protect our easternflank and destroy the anti-Iraqi Forces(AIF), keeping the lines of communica-tions open. For the attack, the city wassliced north and south into six areas ofresponsibility (AORs): TF 2-2 IN onthe northeastern slice of the city withTF 1-3 Marines on our western flankfollowed (east to west) by TF 1-8 Ma-rines, TF 2-7 Cav, TF 3-5 Marines and,finally, TF 3-1 Marines in the north-western AOR along the Euphrates River.

During the attack, many fragmentaryorders (FRAGOs) were issued, whichpushed TF 2-2 IN south of PL Fran tothe southern edge of the city. TF 2-2IN’s rear tactical operations center(RTOC) and two M109A6 Paladin how-itzers were at Camp Fallujah (22 kilo-meters southwest of Fallujah) fromwhich the Paladins fired during theBattle of Fallujah.

The city is about five kilometers wideand five kilometers deep. It is dividedeast and west by Highway 10 with resi-dential neighborhoods to the north andthe industrial sector in the south. In themost southern sector of the city is a poorneighborhood that was filled with for-eign fighters, dubbed the “Martyr’s Dis-trict.” This was the sector in which weencountered the heaviest resistance.

2. Enemy Forces. In TF 2-2 IN’sAOR, the AIF had emplaced many ob-stacles and fortified buildings asstrongpoints, dug trenches and estab-lished fighting positions and bunkers.Additionally, the enemy had riggedbuildings and vehicles with explosives.

Along the southeastern portion of the

city, the AIF emplaced rockets asremotely controlled direct fire weap-ons against any Coalition Forces thatattempted to attack from the south oreast of the city. The enemy alsoemplaced improvised explosive de-vices (IEDs) and mines along keyroutes and at intersections to impedeand funnel Coalition Forces’ move-ment. Vast caches of AIF munitionshad been positioned throughout thesector for tactical resupply.

3. Friendly Forces. TF 2-2 IN de-ployed to Camp Fallujah under theoperational control (OPCON) ofMarine Regimental Combat Team-7(RCT-7), 1st Marine Division. TF 2-2 IN’s task organization consisted ofone mechanized infantry company,one armored company, the brigadereconnaissance troop (BRT), oneIraqi Intervention Forces (IIF) Bat-talion (-), one engineer platoon, twoM109A6 Paladins (positioned onCamp Fallujah), four organic 120-mm mortars and two 81-mm mor-tars. Four Air Force joint terminalattack controllers (JTACs) were at-tached from the 3d BCT headquar-ters and sliced out to the maneuvercompanies with one BALO and anenlisted driver in the task force tac-tical command post (TAC).

4. Artillery Fires. As part of TF 2-2 IN, the M109A6 Paladins and aplatoon fire direction center (FDC)were attached in direct support (DS)to the TF. For most of the fight, thiswas their only role. Later, after TF 2-2 IN had reached its limit of advance(LOA) at PL Fran, it also was taskedto support RCT-7.

The Paladins were in a positionarea (PA) in Camp Fallujah adjacentto the Marine Corps and a battery ofPaladins from the 1st Cavalry Divi-sion, A/3-82 FA, that was attachedto the IMEF. This facilitated the FA’s

TF 2-2 IN FSE AAR:Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah

By Captain James T. Cobb,First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour

and Sergeant First Class William H. Hight


Task Force 2d Battalion, 2dInfantry’s (TF 2-2 IN’s) fire sup-port element (FSE) operated asa mini-brigade FSE during theBattle of Fallujah. The FSE co-ordinated the combat effects ofArmy, Air Force and Marineassets more autonomously thanthe traditional, doctrinal bat-talion-level FSE—a model ofjoint interdependency.

Although the FSE did not havejoint personnel assigned to it, itworked closely with the brigadeair liaison officer (BALO), whowas chopped to TF 2-2 IN, andfunctioned as a “Joint FSE,” ifyou will.

Ed.


sharing meteorological (Met) dataand survey and relieved the platoonof self-security.

a. Organic to the TF. As an organicpart of the TF, the howitzers pro-vided accurate, timely fires through-out the fight, delivering 925 rounds,mostly in danger-close fires. As dedi-cated assets to the TF, Paladin fireswere greatly expedited in a 360-de-gree fight with fluid targets and arapidly advancing maneuver force.Fire missions took less than two min-utes from the initial call-for-fire(CFF) to rounds down range.

b. Responsibilities of TF FSE. TheTF FSE assumed responsibility forcoordinating with the TF 2-2 IN S4for Class V resupply, positioning theplatoon and selecting shell-fuze com-binations. The TF FSE cleared firesat the TAC along with the TF battlecaptain or S3. Clearance of fires wasexecuted by demanding accurate com-pany frontline traces and forward ob-server (FO) locations at regular inter-vals and battle tracking in detail.

c. Role of the Artillery. The artil-lery was used in doctrinal roles, suchas screening the initial point of pen-etration, preparatory fires, close firesupport and disruptive deep fires, aswell as in non-doctrinal roles, such asclearing routes of IEDs and breechingminefields.

Using Paladins directly attached tothe TF gave us a tremendous advantagein the fight. Our tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTP) were effective and le-thal and gave maneuver TFs greaterflexibility, firepower and mobility.

The overall performance was outstand-ing. By using FOs and accurate intelli-gence-driven targeting, the artillery wasa driving force in the TF’s ability toattack through a large city with mini-mum casualties in six days.

d. Massing Fires. The only drawbackwas our inability to mass fires on targetsdue to having only two guns. While wedid have general support reinforcing(GSR) assets, they were slow, cumber-some and more difficult to coordinatewith than our organic systems. Trustwas also an issue as the vast majority ofour fires were danger-close, and we didnot know the proficiency level of thesupporting guns.

While it did not impact our operationsoverall, at times the physical and psy-chological effects of massed artilleryfires were the preferred effects. Wecould use our 120-mm mortars when

we wanted to mass fires, but additional155-mm howitzers would have beenmore effective.

5. Mortars. The Thunder Mortar Pla-toon that is organic to 2-2 IN proved tobe the equal of the artillery in this fightin terms of accuracy and responsive-ness and was an integral part of theindirect fires used.

When provided the five requirementsfor accurate predicted fires, mortars wereevery bit as accurate and deadly asartillery. The firepower of the 120-mmmunitions allowed us to respond quicklywith overwhelming firepower whenneeded. During the course of the battle,mortars fired 942 rounds of timely, ac-curate fires.

a. Mortar Challenges. Our mortar pla-toon received two M252 81-mm mor-tars before deploying to the FallujahAOR. These were useful indirect fireweapons when close fires were required.The only drawback was they had nosights. To use them, we had to takesights from the 120-mm tubes and usethe sights with the 81-mm mortars, tak-ing two 120-mm tubes out of the fight.

The mortars’ high angle of fire waspreferable for military operations inurban terrain (MOUT), but there weretimes when the mortars’ maximum or-

dinate (MAXORD) exceeded theclose air support (CAS) ceiling, lim-iting mortar fires.

b. Platoon Security. The mortarplatoon operated outside of CampFallujah at various firing points andhad to pull self-security. It wasmanned to do so with no degradationof fires. The platoon received enemyindirect fires frequently during thefight and was forced to displace. Butdue to superior training and good man-euverability, it quickly displaced, re-set and resumed operations.

6. Danger-Close Fires. Danger-close missions were the rule, not theexception. 2/A/1-6 FA, our Paladinplatoon, and Thunder Base, our 120-mm mortar platoon, quickly earnedour confidence in their abilities todeliver timely and, more importantly,accurate fires. We routinely had 155-mm and 120-mm fires within 200meters of friendly forces. Less fre-quently, 81-mm mortars fired within100 meters.

a. Walking Fires In. We could de-liver fires in various ways. The na-ture of MOUT actually helped usmitigate the risk of danger-close mis-sions because the houses and struc-

tures served as buffers for effects be-tween friendly forces and the target.The most widely used method whenbringing fires in was to “walk” the firesin close, using adjustments sent from anobserver. Before going into the fire-for-effect (FFE) phase, friendly companiesabout to receive danger-close fires werealerted and given time to button up ortake cover.

b. Danger-Close Redefined. Per doc-trine, the smallest munitions were usedclosest to the frontline traces of themaneuver element and larger munitionsat greater distances. Although this tech-nique was used, rarely were any firesoutside of the doctrinal danger-close600 meters. That was the “deep fight” inthis environment, and to have consid-ered it as danger-close and followed allof the existing procedures for adjust-ment would have decreased the effec-tiveness of indirect fires.

7. FOs. The FOs played a key role inthis fight. We placed a fire support team(FIST) with A/2-2 IN, an FO with theBRT and a fire support officer (FSO)with A/2-63 AR. The FIST with A/2-2IN included a sergeant (promotable) asthe FSO, a private first class as radio-telephone operator (RTO) and a ser-geant in two of the three platoons. One

SPC Deretinald Batiste, Task Force 2d Battalion, 2dInfantry (TF 2-2 IN), looks for snipers in Fallujahduring Operation Al Fajr on 11 November 2004.

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of our team chiefs, a sergeant who wasan experienced FO, became the BRTFO. We did not have the manning todeploy full FISTs but compensated bydeploying leaders where they were mosteffective; the FSE platoon was at 50percent strength.

a. BRT FO Positioning and Reconnoi-tering. A/2-2 and A/2-63 were deployedin the city for most of the fight with theBRT screening to the east. Due to theBRT’s position outside the city, theBRT FO Sergeant Raymond Sapp hadexcellent observation from dominantterrain and was decisive in the earlyfight. He was in position very earlybefore the attack. This was excellentTTP that allowed us to adjust the pre-planned smoke fires for breeching op-erations and destroy enemy observa-tion posts (OPs).

As any combat training center (CTC)fight tells us, he who wins the recon-naissance fight will do well. SergeantSapp could destroy enemy OPs earlyand refine target locations as well asconfirm or deny that targets we hadplanned were viable, such as AIF tar-gets or buildings that did not appear tohave been recently inhabited. His loca-tion with the BRT outside the city look-ing in enabled him to see the entire battle-field and service targets throughout.

He used the BRT’s long-range ad-vanced scout surveillance system(LRAS3), an excellent piece of equip-ment that allowed him to accuratelylocate targets, day or night, with 10-digit grids. LRAS3 is superior to theground/vehicular laser locator designa-tor (G/VLLD) in both optics and target

location, has night-vision optics andcan be mounted on vehicles. If scoutand BRT elements have this equipment,fire supporters also should have it.

b. City FOs Kept Moving. The otherobservers were not as fortunate duringthe early phases of the fight becausethey were down in the city and could notreadily occupy OPs on dominant ter-rain. The platoons that included FOscould not afford the time or manpowerto establish an OP while they were con-ducting the attack.

However, during halts or while theplatoons occupied strongpoints, theobservers established OPs and destroyedtargets. The platoon FOs came into playmainly before the task force crossed theline of departure (LD) when they couldoccupy OPs on rooftops and adjust pre-paratory fires. Sergeant Randall Lairdwas very effective at adjusting roundsonto specific houses and destroyingthem before we crossed the LD.

c. FO Vehicles. The FOs had to ride inthe back of Bradley fighting vehicles(BFVs) or M113s to move around thebattlefield, degrading both their com-munications and ability to observe fires.The TF FSO chose not to bring our twoFIST vehicles (FISTVs) to the fight forthe following reasons: they are me-chanically unreliable; we could not manthem, given our personnel strength; andthey cannot stay abreast of maneuverforces in Bradleys.

Instead we had M1114 up-armoredhigh-mobility multipurpose wheeledvehicles (HMMWVs) with all relatedequipment in them although they oftenwere left in the combat trains with the

FSO’s riding in the company com-mander’s Bradley.

We could have used the new Bradleyfire support team vehicles (BFISTVs)with the personnel to man them.

d. Attached Companies with No FISTs.One of the biggest issues for FOs andmanning was attached companies fromother battalions that did not bring theirFIST personnel. A/2-63 AR broughtonly one second lieutenant for fire sup-port—no other FISTers. This severelydegraded its ability to use fires duringthe battle, especially when its FSO waswounded in action (WIA).

A company attached as part of a TFmust bring its entire FIST, particularlyin a MOUT fight. If not, the ability tosupport that company with fires is ex-tremely difficult.

8. Other Equipment. Before deploy-ing to Fallujah, we made deliberatechoices about what equipment to bringand what to leave behind, and there wasequipment we should have had but didnot have.

a. Fire Support Gear. The FOs hadsingle-channel ground and airborne ra-dio systems (SINCGARS) manpacks,binos, a compass, Viper-2 night-visiongoggles and precision lightweight glo-bal positioning system receivers(PLGRs). Communications were ad-equate. They were degraded when mov-ing, but once OPs were established,they worked well.

The Viper-2 is an excellent tool forFOs. In conjunction with the PLGR, itreliably provided accurate target loca-tion.

The Blue Force Tracker was a goodtool to use at the TF FSE. It provided agood picture of forces on the battlefield,but could not give friendly unit loca-tions consistently enough to clear fires.It is useful for targeting when imageryis loaded.

The flash, immediate, priority and rout-ing (FIPR) messaging function of BlueForce Tracker was a good tool we didnot use fully. It could have been veryeffective in communicating and pass-ing fire support products from TOC toTAC and vise-versa.

b. Joint Surveillance and Target At-tack Radar System (JSTARS). We usedJSTARS as a targeting tool. The assis-tant FSO and S2 collected JSTARS dataat the TOC and passed it to us as target-ing data to be serviced with indirectfires.

c. Advanced FA Tactical Data System(AFATDS). We did not have AFATDS

Soldiers assigned to to A/2-2 IN clear the upstairs of a house in Fallujah on 11 November 2004.

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in the FSE, although2/A/1-6 FA’s platoonoperations center(POC) did. The battal-ion-level FSE has onlyone AFATDS, and itwas at FOB Normandyto support counter-strike operations.

We need two AFATDSat the task force level.Twice we’ve had to ex-ecute split operationsand leave the AFATDSbehind (Najaf, April2004).

Fires were controlledat the TAC. With thevehicle available, wecould not have usedAFATDS, althoughwith a BFIST, wewould have been able to.

We did not use the lightweight for-ward entry device (LFED); it was tootime-consuming to input targets of op-portunity, and there was no AFATDS atthe battalion FSE.

9. Munitions. The munitions webrought to this fight were 155-mm high-explosive (HE) M107 (short-range) andM795 (long-range) rounds, illumina-tion and white phosphorous (WP, M110and M825), with point-detonating (PD),delay, time and variable-time (VT)fuzes. For the 120-mm mortars, we hadHE, illumination and WP with PD, de-lay and proximity fuzes. We also car-ried 81-mm HE with the same fuzes.

a. Range of Munitions. The munitionsat our disposal gave us excellent flex-ibility. The 81-mm munitions allowedus to deliver extremely close fires tofriendly forces while we used largercaliber munitions to engage and destroyheavily fortified houses and bunkers.The standard table of organization andequipment (TOE) for a mechanizedbattalion does not include 81-mm mor-tars, something the Army should exam-ine and correct.

b. White Phosphorous. WP proved tobe an effective and versatile munition.We used it for screening missions attwo breeches and, later in the fight, as apotent psychological weapon againstthe insurgents in trench lines and spiderholes when we could not get effects onthem with HE. We fired “shake andbake” missions at the insurgents, usingWP to flush them out and HE to takethem out.

c. Hexachloroethane Zinc (HC) Smoke

and Precision-Guided Munitions. Wecould have used these munitions. Weused improved WP for screening mis-sions when HC smoke would have beenmore effective and saved our WP forlethal missions.

We had several important targets, of-ten reinforced houses that FOs had eyeson, that would have been more effec-tively engaged with a precision-guidedmunition, such as Copperhead with itsshaped charge or the developmentalExcalibur Unitary round that is con-crete piercing (to be fielded in 2006).Barring the use of such precision-guidedmunitions, concrete-piercing (CP) fuzeswould have been more effective thandelay and PD fuzes were, but the latterwere satisfactory.

d. Ammo Resupply. The biggest chal-lenge we had was ammunition resup-ply. The amount of munitions expendedwas surprising, and we had to struggleto keep our cannons and tubes supplied.The targeting officer at the TOC and theS4 did a fantastic job of obtaining am-munition, but in the future, it would beeasier to over-anticipate ammunitionneeds before the fight and stockpile it.

The Marines gave us what they had,and the location of the Paladin platoonon FOB Fallujah helped greatly. Thefact that the Paladin platoon brought apalletized loading system (PLS) was ahuge plus. It allowed the S4 to coordi-nate for ammunition and the Paladinplatoon to pick it up.

In the final analysis, it all worked, butI recommend we not put ourselves inthat position again. We never ran out ofammunition, but we came close several

times.10. CAS. We used

CAS well in this fight,dropping more than 15guided-bomb unit-12s(GBU-12s), which arelaser-guided 500-pound bombs; four2,000-pound joint di-rect attack munition(JDAMs) penetrators;and one Maverick. Wealso had more than sixhours of AC-130 Spec-ter gunship support.

a. CAS Effectiveness.We had problems withthe GBU-12s. At leastfive duds were dropped,all from F/A-18s. TheAC-130 was an awe-some weapon, operat-

ing at night and prepping our deepbattlespace with outstanding accuracy.The four JDAM penetrators weredropped on a bunker complex with ex-cellent results. The bunker and morethan 20 AIF were destroyed.

Initially, we had difficulty workingwith Marine air. However, once ourJTACs learned the system, it workedrather well. An air liaison officer (ALO)from the Marines at the TOC wouldhave helped in the early stages andfacilitated the use of more Marine CAS.

b. Pulling Timely Air Assets. Whilethe Air Force JTACs were useful on theground, they had limited success pull-ing timely air assets. A TOC ALO is amust for two reasons: first, a MarineALO with direct access to higher willpull air assets more quickly and be ableto disseminate their fires faster than anAir Force JTAC on the ground. Second,you need an officer who understandsthe Marine system attached to the FSEfor better coordination.

Air assets are requested through a dif-ferent system than indirect lethal fires.An ALO with two radios tied in tohigher and the battalion is a must andwill cut air request times in half. Al-though air was planned, it often wasdifficult for the battalion JTAC to talkto the RCT-7 ALO and get air whenneeded.

c. CAS and Other Indirect Fires. A biglesson is that CAS was not a substitutefor responsive artillery and mortars.CAS was most effective in the deepfight, particularly when used on intelli-gence-driven targets.

11. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

A precision air strike takes out an insurgent stronghold as Coalition Forces moveforward through Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr.

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(UAVs) and Tactical UAVs (TUAVS).UAVs were an integral part of this fightand should be included in any futureplanning. The UAVs in this fight—thePredator, Shadow, Hunter and Pio-neer—were very effective for preci-sion, intelligence-driven targeting. Theirtargets often were built-up strongpointsbeing fortified or occupied before ourattack.

a. Targets in the Deep Fight. TheUAVs gave us a great advantage in thedeep fight, usually beyond the coordi-nated fire line (CFL). We engaged whatthe AIF considered safe areas well inadvance of the forward line of troops(FLOT), destroying the AIF’s com-mand, control and communications (C3)nodes and denying them any respitefrom the fight, a tremendous psycho-logical advantage.

Except for the Raven TUAV, theUAVs provided 10-digit grids and ac-curate target descriptions, allowing usto choose the most appropriate weaponfor the targets. The Raven also did nothave enough loiter time to obtain theinformation we needed.

b. Targets of Opportunity. We at-tempted to initiate and adjust fire mis-sions against targets of opportunity us-ing UAVs as observation platforms andwere unable to do so in a timely andaccurate fashion. It was difficult to co-ordinate with the platform operatorswho were great distances away (somestateside) to give us the viewing anglesneeded for adjustments.

The TF TOC used UAVs for targetingand as observers for fire missions sev-eral times. But unless the UAVs werelooking straight down, the grid receivedusually was off by several hundredmeters. When adjusting from the Preda-tor, the delay on the feed is about 20 to30 seconds. The Shadow or Scan Eagleis a better platform for battalion indirectfires as they are more responsive andmore easily adjusted.

We displayed the UAV feed in theTOC on a projector so the FSE couldcoordinate and call for fires. The easiestway to call for fires is to create a ficti-tious observer and adjust through cardi-nal directions (the operators flying theUAVs are not trained in calling forfires). We need to develop TTP foradjusting fires with UAVs.

The way to use a UAV is for the TFFSE to have this asset under its control.It was an almost insurmountable task tocoordinate for and adjust fires accu-rately using UAVs because the control-

ling element had to describe the rounds’impact.

12. Personnel Manning. Big prob-lems in this fight were lack of fire sup-port personnel with concurrent opera-tions in two separate geographical loca-tions. The TF 2-2 IN FSE had 14 of 30authorized personnel before the tacticalroad march to Fallujah.

a. Fire Support Personnel. TF 2-2 INforward deployed with a 10-man FSE,including FIST personnel, leaving fourpersonnel behind as part of the S5 andoperations sections.

Even when the TF fire support NCOwas able to join the FSE, the shortage ofpersonnel stretched the FSE. At theTOC, the targeting officer and RTOliterally slept next to the radios. Untilthe TF FSNCO arrived, the TF FSO wasforced to maintain 24-hour operationsfor three days.

The company FSO for A/2-63 AR wasWIA on Day +3, leaving that companywith no organic FSE to facilitate fires,effectively taking them out of the indi-rect fire fight.

b. Manning Effects on the Fight. Theshortage of fire support personnel putunnecessary strain on maneuver ele-ments and damaged our ability to de-tect, engage and destroy targets. In fu-ture combat deployments, it is impera-tive for the Army to ensure fire supportpersonnel are at or near 100 percentstrength to avoid the problems we facedin this fight.

13. Training. The training that pla-toon, company and battalion personnelreceived at the various CTCs paid offrichly. Our fire supporters could handle

any mission presented to them.TF 2-2 IN FSE conducted danger-

close training several times in Iraq thatpaid huge dividends in the Battle ofFallujah.

a. Confidence in Fires for the Force.FOs were confident in their ability tocall for and adjust close fires and oftendid so. Training with our organic mor-tar platoon facilitated our fire missionsin Fallujah. We often worked with them,knew their capabilities and were su-premely confident in them.

Although we had not worked with 2/A/1-6 FA before deploying to Fallujah, thebattery’s performance early in the fightquickly won our confidence.

b. Importance of Danger-Close Live-Fire Training. In our time in the Army,we have had limited live-fire trainingfor danger-close missions until last sum-mer in Iraq. The typical training ofinitiating and adjusting rounds on tar-gets at great distances is vastly differentfrom training for danger-close fires. Theresults of our missions clearly indicatethis type of training must be imple-mented across the board for fire sup-porters.

c. Training for MOUT. We also learnedthat corrections in MOUT are muchsmaller, often smaller than the doctrinalminimum of add/drop 50 and left/right30 that we are trained on. We oftenfound it necessary to make adjustmentssmaller than these values to get roundson target, particularly when engagingfighting positions, fortified houses,trench lines and spider holes. The artil-lery and mortars showed outstandingflexibility in applying these corrections.

Soldiers attached to A/2-2 IN clear a house in Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr on 13 November2004.

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The bottom line is that before engag-ing in offensive operations in a MOUTenvironment, it is imperative that allfire support personnel are highly trainedon call-for-fire and adjustment proce-dures and their equipment. The MOUTenvironment is extremely fast-moving,and there is no time to waste. Fires mustbe initiated, adjusted and brought to theFFE phase rapidly.

Paladins and mortars are an integralpart of this process, and must move asrapidly as the observers. Combined live-fire training for observers, the FDC andthe guns is the answer.

14. Conclusion. The contributions ofindirect fires were a decisive part of theBattle of Fallujah and contributed tre-mendously to the outcome of the fight.They allowed the maneuver forces torapidly move through the city with mini-mum casualties and demonstrated whata joint and combined arms team can do.

The effects were physically and psy-chologically devastating. Not only didindirect fires destroy AIF personnel,but they also destroyed their will tostand and fight. Indirect fires also posi-

tively influenced our forces by demon-strating to commanders on the groundthat overwhelming firepower was attheir disposal.

The Paladin platoon greatly increasedthe TF’s firepower, timeliness and flex-ibility, allowing us to move at an un-precedented pace through a fortifiedcity.

We learned to use indirect fires earlyand often in large volumes. During thecourse of the battle, more than 2,000artillery and mortar rounds were firedand more than 10 tons of precision AirForce munitions were dropped.

However, as successful as we were,had the battle lasted longer it wouldhave been difficult to sustain fire sup-port operations. We must learn fromthis fight to prepare for the future.

At the end of the fight we thought backon some of the things we were theproudest of. What jumped to the fore-front was infantry and tank platoon ser-geants, platoon leaders and companycommanders telling us that the artilleryand mortars were awesome. At the endof the day, that is what it is all about: our

maneuver brethren recognizing why weare called the “King of Battle.”

Captain James T. (Tom) Cobb has beenassigned to 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery(1-6 FA), 1st Infantry Division, and served asthe Fire Support Officer (FSO) for Task Force2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, (TF 2-2 IN) in Op-eration Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, includingduring the Battle of Fallujah. He also de-ployed with Kosovo Force (KFOR) 4B.

First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour,assigned to 1-6 FA, has been the TargetingOfficer for TF 2-2 IN in OIF II, includingduring the Battle of Fallujah. Also in OIF II,he was a Platoon Leader for 2/C/1-6 FA and,previously, a Fire Direction Officer in thesame battery.

Sergeant First Class William H. Hight, alsoassigned to 1-6 FA, has been TF 2-2 IN’s FireSupport NCO since September 2003, de-ploying in OIF II and fighting in the Battle ofFallujah. He also deployed to Bosnia as partof the Implementation Force (IFOR) and toKosovo as part of KFOR 4B.

Captain Jason M. Bender, SeniorFire Support Instructor, was namedthe Officer Instructor of FY04 at theAviation Warfighting Center, FortRucker, Alabama. He received aplaque for his performance from theCommanding General of the AviationCenter and Fort Rucker, BrigadierGeneral E.J. Sinclair, in ceremonies atthe Museum of Army Aviation in De-cember 2004. He also received a statuefrom the Army Aviation Associationof America (AAAA).

Captain Bender is the Chief of theFires Branch at the Aviation Centerand has been a Fire Support Instructorat the Center since December 2002. Inhis previous assignment, he was aTask Force Fire Support Officer as-signed to the 1st Battalion, 10th FieldArtillery, part of the 3d Infantry Divi-sion (Mechanized) at Fort Benning,Georgia. During his career, he has de-ployed to Operation Allied Force aspart of Task Force Hawk in Albaniaand Operation Desert Spring in Ku-wait.

Redleg CPT Jason Bender SelectedAviation Center Officer Instructor of FY04

Captain Jason Bender, Senior Fire Support Instructor, receives a plaque for hisperformance as Officer Academic Instructor of FY04 from Brigadier General Sinclair,Commanding General of the Aviation Warfighting Center, in a ceremony at Fort Ruckerlast December.


B/377 PFAR:

Two years after the beginning ofthe Global War on Terrorism(GWOT), B Battery, 377th Para-

chute Field Artillery Regiment (B/377PFAR) and Task Force (TF) 1-501stParachute Infantry Regiment (PIR)—TF Geronimo—deployed to Afghani-stan in support of Operation EnduringFreedom (OEF). Upon deployment, thequestion was how to effectively employcannon artillery and get the guns intothe fight. The battery leadership studiedthe enemy, terrain, culture and manylessons learned from the 101st and 82dAirborne Divisions and 10th MountainDivision during their OEF tenures.

Upon official notification of thebattery’s deployment order, 3-6 FA,10th Mountain Division, sent an infor-mative secure internet protocol routernetwork (SIPRNET) email to the bat-

tery commander stating, in part, “OEFartillery battery operations are 3200-mils out from anything our leaders orSoldiers had ever experienced.”

The best insight into forthcoming op-erations was to break away from thebattery mindset and prepare to split theunit into two three-gun or even threetwo-gun platoons. Independent, split-battery, 24-hour continuous combatoperations became the norm.

Distributing fires in support of com-bat operations throughout noncontigu-ous areas of operations (AOs) would bestrongly favored over mass for bothmaneuver and their supporting artil-lery. Simply put, to cover all elementswith fires, we needed to rapidly adaptand organize our battery—six guns anda one-gun “float”—into a platoon-basedbattery.

The purpose of this article is three-fold: to offer techniques that facilitateplatoon-based cannon artillery opera-tions, to highlight some of TFGeronimo’s combat experiences in OEFand to explain why artillery platoons,when properly equipped and manned,best provide maneuver elements whatthey need to win on today’s battlefield.

Initial Combat Operations. In earlyNovember 2003, TF Geronimo closedon Forward Operating Base (FOB)Salerno with 852 combat-ready para-troopers tactically positioned to con-duct continuous combat operations.FOB Salerno is southwest of Kabulalong the Afghani-Pakistani border.(See the map in Figure 1 on Page 30.)

The firing battery occupied and beganconstructing a six-gun, 6400-mil fire-base while establishing and maintain-ing a 24-hour firing capability to sup-

Platoon-Based Fires in AfghanistanBy Captain Shane P. Morgan,

First Sergeant Robert H. Levis andLieutenant Colonel Harry C. Glenn III, IN


A howitzer is sling-loaded to beflown back to Forward OperatingBase (FOB) Salerno, Afghanistan,during Operation Avalanche on14 December 2003.

(Photo by Spc. Gul A. Alisan)

B/377 PFAR:


port the TF. It was during this timeframethat the TF received a warning order(WARNO) to prepare to deploy twohowitzers and associated personnel andequipment via airlift for an indefinitetasking in support of Kandahar Airfieldwith a sequential, on-order mission tosupport Bagram Airfield as part of basedefense plans.

It is important to note that AOGeronimo covered more than 10,000square kilometers and has flat terrainwithin the Khowst Bowl and mountain-ous, rugged, restrictive terrain alongthe Pakistani border. In perspective,AO Geronimo is more than three timesas big as the “box” at the Joint Readi-ness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk,Louisiana, and twice as large as theNational Training Center (NTC), FortIrwin, California.

During mission analysis, questionsrequiring immediate attention were“How will this tasking degrade capa-bilities and affect responsiveness? Canthe battery maintain the 24-hourcounterstrike requirement? Will thislimit the ability to provide indirect artil-lery support of maneuver operationsoutside the wire?”

The answers to these questions wereforthcoming. But, for the time being,

the order necessitated that B/377 PFARestablish at least one two-howitzer fir-ing platoon to operate independentlyfor a sustained, multi-month duration.

Methodology. Why split-battery pla-toon-centric operations? The answer istied to adapting our capabilities to coun-teract the enemy’s advantages during acounterinsurgency. Given the size, spec-trum and austere environment of ourbattlespace and the fleeting enemy wewere fighting, centralized planning anddecentralized execution was the pre-ferred course-of-action (COA).

A significant task during anycounterinsurgency fight is the ability tocollect actionable intelligence whileseparating the enemy from the popu-lace, drying up enemy safe havens. Theexpectation that maneuver companiescan accomplish this essential task aloneis invalid. If we are to mass our combatpower at the critical time and place,then distributive and decentralized op-erations involving every available Sol-dier is the most feasible option for ac-complishing the task.

The greatest challenge for ourArtillerymen was how to maintain indi-rect fire support coverage for each ma-neuver element throughout these op-erations. The TF commander’s intent

for fires would not change during thedecentralized process: “Get the gunsinto the fight.” We understood that any-thing short of meeting this intent couldjeopardize the mission.

Without question, Soldiers faced manynon-doctrinal tasks throughout GWOT.Certainly Redlegs in Operation IraqiFreedom (OIF) and OEF are perform-ing these non-doctrinal tasks as a rule,not as exceptions.

If distributive operations throughoutnoncontiguous AOs are to remainstrongly favored over mass and artil-lery fires continue to support all maneu-ver operations, then artillery batteries,or in this case, artillery platoons, mustbe organized and equipped to supportthese distributive ops.

Reorganization Techniques. Unfor-tunately, when operating as a separatebattery, the manning and equipmentneeded to split a unit “come out of hide.”Fillers from other FA batteries or the FAbattalion staff are not part of the equation.Our unit started this process with ourhowitzer sections. (See Figure 2 on Page31.)

Outfitting our gun crews within thethree-platoon concept was the easy part:we assigned first and second howitzersections in first platoon, third and fourthhowitzer sections in second platoon,and fifth and sixth howitzer sections inthird platoon.

The next part, command and control(C2), was more challenging. We neededthree leaders for C2 of these platoons,but our challenge was in deciding whomto task and how much risk we werewilling to accept.

After much deliberation, we assignedour battery operations officer—who wasexcess on our modified table of organi-zation and equipment (MTOE)—theduties of the 1st platoon leader, the firedirection officer (FDO) as the 2d pla-toon leader and the battery executiveofficer (XO) as the 3d platoon leader.The platoon leaders’ respective platoonsergeants were our chief of firing bat-tery, gunnery sergeant and the mostsenior howitzer section chief.

Creating three fire direction centers(FDCs) from one proved our biggestchallenge. Fortunately, our headquar-ters platoon sergeant (also excess to theMTOE) was a Military OccupationalSpecialty (MOS) 13D4P (Parachutist)FA Tactical Data Systems Specialistwho provided expertise throughout thisprocess. His technical creativity enabledthe unit to outfit three separate, fully

Figure 1: Platoon-Based Operations. While establishing its position area on FOB Salerno,Task Force (TF) Geronimo’s B Battery, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Regiment (B/377 PFAR)received a warning order (WARNO) to prepare to airlift two howitzers and associatedpersonnel and equipment for an indefinite tasking in support of Kandahar Airfield to thesouth. B/377 PFAR had a sequential, on-order mission to support Bagram Airfield to thenorth as part of base defense plans.


mission-capable and certified platoonFDCs.

During this internal battery transfor-mation, we cross-leveled several mis-sion-essential items, including hand-held terminal units (HTUs), battery com-puter systems (BCS), firing charts, OE-254 antennas and advanced system im-provement program (ASIP)/FM radios.Finally, our battery had created threemobile FDCs in high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)and one static FDC at the firebase witha hard-stand, advanced FA tactical datasystem (AFATDS) and Blue ForceTracker (BFT). Our static FDC wascollocated with the battery operationscenter (BOC) in a general-purpose me-dium tent that doubled as our 24-hourC2 and technical fire direction nodethroughout the deployment.

Additional FDC leadership positionsincluded our primary chief computer’sassuming the duties of the 1st platoonFDC chief and our computer operator’scertifying as the chief fire directioncomputer of the newly created 2d pla-toon FDC. After conferring with the TFcommand sergeant major, the batterywas authorized to make its final keyleader move of gaining the assistant TFoperations NCO, an MOS 13C3P Tac-tical Automated Fire Control SystemsSpecialist, to be the FDC chief for 3dplatoon.

After many personnel moves and in-tra-battery equipment transactions, theunit had overhauled all key leader du-ties and responsibilities. Each of thethree firing platoons had a platoonleader, platoon sergeant and an FDC.Each of the FDCs had one officer whodoubled as the platoon leader, one firedirection NCO, two Soldiers and theminimum mission-essential equipmentto conduct independent operations.Within 60 days of arriving in theater,we rapidly had transformed our batteryinto three two-gun platoons that werefully mission-capable.

Initial Testing. 2/B/377th PFAR (19personnel) was the first to deploy toKandahar Airfield under the new two-gun platoon organization while the re-mainder of the TF ramped up for Opera-tion Mountain Avalanche. This theater-wide operation provided the battery andTF the opportunity to validate the artil-lery platoons’ execution of their com-bat tasks.

Avalanche was a combat operationwith many significant combined armslessons learned at all levels. The pri-

mary learning point for indirect sys-tems was that our platoon-based opera-tions concept worked magnificently.However, we also recognized that wecould no longer rely on mortars to sup-port the FOB counterstrike plan.

During this operation, FOB Salernoreceived eight 107-mm rockets with apoint of origin (POO) greater than eightkilometers from our FOB. With 2/B/377 deployed to Kandahar and 1&3/B/377 deployed more than 30 kilometersto the south, there was no indirect assetinside the wire that could provide im-mediate counterstrike on the POOs. 120-mm mortars are an outstanding indirectsystem, but no mortar system cancounterstrike an enemy 107-mm or 122-mm rocket firing at or near their maxi-mum ranges.

From December 2003 through July2004, the battery maintained 24-hourcontinuous 105-mm firing capabilityfrom within the FOB with at least oneplatoon FDC and one howitzer sectionmanning its position at all times. Weknew that every second counts in acounterstrike—seconds can equate tocasualties, friendly or enemy casual-ties. The only immediate delivery meansto take out enemy rockets were BBattery’s howitzers.

Our next combat operation, Moun-tain Blizzard, closely mirrored Ava-lanche and was another successfulcombat operation. During the sametimeframe, 2/B/377 relocated fromKandahar Airfield to Bagram Airfieldand established a counterstrike linkwith the Q-37 Firefinder radar posi-tioned there.

Because of Operation Avalanche’s keylesson learned, 3/B/377 was attached tothe FOB security maneuver companyand maintained a linkage with the Q-36

radar for a 24-hour firing capability.Indirect fire assets available for Moun-

tain Blizzard were 1/B/377 and its twoguns and the 120-mm mortar platoonfrom 3-6 FA that had supported theTF’s (-) conducting continuous combatoperations in the far western portion ofour AO. Operation Mountain Blizzardtook 14 days and neutralized a terroristcell. The TF (-) then redeployed to FOBSalerno to refit, recover and maintain24-hour continuous counterstrike re-sponsibility.

Combat History. Similar to all his-torical combat operations, it was notuntil the TF leadership conducted adetailed 100-day after-action review(AAR) that we understood the impactof terrain, the elements, population and,most importantly, the enemy we neededto hunt down and kill or capture. The TFAAR focused all Geronimo leaders andstaff sections on how we saw the enemyand how we saw ourselves.

It was not until our leaders and troopshad collectively experienced and seenthe complete environment (post-Opera-tions Avalanche and Blizzard) and cross-leveled information that we could painta clear picture and thoroughly assessour battlespace. This truly opened oureyes to the terrain, size and scope, andall fully concurred that our piece of thepie was enormous.

The first priority of the TF commanderwas to collectively readdress how wewere massing our forces and fires. AfterOperations Mountain Avalanche andMountain Blizzard, we assessed oureffectiveness and ascertained that thefight in our AO was a platoon leader’sfight. To force the enemy to show hisface, we had to conduct operations insmaller formations.

Providing C2 at the company level,synchronization, fusion and asset allo-cation from the battalion TF gave ouryoung platoon, squad and team leadersevery advantage and asset needed andenabled them to win every fight. Thisdoesn’t mean the TF wasn’t well pre-pared going into Operations Avalancheand Blizzard or didn’t have excellentplanning information. It simply vali-dates the fact that nothing is more valu-able than “putting boots on the ground”throughout the AO. To become moreeffective, TF Geronimo became moreadaptive and flexible. Our artillery pla-toons had to achieve the same or greaterlevel of flexibility to accomplish theirassigned tasks, operating within thenontraditional three-platoon concept.

B/377 PFAR

HQ 1st 2d 3d

Figure 2: B/377 PFAR Reorganization forPlatoon-Based Operations in Afghanistan.B/377 PFAR reorganized into four platoons.Each firing platoon had two M119 105-mmhowitzers and a fire direction center (FDC).The Headquarters (HQ) platoon had one“float” M119.


Tactics, Techniques and Proce-dures (TTP) Implementation. Af-ter analyzing our operations, the bat-tery refined its TTPs to become moreeffective. During this time, the firstplatoon leader was selected to rede-ploy and assume duties as the rear-detachment commander. This was asignificant leadership loss to the bat-tery, especially to first platoon. Butas the TF commander stated, “If itdidn’t hurt to send him back, then heprobably wasn’t the man for the job.”This drove the decision to move thetargeting officer out of the TF firesupport element (FSE) to lead firstfiring platoon.

We also discovered that the batterystill required a dedicated XO to re-source and provide maintenance andlogistical support for the three pla-toons. Additional personnel movesthen included the headquarters pla-toon sergeant’s (13D4P) assuming pla-toon leader responsibilities for 3/B/377, enabling the XO to concentrateon sustaining the battery. And withsemi-annual howitzer certificationsdue, we needed a dedicated mastergunner, which mandated our chief offiring battery concentrate on certify-ing the howitzer sections.

The decision to move “Smoke” out ofa platoon sergeant position requiredanother senior staff sergeant sectionchief to assume platoon sergeant duties.This afforded another gunner the op-portunity to certify and perform dutiesas the chief of section of first howitzersection. We had broken away from six-gun battery operations, but regardlessof how degraded our platoons became,we would not assume risk with platoon-level leadership.

Thus, we ensured that each elementmaintained a designated platoon leaderand platoon sergeant throughout thedeployment.

Tactical Results. Fortunately, the TFwas outfitted with all indirect assetsrequired of a maneuver battalion. In-cluded in the Geronimo task organiza-tion (organic and attached) were sixM119A2 105-mm howitzers (plus oneoperational float), two 120-mm mor-tars, four 81-mm mortars, one Q-36radar and two lightweight countermortarradars (LCMRs). Each system gave thecommander several options and manyof the same or similar desired effects.

Without question, the rapid rate-of-fire and flexibility of mortar systemshas proven a tremendous combat multi-

plier throughout the deployment. A sig-nificant constraint that applies to anymortar system is that it cannot rangeand, therefore, cannot counteract theextremely high rocket threat facingFOBs.

During the course of nine months,enemy forces fired 150 to 200 rockets atour TF troops with the intent to killfriendly forces where they slept. 107-mm and 122-mm rockets remained thebiggest threat to static forces in theFOB, and although the 120-mm mor-tars can range out to more than sevenkilometers, they cannot counterstrikethe 107-mm or 122-mm rockets.

TF 1-501 PIR’s primary deterrents toenemy rocket fires were activecounterrocket patrols at known or sus-pected POOs and aerial over flights ofnamed areas of interest (NAIs). Theenemy understands the terrain, as hehas spent the better part of his life in thisAO, and is adaptable enough to firerockets in this nonlinear fight. The num-ber one defensive measure against arocket launch in our AO was lethal 105-mm fires that could range all enemyrocket POOs.

After many rehearsals from sensor(Q-36/LCMRs) to shooter (105-mm),the Geronimos developed and fine-tuned

a clearance-of-fires battle drill thatprovided immediate counterstrikeson acquired POOs. B/377’s essen-tial task in OEF remained supportingour maneuver brethren with fires and,simultaneously, making the insur-gents true believers in the devastat-ing effects of cannon artillery. Timelycounterrocket fires alone defined theFA’s relevancy in our AO, but withthree independent platoons, the TFcommander could ask much morefrom his organic artillery battery.

Why Platoon-Based Artillery Op-erations Work. After solidifying ourpersonnel moves and incorporatingour TTPs, our three-platoon conceptwas complete and, once again, put tothe test during the next major com-bat operation, Operation MountainStorm. The battery frequently ma-neuvered as Team Eagle with onefiring platoon, one scout platoon andone up-armored platoon under theC2 of the battery commander.

Team Eagle had the combat powerto function as a maneuver combatteam, enabling the TF to move artil-lery closer to any given objectivearea. Team Eagle also maintainedforce protection and direct fire ca-

pabilities to move and secure itself whileconducting village assessments andcordons and searches and attempting toanswer the commander’s priority intel-ligence requirements (PIRs).

As Operation Mountain Storm began,the TF was relieved of the Bagram Air-field artillery platoon tasking, whichbrought all three firing platoons underthe C2 of the battery. With three inde-pendent firing elements in one battery,we attached one firing platoon to anygiven maneuver company and one pla-toon to deploy with Team Eagle as amaneuver team, always leaving a thirdplatoon at FOB Salerno with the Q-36to support the 24-hour counterstrikeplan.

Typical non-doctrinal tasks (exclud-ing the FOB Salerno counterfire pla-toon) included B Battery instructing anEnglish Language School for local chil-dren (featured in Army Times). The bat-tery also conducted operations fromwithin the local populace, such as train-ing and resourcing the local nationalpolice force, constructing and fundingseveral irrigation wells, providing trac-tors to local villages, delivering genera-tors to schools, performing mountedand dismounted security for the UNAssistance Mission in Afghanistan

B Battery, 377th Parachute Field Artillery Regiment(B/377 PFAR) in Afghanistan.


(UNAMA) voter assistance teams, andproviding medical supplies for the medi-cal civil affairs program (MEDCAP)for local villagers and veterinarian civilaffairs program (VETCAP) for theirlive stock.

These missions provided informationoperations (IO) or other nonlethal ef-fects with a two-fold purpose. First, webuilt rapport with and gained the trustand confidence of the local populacewhile providing them a safe and stableenvironment. Second, we received in-formation from sources in the populacethat led us to enemy forces. Our intentwas to find, fix and finish the enemy,but without the support of the populace,it would have been difficult, if not im-possible.

Counterinsurgency Artillery TTP.Throughout our deployment, one can-non artillery TTP that made a differencewas employing artillery in a show-of-force capacity. While artillery platoonson mounted patrols performed IO andpsychological operations (PSYOPs), the“Big Guns” affected the enemy psycheand often triggered a response. Regard-less of the task—providing MEDCAPor VETCAP or conducting routinemounted patrols—all M119A2 howit-zer platoons “left the wire” ready tosupport any mission, nonlethal throughdirect or indirect live fire to achievedesirable effects.

To counter the insurgents’ advantageof blending with the population, welearned that when a cannon battery con-ducted a live-fire with its howitzers,even just as a “demonstration,” the gen-eral populace felt a sense of security. Asa result of the deafening sound of artil-lery from both delivery and receipt, theenemy was forced to communicate asituation report (SITREP) to superiorsthat often allowed us to pinpoint theirlocations. Bottom line: the battery often

live fired and stimulated signal intelli-gence (SIGINT). On any given daythroughout our deployment, we habitu-ally had one platoon conducting TeamEagle missions, including live fires; oneplatoon attached to or performing directsupport for a maneuver company; andone platoon maintaining a 24-hour no-notice counterstrike capability fromFOB Salerno.

In more than nine months, the threetwo-gun platoons of B/377 PFAR accu-rately and safely delivered in excess of1,000 howitzer rounds through ourseven M119A2 cannons, including 110-extended range munitions (M913rocket-assisted projectiles and Charge8). Each round was tied to an essentialfire support task (EFST) and took theform of demonstration fires, precisionregistrations, counterrocket andcountermortar fires, or danger-closesupport for troops in contact.

Throughout countless operations, thebattery maintained a firing capability inone or more locations and, post-Ava-lanche, never lost the ability to supportthe counterstrike fight.

As a result of artillery platoon-basedoperations, the 852 paratroopers as-signed to TF 1-501 PIR were neverwithout cannon artillery support for theiroperations. Without question, FOBSalerno slept better at night, knowingone of three howitzer platoons and oneof three alert FDCs digitally linked tothe Q-36 radar were ready tocounterstrike on-call.

Most importantly, when asked if theylove their artillery, the 11 series Infan-trymen assigned to Apache, Blackfoot,Comanche and Delaware Companiesunanimously and without hesitationsaid, “Hell, yes!”

Although our platoon operations weretested only in our OEF AO, we believeour method will work equally well in

any theater throughout the GWOT.Decentralized operations with pla-

toons hunting insurgents are critical toour success in this fight. We must focusefforts on the platoon architecture in allcombat arms branches. We stronglyrecommend the Field Artillery movetoward including platoon-centric op-erations and platoon-based fires in ourdoctrine, TTP and training.

Captain Shane P. Morgan commanded BBattery 377th Parachute Field Artillery In-fantry Regiment (B/377 PFAR) and deployedto Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Free-dom (OEF) from June 2003 until August2004 as part of Task Force 1-501st Para-chute Infantry Regiment (TF 1-501 PIR).Currently, he is an Action Officer in theCollective Training Directorate at the Com-bined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. In a previous assignment, he com-manded C Battery, 4th Battalion, 11th FieldArtillery (4-11 FA), 172d Light Infantry Bri-gade (Separate), Fort Richardson, Alaska.

Master Sergeant Robert H. Levis is the FirstSergeant of B/377 PFAR and deployed withthe battery for OEF from September 2003until August 2004. Among other assign-ments, he was the First Sergeant and Chiefof Firing Battery in C/4-11 FA and SeniorEnlisted Firing Battery Observer/Controllerat the Joint Readiness Center, Fort Polk,Louisiana. He has served 20 years in theArmy’s light infantry units.

Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. Glenn III, Infan-try (IN), commanded TF 1-501 PIR, FortRichardson, Alaska, and deployed the taskforce to Afghanistan from July 2003 throughAugust 2004. He is now attending the JointAdvanced Warfighter School at NationalDefense University in Norfolk, Virginia. Healso has served as the S3 of the 3d Brigade,82d Airborne Division, and S3 of 2-505 PIR,both at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The Field Artillery magazine callfor entries deadline has been ex-tended to 1 June 2005.

The purpose of this first annualcontest is to obtain high-quality pho-tos capturing Field Artillery person-nel or units in training or actual full-spectrum operations for use in theChief of the Field Artillery’s posterseries, as cover or other shots for

2005 Field Artillery Photo Contest Call for EntriesField Artillery or in other esprit de corpsor strategic communications projects.

Photos should capture images that helptell the story of today’s Army and MarineField Artillerymen in the Global War onTerrorism or training for GWOT.

The competition is open to anyone,military or civilian, amateur or profes-sional photographer.

Prizes will be awarded in two catego-

ries: (1) Training for or Actual Com-bat Operations and (2) Training foror Actual Stability and Support Op-erations. A First Place of $500, Sec-ond Place of $250 and Third Place of$75 will be awarded in both catego-ries.

For competiton submission guide-lines and rules, visit our website atsill-www.army.mil/famag.


Radar operations are a critical com-ponent of the 1st Infantry Division’smulti-battlefield operating systemcounterstrike fight. The operating envi-ronment in Iraq is defined by non-con-tiguous battlespace, the inability to pro-vide mutual support in traditional waysand, most importantly, an adaptive, de-termined enemy.

The 1st ID relies on its target acquisi-tion batteries’ (TABs’) headquarters tomanage the 15-plus radars operatingin support of the division. This articlemakes the case for the importance ofthese headquarters in future force struc-tures. It was co-authored by three TABcommanders—two in the Active Com-ponent and one in the Minnesota ArmyNational Guard (MNARNG).

Colonel Richard C. LongoCommander, 1st Infantry Division

(Mechanized) Artillery in Iraq

F rom March through May 2004,1st Infantry Division forwardoperating bases (FOBs) were at-

tacked by enemy indirect fire on 435occasions. Of those attacks, 194 wereacquired by radars. Radars are part of aforce protection package and indispens-able for counterstrike operations in the-ater.

Yet radars require constant mainte-nance and repair, especially in the Iraqiclimate. Frequently, units that own andposition the radars are unable to meetall the radars’ maintenance needs. Indi-vidual radar sections neither have ac-cess to repair parts nor exposure to oroversight of all radars in the area ofoperations (AO), which is where thedivision artillery (Div Arty) and TABheadquarters come in.

The Div Arty headquarters providesthe only holistic radar analysis in thedivision and is primarily responsiblefor radar management across thedivision’s AO. This is because the artil-lery battalions embedded in the brigadecombat teams (BCTs) are serving asmaneuver task forces. Two of the DivArty’s principal assets in completingthis mission are the divisional TABheadquarters elements of D Battery, 1stBattalion, 33d Field Artillery (D/1-33FA) and E/151 FA, the latter an ech-elon-above-division (EAD) unit. The25th FA Detachment (FAD) from the25th Infantry Division (Light) servedwith the division in Iraq as well.

It would be difficult for the Div Arty

By Captains John J. Nealand Adam C. Wojcik

and Major Mark N. Roder, MNARNG

34


to manage the division’s radars with-out TABs because radar sections are notmeant to be independent operators.TABs are essential to radar mainte-nance, training, command flexibility,personnel management and variousother important functions.

Radar Maintenance. The most criti-cal function of the TAB headquarters isradar maintenance. The TAB’s radarmaintenance section has one senior ra-dar repairman, Military OccupationalSpecialty (MOS) 35M Radar Repairer,and the battery’s essential repair partsstockage listings (ERPSL) and recom-mended stockage inventory listing(RSIL) stored on two five-ton trucks.

The radar repair section is supple-mented with Soldiers from the TABheadquarters who man the vehicles. Thissection routinely conducts combat pa-trols throughout the sector to help re-pair the division’s radars; on many oc-casions, the section has been instrumentalin keeping other counterstrike radars op-erational in theater.

In most cases, the TAB can fix a radarwithout seeking assistance from a Com-munications Electronic Command(CECOM) logistics assistance repre-sentative (LAR) or from the Div Artybecause it has a senior radar repairmanwith a wealth of experience working onthe battery’s systems. The TAB has fixedproblems at the lowest level and savedlimited resources at the division level.

The TAB maintains a full set of ERPSLand RISL at the headquarters level.Having all radar equipment under onecommand allows better equipment vis-ibility. The high cost of radar repairparts and limited number produced doesnot allow every radar section to have itsown set of parts. Each radar has limitedparts for the most common faults.

The battery’s mobile ERPSL allowsthe radar repair team to travel to thenon-mission-capable (NMC) radar,troubleshoot the system and draw fromthe stock of parts on site. If systemsneed to be parked side-by-side compar-ing oscilloscope readings, it can be donein a TAB unit owning more than onesystem. This allows repairs to be madewithout having to tap external resources,pull parts from other radars or requestLAR support.

The oversight of a strong radar-fo-cused headquarters element also showsin coordinated preventive maintenanceschedules and command-directed fo-cus areas. In the quest to keep radarsfully functional, a clear understanding

of the faults and the ability to accuratelycommunicate those faults is essentialwhen reporting to higher headquartersand requesting support.

The artillery community, by and large,lacks a complete grasp of radar particu-lars; therefore, the knowledge a sea-soned radar platoon sergeant brings tothe fight is invaluable.

Finally, radar parts are priceless, in somecases. Properly accounting for ERPSL isessential, and while supply warehousestake the utmost care, the requisition andhandling of radar repair parts is alwaysbest left to the Soldiers who care themost—the headquarters of the team des-perate for a specific part that will fix adown system.

Radar Section Training. Having allthe repair personnel in a single organi-zation enables a consolidated trainingprogram. The training of a radar sectionincludes many external resource require-ments that can be better used for a largenumber of Soldiers to train instead ofindividual radar’s training indepen-dently. The training includes, but is notlimited to, mortar or artillery live-fireexercises, digital communications drillsand lane training run by external evalu-ators.

The TAB training also is standardizedacross sections because the commander,who is the subject matter expert, drivestraining standards and develops a com-mon training program. The leadershipof the radar sections can leverage eachother to work through training issuesand improve tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs) and standing oper-ating procedures (SOPs).

This consolidated training paid divi-dends in Iraq. We observed that thecombination of a solid radar trainingfoundation and the creative minds ofradar warrants and senior NCOschanged the way we dealt with over-heating and dust in Iraq. The TAB orFAD headquarters connected to the DivArty counterstrike officer helped dis-seminate these modifications andtroubleshooting procedures in a timelymanner, keeping the team functioningproperly. Communications about train-ing techniques between sections andbatteries was essential to team success.

Command Flexibility. TAB com-manders are assets to the deployed force.The TAB commander and support staffcan be used to best meet the needs of thedivision, Div Arty or counterstrike head-quarters. These assets can work longerterm issues while the Div Arty counter-

strike officer works the current fight, orthey can work emergency issues thecounterstrike officer does not have thecapacity to support. This allows thecounterstrike officer to work technicalissues while the TAB commander isworking logistical and tactical issues.

Personnel Management. The TABallows a commander, first sergeant andfirst-line leaders to manage personnelacross the radar sections to ensure thateach radar has a balance of both sea-soned and new Soldiers to make up acohesive team. The many 13R FA Fire-finder Radar Operator and 131A RadarTechnician slots allow the flexibility toput together five strong sections. Ayoung sergeant can be teamed with anexperienced staff sergeant; a new war-rant officer can be teamed with a strongstaff sergeant; or a brand new staffsergeant can be matched with a strongsection to allow him to learn his job andbe set up for success.

In the Reserve Component, NCOcourses can keep first-line leaders outof training cycles for up to eight months.Forming a section that has the propermix of personnel can alleviate such atraining loss. The freedom to shift andmove personnel empowers a com-mander to make the strongest collectivesections possible to meet the needs ofthe mission.

Having five sections from which toselect allows a TAB commander to con-duct proper military decision-makingto assign his sections to maneuver unitswhere the strength of the section matchesthe needs of the maneuver commanderand the combat situation. This could re-sult in emplacing either a Q-36 or Q-37system for proper radar coverage for anAO. It also may mean positioning sec-tions in locations where they can besttackle the problems at hand. An ex-ample of this is placing a section with astrong 35M or 131A at a site at the endof a support chain and putting a sectionweaker in maintenance at a locationwith a LAR or a forward support battal-ion (FSB).

The ability to flex specialty MOS Sol-diers to critical points on the battlefieldis a strength of TABs. 35Ms and 52DGenerator Mechanics are in short sup-ply. Their skills and tireless efforts indifficult situations keep the counterstrikebattle raging. The division’s fight gets asignificant boost from the traditionalTAB or FAD headquarters comman-der’s knowledge of radar operationsand their assets


Other Functions. The TAB headquar-ters also performs other functions. Itcoordinates for limited resources for allradar sections.

For example, the TAB headquartershas worked through the Div Arty head-quarters to the division G4 to obtainsolar shades for the radars, which arecritical to keeping the systems opera-tional in the 130-degree heat of the Iraqisummer. The TAB headquarters alsohas supplied the radar sections addi-tional Class IV material to protect theradars from both direct and indirect fire.In short, the TAB headquarters pro-vides leadership and guidance from se-nior radar leaders within the TAB towarrant officers and NCOs across thebattery.

Another example—the TAB moved,coordinated for the distribution of andsupplied the technical assistance for thedivision’s deception wooden radars. Thebattery also provided the camouflagenets, tents and generator equipment thatmade the deception radars a success.

The TAB works directly with the divi-sion counterstrike officer to monitor

and augment existing radar operationsand to ensure that the radar element ofthe counterstrike fight is successful. TheTAB acts as the Div Arty Commander’seyes and ears at the section level toensure that radars are getting the sup-port they require.

Also, the TAB or FAD commanderplays an important role in future pro-curements for his team. The Army’stechnological growth demands leaderscapable of envisioning a need, findingthe tool to solve the problem and thenactively pursuing the equipment for theunit. TAB and FAD commanders arerequisitioning air conditioning systemsfor Q-37s, lightweight countermortarradars (LCMR) for FOB force protec-tion and acoustic radars as addedcounterstrike resources.

TAB headquarters can move acrossthe battlefield without external supportand offer leadership and guidance acrossthe battery. It is imperative that thisorganization be retained to fight andwin in the future.

Captain John J. Neal is the Commander ofthe 1st Infantry Division’s Target Acquisi-tion Battery, D Battery, 1st Battalion, 33dField Artillery (D/1-33 FA) deployed to north-ern Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom(OIF) II in February 2004. Previous assign-ments include serving as Assistant S3 for1-33 FA in Germany, also in the 1st InfantryDivision, and Battalion Fire Direction Of-ficer (FDO) for 1-15 FA, 2d Infantry Divisionin Korea.

Captain Adam C. Wojcik commands the25th FAD, part of the 25th Infantry Division,and deployed to OIF II in February 2004,assigned to the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq.His assignments include serving as Execu-tive Officer and FDO for C/2-11 FA. He wasa Fire Support Officer (FSO) for A/1-14 IN inthe 25th Infantry Division (Light) at SchofieldBarracks, Hawaii.

Major Mark N. Roder commands E/151 FA(TA), part of the 34th Infantry Division(Mechanized), Minnesota Army NationalGuard (MNARNG). He also deployed hisbattery in support of the 1st Infantry Divi-sion in OIF II in February 2004. He hasserved as the Battalion FDO and A BatteryCommander in 1-125 FA (155-mm self-pro-pelled), also in the 34th Division.

Bringing in a Bad GuyAbove, CPL Ryan Brazil, A/2-8 FA, and PFC JoseRosas, HSB/2-8 FA, bring in a Bad Guy in AshShurah, south of Mosul. These Task Force 2-8 FASoldiers are assigned to the 1/25 SBCT, currentlyserving in Iraq. Top right, SGTs Daniel Dicker,HSB/2-8 FA, and Timothy Phillipson, A/2-8 FA,search a cave for weapons caches near Ash Shurah.Bottom far right, SGT Sampson Mitchell, B/2-8 FA,unloads desks in Farisiyah, south of Mosul. Right,SPC Brandon McClure, 2-8 FA, stands guard at a“flash” traffic control point west of Qayarrah.


CMO in BaghdadThe battalion intelligence officer (S2)

forecast the day’s high temperature inBaghdad as a steamy 110 degrees. Thepavement in the Mansur neighborhoodwas hot, and hundreds of cars packedthe smoggy streets.

The dismounted combat patrol in thatneighborhood had many intelligencerequirements. Who owns this hardwarestore on Mansur Street? What are theIraqi civilians thinking about the up-coming transfer of national sovereignty?What was the message of last Friday’sprayer call? How is the nearby schoolrehabilitation project progressing?

Certainly the NBC television crew fol-lowing the patrol didn’t help the pres-sure-cooker sensation. As always, thefoot patrol was acutely aware of theconstant enemy threat, including snip-ers, suicide car bombers and other ter-rorist criminals.

By the end of the patrol, the patrol

leader, a second lieutenant, had spokento scores of local residents and a localneighborhood council member, negoti-ated a resolution to a contractual dis-agreement between a school headmis-tress and a contractor, and obtained asense of the locals’ feelings of appre-hension regarding the transfer of sov-ereignty.

In an hour’s time, the combat patrolhad collected actionable intelligence,supervised a civic action project, nego-tiated with local leaders, conducted an“atmospherics” assessment, dealt withtelevision media, and provided securityon a major urban intersection. Afterreturning to the battalion tactical op-erations center (TOC), the patrol leaderdebriefed the battalion civil militaryoperations (CMO) officer (S5) and S2on his successful mission.

Several days later, Tom Brokaw intro-duced the patrol leader, Second Lieu-tenant Peter J. Balke, to the nation onthe NBC Nightly News. Despite theheat, Lieutenant Balke appeared remark-ably cool and composed on screen. Asa platoon leader in the Red Dragons 3d

Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82 FA),1st Cavalry Division, his Mansur patrolhad been just another CMO missionamong many.

In Baghdad, 3-82 FA was organizedas a motorized infantry battalion in theBlackjack 2d Brigade Combat Team(BCT) and routinely conducted combatpatrols. The Red Dragons took CMOseriously, and Lieutenant Balke had thetraining and experience to do it right.

This article shares the Red Dragons’experiences in CMO during their tourin central Baghdad from Januarythrough November 2004 in support ofOperation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and II.3-82 FA applied both emerging andestablished doctrine from many spe-cialties, including civil affairs (CA),public affairs (PA), information opera-tions (IO) and others to create an effec-tive standard for CMO. Although theseCMO tactics, techniques and procedures(TTPs) were as unique as the area in

CMO in Baghdad3-82 FA Red Dragons Hit the Streets

By Captain Evans A. Hanson


SGT Henry F. Salquero, left, and SPCReid A. Dixson, A/3-82 FA, have theirphoto taken with Iraqi children in theQadisiyah neighborhood, home to theIraqi Interim Government Minister’s villa.


which the Red Dragons operated, theymight provide points of departure forother units deploying to Iraq today.

The Neighborhood. The Red Drag-ons’ area of operations (AO) was sand-wiched between the infamous GreenZone, now called the International Zone,in downtown Baghdad and the roilingSunni Arab neighborhoods of westernBaghdad. Socio-economically, theMansur District in the AO is wealthierthan many other areas of the city and ishome to many of the major players inIraqi politics.

The terrorists and criminals, alsoknown as anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), oftenattempted to attack troops in convoys,fixed-site security points and patrols.However, their most disruptive opera-tions were criminal and terrorist activi-ties, such as kidnappings and car-bomb-ings against Iraqis in prominent gov-ernment positions and those workingwith the MultiNational Forces (MNF).

3-82 FA faced some limitations uponassuming its mission in February 2004.The unit had a 15-to-30 minute “com-mute” to its AO from a camp near theBaghdad International Airport.

Also, 3-82 received one CA Team-Alpha (CAT-A) from the 425th CivilAffairs Battalion, but with only eightSoldiers and two high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs),the CAT needed augmentation to meetthe daytime three-vehicle requirementto move freely in the AO. The CAT didnot deploy or train with 3-82 and ar-rived two weeks after the Red Dragonsassumed responsibility for their AO.

In addition, the battalion had to workwith a limited reconstruction budgetconsisting of funds from the comman-der’s emergency response program(CERP). The unit’s CERP budget wassmaller than other battalions’ budgetsas the neighborhood’s problems withwater, sewage, schools and other areasof civil assessment were less urgentthan the more problematic parts of thecity where funds could produce a moredramatic IO effect.

Red Dragons’ CMO Techniques. Thefigure outlines five characteristics ofCMO by the Red Dragons in Baghdad.

1. CMO—A Battalion-Wide Effort. FM41-10 Civil Affairs TTPs describes CMOas a “set of unit operations which en-compasses CA activities, PA activities,IO and other types of functions, includ-ing combat operations.” Within thatframework, certain CA activities en-compass humanitarian assistance, re-

construction projects, local leader in-terface and governance support. There-fore, CMO is much more than CA—initself, it is much more than reconstruc-tion projects.

Soldiers executing CMO must have asense of civic pride in their area ofresponsibility (AOR) and attempt tofoster that pride in their residents. Manyunits operate from a forward operatingbase (FOB) that is not near their AO.This makes it difficult for commandersto instill that level of civic responsibil-ity in the troops.

Units should attempt to include allSoldiers in CMO. If everyday combatpatrols make occasional stops at localschool rehabilitation projects, routinelyconduct atmospherics patrols at variousroadside produce stands or deliver hu-manitarian assistance with the CAT,Soldiers begin to feel a connection tothe area and the people who live there.

Soldiers will interact with the popula-

tion everyday and contribute greatly tothe unit’s success if they understand therole and importance of CMO. Empow-ered Soldiers support CMO, determin-ing problems and helping the unit de-velop possible solutions.

In the winter of 2003, the Red Drag-ons honed their combat skills during a14-week pre-deployment train-up atFort Hood, Texas. The proud PaladinArtillerymen of 3-82 FA focused train-ing in their military occupational spe-cialties (MOS) to ensure they coulddeliver timely and accurate fires in sup-port of the Blackjack BCT.

Simultaneously, 3-82 FA leaders stud-ied the demography of their future AOin Baghdad, kept abreast of Iraqi cur-rent events and became proficient inCMO tasks, such as using interpreters,developing cultural awareness and deal-ing with media.

This train-up is described in Lieuten-ant Colonel Timothy A. Vuono’s ar-ticle “3-82 FA Transformation into aHybrid Motorized Rifle and PaladinBattalion: Training for Baghdad” in theJanuary-February 2004 edition. Thetraining imbued Soldiers with a CMOmindset and helped them understandthe need to “be polite, be professionaland be prepared to kill.”

According to FM 41-10, the battalionS5 works in the battalion operationssection (S3) and performs CMO plan-ning and CAT integration as an addi-

CMO must be—

1. Soldier-Executed

2. High-Volume

3. Vertical

4. Neighborhood-Centric

5. Synchronized

Red Dragon’s Five Civil-Military Operations(CMO) Characteristics

CPT Mike Burgoyne, Commander of A/3-82 FA, speaks at a ceremony marking theopening of the Al Faraqid Primary School in June 2004. Reopening the school was oneof many CMO for the unit.

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tional duty. However, the current tableof organization and equipment (TOE)for FA and maneuver battalions doesnot authorize an S5. Commanders knowthe importance of CMO and resource itsexecution, but it helps to have a proac-tive S5.

3-82 FA’s S5 helped give command-ers the information and training toolsneeded to prepare troops for Baghdadduring the pre-deployment train-up. Hebriefed at the command and staff meet-ings and ensured the S5 section had theassets it needed to operate, to include aCMO NCO, laptop computer, officeequipment and HMMWV. Weeks later,when the unit received its attached CAT-A in Baghdad, the CMO team was al-ready a part of the battalion.

Knowing the importance of CMO,battery commanders prepared to per-form CA activities in support of thebattalion mission. Each commanderappointed a CMO lieutenant to partici-pate in weekly neighborhood councilmeetings, track and update CA assess-ments in the battery AOs, and plan theCMO-specific tasks and purposes ofeach preplanned battery combat patrol.In effect, each battery became capableof performing CA activities of its own,including local governance (neighbor-hood council) support, area assessments,atmospherics patrols, small project de-velopment and supervision, manage-ment of the initial consequences of dev-astating AIF attacks and (or) MNF op-erations affecting the civilian popula-tion, and delivery of humanitarian as-sistance.

The Red Dragons tracked the effec-tiveness of MNF CMO and IO cam-paigns using atmospherics patrols. At-mospherics are civil situation indica-tors collected from civilians by patrolsto meet specific civil-military informa-tion requirements.

Patrols collect them by asking selectedcivilians a series of questions devel-oped by the battalion S5 and CAT.Examples include: What is the city’spower schedule? What is the water pres-sure like? How effective are the Iraqipolice in your neighborhood? Are gro-cery prices rising, falling or staying thesame? How long do you have to wait inline for gasoline? What do you thinkabout the reconstruction projects in yourneighborhood? S2s and S5s at all ech-elons reported and analyzed atmospher-ics to help shape future operations.

Increased violence in the unit AO canmake it difficult to perform CMO. AIF

attacks and an increased emphasis ondeliberate MNF combat operations canpreempt CMO patrols, delay ongoingreconstruction projects and keep thebattalion S5 in the TOC to help plan andexecute battalion operations.

However, concern for CMO rarelyfalls by the wayside during these “surge”operations. The battalion S5 (or S2 inmany units) continues to support fight-ing units with interpreters. The S5 alsoperforms consequence management,passively collects intelligence and takesover the execution of the CMO tasksnormally performed by batteries whennot performing surge combat opera-tions. These include project supervi-sion and governance support.

2. High-Volume CMO. Battalion S5sshould see it as their duty to make apositive and stabilizing impact on theirAO in the limited time available. Projectsare a visible way to create a lastingpositive effect on the populace and canbe exploited using IO in support of themission.

3-82 FA developed a CMO campaignplan based on the commander’s intentand current area assessments. Fromspring 2003 through January 2004, 4-1FA, 1st Armored Division, and the sup-porting CAT-A from the 490th CABattalion created a thorough assess-ment database of all key locations withinAO Red Dragon, including schools,mosques, police stations, governancelocations, banks, clinics and utilities. InOctober 2004, the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA) estimated the RedDragons’ AO population exceeded350,000, but Baghdad city administra-tors postulated it could be twice thatnumber.

The initial task of the CAT was toverify and update the area assessmentdata and familiarize itself and the unitwith the existing civil administrationstructure. This meant meeting with thelocal public works and regional electri-cal director-generals and other munici-pal officials.

The Red Dragons created the CMOcampaign plan before deploying, basedon the 1st Armored Division and, later,the 1st Cavalry Division commanders’guidance for CMO. This guidance boileddown to what was known as the sewer,water, electric and trash improvementplan, or “SWET.” The S5 section thenincorporated the commander’s guid-ance, assessment data, the unique needsof the neighborhood and input from thelocal neighborhood and district advi-

sory councils.3-82 FA developed a dynamic cam-

paign plan to create short-, medium-and long-term improvements to essen-tial services and capabilities within theAO and quantified the focus along atimeline. The S5 section recommendedpriorities for each month and quarter.

For example, education improvementbegan in February 2004 as the mostintense CMO effort and continuedthrough the summer vacation period,culminating in an IO event at the begin-ning of the new school year in October.With education, the task was to reha-bilitate all 63 public schools in the areaduring the summer to enable the BaghdadKarkh 1 School District to maintain theschool system in the future.

It was a massive school reconstruc-tion project campaign funded by a com-bination of CERP and rehabilitationfunds from the US Agency for Interna-tional Development (USAID). Ourendstate was the successful handover ofthe management of education to theIraqi Government, culminating in a dis-trict-wide town hall meeting with Min-istry of Education representatives, localschool headmasters, parents and Arabmedia.

Later, sewage system improvementbecame a battalion-level priority to pre-clude anticipated sewer backups duringthe onset of the rainy season in Novem-ber. The battalion priorities shifted overtime to respond to the specific neigh-borhood needs while meeting the bri-gade and division commanders’ intent.

3-82 FA planned scores of reconstruc-tion projects at one time. The steps of aproject are relatively simple, involvinga little paperwork and cooperation froma local Iraqi contractor. The unit createsa detailed statement of work (SOW)with a request for proposal (RFP) andreleases it to local contractors so theycan prepare estimates. The unit thenselects the winning contractor, preparesthe funding request paperwork, seeksand gains funding approval, preparesand signs a contract, and supervises thework.

The battalion S5 arranges final pay-ment only after the contract is com-pleted successfully and usually closesout the project with a ceremony, Arabmedia coverage or other IO event withthe intent to give legitimacy to the IraqiGovernment or council members in-volved.

Local contractors attended the weeklycontractor meeting at the Mamu’n Tele-


communications Tower secured bybattalion troops and Iraqi NationalGuardsmen. The battalion S5 andbrigade CERP pay agents sometimesreceived more than 40 local contrac-tors to release new RFPs, collectestimates, sign contracts, serve no-tices of deficiencies for ongoing workand (or) make progress payments forcurrent or completed projects. Thesystem proved successful, helping3-82 FA manage up to 60 projectsand activities at once.

The batteries and CAT supervisedprojects throughout the week withthe assistance of a team of Iraqi en-gineers and inspectors. Providingfeedback to contractors at the weeklymeeting helped enforce high stan-dards of engineering quality controlwhile still meeting more than 90percent of project completion time-lines.

Project Tracker was one of the unit’smost useful staff products. (See anexample of the project tracker in thesidebar “The S5 NCO and CMOProject Management” by Staff Ser-geant Thomas J. Kelly III on Page43.)

The S5 quickly can get swamped inhundreds of issues, ranging from con-tract disputes, substandard workman-ship, property rights arguments, per-sonal feuds, contractor corruption scan-dals and more. An effective projectmanagement system with detailed andeasily accessible records multiplies theamount of projects one unit can handleat a time, injecting a degree of account-ability and quality control into whatcould be a chaotic process.

The S5 should leave “no stone un-turned” in the search for project fund-ing sources. While the BCT and divi-sion staffs helped the Red Dragons withfunding, 3-82 FA developed many fruit-ful personal relationships with USAID;reconstruction officials from the IraqiInterim Government (IIG); foreign em-bassies, such as Japan and Spain; andnon-governmental organizations (NGOs),such as JumpStart International and theUnited Iraqi Medical Society. Each en-deavor had varying degrees of successbut provided the longer-term benefit ofbringing together diverse groups for acommon purpose: the stability and se-curity of a free Iraq.

3. Vertical CMO. The Red Dragonsmaintained a tactical command post(TAC) in the International Zone forseveral months, giving it the opportu-

nity to liaise with officials in the CPA(later, the US Embassy) and Iraqi Gov-ernment ministries. 3-82 FA workedtogether with the BCT S5 and divisionG5 to gain access to the right group foreach issue faced.

By bringing Iraqi Government offi-cials into the picture, the unit usuallyachieved a more lasting and appropriatesolution to a problem and, eventually,passed responsibility for the work to theappropriate Iraqi agency. This techniquebrought opportunities to help developand strengthen the applicable Iraqiagency to handle other issues for them-selves in the future.

The Red Dragons’ best example ofvertical integration of CMO is the secu-rity of the Grand Mosque of Al Mansurin April 2004. The Grand Mosque wasa partially completed Saddam Husseinpresidential mosque the size of the Hous-ton Astrodome in the center of Bagh-dad’s prestigious Mansur neighborhood.After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003,Shiite Arab peoples from other parts ofBaghdad and Iraq who were led by agroup of influential Shiite religiousscholars moved into the constructionsite by the hundreds.

A series of events followed, includingsectarian accusations of theft and crimefrom local long-time residents, infiltra-tions of the normally peaceful Friday

prayer calls at the construction siteby supporters of the radical Muqtadaal Sadr, and occasional verbal con-frontations between officials fromthe Ministry of Housing and Con-struction and the religious scholarsheikhs at the site. The Red Drag-ons’ main concerns were the secu-rity and safety of all area residentsand enabling the Iraqi Governmentto forge a long-term solution of itsown by deciding what to do with thepartially constructed mosque.

3-82 FA helped initiate a broadCMO plan to ensure immediate andlong-term security at the site. It in-cluded street-level humanitarian as-sistance (HA) delivered to residentsof the construction site and the sur-rounding neighborhood, a CA as-sessment and listing of all 500 con-struction-site residents, the initiationof park rehabilitation projects nearby,meetings between the local com-mander and sheikhs at the mosque,and Arab media accompaniment onall patrols to supervise the project.

3-82 FA employed combat patrolsand set up observation posts (OPs) at

certain times to protect area residentsfrom suspected AIF infiltrating fromother parts of the city. CMO patrols,such as the one conducted by Lieuten-ant Balke, gathered information andintelligence to help plan these opera-tions.

Simultaneously, the battalion comman-der and S5, with the help of the divisionG5’s governance support team (GST),facilitated the first inter-ministerialworking group since the CPA’s cre-ation. For the first time, the workinggroup brought together representativesfrom the CPA, US State Departmentand four separate Iraqi ministries to setthe conditions for immediate securityand the eventual Iraqi Government-sponsored long-term solution.

All parties agreed to a combined pres-ence of Iraqi Facilities Protective Ser-vice (FPS) and periodic 3-82 FA patrolsand observation at the Grand Mosque tostabilize the volatile situation until theMinistry of Housing and Constructioncould enter the premises and removethe government-owned constructionequipment. With interaction betweenall parties from the street to the nationallevel, the Red Dragons were able toaffect short-term security and long-termdevelopment in what could have be-come a hotbed of violence in Mansur.

4. Focus on Iraq: Be an Important

Anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) attacks can preempt CMOpatrols, delay ongoing reconstruction projects andkeep the battalion S5 in the tactical operations cen-ter (TOC) to help plan and execute battalion opera-tions.

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Part of Your Neighborhood. Local na-tional interpreters do much to connectSoldiers with Iraqis in their AO. The 3-82 FA S5 managed up to 45 interpretersfor the battalion who were hired byTitan Corporation, a defense contractorin Iraq. Each battery scheduled and caredfor its own four to seven interpreters.

These brave men and women becamea part of the unit with which they workedand served alongside troops on all mis-sions. They were enormous assets to thebattalion and performed many tasks:atmospherics collection, Arabic lan-guage training, interrogation, intelli-gence collection and daily interpreta-tion. As the platoon sergeant for theinterpreters, the S5 NCO ensured theinterpreters were well cared for, paidand equipped.

Another important technique 3-82 FAused to become intimate with theirneighborhoods was to constantly up-date and renew their area assessments.The CAT, S5 and each CMO lieutenantat the battery level carried a 10-pagepacket with the eight-digit grids, names,phone numbers and other informationon all important locations and individu-als in the area. Verifying this informa-tion in the first few weeks of operationshelped the unit become familiar withthe area. Carrying the information withthem on patrols over the next severalmonths enabled leaders to maintain thisintimacy and react intelligently to mostsituations.

In August 2004, a vehicle-borne im-provised explosive device (VBIED) de-tonated near the IIG minister’s villa com-pound in the neighborhoodof Qadisiyah in the RedDragon AO. Initial reportscame to the battalion TOCfrom security elements nearthe compound as well as viacellular telephone calls fromlocals at the Patriotic Unionof Kurdistan (PUK) buildingnear the attack.

The S5 and local batterycommander contacted repre-sentatives from the Iraqi po-lice station, public works di-rectorate and local hospitalto evacuate the wounded, re-store power, clean up the siteand repair the road to restoretraffic flow in a matter of hoursinstead of days or weeks. Therapid resolution of this eventand subsequent CMO, PAand IO victories for the resi-

dents of Qadisiyah were possible mainlybecause of the highly developed per-sonal relationships between the RedDragons and Iraqi Government andmedical leaders who were just a phonecall away.

In October 2004, the Red Dragonsworked with officials from the Ministryof Education to hold Mansur’s first edu-cation town hall meeting at a local com-munity center. 3-82 FA and USAID hadrehabilitated all but two public schoolsin the area during the summer and wereeager to prepare the local school districtdirector-general to assume the bulk ofthe responsibility for future improve-ments to education. 3-82 FA used aseries of meetings between the MNF-supported district council and the estab-lished, but fragile, education ministryto get the ministry officials up to speedon the progress in their schools and topropose a realistic plan for the future.The presence of the CAT and represen-tatives from USAID helped legitimizethe fledgling district council.

Shortly thereafter, the district counciland Ministry of Education held theirown town hall meeting with hundredsof local headmasters and parents. RedDragons worked with the local Iraqipolice to provide security and invitedArab media to the event. At the end ofthe day, the Ministry of Education anddistrict council had assumed a new levelof responsibility for the public schoolsystem in Mansur, were able to publi-cize the significant improvements madeduring the summer, became account-able to parents and residents for contin-

ued progress in education, and wereprepared to continue improvements ineducation with their new partner,USAID, without day-to-day directionfrom the Red Dragons.

5. Synchronize CMO. 3-82 FA held aninternal weekly CMO meeting in thebattalion conference room. Each bat-tery sent its CMO lieutenant to meetwith the battalion S5, CAT and thebattalion public affairs office (PAO),IO and intelligence exploitation (S2X)officers. Attendees updated assessmentdata and discussed issues and the statusof reconstruction projects. Participantsalso shared information and developedsolutions to other issues ranging frominterpreter assignments and pay tosewer, water or trash service problemsin the AO.

The most important part of the meet-ing was the synchronization roundtable.The S5 developed and briefed a tenta-tive plan for the week. During the round-table, attendees finalized the week’splan by arranging joint battery-CATpatrols, developing specific CMO-re-lated tasks and purposes for selectedbattery combat patrols, developing pas-sive intelligence and atmospherics re-porting requirements for the week, de-termining exactly which operationswould receive Arab or western mediarepresentatives and more. The battalionCMO/IO calendar encoded this infor-mation on a single page, making it vis-ible for all battalion staff and comman-ders for three weeks out. The battalionS3 then revised the CMO/IO plan tosynchronize it with combat operations

and psychological operations(PSYOP).

Lessons Learned. Iraq is adynamic and ever-changingenvironment. Lessons learnedtoday may not apply to theproblems of tomorrow. How-ever, during 3-82 FA’s year-long CMO experience, sev-eral lessons may prove usefulto units operating in Iraq to-day and in the future.

• Provide a common CMOassessment product. The as-sessment data 3-82 FA col-lected on a master file provedto be a useful tool. Soldierson patrol must be able to tellthat the assessment of, say,“their clinic” among the “14clinics” in the AO is still valid.To ensure that the unit as-sesses every inch of ground

SSG Anthony Falcone, Civil Affairs Team Sergeant, talks with an Iraqiwoman and her children about CMO projects in her neighborhood.

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In the dynamic environment of Op-eration Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the dutiesof the civil military operations (CMO)NCO vary greatly from unit to unit andfrom day to day. As the assistant to theCMO officer (S5) for the Red Dragons3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82FA), 1st Cavalry Division, in Baghdadduring OIF I and II, my most importantduty was project management.

The Red Dragons employed a unique,yet simple, reconstruction project man-agement system with four components:the Project Tracker, project filing andrecords system, contract supervision andcontractor meetings.

This article explains how the projectmanagement system multiplied thebattalion’s efforts and enabled 3-82 FAto manage up to 60 reconstruction andcivil affairs (CA) activities simulta-neously while maintaining one of thehighest quality standards and success-ful on-time completion rates in the 1stCavalry Division.

Project Tracker. The Project Trackeris a spreadsheet the S5 produces, up-dates and distributes periodically. (Seethe figure). The tracker includes allprojects in the unit area of operations(AO), including those funded by thecommander’s emergency response pro-

gram (CERP) or other programs fundedby non-governmental organizations(NGOs) and governmental organiza-tions (GOs), such as the US Agency forInternational Development (USAID)and the Iraqi Government.

The document tracks all reconstruc-tion projects from conception throughcompletion, giving commanders thesituational awareness they need to keeptheir Iraqi counterparts informed of theprojects’ progress and make projectdecisions based on mission priorities,funding availability and communityimpact.

Project Recording and Filing. At theconception of the project, the S5 NCOinitially is the project manager and as-signs it a tracking number. He files alldocuments pertaining to that project inits corresponding numbered file.

This system organizes the unit’s CMOand makes it possible for one unit toconduct scores of simultaneous projectswithout confusion. The system consistsof a filing box or cabinet of whateversize is available. The project managerenters files by project tracking numbersin numerical sequence with one hang-ing file for each project. Some projectshave multiple contractors or phases, sothere may be several file folders in the

same hanging file with alphanumerictracking numbers (i.e., 21a, 21b, 21c,etc.). The S5 NCO should check thefiles daily to ensure that documentsgenerated or received for each projectare filed quickly and accurately.

Normally, each project file contains astatement of work (SOW) with a re-quest for proposal (RFP), price esti-mates or bills of quantities from con-tractors, digital photos, a contractor se-lection memo, the funding request docu-ment, the project contract, in-progressinspection reports and pay receipts.

Each project begins with a SOW thatclearly describes what the contractormust perform during the project. TheRFP includes the SOW and providesdetailed instructions and requirementsto contractors who wish to compete inan open bid for the job, such as timelines,pricing limitations and an estimate sub-mission deadline.

Any element of the battalion can pre-pare a SOW and RFP. Usually, how-ever, the S5 obtains RFPs from thebattery commanders and CA team, whoinitiate and supervise the reconstruc-tion projects as part of their ongoingCMO.

After receiving estimates from localcontractors, the S5 and commanders

and speaks to every Iraqi possible, theS5 can draw a cartoon map like thosecommonly sold in tourist cities, notnecessarily to scale, but showing im-portant locations and information in aneasy-to-read format. It can be hand-drawn on a large piece of paper postedon the wall of the TOC or CMO center(CMOC).

If a patrol from B Battery speaks withthe owner of a produce stand near thegas station, the patrol leader can de-scribe it to the S5 who can draw itscaricature on the map with basic infor-mation about the location and the peoplewho work there. The amount of helpfulinformation that could be attained us-ing this method is unlimited, easily un-derstood by all and helpful in solvingthe “puzzle” of Iraq.

Furthermore, this information can befed into the S2’s all-source analysissystem (ASAS) database via contactreports submitted after each mission.

• Add interpreter training to the pre-deployment train-up. Soldiers should

use specific techniques to maximize theeffectiveness of their communicationswhen using interpreters. The languagebarrier may be formidable, but it is notinsurmountable. With our cursory leadertraining on working with interpreters inNovember 2003, many Soldiers failedto communicate effectively.

Learning to use an interpreter prop-erly not only helps the Soldier be under-stood, but also fosters good relationswith the people in the community. Sol-diers will appreciate the immense valuelocal national interpreters offer the unit.By establishing relationships with inter-preters, the battalion can better under-stand the cultural landscape of the AO.

• Seek CA training for S5s and batteryCMO lieutenants. Before deploying, S5personnel attended 40 hours of trainingby CA officers from the John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center sent to FortHood from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.The S5 is not the only Soldier whoperforms CMO tasks. CA training ofany kind for battery-level leaders will

benefit the unit greatly.During their 10 months in central

Baghdad, the Red Dragons worked withIraqis and used CMO to make remarkableand lasting progress in their AO. 3-82FA, together with the Mansur DistrictCouncil, subordinate neighborhoodcouncils and many local leaders andofficials, forged the potential for a brightand prosperous future in an importantand influential area of Baghdad.

Captain Evans A. Hanson is the Civil MilitaryOperations (CMO) Officer (S5) for 3d Battal-ion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82 FA), 1st CavalryDivision, Fort Hood, Texas. From January2004 until February 2005, he was deployedin support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Heserved as an Assistant Operations Officerduring the pre-deployment train-up. Previ-ously, he was the Executive Officer, PaladinPlatoon Leader and Battery Fire DirectionOfficer in B/3-82 FA and Fire Support Of-ficer for D/1-8 Cav.

The S5 NCO and CMO Project Management


compare them based on the unit’s con-tractor selection criteria in an open freebid. Some factors of contractor selec-tion include price competitiveness,source of labor pool, ability to meettimeline requirements, etc.

Similar to a course of action (COA)decision matrix used by staffs duringthe military decision-making process(MDMP), the contractor selection memoexplains why the unit selects a particu-lar contractor. After the project fundingis approved (CERP projects usually areapproved by brigade commanders orhigher), the project manager writes thecontract by combining the RFP, thecontractor’s estimate, SOW and timelinerequirements.

Project Supervision. After the contractis signed and while the project is inprogress, battalion Soldiers supervise thework. Digital photos are a critical require-ment for every stage of the process.

Units must ensure that the S5 andbattery commanders have access to digi-tal cameras so that proper records existfor each project. Project photos shouldbe labeled clearly and kept on file withthe S5.

The S5 issues notices of deficiency tocontractors when inspecting units ormembers of the local neighborhoodcouncils discover substandard work orconduct. These also should be in the

Project andLocation Actions

Contractorand Phone No.RemarksAmountFund Source

Neighbor-hood

Civil-MilitaryTask

BalanceRemaining

Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Project Tracker. This document often grew to more than 10 pages. It also includes “Current WorkingProjects with an External Funding Source” and “Projects Awaiting Approval and (or) Funding.”

165

255

IndexNo.

Mansur

Qadisiyah

Community

Security

Mansur BasketballCourt

IIG CompoundPhase II

Battalion CERP

US Embassy

100% complete. Contractsigned 16 Sep. Final

payment made 7 Nov.

Need to scheduleopening ceremony

Complete

Hakim Hasson7901576980

Ali Rasheed7901672801

$0

$0

Activity

HSB

A Btry

$17,450

$98,050

Awaiting Closeout Procedures

100% complete. Contractsigned 12 Oct. Final

payment made 12 Nov.

Recently Completed Projects (Since Last Targeting Meeting)

Current Working Projects

270

310

169

Hateen

3-82 AOR

Yarmuk

Services

Trash

Public Health

Hateen Fire StationRefurbishment

Mansur FallCleanup

Karkh MedicalCenter

Rehabilitation

Battalion CERP

Brigade CERP

Division CERP

$13,000

$34,000

$290,080

C Btry

S5

Civil Affairs

5% complete.Contract signed 4 Nov.

50% complete.Contract signed 28 Oct.

50% complete. Contractsigned 23 Sep. Secondpayment made 7 Nov.

First paymentarranged: $5,000

First paymentarranged: $15,000

Final paymentarranged: $60,080

Emad Chalabi7901312580

Faid Ismael7901227940

Bayat Group7901435560

$13,000

$34,000

$60,080

AOR = Area of ResponsibilityBtry = Battery

CERP = Commander’s EmergencyResponse Program

Legend: HSB = Headquarters Service BatteryIIG = Iraqi Interim Government

appropriate project files.Receipts are critical in keeping track

of money paid incrementally for workalready completed (i.e., 20 percent, 40percent, 60 percent). Units should neverpay in advance for work not yet per-formed and never make final paymentuntil the contractor corrects all defi-ciencies.

Contractor Meetings These meet-ings are to evaluate the projects’ pro-gress, issue deficiency notices, pay con-tractors, notify contractors of new RFPsand collect estimates from last weeks’RFPs. With more than 50 local contrac-tors all seeking work at each meeting, itcan be a nightmare. Yet, with planningand preparation, the event can be rela-tively painless.

The S5 NCO contacts the local con-tractors and provides them a secure,accessible location and predictable timefor a weekly meeting. He coordinateswith the brigade paying agent for themeeting time and location.

Using the Project Tracker, the projectmanager prepares the pay receipts anddeficiency notices for each currentproject the evening before the meeting.Numbered cards or tickets keep con-tractors in queue in the order in whichthey arrive while they wait to speakwith the S5 and the brigade payingagent. The S5 NCO allows contractors

into a private room to speak with the S5one at a time. The S5 works with eachcontractor, depending on his contractactivities or actions related to RFPs.These meetings often are a good sourceof atmospherics assessments and intel-ligence.

Once the meeting is complete, the S5NCO immediately sorts the new esti-mates by project and checks and returnsall files to the filing cabinet. The S5updates the Project Tracker to distrib-ute to and update commanders on theweek’s progress.

Some recommended supplies forproject managers include a laptop com-puter, filing cabinet, digital camera,copier/printer/scanner and portable USBdisk drives. For examples of products3-82 FA used to conduct project man-agement that were later adopted as the1st Cavalry Division standard, pleaserefer to the “Civil Military Operations”folder on the 1st Cavalry Division se-cure knowledge-sharing network athttp://www.1cd.army.smil.mil.

During their 10-month tour in centralBaghdad, the Red Dragons used thissimple system to manage overlappingprojects and multiply CMO effectivenessin support of a stable and prosperous Iraq.

SSG Thomas J. Kelly IIIS5 NCO, 3-82 FA

1st Cav Div, Baghdad


The USS Bulkeley, a Norfolk, Virginia-based Arleigh Burke Class guided missiledestroyer participated in the Global Waron Terrorism in the Arabian Gulf.(US Navy photo by Photographers Mate First Class PH1 Brien Aho)

44

NFCS is becoming the Navy’skey system to manage surfacefires in littoral warfare. NFCS,

technically the AN/SYQ-27, is bring-ing Navy surface combatants into thedigital fires arena, enabling the con-cepts of the Marine Corps OperationalManeuver From the Sea (OMFS) andShip-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM).These concepts are setting the standardfor the naval combatant operations. Theyalso are leading the way for buyingadvanced technologies to depict battle-space three dimensionally and developa common operational picture (COP).The NFCS provides this COP whileinterfacing with the advanced FA tacti-cal data system (AFATDS), among othersystems. (See the figure.)

Currently the US Navy AmphibiousFleet is redesigning the supporting armscoordination center (SACC) to incor-

porate NFCS and AFATDS asthe fires management systemand the command and con-trol personal computer

(C2PC) for decision making,providing a unified and coordi-

nated command center with linksto all other naval warfare compo-

nents. This displays the COP andstreamlines the decision-making pro-cess. Likewise, the Naval Surface Com-batant Fleet has NFCS hardware andsoftware that enables the ship com-mander to become an integrated mem-ber of this digitally defined three-di-mensional battlespace.

NFCS is a variable message format-(VMF)-based system that manages na-val fires for Arleigh Burke Class de-stroyers equipped with the MK-160 gunweapon system (GWS) using the 5-inch, 62-caliber gun. NFCS also worksin concert with the Aegis combat sys-tem, enabling the addition of land-basedtargets to the COP.

By Master Sergeant (Retired)Gregory T. Kollar, USMC

Naval FireControlSystem

March-April 2005 Field Artillery


Naval Fire Control System (NFCS) Capabilities

Legend:ACO = Air Control Order

ADNS = Automated Digital NetworkingSystem

ATO = Air Tasking OrderGCCS-M = Global Command and Control

System-MarineGWS = Gun Weapon System

HF = High FrequencyFSCM = Fire Support Coordination

Measures

LAN = Local Area NetworkMet = Meteorological

NSFS = Naval Surface Fire SupportSATCOMS= Satellite CommunicationsTACFIRE = Tactical Fire Direction SystemTACLINK = Tactical Communications Link

TBMCS = Theater Battle Management CoreSystem

VHF = Variable High FrequencyVMF = Variable Message Format

NFCS is a two-monitor system thatuses existing Tomahawk display equip-ment. The NFCS operator views thetactical picture on the upper monitorand the NFCS user interface on thelower monitor.

NFCS also supports the display ofNational Geospatial-IntelligenceAgency (NGA) digital mapping prod-ucts. It develops the COP through mul-tiple channels: surface and air tracksfrom the global command and controlsystem-marine (GCCS-M), air taskingorder (ATO) and air control order (ACO)from the Air Force theater battle man-agement core system (TBMCS) and landtracks via the interface with AFATDSor directly from digitally equipped sta-tions.

NFCS receives and processes calls-for-fire (CFFs) and orders to fire (OTFs)from all current Marine Corps fire sup-port systems (MCFSS) fielded. UsingNFCS decreases mission response timesfrom 2.5 minutes for the first round shotto 30 to 45 seconds. Deconfliction fornaval surface fire support (NSFS) re-quires assessing all environments (air,land and sea) before firing a weapon.Normally command information center(CIC) personnel deconflict each war-fare environment to ensure that firingan NSFS weapon will not conflict withother air or surface assets being em-ployed.

NFCS not only deconflicts all environ-ments, but also alerts the operator anddisplays a three-dimensional view of theconflicting item. The NFCS operator canmanipulate the view to better understandthe situation before requesting re-coordi-nation or denying the mission.

Tomahawk fire control personnel op-erate NFCS; being dual-hatted, the sail-ors must be proficient in both navalstrike and littoral warfare duties.

NFCS is compatible with the currentsuite of equipment fielded to both theMarines and Army.

NFCS training is a three-week coursethat trains operators in the tactical op-eration and detailed maintenance of thesystem. This Land Attack Warfare Of-ficers Course is one-week and focuseson integrating Navy littoral warfare intocurrent operations.

The Naval Surface Warfare Command(NSWC), Dahlgren Division, inDahlgren, Virginia, is developing NFCSunder the sponsorship of the ProgramExecutive Office for Integrated War-fare Systems in Washington, DC.

Master Sergeant (Retired) Gregory T.Kollar, USMC, is a Land Attack WarfareAnalyst serving as a Naval Fire ControlSystem Instructor at the Naval SurfaceWarfare Center, Dahlgren Division,Dahlgren, Virginia. He is employed withBAE Systems. In his last military assign-ment, he was the Senior Instructor for

Marine Corps Fire Support Systems at theMarine Corps Detachment, Fort Sill, Okla-homa, from 1996 to 2000 when he retired.Among other assignments, Master Ser-geant Kollar was the Battalion OperationsChief for the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines,at Alameta, California. He also has workedwith the 10th, 11th and 12th Marines.

Stores and displays all permissive and restrictive measures;provides a three-dimensional view of deconfliction problemsfor operator resolution; and complies with FM 101-5 Opera-tional Terms and Symbols (MIL-STD-2525B graphics).

FSCM

Receives ATO/ACO from TBMCS; and parses, displays anddeconflicts against all current geometries.

ATO/ACO

Receives Met data over VMF channels or through the GCCS-Minterface and stores and processes the Met data.

Met Messages

Stores and displays up to 100 friendly units and complies withFM 101-5 (MIL-STD-2525B graphics).

Observers/Friendly Units

Stores up to 5,000 targets and an unlimited target list (has notargeting capability).

Targets

Stores and manages 60 active missions; the GWS may storeup to 20 active missions but fires one mission at a time.

Fire Missions

Develops and stores 10 fire plans, each covering a timeframeof 480 minutes.

Fire Plans

Is VHF/HF/SATCOMS/ADNS LAN-capable and supports 100TACLINK subscribers and unlimited ADNS LAN subscribers.

Communications

Stores directives and ship instructions and processes themagainst decision-making algorithms; allows the operator toautomate multiple decision points based on the current en-gagement.

Command Data

Supports standalone or team training; supports developingtraining scripts for use in either training mode; and, in thetraining mode, maintains live GCCC-M, simulates 100 sta-tions and supports VMF or TACFIRE devices.

EmbeddedTraining

Manages all 5-inch projectiles, accounting for the magazine,NSFS allocated amounts, critical and warning levels, anddecrements of weapons used during other warfare.

WeaponsInventory

Continuously monitors and displays the status of the NFCSrack, GWS, GCCS-M and ADNS servers.

SystemMonitoring

PIN: 082037-000

Field Artillery(USPS 309-010)P.O. Box 33311Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311

Periodicals PostagePAID

Capitol Heights, MD

May-June:

Interview with BG Richard P. Formica, Commander of the JFEC, MultiNational Corps, Iraq

Election Duty

SGT Raul Batalla, C/2-82 FA, 1stCavalry Division, kneels afterhearing gun shots near the votingpolls in Baghdad on 30 January2005. C/2-82 FA helped providean environment in which Iraqiscould conduct elections withoutinterference.

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a joint magazine for us field artillerymen march-april 2005 · a joint magazine for us field...

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