a guide to preparing for and responding to prison emergencies · a guide to preparing for and...

Self-Audit Checklists • National Survey Results

• Resource Materials • Case Studies

U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Corrections

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to

Prison Emergencies

U.S. Department of JusticeNational Institute of Corrections

320 First Street, NWWashington, DC 20534

Morris L. ThigpenDirector

Larry SolomonDeputy Director

George M. KeiserChief, Community Corrections/Prisons Division

Randy CorcoranProject Manager

National Institute of CorrectionsWorld Wide Web Site

http://www.nicic.org

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to

Prison Emergencies

Self-Audit Checklists • National Survey Results

• Resource Materials • Case Studies

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D.Cynthia Barry, Ph.D.

LETRA, Inc.Campbell, California

June 2005NIC Accession Number 020293

This document was funded by cooperative agreement number 02P11 fromthe National Institute of Corrections, U.S Department of Justice. Points of viewor opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not neces-sarily represent the official opinion or policies of the U.S. Departmentof Justice.

Cover photos: Left photo courtesy of the Office of Law Enforcement TechnologyCommercialization, Wheeling, West Virginia. Middle photo ©Photodisc Illustration/Getty Images. Right photo ©Corbis.

iii

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix

Section 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Development of This Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Section 2: Conducting an Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Purpose and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Section 3: Self-Audit Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37–180

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-1

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-1

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-1

Section 4: Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181

Section 5: Resource Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .201

Leadership Issues During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205

Prevention of Prison Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215

Emergency Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227

Prisons and Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241

iv

Section 6: Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255

Fire in a New Institution: Taney County, Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257

Lucasville Prison Riot: Ohio Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Helicopter Intrusion/Escape: Colorado Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . 271

Riot at Max: Montana State Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277

The 1993 Midwest Floods: Missouri Loses Renz Correctional Center . . . . . . 289

The Morey Unit Hostage Incident: Arizona Department of Corrections . . . . . .293

Hurricane Andrew: Florida Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

Contents (continued)

v

In 1996, the National Institute of Corrections(NIC) published its monograph Critical Analysisof Emergency Preparedness: Self AuditMaterials. In introducing that monograph, Iwrote:

Emergency preparedness is a cruciallyimportant topic for every state depart-ment of corrections and for every cor-rectional institution. Large-scale inmateviolence or a natural disaster canthreaten the lives of both the institution-al staff and inmates. In hours, a majoremergency can cost a state tens of mil-lions of dollars and result in many yearsof litigation. The negative publicity sur-rounding a major institutional crisis canalso be overwhelming and almostinterminable.

Emergency preparedness is often notafforded the priority that it needs anddeserves. In some cases, this may be dueto complacency. In other cases, it hap-pens because establishing a comprehen-sive system of emergency preparationand emergency response is not easy. Itrequires budget, time, equipment, inter-agency coordination, and long-termmanagement attention.

Nearly a decade later, those comments still ringtrue. However, the field of corrections has madea great deal of progress regarding emergencypreparedness. A number of state departments ofcorrections have committed to comprehensive

initiatives designed to improve their emergencyreadiness at both the departmental and institu-tional levels. As a result, substantially more cor-rectional agencies are well prepared today forthe possibility of a major crisis situation, andfewer remain complacent and/or unprepared.

Obviously, the world around us has changed dra-matically in recent years. The bombing of thefederal building in Oklahoma City, the eventsof September 11, 2001, the subsequent anthraxincidents, and, as this is written, the train bomb-ings in Madrid, Spain, and the killing of hun-dreds of school children in Russia serve noticeon American corrections about a whole newrange of risks that cannot be ignored. Bombthreats or even the possibility of an outsideassault designed to free an inmate are not newconsiderations for prisons or jails. However, thethreat of concerted terrorist activity with sophis-ticated planning, coordination, and even muni-tions represents a challenge that is categoricallydifferent from our traditional concerns about sit-uations involving inmate violence or natural dis-asters. It is NIC’s hope that this new guide willhelp state and local correctional agencies contin-ue to improve their preparedness for traditionalemergencies and will also provide a startingpoint for considering the emerging realities ofterrorist threats.

This guide builds on the self-audit instrumentsthat were at the heart of the 1996 monograph.Those instruments, together with a related seriesof NIC-sponsored seminars, were designed to

Foreword

vi

help state departments of corrections evaluatetheir readiness, at both the institutional anddepartmental levels, to handle major crisis situa-tions. The 1996 monograph proved to beextremely popular and useful, and NIC contin-ues to receive requests for it to this day. Onemeasure of its success is that department-conducted self-audits of emergency readinesshave largely replaced what had been a growingtrend of NIC-funded assessments conducted byoutside experts.

We hope that this new guide will be even moreuseful. It is much more than a simple update ofthe earlier monograph. The self-audit materialshave been substantially modified, refined, andexpanded, and the rest of the guide is essentiallynew in scope and character.

Morris L. ThigpenDirector

National Institute of Corrections

vii

Preface

It is instructive to review the introduction to theprison emergency preparedness self-audit mate-rials published in 1996 as an NIC monograph.The monograph noted a number of positivechanges that had occurred in the previous 20 to30 years with regard to prison emergencies, andit also underscored several problems and chal-lenges that remained widespread. The 1996monograph reviewed the trend toward seriousemergency preparedness at most state prisonsand drew contrasts with earlier times when com-prehensive emergency planning was the excep-tion rather than the rule. It singled out theemphasis on prevention of crises and emergen-cies as another major improvement. On theother hand, the 1996 monograph was candidabout the number of institutions and depart-ments in which emergency preparedness was nottaken seriously or existed only on paper, not inreality. The prevailing belief in such places was“it can’t happen here.” The monograph alsonoted a more specific problem: the tendency ofdepartments and institutions to base their emer-gency planning almost solely on riot andhostage situations.

More than 8 years have passed since that mono-graph was published—not a long time in theevolution of a discipline like corrections.Predictably, many of the observations in the1996 monograph still hold true today. However,some things have changed substantially, and a

few have changed quite dramatically—asreflected in the content of this guide. One sub-stantial change is the much broader appreciationtoday of the need to prepare for crises that arisenot from inmate violence but from incidentssuch as fires, floods, and hurricanes. Thus, thisguide includes a separate checklist for assessingprison readiness to deal with natural disasters.

With regard to dramatic change, terrorism hastaken front and center stage. When the 1996monograph was published, the events ofSeptember 11, 2001, were, for most people andmost agencies, simply unimaginable. It is clearthat since September 11, some things will neverbe the same. Considerations of terrorism nowseem to be a part of our daily lives. Therefore,this guide includes a separate checklist forassessing counterterrorism efforts and planningin prisons—the first self-audit checklist of itskind, but likely not the last.

In today’s world, the forces that define prisonemergencies continue to change, sometimesvery rapidly. Thus, this guide clearly cannot bethe final word on prison emergency prepared-ness. The purpose of the materials in this guideis to help move the field of corrections forwardin understanding the demands of prison emer-gency and crisis situations and in understandingcurrent best practices with regard to emergencyplans, policies, and practices.

viii

The goals of this guide, then, are simple butimportant. It is hoped that the guide will resultin improved prevention efforts, planning, andresponse, so that some emergencies may be

averted entirely and others may be mitigated. Ifthis guide helps prevent violence in just a fewlocations and if it minimizes injuries, deaths, orescapes during just a few prison crises, then itwill have fully satisfied its objectives.

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D.Cynthia Barry, Ph.D.

LETRA, Inc.Campbell, California

ix

This guide is the result of a cooperative agree-ment funded by NIC. The guide could not havebeen developed without the efforts of many indi-viduals and the active participation of the major-ity of state departments of corrections (DOCs)across the United States.

Seven consultants worked on this project: RichCruickshank of the Nebraska DOC; Richard(Dick) Franklin, now retired and most recentlyof NIC’s Prisons Division; Bill Gentry, Directorof Person County (North Carolina) EmergencyServices; Brad Hansen of the Nebraska DOC;Richard Holder, retired from the Oregon DOC;Marty Jones, retired from the California DOC;and Charles Stewart of the North Carolina DOC.This group of consultants represents more than150 years of experience in corrections. Moreimportantly, each individual has a great deal ofhighly specialized experience in dealing withprison crises, major emergencies, and naturaldisasters. The collective wisdom of this groupencompasses not only emergency planning andpreparation but also firsthand experience inresponding to and managing prison crisis andemergency situations. The consultants workedindividually and in small groups to improve theself-audit materials from the earlier monograph,develop new materials, and critique drafts. Weare indebted to them for their generous contribu-tions to this guide.

Randy Corcoran of NIC’s Prisons Divisionserved as the Project Manager throughout thedevelopment of the guide. Randy monitored theprogress of the project and handled a variety

of administrative tasks for the Institute. Randywas an experienced warden in the MarylandDOC before he joined NIC’s Prisons Divisionand was always willing to roll up his sleeves andmake substantive contributions to the guide inaddition to carrying out his administrativeresponsibilities. Everyone who worked on thisproject thanks Randy for his involvement, hispatience, his commitment, and his many specificcontributions.

Susan Hunter, the long-time Director of NIC’sPrisons Division, became seriously ill and diedin early 2004. She had been personally involvedin this project from its conception. As with somany things at NIC, Susan’s hand is upon thisguide, and we are grateful for the time and ener-gy she devoted to this project.

NIC developed this monograph through a coop-erative agreement with LETRA, Inc., ofCampbell, CA. LETRA is a nonprofit trainingand research organization with more than 30years of experience in working with law enforce-ment and correctional agencies across the UnitedStates and Canada. Importantly, LETRA hasspecialized in developing comprehensive emer-gency systems for prisons and jails and in train-ing prison staff on emergency preparedness forthe last 25 years. A number of people associatedwith LETRA supported this project and madecontributions to this monograph, and we grate-fully acknowledge that assistance.

Dionne Niemi was LETRA’s office managerthroughout this project and had primary

Acknowledgments

x

responsibility for preparing draft materials, pro-viding logistical support to project staff andconsultants, and formatting the materials in theguide. She also carried out a wide range of otherduties that kept the project moving forward.

Two of the project consultants made an impor-tant additional contribution to the guide. BradHansen and Rich Cruickshank, both of theNebraska DOC, had collaborated with theProject Director and Deputy Director on thedevelopment of a training curriculum designedfor managers at the level of warden and above.That curriculum was completed a few yearsbefore this guide was developed. Three chaptersfrom the curriculum, “Leadership Issues DuringCrises,” “Prevention of Prison Emergencies,”and “Emergency Teams,” are reprinted in sec-tion 5 of the guide, with the permission of theauthors. We also want to express our gratitude toHarold Clarke, Nebraska’s former Director ofCorrections, and to the Nebraska DOC for theirimportant contributions to that training curricu-lum in general and to the three reprinted chap-ters specifically.

Of the country’s 50 DOCs, 33 agreed to partici-pate in this project by sending emergency plans,policies, and/or procedures for review. TheseDOCs also responded to a lengthy written sur-vey inquiring about emergency practices, poli-cies, plans, and procedures within their prisons.(The guide includes a detailed report on theresults of that survey, which was the first of itskind.) The DOCs’ contributions to the guide arevery much appreciated. On a related note, it is

important to acknowledge that this guidereflects a much larger body of knowledge aboutlarge-scale crises and emergencies in prisonsand that this body of knowledge is derived inlarge part from the practical experiences of agreat many correctional professionals.

Publications are like fine food. Good ingredientsare not enough: preparation and presentation arealso essential. For this monograph, we wereextremely fortunate that NIC provided the serv-ices of Aspen Systems Corporation ofRockville, MD. Lynn Marble and JanetMcNaughton, both of Aspen, not only correctedgrammar and punctuation and clarified syntax,they reorganized material and sometimes re-framed discussions, always moving the mono-graph toward increased clarity. In addition,Lynn, Janet, and designer C. Denise Collins areprimarily responsible for the cover design, thepage layout, and the graphics in this monograph,and they suggested important format changes inthe emergency checklists themselves, whichmade those instruments more “user friendly.”This monograph has benefited in many ways,some obvious and some subtle, from the first-rate professional editing services of Aspen, andwe are most grateful to them.

Jeffrey A. Schwartz, Ph.D.Project Director

Cynthia Barry, Ph.D.Project Deputy Director

LETRA, Inc.San Jose, California

Section 1Introduction

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Prisons and Major Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Assessing Emergency Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

The 1996 NIC Self-Audit Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Prison Emergencies and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) . . . .6

Development of This Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Why the Guide Was Developed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

How This Guide Differs From the 1996 Monograph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

In This Section

3

Prisons and Major Emergencies Emergency preparedness is a central, even criti-cal issue throughout American corrections.Today, most public agencies must have emer-gency plans, and even private businesses haveturned to disaster preparedness and businessrecovery planning. Prisons, however, are not likeother public agencies. They are responsible forthe safety of large numbers of individuals whoare usually locked up and cannot protect them-selves in many emergency situations. Further,and perhaps ironically, the very people who arelocked up and whose safety must be assured arethe source of the most frequent and the mostserious prison emergency situations. Finally, thefirst priority for every prison is community pro-tection, which means that even in the chaos of amajor emergency, prisons must ensure againstescape.

No prison is immune from large-scale emergen-cies. A minimum-custody facility housing short-term inmates may be at very low risk for riot anddisturbance situations, but a minimum-securitydesignation is no shield against fire, earthquake,chemical spill, or staff walkout.

A complicating factor is that the twin risks thatan emergency will happen, and that it will gobadly, are heightened by population overcrowd-ing and decreases in staffing levels and otherresources, as well as by the elimination of someprograms that help stabilize prisons (e.g., earnedgood time). These conditions are ubiquitous inAmerican corrections. As a result, most state

prison systems are in a more precarious positionwith regard to major emergencies than they were15 or 20 years ago.

Another factor affecting how prisons deal withmajor emergencies is the changing compositionof the correctional workforce. Recent years haveseen the wholesale retirement of staff who begantheir careers in the late 1960s and 1970s—staffwith 25 or 30 years of experience, many ofwhom had been through riots and hostage inci-dents and had demonstrated leadership underfire. Today, prisons promote staff much morequickly than once was customary. A captain mayhave 8 years of service now, whereas 20 yearsago a “young” captain in the same departmentwould have had 16 to 18 years of experience. Inthe absence of experience, agencies are far moredependent on policy, plans, and formal training.However, not everyone recognizes that reality.

If the likelihood and dangers of large-scale crisesin prisons are widely acknowledged as real, doesit not follow that almost all state prison systemswould commit serious time, resources, andthought to emergency preparedness? In fact, thatis not the case. The reasons are complex.

One reason that most prison systems have notplaced high priority on emergency preparednessis that planning for emergencies does not seemas pressing as day-to-day problems—until thereis an actual emergency. Second, most peoplejudge emergency situations by their outcome—whether they ended well—rather than looking athow the situations were handled—whether staff

Background

4

A Guide to Preparing for and Responding to Prison Emergencies

performed properly, the right training and equip-ment were in place, policies proved valid, etc. Intoo many systems, no serious scrutiny or reviewtakes place unless a situation ends in tragedy.Third, effective, comprehensive emergency pre-paredness is demanding and difficult to achieve.Fourth, some traditions in corrections workagainst effective emergency preparedness:

● Management by personality rather than byprocedure and policy.

● Separate plans for various types of emergen-cies, with no requirement that the plans beintegrated or consistent.

● A deep-rooted belief that riots and hostagesituations are the only prison emergenciesthat really matter.

● An equally deep-rooted belief that planningreally isn’t important because every emer-gency situation will be different.

Assessing Emergency ReadinessEffective planning plays a crucial role in pre-venting major emergencies and, more common-ly, in containing crisis situations once they arise.With good planning, some situations—planneddisturbances, some kinds of fires, some types ofhostage incidents—may not occur in the firstplace. Good planning can also result in earlyintervention that resolves small, localized crisesbefore they escalate into major emergencies thatthreaten the entire institution. The lack of effec-tive emergency preparedness may increase thelikelihood both that a major emergency willoccur and that if a large-scale crisis does occur,it may go more badly than necessary.

If a state department of corrections (DOC) doesnot have the level of emergency preparednessthat it wants or needs, assessment is the logicalfirst step. Traditionally, administrators haveeither asked their own people to conduct an

assessment or contracted with outside consultantsto do the job. Both approaches have drawbacks.

Involving the management staff of an institutionor a department in evaluating the strengths andweaknesses of their own emergency prepared-ness (policies, procedures, plans, equipment,etc.) may be all the motivation they need tobegin to improve their emergency systems. Onthe other hand, staff may lack the objectivity topoint out areas in which “the Emperor has noclothes.” Even if they are objective, in-housestaff may not notice obvious problems becausethey have lived with the conditions for so longthat they think of them not as problems but asthe natural state of affairs. Further, internal staffare unlikely to be aware of the breadth of alter-native solutions available across the 50 state cor-rectional systems. In addition, politics andpersonalities can impede an internal assessment.

A different set of problems arises if externalconsultants are engaged. First, consultants costmoney, and a serious evaluation may be expen-sive. Second, most consultants have specializedareas of expertise. Some are very good with fireprevention and firefighting systems, others withCERT and SWAT, and still others with traininghostage negotiators—but very few people in thecountry have indepth experience and expertisewith the entire gamut of comprehensive emer-gency preparedness issues. Third, managementstaff may see outside consultants as “walk-through experts” and not take them seriously.Finally, political rather than purely constructivemotives may govern how a department or institu-tion uses a consultant’s report.

The 1996 NIC Self-AuditMonograph Since many DOCs rely heavily on self-auditprocedures in other areas of their operations, itfollowed that a well-designed self-assessment

Section 1. Introduction: Background

5

instrument to analyze emergency preparednesscould be extremely useful. Such an instrumentcould help to address some of the drawbacks ofself-assessment mentioned in the preceding sec-tion. Thus, the primary focus of NIC’s 1996monograph on emergency preparedness was the

development of a detailed, comprehensive self-assessment instrument for evaluating emergencypreparedness in both state DOCs and individualcorrectional institutions. Further development ofthis tool remains one of the central objectives ofthis guide.

Validating the 1996 Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

Three states participated in a validation study to compare self-audit results with findings from anevaluation by experienced consultants. Each state selected one maximum-security institution andone minimum- or medium-security institution for the study. The state administered the NIC self-audit materials at the two institutions and at the departmental level. Then senior project staff mem-bers and project consultants conducted an onsite evaluation of emergency readiness, touring eachinstitution and reviewing institutional emergency plans and departmental policies, emergencyequipment, emergency staffing and specialists, etc. Project staff reviewed the results of theironsite evaluations with top departmental and/or institutional managers. These findings were thencompared with the results of the self-audits.

In general, the two methods—self-audit and consultant review—produced remarkably similarresults. Both methods quickly identified institutions that had little emergency readiness. Both meth-ods also consistently found a much better state of readiness in institutions that demonstrated astrong commitment to emergency preparedness and significant work on emergency issues. Thetwo methods also tended to agree at a much more detailed level. For example, both methodsrevealed any lack of provisions for hostage negotiation or tactical capacity for hostage rescue.

Some important differences between the two methods did emerge:

● The self-audit checklists proved more detailed and thorough than the consultant evaluation.Even when two experienced consultants spent a full day reviewing a moderate-sized institution,they did not have time to inquire about every area covered in the self-audit checklists. The con-sultants also skipped some of the details contained in the checklists.

● The consultant evaluation did a better job of identifying when things were in place but substan-dard, or when appearance and reality differed sharply.

● At institutions with minimal involvement in emergency issues, a review meeting with outsideconsultants appeared to motivate management to consider the results of the evaluation serious-ly, whereas the self-audit materials did not. Clearly, self-audits will not be effective unless man-agement is committed to conducting an honest and rigorous evaluation.

6


NIC has received substantial feedback aboutthe self-audit materials in the 1996 monograph.Almost all of the feedback has been extremelypositive. The monograph continues to befrequently requested and used, and its popularitysuggests the need for new, improved self-auditmaterials that reflect the many changes in thecorrectional environment since 1996.

Prison Emergencies and theNational Incident ManagementSystem (NIMS) Some correctional administrators are alreadyfamiliar with NIMS or with the Incident Com-mand System (ICS). Both are generic, multi-agency systems for responding to majoremergency incidents (although NIMS is general-ly a broader approach than ICS). A brief reviewof NIMS and how it relates to prison emergen-cies and to this guide provides important contextfor the guide’s users.

Background

Prior to the 1970s, there was no nationally rec-ognized system for managing emergency inci-dents or natural disasters. ICS was developed byfire departments in the early 1970s as a systemfor coordinating the response of multiple agen-cies to the same fire or group of fires. The heartof ICS was a command-and-control system, andICS was intended to overcome many of the tra-ditional problems associated with multiple-agency responses, such as ambiguous or unclearlines of authority, incompatible communicationsystems, and lack of standardized equipmentand terminology. From its inception through the1980s and 90s, offshoots of ICS evolved insome agencies and states. ICS was also adaptedfor use by law enforcement agencies in a num-ber of state and local jurisdictions.

After the events of September 11, 2001, aprimary concern of the newly established

Department of Homeland Security was coordi-nation among agencies that would potentiallyrespond to a terrorist event. A presidential direc-tive charged the new department with establish-ing standards for a national emergency system.That system, called NIMS, is largely an out-growth of ICS. NIMS represents a major stepforward: for the first time, the nation has a uni-fying system for coordinating the response toincidents as diverse as a forest fire, a tornado, ora terrorist bombing.

How NIMS Relates to Prison Emergencies

For corrections officials, and for this guide, thekey question is: what is the relationship ofNIMS to prison emergencies? The answer is thatNIMS is both a help and a challenge.

NIMS is a help in several obvious ways. When acorrectional agency assists in the response to acommunity disaster, radio frequencies of thevarious responding agencies are more likely tobe compatible, and information about theemergency is more likely to be shared in plainEnglish rather than in codes. Jurisdictionalissues are more likely to have been worked outin advance. Coordination and planning maywell have been tested during drills and exercis-es. The same issues of coordination, planning,communication, command, and logistics alsoapply when a correctional agency has a majoremergency itself and needs assistance from fire,police, and other external agencies. Thus, cor-rectional agencies clearly should embrace NIMSand become familiar with its concepts andterms.

The challenge for corrections officials is torecognize that NIMS is a generic interagencystructure; it is not procedural, and it does notspeak to specific correctional issues. Nothing inNIMS tells a correctional institution how toevacuate the segregation unit of a large prison(just as nothing in NIMS tells a fire department

Section 1. Introduction: Background

7

how to put out a petroleum fire). Thus, whileNIMS provides important and necessary assis-tance in areas such as interagency coordination,resource allocation, and planning, a correctionalagency still needs all of the corrections-specificexpertise that has traditionally existed within acorrectional emergency system.

An analogy may be in order. To compose adocument on a computer, you use a word-processing software program that determines how you move text and format the document.However, you also need another software pro-gram: the computer’s operating system. Althoughit has little to do with the specifics of composingthe document, the operating system sits above theword-processing software and allows it to run onthe computer. NIMS is like an operating systemin that it provides the framework and architecturein which all of the corrections-specific emergencyprovisions reside.

A correctional agency has two alternatives withregard to NIMS. It can adopt NIMS and then setabout developing its own corrections-specificpolicies, procedures, and other emergency sys-tem requirements, tying all of that to variouscomponents of NIMS. Or it can adopt NIMSand use a comprehensive correctional emer-gency system within NIMS to provide the sub-stance and content that make an emergencysystem useful in a prison. If it chooses the sec-ond alternative, it must take care that its emer-gency system is consistent with the NIMSframework. For example, the Nebraska DOChas worked with LETRA’s corrections-specific

emergency system for 10 years, but it has alsobeen identified as the state’s lead agency forhomeland security and is in the process of train-ing staff on NIMS. Nebraska’s experience is thatthe two systems—NIMS and a corrections-specific emergency system—are compatible,not contradictory.

How This Guide Relates to NIMS

Users of this guide will find that it is consistentwith NIMS. In particular, the three freestandingself-audit checklists that constitute the heart ofthe guide (see section 3) include items thatcover every aspect of NIMS, ranging from riskassessment to interagency coordination torequirements for drills, exercises, and simula-tions. The checklists include even more itemsthat are corrections specific and are not part ofNIMS. For example, the general emergency pre-paredness checklist includes many questionsabout hostage negotiation teams and tacticalteams. Almost all of these questions are correc-tions specific; because NIMS is generic, it doesnot provide policy direction for a hostage nego-tiation team or direction for operating a tacticalteam.

In summary, this guide is consistent with NIMS,and it directly addresses a number of key provi-sions and concepts within NIMS. However, it iscomprehensive with regard to expertise aboutcorrectional emergencies and should not beregarded, directly or indirectly, as a systematicpresentation of NIMS issues.

9

Why the Guide Was DevelopedTwo primary reasons prompted the developmentof this guide. The first was that the success ofthe 1996 monograph suggested the need toimprove on that earlier publication by expandingthe scope, building on experience with the 1996checklists, and generally updating the materials.The second reason was the need to account forchanges since 1996 in the conditions that giverise to emergencies and crises in prisons, mostparticularly with regard to terrorism.

Improving the Materials

As correctional professionals became familiarwith the 1996 self-audit materials, a number ofcriticisms, suggestions for improvements, andideas for reorganization emerged. The authorshad informally kept track of these suggestedchanges, and other updates and modificationsresulted from the process of drafting and review-ing this guide (see “How the Guide WasDeveloped”).

Reflecting Changes in Conditions

When the 1996 monograph was drafted, today’spervasive concern with terrorism could not havebeen foreseen. After the events of September 11,2001, no publication on emergency preparednessfor prisons would be complete without compre-hensive consideration of counterterrorism strate-gies. In addition, developments since 1996 pointto the need for greater emphasis on natural dis-aster preparedness. For example, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) andits state and local derivative agencies havebecome an increasingly sophisticated and unifiedsystem of emergency planning and response.That system’s heavy emphasis on natural disas-ters is not reflected in the 1996 monograph. Inaddition, situations involving hazardous materi-als, covered briefly in the 1996 monograph, havebecome the focus of fines and other enforcementactions at some jails and prisons.

How This Guide Differs From the1996 MonographThis guide is very different from the 1996 mono-graph. In fact, the guide is more accuratelyviewed as a new document than as a revised edi-tion of the earlier work.

The 1996 monograph included two genericemergency preparedness self-audit checklists:one designed for correctional facilities and theother designed for the state DOC’s central office.This guide combines these two generic check-lists into a single generic emergency prepared-ness self-audit checklist that is designedprimarily for institutions but includes a sectionon departmentwide issues. This change wasmade because the single checklist is more effi-cient and avoids the redundancy that character-ized the two previous checklists. In addition,experience with the 1996 monograph demon-strated that the checklists almost always wereused by institutions and seldom were used solelyat the departmental level.

Development of This Guide

10


How the Guide Was Developed

The checklists in the 1996 monograph provided the foundation for the new checklists in this guide.Those earlier checklists were mailed to all seven project consultants and the NIC program manag-er, along with suggestions for additions and other changes that the authors had accumulated sincethe publication of the 1996 monograph. All members of the project team were asked to review theexisting materials and the suggestions for changes and to consider potential reorganization of thechecklists at a global level, changes in format, specific modifications of individual checklist items,and any other revisions that seemed justified.

A 3-day project planning meeting was then scheduled at LETRA’s offices in Northern California, andall members of the project team attended. Each individual offered a number of suggestions forchanges and additions, some global and some very detailed. The team discussed the central ques-tions of the guide’s scope and organization at length. Almost all decisions were arrived at by con-sensus. Practical questions about the layout and use of the checklists received extensiveconsideration, in part because most team members had actually used the 1996 checklists and hadstrong feelings about what should be kept and what needed to be changed. During the meeting,team members reviewed the 1996 checklists item-by-item. At the end of the meeting, the projectconsultants were split into two- and three-person teams and given responsibility for creating initialdrafts of the natural disaster/hazardous materials (HAZMAT) checklist, the counterterrorism check-list, or the general emergency preparedness checklist.

As the subgroups within the project team completed their draft checklists, the drafts were sent toall other team members for comment and review. The project director and deputy director thenintegrated all of the responses into working drafts of each checklist. In a parallel process, the proj-ect director and deputy director distributed drafts of the guide’s four resource papers to the othermembers of the project team. Three of these papers came from LETRA’s recent training program,and one was written specifically for this guide. The director and deputy director also completed thesection presenting results from the national survey of 50 state DOCs on emergency preparednesspolicies and practices and distributed it in draft form to the project team members.

The working drafts of the checklists and other sections were then sent to NIC for review and modi-fication by the NIC project manager in consultation with the project director and deputy director, allof whom then reviewed a final draft at a meeting held at NIC offices in Washington, DC. NIC publi-cations manager Georgette Walsh coordinated the final phase of the preparation of the guide,working with editing and graphics specialists from Aspen Systems Corporation and the projectdirector and deputy director.

A Note About Field Testing: No “field testing” was conducted with the checklists in this guide. That is because they weredeveloped from the 1996 checklists, which were field tested and used extensively across the country. In a sense, then,the checklists in this guide have received extensive field testing—because the field experience with the earlier check-lists contributed to their development.

Section 1. Introduction: Development of This Guide

11

The guide also adds two new freestanding self-audit checklists: one on natural disasters,HAZMAT incidents, and fire; the other on coun-terterrorism. The natural disaster/HAZMAT/firechecklist is intended for use by individual insti-tutions. The counterterrorism checklist is appro-priate for institutions and for state DOCs.

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Checklist

The decision to present natural disaster andrelated items in a separate checklist rather thanincorporating them in the generic emergencypreparedness checklist reflects several importantconsiderations:

● This format underscores the importance ofplanning for natural disasters. Many prisonshave done substantial work planning andpreparing for inmate violence (disturbances,hostage incidents, etc.) but have not paidserious attention to the possibility of a natu-ral disaster.

● With a freestanding checklist, natural disas-ter and HAZMAT issues will not be camou-flaged by the more dramatic, traditionalprison concerns with inmate violence.

● The level of preparation required to achievereasonable readiness to handle natural disas-ters and HAZMAT situations is extensive.The freestanding checklist makes thatimmediately apparent and focuses attentionon extremely challenging issues, such asoffsite evacuations, that are unlikely to arisein an emergency involving inmate violencebut have a much greater probability inresponse to a natural disaster.

● If natural disaster and HAZMAT items wereadded to the generic emergency prepared-ness self-audit checklist, that already-largedocument might become too cumbersome tobe useful.

In addition to these practical considerations, aphilosophic issue guided the decision to create aseparate checklist for natural disasters. Thegeneric emergency preparedness checklistmakes no attempt to provide detailed coverageof every kind of major emergency that mightbefall a prison. It is intended to reflect overallplanning, preparation, and response for emer-gency situations and crises. If the specifics ofnatural disasters, HAZMAT situations, and fire

Redundancy

A clear drawback to presenting the naturaldisaster and counterterrorism checklists asfreestanding documents is the potential forredundancy with the generic emergencypreparedness checklist. Arguably, to becomplete and logical, the two new check-lists would need to include almost every-thing from the generic checklist. Thatstrategy would make the new checklists solarge that their specialized focus would belost. It would also cause extensive repeti-tion. On the other hand, some items in thegeneric checklist are so central and rele-vant to the specialized checklists that theiromission would make the specializedchecklists less than meaningful. Thus,although some repetition is necessary, it isminimal. The vast majority of items appearin just one checklist. Only items that areessential for logic or continuity are repeat-ed. The individuals who use this guide willjudge whether, as hoped, the relativelysmall amount of repetition is necessary andhelpful.

12


safety were added to that checklist, why thenwould the checklist not also include equally specific treatment for other types of prisonemergencies (bomb threats, epidemics,explosions, etc.)?

Counterterrorism Checklist

The creation of a freestanding checklist oncounterterrorism was guided by similar concernsbut was, perhaps, an easier decision. Unlike nat-ural disaster issues, counterterrorism matters arequite new to most prisons. Additionally, in ahigh-threat-level environment, counterterrorismefforts could potentially redefine the entire oper-ation of a prison. Even the potential risks andthreats associated with terrorism are quite differ-ent in nature and scope from those posed bymore traditional prison emergencies. The free-standing self-audit checklist on counterterrorismhelps a prison or a state department of correc-tions focus on its policies, procedures, plans,and general readiness in this relatively new area.

Checklist Format and Content

Those familiar with the earlier checklists willnote several modifications of the format andcontent.

● More items. Many new items have beenadded to the generic emergency prepared-ness checklist.

● More space for comments. Many users ofthe earlier checklists said the space for com-ments next to individual items was inade-quate. The checklists in this guide providesubstantially more room for comments.

● Portrait instead of landscape format. The1996 checklists were in landscape format,which proved cumbersome. The checklistsin this guide are all in portrait format.

● Standards vs. criteria. Individual itemswithin the checklists are now referred to as

“criteria” rather than “standards.” Thischange is important because NIC does notpromulgate standards. Some national organ-izations do issue correctional standards.Local, state, and federal correctional agen-cies may chose to adopt nationally availablestandards, to develop their own standards, ornot to acknowledge any particular set ofstandards—that is an agency-by-agencydecision. Referring to each checklist item asa criterion more accurately reflects NIC’sobjective of providing “food for thought” tohelp state and local agencies conduct theirown evaluations, without implicitly orexplicitly suggesting that NIC is proposing aset of standards.

● Verifying methods. The checklists ask theaudit team not only to make a judgmentabout the status of each item (“meets criteri-on,” “partially met,” etc.) but also to statethe method used to verify that status (“docu-ment review,” “staff interview,” etc.).

Survey Report

A survey of emergency preparedness was con-ducted in 33 of the 50 state departments of cor-rections. The guide presents detailed findingsfrom this survey, which was the first of its kind.Readers will find a wealth of data on common(and less common) approaches to emergencyreadiness, the extent to which agencies commitresources to emergency preparedness, how manyagencies train and maintain their own tacticalteams and negotiators, and many other aspectsof current practices.

Resource Materials

The “Resource Materials” section offers fourimportant new papers on leadership duringcrises, prevention of emergencies, prison emer-gency teams, and counterterrorism. These newpapers are very different from anything offeredin the 1996 monograph.

Section 1. Introduction: Development of This Guide

13

● Leadership Issues During Crises. Althoughthis paper specifically concerns leadershipin prison crises and emergency situations,much of its discussion could apply to crisismanagement in any setting. Furthermore,experienced prison wardens who have readthe paper have noted that the issues dis-cussed are relevant not only during crises butalso during day-to-day operations.

● Prevention of Prison Emergencies. Thispaper argues that although prison adminis-trators commonly talk about preventingemergencies, often little is being donespecifically for that purpose. The paperdemonstrates the scope of measures that candecrease risks and potentially reduce thelikelihood that a major crisis will happen.

● Emergency Teams. This paper discusses themost common types of specialized teamsrequired in prison crisis and emergency situ-ations: tactical teams, hostage negotiationteams, and crisis intervention teams. Ratherthan considering the specifics of organizing,training, equipping, and operating suchteams, the paper attempts to provide a high-level management perspective, exploringpotential strengths and common pitfalls andfocusing on requirements for successfullymanaging these teams.

● Prisons and Counterterrorism. This paperdiscusses terrorism threats and incidents as

they relate to prisons. Before the events ofSeptember 11, 2001, U.S. prisons had littlereason to be concerned about terrorism.Thus, even the basic concepts of the subjectmay be unfamiliar to correctional staff.Now, terrorism is a “hot topic” in interna-tional news and in novels, motion pictures,and television dramas. Unfortunately, nei-ther news reports nor fictional accountstranslate into practical measures a stateprison should consider as part of a counter-terrorism strategy. The decision to includeboth a counterterrorism checklist and thispaper in the guide was prompted by theurgent need for prisons to gain familiaritywith this topic.

Case Studies

The last section in the guide presents sevencase studies illustrating how prisons haveresponded to different types of emergency andcrisis situations. Four of the studies—HelicopterIntrusion/Escape (Colorado DOC), 1993 Mid-west Floods (Missouri Loses Renz CorrectionalCenter), Hurricane Andrew (Florida DOC),and Fire in a New Institution (Taney County,MO)—are updated carryovers from the 1996monograph. The other three—Morey UnitHostage Incident (Arizona DOC), LucasvillePrison Riot (Ohio DOC), and Riot at Max(Montana DOC)—are new in this guide.

Section 2Conducting an Audit

Purpose and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Purpose of an Emergency Preparedness Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Deciding To Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Who Should Conduct the Audit? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Standards for Auditors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Examples of Completed Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

In This Section

17

Purpose of an EmergencyPreparedness Audit Conducting emergency preparedness audits ofinstitutions is important for a number of reasons.Some reasons are obvious, others more subtle.

An audit validates a comprehensive emergencypreparedness system. For a prison, comprehen-sive readiness for crises, natural disasters, andmajor emergencies is no easy matter; it is a far-reaching effort that can take years to fully devel-op and can require large amounts of money, stafftime, management attention, and other scarceresources. An audit specific to emergency pre-paredness makes a strong statement that all ofthe work undertaken to develop and maintain theemergency system has been intended, planned,and coordinated.

Perhaps the most obvious reason for an audit isthat it provides management with an objectiveassessment of the progress and status of theemergency system. Because a prison’s emer-gency system is necessarily large and multi-faceted, nothing short of a systematic auditprocedure will effectively evaluate the system.An institution’s emergency preparedness coordi-nator may be familiar with several substantialproblems and may also have several initiativesawaiting funding or management commitment.However, the coordinator is inevitably too closeto the system—too involved in the system andtoo familiar with what is in place—to serve asan independent evaluator. To varying degrees,the same will be true of the institution’s

managers and emergency specialists, who maybe quite familiar with its emergency prepared-ness and response capabilities. An objective anddetailed audit process can surmount these limita-tions. For management, then, the emergency pre-paredness audit offers the opportunity to identifyweaknesses, deficiencies, developing problems,areas of vulnerability, inconsistencies, and sim-ple mistakes in the facility’s emergency pre-paredness efforts.

The audit also provides an opportunity to eval-uate or reevaluate resource allocation. Forexample, a prison’s CERT program may havebecome more and more expensive because ofcosts associated with increased training time andshooting practice, while its hostage negotiatorshave stopped training regularly and have notworked together for more than a year. It may betime for the institution’s administrators to revisitthe priorities reflected in the allocation of theirtraining resources. Such questions of resourceallocation and relative priorities run throughouta comprehensive emergency system.

Relatively frequent audits can help the correc-tional leader identify tendencies toward com-placency and “cutting corners” in criticalpractices. Audits can also offset the dangerousconsequences of faster turnover in managementand supervisory positions. Rapid turnover meansa loss of knowledge and experience in importantareas. Without regular audits, an institution’spolicies and post orders may come to bear littleresemblance to actual practice.

Purpose and Philosophy

18


Another central purpose of an emergency pre-paredness audit is to verify compliance withstandards and policies. Regardless of whetherthe standards or policies involved are at thedepartmental or facility level, or whether thestandards are external (e.g., from the AmericanCorrectional Association) or internal, the point isthat the organization has adopted them andexpects them to be followed. Compliance withstated standards and policies goes hand in handwith accountability, which is essential to anymanagement endeavor. However, even if a policyis well written, disseminated, discussed, andreinforced by training, compliance is not guaran-teed. Although first-line supervisors generallycarry the primary responsibility for day-to-daycompliance with policies, and institutions oftenneed to reinforce an individual policy or checkon how it is being followed, the best way toensure compliance with policies, standards, andwritten procedures in a broad area such as emer-gency preparedness is to conduct an areawideaudit.

An audit may also be an excellent staff develop-ment tool and increase staff awareness of crucialissues related to emergency preparedness. Thisfunction of the audit applies not only to the auditteam members but to the institution’s staff atlarge. As the audit team reviews records, asksabout emergency procedures, observes emer-gency responses, and focuses on the less visibleaspects of emergency readiness, the institution’sstaff read the message clearly: managementthinks emergency preparedness is important andis checking to see if things are as they should be.Inevitably, staff other than audit team membersspot deficiencies as the audit progresses. In addi-tion, when management takes corrective actionsafter reviewing audit findings, those actions arelikely to have greater impact because of thestaff’s heightened awareness of emergency issues.Further, employees who have not understood why

some procedures were necessary for emergencyreadiness may come to appreciate the rationalefor those procedures. Finally, the audit offers theinstitution staff a chance to learn “best practices”with regard to emergency preparedness.

All of these reasons point to the same conclu-sion: an audit of an institution’s emergency pre-paredness system provides an opportunity toimprove the system. That is the ultimate goal. Ifmanagement does not subscribe to that goal,then there is little point to engaging in a vigor-ous, demanding, and detailed evaluation of theemergency system. (The same can be said of anykind of large-scale institutional audit, and thisguide’s focus on emergency preparedness in noway suggests that an audit in this area is moreimportant than, or conceptually different from, asecurity audit or other kinds of major audits.)

Philosophy Protecting the community is the primary missionof all state DOCs and of the individual institu-tions within those departments. An audit ofemergency readiness is entirely consistent withthat mission. In fact, with the exception of somehighly specific aspects of prison operations suchas perimeter security, one would be hard pressedto find an activity more closely related to pro-tecting the public than evaluating the institu-tion’s readiness to handle large-scale crises andmajor emergencies.

Emergency preparedness audits involve philo-sophic considerations beyond the institution’smission. If the institution and the department arepolicy-driven organizations, then audit proce-dures necessarily will be philosophically consis-tent with that orientation. It also follows that ina personality-driven organization or an organiza-tion that has no consistent orientation withregard to actual decisionmaking, audit processesmay be less helpful or even counterproductive.

Section 2. Conducting an Audit: Purpose and Philosophy

19

More specifically, an audit should be a “win-win” approach to improving emergency readi-ness. A prison’s level of emergency readiness iswhat it is, and an audit should define currentconditions and offer opportunities for improve-ment. However, if an audit becomes a kind ofwitch hunt (“who screwed up, and where andwhen?”), then it will not be a positive exercise.Worse, if administrators regard the audit as anopportunity to assign blame for the prison’sshortcomings, then staff will be defensive andthe audit results will almost certainly be inaccu-rate and incomplete. This point is critical:Sending the wrong message to staff about thepurpose and philosophy of an emergency pre-paredness audit will invariably compromise theaudit findings.

Similar considerations apply to the concept of“audit scores.” Some audits and audit proce-dures, such as audits of American CorrectionalAssociation standards, produce an overallnumeric score for the institution. Wardens andother administrators often speak proudly of suchscores (“we got a 99.2% and that is the highestscore any institution in our state has everreceived”). For the emergency preparednessaudits presented in this guide, however, such aview of scores would be meaningless or worse.Every staff member involved in these auditsshould understand from the outset that there isno acceptable overall score. The individual items

in the self-audit checklists are not presented inany particular relationship to each other and arenot of equal weight or value. In fact, differentinstitutions probably will place different weightsand values on the items, and that is as it shouldbe. Thus, an overall score or average rating ismeaningless, and may be misleading or evendangerous. As Richard Franklin pointed out inan NIC monograph on security auditing, “It isquite possible to drown in a river that has anaverage depth of six inches.”

Before an emergency preparedness audit begins,its underlying philosophy should be discussedand disseminated. That philosophy shouldinclude the following goals:

● To support the mission of the institution ingeneral and the institution’s emergency pre-paredness system specifically.

● To increase staff awareness of emergencypreparedness and provide opportunities forstaff development.

● To provide management with rigorous,objective, detailed, professional assessmentsof the current status of the emergency pre-paredness system, with particular attentionto unusual strengths and weaknesses.

● To provide opportunities for recognition ofinnovation and excellence.

21

Deciding To Audit Using the self-audit materials in this guide toassess the emergency preparedness of a prisonwill be demanding, and the results may bedaunting—especially if the institution has notpreviously placed high priority on emergencyreadiness. Before deciding to conduct an emer-gency preparedness self-audit, prison manage-ment should first consider all of the implicationsand be ready to support the process fully.

Prison management should also closely examinesome very specific considerations before initiat-ing an emergency preparedness audit:

● What else is going on in the institution? Ifanother activity is demanding large amountsof staff time and pushing staff hard, expect-ing an audit to proceed smoothly at the sametime is unreasonable. The audits in thisguide, though not extremely lengthy, shouldbegin only when they are likely to be “theonly game in town” for several days.

● Can audit team members focus exclusive-ly on the process until it is completed?Management must make the commitmentthat, barring some absolute emergency, thesmall number of staff assigned to the auditteam will be free to complete the audit with-out interruption. This means avoiding theall-too-common practice of assigning staff toa project and then reassigning them beforethey complete the project. If managementfails to honor its commitment of staff time,

an otherwise serious audit effort will becompromised.

● Is management committed to reviewingthe audit findings? Sometimes managementtends to regard an audit as completed oncethe team has finished filling out the forms.The most important work in the audit

Audit Decisions at theDepartment Level

If a state department of corrections simplymandates emergency preparedness auditsat all prisons in the state without first dis-cussing the subject with facility managersand giving them time to consider it, theaudits will take place but the timing maynot be good and the process may not besupported at the facility level. An audit initi-ated by administrative decree from above islikely to produce resentment from facility-level management, and that resentment willinformally but effectively be transmitted toinstitution staff. As a result, the audit effortis unlikely to be a positive learning experi-ence, and the results may be inaccurate andincomplete. Thus, it is prudent for depart-ment administrators to involve facility-levelmanagement in the decision to conductemergency preparedness audits statewide.

Preliminary Considerations

22


process doesn’t begin until the checklistshave been finished. The single most impor-tant product of the audit process is manage-ment decisionmaking—at review meetingsin which audit findings are discussed andanalyzed—that develops a plan of correctiveaction and followup. Managers must com-mit to participating in the review process.Top managers should recognize that thereview will be time consuming. Before theaudit begins, managers should agree to aninitial review meeting and should under-stand that, barring emergencies, they willneed to attend all review meetings.

Who Should Conduct the Audit? The audits in this guide are better performed bya team than by an individual. Once a team com-pletes the general emergency preparednessaudit, it may be acceptable for an individual,even the institution’s emergency preparednesscoordinator, to conduct one or both of the morespecific audits (natural disasters and counterter-rorism). Optimally, however, all audits will becompleted by a team.

It is not necessary that an institution conduct allthree audits, at least not simultaneously. In fact,often it will be most productive to first completethe general emergency preparedness audit, waita few months or more (until the general emer-gency preparedness issues have been resolved),and then complete the other two audits. Further,some institutions may not think the counterter-rorism audit is a high priority, or even necessary.

Although having a single team complete all ofan institution’s audits may be the most efficientapproach, using a different team for each audithas distinct advantages. Most obviously, morestaff develop interest in and ownership of emer-gency readiness; secondarily, the institution ben-efits from two or three independent assessments,which may reveal problems that would not havecome to light had a single team been used.

The audit team should have two to fourmembers. Management should appoint onemember as team leader. If the institution hasan emergency preparedness coordinator, thatindividual should be part of the team butshould not serve as team leader. (Issues ofownership, defensiveness, ego, lack of per-spective, etc., might interfere with a coordi-nator’s ability to lead the team objectively.)The team leader must have sufficient rank orother status to have access to all relevant dataand all areas of the institution.

Ideally, at least one member of the audit teamwill be from another institution within thedepartment or from the department’s centraloffice. This may not be practical, and it is notessential, but it does contribute to the independ-ence and objectivity of the audit. At least onemember of the team should be from the institu-tion’s management or midmanagement level. Ingeneral, team members should be chosen on thebasis of experience, credibility, knowledge ofcustody and security operations, and, to a lesserextent, familiarity with emergency operations.To avoid compromising the audit’s objectivity,management should not create an audit teamcomposed predominantly or entirely of emer-gency specialists (e.g., a four-person team con-sisting of the institution’s CERT team leader,armory officer, emergency preparedness coordi-nator, and chief negotiator).

The audit team members should meet with theinstitution’s top managers before beginning theaudit. Members should clearly understand theirrecourse if they encounter serious resistanceor other trouble as they conduct the audit.(Typically, a team will have negotiated the rightto call an impromptu meeting with top adminis-trators to review such situations and will waituntil management intervention clears the waybefore proceeding with the audit.) The teammembers should meet at the end of each day

Section 2. Conducting an Audit: Preliminary Considerations

23

while the audit is in process. They should meetface-to-face with top management as soon asthey complete the self-audit checklists, beforethe management review meetings take place.During this prereview meeting, the team givestop management an informal “read” on how theaudit progressed, the most important conclu-sions, and any particularly surprising findings. Itshould be the verbal equivalent of a written“executive summary.”

Standards for AuditorsAs noted earlier, the self-audit checklists do notattempt to impose standards for emergency pre-paredness but rather provide criteria by whichprisons can measure their own preparedness.However, certain basic standards of conductshould guide the efforts of the audit team.

1. Maintain confidentiality. Audit findingsand information are confidential, to beshared initially with the institution’s topmanagement only. How the findings aredisseminated from that point should bedetermined by the administration of theinstitution and the department.

2. Be considerate. To the extent possible,auditors should not interfere with the ongo-ing operation of the institution. They shouldrespect other staff responsibilities.

3. Report dangerous situations. If auditorsencounter an imminent life-threatening con-dition or situation, they should report itimmediately to the warden or superintendent.

4. Be discreet. When auditors find a problemor potential deficiency in an area, theyshould not explain it or point it out to staffin the area unless asked. However, if asked,audit team members should provide accu-rate, straightforward answers about whatthey are looking for and what they are find-ing. They should limit the information to thequestion asked and should not encourage

discussion. If the issue is confidential (e.g.,a plan for responding to an employee workstoppage or job action), the auditors shouldsay that they are looking at a confidentialmatter and should provide no information.

5. Be professional. Auditors must not use theirrole, information, or findings to impressother staff or create dissension.

6. Try not to single out individuals. To theextent possible, auditors should not report ina way that singles out individual staff mem-bers. However, if the reported problemresults from complacency, cutting corners,ignorance of policy, or other violations ofsound practice or policy, auditors may haveto cite specific persons or posts in need oftraining or supervisory attention.

7. Be ethical. Auditors should not create artifi-cial situations to detect deficiencies in prac-tices (e.g., hide keys left lying around ortamper with documents to see how long thechange goes unnoticed by staff). Instead,they should seek legitimate opportunities toevaluate practices (e.g., fire drills, emer-gency counts). There is an important differ-ence between openly “testing” a policy orprocedure (“would you show me the insulinsyringes so we can verify the count againstthe inventory balance in the log?”) and “set-ting up” staff (planting contraband to see ifit is discovered). The former is good audit-ing; the latter is not.

8. Audit rigorously. Auditors should be rigor-ous and demanding. They do a disservice tothe institution if they assume something isacceptable without verification, gloss overproblems, or “give the institution a pass” onan item they know to be deficient to someextent.

9. Choose appropriate methods. Directobservation of practices is the best wayto audit individual items. Observation

24


generally is a more reliable method thanreviewing records and policies or interview-ing staff and inmates. It often is necessaryto use both observation and documents toensure that practice and policy are consistent.

10. Maintain objectivity. Auditors shouldmaintain objectivity, professionalism, andperspective. No one is perfectly objective,but auditors should neither hope to findproblems with almost everything nor hopefor extremely positive findings The easiestway to ensure objectivity is to focus on theevaluation criteria and not on personalpreferences.

11. Be a reporter, not an advocate. The audi-tor’s job is factfinding, not decisionmaking.Top management decides what will be doneconcerning the audit findings. Althoughauditors can and should recommend andadvise when they believe they have insightabout a deficiency, their primary role is topresent the facts as they found them. Theaudit team and its work product may losecredibility if top management perceives thatauditors are advocating strongly for certaindecisions and are heavily invested in what isdone with the audit findings.

Disclaimers Before moving on to the specifics of how to usethe self-audit materials in this guide, readersshould be aware of some fundamental pointsabout the nature of these materials and aboutprison audits in general:

● This audit system does not represent advicefrom NIC about what an institution’s emer-gency system should or should not include.That is a decision for the institution and itsdepartment of corrections.

● The self-audit checklists in this guide arenot the only method for evaluating emer-gency readiness in a prison. One alternative

is to retain consultants to perform such ananalysis. Another is to conduct comprehen-sive critical incident reviews when serioussituations occur.

● An emergency preparedness audit is not asecurity audit. The two types of auditsshould complement each other, but one can-not be substituted for the other. Both areextremely important undertakings in aprison. NIC has developed a comprehensive,sophisticated security audit manual, whichinterested readers are encouraged to consid-er as the foundation for an indepth evalua-tion of institutional security policies,procedures, and practices.

● Some departments engage in policy audits,and many conduct their audits againstsome national or state set of correctionalstandards—most commonly, the AmericanCorrectional Association standards. Becausesuch audits cover so many areas, they arenot detailed or comprehensive with regardto emergency preparedness (or about institu-tional security, for that matter). A prisonmay “pass” all of the emergency prepared-ness items on a national standards audit andyet be woefully unprepared for a large-scalecrisis.

● Institutions and agencies must be absolutelyclear about what type of emergency pre-paredness audit they are conducting andmust be equally clear in communicating thisinformation to staff. Is it a policy audit, anoperational audit of practices, or both? If aninstitution passes a policy audit, the staffmay assume all is well when in fact theinstitution has major problems with prac-tices, procedures, and operations, whichwere not within the purview of the policyaudit. Clarity about the purpose and scopeof an audit is essential. (The audit materialsin this guide cover both policies andpractices.)

25

OverviewThe intent of the self-audit checklists in thisguide is to help a state department of correctionsor an individual institution evaluate its readinessto contend with a major emergency. The threechecklists—general emergency readiness,natural disaster/HAZMAT/fire, and counter-terrorism—are extensive but they are not all-inclusive. They cannot cover every emergencypreparedness-related issue and detail, and someof the issues and details that are not covered maybe crucial for a particular agency or institution.The ultimate decision about what is important inemergency preparedness must be the provinceof each individual department or institution.

Similarly, the fact that an institution does notmeet some of the criteria in the checklists doesnot necessarily mean that the institution iswrong or in jeopardy. For example, if the insti-tution has thoughtfully decided not to purchasecertain equipment or not to include certain poli-cies or procedures, there may be an excellentreason for that decision. Conversely, however, if

the institution has decided that certain criteriaare important but has not complied with themor if it simply has never considered some of thecriteria, then the checklists may serve a usefulpurpose in stimulating corrective action or con-sideration of new possibilities.

The checklists in this guide can provide aframework for a thorough review of emergencypreparedness. Before getting started, however,the institution or department contemplating sucha review should carefully consider the followingpoints:

● If the self-audit is not going to be taken seri-ously and conducted rigorously, it probablyshould not be done at all. An audit thatglosses over problems or fails to report defi-ciencies can create an illusion of emergencypreparedness and may be more dangerousthan no assessment at all.

● The manner in which a department or insti-tution approaches the audit is most impor-tant. If top management expects a grade orscorecard from the audit, then that perspec-tive will be transmitted to subordinate staff,and the audit process is unlikely to be pro-ductive. Management should emphasize thatthese are self-audits designed to help thedepartment or institution review highlyimportant areas. The audits should be asource of ideas and constructive change,not criticism.

How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

All managers who will be involved withthe self-audit of emergency preparednessshould read these instructions thoroughlybefore proceeding. (Some issues discussedin this section were raised in previoussections of the guide but bear repeatinghere.)

26


● The old computer adage about “garbage in,garbage out” holds true for these self-audits.If they are not done carefully and accurate-ly, the results will be misleading. If auditorsare unsure about an item, they should checkit out or leave it blank. Guessing and assum-ing will defeat the purpose of the audit.

● Top management should schedule a meetingto review audit findings as soon as the auditteam has completed the checklists. Allappropriate administrators and managersshould attend. During the extensive field-testing of the self-audit materials, reviewmeetings were strongly correlated with theusefulness of the self-audit process to thedepartment or institution involved. Withoutsuch meetings, a department or institutionmight never address the problems a carefulself-audit can reveal.

These audits are not intended to take a long timeto complete. In field testing, the time requiredfor audit teams (typically two to four staff) tocomplete the earlier version of the largest check-list ranged from 8 hours to 2 days.

What will actually be needed to conduct a self-audit? Each of the three audits will require twoto four assigned staff (see “Who ShouldConduct the Audit” for staff qualifications).Auditors will require 1 to 2 days of uninterrupt-ed time to complete each checklist. They willneed full access to all areas of the institution, tostaff who manage specialized functions in anemergency (e.g., the CERT leader and hostagenegotiators), and to all relevant policies, proce-dures, and other written documents. (Access toall areas during all shifts is especially criticalbecause, as stated earlier, it is more important toaudit practices than to audit documents.) Theself-audits will not require any specializedequipment or unusual resources.

A Note About Minimum-SecurityFacilities

A small or minimum-security facility typical-ly does not have the same set of risks foremergency situations as a large, high-security prison. (This fact illustrates theimportance of good risk assessment as astarting point for emergency prepared-ness.) A minimum-security facility may havea relatively low risk of large-scale distur-bances or planned hostage incidents and somay understandably choose not to maintainits own tactical teams. However, such situa-tions certainly are possible in a minimum-security facility, and if a facility does nothave its own tactical team, it needs toknow who would provide one if needed.Furthermore, compared to many large,high-security institutions, a small orminimum-security facility may be at greaterrisk for loss of life from some other kinds ofemergencies (e.g., fires, tornadoes). Thepoint is that most items in the self-auditchecklists for emergency preparedness arerelevant for small or minimum-securityfacilities, even though these facilities haveunique considerations (e.g., staff may beresponsible for multiple functions in anemergency, and the facility may dependheavily on external resources). In thissense, emergency readiness is often agreater challenge for the small or minimum-security institution than for the large, high-security prison that has far greaterresources.

Section 2. Conducting an Audit: How To Use the Self-Audit Checklists

27

DirectionsThis section provides specific directions forbeginning an audit, completing the audit check-lists, and completing a “summary of noncompli-ance items” for each checklist. (Underlinedwords are the actual terms the checklist andsummary forms use to label spaces for entries.)Examples of completed checklist and summarypages follow the directions.

Getting Started

1. The guide contains three assessment docu-ments (self-audit checklists). The first is forindividual institutions and departments ofcorrections to use in assessing/evaluatinggeneral emergency readiness. The secondis for individual institutions to use in evalu-ating preparedness for natural disasters,HAZMAT situations, and fire. The third isfor institutions and departments to use inmeasuring preparedness for terrorist threatsor incidents. Each checklist is separate andfreestanding. Make sure you have the rightdocument.

2. Make as many photocopies of each checklistas needed. For example, if you will beauditing seven institutions and you wanttwo copies for each institution, plus someextras, you may want to start by making

20 copies of the original. Retain the origi-nal, unmarked, for future reference and use.

3. Also make copies of the noncompliancesummary sheet at the end of each checklist.Auditors complete this summary for use bymanagement in reviewing the audit results.In field testing, auditors typically neededbetween 5 and 15 of the summary sheets foreach checklist. A particular institution mayneed fewer or more, depending on howmany items are “partially met,” “not met,”or “not applicable” (see below). Note thatthe format of the summary sheet is the samefor all three checklists, but the title at the topis different for each, to prevent confusion.

4. One person should be in charge of the audit.That person need not conduct the entireaudit alone but should direct and superviseevery aspect of it. The person selected tolead the audit should be high enough in theorganization to be aware of all necessaryinformation. The selection should send theappropriate message to staff regarding theimportance of the audit to the institution ordepartment.

5. Plan to conduct the audit without interrup-tion, in a relatively short period of time. Itshould not take months to complete, and itshould not stop while individual items are

A Note About Sections 4–6 in This Guide

Reading the sections that follow the checklists—National Survey of Emergency Readiness inPrisons, Resource Materials, and Case Studies—is not a prerequisite for completing the self-audits. These materials are intended to provide additional background information, a thought-provoking source of new ideas and approaches, and some “lessons learned” in respondingto prison emergencies. However, because terrorism is a relatively new concern for prisons,correctional decisionmakers and auditors should find it useful to read the monograph “Prisonsand Counterterrorism” (see section 5, Resource Materials) before undertaking a counterterrorismself-audit.

28


fixed or brought into compliance. (However,as noted earlier, if the team discovers a life-threatening problem, it should report thesituation to management immediately.)

6. Before attempting to complete a checklist,read the “Glossary of Terms” that followsthese directions. Every department has someunique terminology, and the same term maymean two different things in two differentdepartments. Some ambiguity about termi-nology may be inevitable in these genericchecklists, but the glossary should help tominimize this problem.

Completing the Checklists

7. On the first page of the checklist, enter thefacility name, the audit team leader’s name,and the names of everyone on the team.Print the names.

8. Each item on the checklists has two blanksto be filled in: status and method. The itemsdo not have to be taken in the order pre-sented, but all items must be completed.

9. Status. For every item, enter a code in thestatus box: MC (“meets criterion”), PM(“partially meets criterion”), NM (“criterionnot met”), or NA (“not applicable”). Choosejust one status code for each item. Makeno other entry in the status box.

Determining status. For some items, the dis-tinction between MC and PM, for example,will be a difficult judgment call. In assign-ing status to items, try to be rigorous andconsistent. Remember that an item checkedMC probably will not be reviewed further.Items checked with any of the other threestatus codes should, however, be subject tofurther discussion and review.

Substitutes. If the institution or departmentdoes not have the specific item mentionedin the checklist but has something else thatserves the same purpose, enter NM for that

item rather than MC. The managementreview will determine whether what is inplace is comparable to or better than whatis specified in the checklist.

Written policies. Several checklist items askfor specific written policies. Do not checkMC just because almost all staff understandsomething to be informal policy (eventhough it is not written) or just because agroup of related items are scattered through-out procedural manuals (where they wouldbe of little use during an emergency). Theinstitution or department may follow a par-ticular procedure regularly, but if the check-list asks whether that procedure is “requiredby policy” and it is not part of written poli-cy, then the status box should show NM.

10. Method. For every item, enter in themethod box the code(s) for the method(s)used to determine status: OB (“observed”),DR (“document review”), SI (“staff inter-view”), II (“inmate interview”), and/or OT(“other”). You may enter more than onemethod. This is not like the status box,where only one entry is permissible. Enterall of the methods actually used. If youenter OT, specify the other method used.

11. Comments. Use this field to record notesabout an item’s status or the audit process.Keep in mind that the noncompliance sum-mary (see below) requires explanations forany items not coded MC. The commentsfield also provides extra space for describ-ing “other” audit methods (OT entries inthe method box).

12. When every item on a page has been com-pleted, the audit leader should print his or hername at the bottom of the page and date it(unless another audit team member has com-pleted all items on the page, in which casethat team member should sign and date thepage at the bottom).


29

13. NC#. When the entire checklist is complete,the audit team leader should fill in the NC#(noncompliance number) boxes at the farright of the form. The objective here is tocreate a numbered list of items subject tomanagement review. Starting on the firstpage of the checklist, use the NC# boxesto number consecutively all items exceptthose with the code MC.

Summary of Noncompliance Items

14. At the end of each checklist is a page titled“Summary of Noncompliance Items.” Thepurpose of this summary is to list all itemsthat did not fully meet criteria (i.e., all itemscoded PM, NM, or NA) and to explain thereasons for noncompliance. As noted above,management will use this summary in itsreview of the audit results. The audit teamleader completes the first three columns ofthe summary (entries may be typed or hand-written). The other columns are completedduring the management review.

15. Audit team leader. Using as many copiesof the summary page as necessary, list everyitem numbered in the NC# boxes in thechecklist (i.e., every item not coded MC).First, enter the NC# (entries should be inNC# order). Below the NC#, enter thestatus code and the method code. (Thus,for each noncompliance item, you willmake three entries in the first column:

NC#, status code, and method code.) UnderItem Description, briefly summarize theitem (as a convenience, so reviewers willnot have to refer back to the checklist).Under Reason for Noncompliance, explainwhy the item was marked PM, NM, or NA.(Be brief, clear, and forthright. If there is noclear reason, leave the space blank. Do notinvent an explanation.) At the top of eachpage, enter your name, the date the pagewas completed, and the page number.

16. Management review. Use the noncompli-ance summary to document managementresponse for each noncompliance item.Under Assigned To, enter the name of theperson assigned responsibility for bringingthe item into compliance (leave blank untilthe item is reviewed and an assignment ismade). Under Due Date, enter the datecompliance is to be completed (enter a dateonly if the item has been assigned). Theadministrator responsible for reviewing theaudit results should sign his or her nameunder Approved By and date the signatureunder Approval Date after he or she hasreviewed and approved the corrective action.(Typically, the reviewer should not be amember of the audit team. Different admin-istrators may review different items, or oneadministrator may review all items.)

30


The Management Review Meeting: Translating Audit Results Into Action

The management review meeting may be the most crucial element in the entire emergency auditprocess. If the meeting is not attended by the "right" people (the institution’s top managers) or if man-agement’s consideration of the audit results is superficial or defensive, the entire audit effort may berendered useless.

For most institutions, the management review process will be lengthy—two or more meetings maybe required to complete the work. Management must be willing to consider policy and practices indetail. For any particular item, it may be tempting to conclude that "what we are doing is more thanadequate." However, managers should never reach that decision without understanding why theaudit instrument includes the criterion in question—i.e., specifically how the criterion relates to bestpractices in emergency preparedness and how the institution’s practices differ from the criterion.

As with so many other areas of corrections, there is no substitute for strong leadership in manage-ment reviews of emergency audit results. If the warden or other top manager is in and out of thereview meeting and appears superficial, uninterested, or dismissive in responding to the audit team’sfindings, other staff will follow that lead and the results will be less than constructive. On the otherhand, if the leader clearly is determined to translate audit results into action, other staff will beinspired to share that commitment.


31

Examples of Completed Forms

Completed Page of Self-Audit Checklist

32


Completed Summary of Noncompliance Items


33

Glossary of TermsAfter action report: see critical incidentreview.

Chain of command: A prioritized list, by jobtitle, of the individuals who would assume com-mand of the institution in an emergency.

Chain of custody: Procedures and documenta-tion that verify who is in possession of evi-dence, the location of the evidence, and theintegrity of the evidence at every point in time.

Command post: The location from which theemergency operation is directed and controlled.It is almost always in or at the institution experi-encing the emergency and is the place fromwhich the commander works.

Commander:

Initial commander: The person in chargeof the institution and the emergency at thebeginning of a large-scale crisis.

Ultimate commander: The individual, byjob title, who assumes and maintains author-ity over the institution and the emergencyonce he or she arrives and is briefed. Theperson who remains in charge until theemergency has been resolved.

Contingent contracting: A formal agreementfor crucial services that may only be requiredduring or after an emergency. Typically, theagreement includes either an annual retainer or arate of compensation that is substantially abovemarket, to guarantee that the institution willreceive highest priority for the services or equip-ment in an emergency.

Correctional Emergency Response Team(CERT): See tactical team.

Cover group: A group of staff sent to the loca-tion of a reported emergency, with responsibilityfor isolating and containing the emergency.

Critical incident review: A comprehensive andfactual review of a major emergency, withemphasis on “lessons learned.” Also referred toby some agencies as an “after action report.”

Critical indicator system: Mathematical orother analytic procedure that produces a summa-ry of the frequency of certain events and thetrend of those frequencies over time. Suchevents may include grievances per month,inmate-inmate assaults per month, inmate disci-plinary actions per month, percentage ofinmates in protective custody by month, etc.

Deactivation checklist: A list of actions andprocedures to be followed immediately after theresolution of a major emergency. See also step-down plan.

Defend in place: Also called “safe harbor.” Analternate strategy to mass evacuation of a facili-ty to another location, used when time or cir-cumstances make mass evacuation impractical.This strategy differs with type of emergency butusually involves concentrating inmates and staffin the easiest locations to defend and then fur-ther mitigating risk with equipment, supplies, orspecialized procedures.

Desert island operations: A plan to operate aninstitution for an extended period of time withoutcontact or assistance from outside the facility—for example, if a hurricane and flood cut off allroad access and communications, and air accessis impossible because of severe weather.

Disturbance control team: A sublethal forceteam, or riot squad, that is trained to clear a yardor retake a cell block where there is an inmatedisturbance. A disturbance control team usuallytrains with shields, batons, and chemical agents.It is distinguished from a tactical team thattrains with firearms.

34


Emergency operations center (EOC): A physical location—a situation room or “warroom”—set up and staffed to provide high-leveladministrative support in an emergency, usuallyat a headquarters or regional office. The EOC isdistinguished from a command post, which isusually set up onsite to direct the emergencyoperation.

Emergency post orders: A job description for aspecialized function that only exists in an emer-gency, or for a function that is different duringan emergency than it is day to day.

Emergency staff services (ESS): A plannedoperation providing comprehensive support andassistance to traumatized staff members andfamilies of staff, during and after an emergency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA): By law, each state must maintain astate emergency management agency that coor-dinates with FEMA, the federal agency chargedwith building and supporting the nation’s emer-gency management system. The names of thevarious state emergency agencies differmarkedly.

Fireloading: The amount of potentially com-bustible material available to contribute to thegrowth of a fire. In prisons, this term is oftenused to refer to the amount of inmate personalproperty (magazines, clothing, etc.) in cells, butmore properly it also includes material in corri-dors, storerooms, or anywhere else a fire mightreach.

Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) team: Ateam that is trained to deal with toxic gas releas-es, chemical spills, etc. HAZMAT teams may bepublic or private and vary widely in training andcapabilities.

Initial response checklist: Also known as com-mand post checklist. A prioritized list of actionsto be taken by the initial commander at the

onset of an emergency. It should includecolumns for initials and time next to each item.It is generic rather than specific to a particulartype of emergency.

Intelligence function: In day-to-day operations,a person or persons in charge of coordinatinginformation about certain types of securitythreats and problems for the entire institution. Inan emergency, the intelligence function is anoperation designed to help resolve the situationby developing information about motives, plans,identities, etc., of the inmates or victimsinvolved.

Job action: A strike, “blue flu,” or other crisiscaused by staff acting in concert and inten-tionally interfering with the operation of theinstitution.

Planned use of force: The use of force in a sit-uation where time and circumstances allowsome degree of planning, marshaling ofresources, and supervisory or managementreview and direction. The opposite of “reactiveuse of force.”

Plot map: Also called a plat map. For a prison,a map or diagram of the grounds or compoundshowing buildings, fences, and other develop-ments to scale. “As built” plans and diagramsoften differ from “initial design” plans and dia-grams; current “as built” plans and diagrams arepreferable for almost all emergency purposes.

Risk assessment: An examination of an institu-tion’s relative exposure to various types ofemergencies. Determines which emergencies aremost probable and which areas of the institutionare most vulnerable. See also vulnerabilityanalysis.

Safe harbor. See defend in place.

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team:See tactical team.


35

Step-down plan: A plan for how an institutionwill return to normal operations after an emer-gency. See also deactivation checklist.

Sublethal force: Force that is not reasonablyexpected to produce death or permanent bodilyinjury. Sublethal force includes use of chemicalagents, pain-compliance holds, batons, electron-ic immobilizing devices, water hoses, etc. Alsoreferred to as “less than lethal” or “less lethal”force.

Table-top exercise: An emergency simulationinvolving a small group of staff and conductedverbally or with paper and pencil but withoutany role playing or use of actual prison facilitiesor extended agencies. Essentially, a hypotheticalproblem given to staff to work on in an officesetting.

Tactical team: A weapons team trained for situ-ations such as hostage rescue and firearmsassault. Distinguished from a disturbance con-trol team or sublethal force team. Many tactical

teams are called SWAT (Special Weapons andTactics), CERT (Correctional EmergencyResponse Team), or some similar acronym.

Tone: The “climate” or interpersonal atmos-phere of an institution, sensed by experiencedstaff when walking through the institution.

Turnout gear: Outer clothing worn for fire-fighting. Typically a jacket and pants, worn witha hat and high boots. Key characteristics are awaterproof/water-resistant outer fabric and theability to protect the skin from burns and blister-ing due to radiant heat.

Vulnerability analysis: A detailed review of aninstitution’s areas, functions, people, equipment,procedures, etc., to determine relative risks andthe attractiveness of various targets. This term iscommonly used with regard to counterterrorismactivities, whereas risk assessment—a similarconcept—is more frequently used with regardto general emergency readiness and naturaldisasters.

Section 3Self-Audit Checklists

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-Outline

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-1

Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP-Noncompliance Summary

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-Outline

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-1

Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-Noncompliance Summary

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-Outline

Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-1

Summary of Noncompliance Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-Noncompliance Summary

In This Section

EP-Outline

I. Emergency System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–1

II. Role of Central Office During Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–7

III. Emergency System Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–10

IV. Prevention of Major Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–12

V. Institutional Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–19

VI. Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–21

VII. Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–22

VIII. Staff Specialists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–27

IX. Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–35

X. External Agency Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–36

XI. Emergency Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–40

XII. Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–51

XIII. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–53

XIV. Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–56

XV. Organizational Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–63

XVI. Extended Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–65

XVII. Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–66

XVIII. Emergency Staff Services (ESS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EP–70

XIX. Medical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EP–72

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist: Outline

EP-1

Status: MC – Meets Criterion; PM – Partially Met; NM – Not Met; NA – Not Applicable.Evaluation Methodology: OB – Observed; DR – Document Review; SI – Staff Interview; II – Inmate Interview; OT – Other (specify).NC# Boxes: See instruction 13.

AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

INSTITUTION(S): _____________________________________________________________ DEPARTMENT: ________________________________

TEAM LEADER: ______________________________________________________________

AUDIT TEAM: _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Method

StatusCriterion Comments

I. Emergency System

A. Is there a philosophy statement or mission statement governing major emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is there a statement of the institution’s goals or objectives in major emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Emergency Policies

1. Command

a. Does policy specify who is in initial command of the institution in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify who is in ultimate (final) command of the institution in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy specify the institutional chain of command in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-2


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


d. Does policy state any limitations on the authority of the person in command during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy specify how to change command in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Notifications

a. Does policy specify the notifications to be made by the institution in a major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy include a priority level or order in which those notifications will be made?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy mandate notification of the department’s central or regional office in the event of a major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy specify the role of the central office during an emergency and the relationship of the institution to the central office during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-3


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


3. Use of Force

a. Does policy differentiate between planned use of force and reactive use of force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy state the conditions under which the institution may engage in the planned use of lethal force during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy state the conditions under which the institution may engage in the planned use of sublethal force during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. If planned use of lethal force is necessary, does policy state who will use such force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. If planned use of sublethal forceis necessary, does policy state who will use such force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Does policy specify minimum standards (training, equipment, etc.) for individuals who may engage in planned use of lethal force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-4


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


g. Does policy specify minimum standards (training, equipment, etc.) for individuals who may engage in planned use of sublethal force?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Public Information

a. Does policy identify who at the institution will deal with the media during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify who at the institution has the authority to release information during a major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy explain how media operations will be coordinated between the institution and the department’s central or regional offices during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy identify who will manage rumor control during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy identify who will be responsible for communicating with the local community in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-5


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


5. Training

a. Does policy provide minimum requirements for training all staff in emergency preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy provide additional minimum requirements for trainingstaff at shift command level and above?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy include specific requirements for training various staff specialists (negotiators, public information officers [PIOs], etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy provide standards for both initial and annual/refresher training for emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy specify training standards for inmates (fire evacuation, tornado, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Deviation From Policy

a. Does policy identify which individuals have the authority to deviate from policy?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-6


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


b. Does policy outline responsibilities of a staff member if he/she is ordered to deviate from policy in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Does policy require that one individual at the institution have overall responsibility for emergency preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does department policy require one individual to be responsible for emergency preparedness departmentwide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Evacuation

a. Does policy require detailed plans for an offsite (out-of-compound) evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy require detailed plans for an onsite (out-of-buildings) evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Hostage Incidents

a. Is there a policy statement specifying that persons taken hostage have no rank or authority and that staff will not comply with orders from a person held hostage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Emergency Preparedness Audit Checklist (continued)

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

b. Is there a policy statement listing nonnegotiable items?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Employee Job Action

a. Does the institution maintain a plan (or an appendix to a generic emergency plan) for responding to a strike or other employee job action (e.g., “blue flu”)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Is each institution required to keep its plan for employee job actions confidential and to distribute the plan only to a designated group of top managers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________II. Role of Central Office

During Emergencies

A. Does the department’s central office have its own emergency plan for an institutional emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the plan outline rules and responsibilities for various individuals in the central office?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are interagency responsibilities detailed in the plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Criterion Comments

EP-7


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-8


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Does the central office’s emergency plan include a public information plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the central office’s emergency plan include a resource allocation plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the plan specify how the central office will communicate with unaffected institutions during the emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the central office’s plan outline responsibilities for communicating with the Governor’s office and the legislature?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the central office’s plan include aduty officer system or other 24-hour notification method?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

1. Does the central office’s plan call for establishing an EOC during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the location of the EOC specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-9


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


3. Are an adequate number of telephones (or telephone jacks) at that location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is adequate radio communication available at that location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Can an open phone line be maintained between the EOC and the institution experiencing the crisis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are current emergency plans for each institution available in the EOC?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Is the EOC equipped with diagrams of each institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the EOC have broadcast and cable television, an am/fm radio, and a video recorder?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Does the central office’s plan outline EOC security procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-10


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


10. Is the EOC large enough for the number of individuals necessary to staff it?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the central office have a separate plan or plans for an emergency that occurs in the central office (fire, natural disaster, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________III. Emergency System Review

A. Audit Procedure

1. Is there a departmentally specified procedure for auditing each institution’s emergency system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution conduct an annual review or audit of its emergency preparedness system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does that review or audit team include individuals from outside the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Emergency Tests/Drills

1. Is there a standard for how often the institution must run emergency tests/drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-11


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


2. If yes, has that standard been met during the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are monitors always assigned to evaluate emergency tests/drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are monitors and/or evaluators trained and authorized to temporarily or permanently stop an emergency exercise, drill, or simulation in the event of a serious safety or security problem?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are monitors trained to evaluate tests/drills and provide both verbal and written assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Do policies or procedures require monitors and/or evaluators to debrief staff involved in drills and exercises, pointing out strengths and weaknesses observed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are written evaluations of every test/drill required from those monitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-12


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


8. Are recommendations required as part of each monitor’s evaluation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Are the monitors’ evaluations and recommendations of emergency tests/drills routinely reviewed and approved by someone in authority?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Does policy require that some emergency tests/drills be conducted on evenings and weekends and on all shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is there a requirement that emergency tests/drills be based on a wide variety of emergency scenarios and based on the risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________IV. Prevention of Major Emergencies

A. Management Philosophy

1. Is prevention of major emergencies stressed at management meetings?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Do managers consistently review prevention issues with subordinates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does management stress early intervention in problem situations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-13


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


4. Does management stress the need for frequent, open communication between staff and inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does management monitor staff/inmate communication issues?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Does management aggressively monitor the “tone” (climate) of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Does each institution top manager visit and review all areas of the institution at least twice per month?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Are visits by institution top managers to various areas of the prison documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are all staff trained to recognize the traditional signs of impending trouble (stockpiling commissary items, more racial grouping than usual, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-14


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


C. Does the institution use a “critical indicator system” (mathematical/statistical charting of trends in inmate grievances, assaults, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is there an institutionwide formalized intelligence function (as distinguished from security threat group operations or institutional investigations)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Classification

1. Is there an objective inmate classification system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the classification system followed rigorously?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Is there a system that identifies and manages high-risk inmates (escape risks, racists, violent psychotics, assault risks, security threat groups, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is there an intelligence file containing names and pictures of those inmates likely to plan serious violence or likely to become inmate leaders during an insurrection?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-15


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


F. Security

1. Does the institution do random urinalysis testing of inmates for illegal drugs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is there some other (other than urinalysis testing) specified drug interdiction program?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does the institution define contraband?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the institution perform random cell searches for contraband?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is there a minimum standard for the number of random cell searches performed in a given time period?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Has that cell search standard been met during the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-16


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


7. Is there a log for the institution or for each area that lists all random searches of cells or areas of the prison?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the institution perform random security inspections of cells (bars, locks, vents, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a minimum standard for the number of random security inspections of cells performed in a given time period?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Has that cell security inspection standard been met during the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is there a log for the institution or for each area that lists all random security inspections?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are day-to-day security issues monitored closely and regularly by managers and supervisors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-17


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


13. Are supervisors and managers required to file written reports regularly evaluating security practices?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Are staff held accountable for security lapses through the use of corrective actions, remedial training, counseling, or discipline?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Is security equipment organized and maintained in good working order?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Are there inspections of the internal and external areas of each housing unit on a daily basis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. Are such daily housing unit inspections logged or otherwise documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

18. Is there a standard specifying the frequency of inspections of the perimeter security checks, vehicle and pedestrian entrances, gates, sally ports, visiting areas, control centers, and administration areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

Criterion Comments

EP-18


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status

19. Are all of those security inspections logged or otherwise documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

20. If there is such a standard (item 18 above), has the institution met that standard for the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

21. Is there a security inspection/review of tool control and key control at least monthly, and are such inspections/reviews documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Inmate Grievance System

1. Is there an inmate grievance system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Has the inmate grievance system been certified or reviewed and approved by an outside agency such as the U.S. Department of Justice or the courts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does management stress the importance of treating all inmate grievances seriously?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-19


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


4. Does management regularly review the substance of inmate grievances?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is there a monthly summary of all grievances, including subject, area of institution, and numbers upheld and denied?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________V. Institutional Emergency Plans

A. Does the department require institutional emergency plans to be written in a standardized format?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the department have a formal approval procedure for institutional emergency plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the approval procedure for institutional emergency plans include a requirement that a manager from the department’s central or regional office review and approve each institutional plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have a single, comprehensive emergency plan (versus individual plans for various emergencies)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-20


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status

E. Did the institution’s emergency plan go through a formal approval procedure, and is the plan signed and dated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Has the institution’s emergency plan been formally reviewed during the preceding 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the plan include a distribution list showing locations and/or individuals who have copies of the plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is each copy of the plan identified by a unique number or letter, and is there an inventory system for the copies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Does the emergency plan include a procedure for documenting changes and updates to the plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Checklists

1. Does the plan include an initial response (command post) checklist?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the plan include procedures for specific types of emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

Criterion Comments

Criterion Comments

EP-21


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status

3. Does the plan include job-specific checklists to be used during emergencies (emergency post orders)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the plan include a deactivation checklist?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Is the institution emergency plan tailored to that specific institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VI. Risk Assessment

A. Does the institution’s emergency plan require an annual risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are executive staff and emergency specialists required to review the annual risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Is the section on risk assessment specific to that institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the risk assessment include identification of those emergencies judged most likely to occur at that institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-22


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


E. Does the risk assessment identify institutional “hot spots”?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the risk assessment include evaluation of the security of control centers, armory, emergency generators, and perimeters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the risk assessment include provisions for mitigating those risks that could be reasonably reduced?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the risk assessment include an evaluation of changes in the inmate population and how those changes affect risk and vulnerability?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VII. Preparation

A. Emergency Notifications

1. Are home phone, cell phone, and pager numbers of key staff immediately available in the initial command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are home phone, cell phone, and pager numbers available for staff specialists (PIOs, negotiators, etc.) as well as for top managers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-23


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


3. Are key emergency staff and top management staff contact phone numbers maintained separately from general staff recall phone lists?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are general staff recall phone procedures organized by geographic proximity to the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are staff emergency notification lists (next of kin) updated annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are staff emergency notification lists available to the commander in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are there special ID cards to expedite entry of outside emergency personnel?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a system to minimize the number of calls the control center must make in an emergency (e.g., phone trees)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Are there phone lines that can be restricted to only outgoing calls in the event of an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-24


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


10. Does the institution have rapid-dial or auto-dial equipment to assist with emergency staff recalls?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Plot Plans

1. Are plot plans/blueprints for every area of the institution available in the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Do plot plans show location and type of all emergency utility cutoffs (electric, water, gas, oil, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Do plot plans show all secondary fire access doors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Do plot plans show the size or volume of all rooms and buildings in the institution (in case chemical agents must be used)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Do plot plans show direction doors and windows open?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Do plot plans show emergency escape routes for various areas of the institution in case of a hostage incident or insurrection?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-25


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


7. Do plot plans show all fire extinguishers, standpipes, and fire hose locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the institution have current video of all areas showing entry, egress, windows, door operation, and floor layout?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a mechanism to update emergency plot plans if routine or scheduled maintenance is done?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Can the institution disable all inmate pay phones and/or outside phones?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. In an emergency, can staff disable inmate access to television?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are all roofs painted with numbers or letters for helicopter identification?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-26


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


F. Are all buildings labeled with large letters or numbers on all sides for immediate identification by outside agency staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is an inventory of serious staff medical conditions available to the commander during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is a list of staff blood types available to the commander in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Is there a written plan for dealing with inmate family members who may come to the institution during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Is there a plan for providing phone information on the status of individual inmates to family members during a lengthy emergency or evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Is there an inventory of staff foreign language skills (including sign language) available to the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-27


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


L. Is there a group of staff trained in search and rescue for individuals in the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Are there written procedures for command post security during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Is there a plan for operating food service during a major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Is there an emergency plan for facilities maintenance engineering?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VIII. Staff Specialists

A. Tactical Teams

1. Does the institution have a tactical team trained to respond to emergency situations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. If the institution does not have its own tactical team, have clear, detailed arrangements been made with an external tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-28


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


3. Are the tactical team structure and minimum size specified in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the tactical team currently at or above minimum strength?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does the tactical team have an identified leader and assistant leader?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are the minimum training standards for the tactical teams specified in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Is the tactical team currently in compliance with its minimum training standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a medical person (nurse, med tech, etc.) attached to the tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a video operator attached to the tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-29


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


10. Are equipment standards specified for the tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Does the tactical team’s equipment currently meet those standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Does the tactical team train with command-level staff and negotiators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Does the tactical team practice with a wide variety of scenarios?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Are tactical team members available by pager?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Does the tactical team include snipers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Are snipers trained to work with spotters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-30


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


17. Are team members’ leave and vacation schedules coordinated to ensure team availability?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Disturbance Control

1. Does the institution have a disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. If the institution does not have its own disturbance control team, have clear, detailed arrangements been made with an external disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are the disturbance control team structure and minimum size specified in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the disturbance control team currently at or above minimum strength?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does the disturbance control team have an identified leader and assistant leader?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are the minimum training standards for the disturbance control team specified in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-31


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


7. Is the disturbance control team currently in compliance with its minimum training standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a medical person (nurse, med tech, etc.) attached to the disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is there a video operator attached to the disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Are minimum equipment standards specified for the disturbance control team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Does the disturbance control team’s equipment currently meet those standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are all team members current with baton training?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Are all team members current with chemical agent training?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-32


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


14. Have all team members had training in restraint and transport techniques?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Are all team members current with CPR and first aid training?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Hostage Negotiators

1. Does the institution have its own trained negotiators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. If not, does the institution have detailed arrangements with external negotiators who would be used in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. If the institution relies on external negotiators, do the arrangements guarantee the availability of the negotiators to the institution on a 24-hour basis and with an acceptable response time?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is there a written standard for the minimum number of negotiators available to the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Does the number of currently available negotiators meet this standard?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-33


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


6. Is there an identified chief negotiatorand assistant chief negotiator?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are there minimum standards for initial and refresher training for negotiators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Do all of the institution’s negotiators currently meet these training standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is the working structure of the negotiating team specified in writing?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Do the negotiators have a portable audiotape recorder, throw phone, and preprinted negotiation log forms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is negotiator availability guaranteed by coordinating leave and vacation schedules?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Do the negotiators train with the command-level staff and with the tactical team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-34


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Public Information Officer (PIO)

1. Does the institution have an identified PIO?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is there at least one alternate or assistant PIO?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are there minimum training standards specified for the PIO?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the PIO meet these training standards?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is there a written overview or description of the institution available for distribution to the media in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Is there a procedure for logging and returning media phone calls in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are there written procedures for identifying and escorting media personnel in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-35


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


8. Do procedures exist to establish an 800 information line during an extended emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Is the required equipment available for the identified media center during an emergency (podium, easel, microphone and sound system, departmental seal, phone jacks, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________IX. Training

A. Do new security staff receive at least 8 hours of training on the emergency plan and emergency procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does this training include hostage situations, riots, disasters, and other emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do new civilian (nonsecurity) staff receive at least 4 hours of training on the institution’s emergency plan and on emergency preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have all institution staff at the level of shift commander and above received at least 20 hours of formal training on emergency preparedness?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-36


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


E. Have all institution staff at the level of shift commander and above participated in emergency preparedness exercises/drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Have all institution staff received at least 4 hours of training on emergency situations during the last 2 years?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Has the institution conducted emergency exercises or simulations during the last year that involved external (mutual aid) agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________X. External Agency Agreements

A. Does the institution have written agreements for assistance during an institutional emergency with the following external agencies

1. State police?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Local police?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Local sheriff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-37


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


4. Nearby correctional institutions (including county jails, federal prisons, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. National Guard?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. State/federal emergency management agency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Local fire department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Nearest hazardous materials (HAZMAT) team?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Local phone company?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Utility company(ies)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-38


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


11. Local hospitals?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Ambulance services?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does each written external agency agreement include the following

1. Emergency contact names and 24-hour phone numbers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Services the agency can provide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Equipment they can provide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Restrictions on assistance?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Reporting (staging) locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-39


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


6. Command relationships?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Provision for annual review of agreement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Provision for involvement of the external agency in emergency simulations and drills at the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Provision for the institution to provide assistance in the event of a community disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have interagency agreements with other institutions within the department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are there written agreements with external agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are there specific ordinances, regulations, statutes, or verbal agreements covering interagency operations in emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-40


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


F. Within the last 12 months, has the institution held meetings with all external agencies to review and update emergency plans and procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XI. Emergency Equipment

A. Is there a comprehensive inventory of emergency equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Is such an inventory available to the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the emergency equipment inventory current within the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does the inventory include the location of each item?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is emergency equipment stored in an area accessible to staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is emergency equipment secured to prevent access by inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-41


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


6. Is there an emergency equipment testing program to ensure that all equipment is serviceable and ready for use when needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is there a comprehensive motor vehicle inventory for the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Is such an inventory readily available to the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the vehicle inventory updated for accuracy at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are the vehicles accessible after business hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is vehicle fuel available after business hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Armory

1. Are there written policies and procedures for the armory?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-42


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


2. Does policy or departmental regulation specify all approved types of weaponry, chemical agents, ammunition, and other defensive equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does policy or departmental regulation specify minimum quantities of each such weaponry, chemical agents, and other defensive equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the armory currently in compliance with these policies and procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Is the armory secure from rioting inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are armory keys restricted from inmate areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Do on-duty staff have immediate 24-hour access to the armory?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is the armory inventoried at least monthly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-43


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


9. Are discrepancies in the armory inventory investigated and reconciled?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Is the armory inventory reviewed by management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Is the armory inspected by a management-level staff person at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are ammunition and firearms inventoried?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Is there a written procedure for checking out weapons and other armory equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Is there a procedure to ensure that an individual staff member is currently qualified in firearm and/or chemical agent use prior to issuing a firearm and/or chemical agent to that individual (except for training or qualification purposes)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Chemical Agents

a. Are there sufficient chemical agents to control a large riot at the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-44


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


b. Are the pyrotechnic, blast, barrier, and aerosol formats available in both projectile and throwing grenade types?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Are all chemical agents clearly dated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Are all chemical agents (except those for training use) within manufacturers’ shelf life?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Are those chemical agents designated for training use clearly labeled as such to differentiate them from the general inventory of chemical agents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Has the department specified a minimum number or percentage of security staff who must be currently qualified in the use of chemical agents, and is the institution in compliance with that requirement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

g. Is there a policy requiring immediate medical screening/treatment for offenders and staff who have been exposed to chemical agents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-45


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


h. Are chemical agents stored in a secure location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

i. Do duty staff have immediate 24-hour access to stored chemical agents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Firearms

a. Considering the size and nature of the institution, is there an adequate supply of firearms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Are the types of firearms and ammunition appropriate for the nature of the institution and for the location and function of armed posts at the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Are all firearms cleaned, inspected, tested, and sighted on a regular schedule?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Has the department specified a minimum number or percentage of security staff who must be currently qualified in the use of firearms, and is the institution in compliance with that requirement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-46


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


e. Do duty staff have immediate 24-hour access to stored firearms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution’s emergency equipment include the following:

1. An adequate supply of flexcuffs (four times the entire inmate population)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. An adequate supply of steel restraints?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. A supply of binoculars?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. A supply of flashlights and batteries?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Distraction devices (flash-bang grenades)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Bomb blanket?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-47


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


7. Long-handled corner (90-degree) mirror?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Loud hailers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. High-visibility clothing (fluorescent vests, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Portable smoke ejectors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Portable emergency generator?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Portable lighting?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. High-speed cutting torch?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Bolt cutters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-48


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


15. Radio with a tactical channel?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. An adequate supply of riot shields?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. An adequate supply of helmets with face shields?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

18. An adequate supply of riot batons?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

19. An adequate supply of potable water (48–72 hours)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

20. Fire axes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

21. An adequate supply of gas masks?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-49


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


22. Stun shield(s) or taser(s)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Emergency Keys

1. Are there emergency key rings for all buildings and areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is there a set of emergency keys outside the perimeter of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are emergency keys and locks color coded for quick identification (red for fire, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are emergency keys and locks notched for night identification?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are emergency key rings soldered or welded closed to prevent unauthorized removal of keys?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Do emergency key rings include a metal ring disk (“chit”) stamped with the name of area the ring accesses and the number of keys on that ring?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-50


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


7. Have all emergency keys and locks been tested in the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Emergency Generators

1. Is there an emergency generator?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Is the emergency generator adequateto run critical areas of the institution and critical equipment safely for 24 hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are the critical areas and equipment powered by the emergency generator documented and annually tested to confirm that power is adequate?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Is the emergency generator secure from inmate sabotage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are staff trained to know which systems will be run on emergency power and which will be inoperable during a main power outage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Is there battery-powered lighting in the emergency generator areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-51


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


7. Are the emergency generators full-load tested for 10 minutes or more at least quarterly to determine that they are in proper working order, and are such tests documented?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Do all emergency generators have sufficient fuel to run for a minimum of 72 hours continuously?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. If the emergency generators must be started manually in the event of a main power outage, are there staff on duty on a 24-hour basis who are trained to start and operate those generators?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Is the diesel fuel for the emergency generators checked for mold on a regular basis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XII. Locations

Are the following locations specified in the institutional emergency plans:

A. Command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Alternate command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-52


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


C. Command post location outside compound?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Media room and/or staging area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Staff/family support area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Inmate family area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Staff staging/reporting area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Mutual aid staging area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. External traffic control points?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-53


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


J. Mass casualty/triage area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Disturbance control team dressing/assembly area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Tactical team dressing/assembly area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Morgue?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Heliport?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Staff break areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XIII. Procedures

A. Does the institution have a general procedure for responding to major emergencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-54


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


B. Do procedures call for audio recording in the command post during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do written procedures specify who will keep a log during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do written procedures call for double-posting key locations in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does procedure call for relieving staff from noncritical posts in an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are there written procedures for emergency counts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are there written procedures for emergency lockdown?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is there a standard procedure for sending staff to investigate a report of a developing emergency (a cover group)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-55


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


I. Are there procedures that specify accounting for staff, visitors, volunteers, etc., in the event of an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. At the onset of a major emergency, could the institution quickly account for all staff within the institution and determine the identities of staff not accounted for?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. At the onset of a major emergency, could the institution quickly account for all visitors within the institution and determine the identities of any visitors not accounted for?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Are emergency traffic-control procedures specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does procedure call for cutting off inmate telephones at the onset of a major emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Is there a procedure for briefing on-duty and returning staff about the nature of an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Does procedure call for informing the inmate population of emergency conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-56


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


P. Is there a procedure for limiting the initial staff response to a reported emergency to avoid set-up or distraction (as opposed to a procedure whereby all available staff respond as quickly as possible to the location of the reported emergency).

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Does the institution have a system of first responders?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Does the institution have a system of second responders?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XIV. Evacuation

Note: The Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire self-audit checklist also includes questions pertaining to offsite evacuation plans and fire prevention and response.

A. Is there an evacuation plan for all areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does every area of the institution have a secondary evacuation route?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are evacuation routes posted in all areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-57


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Are there battery-powered or emergency generator-powered emergency exit lights in all living and program areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Units

1. Are SCBAs available in or adjacent to all living areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are SCBAs stored or hung on walls in pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are SCBAs examined annually for functionality?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are all SCBAs inspected, charge-checked, and tagged at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Have all staff been medically cleared to wear and use SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Have all staff been trained in the use of SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-58


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


7. Does the SCBA training for all staff include donning the SCBA, achieving a seal, and then breathing for some period of time?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Are staff trained to use SCBAs in pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Have all staff in the institution had refresher training on SCBA use within the past 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Fire Drills and Other Fire Safety Measures

1. Are staff trained in fire evacuation procedures for areas currently assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are inmates given orientation on fire evacuation procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are fire drills unannounced?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-59


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


4. Are all fire drills

a. Monitored?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Timed for clearing the area in which the drill was held?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Timed for clearing a count of inmates evacuated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Evaluated in writing by monitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are fire drills conducted on all shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are there minimum standards for how often fire drills must be conducted in each area of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Have all areas of the institution met this standard within the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-60


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


8. Are fire drill reports, evaluations, and plans for improvement reviewed and approved by management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. Are fire drill reports and evaluation records kept in one central location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Has the local or state fire marshal inspected the facility within the past year for compliance with state/local fire codes and regulations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Has the local or state fire marshal approved the number, type, and location of fire extinguishers throughout the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are all fire extinguishers inspected, charged, and tagged at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Are all fire hoses and standpipes inspected, tested, and tagged at least annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Does the institution know the actual response time for the local fire department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-61


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


15. Has fire-fighting equipment been brought into institutional areas to make sure the equipment can be connected and effectively used in each area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Does the institution have its own fire brigade (trained inmates or staff)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. Has the institution considered training a fire brigade that would serve as a first-response force until the fire department arrived?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are manual unlocking devices and/or backup keys available onsite for unlocking every living area of the institution 24 hours a day?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is there an offsite evacuation plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. If yes, does the offsite evacuation plan include the following:

1. Potential destinations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-62


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


2. Specific transportation alternatives?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Security procedures during evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Which inmate records must be moved with inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Procedures for providing medical services during and after the evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Provisions for coordinating with local and state police during the evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Arrangements for meal service at the new location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Arrangements for inmate identification and count at the new location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-63


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


9. Arrangements for housing and security at the new location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Predetermined evacuation routes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Procedures for protection or destruction of confidential records that cannot be evacuated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are there defend-in-place (“safe harbor”)procedures, equipment, and supplies to protect the inmate population in emergencies when evacuation is not necessary, feasible, or possible?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Have areas been designated as defend-in-place within the facility, based on the types of potential hazards identified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is facility staff trained on the predesignated defend-in-place areas and the preparation needed, if any, to activate them?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XV. Organizational Structure

A. Is an emergency organizational structure defined in detail?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-64


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


B. Are responsibilities specified for managing the unaffected portions of the institution during an emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are supervision and direction of the cover group (staff initial response group) specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is supervision of perimeter staff during an emergency specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is the responsibility for coordinating on-duty and returning staff identified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Is the responsibility for emergency equipment detailed and assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the responsibility for liaison with external agencies assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is the intelligence function described and responsibility for it assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

Method


EP-65


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

I. Is the responsibility for the tactical function defined and assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Is the responsibility for coordinating emergency staff services (ESS) assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Are there written guidelines (emergency post orders) available for each specialized emergency assignment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is there an emergency checklist available for each specialized emergency assignment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XVI. Extended Emergencies

A. Is there a written plan for staffing in an extended emergency (beyond 12 hours)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is responsibility for assignments and scheduling in an extended emergency assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. In an extended emergency, is the length of shift specified by assignment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-66


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Does the plan for extended emergencies include provision for staggered relief of key positions including the emergency response commander?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the plan for extended emergencies include arrangements for onsite bivouac of key staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the plan for extended emergencies include arrangements for bivouac of staff on emergency call-back duty?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are relief procedures specified for key staff during an extended emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XVII. Aftermath

A. Are damage assessment procedures outlined and responsibilities assigned in the emergency plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are report writing and debriefing procedures detailed in the emergency plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Is there a review and approval procedure for all reports?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-67


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Is there a procedure for collecting audiotapes, videotapes, photos, and/or logs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is there a chain-of-custody procedure for all reports, logs, photos, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Is there a procedure for gathering staff-generated inmate disciplinary reports?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is there a procedure for gathering external agency reports?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is a short-term step-down procedure required before key staff are relieved of duty?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Are crime scene preservation procedures specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are criminal evidence collection and preservation procedures detailed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-68


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


K. Is immediate liaison with criminal prosecution authorities required?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is civil liability review mandated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the plan include procedures for managing released hostages?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Are medical and psychological screenings required for key and/or traumatized staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Is a critical incident review mandated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Are critical incident review procedures specified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Are critical incident reviews shared with all institutions in the department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Is a review of insurance issues mandated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-69


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


S. Does the emergency plan specify developing a media relations plan as part of the aftermath activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

T. Do procedures specify the identification, segregation, and interviews of inmate suspects and witnesses?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

U. Do procedures specify releasing information to all staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Do procedures specify releasing information about emergency status to inmate populations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

W. Do procedures require developing a plan for communications with the local community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

X. Do procedures require a plan for regularly briefing central office and other branches of government?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Y. Is there a procedure for establishing emergency purchasing authority in the wake of a major crisis or natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-70


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


Z. Does the emergency plan include procedures to prevent staff retaliation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

AA. Does the emergency plan include procedures to deactivate the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XVIII. Emergency Staff Services (ESS)

A. Is there a general plan for ESS?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are responsibilities for ESS during emergencies assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are ESS resources for specialized help (e.g., trauma counseling) identified?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the family support plan include child care provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the family support plan include transportation provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the family support plan include emergency financial assistance?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

EP-71


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


G. Does the plan include liaison assigned to each family of hostage/injured staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is a staff family briefing area identified in the ESS plan and is it separate from the inmate family area and the media briefing area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Does the plan include provision for individual and group trauma counseling within 48 hours of the incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the plan include procedures for rehabilitating traumatized staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Are there arrangements for secure motel/hotel housing for staff families during the incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Is administrative leave mandatory for hostage/traumatized staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the plan include death notification procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-72


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


XIX. Medical Services

A. Is there a comprehensive medical plan for an institutional emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the plan include mass casualties/triage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are staff trained in blood-borne pathogen precautions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are supplies for safely handling blood or other body fluids provided or readily available?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the plan include evacuation procedures for nonambulatory or critically ill inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Is a location other than the infirmary identified for mass casualties/triage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution have an emergency-equipped medical crash cart?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

EP-73


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


H. Are there adequate numbers of gurneys?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Are backup medical resources for emergencies identified in the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

EP-NoncomplianceSummary

Review of all items on this page completed: Yes________ No________

NAME: _________________________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

SUMMARY OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMSEmergency Preparedness Self-Audit Checklist

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________

DATE: _________________________________________________________

Assigned Due Apprvd ApprvalNC # Item Description Reason for Noncompliance To Date By Date

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

I. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-1

II. Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-5

III. Offsite Evacuation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-6

IV. Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-7

V. Tornado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-8

VI. Earthquake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-10

VII. Flood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-13

VIII. Chemical Spill/HAZMAT Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-14

IX. Hurricane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-16

X. Severe Winter Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-18

XI. Fire Prevention and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ND-20

ND-Outline

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist: Outline

ND-1


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist


TEAM LEADER: ______________________________________________________________

AUDIT TEAM: _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Method


I. General Considerations

A. Does the institution have policies in place specific to natural disaster planning, response, and recovery operations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution conduct routine training in natural disaster response, including drills and exercises?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution conduct an annual vulnerability analysis (risk assessments) for natural disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution mitigate the threat of natural disasters, where possible, based on the vulnerability analysis?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are natural disaster shelter areas identified that will maximize protection for inmates, staff, and visitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the institution have current mutual aid agreements with outside agencies to coordinate response activities during a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

ND-2


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


G. Does the institution have emergency response plans and checklists specific to natural disaster response?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Do the specific emergency response plans and checklists include a “defend-in-place” strategy for situations where evacuation may not be practical or possible?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Has the institution identified supplies and equipment that may be needed in a natural disaster (water, tents, portable toilets, portable lighting, blankets, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the institution have agreements to obtain critical equipment and supplies that are not available onsite or that may become inoperable during a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Does the institution have evacuation and relocation plans, alternative sites selected, and arrangements and agreements for natural disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have and conduct routine tests of early warning systems for natural disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution have a plan to operate the institution with reduced staffing levels should a natural disaster make that necessary?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Natural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-3


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


N. Does the institution have an emergency staff services (ESS) program available to respond to staff and staff family needs in the event of a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Does the institution have a public information strategy prepared in the event of a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Has the institution planned for “desert island operations” (operating for an extended period without contact or assistance from outside) in the event of a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Is the institution prepared to maintain security and essential services, in the event of loss of power or other utilities, for as long as 72 hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution have a 3-day supply of potable water onsite or an alternate water supply system?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Does the institution have a 3-day supply of food that would not need cooking?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Does the institution have a 3-day supply of medications for inmates onsite?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-4


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


5. Have staff been encouraged to maintain a 3-day supply of their medications and an extra pair of eyeglasses on site?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Are staff trained in initial response procedures specific to natural disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Do staff and inmates participate in severe weather drills?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

S. Do the emergency response plans and checklists for natural disasters include notification of and coordination with the department emergency operation center?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

T. Does the institution have current copies of the county emergency management agency’s emergency operating plan, and are those copies kept with or part of the institution’s emergency plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

U. Are staff encouraged to maintain a family emergency preparedness kit at home?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Are staff encouraged to identify family relocation areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-5


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


W. Are staff encouraged to identify an out-of-area relative or friend for family phone contacts and to relay messages?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________II. Vulnerability Analysis

A. Has the institution’s vulnerability analysis been distributed to both county and state emergency management agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the vulnerability analysis include conditions affecting the institution (understaffing, overcrowding, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the vulnerability analysis cover all natural disasters for which the institution is at risk and include an assessment of the degree of risk for each disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the vulnerability analysis include a historical review of natural disasters that have affected the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the vulnerability analysis include an assessment of which people, property, facility functions, etc., are at particular risk with regard to specific types of disasters?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Have the vulnerability analysis and institution emergency response plans for natural disasters been reviewed by the county and state emergency management agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

Method


ND-6


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

G. Have other emergency services external agencies reviewed the institution’s vulnerability analysis and emergency response plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________III. Offsite Evacuation Plan

A. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation plans account for expected civilian evacuation routes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation plans include procedures for maintaining security of the facility after evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation plans include procedures for reoccupying the facility after the natural disaster has concluded?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. If yes, do these procedures include the following:

1. Testing of security systems?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Testing of all life lines (telephone, electricity, water, etc.)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Gradual phase-in of the inmate population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-7


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


4. Evaluation of medical and food service facilities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation plans include provisions for moving crucial inmate records with the inmate population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Do the institution’s offsite evacuation plans include provisions for securing or backing up noncrucial inmate records that will not be moved during the evacuation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution have different offsite evacuation plans for different types of natural disasters (e.g., are the plans for a flood different from those for an earthquake)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________IV. Recovery Operations

A. Does the institution have a detailed and thorough plan for conducting a damage assessment after a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have a plan for conducting search and rescue operations after a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have a plan for management and treatment of mass casualties resulting from a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-8


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Has the institution identified resources (internal and external) necessary for cleanup and immediate repair to barriers and security systems damaged in a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the institution have written procedures for working with insurance carriers and/or the state government’s risk management agency in the aftermath of a natural disaster?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does policy specify that the institution will apply to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster, and does policy designate responsibility for submitting that application?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________V. Tornado

A. Are there specific tornado procedures in the institution’s emergency plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution’s vulnerability analysis include an evaluation of each building’s ability to withstand a tornado?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have tornado shelter areas been identified within the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do the institution’s response plans distinguish between tornado watch and tornado warning, and are staff trained on this distinction?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-9


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


E. Does the institution have mandatory procedures that are enacted in response to a tornado watch or warning for the area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are there procedures for evacuating towers or other vulnerable staff posts in the event of a tornado watch or warning?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are there procedures for bringing in outside inmate work crews and/or moving inmate groups at risk to safety in response to a tornado watch or warning?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the institution have written procedures mandating that the yard and other outside areas of the facility be inspected each spring for objects or supplies that might become airborne and hazardous in a tornado?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Do staff practice tornado drills at least once per year?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Do inmates receive orientation on tornadoresponse and participate in tornado drills at least once per year?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

ND-10


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


K. Do the institution’s emergency plans include safety precautions for staff or inmates who may be in offices, classrooms, or other areas at risk from flying glass during a tornado?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA) radio with battery backup and warning alarm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Are there tie-downs for trailers and portable buildings, anchoring them to concrete foundations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Do tornado response plans include provisions for sheltering/evacuating visitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Do tornado response plans include procedures for evaluating damage to the security perimeter and making short-term repairs as needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VI. Earthquake

A. Does the institution have a specific response plan for earthquakes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Has the institution evaluated its earthquake risk based on proximity to fault lines and seismic history of the area?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-11


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


C. Has the institution evaluated the structural ability of each building to withstand earthquakes of various severities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Has the institution evaluated the vulnerability of the following to earthquakes:

1. Emergency power generators and fuel storage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Water supply and primary power supply?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Natural gas lines and/or propane storage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Communication systems, perimeter security, armory, infirmary and emergency medical services, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are the institution’s earthquake plans based on the ability to be self-sufficient onsite for as long as 72 hours?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

ND-12


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


F. Are the institution’s maintenance plans, diagrams, and architectural records available onsite?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are bookcases, appliances, and high, heavy objects tied down or anchored against walls to mitigate risk in the event of an earthquake?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Have hanging objects been identified and secured or removed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Has the institution completed a structural engineering review of earthquake-vulnerable buildings to design potential retrofitting with foundation ties, sheer wall, foundation beams, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Have staff received specific training on response to earthquakes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Have inmates received specific training on response to earthquakes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have contingent contracts with structural engineers or any other special provision for evaluating structural integrity of buildings in the aftermath of an earthquake?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-13


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


VII. Flood

A. Has the institution identified and posted county emergency management agency phone numbers in control rooms and other appropriate locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Has the institution conducted a thorough risk assessment of vulnerable areas and equipment in the event of rising water?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have detailed plans for a complete offsite evacuation in the event of a flood?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have those offsite evaluation plans been reviewed carefully within the past 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Has the institution practiced or drilled with a flood-related offsite evacuation scenario within the past 24 months, at the level of table-top exercise or above?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Does the institution have a plan for moving expensive or crucial equipment in the event of rising water?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the institution’s offsite evacuation plan for flood developed in stages, so it could be enacted in response to predetermined flood stages or severity of warning?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-14


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


H. Does the institution have access to small boats or rafts that could be used for search and rescue operations with rising flood waters at the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Do the institution’s flood plans include an analysis of which access and egress routes would be rendered unusable at various flood stages, along with alternate access and egress plans for those flood stages?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Do the institution’s response plans distinguish between flood watch and flood warning and are staff trained on this distinction?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VIII. Chemical Spill/HAZMAT Incident

A. Has the institution analyzed the surrounding area for potential hazardous material situations such as chemical factories, fertilizer manufacturing, and chemical storage or transportation routes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. If such an analysis of the area has been done, does it include prevailing wind and weather patterns?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have staff who have been trained in HAZMAT first responder procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

ND-15


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Does the institution have interagency agreements or arrangements with a nearby HAZMAT team that is fully trained and equipped?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Has the external HAZMAT team toured the institution to familiarize themselves with structural and operational issues?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Has the external HAZMAT team participated in an emergency drill, exercise, or simulation at the institution within the last 3 years?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Do the institution’s HAZMAT response plans include contact information for a laboratory that could quickly identify an unknown substance that is potentially hazardous?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Do the response plans include defend-in-place provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Has the institution conducted table-top exercises involving HAZMAT situations and defend-in-place strategies within the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Has the institution conducted a functional exercise or full-scale simulation involving a defend-in-place strategy with a HAZMAT incident within the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-16


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


K. Has the institution set aside any supplies and/or equipment specifically for a defend-in-place response to a HAZMAT incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Has the institution’s storage and/or disposal of chemicals and/or hazardous materials been reviewed by any external agency within the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________IX. Hurricane

A. Does the institution’s risk assessment include an evaluation of the likelihood of hurricane?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Has the institution conducted an analysis of all buildings to determine their ability to withstand hurricane-force winds?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have supplies and plans for reinforcing/protecting vulnerable areas such as windows?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do hurricane response plans include provisions for moving out of buildings that would be structurally unsound during a hurricane or that cannot be adequately protected?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is there a plan for managing the inmate population while waiting to see if a hurricane actually will hit the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

Method


ND-17


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

F. Has the institution retrofitted buildings with tie-downs or other structural improvements, where possible and practical, to increase protection against hurricanes?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution inspect the yard and other outside areas annually, prior to the start of hurricane season, for objects and materials that could become airborne and dangerous with extremely high winds, and remove or secure such items?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Have staff received any training specifically on preparing for and responding to a hurricane within the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Have inmates received orientation specifically on hurricane response within the last 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Do the institution’s hurricane plans include an assessment of potential for localized flooding?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Do the institution’s hurricane plans include an assessment of the vulnerability of various utilities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

Criterion Comments

ND-18


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status

L. Does the institution have a NOAA radio with a battery backup and warning alarm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Are staff trained on the distinction between hurricane watch and hurricane warning?

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Does the institution have portable water pumps?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________X. Severe Winter Storm

A. Do the institution’s emergency response plans include severe winter storms?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. If the institution were to lose heat during extended below-freezing weather, does the facility have a backup system or backup plan?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have its own snow-clearing equipment, and is it heavy enough to operate in an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have specialized clothing for staff who would need to operate snow-clearing equipment or do other outside work under extreme winter blizzard conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-19


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


E. Does the institution have an adequate supply of heavy jackets, blankets, etc., for the inmate population during an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Has the institution evaluated which utilities would be most vulnerable to failure during an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the institution’s primary water supply at risk in an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is the institution dependent on perimeter electronics that would be likely to fail in an extreme winter storm?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Is there a specific and detailed plan for managing the inmate population during an extended period of extreme winter weather?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Is there a plan for transporting staff to and from the institution in small groups or in pairs, for their own safety, during extreme winter weather?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Does the institution’s response plan include provisions to switch to 12-hour shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-20


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


L. Has the institution analyzed the compound for areas and equipment that would be at risk during long-term subfreezing conditions or from the weight of large amounts of ice?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution keep an adequate supply of sand and salt for walkways and essential vehicle access areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Does the institution maintain a supply of chains for use on its vehicles during extreme winter weather?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XI. Fire Prevention and Response

A. Fire Loading

1. Does the institution have written standards for the amount of inmate property permissible in cells or dormitories?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are these written standards consistent with minimizing fire loading in living areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are inmate cells and other living areas inspected at least once per month for compliance with this standard?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

Criterion Comments

ND-21


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status

4. Is the standard strictly adhered to?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are all other areas of the institution inspected at least once per month to determine if there is excess fire loading?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. If excess fire loading is discovered, is there a procedure that mandates reporting the situation to management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Does the institution maintain written records of inspections for fire loading and of corrective efforts when excessive fire loading is discovered?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Is there a mandatory review for flammability and toxic smoke during fire, for all supplies and materials ordered for the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Ignition Control

1. Are inmates permitted to keep matches or lighters in their cells or dormitories?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Do inmates have open access to matches or lighters in day rooms or other common areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-22


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


3. Are electric outlets and accessible wiring in inmate living areas and common areas inspected at least monthly for tampering or maintenance problems?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are housing areas and common areas accessible to inmates inspected at least monthly to review proximity of flammable items to heat sources such as electric lights?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Fire Safety Review

1. Does the institution have a staff member in charge of fire safety?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution’s fire safety officer report directly to a person at management level?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are all areas of the institution inspected at least monthly to determine if fire doors are operable and fire exits and evacuation routes are kept clear?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are written records required for these reviews?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. When a problem is encountered during a fire inspection and is not immediately corrected, is there a policy or procedure that mandates bringing the problem to management attention immediately?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-23


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


6. Does the institution, on at least an annual basis, review all living units and other occupied areas to ensure that there are at least two exits in the case of fire?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Has the local or state fire marshal inspected the institution within the past year for compliance with state/local fire codes and regulations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Has the local fire department inspected the institution within the past year to discover potential fire problems and to become familiar with the physical plant?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Fire Drills and Fire Evacuation

1. Is there an evacuation plan for all areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does every area of the institution have a secondary evacuation route?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Are evacuation routes posted in all areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Are there battery-powered or emergency generator-powered emergency exit lights in all living and program areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-24


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


5. Are staff trained in fire evacuation procedures for areas currently assigned?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are inmates given orientation on fire evacuation procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are fire drills unannounced?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Are all fire drills

a. Monitored?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Timed for clearing the area in which the drill was held?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Timed for clearing a count of inmates evacuated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Evaluated in writing by monitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-25


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


9. Are fire drills conducted on all shifts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Are there minimum standards for how often fire drills must be conducted in each area of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

11. Have all areas of the institution met this standard within the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Are fire drill reports, evaluations, and plans for improvement reviewed and approved by management?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Are fire drill reports and evaluation records kept in one central location?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Fire Equipment

1. Has the local or state fire marshal approved the number, type, and location of fire extinguishers throughout the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Are all fire extinguishers inspected, charged, and tagged at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-26


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


3. Are all fire hoses and standpipes inspected, tested, and tagged at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Units

a. Are SCBAs available in or adjacent to all living areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Are SCBAs stored or hung on walls in pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Are SCBAs examined annually for functionality?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Are all SCBAs inspected, charge-checked, and tagged at least quarterly?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Have all staff been medically cleared to wear and use SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Have all staff been trained in the use of SCBAs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-27


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


g. Does the SCBA training for all staff include donning the SCBA, achieving a seal, and then breathing for some period of time?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

h. Are staff trained to use SCBAs in pairs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

i. Have all staff in the institution had refresher training on SCBA use within the past 24 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Are fire doors or fire door locks color coded for easy match to fire keys?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Are fire door locks and emergency keys notched for identification in dark or smoke-filled conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Are manual unlocking devices and/or backup keys available onsite for unlocking every living area of the institution 24 hours a day?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. Does the institution have two or more sets of turn-out gear?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-28


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


F. Fire Response

1. Does the institution know the actual response time for the local fire department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does the institution have its own fire brigade (trained inmates or staff)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Has the institution considered training a fire brigade that would serve as a first-response force until the fire department arrived?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#

ND-NoncomplianceSummary


NAME: _________________________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

SUMMARY OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMSNatural Disaster/HAZMAT/Fire Self-Audit Checklist

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________

DATE: _________________________________________________________


Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

I. Consideration of Terrorist Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-1

II. Emergency System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-2

III. Emergency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-8

IV. Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-11

V. Security Threat Groups (STGs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-16

VI. Inmate Visitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-17

VII. Inmate Telephone Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-18

VIII. Inmate Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-19

IX. Specialized Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-20

X. Response to a Terrorism Incident in the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-21

XI. Institutional Intelligence Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-22

XII. Response to Notification of Terrorist Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-23

XIII. Response to Cyber Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CT-27

CounterterrorismSelf-Audit Checklist: Outline

CT-Outline

CT-1


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist


TEAM LEADER: ______________________________________________________________

AUDIT TEAM: _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Method


I. Consideration of Terrorist Strategies

A. Have the department and institution planned for the possibility that prisons might be targeted for a terrorist attack either because of the density of people in an isolated location or because the facility is a symbol of government control and stability?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Have the department and institution planned for and analyzed the potential for terrorists to target an institution for mass escape, either to create panic or to demonstrate the vulnerability of government controls?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have the department and institution planned for and analyzed the potential for terrorist groups to recruit “soldiers” from the inmate population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have the department and institution planned for and analyzed the potential for an inmate strategic threat group (STG) to affiliate with a terrorist organization or to plan terrorist activity on its own?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-2


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


II. Emergency System

A. Is there policy in place that requires the department and institution to conduct an annual risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the risk assessment specifically evaluate the risk of a terrorism emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Has the institution completed a risk assessment in the last 12 months?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does policy require that action plans be developed to mitigate deficiencies identified in the risk assessment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are those action plans monitored throughout the year to determine progress and completion?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Emergency Policies

1. Command

a. Does policy specify who is in command in a terrorism event?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Counterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist (continued)

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-3


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


b. Does policy specify command and coordination with local law enforcement, the local health department, state police, the state emergency management agency, the FBI, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy specify where the command post will be situated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy specify who will be allowed in the command post?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Does policy require mutual aid agreements and/or letters of understanding with outside agencies regarding counterterrorism policies and procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Notification

a. Does policy specify which agencies to notify during a terrorism event?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify which services/functions each external agency is expected to provide?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-4


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


c. Do the notifications include local law enforcement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Do the notifications include the state police?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Do the notifications include the state emergency management agency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Do the notifications include the FBI?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

g. Are telephone numbers of external agencies kept current (verified annually or more frequently)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

h. Does policy specify that emergency manuals contain contact information (business- and after-hour telephone numbers, as well as cell phone and pager numbers) for all mutual aid agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-5


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


4. Public Information

a. Does policy specify who is to speak for the department/ institution during a terrorism event?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Does policy specify how information will be shared with outside agencies?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy specify “one channel out” (a single source controlled by the commander) for communicating information to the media?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy require mutual aid agreements and/or letters of understanding with outside agencies regarding management of public information?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy specify where a joint public information center will be located?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Training

a. Does policy require counterterrorism emergency exercises at least annually for the department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-6


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


b. Does department policy require counterterrorism emergency exercises at least annually for each institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

c. Does policy require a functional and/or full-scale counterterrorism exercise at least every 3 years for the department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Does policy require a functional and/or full-scale counterterrorism exercise at least every 3 years for the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Does policy require that outside agencies (FBI, Department of Homeland Security, state police, state emergency management agency, and local health, law enforcement, and fire departments, at a minimum) be invited to participate in counterterrorism functional or full-scale exercises?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

f. Does policy require evaluation of counterterrorism exercises, written identification of areas that need improvement, and monitoring of those areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

CT-7


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


g. Are all staff trained in awareness of potential terrorist threats?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

h. Are all staff trained in early detection and intervention strategies to prevent terrorist events?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

i. Are all staff trained in specific action steps expected if a terrorist event takes place?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

j. Are first responders trained specifically in precautions to take if a terrorist event is suspected?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

k. Are mailroom and warehouse staff trained in how to identify a suspicious package or substance and what to do in response?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

l. Are specialized staff trained in decontamination procedures?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-8


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


m. Are institution staff trained in basic fire suppression (in the event that local fire agencies are not available to respond because of a community terrorism incident)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________III. Emergency Plans

A. Does the institution have specific emergency plans for responding to a physical assault from outside the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a biological attack on the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a biological attack in the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a chemical attack on the facility?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a chemical attack in the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-9


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


F. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to a suspicious package or substance received by an individual staff member or the mailroom?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution’s emergency plan specify how to isolate and treat staff who may have been contaminated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Do institution emergency plans specify how to preserve crime scenes and protect evidence?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Does the institution have emergency plans that describe steps to take in a mass casualty emergency?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Does the institution have emergency plans that specify how daily operations will be carried out during a utility failure?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Do the department’s central office and the institution have plans for responding to a cyber attack?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-10


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


L. Does the institution have emergency plans for responding to bomb threats?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution have emergency plans that specify how to respond if a bomb is found or is detonated?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

N. Do institution emergency plans specify where inmates and staff are to be evacuated if necessary in a terrorist attack?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Do institution emergency plans specify what will be done regarding staff families in the event of a terrorist attack in the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Do institution emergency plans specify how to respond to an aircraft impact or vehicle impact/explosion?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Do the central office and the institution have a plan for operating with reduced staffing levels if a terrorist attack in the community prevents staff from reporting to work?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-11


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


IV. Mitigation

A. Do post orders specifically require that officers monitor the exterior of the institution to detect unusual activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are specially selected and specially trained counterterrorism staff assigned to armed posts?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are food and water storage areas secured and protected from outside tampering?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have arrangements been made for critical equipment and supplies (potable water, portable toilets, packaged meals, etc.) in the event of a terrorism incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are deliveries closely inspected and screened before they enter the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are vendors and contractors required to submit to background checks before they enter the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-12


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


G. Are blueprints/site plans signed for by the contractors and returned to the institution after projects are completed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Are emergency generators and regular power and water supplies outside the perimeter secured from public access?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. In an emergency, can the power plant emergency generators and water supply be operated without inmate labor?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are the front entrances and vehicle sally ports monitored by video cameras?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

K. Has the institution analyzed its vulnerability to car bombs or vehicle intrusion and erected vehicle barriers to mitigate high-risk threats?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

L. Does the institution have onsite explosive detection equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

M. Does the institution have onsite x-ray equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

CT-13


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


N. If the institution does not have x-ray or explosive detection equipment, does it have written agreements with outside agencies to obtain that equipment if needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

O. Are National Crime Information Center (NCIC) checks conducted on all new staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

P. Is staff parking separated from visitor parking?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Q. Can the staff parking area be readily secured under emergency conditions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

R. Are procedures for high-risk inmate escort/travel orders reviewed annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

S. Are visitor vehicle license plates checked at random periodically for outstanding arrest warrants?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

T. Do the site plans show the institution “as built” rather than “as designed”?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

CT-14


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


U. Does the institution have video or photographs of each building, with indications of square footage, distances, utilities, entry/egress points, keys, phones, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

V. Do staff check visitor areas (including lockers) before and after each visitation period?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

W. Does the institution update its staff emergency notification/information sheets at least annually and keep staff photos current?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

X. Are staff encouraged to maintain a personal emergency preparedness checklist in their home?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Y. In the event of an emergency, are utility shut-off locations available to responding police, fire, and utility company staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Z. In the event of an emergency, do authorized personnel have 24-hour access to building plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-15


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


AA. In the event of an emergency, are special ID cards available to expedite entry of outside emergency personnel?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

BB. In the event of a heightened terrorism alert, are there plans for increased perimeter security patrols?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

CC. In the event of a heightened terrorist alert, are there plans to provide special armament and equipment to perimeter patrol staff and traffic checkpoint staff?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

DD. Does equipment for these staff include rifle, shotgun, sidearm, aerosol chemical agent, flashlight, lantern, florescent vest/jacket, protective vest, and handcuff/flexcuffs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

EE. Are driver photographs, driver license numbers, and truck license plate numbers for regular delivery vehicles available to institution staff at extended traffic checkpoints?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

FF. Is an area identified for offloading deliveries and supplies outside the institution’s secure perimeter, and is there a plan to use this area if necessary.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-16


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


GG. Does the institution’s inventory of state vehicles include license plate numbers, and is it updated at least annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________V. Security Threat Groups (STGs)

A. Is there a formalized plan to identify and monitor STGs?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are all staff trained to recognize STGs through language used, signs, and tattoos?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are possible threats by STGs regularly identified and monitored?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Do staff monitor STG recruitment activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are staff aware of significant holidays observed by STGs and do they monitor activities of STG members during those times?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-17


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


F. Are STG members denied access to certain jobs and/or areas of the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Is the mailroom staff trained to monitor written materials for STG activity?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Is incoming mail for STG members monitored more frequently or more closely than mail for general population inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

I. Is there a reporting protocol established with the FBI and state police regarding STGs and members?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

J. Are STG member phone calls monitored more frequently than phone calls for the general population?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VI. Inmate Visitation

A. Are inmate visitors checked for outstanding arrest warrants?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

Criterion Comments

CT-18


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status

B. Are inmate visitors checked against a database of former inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are visitors of STG members (and/or other high-risk inmates) subjected to a higher level of screening/security checks than other inmate visitors?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are inmate visitations randomly monitored for conversation content?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Are visitations of high-risk inmates monitored more frequently or more closely for conversation content than visitations of general population inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VII. Inmate Telephone Calls

A. Are phone calls restricted to an approved list of individuals for each inmate?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are individuals on inmate phone lists screened for warrants?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Are individuals on inmate phone lists screened against a database of former inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

CT-19


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


D. Are individuals on high-risk inmate phone lists subjected to a higher level of security screening than individuals on general population inmate phone lists?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Is there a standard for the percentage of an inmate’s phone conversations that are monitored?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are high-risk inmate phone conversations monitored more frequently than phone conversations of general population inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Are all inmate phone conversations electronically recorded to provide a perpetual database of at least 10 days’ duration?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________VIII. Inmate Mail

A. Is mail to inmates monitored for coded information or terrorist information/activity?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Are publications identified that are aligned or associated with terrorist groups or activities?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-20


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


C. Is mail for high-risk inmates subjected to a higher level of screening than mail for general population inmates?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is there a protocol for reporting adverse or potentially dangerous terrorist information obtained from inmate mail?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________IX. Specialized Equipment

A. Does the institution conduct annual equipment assessments specifically to determine needs and accessibility with regard to terrorism incidents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Is emergency equipment tested on a monthly/quarterly/annual basis, with documentation of those checks?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Do staff have immediate access to personal protective equipment in the event of hazardous material contamination?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Have staff been trained in the use of this equipment?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

Criterion Comments

CT-21


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method

Status

E. Does the institution have bomb detection equipment or bomb-sniffing dogs available?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. In the case of an explosion, is search and rescue equipment readily available to the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

G. Does the institution have equipment and/or systems that provide communication among all key external emergency organizations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

H. Does the institution have an adequate supply of radios that share a frequency with local and state law enforcement and the local fire department?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________X. Response to a Terrorism

Incident in the Community

A. Does the institution have a plan for supplying the community with food and other provisions?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have a plan for loaning out staff in response to a community terrorism incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. Does the institution have a plan to supply medical staff/equipment to the community?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

CT-22


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


2. Does the institution have a plan to send specialized teams such as CERT to assist in a community terrorist incident?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Does the institution have a plan to make inmates available to the community to assist with cleanup?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Does the institution have a plan to make transportation available to the community if needed?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Do the institution’s emergency preparedness specialists train with the local and state emergency management agencies at least annually?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XI. Institutional Intelligence Function

A. Does the institution have an identified intelligence operation?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does department-level policy or procedure specify coordination of institution intelligence operations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have staff assigned to the intelligence function received training in identifying terrorist activity and in responding to terrorist threats and incidents?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

Method


CT-23


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

XII. Response to Notification ofTerrorist Threats

A. Does the institution have different levels of alert (or readiness) defined in policy?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Does the institution have different levels of alert (or readiness) specified in its emergency plans?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. In responding to notification of a credible and serious terrorist threat, does the institution have emergency policies that specify the following:

1. Security for employee parking?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

2. Methods to increase screening of delivery vehicles?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Methods to increase security of mail and package delivery and storage?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Provisions for increasing security of vehicles on grounds?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

Method


CT-24


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

5. Procedures for identifying/locating abandoned packages, suitcases, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Procedures for verifying staff and visitor identification?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. A plan to reduce points of access to the institution?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. A plan to increase inspections of all internal and external physical premises?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

9. A plan to arm (or increase the arming of) the perimeter?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

10. Provisions for erecting temporary vehicle barriers?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-25


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


11. Procedures for informing management staff families about receipt of suspicious packages/mail?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

12. Provisions for increasing liaison with local, state, and/or federal law enforcement?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

13. Plans to move vehicles, crates, large trash receptacles, and other things that could conceal explosives or weapons away from buildings and critical areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. Provisions for increasing external security patrols?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

15. Plans to place emergency specialists on standby?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

16. Plans to suspend inmate programs, outside work crews, onsite construction, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

17. Plans to notify contractors, vendors, and/or visitors of restricted or cancelled access?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#

CT-26


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


18. A plan to move into hard lockdown?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

19. A plan to establish a traffic control point (or to move it farther from the institution)?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

20. A plan to increase computer security?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

21. A plan to increase random security spot checks of vehicles, visitors, packages, staff, etc.?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

22. A plan to notify staff and staff families of higher alert levels to reduce rumors and family anxiety?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

23. A plan to add security for and decrease access to critical resource areas?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-27


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method


24. A plan to discontinue all inmate transfers in/out and to transport inmates to community hospitals and courts only in emergency situations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Is there a protocol established for reporting relevant terrorist information to the state police and FBI?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________XIII. Response to Cyber Attack

A. Have the institution and the department’s central office analyzed vulnerabilities to cyber attack?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Have the institution and the central office identified crucial records and crucial databases?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

C. Have the institution and the central office designated “hot sites” (locations with an operating computer system that can accept and maintain software and/or database information from a disabled site) distant from their own locations?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

D. Are all crucial databases and records within the department backed up offsite?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

NC

#N

C#

CT-28


AUDITOR: _________________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

Method



E. Are there detailed plans for data recovery?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

F. Are there detailed plans for operating with primary servers, databases, and programs disabled?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

NC

#N

C#

CT-NoncomplianceSummary


NAME: _________________________________________________________

SIGNATURE: ____________________________________________________ DATE: ______________________________________________

SUMMARY OF NONCOMPLIANCE ITEMSCounterterrorism Self-Audit Checklist

AUDITOR: ______________________________________________________ PAGE _________ OF __________

DATE: _________________________________________________________


Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Status:

Method:

Section 4Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183

Survey Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .184

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198

In This Section

183

Discussions of emergency preparation andresponse in prisons typically address what isdone, what is in place, what is commonlyaccepted, and what is missing, with no recourseto systematic evidence or a body of data. Rather,such discussions typically reflect the experienceof individuals who may be familiar with depart-ments of corrections (DOCs) in a few states andsometimes are based simply on unexaminedassumptions and biases. Believing that data onthe current state of emergency preparedness andpractices in prisons nationwide would benefit thefield, the project team decided to develop a com-prehensive survey for state DOCs with questionsranging from prevention and policy to equipmentand personnel.

MethodOnce the survey was developed, the project teamrecognized several barriers that might keepDOCs from completing it:

● The survey asked for a substantial amount ofinformation and would require several hoursof staff time to complete.

● Some departments have an individual incharge of emergency preparedness depart-mentwide; others do not. Moreover, the titlesof these positions vary from state to state,and the positions may be located in thedepartment’s central office, at a specificinstitution, or at a training academy. Thus,there was no ready answer to the question“To whom should this survey be sent?”

● The survey asked for information about sev-eral areas that many departments regard assensitive and/or confidential (e.g., tacticalteam training).

To overcome these barriers, the project teamimplemented a two-step strategy. First, a letterdescribing the overall project, the purpose of theguide, and the survey was sent to the commis-sioner (or director or secretary) of each depart-ment. The letter invited the department toparticipate in the survey and asked the commis-sioner to identify either the person in charge ofemergency preparedness or the person whowould be designated to complete the survey. Theproject team would then work directly with thatindividual rather than continue to work throughthe commissioner’s office. The letter alsoemphasized that the project was being conductedunder the aegis of NIC. This fact served toassuage department concerns regarding confi-dentiality, even in states where the commissionerwas unfamiliar with both the organization con-ducting the project, LETRA, Inc., and withindividual members of the project team.

Once a commissioner agreed to participate in thesurvey and identified a contact person within hisor her department, the project team correspondedwith the contact person and sent the surveyitself. If the contact person did not return thecompleted survey in approximately 6 weeks, theproject team followed up with a reminder letter.If several more weeks passed with no response,a member of the project team telephoned the

Report on the National Survey ofEmergency Readiness in Prisons

184


department contact person to encourage comple-tion of the survey.

Survey Limitations

Accuracy

Like most surveys, this instrument was designedfor self-report—that is, the information theresponding departments provided could not, forthe most part, be verified. The survey instruc-tions did ask the departments to return backupinformation such as copies of emergency poli-cies and emergency response plans along withthe completed survey, and these documents con-firmed most of the responses of most of thedepartments. However, the project team was notalways in a position to know whether a depart-ment’s state of emergency readiness was as goodas the department claimed. Similarly, if a depart-ment answered a question inaccurately becausethe person filling out the survey misunderstoodthe question, the project team had no way toidentify the error.

Completeness

Some departments that filled out and returnedthe survey did not answer every question. Mostof these departments provided no explanation forresponses left blank. Possibly, the unansweredquestions seemed inapplicable to the person fill-ing out the survey or too time consuming or dif-ficult to answer.

Timeliness

These survey results were obtained in 2002–2003 and reflect the national status of emergencyreadiness in state DOCs at that time. The resultswill be less representative as time passes anddepartments change.

Results

Participating Departments

Of the 51 departments asked to complete thesurvey (the 50 state DOCs and the FederalBureau of Prisons), 41 initially agreed and 34actually returned completed surveys—that is, 7departments whose commissioners agreed toparticipate did not return completed surveys,despite additional correspondence and phonecalls encouraging them to do so. Several of thesedepartments continued to state their commitmentto participate but simply did not find time toactually complete the survey. A few departmentsdid not communicate with the project staff inany way after the commissioner’s initial commit-ment to participate. Of the remaining 10 of the51 departments, 1 declined to participate and 9never responded to the initial letter or to fol-lowup letters.

Overall, 34 of the 51 departments—exactly two-thirds—completed the survey, providing alarge sample. Given the amount of informationthe survey asked for and the confidential natureof some of the information, the response rateactually exceeded the project team’s most opti-mistic initial estimates. The sample includes fourof the five largest DOCs in the country as wellas an excellent cross section of medium-sizedand small departments. All geographic regionsof the country are also represented.

Characteristics of Sample

Of the 34 departments, 3 have full peace officerpowers for their security staff, 12 have partialpeace officer powers, and 19 have no peaceofficer powers. Seven of the participating depart-ments are combined jail and prison systems.Only 3 of the responding departments includejuvenile institutions, while 29 do not. Some formof probation and parole is provided by 25departments, 19 of which have probation andparole staff within the department.

Section 4. Report on the National Survey of Emergency Readiness in Prisons

185

Emergency System

The terms “emergency plan” and “emergencysystem” should not be confused. “Emergencyplan” most often designates the plannedresponse to an emergency at a particular institu-tion, whereas “emergency system” usually desig-nates a department’s comprehensive preparationsfor emergencies. Emergency systems mayinclude philosophy and goals in emergency situ-ations, emergency policies, organizational struc-ture, plans for addressing aftermath issues, stafftraining on emergency topics, prevention strate-gies, and risk assessment, in addition to individ-ual institutional emergency plans that focus onresponse procedures, emergency equipment, andemergency teams.

Twenty-eight of 33 departments (85 percent)reported having a departmental emergencysystem in place at each institution in the state

(table 1). Although the other five departmentsdid not have departmental emergency systems,it was evident from their answers to other ques-tions in the survey that they do have some emer-gency plans, policies, and procedures at theirinstitutions. For these five departments, emer-gency planning is entirely an institutionalfunction. With no departmental framework,requirements, or template, emergency prepara-tion and response may vary widely from prisonto prison, and issues such as mutual aid may bemore problematic.

Of the 14 departments that reported developingtheir own emergency system (table 1), 7 statedthat the system either was modeled on that ofanother state or that they had used materialsfrom another state. Several of these departmentscited the Oregon DOC’s emergency system astheir model or as one of the primary sources forthe development of their system. Three depart-ments reported basing their system on some vari-ation of the Incident Command System (ICS)originally developed for fire departments. Oneof these departments cited a local fire depart-ment as its source, and the other two mentionedthe Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA). The majority of state DOCs whoseemergency systems were used as models byother states use the LETRA system themselves.

Ten of the twelve departments that did not devel-op their own emergency system reported usingLETRA’s Emergency Preparedness for

Interpretation of Survey Results

Although 34 state departments of correc-tions returned completed survey forms, thenumber of responses to a specific questionmay be fewer than 34. There are two rea-sons for the variance in the number ofresponses. First, as noted above, somedepartments did not answer every surveyquestion. The second reason is that somesurvey responses were difficult to interpret.If the project team was not reasonably cer-tain about the meaning of a response to anitem, the response was excluded from thedata and analysis presented in this report.The number of respondents (N) is noted intables when appropriate.

Table 1. Most departments do have some typeof emergency system

Characteristic of DepartmentsEmergency System Yes No

Departmental system 28 5System developed internally 14 12

186


Correctional Institutions.1 Several other stateDOCs reported using as a model a state thatuses the LETRA emergency system without cit-ing LETRA directly. No other proprietary sys-tems were mentioned.

Emergency Plans

Emergency plans differ dramatically fromdepartment to department, in form as well ascontent. Although emergency plans are institu-tion specific in most correctional agencies, theyare departmentwide in a few. For most DOCs,the term “emergency plan” is synonymous witheach institution’s emergency manual (or manu-als). However, there are departments in whichemergency plan refers to a section of the depart-mental policies and procedures. Many prisonshave emergency plans that are several hundredpages in length, but it is also possible to findprison emergency plans that are fewer than 10pages. It is tempting to assume that all prisonshave an emergency plan, whether large or small,good or bad. Although that is true for the vastmajority, some prisons have no emergency planat all. For example, the inquiry after the 1993insurrection at the Montana State Prison (seeSection 6, Case Studies, “Riot at Max: MontanaState Prison”) discovered that the warden hadbeen working on a draft emergency plan at thetime of the riot, but that no plan was or hadbeen in place.

The survey data reflect two fundamentally dif-ferent approaches to emergency planning (table2). For many years, the traditional way to devel-op an emergency plan was to create a separate,independent plan for each type of emergencyconsidered. When compiled, the separate plansbecame the overall institutional emergency plan.

More recently, some departments have changedto a single, comprehensive plan (sometimescalled an “all-risk” plan) that is the basis forresponding to any emergency or large-scalecrisis in the prison. This generic plan is supple-mented by appendixes or emergency-specificadditions that specify how the plan will be aug-mented or modified for a particular type ofemergency. The rationale for using a genericplan is as follows:

● Most of the steps that must be taken inresponse to any major crisis are the same(emergency lockdown, command notifica-tions, staff callbacks, use of mutual aidagencies, etc.).

● It is easier to train staff in one generic planthan six or eight different plans.

● Different plans may actually provide con-flicting directions when an emergency situa-tion involves more than one type of crisis.

Nearly half of the departments reporting havechanged to the generic plan approach, eithersolely or in combination with some form ofindividual plan.

The responses regarding the specific types ofemergencies addressed in emergency plans weresomewhat surprising (table 3). It was predictablethat most DOCs would have emergency plans

Table 2. Most departments have separateplans for different types of emergencies

DepartmentsType of Emergency Plan(s) in Use (N = 34)

Generic plan for all emergencies 10*

Separate plans for different kinds of emergencies 30Both generic and separate plans 6†

* All 10 departments use the LETRA emergency system.† It was not possible to determine from these departments’

responses whether they have generic plans combined withspecific emergency additions or traditional separate plansaccompanied by some departmental provisions that are moregeneral.

1 The comprehensive emergency system developed by LETRA,Inc., for correctional institutions is described in EmergencyPreparedness for Correctional Institutions, 3d edition (Campbell,CA: 2004).


187

that specifically considered fire, hostage inci-dents, riot, and mass escape. However, less thanone-third of the responding departments hadengaged in any specific planning for terrorismor terrorist threats, even some 2 years after theattacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Similarly,less than half the departments reported any spe-cific plans for responding to an outside assaulton the prison, although such situations haveoccurred several times around the country, typi-cally as an attempt to break specific inmates outof the prison.

The format of an emergency plan is an impor-tant consideration, one that goes far beyondquestions of style. The advantages to using thesame emergency plan format at all institutionsin a DOC are obvious when an institution is inthe midst of a large-scale crisis and needs staffor other resources from other institutions in thedepartment. Additionally, the uniform formatwill enable central office staff to review theemergency plans of the institution experiencingthe crisis without research or analysis, thus sav-ing precious time. A uniform emergency planformat also allows staff transferring from oneinstitution to another within the state to under-stand the new institution’s emergency plansquickly and easily. The data in table 4 indicate

that 82 percent of the responding departmentsrequire a uniform emergency plan format ateach institution.

Recognition has also increased over the past 25years that checklist-driven emergency plans aremore practical and user friendly than plans thatuse a narrative format. Thirty-one of the 33departments responding to this question (94percent) use emergency plans that are eitherpredominantly checklist based or that combinechecklists and narrative (table 4). Only twodepartments reported using emergency plansthat are entirely narrative in format.

As expected, only a relatively small percentageof departments (15 percent) reported usingemergency systems that are computerized toany substantial degree (table 4). No departmentreported an emergency system that is exclusive-ly computerized. In private industry, computer-ized approaches to disaster planning are quitecommon, and many companies now base theirdisaster planning efforts around a proprietarysoftware program. An important distinction isthat for many private industries, the emphasisis on disaster planning and disaster recovery,whereas for correctional institutions, the greatest

Table 3. Departments varied greatly in thenumber of specific types of emergenciesaddressed in their emergency plans

Type of Emergency DepartmentsAddressed in Plan (N = 34)

Fire 31Hostage incidents 30Severe weather 28Riot 28Mass escape 28Hurricane 12Outside assault 12Terrorism or terrorist threats 11

Table 4. Most DOCs employ a consistentformat for emergency plans

DepartmentsFormat of Emergency Plans (N = 33)

Uniformity of plans

Same at each institution 27Vary from prison to prison 6

Format of plans

Checklist and narrative 26Predominantly checklist 7Entirely narrative 2

Computerized emergency system

In use and available to each institution 5Not used 28

188


emphasis must be on responding to the emer-gency in real time. Nevertheless, it seems proba-ble that future directions in prison emergencyplanning will rely increasingly on software andautomated systems for some aspects of emer-gency planning and response.

Large-scale crisis situations also frequentlyrequire highly specialized functions. The majori-ty of the responding departments reported hav-ing written plans for some specialized functionswithin their overall emergency response proce-dures (table 5). As might be expected, the num-ber of departments varied with the type ofspecialized function.

The results in table 5 are very encouraging.They reflect a sharp increase in the degree ofsophistication of DOC emergency plans acrossthe United States.2 Two-thirds of the respondingDOCs indicated that their emergency plansincluded specific procedures for posttraumaticincident support for staff, and two-thirds alsohave specific procedures for emergency counts.Almost half the departments reported proceduralconsideration for mass casualty situations. Theseresults reflect a degree of sophistication notfound as recently as 10 years ago.

Emergency Teams

The responses on the use of emergency teamsare surprising (table 6). Of 32 departmentsresponding to the question, 31 (97 percent) saidthey maintain one or more emergency teams,suggesting that the use of emergency teams hasbecome close to universal in state prison sys-tems. This finding is another indicator of thesharply increasing sophistication of the correc-tions field in the area of emergency readiness.Just over two-thirds of the responding depart-ments also said they rely on external teams atsome of their institutions. That is, a DOC mayhave its own CERT teams and hostage negotia-tion teams at its major institutions but rely onlocal or state law enforcement emergency teamsto provide these functions at its smaller andmore isolated prisons—typically those that arelower security institutions. Such a strategy ispractical and efficient but requires a great dealof planning, coordination, and training to beeffective.3

Departments were asked to describe the types ofemergency teams they maintained. These dataare not precise because some departments usethe same name for different types of teams,whereas other departments use very differentnames for teams with essentially the same func-tion. In particular, some departments maintainmarksman/observer teams (snipers), but because

Table 5. Most emergency plans includeprocedures for specialized functions

Specialized Function Represented in Emergency Plans Departments

Inmate death 29Emergency count 26Emergency lockdown 23Posttraumatic support for staff 23Mass casualties 16Officer-involved shooting 11

Table 6. Most departments have their ownemergency teams

DepartmentsUse of Emergency Teams Yes No

Department has one or more teams (CERT, SORT, hostage negotiators, etc.) 31 1Department relies on external teams at some of its institutions 21 9

3 The topic of emergency teams is also discussed in the chapterby that name in Section 5: Resource Materials.

2 This observation is based on the project director’s personalreview of emergency readiness in more than half of the stateDOCs during the past 20 years.


189

these teams are attached to or part of the tacticalteam, the departments may not have identifiedthem separately. Thus, it is likely that marksmanteams are underrepresented in these data.

Similarly, almost all departments had some formof tactical and/or disturbance control team (table 7). The survey distinguished betweenthese two types of teams as follows:

● Tactical team: Team members train withfirearms. The team’s function includes mis-sions such as hostage rescue. It is a lethalforce team, although it is also trained andequipped to use sublethal force.

● Disturbance control team: Team memberstypically train with batons and shields andwith chemical agents and practice forma-tions but do not train with firearms. Theteam’s identified missions do not includehostage rescue and dynamic entry withfirearms. It is a sublethal force team.

If a department responded by describing aCERT or SORT team and its description did notclarify whether the team should be classifiedas a tactical or disturbance control team, thedepartment was arbitrarily counted as having atactical team. As a result, these data may over-estimate the number of tactical teams and under-estimate the number of disturbance controlteams.

In most cases, the tactical teams were statewideor regional and the disturbance control teamswere institution based; however, there wereexceptions.

The responding departments used a wide varietyof names for both hostage negotiation and post-trauma teams. The responses also identifiedseveral other teams unique to a particulardepartment, such as public information teamsand mounted horse teams.

Table 7 demonstrates state DOCs’ almost com-plete acceptance of tactical and disturbancecontrol teams as essential to emergency pre-paredness. Only one department responded thatit had neither a tactical nor a disturbance controlteam. It may well be that this department hasdecided to use law enforcement tactical teamswhen the need arises. On the other hand, onedepartment did not answer this survey question,and there is almost certainly a sampling bias inthese survey results. That is, DOCs that haveemphasized emergency preparedness were morelikely to respond to this survey than departmentsthat have ignored or given short shrift to emer-gency readiness. Thus, it is reasonable to sur-mise that some of the 17 DOCs that did notparticipate in this survey have not developed ormaintained emergency teams and may havemade no alternate arrangements (e.g., with lawenforcement agencies within their state).

Seventy-nine percent of the departments havetheir own hostage negotiation teams. These datareflect more than simply an increase in sophisti-cation about hostage incidents in the field ofcorrections. They indicate a change in philoso-phy. In the 1970s and 1980s, many DOCs didnot have hostage negotiation teams. In somecases, the absence of a hostage negotiation teamwas a result of a lack of knowledge or lack ofspecialized expertise but, in many cases, it wasbecause the department leadership had taken thestance that “we don’t negotiate” (sometimes

Table 7. Most DOCs have tactical teams andhostage negotiation teams

Departments(N = 33)

Type of Emergency Team Number Percent

Tactical 32 97Disturbance control 18 55Hostage negotiation 26 79Posttrauma or peer counseling 6 18Marksman (“sniper”) 5 15K–9 4 12

190


expressed as “If they take hostages, we aregoing to assault—period!”). The history ofhostage incidents in American prisons andjails has demonstrated that most hostage situa-tions can be resolved successfully throughnegotiation—although some cannot—and thatwhen negotiation can be used successfully,doing so is decidedly a much safer alternativefor the hostages. The change in the generalapproach to dealing with hostage incidentsdemonstrated by the survey data reflect a broadawareness of this history.

Only six departments (18 percent) reportedmaintaining posttrauma or peer counselingteams. It is tempting to interpret this relativelysmall percentage as a negative reflection on thefield. However, that conclusion is not warrantedbecause a relatively large number of depart-ments indicated elsewhere in the survey thatthey depend on external resources (e.g., contractmental health professionals) rather than ondepartmental teams for these services. Thesedata do suggest that relatively few departmentsuse both specialized private psychological serv-ice providers for posttrauma care and peer sup-port groups for additional capacity to screen,debrief, and work with potentially traumatizedstaff. Such a combined approach may deservemore attention than it appears to have received.

Emergency Training

The findings on emergency preparedness train-ing for new recruits are discouraging. Thesurvey results show the length of the averagerecruit academy to be almost 51/2 weeks, withonly 6 hours devoted to emergency preparedness(table 8). Emergency preparedness is both anunusually broad topic and one in which “thedevil is in the details.” For recruit training onemergency preparedness to be effective, newlyhired staff must come away from the academytraining program with a clear understanding ofthe specific procedures required in various

types of crisis situations. How that goal can beaccomplished in 6 hours or less is difficult tounderstand.

The commitment represented by a 51/2-weektraining program for new recruits must beacknowledged, however, as a direct manifesta-tion of a profound change that has taken placein corrections. State corrections has gone frombeing a largely nonprofessional endeavor asrecently as three to four decades ago to beinga professional field with rigorous standards forpersonnel and training. In some departments,older staff still talk about reporting for their firstday of work and receiving a set of keys and awarning to “be careful while you’re figuring itout,” with no training whatsoever. Althoughthose days were 25 to 35 years ago in mostdepartments, the use of lengthy and comprehen-sive recruit academy training programs has onlyevolved much more recently.

The responses on inservice training on emer-gency preparedness reflected three distinctapproaches:

● A substantial initial inservice training pro-gram, typically between 8 and 16 hours,

Table 8. The average recruit academy is morethan 5 weeks’ duration

Criteria Hours*

Average length of recruit academy 213†

Average time spent on general emergency preparedness in recruit academy 6‡

* Thirty departments responded to this question.† The responses ranged from a low of 36 hours to a high of 720

hours.‡ Most departments identified a few emergency subjects, such as

fire, riot, and hostage situations, to which they give a small num-ber of hours of additional specialized emphasis. Each of thesetopics averages 2 hours’ coverage within the recruit academycurriculums. No other emergency subject area was identified byas many as five departments.


191

followed up with annual refresher training,ranging from 4 to 8 hours.

● Annual inservice training ranging from 2 to4 hours, with no substantial initial block oftraining on either an inservice or preservicebasis.

● Little or no inservice training (1 hour orless).

Of the 30 departments responding to the ques-tion about inservice training, 8 (just over one-quarter) were in the last category. One hour orless per year of emergency preparedness train-ing is obviously inadequate for prison staff. Thislack of commitment to ongoing emergencytraining can itself create unacceptable risks.

In contrast to the results on inservice trainingfor general staff, the data for mid- and upper-level managers are quite positive. The majorityof the responding departments provide addition-al training on emergency preparedness to staff atmiddle management level and above—a findingthat reflects awareness that prison staff at theselevels serve as shift commanders. In almost allprisons, it is the shift commander who is incharge of the institution during evenings andweekends and who may suddenly be in com-mand if an unexpected crisis occurs. It followsthat these staff members need far more depthof preparation for responding to emergencysituations than the front-line staff member orfirst-line supervisor. For these reasons, it isencouraging to find that 23 of the 30 respondingdepartments (77 percent) provide managers atmid-level and above with at least 2 hours ofemergency training annually beyond that provid-ed for general staff (table 9).

Given the high percentage of DOCs that provideadditional refresher training on emergency pre-paredness for mid- and upper-level managers,the responses regarding additional initial emer-gency training for these managers are somewhat

surprising. Only 12 of 30 departments (40 per-cent) provide more initial emergency trainingfor their mid- and upper-level managers than fortheir general staff (table 9). Some departmentsclearly indicated not only that they providedadditional training for management staff onemergency and crisis issues, but that the trainingwas specifically tailored to the responsibilitiesof higher ranking staff. In many cases, however,the departments’ descriptions of their trainingprograms and curriculums were too idiosyncrat-ic or lacking in sufficient detail to allow theproject team to draw further conclusions.

Emergency Drills and Simulations

All departments responding to the survey indi-cated they conduct fire drills of some sort, buttwo departments did not indicate how frequently(table 10). The majority of the departments con-duct some actual timed evacuation drills andsome simulations (staff walkthroughs) (tables 11and 12). The following patterns were the twomost commonly cited:

● Conducting all fire drills as actual evacua-tion drills, except for those in restricted orsegregation housing units, which are han-dled with staff walkthroughs.

Table 9. Most departments provide additionaltraining on emergency preparedness at themiddle management level and above

Hours of Additional Emergency DepartmentsPreparedness Training (N = 30)

Initial training

8–16 71–4 5None 18

Refresher training (hours/year)

More than 10 26–10 52–4 161 or less 7

192


● Conducting actual evacuation drills on oneshift per quarter per housing area and staffwalkthroughs on the other two shifts in eachhousing area each quarter.

One fire drill issue deserves special mention, asit remains controversial: Should fire drills in aprison’s highest security areas (e.g., administra-tive segregation) and areas most difficult to move(e.g., an infirmary) be conducted as actual, timed

evacuation drills or as staff walkthrough sim-ulations? Some prison administrators wouldnever consider actual evacuation drills for suchareas because they believe the risks are too high.Others feel just as vehemently that without con-ducting actual evacuations, procedures existonly on paper and there is no way to discoverproblems or adequately prepare staff for theeventuality of a real evacuation. Administratorsthat subscribe to the latter rationale typicallydeploy extra staff and use extra planning whenconducting evacuation drills in high-profileareas. The survey did ask specifically aboutareas excluded from evacuation drills, but thequestion proved not to be well-enough defined,and the answers were not consistent enough tobe interpreted numerically.

Excluding fire drills, at least some other type ofemergency exercise or simulation is required bypolicy in 23 departments (table 12). Theseinclude tabletop exercises, functional exercises(defined by the survey instrument as involvingrole playing in real time without the participa-tion of external agencies), and full-scale simula-tions (major exercises in real time using actualareas of the facility and actual emergency equip-ment and involving the participation of externalagencies). Most of the departments conductfunctional exercises and full-scale simulationsannually at each institution, although a smallnumber indicated that they conduct them quar-terly. The data in table 12 also indicate thatsome of the departments regularly conductingemergency exercises and drills do not requirethat activity by policy.

Table 13 shows the general requirements foremergency drills and simulations reported bythe 29 departments in the survey that conductthem. When asked whether they conduct emer-gency exercises on each shift, 16 departmentssaid “yes,” 13 said “no,” and 5 did not answerthe question. This result reveals a longstandingbias. Emergency drills and emergency plans

Table 10. All departments require fire drills

DepartmentsFrequency of Fire Drills (N = 34)

Once a month on each shift in each housing area (36 drills per year per area) 1Once per quarter on each shift in each housing area (12 drills per year per area) 13Once per quarter per housing area (4 drills per year per area) 18Frequency not reported 2

Table 11. Most departments time andevaluate evacuation fire drills

DepartmentsRequirements for Fire Drills Yes No

Timed evacuation and written critique of drill’s strengths and weaknesses 32 2Monitors or evaluators must be present 28 4Observation/assessment by community fire officials in all or some drills 7 27

Table 12. Most departments require someprogram of emergency drills and exercises

Departments(N = 34)Type of Emergency Exercise

or Simulation Yes* No

Tabletop exercises 23 (12) 11Functional exercises 29 (20) 5Full-scale simulations 21 (16) 13

* The number of departments that require the given type ofexercise by policy is given in parentheses.


193

tend to be written on the assumption that crisesand disasters will strike on the day shift betweenMonday and Friday, and prison administratorsoften operate under the same assumptions.History says these events tend to happen duringthe evening and on weekends.

Emergency System Audits

Twenty departments reported using a writtenemergency system audit form or protocol and13 said they did not have or use such aninstrument. The most common frequency ofemergency system auditing was annually (13departments), followed by biannually (6departments).

Basic Security and OperationalInformation

Security audits, random urinalysis testing ofinmates, and inmate grievance systems are well-accepted best practices, and the survey’s docu-mentation of their widespread use is encouraging(table 14). The results also show increasingacceptance of the crucial role the public informa-tion function plays, not only in prison crises, butin day-to-day correctional management. Of 34

departments responding, 20 (59 percent) havedesignated public information officers at eachinstitution. All 20 of these departments alsohave a department-level public informationofficer.

The breakdown of information in table 14 onhow security audits are conducted reveals that of32 departments, only 6 (19 percent) rely prima-rily on external consultants, whereas 26 (81percent) use some combination of their ownstaff and other departmental staff. The overallsecurity audit data represent another importantchange in the field: As recently as 15 years ago,regular security auditing was not a commonpractice among state DOCs.

Table 13. Emergency exercises are typicallyplanned, evaluated, and critiqued

Departments(N = 29)

General Requirements for Emergency Drills and Simulations Yes No

Monitors or evaluators must be present 26 3Written plan for exercises required with objectives stated 25 4Written critique of strengths and weaknesses discovered during the exercise required 27 2Controllers employed to monitor safety of exercise and stop it if conditions become unsafe or a real emergency develops 28 1

Table 14. Almost all departments conductsecurity audits and urinalysis tests andoperate an inmate grievance system

DepartmentsSecurity Procedure Yes No

Regular security audits 32* 2Combination of one or more of the following methods 26 —

Self-audit 16 —Security managers from other institutions 13 —Participation of staff from the central office 26 —

External security consultants 6 —Random urinalysis testing of inmates for illegal drugs† 34 0Random urinalysis testing of staff for illegal drugs 8 18Formal inmate grievance system 34 0Monthly summaries by area of institution, shift, and nature of grievance 30 4Departmental public information officer 24 10Public information officer at each institution 20 14

Note: —, not applicable.* Most departments stated that they conduct audits annually.† The percentage of the inmate population tested each month

ranged from 2 to 40 percent, for an average of 10 percent.

194


These results do raise a troubling question: Howdo DOCs define a security audit? Most correc-tions professionals with specific expertise insecurity auditing would assume that a securityaudit is a rigorous, detailed, comprehensiveexamination that covers a great number of aninstitution’s security procedures and practices aswell as its security equipment, logs, reports andother documentation, and more. As a practicalmatter, that kind of audit is far too demanding tobe performed monthly. Thus, the DOCs report-ing monthly security audits may be referring tosecurity inspections or some other review that isfar less thorough than what is generally under-stood by the term “security audit.”

Emergency Policies and Specific Response Plans

The survey responses on emergency policies,procedures, and response plans held few surpris-es. Most departments indicated specific policies,procedures, and response plans for many of thepredictable aspects of a crisis or emergency situ-ation (table 15). Only 12 of 30 departmentsresponding (40 percent) reported the use of anykind of risk assessment process—a somewhatsurprising result, because risk assessment shouldbe the starting point for emergency planning atany institution. Without performing a riskassessment, it is impossible to prioritizeresources, planning, and training time to matchthe relative probabilities of specific types ofemergencies at the facility.

Table 15. Most departments have specific policies, procedures, and response plans for thepredictable aspects of a crisis or emergency situation

Departments

Specific Emergency Policies, Procedures, and Response Plans Yes No

Written policy/procedure for emergency counts 29 4Written policy/procedure for emergency lockdowns 20 14Crucial emergency locations identified at each institution (e.g., media area) 31 3Specific response plans

Offsite evacuation 25 9Defending in place* 18 16Natural disasters 27 5

Specific policies/proceduresPrevention of major emergencies 23 11Natural disasters 18 15Terrorist threats or response to terrorism 11 23

Command post checklists used 30 4Risk assessment processes 12 18Emergency assessment form used to evaluate a developing emergency 15 19

Assessment form used to gauge readiness for natural disasters 10 24Policy requiring institutional emergency plans to be reviewed or approved outside the institution 23† 11

* Maintaining a defensive position within the facility rather than evacuating.† Twenty-two of these departments require the review and approval process to occur annually.


195

Table 15 shows a puzzling discrepancy in thedata on planning for natural disasters. Of 32departments responding, 27 (84 percent) saidthey have specific response plans for naturaldisasters. A response plan for natural disasterswould certainly include some specific proce-dures, yet only 18 of 33 responding departments(55 percent) replied that they have specific poli-cies or procedures for natural disasters. Possiblysome departments that stated they had naturaldisaster response plans did not then respond thatthey had specific policies and procedures fornatural disasters because they believed theprevious response had already answered thequestion—that is, the apparent discrepancy maybe an artifact of the sequence of questions. Thelow percentage of departments reporting specificpolicies and procedures for dealing with naturaldisasters was, however, a major factor in thedecision to include in this guide a freestandingself-audit checklist for natural disasters, fires,and HAZMAT situations.

Twenty-five of 34 departments (74 percent)indicated that they had specific response plansfor offsite evacuation. It is worth noting that offsite evacuation is a very easy concept but avery complex and challenging reality.

Finally, LETRA’s emergency preparedness sys-tem began 25 years ago to advance the conceptthat checklist-driven emergency plans are moreuser friendly during a crisis. The data in table 15showing that 30 of 34 departments (88 percent)use a command post checklist suggest thatacceptance of that principle is now almostuniversal.

Any thoughtful analysis of prison emergencysituations will conclude that some of the well-accepted standard policies and procedures usedto direct day-to-day operations will not workwell in emergencies or large-scale crises. Forexample, an institution’s policies and procedurestypically assign responsibilities for certain func-tions by rank or specific position within the

institution. In an emergency, however, specificindividuals or any staff of a specific rank maybe off duty, on annual leave, or otherwiseunavailable. Nevertheless, the function in ques-tion must be managed immediately or the over-all response to the emergency situation may fail.In such circumstances, emergency plans mustinclude emergency post orders or a similarmechanism that allows an available staff mem-ber to be assigned to an emergency responsi-bility for which that staff member may haveminimal training and preparation. The data intable 16 suggest that most DOCs now recognizethe distinction between day-to-day policy andprocedure and emergency policy and procedure.

The survey responses demonstrated a high levelof emphasis on postemergency procedures (table17). Predictably, a reporting process for docu-menting emergencies was the deactivation pro-cedure mentioned most often, cited by 32 of the34 participating agencies (94 percent). Manydepartments also reported plans for emergencydeactivation and policies or plans for returningto normal operations (“stepdown” plans) (76percent and 79 percent of responding depart-ments, respectively). The least frequently citedpostemergency policy or procedure was amethod for using “lessons learned,” reported byonly 17 of 30 of responding departments (57percent).

The somewhat lower frequency of use of lessonslearned compared with other deactivation andpostemergency procedures probably reflects ahesitancy to analyze and document weaknessesand failures that occurred during a crisis. Al-though some of this hesitancy may be ascribedto defensiveness on the part of the department orindividuals leaders, much of it is likely rooted infear of litigation. A department may recognizethat it is professionally important to disseminatea thoughtful critique of its performance in anemergency situation but may be less sanguineabout creating a roadmap for potential plaintiffs.

196


Thoughtful administrators recognize that almostnothing escapes the discovery process in civillitigation and that it is far more important tolearn from mistakes than to hoard informationthat could avert a future emergency.

All 34 departments participating in the surveyreported using some form of employee assis-tance program (EAP), whether state government,department, or institution based (table 18).Twenty-one departments—a significant 62percent—also provide some type of specializedcrisis intervention help for traumatized or

injured staff or staff families, and 14 depart-ments (41 percent) provide peer counseling orpeer support group assistance for injured ortraumatized staff. These data demonstrate amarked shift from the traditional stance of “Youhave to get back in the saddle,” and “If youaren’t tough enough to deal with this, maybe youaren’t tough enough to work here.” Most depart-ments’ posttrauma programs or services havebeen developed within the past 20 years, andthis change in the field is another that is emblem-atic of a philosophical shift. (The apparent

Table 17. Most departments have detailed procedures for the aftermath of an emergency

Departments

Postemergency Policies and Procedures Yes No

Emergency deactivation plan 25 8Policy or plan for “stepping down” from emergency conditions to normal operations 26 7Standardized reporting process for documenting emergencies 32 2Policy mandating a postemergency strategic response that includes identifying and addressingthe factors that caused the emergency 20 14Standard method for finding and disseminating lessons learned from emergency situations 17 13

Table 16. Many emergency policies and procedures differ substantially from day-to-day policiesand procedures

Departments

Standard Policies and Procedures That Change During an Emergency Yes No

Designated command structure for emergencies that is different from the day-to-day organizational structure 31 3Emergency post orders or similar vehicle used to specify command duties during an emergency 31* 3Emergency policies that are separate and distinct from everyday policy 27 6

Public information policy for emergencies 11 23Policy on change of command during an emergency 24 10Policy plans for the treatment of hostages after release 26 8

Specific staff position for coordinating emergency readiness and response Department level 20 14Institutional level 17† 7

* These are the same departments that responded “yes” to the previous question.† All of these departments also have a departmental emergency preparedness coordinator.


197

discrepancy between these findings and the datareported earlier indicating that only six depart-ments maintain peer support or peer counselingteams may be a gap between policy and reality.That is, some departments may have policy andplans specifying that peer support will be pro-vided in the aftermath of a traumatic situationbut may never have organized a team to providesuch support or may have initially formed ateam and then allowed it to lapse. The authorshave had experience with that state of affairs,not only with peer counseling teams but alsowith hostage negotiation teams.)

Reliance on outside agencies is not a new con-cept. It is probably as old as prisons themselves.Prisons have always relied heavily on local firedepartments to respond to major fires and onstate and local police to help respond to largeinmate riots and prison disturbances, or even totake over in responding to these events. A riot ora hostage situation has always meant that ambu-lances and support from local hospitals mightbe essential. Thirty or forty years ago, that kindof help would have been unplanned—that is,details of the assistance would have beenworked out on the spot, in the heat of the crisis.The data in table 19 show this is another areathat has seen major change.

Today, reliance on external agencies for assis-tance during a crisis is most often an integralpart of a prison’s emergency planning and iswritten into the institution’s emergency manuals.In this survey, 24 of the 33 departments re-sponding to this question (73 percent) indicatedthat written interagency agreements are includedin the institution’s emergency plans. Responsesto two other questions reported in table 19 alsoreflect major changes that have occurred overthe past 10 to 20 years in American prisons: 15of 33 departments (45 percent) stated that theyhave trained inmates to provide some form ofcommunity assistance in the event of certaintypes of community disasters, and 11 of 32departments (34 percent) have written agree-ments describing that kind of community assis-tance. Using inmates to help with communitydisasters is not a new or recent idea, but plan-ning for that eventuality is an outgrowth of therecent emphasis on developing comprehensive,detailed, and realistic emergency policies andplans.

Table 18. All departments offer an employeeassistance program, and the majority provideadditional specialized posttrauma care

Postemergency Staff DepartmentsSupport Services (N = 34)

Employee assistance program (EAP)* 34State government program 22Department program 15Institution program 9

Services in addition to EAPPeer counseling 14Specialized crisis intervention services 21

* Some departments have more than one form of EAP.

Table 19. State DOCs rely in part on externalagencies for emergency assistance

Departments

External Agency Agreements Yes No

Emergency plans include interagency agreements 24 9

With state police 22 —With local police 20 —With local fire departments 19 —

Written interagency agreement to provide services to community in event of disasters 11 21Inmates trained to provide community assistance in event of disasters 15 18Working relationships with other agencies

State emergency management agency 29 3County emergency organization 16 16National Guard 19 13

Note: —, not applicable.

198


Thirty-two departments responded to a series ofquestions about working relationships with otheragencies. Of the responding departments, 29 (91percent) reported having a working relationshipwith their state emergency management agency,and 16 (50 percent) reported a working relation-ship with their county emergency organization.Many of these relationships have been forgedsince 9/11 and the advent of the Department ofHomeland Security. Since FEMA was organizedat the national level, some state emergency man-agement agencies have had access to extraordi-nary emergency resources. However, until the1990s—and until the events of September 11,2001, in some cases—state DOCs had no work-ing relationship with their state emergencyagencies and had no awareness of the kinds ofresources available to them through those agen-cies. The survey results show that this is nolonger the case and that the National IncidentManagement System is being well incorporatedinto prison emergency planning.

The response pattern was quite different whendepartments were asked about terrorism and ter-rorist threats (table 20). The data on specificcounterterrorism measures are quite consistent

with the survey data on training on terrorismand terrorist activity. Notably, only 10 of 34departments responding (29 percent) reportedany specific policy, response plan, or proceduredesigned to respond to terrorist threats or a ter-rorist incident. These data are not encouragingwhen compared with the level of counterterror-ism planning in fire departments and lawenforcement. At the time of this survey, in the aftermath of September 11, almost everymedium-sized or large local or state lawenforcement agency and fire department wouldhave answered this question in the affirmative.

The first item in table 20 is more positive. Of 34departments responding, 24 (71 percent) wereregularly participating in interagency meetingson counterterrorism at the time of the survey.Continued participation of state DOCs in inter-agency counterterrorism meetings and taskforces should lead departments to incorporatecounterterrorism concerns, policies, and proce-dures more frequently into their emergencyplanning.

Summary Fifteen years ago, it is doubtful that one-third ofthe state DOCs had any kind of serious systemof emergency preparedness and response. Thesurvey results suggest that today this figure isabove 70 percent and perhaps closer to 85 per-cent. Corrections has come a long way in emer-gency preparedness if it has indeed reached thepoint where having a few old, unrealistic emer-gency plans on the shelf in the warden’s officeis no longer acceptable and where a true systemof preparation and response designed for correc-tional institutions is the norm. That is not to sayevery department in the country takes emer-gency readiness seriously. Some 15 percent ofthe departments responding in this survey

Table 20. Specific counterterrorism measuresremain infrequent among state DOCs

Departments(N = 34)

Counterterrorism Measure Yes No

Regular participation in interagency meetings on terrorism 24 10Specific policy or response plans/procedures for terrorist threats or terrorism 10 24Equipment acquired specifically for threat of terrorism 3 31Policies/procedures for integrating FBI into department’s response to terrorist activity 3 31


199

acknowledged having no departmentwide emer-gency system, although they did have somedegree of planning at the institutional level, andit is reasonable to assume this percentage wouldrise if the DOCs of all 50 states were examined.

Fifteen to twenty years ago, almost all DOCsused separate and distinct plans for differentkinds of emergencies, and emergency plans atdifferent institutions in the same departmenttypically bore no relation to each other. The sur-vey results show that both of those factors arenow changing. The majority of the respondingDOCs reported that they specify a department-wide format for emergency plans, an approachthat has several advantages. The results alsoshow the beginning of a clear trend away fromdeveloping separate plans for separate emergen-cies and toward the use of a single generic orcomprehensive emergency plan with appendixescontaining emergency-specific information, asfirst pioneered some 25 years ago in LETRA’sproprietary approach to comprehensive emer-gency systems designed specifically for correc-tional institutions.

Another encouraging sign is the prevalence ofwell-defined emergency teams, which were theexception rather than the rule as recently as 10 years ago. The survey data show that highly specialized tactical teams (CERT or SORT),institution-based disturbance control teams, andteams of hostage negotiators are now the normfor state DOCs. There is also a clear trendtoward peer counseling and posttrauma servicesdesigned to deal with staff needs after an inci-dent. The creation of these emergency responseteams and services represents a significantinvestment in and commitment to emergencypreparedness on the part of the state DOCs.

The data on training may help separate thedepartments that are most serious about emer-gency readiness from those that are less so.Many departments have plans, policies, and

even well-thought-out emergency teams but donot provide their rank-and-file staff with a rea-sonable level of training in the emergency sys-tem. However, many agencies do provide staff atthe rank of shift commander and above withspecialized training in emergency preparedness.This is important because it makes little sense toinvest heavily in developing and training sophis-ticated emergency teams but to do little or nowork with the shift commanders and higherranking staff who will be in command of thesituations in which those specialized teams areto be used.

The same pattern is seen with regard to drillsand exercises. Although all the DOCs thatresponded to this survey conduct fire drills andmost reported the right things about evaluators,monitors, written assessments, and the like,some departments appear to have no substantialprogram of emergency drills and exercises. Onthe other hand, a surprising number of depart-ments are committed to an ongoing program oftabletop exercises, functional exercises, and full-scale simulations and have specified standardsfor these exercises in policy. This, too, is amajor change in the field.

Planning tools such as specific response plans,emergency post orders, deactivation and step-down procedures, risk assessment tools, andprevention plans are now commonplace. Thenumber and variety of specific planning toolsand response mechanisms consensually acceptedby the responding DOCs indicate that the cor-rections field is moving toward a commonunderstanding of emergency preparation andresponse in prisons.

The one surprisingly negative note in the surveyresults was the relatively low percentage ofdepartments that had developed specific prepa-rations or response plans with regard to terror-ism. It is not clear whether most state DOCshave simply been slow to respond in the wake

200


of the September 11 attacks or whether theybelieve terrorism is not a prison issue. The par-ticipation of most of the responding state DOCsin law enforcement-led task forces on terrorismis, therefore, an encouraging finding. Theirinvolvement in these task forces may well leadto more specific and focused preparation fordealing with terrorist threats and responding toterrorism.

Overall, the survey found a healthy level ofemergency preparedness in the nation’s prisons.Undoubtedly, some departments may haveresponded to some items rather liberally,attempting to put forward the most positive facepossible. However, even when the possibility ofsome positive bias is taken into account, the

nationwide improvement in prison emergencypreparedness over the past 8 to 10 years isunquestionable. At the same time, there remainsroom for, and substantial need for, improvementin this national picture. The various discussionsin the “Results” section have raised specificproblems and omissions, but the two most gen-eral weaknesses reflected in these survey dataare the failure of many departments to engage ina systematic program of emergency drills, exer-cises, and simulations and the lack of adequateinitial and refresher emergency preparednesstraining for front-line, supervisory, and manage-ment staff. A similar survey conducted 10 yearsfrom now would hope to find these deficitscorrected and new areas of strength apparent.

Section 5Resource Materials

Leadership Issues During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205

Importance of Leadership During Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205

Status of Leadership Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205

Preparation for Crisis Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .205

The Isolation of the Leader During a Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .206

Crisis Leadership Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207

Dynamics of a Crisis Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .208

Elements of Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .210

Aftermath and Deactivation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .213

Prevention of Prison Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215

Commitment to Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .215

Can Prison Emergencies Be Prevented? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216

Specific Measures Designed To Prevent Prison Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .217

Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a Role in Prevention of Emergencies . . .222

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .225

Emergency Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227

General Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .228

Tactical Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230

Hostage Negotiation Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235

Crisis Intervention Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239

In This Section

Prisons and Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241

Role of Prisons in a National Counterterrorism Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .242

Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response in Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253

205

This paper is intended as a “think piece” aboutleadership during crises and major emergencies.Although the paper focuses on prison and jailcrises, most of the discussion is also relevant toleadership in other emergency services such aslaw enforcement and fire fighting.

The literature on leadership is extensive. Muchof it is concerned with leadership in industry,and many books are devoted entirely to qualitiesof leadership. This discussion, then, is not exhaus-tive; rather, it is intended to raise some of themost crucial issues concerning leadership dur-ing a crisis. The authors have not attempted toexplore each issue in detail and also recognizethat many aspects of leadership are not exploredherein at all.

Importance of Leadership During Crises The importance of leadership in an emergency ora major crisis cannot be overstated. The actions,decisions, style, presence, and direction of theperson in charge will often determine the out-come of a situation. At a personal level, aleader’s performance during a time of crisis maydefine his or her future, not only with regard tocareer, but also with regard to broader mattershaving to do with health, family, and life goals.In the world of corrections, a major crisis (e.g.,the inmate uprisings at Attica and Santa Fe) candefine for decades not only an institution and itsleaders but the entire larger organization.

Status of Leadership DevelopmentFortunately, in the wake of large-scale inmateinsurrections (e.g., Attica, Santa Fe, Lucasville,Camp Hill), most state prison systems andmedium-sized and large jail organizations nowengage in serious and comprehensive emergencypreparedness efforts. Unfortunately, many ofthese same organizations do not believe that theyhave the time, budget, or other resources toengage in serious leadership development.Leadership during crisis has received preciouslittle attention within management developmentefforts and often receives short shrift even withinemergency preparedness and crisis managementtraining.

Preparation for Crisis SituationsPreparation for emergencies is essential, butevery crisis will be different. In fact, no twoprison or jail emergencies will ever be close toidentical. A crisis in a prison or jail is, by defini-tion, complex, and each situation is unique inmany important aspects. This is not an argumentagainst planning or preparation. To the contrary,the challenge is to find common elements thatmake it possible to generalize across crisis situa-tions so that policy, procedure, equipment, andtraining can be developed and meaningfullyapplied. That proposition also holds true for

Leadership Issues During Crises

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced EmergencyPreparedness, by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry(Campbell, CA: LETRA, Inc., 2002), by permission of theauthors. Copyright 2002 by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and CynthiaBarry.

206


leadership. The leader who has planned foremergencies and is personally and organization-ally prepared is far more likely to succeed thanthe leader who has not. The common wisdom isthat “leaders are born, not made.” Yet, the indi-vidual who is not a natural leader but is welltrained and prepared for crisis situations may bemore successful and may exhibit more leader-ship than the individual who is a “natural” leaderbut lacks training and preparation.

On the other hand, a leader in a crisis situationcan do everything right and still have a negativeoutcome or do everything wrong and have a pos-itive outcome. After a riot, natural disaster, orother major emergency, judgments by the public,media, and political elements—and, often, evenmost of the corrections organization itself—arebased on the outcome. Usually, however, only afew people actually know the details of whathappened and recognize whether leadership wasstrong and positive and whether decisions werejustified given the information available to theleader at the time.

It would be foolhardy to ignore theimportance of attributes such ascommon sense, judgment, maturity,and even luck in a crisis, but thatdoes not disparage the importanceof planning, training, and otherpreparation. Simply put, crises aresituations in which it can be betterto be lucky than good. The enlight-

ened leader hopes to be both lucky and good butrecognizes that he or she can only control thelatter.

For the leader, it is crucial to recognize the roleof luck (or “fate,” if one prefers), the fact that heor she will be judged primarily on the outcomeof the crisis, and the fact that no amount of plan-ning and preparation can anticipate everythingthat will be encountered in a real emergency.Consideration of these factors should occur

before the leader actually manages a crisis.Otherwise, if a crisis ends badly, the aftermathcan be personally devastating. These are not les-sons best learned by trial and error.

The Isolation of the Leader During a Crisis In addition to making the key decisions during acrisis, the leader is also setting the tone for therest of the staff (and sometimes the inmates aswell). The leader is “on view” during the entirecrisis, typically surrounded by staff from begin-ning to end. Staff members may not offer alter-natives while a decision is being made but maythen quickly criticize that decision if the situa-tion deteriorates. The leader experiences notonly constant pressure from the situation itselfbut also constant scrutiny by staff.

Despite being surrounded and scrutinized bystaff during an emergency, the leader is in asense alone. Staff may offer fewer suggestionsand participate less actively than the leaderanticipated. The reasons are simple. Staff see theawesome responsibility of making life-and-deathdecisions; many are intimidated, and some arereluctant to become involved. Recognizing thepressure on the leader, staff may also be hesitant,fearing their contributions may interfere with theleader’s work.

Strong teamwork can help to reduce the leader’ssense of isolation. In general, it will not be pos-sible to establish a good working team of topmanagers during a crisis unless those individualshave a history of teamwork and trust. Similarly,if the culture of the organization has been pre-dominantly negative, staff will find it difficult tosupport each other during an extended emer-gency. There are some exceptions. Regardlessof past relationships, staff sometimes rise to theoccasion in a crisis, particularly in a short-termemergency. Also, emergency conditions do tend

Despite being

surrounded and

scrutinized by staff

during an emergency,

the leader is in

a sense alone.

Section 5. Resource Materials: Leadership Issues During Crises

207

to bring out the best in many people. However,over time, particularly during an extended emer-gency, the history and the culture of the organi-zation will exert a strong influence on behaviorsduring the crisis.

After an emergency has ended, some crisis man-agers walk away nonchalantly and say some-thing like “I’m fine. I did what I had to do and itdidn’t affect me.” (Some will dismiss that reac-tion as denial, and readers are free to draw theirown conclusion.) However, most leaders emergefrom a crisis and acknowledge a dramatic, some-times profound, personal impact. Yet, in this“enlightened” era in which corrections has final-ly acknowledged the importance of posttraumacare and other emergency services for staff, itis disturbing that the one individual frequentlyomitted from psychological screening, employeeassistance programs, posttrauma debriefing, andthe like is the leader.

Crisis Leadership AttributesIn the “good old days,” a booming voice andstern demeanor were the qualities associatedwith effective leadership in prisons and jails. Anintimidating physical presence (and a coffee cupwelded to one hand) seemed to help as well.Although corrections has not completely aban-doned the old stereotypes, most professionalsrecognize that strong leadership has nothing todo with size or gender.

The word “strong” is important. In times of cri-sis, strong but flawed leadership may be prefer-able to weak leadership or no leadership at all.Almost all organizations depend on and reflecttheir leadership, and in paramilitary organiza-tions such as correctional institutions, the centralimportance of leadership is heightened becauseof the enormous risks inherent in operating theseorganizations and because staff expect decisivedirection.

No single set of characteristics defines the idealleader. Those who are “natural” leaders seem tocome in a wide variety of personality types:stern or humorous, quiet or verbal, etc. Similarly,those who have worked, trained, and studied tobecome effective leaders are a varied group.Individuals can be themselves and still developand enhance qualities associated with effectiveleadership.

What are the crucial qualities of effective leader-ship during a crisis? Integrity is the core andfoundation. Decisiveness is obvi-ous, as are calmness and supportfor subordinate staff. Many crucialqualities are not so obvious.Patience is near the top of the list;however, staff may misinterpretpatience as indecisiveness. Maturityis a necessity; ego involvement andtestosterone-driven behavior havethe potential, quite literally, to befatal. Tenacity, physical endurance, mental flexi-bility, and the ability to tolerate ambiguity arealso high on the list. Communication skills,often overlooked in discussions of crisis man-agement, are important; listening well andexpressing oneself clearly and succinctly areskills that any crisis situation will test repeatedly.Understanding and compassion must be on thelist, and analytic thinking may be a crucial quali-ty. On the other hand, lack of judgment or lackof common sense can render any of these quali-ties and attributes ineffectual.

Because second guessing, Monday morningquarterbacking, and blunt criticism are inevitablein extended crisis situations, self-confidence andgrace under pressure might be excellent qualitiesto add to the list. Effective leaders need to knowthemselves and be able to draw on innerresources because, at the end of the day, no oneelse may be there. Once the crisis is over, theyneed to live comfortably with their decisions and

. . . the history and the

culture of the

organization will exert

a strong influence on

behaviors during the

crisis.

208


performance and must be able to continue tolead, which is often the greatest challenge.

Dynamics of a Crisis SituationCycles, waves, phases, stages—all of theseterms characterize the progression of a crisis sit-uation through time. Certain dynamics are char-acteristic of crisis situations, and these dynamicschange as the crisis unfolds. To some extent, thedynamics of a crisis are predictable.

The Early Phase

The initial phase of an extended crisis situation(or the entirety of a short crisis or emergency)typically is quite different from the rest of an

extended situation. If planning,preparation, and training have beengood, much of the initial responseis almost reflexive. A host of stepscommonly taken when a crisis firstarises—lockdowns, emergencycounts, dispatching staff to try toresolve or to isolate and contain thesituation, notifying top staff, etc.—may be carried out relatively easily

because they have been planned and practiced.At this point, the leader’s challenge typically isto figure out what has happened and what iscontinuing to happen. Early information isalways incomplete or inadequate, and oftensome of the crucial information available early

on turns out later to be simply wrong. Also, theearly stages of crises usually are characterizedby some degree of chaos, which makes it diffi-cult to interpret available information.

Interpreting Available Information

During a prison crisis, every staff member typi-cally has some specific task or defined responsi-bility. The only person who by necessity musttake the long view and the broad view is theleader. That is, only the leader may have accessto all of the information from all areas of theinstitution. If the leader does not recognize animportant pattern in the events (indicating, per-haps, that the crisis is a planned mass escaperather than a spontaneous disturbance), no oneelse is likely to do so, and the actual nature ofthe problem may go unrecognized for a longtime, with disastrous consequences. It is up tothe leader to identify the broad parameters ofthe situation as soon as possible. How much ofthe institution is involved? Was this planned? Is“another shoe” about to drop (and if so, whatmight that “other shoe” consist of)? The leaderis in the unenviable position of directing animmediate and almost all-consuming responsewhile at the same time functioning as the onlystrategist in the situation and as a data analyst.

Avoiding the “Ambiguity Trap”

Early in many crises, the leader is likely toencounter a specific trap. (In the later stages of

Important Qualities of Leadership During a Crisis

• Integrity • Patience and maturity • Support for staff

• Decisiveness • Physical endurance • Communication skills

• Calmness • Mental flexibility and creativity • Compassion

• Tenacity • Tolerance for ambiguity • Analytic thinking

If planning,

preparation, and

training have been

good, much of the

initial response is

almost reflexive.


209

a crisis, staff may press the leader to resolvethe situation with a decisive use of force eventhough conditions do not warrant such anaction.) In the early stage, the leader may facepressure to adopt a view of the emergency thatis inconsistent with the available information. Itis an ambiguity trap. The leader and many staffmay want the certainty of knowing what they areconfronting. However, because early informationis typically incomplete, contradictory, or justwrong, it may not be possible to know the truenature or extent of the crisis in the early stages.The leader must be able to tolerate ambiguityand reject the allure of false clarity that may leadto unfortunate outcomes.

Helping Staff Remain Calm

During the early phase of a crisis, the leadermust be careful not to allow panic to set inamong staff, particularly if the crisis threatens tooverwhelm the initial response. In guiding staffthrough this intense period, the leader must bedecisive without becoming impulsive. He or shemust listen well but be resolute, even in the faceof pressure or emotion from subordinate staff.

As the Crisis Unfolds

In an extended crisis, staff reactions will changepredictably as the early adrenaline rush givesway to anger, anxiety, and doubt, along withmoments of enthusiasm and even elation.Different staff will, of course, react differently.The volatility of the crisis situation itself and ofthe staff reactions to the situation make it essen-tial that the leader remain steady and portrayconfidence and professionalism.

Serving as a Role Model

Although a sense of humor, if used judiciously,can be invaluable, a crisis is not a time forjokes. Nor is it a time for cynical observations,

profanity, or expressions of anger. When staffrealize that the crisis, with its attendant dangersand personal risk, may continue for a long time,the leader must function not only as the chiefdecisionmaker but as a highly visible role model.

In an extended crisis, the leader may also servedirectly or indirectly as a role model for inmates.For example, in a large-scale hostage-takingincident, the leader’s steady, measured responsesmay calm highly agitated inmates and bringdown their emotional tone, which in turn maylessen the danger to the hostages. Additionally,the leader’s steady demeanor may begin tobuild the inmates’ trust toward the institutionor department leadership, and that trust may bean essential ingredient in later attempts atresolution.

Meeting Staff Needs

The effective leader also recognizes the need tobuild staff confidence during the actual crisisevent. Keeping in mind that the occasional mis-take or bad behavior is always easier to recog-nize than the many things done correctly orunusually well, the leader must consciously lookfor ways to be positive with subordinate staffand to reinforce their actions and decisions—

Fiction vs. Real Life

Television and movies often portrayextremely dramatic, high-risk initiatives asthe only way to successfully resolve emer-gencies. The wise manager recognizes thattelevision and movie scripts are written tobe compelling and that real-life emergen-cies often require thoughtful, measured,low-risk initiatives that are quite the oppo-site from what Hollywood might choose.

210


even if doing so means swallowing somedoubts.

At the same time, some individuals can “comeapart” under the pressure of crisis conditions,and it is seldom possible to predict who will beunusually strong in a crisis and who may fallapart. Inappropriate anger or incapacitating anx-iety is a sign that a staff member is losing emo-tional control, and the leader must be aware ofthese signs. If a staff member is losing control,the leader usually will not have time to help andshould be prepared to have the individualremoved, quickly and firmly, from the crisissituation.

The Resolution

As a crisis continues, the pressure on the leaderbuilds. If the situation involves inmate violence,the leader almost always is urged to assault—touse a sniper or in some other way commit to atactical initiative that will end the crisis. If aresponse was dismissed early in the crisis as toodangerous, the mere passage of time will sel-

dom transform that option into amuch better response. Never-theless, the leader may be underpressure from many sources to endthe situation. A tactical team maylobby for action, saying that they

can assault quickly and take control with mini-mal risk. Political decisionmakers may be ask-ing when they can expect something decisive tohappen. Rank-and-file staff may strongly feelthat doing something is better than doing noth-ing. Seldom does it help for the leader toexplain that waiting, talking, planning, and fur-ther analyzing available information is far dif-ferent from “doing nothing.”

The leader’s greatest pressure at this point maycome from within. Managers have commonlyreported that after some period of time in a cri-sis, they began to feel that it didn’t matter

whether the situation ended badly or well, aslong as it ended. That reaction may be typicaland instinctual, but some crisis situations maydemand an opposite and counterinstinctualposture. For example, during the 2-week siegeof the federal prisons at Atlanta and Oakdale,Michael Quinlen, then Director of the FederalBureau of Prisons, said “my patience is end-less.” Larry Meachum, the former Director ofCorrections for both Oklahoma and Connecticut,later pointed out in print that “endless patience isactive management.” This concept is an espe-cially important one for a leader to understand,particularly in an extended crisis situation.

Elements of Strategy In an extended crisis, strategy is essential. Thefrantic pace of the emergency can easily con-sume everyone’s time and attention, and staffcan easily mistake tactics for strategy. It is up tothe leader to take specific steps to focus on strat-egy, because it won’t happen by accident. Theleader may choose to take full responsibility forstrategy, to work with one or more top staffmembers on strategy (a “crisis managementteam” approach), or to develop a separate groupto formulate and evaluate strategy alternatives(a “strategic planning group”). Any of thesealternatives will demand some of the leader’stime and attention.

A common problem in formulating strategies isfailing to consider risks as well as benefits. Theleader must identify and weigh the risks of vari-ous strategies contemplated. (“You said withthis kind of dynamic entry, your team has an 80-percent chance of controlling the hostagetakers before they can reach the hostages. If youaren’t successful, what do you expect we willhave in injuries and deaths if we are in that 20percent? And then how long will it take to con-trol the situation? Is there any risk that otherpeople may come under threat?”)

“[E]ndless patience is

active management.”


211

Another common problem is simply failing toidentify and evaluate additional strategies, par-ticularly those that may be unusual and creative.A leader can easily lose perspective and concen-trate too soon on a single, obvious strategy.

The leader must remember that crisis conditionstend to constrict creative thinking. This tendencymay be an argument for using a strategicplanning group, particularly during extendedemergencies.

Aftermath and Deactivation IssuesOnce a crisis has been resolved, the leader’sresponsibilities as a role model for staff maytake precedence over decisionmaking responsi-bilities. The leader knows, from training,experience, and preparation, that the aftermathof a major crisis is often longer and sometimesmore dangerous than the crisis itself. A hugeamount of work remains to be done (e.g., pre-serving evidence, protecting the crime scene,developing a short-term step-down plan, isolat-ing key witnesses), and much of it cannot bepostponed simply because staff are physicallytired and emotionally drained. The leader mustmake it clear by direction, but also by example,that this work requires immediate attention.

Responding to Criticism

This is also the point when instant media analy-sis of the event often leads to internal and exter-nal criticism, recriminations, and even outrightexpressions of guilt and anger. Here, the leadermust walk a fine line. The leader must thankstaff for their efforts and, where it is reasonablyclear that work has been good, acknowledgethat. On the other hand, in the case of controver-sial issues, media criticism, and inmate com-plaints, the leader cannot make snap judgmentsand simply exonerate staff out of hand. Theleader must see to it that these matters areinvestigated promptly, thoroughly, and honestly.Although others may press the leader to say“staff did nothing wrong,” that statement, com-bined with “the causes of the disturbance arestill under investigation,” clearly signals savvyobservers that the “investigation” is actually awhitewash. The leader needs to support staff,particularly after a lengthy and emotional crisis.However, “supporting staff” does not meanexonerating them before the facts are known.

Tactics vs. Strategy

Strategies and tactics are both plans orcourses of action. In general, whereas tac-tics are narrower, shorter term, and morelimited in their objective, strategies areoften intended for the duration of the situa-tion; they are broad in scope, and theirobjective is to resolve the matter. Theexpression “we won the battle but lost thewar” suggests good tactics but bad strategy.

In a developing prison disturbance, onestrategy might be “let’s contain it and thenlet it dissipate on its own”; another mightbe “we need to regain control as soon aspossible before the inmates get betterorganized.” These two very different(almost opposite) strategies would lead tovery different tactics, and either strategywill suggest a rather large number of spe-cific tactics.

Finally, when a tactic is unsuccessful, it isusually possible to try a different tactic.However, if the overall strategy is wrong,the entire venture may be lost.

212


Driving the Agenda

The single most important principle to guide theleader in the aftermath of a major crisis is “driveyour own agenda or someone else will drivetheirs.” Even if the leader is devastated and the

institution is in shambles, theleader must develop a game planand pursue it aggressively. Other-wise, other forces, usually external,will step into the vacuum, and theleader and the institution will findthemselves in a reactive, ratherthan proactive, position. Like somuch else in this paper, however,

driving the agenda is easier said than done. Itinvolves myriad tasks, including the following:

● Developing a thoughtful, detailed step-downplan.

● Beginning a comprehensive inquiry into theevents of the crisis itself.

● Initiating a careful study of damage controland establishing repair priorities.

● Taking firm control of media relations andestablishing a proactive media plan.

● Holding staff briefings and attending to staffmorale.

● Communicating frequently with the inmatepopulation.

● Preventing staff retaliation.

● Briefing departmental officials and politicaldecisionmakers frequently and candidly.

Energetically undertaking these and other de-activation tasks allows the leader to maintaincontrol in the aftermath of the crisis. It also hasa beneficial byproduct: staff are engaged andchallenged and begin to reestablish their ownbalance and confidence.

The Road Not Taken

It is always hardest to analyze alternatestrategies that are furthest from what iscurrently underway.

For example, in the midst of a long, verydifficult hostage siege, the commander,through a well-trained negotiator, is makingno progress deflecting the leader of thehostage takers from a time ultimatum tiedto a threat to harm the hostages. While thecommander tries different approaches withthe leader, someone else suggests using adifferent negotiator and asking to talk withall the hostage takers at once, as a group.Surprisingly, it works. The leader is themost aggressive and committed of thehostage takers; as a group, the inmates are“easier” and less focused. Changing nego-tiators does not undermine the rapportbetween the original negotiator and theinmate leader, and the change provides alogical reason for asking to talk with thegroup. This successful strategy might neverhave occurred to the commander, who was“locked in” to the confrontation with theinmate leader and was no longer evaluatingalternative approaches.

It is the leader’s responsibility to see that“the road not taken” is at least fullyconsidered.

. . . in the aftermath

of a major crisis . . .

“drive your own agen-

da or someone else

will drive theirs.”


213

Addressing Human Needs

Good emergency plans include comprehensivepreparation for dealing with the special needs ofstaff and their families in a crisis and separateprocedures for dealing with traumatized inmatesand their families. Such plans should also pro-vide for services or procedures to help theleader cope in the aftermath of a major crisis.Often, it is best if this assistance for the leader iskept separate from the department and from theleader’s colleagues, so the leader can work outpersonal issues privately. (Once again, the twinthemes of the isolation of the leader in crisis and

the extraordinary demands placed on the leaderby the crisis are both apparent.)

ConclusionAwareness of the issues discussed in this papercan help prepare a correctional manager oradministrator for leadership during a majorinstitutional emergency. However, because everycrisis is unique, even the most thorough prepara-tion cannot guarantee a positive outcome.Recognition of that fact provides some of therealistic perspective the leader needs to functioneffectively during and after a crisis.

215

Prevention of Prison Emergencies

An emergency in a prison is a serious matter.Even a relatively brief prison emergency canleave a wake of deaths, serious injuries, andmillions of dollars in damage. Regardless ofwhether an emergency involves inmate violence,the stakes are always high, for obvious reasons:

● Population densities in prisons are veryhigh.

● Inmates typically are locked into their cellsor living units or onto the prison compoundand cannot protect themselves in manyemergency situations.

● In any kind of emergency, some inmatesmay attempt to capitalize on the situation,complicating matters and escalating risks.

● Efforts to respond to or control an emer-gency in a prison must be weighed againstsecurity interests and the prison’s overridingmission of preventing escapes and protect-ing the public.

These issues are the rationale for a familiaradage in corrections: “The best way to deal withprison emergencies is not to have them in thefirst place.” Although not every emergency canbe prevented, serious prevention efforts can stopsome crisis situations from occurring at all andwill mitigate other incidents so they do notdevelop into full-scale crises.

This paper first discusses the level of commit-ment to prevention in corrections and thenaddresses the question of whether prison emer-gencies can indeed be prevented. The bulk of

the paper focuses on specific measures designedto prevent emergencies and on day-to-day oper-ational issues that play a role in prevention.

Commitment to PreventionGiven the issues discussed above, it seems rea-sonable to expect a universally strong commit-ment to preventing emergencies and large-scalecrises in prisons. That is not the case. Certainlythe rhetoric is there. Almost every prison admin-istrator and high-level correctional executivetalks about the importance of preventing emer-gencies. However, the level of commitment toprevention in most institutions and agencies, ifmeasured by allocation of resources, manage-ment attention, or degree of accountability, issurprisingly low. This generally negative assess-ment has two significant qualifications, bothrelated to current prison practices.

First, one of the most important ways to preventprison emergencies is to be well prepared torespond to emergency situations and to situa-tions that have the potential to escalate intoemergencies. Today, most prisons and most statedepartments of corrections (DOCs) do engage inserious, broad-scale efforts to maintain a highlevel of preparation for emergency situations. Inthat context, they are also engaging in importantpreventive activity.

Reprinted, with changes, from Advanced Emergency Preparedness,by Jeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry (Campbell, CA: LETRA,Inc., 2002), by permission of the authors. Copyright 2002 byJeffrey A. Schwartz and Cynthia Barry.

216


Second, many prison practices have the effect oflowering the probability of a riot, a hostage situ-ation, or some other major crisis involvinginmate violence. However, prisons engage inmost of these practices because the practicesrepresent good day-to-day operations and arerecognized as effective ways to run prisons—notbecause the practices have a preventive role.

It can be argued that such distinctions are unimportant—that as long as a desirable practicewith a preventive effect is in place, it does notmatter why it is in place. Evidence suggests,however, that prevention of major emergencies

does not receive the priority itdeserves. A number of prisons haveexcellent inmate grievance systems,emphasize positive staff/inmaterelationships, and generally useday-to-day procedures that tend toreduce the probability of inmate

violence. By comparison, efforts that are notcommon to day-to-day prison management butthat focus narrowly and clearly on preventionare largely lacking.

Thus, prevention of major crises is far bettertoday than it was 20 or 30 years ago, but pri-marily because today’s prisons are generallymuch better managed and because most oftoday’s prisons engage in comprehensive emer-gency preparedness. A great deal of roomremains for increased emphasis and improve-ment with regard to pure prevention efforts.

Can Prison Emergencies BePrevented?This question is more complex than it firstseems. The answer is “yes and no.”

Some prison emergencies obviously cannot beprevented. We cannot prevent an earthquake, atornado, or a tsunami. Most natural disasters fallinto the “unpreventable” category. Even if a

natural disaster conceivably could be averted(e.g., a flood), the necessary measures are gen-erally beyond the influence or jurisdiction ofcorrectional officials.

However, other kinds of large-scale crises andemergencies in prisons are potentially preventa-ble. The most common of these are situationsthat involve inmate violence—riots, distur-bances, sit-downs, hostage incidents, etc. Fire isanother common, potentially preventable emer-gency. (Forest fires are a separate matter.Although many prisons are not at risk from for-est fires, a smaller number of prisons could bedevastated by a serious forest fire. Some forestfires, such as those caused by lightning strikes,cannot be prevented; others can. However, theprevention of forest fires is not within thepurview of correctional agencies.) A number ofless common situations, ranging from staff jobactions to food poisoning, are also potentiallypreventable. Finally, some crises fall into bothcategories. For example, prisons may be able toprevent a toxic material spill within the com-pound but they cannot prevent a similar eventoutside prison property.

“Potentially” preventable is an important dis-tinction. No emergency is completely preventa-ble. Even the best run prison may have ahostage incident or a riot. A devastating fire canhappen even if a prison minimizes combustibleloading and ignition possibilities and conductsfrequent, serious fire drills. Nevertheless, com-mon sense dictates that even though many kindsof prison emergencies cannot be totally prevent-ed, good prevention efforts can reduce the prob-ability that they will occur.

Another important element of this discussion ismitigation. Good emergency preparedness canresult in both prevention and mitigation. Forexample, a prison may not be able to foresee apower surge that creates an electrical fire. If thefire starts in an area equipped with sprinklers,

Good emergency

preparedness can

result in both preven-

tion and mitigation.

Section 5. Resource Materials: Prevention of Prison Emergencies

217

no emergency may ensue; good preparation hascompletely prevented a crisis. If the fire starts inan unprotected area and begins to spread, butthe prison has minimized combustibles thatwould fuel the fire, and the prison’s fire alarmsystem, fire-fighting response, and evacuationdrills are all excellent, then the prison mayexperience a relatively minor emergency insteadof an institutionwide crisis or even a disaster; inthis case, emergency preparedness has resultedin mitigation.

It is easy to envision hypothetical situations inwhich good emergency preparedness may miti-gate a disturbance or a hostage situation. Evenwith unpreventable situations such as naturaldisasters, good preparation efforts can make itmuch easier for the prison to contend with theemergency.

The importance of preparedness in preventingprison emergencies cannot be overstated.Preparedness may seem to be primarily con-cerned with responding to an emergency thathas already occurred—at a point when it is toolate to be concerned with prevention. Closerexamination reveals this not to be the case. Forexample, after a prison riot in which lives havebeen lost and millions of dollars in damage hasoccurred, it may become clear that the crisisstarted with an unplanned fight among a fewinmates, which escalated into a full-scale riotthroughout the facility. Better emergency pre-paredness might have produced an earlier, betterresponse. Perhaps the initial fight could havebeen stopped. Perhaps the disturbance couldhave been isolated within just one living unit orat least contained within one building. If theprison translates its experience into better emer-gency preparedness, it may be able to prevent amajor riot in the future. In addition to preven-tion and mitigation, good emergency prepared-ness may also mean faster resolution of a majoremergency and/or more successful resolution.

Specific Measures Designed ToPrevent Prison EmergenciesMeasures designed specifically to prevent prisonemergencies include training staff to recognizeearly warning signs, avoiding agency-initiatedcrises, creating a prevention-specific intelligencefunction, being alert to “hot” issues likely tocause dissension among inmates, and imple-menting automated early warning systems.Proactive management, though less specificallyrelated to prevention, nevertheless plays a criti-cal role.

Traditional Warning Signs

This is the one prevention initiative that almostall prisons use, and it is primarily a matter ofstaff training. Correctional staff have long rec-ognized a number of warning signs of impend-ing violence in a prison. The list of traditionalwarning signs may vary somewhat, but almostall DOCs have such a list and teach it to staff aspart of the recruit academy curriculum. Somedepartments revisit the list as part of inserviceor refresher training.

Warning signs are part of many experiencedstaff members’ “sense and feel” of the institu-tion. When an experienced staff member walksinto a familiar prison and notices that the noiselevel, inmate groupings, and staff-inmate inter-actions are out of the ordinary, the staff memberquickly registers that something is amiss, per-haps without articulating exactly what led tothat conclusion. (This and other aspects of insti-tutional “tone” are further discussed below,under “Ongoing Operational Issues That Play aRole in Prevention of Emergencies.”)

Training staff in the traditional warning signs ofimpending violence is an important preventivemeasure, particularly with new staff. The prob-lem is that in many prisons, it is the only initia-tive targeted specifically at preventingemergencies.

218


Agency-Initiated Crises

A number of now-infamous prison crises result-ed from some change or other action by theprison administration. For example, the 11-dayhostage siege at the Southern Ohio CorrectionalFacility in Lucasville, OH, which resulted in themurder of one staff member and nine inmates,can be traced to a decision by the Ohio DOC toconduct skin tests for tuberculosis on the entireinmate population throughout the department.Other states can point to prison riots that beganwith a decision to introduce a no-smoking poli-cy, to restrict visits or packages, to change foodservice providers, etc.

Unfortunately, too many prison crises have beeninitiated by decisions at the institution or depart-mental level. The problem is not with the deci-sions themselves. Although some may not havebeen the best choices (or even wise), they wereproperly within the authority of the prison or thedepartment. The problem is that a negative andpotentially explosive reaction from inmates wasforeseeable, but nothing was done to preventthat reaction.

A good case in point is the decision to change aprison to a no-smoking (“tobacco-free”) envi-ronment. Such decisions are a relatively recentphenomenon but may already be the classicexample of an agency-initiated crisis. Someprisons have decided to make the change,announced the decision and the effective date,done nothing else, and then had a serious inmatedisturbance. Other prisons have made the samedecision but then developed plans for minimiz-ing the impact on inmates and communicatedfrequently with inmates about the change.(Many prisons in this latter group have usedphased-in approaches and offered smoking ces-sation classes and/or cessation patches and gum,etc.) Very few prisons that engaged in preventiveefforts had any serious problem making thechange. The question appears to have been notwhether those efforts were good, better, or thebest but rather whether the prison did anythingat all.

The issues in this no-smoking policy exampleappear to apply to a broad range of policy deci-sions and other changes that a prison may insti-tute. Experienced correctional professionals caneasily foresee which changes have a high poten-tial for angering inmates. Once this potential isrecognized, it is often a fairly straightforwardmatter to plan ways of introducing the changethat will make it more likely to gain inmates’acceptance. Still, it can be extremely challeng-ing to find ways to “soften the blow” when achange is necessary but likely to elicit a strong

Traditional Warning Signs ofImpending Violence

• Inmates hoarding food or canteen goods.

• Inmates refusing to go to the yard.

• Increase in requests for protective custody status.

• A sharp increase or decrease in the number of inmate grievances.

• Increase in racial grouping of inmates.

• Increase in inmate sick calls and attempts to get to the infirmary.

• Inmates sending personal items out of the institution.

• A substantial change in the noise level in the institution.

• Inmates wearing extra clothing in the yard.

• Decrease in inmate visiting.

• Decrease in staff/inmate interaction.

• Inmates actually warning well-liked staff not to come to work.


219

emotional reaction from inmates. Even in thesecases, what appears to be most important is thatthe prison recognize the situation in advanceand make its best effort to communicate andimplement the change as constructively aspossible.

A Day-to-Day Intelligence Function

The term “intelligence” means different thingsin different institutions and departments. It maymean information from inmates, particularlyfrom known informants. It may mean informa-tion about gangs. In some institutions, the staffmember assigned to “intelligence” is the gangcoordinator (or “security threat group coordina-tor”). In others, “intelligence” refers to theprison investigator or to the staff member whoworks with law enforcement agencies and withother institutions. These definitions are notmutually exclusive.

Intelligence as it pertains to prevention of prisonemergencies is none of the above. Rather, itrefers to a staff member (or group) responsiblefor reviewing security data and inmate informa-tion across the institution’s areas, shifts, andfunctions. Many prisons do not have this kind ofintelligence function. For example, an incidentthat occurs on the day shift between twoinmates in an education classroom may not beserious enough to require much attention. Thatsame evening, another incident occurs in thegymnasium, involving one of those two inmates;that incident is also not particularly serious byitself. The next morning, a fight breaks out inthe dining room involving inmates who areclose friends of two of the inmates involved inthe two earlier incidents. None of these threeincidents is by itself surprising or predictive of amajor problem. However, any experienced staffmember in the institution, looking at all threeincidents together, would have an “oh no!” reac-tion and be quite certain that large-scale vio-lence was likely. The question is whether the

prison has assigned a staff member the specificresponsibility of looking for such patterns.

Some prisons would answer “yes” but then goon to explain that recognizing dangerous pat-terns is the responsibility of the warden (or thedeputy warden), who sees all the reports and isresponsible for everything. The problem withthis response lies in the last three words of thatexplanation. The warden is responsible foreverything and therefore cannot focus enoughattention on incident reports and on informationfrom staff and inmates to reliably identify pat-terns like the one in the example describedabove.

An effective intelligence function can be one ofa prison’s most important means of preventinglarge-scale crises and emergencies. However,the prevention-focused intelligence functionmust be something quite different from, and inaddition to, investigations and gang information.

“Hot” Issues

Experienced correctional staff know that a fewissues, if sufficiently mishandled, have thepotential to start a riot or disturbance almostimmediately. Food is one of them. Several yearsago, for example, the Kansas DOC had threedifferent prison disturbances occur concurrentlybecause of a statewide change in food serviceand problems with the new food serviceprovider immediately after the change. Clearly,food-related issues—changing inmates’ food,feeding them too little, or feeding them foodthey hate—can easily cause a riot.

Several other areas—visitation, medical servic-es, recreation, mail—are also highly sensitiveissues for inmates. Prison staff, especially man-agement, need to pay particularly close attentionto any developing problems or incidents in theseareas.

220


As emphasized in the discussion of agency-initiated crises, quickly recognizing a problemin one of these “hot issue” areas appears to bethe largest part of the battle. Once the problemis recognized, managers should usually find it astraightforward matter to either fix the problemquickly or communicate clearly and frequentlywith the inmate population about the problemand about the steps being taken to address it.

Automated Early Warning Systems

An automated early warning system is asoftware-driven computerized system specifi-cally designed to “crunch numbers,” analyzedata, and alert prison staff when the data indi-cate that trouble may be brewing. The earliest,most impressive work on such a system was car-ried out by the Pennsylvania DOC in the after-math of the Camp Hill riots.

The Pennsylvania DOC looked retrospectivelyat a small number of key indicators at the CampHill prison: the number of inmate-on-inmate andinmate-on-staff assaults per month, the numberof grievances per month, the number of discipli-nary reports, staff use of sick leave, etc. The

research found dramatic changes in these indica-tors during the months leading up to the CampHill riots.

Based on this research, Pennsylvania developeda software-driven system in which each of thestate’s prisons collects data on critical indicatorsevery month and sends the data to the DOC’scentral office for entry into a database. Becausethe data are monthly numerical totals, thisprocess is quick and easy. The software thenanalyzes the data from each prison, measuringchanges from previous months and, since someindicators follow a cyclical or seasonal pattern,from the same month of the previous year. Thesoftware “flags” any indicator with a significantchange and produces a printed report for reviewby department administrators and prisonmanagers.

In some cases, indicators might be flagged forpredictable reasons. For example, a majorincrease in grievances about food service mightresult if an institution remodels its kitchen andchanges to two cold meals a day until theremodeling is completed. If the prison tooksteps to communicate these changes to inmatesin advance and to mitigate the impact of thechanges on the inmates (thereby avoiding anagency-initiated crisis), the flag may not because for concern, because some inmates willfile grievances under these circumstances nomatter what steps the prison takes. However, ifseveral key indicators are flagged at a high-security prison, and the warden, in discussionswith departmental officials, cannot identify anyparticular incident or change that might havecaused a dramatic shift in those indicators, thenactions designed to prevent a crisis should beginimmediately.

This approach has great potential for preventingprison crises. Experienced prison staff like tothink they understand everything that is goingon within the institution, but no one can make

The “Turkey a la King Riot”

In Hawaii, “luau” food (Kahlua pig, lomilomi salmon, poi, etc.) is the traditional fareon Hawaiian holidays, the most important ofwhich is King Kamehameha’s birthday.Many years ago, perhaps the largest riot inHawaii prison history occurred on that holi-day, when many prison officials had the dayoff, no one remembered to plan appropriatefood, and the old Oahu prison attempted toserve turkey a la king for dinner. In Hawaii,it is still referred to as the “turkey a la kingriot.”


221

sense of so much information all of the time.Computerized methods for regularly analyzingcrucial information may bring to light serious,imminent problems that otherwise would beoverlooked.

Pennsylvania’s automated early warning systemis a true prevention initiative. It is important tonote that some departments collect data onalmost every aspect of prison operations, andsome then enter all of that information into large

databases. Although valuable for documentation,accreditation, management review, and otherpurposes, that approach is not particularly usefulfor early warning purposes and should not beconfused with software-driven critical indicatoror early warning systems. In a comprehensivedatabase, too much information operates like noinformation. It is impossible to sort the wheatfrom the chaff. With hundreds of indicators,most will have nothing to do with predicting a

Institutional Climate Scales

A number of state DOCs now use some form of institutional climate (or atmosphere) scale to evalu-ate the “tone” of prisons on a weekly or, more commonly, monthly basis.* These scales are closelyrelated to the early warning systems discussed in this section, but there are important differences.

The primary difference between institutional climate scales and automated early warning/criticalindicator systems is that the scales tend to be subjective. With an automated critical indicator sys-tem, the number of inmate grievances filed in a month, for example, is what it is—it generally is notsubject to interpretation. With an institutional climate scale, a prison manager’s evaluation of thequality of staff-inmate interactions over the course of a month is profoundly subjective. The authorshave toured state prisons in which wardens “filled in” climate indicators in the same way monthafter month after month, an empty exercise that predicts nothing.

Requiring prison officials to stop and evaluate changes in institutional climate over time has realmerit. Such evaluations can produce information that might not emerge from a computer-drivenearly warning system. Both approaches may be important in predicting and preventing prisonemergencies. However, the process for measuring prison climate must involve more than a wardenwriting “acceptable” next to every indicator every month. Promising methods share the followingattributes:

• Combining objective measurements with subjective judgments.

• Requiring staff to assess detailed aspects of prison operations rather than making a broadjudgment about the overall climate in the prison.

• Involving the perceptions of at least several staff members from different levels and locations within the institution.

*Institutional tone is also discussed below, under “Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a Role in Prevention ofEmergencies.”

222


riot or disturbance. Further, when data are col-lected on many different dimensions, some ofthose dimensions will show unusual changeseach month simply as a matter of statisticalprobability, and those results will be indistin-guishable from any results that are true posi-tives. An effective early warning system shouldbe quick and easy to use and should track fewerthan 10 key indicators.

Proactive Management

Proactive management is the least specific of themethods that may be used to prevent emergen-cies in prisons. It may not be a specific initiativeat all. Nevertheless, the quality of leadership ina prison is a crucial factor in every area of man-agement and operation, and prevention of emer-gencies is no exception. In fact, withoutproactive management, a number of the morespecific prevention initiatives discussed abovemay be rendered useless.

The relationship between proactive managementand emergency prevention is neither ambiguousnor theoretical; it is direct and practical. Twoexamples may illustrate that relationship. Whenstaff morale is low and employees are angrybecause of a bad incident, proactive manage-ment engages employee groups and works torebuild communication and trust; in the samesituation, status quo (laissez-faire) managementdoes little as the situation deteriorates and per-haps an employee job action then throws theprison into a major crisis. When a prison facesescalating racial tension, proactive managementaggressively pursues conflict resolution, where-as status quo management denies the problemexists until a race riot occurs.

Proactive management is closely related to theoperational issue of early intervention as a phi-losophy and a skill set for supervisory and front-line staff. This related concept is one of theissues discussed in the next section.

Ongoing Operational Issues That Play a Role in Prevention of EmergenciesIn addition to measures designed specifically forthe purpose of preventing emergencies, manyelements of day-to-day prison operations play arole in prevention. These elements include day-to-day security practices, inmate classification,early intervention, the tone of the institution,and staff professionalism.

Day-to-Day Security Practices

Good day-to-day security practices are crucial inpreventing prison crises such as riots, distur-bances, and other incidents involving inmateviolence, including both planned and unplannedevents. For example, were it not for a series ofcascading security breaches and mistakes, the1993 inmate takeover of the “supermax” unitat the Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge,Montana, could not have occurred. That inci-dent, which resulted in the murder of fiveinmates, was planned by inmates based on theirknowledge of chronic security lapses by staff.

Fortunately, planned riots and disturbances arerelatively uncommon. Far more common is theunplanned situation that escalates into a riot ordisturbance. Here too, the role of day-to-daysecurity practices is central. In many cases, asecurity error creates an opportunity that initi-ates the entire incident. In others, a securityerror allows what should have been an isolatedincident to escalate into an institutionwidecrisis. In both cases, the end result is a riot ordisturbance that is truly a “crime of opportuni-ty,” and the opportunity was a security lapse.

It is tempting to assume that most prisons, par-ticularly higher security institutions, are verygood with basic security procedures and prac-tices. That is a myth. While many prisons havewell-designed security procedures and follow


223

those procedures consistently and in detail,many prisons do not. It is beyond the scope ofthis discussion to attempt to identify specificsecurity practices that are important but fre-quently violated. However, even the most super-ficial review of some prisons will revealproblems such as poor or non-existent key con-trol and/or tool control, munitions stored inareas where inmates could gain access, sallyport doors operating on override rather thaninterlock, and poor escort procedures—the listgoes on. Given such opportunities for unneces-sary incidents to occur and for incidents toescalate unnecessarily, the mystery is why majorinmate disturbances are not more common.

It is important to emphasize that not only muststaff consistently follow security procedures,those procedures must be well designed andeffective in the first place. Poor implementationis far more common than bad procedures, butbad procedures do exist. Furthermore, despite an

emerging national consensus as to what consti-tutes good security practices (a byproduct of theproliferation of security audit processes), specif-ic areas of disagreement remain. In addition,many prisons maintain security practices on thebasis of custom rather than reason.

Finally, the centrality of the security audit inmaintaining or improving security practices hasbecome increasingly clear. A particular institu-tion may have exceptionally good security with-out conducting audits. However, in general,departments and institutions that performexternal security audits or even self-audits annu-ally or biannually have substantially better secu-rity practices than those that have no means ofcomprehensive security assessment.

Classification

Good classification practices—a key componentof effective prison management—are thefoundation of emergency prevention. Two

Common Myths About Prison Security

Myth: Maximum-security facilities have the best security practices. Fact: If “good security” meansprocedures appropriate to the security level of the institution, then it is not difficult to find examplesof very good and very bad security at all kinds of institutions—minimum, medium, and maximumsecurity.

Myth: Security is the responsibility of the prison’s uniformed (custody) staff. Fact: In a correctionalinstitution, security is every staff member’s first priority.

Myth: A natural tension exists between good security practices and an emphasis on inmate pro-grams and services. Fact: Effective inmate programs and services complement good security prac-tices. Poor or inconsistent security undermines programs and services and forces inmates to worryabout their own safety. Good inmate programs and services reduce idleness and anger and provideinmate incentives to comply with security practices.

Myth: Staff will be able to tighten security as soon as they realize they are in a major emergencysituation. Fact: If staff security procedures are sloppy day to day, they will predictably be sloppyduring a crisis or major emergency.

224


problems—misclassified inmates and mismatch-es between inmates and institutions—can leaddirectly to crisis situations. If many inmates areclassified at a higher security level than a facili-ty’s design, staffing, and operating procedureswere designed to handle, serious problems maybe inevitable. Another very serious warning sig-nal is frequent overrides of classification rules.

Early Intervention

As noted previously, early intervention is con-ceptually related to proactive management. It isa matter for front-line and supervisory staffrather than a management-level concern. Earlyintervention is to some extent a result of institu-tional culture, but it is largely an issue of training.

In short, the issue is whether staff attempt todeal with inmate conflicts, confrontations, and

personal crises as early as possible,or whether staff wait until a prob-lem escalates into a fight or someother clear disciplinary issue.When low-level problems are notdealt with, some will simply goaway but others will not. Thosethat do not tend to escalate inintensity and scope. Yesterday’sargument is today’s fight. Yester-day’s fight is today’s stabbing.

Yesterday’s two-inmate confrontation is today’sgang war. Finally, today’s race riot may have itsroots in yesterday’s conflict between twoinmates of different races, even though the con-flict itself had nothing to do with race.

Despite these clear connections, some correc-tional administrators hesitate to commit substan-tial resources to developing early interventionskills and practices because the payback—i.e.,bad things that do not happen—is not visible. Ina twist on the “if a tree falls in the forest and noone hears it . . .” riddle, the question in a prisonbecomes “if an inmate disturbance does not

occur because of our investment of training andother resources, will anyone recognize that itwould have occurred without the investment?”Hesitant administrators should keep in mind thatan early intervention philosophy is a worthwhileobjective not only because it helps preventmajor emergencies but also because it producestwo highly visible results: a better running facil-ity and increased staff professionalism.

Tone of the Institution

The “tone” of a prison is also referred to as its“atmosphere” or “climate.” (Institutional “cul-ture” is quite different. Culture refers to a moreabiding set of attributes, although some overlapexists between an institution’s culture and itstone, atmosphere, or climate.)

An institution’s tone is complex, but, as men-tioned in the earlier discussion of “traditionalwarning signs,” it is something that experiencedprison staff register quickly (if subjectively).Many staff are certain that they know whensomething is wrong or substantially changedwithin a minute of entering a prison, before theyhave walked 50 yards. Is it the noise level?Partly. The way inmates are speaking to anddealing with other inmates? Again, partly. Doesit also have to do with the nature of staff-inmaterelationships? Absolutely. Most staff (and mostinmates) believe they can feel the differencebetween a tense prison and a relaxed prison.

A prison’s tone also has to do with the way thefacility is run. In a prison operated much morerestrictively than necessary, where staff areheavy handed, distant, and quick to write disci-plinary reports, the tone will differ dramaticallyfrom that in a prison operated as openly as pos-sible for its security level, where staff-inmateinteractions are low key, informal, and generallypositive.

Unlike a prison’s culture, which generally tran-scends any single turn of events to remain

Two problems—

misclassified inmates

and mismatches

between inmates and

institutions—can lead

directly to crisis

situations.


225

relatively stable over time, its tone can changedramatically because of an incident, a policychange, or even external events. Thus, a prison’stone, which can predict the likelihood of large-scale inmate violence (see earlier discussion ofinstitutional climate scales), can also cause cri-sis situations. A hostage situation or some othermajor disturbance is far less likely to occur in aprison that is clean, quiet, and run within theboundaries of constitutional requirements thanin a prison that is dirty, noisy, and run withoutregard to the constitutional rights of inmates. Itis the overall tone of the prison that may pro-duce violence in one case and a secure and con-structive environment in the other.

Staff Professionalism

As is true with many of the factors and issuesdiscussed in this paper, staff professionalismdoes not exist in a vacuum. It both contributesto and reflects the tone of the institution. It isenhanced by proactive management andstrengthened by skills such as conflict resolu-tion, and it helps the institution achieve consis-tency in security practices. Beyond theseconsiderations, however, staff professionalismitself plays a direct role in preventing prisonemergencies.

In most prisons, even though inmates interactfar more frequently with other inmates than withstaff, they depend on staff when something iswrong. Staff intervene before an inmate is seri-ously injured in a fight, arrange for medicalassistance when an inmate appears to be inimmediate distress, and provide counselingwhen an inmate has a serious personal problem.In a prison that values and rewards professional-ism, staff take these kinds of responsibilitiesmost seriously; in doing so, they avert moredangerous problems.

Inmates also rely on staff for many day-to-dayfunctions. In a minimum-security facility,

inmates with outside jobs may live relativelyindependently but still depend on staff to letthem in and out of the facility. Staff takeinmates to parole board hearings, track theirrelease dates, and arrange for family visits,among many other tasks. At a high-securityprison, inmates depend on staff for most of thenecessities of daily life—food, clothing, show-ers. In part because of these dependent rela-tionships, inmates are sensitive to lack of professionalism—to the officer who practicesverbal “one-upmanship” as inmates eat or show-er or who plays favorites and makes a point of“writing up” an inmate for personal reasons.Staff members who behave unprofessionallytoward inmates may never know that their ownbehavior initiated an institutionwide disturbance.When viewed in this light, it is clear that staffprofessionalism can help prevent inmate vio-lence (among a number of obvious benefits)and is also a major factor in staff safety.

ConclusionAs noted at the beginning of this paper, someprison emergencies cannot be prevented.However, serious prevention efforts can stopsome crisis situations from occurring and willmitigate other incidents so they never developinto full-scale crises. A surprisingly wide rangeof initiatives have excellent potential to preventprison emergencies, and many of these initiativeshave been underutilized in prison management.In addition, many aspects of a prison’s day-to-day operations—especially, perhaps, its securitypractices and overall tone—are important pre-ventive factors.

Good prevention efforts are an important part ofgood prison management. The old adage bearsrepeating: “The best way to deal with prisonemergencies is not to have them in the firstplace.”

227

Emergency Teams

Emergency teams are critical to emergency pre-paredness in any department of corrections(DOC). The three types of teams discussed inthis paper—tactical, hostage negotiation, andcrisis intervention—deal with life-and-deathmatters. They have saved lives in the past andthere is no doubt that they will continue to savelives in the future. Tactical teams, sometimes atgreat personal risk, have rescued hostages whootherwise almost certainly would have beenkilled. Hostage negotiation teams have workedout nonviolent surrenders when almost everyobserver predicted a bloodbath. Crisis interven-tion teams have saved staff and their familiesfrom long-term mental anguish and the kind ofdownward spiral depicted so poignantly byJoseph Wambaugh in The Onion Field. Con-versely, lives have been lost when a departmentlacked one or more of these crucial functions.However, while there should be no debate aboutthe importance of these teams, a few manage-ment mistakes can turn an emergency team intoa high-profile liability (in the words of someprison administrators, “emergency teams, can’tlive with them, can’t live without them”).

Clearly, the subject of emergency teams isimportant. This paper is directed to institutionalCEOs and departmental administrators andfocuses on strategic, organizational, and man-agement issues associated with emergencyteams—with particular attention to problemsand pitfalls that may confront a manager oradministrator.

A wealth of material is available on the trainingof negotiators and tactical teams. Many emer-gency teams have voluminous policies andprocedures. This paper does not attempt to syn-thesize training or procedural materials for thevarious types of emergency teams, nor is thispaper intended as a “how to” manual.

Background

Terminology

Most state DOCs and most medium-sized andlarge local jails have one or more emergencyteams. However, different departments have dif-ferent names for their teams, and terminologycan be a major barrier to thoughtful discussion.

The most common of the threegeneral types of emergency teamsis a tactical team. This paper uses“tactical team” as a generic namefor various units—disturbancecontrol, SORT (Special Operationsand Response Team), CERT(Correctional Emergency ResponseTeam), SWAT (Special Weaponsand Tactics), and many others—that are special-ly trained in the use of sublethal and/or lethalforce.

[Emergency teams]

have saved lives in the

past and there is no

doubt that they will

continue to save lives

in the future.


228


The second most common type of emergencyteam is a hostage negotiation team. Theseteams may also be called “SitCon,” “crisis nego-tiation,” “crisis intervention,” or various other,less frequently used names.

The third type of emergency team is most com-monly known as a crisis intervention team,although some departments use that term torefer to hostage negotiators. Crisis interventionteam members are specially trained to providesome combination of support, postincidentdebriefing, peer counseling, and posttrauma careto staff and staff families. These teams have thebroadest range of names, such as “peer coun-selors,” “critical incident debriefing team,” and“posttrauma team.”

To summarize, this paper refers to a use-of-forceteam as a tactical team, to hostage negotiators asa hostage negotiation team, and to a group thatprovides psychological services and/or supportto staff during and after an emergency as a crisisintervention team.

Clarifications

Correctional institutions often have specialteams trained to do cell extractions (also com-monly referred to as “forced cell moves”). Insome institutions, cell extractions are performedby the tactical team (whatever that team may becalled). Other institutions may have a cellextraction team (or teams) and a completelyseparate disturbance control team, CERT team,or the like. This paper does not address cellextraction teams or the cell extraction responsi-bilities of tactical teams.

Confusion also may arise about nomenclatureand organization of duties in tactical teams.Tactical teams can be viewed as having twogeneral levels. This paper uses “disturbancecontrol team” to indicate the first level—atactical team trained for some combination of

application of sublethal force, mass arrests, anduse of riot formations. It uses “CERT/SORTteam” to indicate the second level—a tacticalteam trained for hostage rescue missions,dynamic entries (a surprise forced entry into abarricaded or locked position, typically usingfirearms to take control of the situation inside asquickly as possible), and use of semiautomaticweapons. Some agencies have a single level ortype of tactical team that performs all of thesefunctions; others have two levels. Departmentswith two levels often make successful participa-tion in the disturbance control team for a periodof time (e.g., 2 years) a prerequisite for joiningthe CERT/SORT team. Generally, that hasworked well for selection.

Finally, this paper does not address “firstresponder” systems. (These systems aredesigned to provide a controlled response to analarm or an officer’s call for assistance whilemaintaining some secondary response capabili-ty. Typically, first and second responder staff areidentified at the beginning of each shift.) Firstresponder systems are becoming increasinglycommon in prisons throughout the country, buttheir function is not within the scope of thisdiscussion.

General Management Issues

Coordination

Prisons should ensure that emergency teamsunderstand each other’s missions and the poten-tial importance of each team in resolving anemergency. Without such understanding, oneteam may lack respect for another’s role (e.g.,a CERT/SORT team responsible for hostagerescue may regard the hostage negotiation teamas a weak and unacceptable alternative). Allteam members must clearly understand theirown roles and be committed to overall depart-mental policy.

Section 5. Resource Materials: Emergency Teams

229

Preparing teams to function effectively andseamlessly in an emergency requires coordina-tion. Ideally, a department-level person will beassigned responsibility for coordinating all threetypes of teams throughout the prison system.This person needs the authority to ensure thatteams are properly trained, follow departmentalpolicy, and maintain a positive team culture.

Membership and Selection

The qualifications of emergency team membersare extremely important, and the departmentshould have a strict policy on membershiprequirements for each team. Membership should

be voluntary. The goal is to attract the very bestindividuals—those who are concerned aboutsaving lives and who understand what it maytake to respond to an emergency in a controlledmanner. Applications for team membershipshould be reviewed and approved by the teamleader, the institution’s security administrator,and the warden.

Applicants for emergency teams should have atleast 1 year of experience in the correctionalfield. This requirement allows theapplicant to become accustomed tothe correctional environment andfamiliar with the department’s mis-sion and philosophy, and it allowsthe department to observe and eval-uate the employee’s demeanor, pro-fessionalism, and approach tohandling inmates in difficult situa-tions. Applicants should not holdpositions with other emergency-related responsibilities (e.g., com-mander, intelligence officer). In addition,applicants should demonstrate the following:

● Emotional maturity, ability to functionunder stress, and willingness to defer deci-sionmaking to higher authorities.

● Total commitment to the department andteam philosophy.

● A good job history, free of disciplinaryinfractions (especially excessive use offorce).

In order to select the right type of employee formembership on an emergency team, psychologi-cal evaluations may be conducted. A psycholog-ical evaluation may not be helpful if a thoroughevaluation and background investigation of theemployee are conducted. The question iswhether a “psych” evaluation adds value to theselection process. If an employee has a clean

Diversity

Emergency team composition should reflectthe importance of diversity as a workforceissue. Hostage negotiation teams tradition-ally recruit for diversity (i.e., participationby women and minorities) because it is wellestablished that in some situations a femalenegotiator, for example, may be effectivewhere a male negotiator will not. However,some tactical teams have not wanteddiversity—especially if the department hasnot emphasized diversity in its overallrecruiting and selection practices. A tacti-cal team’s mission may place extraordinaryphysical demands on members. If that isthe case, the department should specifythose demands and the related selectionrequirements. However, departmentsshould eliminate any membership require-ments that are not essential and that tendto work against diversity of team member-ship (a minimum height requirement, forexample).

The goal is to attract

the very best . . . those

who are concerned

about saving lives and

who understand what

it may take to respond

to an emergency in a

controlled manner.

230


work history of several years with the depart-ment and is in all other ways well qualified,should that employee be eliminated because ofa score on, say, the Minnesota MultiphasicPersonality Inventory (MMPI)? On the otherhand, psychological testing sends an unmistak-able message about the importance the depart-ment places on psychological stability in thesepositions. This is not an open-and-shut decisionand is one of the reasons a time period shouldbe established before a new employee can applyto become a member of the team. That allowsthe supervisor and the administration to focuson the employee’s behavior and attitude ratherthan on a test that may or may not predict thatbehavior and attitude.

Tactical Teams

The Importance of Strong Management

The best tactical teams have a most impressivedegree of professionalism in addition to theirtechnical skills. Even tactical teams that havenot been well equipped or thoroughly trainedhave sometimes been able to resolve life-and-

death situations because of theirbravery and commitment. However,of the three types of emergencyteams, tactical teams present thegreatest risk for management.There are many well-documentedsituations in which a tactical teamhas embarrassed its agency, orworse. Tactical teams have engaged

in and covered up excessive or unauthorized useof force, worn unauthorized uniforms and car-ried unauthorized equipment, harassed and pro-voked inmate populations, alienated themselvesfrom the rest of the correctional work staff,threatened to quit en masse if they did not gettheir way (and carried out the threat), conspiredto create false overtime or training records, cre-ated incidents that made front-page news, and

initiated incidents that led to court judgments orsettlements in six and seven figures. A completelist of problems prisons have encountered withtactical teams would be much longer and wouldinclude some truly bizarre incidents. In somecases, members of tactical teams have gone toprison for their activities.

Why are problems with tactical teams so fre-quent and so serious? The answer is simple:inadequate management or, more frequently,complete lack of management. Tactical teamsrequire strong, active management in addition tostrong leadership. The team leader’s role is cru-cial, but the leader is a member of the team andcannot also be its manager. Some administratorsfail to actively manage the tactical team becausethey lack the necessary technical backgroundand feel intimidated by the team. Other adminis-trators are themselves “wannabe” tactical teammembers and go much too far in trying to pleasethe team. Regardless of the underlying reason, iftop management at the institutional and depart-mental levels is not actively involved in direct-ing the tactical team, serious problems areinevitable.

Ideally, management would start from scratchwith its tactical team, defining and planning themission, philosophy, structure, leadership, train-ing, incentives, and management oversight. Inmost departments, however, tactical teams havebeen around for years and are not the result ofan analytic process. A team may have been thepet project of a well-known (and long sincedeparted) warden or administrator, or it mayhave simply managed to stay beneath manage-ment’s radar until a well-publicized incidentplaces it in the spotlight. If a department orinstitution does not have the opportunity to“design” its tactical teams, it needs to work withexisting teams to ensure their professionalismand effectiveness.

. . . of the three types

of emergency teams,

tactical teams present

the greatest risk for

management.


231

Team Culture

A clear understanding of mission andphilosophy—shared by the team members andleader, institutional managers, and departmentaladministrators—is fundamental for any tacticalteam. Managers can and should insist on atactical team that reflects the values of theoverall agency rather than behaving as a rogue“organization-within-an-organization.” Anexample from the law enforcement field illus-trates the difference. One of the authors workedon a project involving a large police departmentand a large sheriff’s office in the same county.At the time, the police tactical team had been onmany consecutive assignments in which no

shots were fired, and the team took great pridein that record. Conversely, the sheriff’s tacticalteam regarded any assignment in which no shotswere fired or force was used as frustration orfailure. The two teams, which were similar interms of equipment, staffing size, training hours,and budget, had totally different levels of pro-fessionalism, as reflected in their attitudes,appearance, language, demeanor, and more sub-tle attributes.

Management has many ways of defining the cul-ture and professionalism of its tactical teams. Inaddition to emphasizing a positive, professionalstatement of team mission, philosophy, and val-ues, management must also scrutinize leader-ship, selection, and training.

Leadership

Prison managers tend to think that the tacticalteam leader should be one of the toughest offi-cers in the institution. Often, however, such anofficer may not be the best candidate for the job.Integrity, character, judgment, and intelligenceare more important qualities for the tacticalteam leader than physical strength, familiaritywith weapons, or training in martial arts. Theleader must be able to deal rationally with teammembers’ pressures to use heavier weaponry,make the team more elite, increase shootingtime during training, engage in “wilder” trainingsimulations, etc. It takes character not to bow tosuch pressures in order to appear tough andloyal to the team.

Elitism and Anonymity: The TwinScourges of Tactical Teams

The twin scourges of tactical teams are elitismand anonymity. A good tactical team will havestrong identity, cohesiveness, and pride. How-ever, these must not be achieved by team mem-bers setting themselves apart from the rest of theworkforce. This can be a difficult balance tomaintain.

Why Management Matters

Management presence and involvementare essential in properly maintaining a tac-tical team. Even if team leadership is excel-lent, management involvement is importantfor several reasons:

• Motivates team members.

• Provides opportunities for the manager to transmit personal values directly to the team and reinforce the values of the organization.

• Allows the manager to personally assessthe team’s style, culture, and tone—without the team leader’s “filter.”

• Refines the manager’s knowledge of the team’s capacities, equipment, training, and procedures—knowledge that may prove invaluable in an emergency.

• Establishes an informal “open door” between the manager and individual team members.

232


There is nothing wrong with an identifyingpatch on the uniform, or a ribbon or the like.More than one identifying insignia on the uni-form should sound warning bells, and differentuniforms should not be permitted unless theyare a necessity during training or during actualassignments. If that is true, then the differentuniforms should only be worn for training orwhen on assignment as part of the tactical team;the rest of the time, the team members shouldwear the same uniform as other officers.

Similarly, it is usually not a good idea to organ-ize tactical teams in such a way that betweentactical assignments they perform other special-ized duties as a team. Although this is a com-mon way to operate a tactical team, teammembers do not do “regular” correctional offi-cer work, elitism is hard to control, and teammembers get comfortable talking tough toinmates from behind smoked-glass helmetvisors.

As a manager, you know you are in troublewhen you notice that your tactical team uni-forms are black (the rest of the department

wears gray and green) and theyrather resemble Ninja outfits.Another bad sign is when the teamseems to spend most of its time intheir basement ready-room tellingapocryphal stories, talking trashabout other staff, and ordering inpizza.

A mark of a good tactical team is support foraccountability as a team and as individuals.However, tactical team members often resist theidea of individual accountability, usually bypushing for anonymity. Team members mayargue against having their names stenciled onhelmets or jumpsuits as is done for other staff,claiming that inmates will retaliate against themafter an incident. Team members may evenrebuff the idea of using identification numbers

or letters on their uniforms. If a manager per-mits anonymity, a team member may escapeaccountability for even the most blatant malfea-sance. Perhaps more importantly, when teammembers know they are identifiable andaccountable, it often works as a deterrent, pre-venting bad behavior.

Training

Training tactical teams is a tricky business.Training needs to instill a set of values in teammembers, prepare them for the dangers theyface (without making them paranoid), anddevelop multiple skills.

If possible, a department should conduct its owntraining for tactical team members. Too often,external training will not reflect the depart-ment’s values and needs. Even if a departmenthas a policy stating that any contradictionsbetween external training practices and depart-mental expectations will be resolved in favor ofthe latter, external training can be more detri-mental than helpful. For example, in the early2000s, a midwestern DOC was sending its tacti-cal team members to a larger neighboring statefor initial training at a “CERT Academy.” Aftercomplaints from new team members that thetraining was sometimes abusive and humiliating,and after managers observed that the new teammembers had a “special forces” philosophyabout the team, the department committed thetime, money, and other resources to develop itsown tactical team training.

Training should not focus on terrorist incidents.It should not be “warmed over” police training.Nor should it be designed to convince teammembers that every inmate in the institution isplotting their assassination. Rather, tactical teamtraining should be practical and varied. It shouldemphasize skill building, discretionary decision-making, and professionalism. Exercises andsimulations should reflect the range of crises,

A mark of a good

tactical team is

support for

accountability as a

team and as

individuals.


233

emergencies, and disasters that the prison mightrealistically expect to confront.

The initial training for tactical team members isespecially important. If new team membersreceive training that sets false expectations, theteam probably will develop a culture that is notwhat management wants and needs. Initial train-ing for tactical team members is not Marine bootcamp. It should not include hazing. Instructorsshould not scream at, swear at, intimidate, orotherwise demean trainees. Unnecessarily harshtreatment does not develop mature, thoughtful,independent decisionmakers. Instead, initialtraining must first establish the mission andphilosophy of the tactical team and how thatsupports the mission of the institution anddepartment. Initial training can then go on todevelop basic skills, communication methods,contingency plan familiarity, and weaponsproficiency.

Tactical team members need a relatively highlevel of competence with a relatively broadrange of skills. In addition to physical fitnessand, for CERT/SORT members, weapons train-ing, teams must know how to use various otherauthorized instruments of force and/or chemicalagents. Tactical team members typically need ahigher level of training in CPR, first aid, andHAZMAT procedures than other staff. Theirtraining often also includes mass arrest tech-niques and various formations and disturbancecontrol procedures. Their firearms trainingshould go beyond qualifying scores on thefiring range to include weapons familiarity,“shoot/don’t shoot” contingent decisionmaking,and overall use-of-force policy. Tactical teammembers also need substantial understanding oftactics and strategies in crisis situations.

Incentives

Most tactical team members are highly motivat-ed with regard to their team duties. Typically,

that is true even for bad tactical teams, althoughthere are certainly some exceptions. Many tacti-cal team members would serve gladly withoutany incentives; however, management shouldstill attempt to provide incentives, both to attractqualified applicants and to demonstrate theimportance management places on the team’sfunction. The question of incentives is trickyand a matter of balance: bad decisions can leadto development of team elitism and individualprima donnas. Reasonable incentives may con-sist of a small pay increment, or overtime fortraining in an agency in whichovertime is rare, or comp time, orsome more creative solutions. If theincentives are too great, they willbe resented by the rest of the work-force and develop unrealisticexpectations among team members.On the other hand, if the incentivesare trivial, team members willregard them as an insult and the agency woulddo better to provide no incentives at all.

Team Size and Structure

With regard to structure and function, severalmanagement issues are worthy of exploration.There is little or no consensus among tacticalexperts about the appropriate size and structurefor tactical teams. Thus, these teams come in awide variety of sizes and shapes. Teams some-times consist of two to four subordinate squadswith squad leaders, an assistant team leader, andan overall team leader. Some teams do not havesquads. Where there are squads, they may havespecialized functions (e.g., a chemical agentsquad), or every squad may include every teamfunction. This paper does not endorse any par-ticular team size or structure, although it is rec-ommended that each tactical team include amedical person and a video camera person.

The number of tactical teams and the total num-ber of staff trained for tactical team duty will

Tactical team members

need a relatively high

level of competence

with a relatively broad

range of skills.

234


vary with the size of the department and the sizeand geographic location of its institutions. Thekey question is usually “what is the minimumnumber of people we will need assembled forthe team to be effective, and how long will ittake to assemble that many specially trainedstaff at each of the respective institutions?” (Thesame questions are, of course, equally relevantfor hostage negotiation teams.) Similarly, thereis no general rule about whether various emer-gency teams should be institution based, region-al, or statewide. That decision will depend onthe same set of factors described above. It is not

uncommon for departments to have institution-based disturbance control teams and regional orstatewide CERT/SORT teams.

Weapons Assault and Marksman(“Sniper”) Capacity

A prison system cannot avoid the possibility thatit will need to use a weapons assault team.Similarly, it cannot deny the chance that amarksman (“sniper”) may be needed. Situationsthat need to be handled by a hostage rescueteam using firearms are, fortunately, very rare inAmerican prisons. Situations that require the useof marksmen are far more rare. Still, either ispossible. The correctional department that doesnot want to develop and maintain either of thesecapacities must decide in advance which lawenforcement agency it would call on for thatkind of help. It must then work out any policyand jurisdictional issues with that law enforce-ment agency. For example, if the law enforce-ment agency’s policy requires that its tacticalteam commander have overall control of theentire crisis situation, that would not work forthe correctional department. Such dilemmasshould be resolved in advance. Further, the cor-rectional agency should conduct joint trainingwith the law enforcement agency to furtherensure a common understanding of the workingrelationship and effective coordination.

Traditionally, a two-person marksman/observer(“sniper”) team is assigned to the hostage rescueteam. Because of the architectural design ofprisons, this team is much more likely to berelied on to observe hostage-taker activities thanto take a shot to end a situation. Marksman/observer teams generally have extensive trainingin accurate long-range shooting but much lesstraining in how to observe situations and pro-vide essential intelligence to the commander.States should ensure that policies and proce-dures are crystal clear about authorizing a shot

Backup Planning: The Key toHandling SimultaneousEmergencies

The department should have policies andprocedures in place to govern how tacticalteams from different institutions andregions will back up each other in a crisis.In general, when a team is called out, atleast one other team should be called outas backup. (The same logic applies tohostage negotiation teams.) A goodapproach is to have all institutions agree toa predetermined backup/relief plan thatgoes into effect at the outset of a crisis.The plan immediately mobilizes the team atthe affected institution, sends the team atthe next nearest institution as backup, andplaces a specific team at a third institutionon standby. Such an arrangement can becrucial if emergencies break out at two ormore institutions concurrently, which hashappened on a number of occasions acrossthe country.


235

by a marksman. Similarly, policy and trainingneed to be clear and consistent about how longthe two-person team can be in place beforebeing relieved by another team and about howfrequently the marksman and observer shouldswitch roles. (It is well established that snipersmust be cross-trained for both positions and thatone should not remain “over the gun” for verylong—usually a matter of minutes—at a time.)These details and procedural issues, althoughnot treated comprehensively in this paper,require consideration in great detail.

Hostage Negotiation Teams

Team Size and Structure

Like tactical teams, hostage negotiation teamscome in many varieties. A team may have twoto seven members, or even more. (Here, “team”refers to the actual working group assembled todeal with a specific hostage situation, not to thetotal number of trained negotiators available to

the department or institution.) Often, the sizeand structure of a negotiation team reflect rec-ommendations that original negotiators receivedduring their initial training. When this is thecase, the administration and the negotiators maybe unaware of the major differences among vari-ous approaches to negotiator training, and thedepartment probably has never considered alter-natives to the current structure of its negotiationteam.

The most crucial negotiating functions arealmost always handled by a two-person unit: theactive negotiator (or “negotiator one”) and thecoach (also called the “passive negotiator” or“negotiator two”). The team may also include an“intelligence officer,” “communications officer,”“recorder,” and other positions. It must be clearthat all other positions exist to support the twoteam members—the active negotiator andcoach—who are conducting the actual negotia-tions with the hostage takers. All team membersmust be cross-trained, so that the first two whoarrive on the scene and are briefed can immedi-ately make contact with the hostage takers,without waiting for the rest of the team toassemble.

Reporting Relationships

In hostage negotiations, the reporting relation-ship is essential. The hostage negotiation teammust report directly to the situation commander.Not long ago, law enforcement hostage negotia-tors often were attached to the tactical team andreported to the tactical team’s commander.Fortunately, that is no longer common, and onehas to look no further than the FBI handling ofthe Branch Davidian siege at Waco, Texas, forcompelling evidence. To weigh options for reso-lution as carefully as possible, the situationcommander must receive information firsthandfrom both the hostage negotiation team and thetactical team. Even with a coequal reportingstructure, commanders have a strong tendency

Why Marksman Capacity IsNecessary

If a DOC refuses to consider the possible(though unlikely) need for a marksman, theconsequences could be dire. Here is onescenario. An inmate takes hostages, killsone or more of them, and then becomesvisible in an area where a marksman couldtake a shot and end the situation. But theDOC has no marksman on hand, either fromits own staff or through arrangements witha law enforcement agency. The hostagetaker then retreats out of sight and killsmore hostages. The DOC would find it diffi-cult to explain (or live with) this outcome.

236


to rely on the tactical team over the negotiatingteam. A number of factors play into this tenden-cy: Tactical information is often more dramaticthan negotiation updates, and planning for anassault and dynamic entry can be very seduc-tive. Unlike on television and in the movies,real-life hostage negotiations are often lengthy,“two steps forward, one step backward” affairs.Finally, most people’s gut reaction to a serioushostage incident is that it will not be resolved bytalking. If, in addition to these factors, thehostage negotiation team reports to the com-mander through a tactical team leader, negotia-tion most certainly will receive short shrift as arealistic alternative for resolving the crisis.

A great deal of attention has rightfully beenplaced on the rapport and chemistry that devel-

ops between the negotiators and thehostage takers. However, the chem-istry between the commander andthe negotiators is also important,and that is often ignored. There is agood reason why modern hostagephones have provision for a remote

speaker or earphones in the command post. Atsome points in a hostage situation, there may beno adequate substitute for allowing the com-mander to listen to the tone and quality of thenegotiations firsthand. The same logic suggeststhat the commander needs unfiltered access tothe pair of negotiators. Most departments thatrely on two-person negotiator teams do not usea negotiation team leader concept. However,departments that use five-person, seven-person,or larger hostage negotiation teams typically doinclude the position of team leader. Where thereis a team leader, he or she may report to thecommand post. If the commander’s informationabout the negotiations always comes by way ofa team leader, then it reflects that person’s judg-ments, values, and subjective perceptions.

Training

A department or an institution often decides tohave a team of hostage negotiators, chooses theteam members, arranges for their initial training,and then forgets they exist. With promotions,transfers, and retirements, the list identifyingwhich negotiators are available at which institu-tions becomes increasingly inaccurate over time.If the department or institution is fortunateenough not to have any situations requiring ahostage negotiation team, individuals on the listmay grow cynical and bitter about their decisionto volunteer and about the effort they put intotheir initial training. In other words, they mayburn out without ever having taken part in ahostage negotiation. Perhaps more importantly,

The Stockholm Syndrome

The phenomenon in which hostages beginto identify with their captors—the so-called“Stockholm Syndrome”—is well document-ed. This syndrome can also have a pro-found impact on hostage negotiators. Partof the negotiation coach’s role is to makesure the active negotiator does not over-identify with the hostage takers. If thedepartment uses a team leader position,that individual is also responsible for mak-ing sure that the two-person negotiatingteam is not “losing distance.” However, thecommander bears the ultimate responsibili-ty for determining whether the negotiatingteam is over-identifying with the hostagetakers and beginning to blur its allegiances.That is an important reason for the com-mander to assess negotiations firsthand.

The hostage

negotiation team must

report directly to the

situation commander.


237

if a hostage situation arises 3 years after the ini-tial training, the negotiation team is unlikely tobe able to perform in accordance with that train-ing. Hostage negotiators do not need as much(or as frequent) refresher training as tacticalteams, but they do need regular, serious, well-planned refresher training.

Conducting some hostage incident simulationsor full-scale exercises that provide training forboth the negotiation team and the tactical teamis an excellent idea. However, because theirtraining needs are different, the two teamsshould not always train together. Varying theoutcomes of joint simulations and exercises isalso important. If the sessions always end withan assault by the tactical team, negotiators willcome to believe they are irrelevant at worst or adiversion at best, and the tactical team will getthe wrong message—i.e., success in an emer-gency means a weapons assault. This state ofaffairs is demoralizing for the negotiating teamand counterproductive for the department orinstitution, but it is surprisingly common.

Negotiators need experience, and because actualhostage incidents fortunately are quite rare,much of a new negotiator’s experience must beachieved through training. Some of that trainingcan take the form of having new negotiators par-ticipate in critical incidents that do not involvehostages, such as cell extractions and group con-frontations. The negotiators can develop theirskills in establishing rapport, communicatingwithin limits set by the person in command, andavoiding making decisions themselves, and theprison may benefit from their increasing expert-ise in resolving volatile situations without vio-lence. Some managers regard negotiator trainingas entirely a matter of experience (“just get usedto doing it—there are no rights and wrongs, it isall judgment”). However, negotiators also needspecific skills, and some of their training mustidentify what is right and wrong, what is good,

better, and best. This requires specific skilltraining, including rigorous critiques of actualincidents.

Communication Equipment

The hostage negotiation team’s most basicequipment is the hostage phone. Many kinds ofphones are available, including throw phones(the handset or part of a hostage phone sent orthrown into the hostage situation to be used bythe hostage takers), phones with recording capa-bilities, phones that make it possible to hearand/or see what is happening inside the hostagearea, and phones that can detect chemicalagents. Prices for hostage phones vary widely,but none are cheap.

In selecting a hostage phone system, a depart-ment must decide what capabilities it needs andwhat funds are available. Ideally, the phone sys-tem is easily operated, requires minimum main-tenance, can record conversations, and can beused as a freestanding phone or connected to theinstitutional phone system. Other capabilitiessuch as listening devices and cameras can behelpful, but they are not necessary for successfulnegotiations. In fact, some agencies have foundthat additional technologies increase the likeli-hood that the phone will malfunction.

If an agency purchases technologically sophisti-cated hostage phones, it must be able to deploythis equipment quickly to any institution. Moreimportantly, hostage negotiators must train withthe equipment to the point that its use becomessecond nature and “transparent” (i.e., the nego-tiators can “look through” the equipment andfocus entirely on the hostage takers at the otherend of the line).

Incentives

Negotiation teams, like tactical teams, deserverecognition and incentives. Compared with

238


tactical teams, the negotiators’ assignment ismore reflective, and their motivation may bemore internal and less dependent on esprit decorps. Whereas management must watch thattactical team identity does not go overboard, thechallenge with the negotiation team is to devel-op cohesiveness and pride. Despite the differ-ences between the two teams, management oftencan use the same types of incentives for both(see “Incentives” in the section on tacticalteams). As with tactical teams, management’sinvolvement constitutes a strong incentive fornegotiation teams to perform well, and it alsokeeps management in touch with the team’scapacities and limits.

Crisis Intervention TeamsCrisis intervention teams are not as common astactical or hostage negotiation teams, but theyare quickly coming into wider use. These teamsvary far more in structure, mission, and proce-dures than the other two types of teams. In somedepartments, the crisis intervention function isfulfilled primarily by consultants or local mentalhealth professionals rather than by a staff team.

The starting point in developing a crisis inter-vention team is to define its mission and specifyhow and when the team will operate. Thisentails answering a number of questions:

● Will the team screen employees for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after anincident?

● Will the team treat PTSD?

● Will the team interview (debrief) involvedstaff after an incident, to give staff someoneto talk with?

● Will team members refer to or coordinatewith professional resources?

● Do the psychology and psychiatry staff whowork with inmates have a role in the crisisintervention team?

● Is it mandatory or voluntary for staff to beseen by the team or a team member after anincident?

● Can the team guarantee anonymity?

● When is the team mobilized—at the outsetof a crisis, in the midst of a crisis, or after acrisis has been resolved?

These questions have important implications.Although detailed answers are beyond the scopeof this paper, some recommendations are inorder.

After a large-scale prison crisis or other poten-tially traumatic event, psychological screeningfor staff should be mandatory. However, psycho-logical treatment should be voluntary. That is,the department has a right to ensure that staffare able to work and a responsibility to deter-mine whether some staff need professionalassistance and to provide related information tothe staff members involved. However, it is theright of individual staff members to decidewhether to accept treatment and to determinewhat kind of treatment they will receive, just aswould be true of a medical situation.

In most jurisdictions, uniformed correctionalstaff will need an alternative to a local or stateemployee assistance program (EAP) for assis-tance after a crisis. Some staff will not use theEAP even if their need is acute. They may ques-tion the EAP’s confidentiality, or they may wantto deal with professionals who have experiencein a correctional environment. Uniformed staffalso are unlikely to accept treatment from pro-fessional staff who treat inmates. However,some jurisdictions have had success with thisapproach when front-line staff and supervisorsacknowledge the credibility and expertise oftreatment staff.


239

A few more specific recommendations mayprove useful:

● The crisis intervention team’s mission isbest defined broadly.

● The team’s mandate should include familiesof staff members.

● The team should be mobilized at the outsetof a crisis or a major emergency, not after itis over.

● Team members should have no other spe-cialized role in emergency response.

● Attention to ethics and confidentiality iscrucial for crisis intervention teams andmust be strict and ongoing.

As with hostage negotiation teams, crisis inter-vention teams typically are more effective whenthey are used frequently, in a broad range of sit-uations. Thus, it makes sense to extend the use

of crisis intervention teams from traumatic inci-dents and major emergencies to day-to-daysituations involving staff trauma and crisis (e.g.,a terminally ill staff member). Clearly, however,a team of this kind can be crucially importantboth to staff and staff families during a criticalincident and in its aftermath.

ConclusionAs noted at the beginning of this paper, prisonemergency teams—tactical, hostage negotiation,and crisis intervention—all deal with life-and-death matters. Properly managed, these teamssave lives and offer correctional staff paths forrecognition and professional growth. The issuesdiscussed in this paper provide institutional anddepartmental leaders with food for thought inmanaging these emergency teams so as toensure that they make a positive, professional,and effective contribution to the department.

241

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center andthe Pentagon on September 11, 2001, terrorismhas been at the forefront of U.S. priorities andthe American psyche. A new Cabinet-leveldepartment of the federal government, HomelandSecurity (DHS), was created specifically to com-bat terrorism. President Bush declared a “war onterrorism,” and that phrase has become a regularpart of our national vocabulary.

A complete list of all the activities we haveengaged in on a national level to prevent orcombat terrorism would be very lengthy. Thedomestic components of the war on terrorismhave focused heavily on airport security and onpolice, fire, and health departments—that is, onour first responders. Billions of dollars havealready flowed to these agencies and servicesfor equipment, training, developing new capaci-ties, and augmenting existing capabilities.

For fire departments—which include paramedicunits—and firefighters, the reason for theresources and focus is quite clear: they will becrucial first responders in the event of almostany type of terrorist attack. Whether the situa-tion is a bombing or other kind of explosion(like the one at the World Trade Center), anattack that results in massive fire, or an incidentinvolving chemical agents, biological agents, orother hazardous materials, firefighters and para-medics are likely to constitute much of the initialreaction and first line of defense in the wake of aterrorist attack.

Law enforcement’s role in domestic counterter-rorism is also clear, if somewhat broader. Likefirefighters, the police are first responders. It isdifficult to envision any kind oflarge-scale terrorist incident in thiscountry in which local law enforce-ment would not play a central rolein attempting to apprehend perpe-trators, engaging in crowd and traf-fic control, establishing crimescene and evidence preservation,providing security for firefighters and medicalpersonnel, and more. In addition to its role asfirst responders, law enforcement also consti-tutes the largest intelligence network in thecountry—a separate but crucial part of a com-prehensive domestic counterterrorism strategy.

There are other agencies and services that haveclearly identified roles in counterterrorist prepa-ration and/or response. Hospitals and ambulanceservices constitute another important group offirst responders in the event of a terrorist attack.Few Americans can remain unaware of thechanges that have been made in airports andairport security. It is incontrovertible that thenation has embarked on an extensive counterter-rorism effort directly involving more than amillion people, billions of dollars, and a broadrange of activities.

The field of corrections, however, has not yetbeen fully considered in the counterterrorism

Prisons and Counterterrorism

The field of corrections

has not yet been fully

considered in the

counterterrorism

discussion . . . .

242


discussion, although many correctional agenciesparticipate to some degree with local or statelaw enforcement intelligence networks and areperipherally involved in other counterterroristefforts. A strong argument can certainly bemade for the contributions American correctionscan make toward increasing national securitywith regard to terrorism, but much of that workremains to be done. By and large, corrections isnot yet a major component of our domesticcounterterrorism plans or strategy.

This paper examines the role of prisons in anational counterterrorism strategy and presentsrecommendations for how prisons should pre-pare for and respond to terrorist threats and inci-dents. Much of this discussion will also berelevant to city and county jails; however, thepotential roles of other branches of correctionsin the war on terrorism are not considered herein any detail.

Role of Prisons in a NationalCounterterrorism StrategyPrisons constitute a potential target for terroristattack in at least three important ways. First,prisons are densely populated and difficult todefend against external assault. The cells, gates,fences, and other security barriers that keep pris-oners inside also make it difficult for both pris-oners and staff to evacuate quickly. An attack ona prison could kill a large number of victims.

Second, unlike many other high-density poten-tial terrorist targets, prisons are symbols ofgovernment authority. As such, they representan attractive target for terrorists seeking to cre-ate a scenario in which the government appearsunable to protect its citizens, even within itsown domains of power.

Finally, in attacking a prison, terrorists have thepotential to effect a mass outbreak of hundredsof high-security prisoners who would representa grave danger to surrounding communities. Thepredictable widespread panic that would resultmight be a more important objective to terroriststhan a high death count. Terrorists might wellregard the death and destruction at the prisonitself as beneficial byproducts to the central goalof mass escapes, community terror, and chaos.

Unfortunately, the experience of foreign coun-tries in which terrorist activity has been relative-ly frequent substantiates these arguments. Inreality, prisons have been targets for terrorists,as have jails and police stations. For example,for many years, police in England have beenhigh-priority targets of the Irish RepublicanArmy (IRA). Basque separatists have attackedSpanish police stations. As this is written, Iraqipolice are the frequent targets of insurgents.

As described above, prisons may be a likely tar-get of terrorist attack, and they also have addi-tional potential to contribute to nationalcounterterrorism efforts. In addition to theirattractiveness as terrorist targets, there are at

Defining Terrorism

Many intelligence agencies and politicalentities have attempted to define terrorism.However, no one definition has been adopt-ed or officially recognized. This paper usesthe FBI’s definition of terrorism: “the unlaw-ful use of force against persons or propertyto intimidate or coerce a government, thecivilian population or any segment thereof,in the furtherance of political or socialobjectives.” This definition includes threeelements: (1) Terrorist activities are illegaland involve the use of force. (2) The actionsare intended to intimidate or coerce. (3) Theactions are committed in support of politi-cal or social objectives. Also, these activi-ties may be carried out by one or severalindividuals.

Section 5. Resource Materials: Prisons and Counterterrorism

243

least three other important reasons to make pris-ons an integral part of our domestic counterter-rorism effort:

● Terrorists may exist within the prison popu-lation and could be identified.

● The prison population offers terrorists apromising pool from which to recruit newmembers, allies, or mercenaries.

● The prison population is a potential sourceof intelligence about terrorist groups.

These issues, which are explored in the follow-ing sections, are either unique to prisons ormore evident within prisons than any other areaof government.

Potential To Identify Terrorists WithinPrison Populations

Many if not most prisoners are apolitical. Thatis, the average criminal offender may be a

violent and dangerous high-security inmate witha long record or a low-security inmate doing timefor a nonviolent crime, but the odds are high inboth cases that the inmate is uninvolved—andprobably uninterested—in national or interna-tional politics. In fact, “politics” within a prisonpopulation usually refers to personality dynam-ics among small groups of inmates and some-times to prison gangs or prison racial groupings.However, a small percentage of the prisonpopulation within the United States is intenselyinvolved in larger political issues. This group ofpolitically aware and active inmates tends to beheavily weighted toward the extreme right andextreme left of the political continuum—thecompass points that produce terrorists.

Committed terrorists may be housed among ourprison population and may not be easy to identi-fy. Active terrorists may be sentenced for somecrime unrelated to terrorism and go unrecog-nized in prison. Such individuals may be skillful

Role of Other Branches of Corrections in Counterterrorism

The other major branches of corrections have differing relationships to potential terrorist activitiesand threats that affect their need for counterterrorism preparedness and role in counterterrorismresponse. For example, the risk of probation and parole agencies being targeted for terrorist attackis extremely low. On the other hand, those same agencies are potentially invaluable in the area ofintelligence because of their detailed knowledge of a wide range of criminal offenders in the com-munity and their active monitoring of the activities of many of those offenders.

Jails, like prisons, are potential terrorist targets—densely populated structures that are difficultboth to defend and to evacuate. In addition to being potential targets of terrorist activity, jails maybe involved with terrorists in other ways. Many of the criminal offenders monitored by probationand parole officers in the community are also occasionally arrested by law enforcement and thenspend time in county jails, whether for short stays or en route to state prison. Jails also receiveindividuals who may be wanted for very serious offenses but have been arrested on quite minorcharges. For these reasons, jails are in a position to make crucial contributions to counterterroristintelligence efforts.

244


at maintaining their identities as “regular” pris-oners. Prisoners who become committed terror-ists while in prison, on the other hand, are muchmore likely to be less skilled and experienced athiding their true philosophies and objectives andwould typically be individuals who were wellknown for their extremist views. In any case, thepotential for prisons to identify active and/orcommitted terrorists within their own inmatepopulations should not be ignored.

Potential for Terrorists To RecruitMembers and Allies

Prisons offer terrorists perhaps the single mostfertile ground in this country for recruiting newmembers, allies, or mercenaries. Among the

hundreds of thousands of peoplelocked up in our prisons are manysmart, tough, disciplined individu-als who blame our society, ourlaws, and our government for theirruined lives and for the fact thatthey are in the midst of servinglong sentences. Many of them areangry and alienated enough to beeasily turned from violence forcriminal purposes to violence forpolitical or even religious purposes.For terrorists, recruiting these peo-ple is a great advantage: They donot have to be taught to be violent.In many cases, their criminalrecords prove they are capable ofbeing extremely violent and that

they are psychologically able to cope with com-mitting violence at the level of terrorism.

It would be folly to ignore the potential for ter-rorist groups to look to our prison populationsas breeding grounds for recruits and/or allies,particularly given the history of the late 1960sand early 1970s, when the Symbionese Lib-eration Army (SLA) and other groups withsimilar philosophies and characteristics were

incubated entirely within our prison system.There is no obvious reason why history couldnot repeat itself.

The question of mercenaries deserves additionalmention. Finding “hired help” would be mucheasier for terrorists than attempting to recruitnew members and allies. If a group were plan-ning an attack or some other terrorist activitythat required larger numbers of people to carryout than the terrorist group itself had, wherewould that group look for “soldiers”? Whereasonly a very small percentage of the prison popu-lation might be approached on political groundsto become members of a terrorist group, a verylarge percentage could be approached withmoney to do almost anything.

Prisons are an all too obvious source if the needis simply for people who will do bad things fora great deal of money rather than people whoare philosophically, religiously, or politicallycommitted in any way. The question for correc-tional administrators and for policymakers outside the area of corrections is: How well pre-pared are our prisons and prison staff to recog-nize terrorist recruiting activities? Unfortunately,the current answer is not at all.

Potential To Gather Intelligence About Terrorists

For the reasons discussed above, potential intel-ligence about terrorists is more available in pris-ons than many other places. Terrorist groups andterrorist incidents can originate wholly within aprison or department of corrections (DOC).Under certain conditions—the influence of lead-ers who are more political than religious, eventsin the outside world (e.g., the United States atwar with a particular country or in a particularregion of the world), or perceived discriminationagainst the group itself—religious, ethnic, andracially affiliated groups have the potential tobecome terrorist organizations or to spawn such

The question for

correctional

administrators and for

policymakers outside

the area of corrections

is: How well prepared

are our prisons and

prison staff to

recognize terrorist

recruiting activities?

Unfortunately,

the current answer is

not at all.


245

organizations. In general, knowledge of thesegroups and their leaders may be crucial.

It is also true that an organized group of terror-ists operating within the United States must do anumber of things outside the law. The groupmay be laundering money, obtaining weaponsillegally, purchasing false identification, operat-ing under false identities, or engaging in a hostof other activities that are not central to its vio-lent objectives but that are required to allow thegroup to operate in secrecy or to proceed withits plans. These various illegal activities providepotential avenues for identification of terroristgroups. When a terrorist group operating in thiscountry needs to purchase unregistered oruntraceable weapons, obtain false identification,or gain access to stolen motor vehicles, it ismost likely to look to the “common criminal” inour cities and on our streets to arrange the nec-essary illegal business transactions.

Government attempts to locate and identify ter-rorist groups through interdicting these low-level criminal transactions have traditionallyfocused on intelligence efforts ranging fromlocal law enforcement to state antiterrorism net-works to national organizations such as the FBI.Consideration of the prison population has beenleft out of the equation. Because the prison pop-ulation is largely transient and because the crim-inals who sell guns, license plates, falseidentification, and so forth tend to cycle fromstreet crime to prison and back, the prison popu-lation is a repository for a large amount of infor-mation about the kinds of illegal activitiestaking place in the community and the individu-als who are involved. Admittedly, a great deal ofrumor and false information circulates amongthe prison population, but there is also validinformation. Monitoring this source of intelli-gence about illegal activities that could supportterrorist groups should be an integral part of ourcounterterrorism strategy.

Counterterrorism Preparednessand Response in PrisonsThe remainder of this paper considers how pris-ons should prepare for and respond to terroristthreats and incidents. In short, what constitutescounterterrorism at a prison?

The starting point for any prison assessing itscapacity to prevent and respond to a terroristattack must be its system of emergency pre-paredness. The news for U.S. prisons is good inthis regard. Unlike 20 or 30 years ago, mostprisons now have well-defined emergency pre-paredness systems supported bysubstantial resources, detailedplans, specialized equipment, andextensive staff training. This emer-gency readiness is the foundationupon which prison counterterror-ism efforts must be built. There isno practical alternative. The rela-tively small number of U.S. prisonsthat have little or no emergencyreadiness will not be able to seri-ously consider how they wouldrespond to a sophisticated terroristattack until they sort out policyissues concerning command duringmajor emergencies, train negotia-tors (or set up agreements to useexternal negotiators), prepare fordealing with the media during alarge-scale crisis, and address all of the othercomponents of a detailed and realistic emer-gency plan discussed in section 1 of this guideand enumerated in the Emergency PreparednessSelf-Audit Checklist in section 3.

However, counterterrorism at a prison involvesconsiderably more than basic emergency pre-paredness. After a prison has established itsgeneral emergency preparedness plan, trainedits staff in all of the plan’s components, andembarked on a program of drills, exercises, and

A great deal of rumor

and false information

circulates among the

prison population, but

there is also valid

information.

Monitoring this source

of intelligence about

illegal activities that

could support terrorist

groups should be an

integral part of our

counterterrorism

strategy.

246


refresher training, it must give further attentionto the following areas critical to preparing forand responding to terrorist threats and activity:

● Intelligence operations.

● Staff training.

● Target hardening.

● Alert systems.

● Medical services.

● Procedures for responding to alarms.

● Interagency agreements.

● Aftermath.

These topics are addressed in the sections thatfollow.

Intelligence Operations

The core of most counterterrorism preventionefforts in prisons will be the prison’s intelli-gence operations. Existing intelligence opera-tions in prisons vary widely. Some prisons haveextremely sophisticated intelligence functions,whereas others have no intelligence capabilitieswhatsoever. Not surprisingly, prisons withsophisticated intelligence operations in placewill be able to incorporate counterterrorismfunctions much more easily than those with lesswell-developed abilities to gather and analyzecritical information.

One of the first priorities for a prison seeking todevelop intelligence on terrorism is to exploreand understand local and statewide intelligence

Security Threat Group Operations

Many prisons have a security threat group (STG) coordinator. This person may operate relativelyindependently, but in large prisons, he or she may also have subordinate staff. STGs are oftendefined as neither more nor less than gangs and may be street gangs or prison gangs. The STGcoordinator’s job includes reviewing new admissions to identify both gang members and inmateswho are not gang members but may be affiliated with particular gangs. The coordinator mayaccomplish this through interviews, identification of tattoos, information obtained from otherinmates, the new inmate’s record, and information from local and state law enforcement agencies.Typically, once gang members or affiliates are identified, they are entered into the STG databaseand then tracked and monitored throughout their stay in the prison.

A good STG operation will have safeguards against practices such as overloading a housing unitwith too many members of one particular gang, allowing relatives of members of one gang tocross-visit at the prison, and permitting the identified gang member to make collect phone calls toknown gang members on the outside. Phone conversations of gang members may be monitored orrecorded and archived. The prison will monitor and attempt to stop gang efforts to recruit withinthe inmate population and to control housing assignments, recreation, commissary goods, or otherpotential sources of power. The elements of a well-developed STG operation—early identification,suspect databases, tracking and monitoring procedures, and the capacity to monitor mail, phone,and visitation—are equally applicable to prison counterterrorism intelligence operations.


247

networks involving law enforcement, the mili-tary, staff from county and state emergencymanagement agencies, federal enforcementagencies, and other such organizations. Theprison should work to become a full partner insuch terrorism task forces.1

Preventing terrorist activity is a prison’s respon-sibility, but it is also an external issue. Prisonsand correctional agencies may have little controlover preventing terrorist activity when the threatis external. For example, if a terrorist group istargeting a prison for an attack, but no inmatesor other individuals associated with the prisonare involved in the planning or with the group inany other way, the success or failure of the ter-rorists’ plans may rest solely with national lawenforcement resources, particularly the FBI. Thetargeted prison might not know about the plotuntil members of the terrorist group are appre-hended or, if law enforcement intelligenceefforts are unsuccessful, until an attack actuallytakes place. However, if the plot to attack aprison also involves inmate collaborators orplans to free high-profile “political” prisoners,or if members of the terrorist group have infil-trated either the inmate population or the prisonworkforce, then the prison and prison staffmight have the opportunity to foil the terrorists’plans through effective intelligence operations.

Staff Training

The biggest difference between prison gangsand terrorist organizations may be summed upas “sophistication.” While some of the larger,longer established prison gangs are reasonablysophisticated, with constitutions, bylaws, andwell-defined organizational cultures, even thesegangs are a far cry from the sophistication ofmost terrorist groups. Most correctional staff,

like most law enforcement officers, have littleexperience with groups of offenders who aresmart, well funded, highly trained, and disci-plined. Prison staff are accustomed to inmategroups that plan poorly, follow through badly,and have trouble keeping secrets for more than30 minutes. Few staff in prisons have any con-cept of the level of planning, training, resources,secrecy, and commitment to cause that isrequired for an event like the September 11attacks. It follows that staff training on terrorismis one of the most important and earliest steps inbuilding counterterrorism capabilities into anexisting prison emergency preparedness system.

The lack of awareness of an appropriate frameof reference and of specific knowledge aboutterrorism on the part of prison staff is not limit-ed to intelligence operations or other preventionefforts. The need for staff training specific toterrorism is equally relevant to planning andpreparation and also applies to building responsecapabilities for possible terrorist acts at or inprisons.

Target Hardening

Once a prison has declared alert status or acti-vated an alert system in response to a terroristthreat, specific activities and procedures fall intoseveral categories, the first of which is usuallyreferred to as “target hardening.” Target harden-ing includes a wide range of steps that mostprisons can initiate to increase security againstoutside assault. As noted above, almost allprison security is designed from the inside out,and many high-security institutions that areextremely well designed to prevent escape havealmost no security systems that are effectiveagainst external threats. Examples of targethardening include the following measures:

● Establish vehicle- or traffic-control check-points at some distance from the main gates.

1 Understandably, small minimum-security prisons may givecounterterrorist intelligence efforts much lower priority than largemedium- or high-security facilities.

248


● Change procedures or erect barriers atvehicle sally ports.

● Tighten or restrict inmate mail or visitationprocedures.

● Institute background checks and positiveidentification requirements for deliverytruck drivers and/or inmate visitors.

● Increase external vehicle patrols and armthose staff.

● Increase night lighting for areas outsideperimeter fences.

The list will vary substantially depending on thenature of the particular institution and the levelof the perceived threat.

One of the greatest assets available to wardensseeking to identify opportunities for target hard-ening is the expertise of their tactical teams.Many wardens have never analyzed their facili-ty’s degree of vulnerability to external assault. Itis a challenging exercise, and the results areoften disturbing. Wardens who charge theirCERT teams to assume the role of a group ofsoldiers of fortune hired to attack the prison toexecute an escape will likely be alarmed at thevulnerabilities the team identifies. Many of therisks found will have been unrecognized, andsome may be obvious and severe. The leadermust recognize that the more alarming the infor-mation, the more valuable the exercise.

Alert Systems

As used in this paper, the term “alert system”refers to a method for placing a prison in higherstages or levels of readiness in response toheightened threat levels. In our post-September11 world, almost everyone in the United Statesis familiar with the statement “We are now atthreat-level orange,” and people who served inthe military during the cold war are unlikely toforget “We are now at DEFCON 3.” However, aprison alert system should not be confused with

the five threat levels of DHS’s color-coded advi-sory system. The core concept of a prison alertsystem is the need for a rational, plannedmethod for responding to a heightened threat ofterrorist activity aimed at the prison or its sur-rounding community. All staff must be welltrained in the alert system.

Most state DOCs do not have any sort of alertsystem; however, some states have exactly thiskind of system built into their overall emergencypreparedness plans. Notably, New York’s DOChas a detailed, sophisticated, and well-designedalert system, and the group of states usingLETRA’s Emergency Preparedness forCorrectional Institutions have an alert systemthat is an integral part of that approach.2

There is no single type of prison alert systemthat must be used. Because experience with alertsystems in prisons is limited, it would be diffi-cult to make a case for the number of stages ofreadiness a prison alert system should have.There is a good deal of room for creativity andvaried approaches in designing a prison alertsystem. However, effective alert systems have atleast one element in common: they are true sys-tems with specific plans and measures in whichstaff have been trained. The importance of plan-ning and training cannot be overemphasized.Prisons cannot expect to figure out how torespond once they are under serious threat.Without thorough planning, training, and prac-tice, it is an unfortunate certainty that underthreat and time pressure, the prison willmake avoidable mistakes and forget obviousprocedures.

The information leading a prison to activate itsalert system may come from intelligencesources within the prison or from law enforce-ment or other external sources. Similarly, the

2 The comprehensive emergency system developed by LETRA,Inc., for correctional institutions is described in EmergencyPreparedness for Correctional Institutions, 3d edition (Campbell,CA: 2004).


249

target of the threat identified in the intelligencemay be the prison itself, but it is also possiblethat the prison may have to respond to threats toa nearby city or the surrounding geographicarea.

Responses to declaring alert status or raising thethreat level, if the alert system has stages or lev-els, include but are not limited to the following:

● Activating emergency command proce-dures. The prison may need to ensure thatone of its top managers is either onsite oravailable in relatively close proximity 24hours a day.

● Initiating target-hardening measures. Forexample, if the intelligence points to thepossible use of a truck bomb, concrete barri-ers might be erected in front of vehicle sallyports, and a traffic-control post might beestablished at some distance from the insti-tution and staffed around the clock. If theintelligence points instead to a biologicalthreat, processing of mail and packagesmight be moved to a location outside theinstitution’s perimeter.

● Marshalling additional resources, eitherthrough activation or standby status. Forexample, intelligence staff may need toincrease their operations, and the adminis-tration may need to cancel vacations formembers of CERT teams, hostage negotia-tors, and other staff with critical jobs duringemergencies. Hostage negotiation andCERT teams may need to be on phonestandby.

● Activating interagency agreements. Forexample, intelligence-sharing activities maybe intensified.

● Developing an initial media strategy ifthe prison’s response comes to mediaattention. For example, if the intelligenceinformation received is highly confidential,

the prison will need some acceptable publicexplanation of security measures such astraffic controls, the reduction in inmate vis-iting, and increased staffing. The sameexplanation may need to be given to thestaff and inmate population as well.

● Modifying operations in ways that reduceexposure to the threat. For example, if thethreat is an attack involving a bomb or anexplosion intended to kill people within theprison and allow mass escapes, then reducedprogramming and some degree of lockdownmay mitigate the risk of mass escape.

Other Benefits of Alert Systems

An alert system, even if developed specifi-cally as part of a counterterrorism plan, hasthe potential to serve the institution well inthe more traditional kinds of prison crisesand emergencies. Most prisons operate intwo well-defined modes: normal day-to-dayoperations and the crisis mode that goesinto effect in response to any major emer-gency. There is usually nothing in between.This situation is problematic in that, formost prisons, the time spent building up toor recovering from a major emergency isusually much longer than the time spentoperating under emergency conditions. Yetemergency operations are carefully speci-fied in detail, while the much more commonsituation of operating under very high ten-sion and at very high risk is handled on a“catch-as-catch-can” basis, without seri-ous planning or procedures. A well-thought-out alert system can fill this gap.

250


The range of options a prison must consider inresponse to a credible threat of terrorist attack isbroad. This brief summary of some of the moreobvious actions should illustrate that it is toolate to build that response after the threat isreceived.

Medical Services

Whether a terrorist attack at a prison involvesautomatic weapons, a bombing or explosion, orthe unleashing of chemical or biological agents,the potential for mass casualties is very high.Consequently, a medical services plan devel-oped as part of the prison’s overall emergency

preparedness procedures may beinsufficient to respond to a terroristincident. Medical services plans forprison emergencies are usuallygiven the same priority as emer-gency food services plans or emer-gency facilities and maintenanceplans. The medical services plandeveloped for response to terroristincidents must be far more detailedand must envision the possibility ofvery large numbers of dead and/orinjured, including both inmates andstaff.

The most obvious need will be for a large masscasualty center and an alternate location, shouldthe primary location be unavailable or disabledbecause of the nature of the incident itself.Large-scale triage operations will have a simi-larly high priority. The prison should scrutinizeits existing interagency agreements with com-munity hospitals and ambulance services, asthese agreements will likely need to be expanded.

Procedures for Responding to Alarms

Prisons should also examine their procedures forresponding to alarms and reported emergencies.Those that already use some form of first

responder system3 will have an advantage in thisregard. Any system that controls staff responseto an alarm should offer some level of protec-tion against a well-planned diversion designedto bring all available staff into one area of theprison so that they can be attacked or takenhostage or so that something else can happen atthe other side of the prison compound. However,when focusing on counterterrorism capabilities,prisons should carefully examine even a well-defined first responder system, particularly withregard to the training of the first respondersthemselves. In most prisons, how many initiallyresponding staff would recognize a potentialanthrax situation and know they should stop fur-ther response and attempt to isolate and seal offthe area? If onduty staff at a prison found peo-ple sick or dying and suspected chemical or bio-logical contaminants, would any of them knowhow to contact the nearest HAZMAT team?Does the prison have protective clothing or othersafety equipment available for first respondersand other prison staff if a biological or chemicalterrorist incident is suspected? If a potentialbomb was discovered in the prison, would staffknow not to move or handle it? Has the prisonconducted drills or simulations for responding toa biological attack? A discovered bomb? Arethere specific procedures that would help staff inthese kinds of emergencies?

“Defend-in-place” strategies—remaining in thefacility and coping with the crisis rather thanevacuating—also deserve attention. Many poten-tial terrorist scenarios could require a defend-in-place response. With the exception of institu-tions in areas at high risk for tornados, few pris-ons or jails place a premium on planning orpracticing defend-in-place strategies. However,

If onduty staff at a

prison found people

sick or dying and

suspected chemical or

biological contami-

nants, would any of

them know how to

contact the

nearest HAZMAT

team?

3 A first responder system is one in which specific staff are desig-nated as initial responders to an alarm, fight, or other such incidentand other staff are held in reserve as second responders. Firstresponder systems include a variety of methods other than the oldand traditional approach that calls for every available staff memberin the prison to drop everything and run to the incident as soon asan alarm goes off.


251

if a terrorist attack is sudden and produces deathand chaos, the nature of the attack may not beclear, nor may it be clear which direction repre-sents safety and which represents increaseddanger. When the risks to community safetyresulting from the unplanned movement of largenumbers of inmates are added to the equation, adefend-in-place response may be the only viablealternative. This rationale suggests that defend-in-place strategies may need considerably moreattention and practice than they have received todate in prisons.

Interagency Agreements

Interagency agreements with hospitals, ambu-lance services, fire departments, HAZMATteams, and other agencies are indispensable to aprison’s counterterrorism preparedness. For

most prisons, however, the most crucial inter-agency agreements in many types of terroristincidents will be those with law enforcement. Ifa prison has not yet found a need for detailedand comprehensive written interagency agree-ments with state and local law enforcementagencies, focusing on potential terrorist activ-ity should provide the necessary motivation.Jurisdictional issues must be carefully consid-ered and worked out in advance, rather thanargued about in the midst of the response to abombing. The use of prison staff outside theboundaries of the prison and the use of lawenforcement officers inside the prison should beconsidered with regard to questions such asarrest powers, authority for use of force, report-ing relationships, and extent of authority. Afterlaw enforcement, other very high-priority inter-agency agreements would include those withcounty and state emergency management agen-cies (many of which already include prisons intheir planning) and the National Guard.

Developing realistic and comprehensive inter-agency agreements is a substantial amount ofwork. However, the good news is the work is“front-end loaded.” That is, once the agreementsare fully developed, maintaining and updatingthose agreements are relatively easy. Both agen-cies should review the agreements annually forchanges or necessary additions.

Aftermath

A prison’s general emergency plan shouldinclude detailed policies, procedures, andresources for dealing with the aftermath of anincident. Most of these measures will be equallyeffective if the incident in question is a terroristact rather than, say, an inmate hostage taking.There are several key differences, however:

● In a terrorist incident, most of the investiga-tion and prosecution will be in the hands ofnational rather than state and local agencies.

Interagency AgreementsNecessary to PrisonCounterterrorism Planning

• Local and state law enforcement agencies

• County and state emergency management agencies

• Hospitals

• Local utility companies

• Ambulance services

• Fire departments

• Other correctional facilities or agencies

• HAZMAT teams

• FBI Correctional Terrorism Initiative

• American Red Cross

252


● The prison will have much less control thanit does after a “traditional” emergency. Forexample, even after the incident is over, agreat deal of information will likely remainhighly confidential and unavailable to thepublic and the media. This situation can cre-ate strong tensions between the media andthe prison and between the prison and itsown staff and inmates, even though the rulesare not of the prison’s making.

● Because the incident involves terrorism, itsnewsworthiness will likely be magnified toa degree that prison staff find almostunimaginable. The coverage of the eventwill be international and the scrutiny willlikely continue for months rather than hoursor days.

● The involvement of elected political figuresis likely to be national as well as local andstatewide.

These circumstances will strain the prison’sresources and its emotional stability at a timewhen it is fighting to return to normal opera-tions and can ill afford additional pressures,tensions, or other risk factors. A complete dis-cussion of deactivation and aftermath proce-dures is beyond the scope of this paper.However, for a prison attempting to recoverfrom a high-profile terrorist incident, thefollowing areas and functions will be critical:

● A sophisticated long-term public informa-tion operation.

Drills and Exercises

Without drills or exercises, counterterrorism measures will be largely useless, as is true for othertypes of emergency planning. The counterterrorism procedures discussed in this paper are not“one-time fixes” that can be written or planned and then ignored as if they had already beenaccomplished. Although staff must receive refresher training, testing the procedures and othermeasures that are developed is even more important. Part of the reason for testing is to help staffbecome comfortable and familiar with the new procedures and measures. The other primary pur-pose is to see whether these procedures and measures can be put into practice under realisticconditions and, to the extent possible, whether they are effective in accomplishing their objectives.Accomplishing these goals requires neither more nor less than the kinds of exercises, drills, andsimulations that should be second nature to emergency planners.

One warning must be added. It is easy to design a terrorism scenario or exercise that is over-whelming and frightening rather than challenging and realistic. Terrorism is inherently a dramaticand compelling topic for most people, especially correctional and law enforcement staff who arelikely to find themselves on the front lines in the event of a terrorist attack. However, the point ofexercises and drills is to test individual components of a counterterrorism system and build staffconfidence through success. A practice scenario that begins with a tactical nuclear weaponexploding in the main dining hall of a large prison is unlikely to test anything worthwhile or toadvance staff confidence.


253

● Ongoing emergency staff services (ESS).4

● Communication with staff and with theinmate population.

● Stepdown planning (returning prison opera-tions to normal).

● Critical incident review (an analysis of thenature of the incident and what was donecorrectly and incorrectly).

● Assessment and repair of facility damage.

ConclusionThis paper has presented recommendations forhow prisons can prepare to respond to terroristthreats and incidents. Almost every issue thathas been discussed is also an element of aprison’s general emergency planning, and aneffective emergency preparedness system mustbe the foundation of any prison’s counterterror-ism measures. It makes little sense for prisonswith almost nothing in the area of emergencypreparedness and those with emergency plansand procedures that are outdated and/or ineffec-tive to embark on a counterterrorism initiativethat will be demanding of time, money, effort,and other resources. The end result would be anarrowly designed system that is only prepared

to respond to terrorist activity, the probability ofwhich at any specific prison is extremely small.For U.S. prisons that have neglected emergencyplanning, the threat of terrorismshould serve as a wake-up call tobegin developing comprehensiveemergency preparedness systemsthat incorporate counterterroristplanning.

American correctional institutionsoffer major opportunities for assist-ing with national security effortsthat are underway, but much of thatwork remains to be done. Prisons,in particular, have the potential tofunction as an important and majorcomponent of the national counter-terrorism effort. The implicationsof this conclusion point in twoquite different directions. On the one hand, mostU.S. prisons are not well prepared for the threatof terrorist activity. The responsibility for cor-recting that situation rests with prison adminis-trators. On the other hand, our prisons, with afew minor exceptions, are not involved with orcontributing to our national counterterrorismstrategies. The potential to change this situationrests with high-ranking government officials andthose who formulate policy and strategy at anational level.

For U.S. prisons that

have neglected

emergency planning,

the threat of terrorism

should serve as a

wake-up call to begin

developing compre-

hensive emergency

preparedness systems

that incorporate

counterterrorist

planning.

4 Emergency staff services should include, but not necessarily belimited to, psychological screening, posttrauma counseling forstaff, assistance for staff families, and aid in filing for insuranceand other benefits.

Section 6Case Studies

Fire in a New Institution: Taney County, Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .257

Lucasville Prison Riot: Ohio Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .261

Helicopter Intrusion/Escape: Colorado Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . .271

Riot at Max: Montana State Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277

The 1993 Midwest Floods: Missouri Loses Renz Correctional Center . . . . . . . .289

The Morey Unit Hostage Incident: Arizona Department of Corrections . . . . . . .293

Hurricane Andrew: Florida Department of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .319

In This Section

257

Taney County, Missouri, is located in a rela-tively isolated area of the Ozark Mountains.Forsyth, the county seat, is a town of approxi-mately 1,200. The Taney County Jail in Forsythwas completed in 1982. It is designed to holdapproximately 32 prisoners, primarily in doublecells. The jail building also houses the CountySheriff’s Dispatch Center and all of the officesof the Sheriff’s Department.

The jail is constructed of steel and concrete andwas equipped with numerous fire extinguishersbut no self-contained breathing apparatus, firehoses, or sprinkler system. Located behind theadministrative areas and the dispatch room, thehousing areas are entered through a sliding steeldoor that then gives access to three separate sub-housing areas: the women’s unit, the men’s min-imum unit, and a high-security men’s unit. Eachof these areas is accessed by another sliding,electrically operated steel door. The cells are ofopen-front construction, with sliding barreddoors. All of the doors in the jail can be manual-ly operated with a key in the absence of electricpower, but there is no gang unlock and each celldoor must be individually keyed open.

At approximately 3:45 a.m. on September 14,1991, some of the minimum-custody prisonersin cells along the back wall of the jail becameaware of a fire just outside the jail walls and

visible through translucent windows in the hous-ing area. They began yelling and woke the trustyinmates housed in the cells closest to the doorsto the dispatch room, where the night staffmember is usually stationed. At night, the TaneyCounty Jail is staffed by one person, a dispatcher/jailer who runs the county dispatch center andalso handles duties inside the jail. Inmates wereunable to contact this staff member for a sub-stantial period of time. By the time contact wasmade, smoke was coming into the jail from theroof.

A wooden shedlike structure had been con-structed just outside the east wall of the jailbuilding to house a large emergency generatorfor use in the event of a main power failure. Theemergency generator was powered by propane,and a large propane tank was mounted outsidethe wooden shed approximately 1 to 2 feet fromthe shed’s northern wall. By state code, thepropane tank should have been at least 10 feetfrom any flammable structure. The shed housingthe emergency generator also housed two largebatteries and a battery charger, which was pow-ered with electric lines run from inside the jail.

Although a number of issues surrounding thisfire remain unclear or in dispute, a short circuitin the battery charger or its wires appears tohave produced the fire that involved the woodenshed. The roof of the jail is constructed of pre-stressed concrete, but above that a wooden sof-fit, or eaves, and a false roof had beenconstructed in apparent violation of state codes.

Fire in a New Institution: Taney County, Missouri


258


The fire in the shed spread to the wooden struc-ture above the concrete roof of the jail, and thiswooden roofing apparently produced most ofthe smoke that entered the jail. At some pointearly in this series of events, the shed fireburned the wiring on both the emergency gener-ator and the main power lines, and the jail lostall power.

When the dispatcher/jailer responded to theouter door of the jail housing areas, he had animmediate problem. If that door, the innerdoors, and the cell doors were opened to evacu-ate the inmates, they would be in a corridorleading to an unsecured outside door to the jailand might escape. At some point after the powerwas lost, the dispatcher/jailer tried to manuallykey the main housing area door, but was unableto operate it.

Conditions within the cell areas becameextremely bad. Thick smoke was reaching all ofthe cell areas. The built-in smoke ejector systemdid not work because it was dependent onpower. Although timelines are not clear, recon-struction of events suggested that it may havebeen more than 30 minutes after the dispatcher/jailer was alerted before help arrived. Two orthree jail staff, including the head jailer, and firedepartment assistance all arrived in close prox-imity to each other. After the head jailer triedunsuccessfully to operate the main housing area door manually, a firefighter wearing self-contained breathing apparatus was finally ableto open the door. The doors of the units also hadto be opened manually, and then cell doors hadto be opened individually. The jail staff and fire-fighters were able to enter the women’s area andthe minimum-security men’s area and open celldoors. The maximum-security unit door couldnot be operated manually and eventually wasopened with an acetylene torch, causing evenlengthier delays in reaching the cells there.

Three male inmates and one female inmate diedof smoke inhalation. Another female inmate suf-fered very serious permanent lung damage andwill require oxygen assistance for the rest of herlife. The other 21 inmates housed in the jail suf-fered smoke-related injuries described as mild tomedium. No serious injuries occurred to jailstaff or firefighters.

The time at which the power and emergencypower were lost has never been established withany degree of precision. There were allegationsthat the dispatcher/jailer had a window ofopportunity after he had become aware of thefire, and before the power was lost, duringwhich he could have operated all of the doorselectrically and evacuated all of the inmates, andthat he had failed to do so out of fear aboutescapes or simply because he did not know anevacuation procedure. It was also suggested thatthe power went out almost immediately afterthe fire was first noticed and well before thedispatcher/jailer was even notified.

The jail had not conducted fire drills or any sortof practice evacuations. State code required anannual fire safety inspection of the jail, with awritten report of the results of the inspections.No such inspections had been conducted and thefire marshal did not have jurisdiction over thejail. The smoke detectors installed in the jail didnot have battery backup and were ineffective.

No comprehensive analysis of what happened,and why, was attempted in the aftermath of thefire. With the exception of a short investigationreport by the Division of Fire Safety of the StateDepartment of Public Safety (consisting primar-ily of a description of what was found burned,partially burned, and intact), most of the avail-able documentary information on the fire isfound in deposition testimony resulting from alarge number of lawsuits filed by survivinginmates and families of the deceased inmates.

Section 6. Case Studies: Fire in a New Institution

259

The lengthiest of the civil cases was concludedin 1995. Taney County was insured, and thecarrier settled relatively quickly at policy limits.Out-of-court settlements were also reached withthe company that manufactured the securitydoors and the company that installed the pro-pane tank that fed the emergency generator.

When the jail was repaired, the eaves and falseroof were redesigned using nonflammable mate-rials. The dispatcher/jailer who had been onduty had a severe posttraumatic stress reactionto the incident and eventually resigned from theSheriff’s Department.

Lessons Learned1. No building is fireproof.

2. Even in a modern facility constructed ofsteel and concrete, many items are capableof producing life-threatening smoke, includ-ing mattresses, inmates’ personal property,carpeting, wall paint, cleaning supplies, andinsulation.

3. Unless procedures are tested with fire drillsthat include full-scale evacuation, someproblems may not be identified until theyoccur during a real fire, perhaps with disas-trous consequences.

4. Local fire departments should participate insimulated fire emergencies with local cor-rectional institutions.

5. Every correctional institution should haveself-contained breathing apparatuses andstaff trained to use them properly. The pri-mary purpose of this equipment is not firesuppression but search and rescue.

6. Fire exit signs and smoke and fire detectorsshould always have battery backup systems.

7. Inmate housing areas that are isolated fromstaff during some portions of the day musthave a method or mechanism for alertingstaff to an emergency.

8. Where possible, emergency generatorsshould not be in the same location as themain power for the institution.

9. Every correctional institution should under-go a thorough fire inspection at least annu-ally, conducted by someone not on theinstitution’s staff.

10. A comprehensive critical incident reviewshould be required after every seriousemergency situation to ensure that problemsencountered do not reoccur and to avoidother problems.

261

On April 11, 1993, Easter Sunday, the SouthernOhio Correctional Facility (SOCF) in Lucas-ville, Ohio, experienced the start of what hasbecome the longest prison riot in the past fourdecades and the third most lethal disorder inrecent penal history.1 When the riot ended11 days later, a correctional officer and nineinmates had been murdered. Nearly 2,000 lawenforcement officers and National Guard troopswere involved in responding to the riot over its11-day course. In bringing the riot to a close,state negotiators accepted a 21-point list ofgrievances with the promise to review them forpossible improvements to the besiegedLucasville prison.

At the time the riot began, SOCF held 1,822inmates, 44 percent of whom were double celledbecause the prison was operating over capacity.As the state’s only maximum-security prison,SOCF held the most violent and predatoryinmates in a system with a total population ofapproximately 40,000.

In the months preceding the riot, the Ohioprison system had discovered a few active casesof tuberculosis (TB) among the prison popula-tion and decided to administer the tuberculinskin test to the entire prison population. AllOhio prisons but SOCF completed the TB test-ing without major problems. At SOCF, theMuslim inmates informed the warden that their

religion prohibited skin testing and that theywould not participate or comply. The wardenmet with an inmate leader and a Muslim imamand told them that they would have no choiceand that it would be “my way or the highway.”(The warden later candidly acknowledged thathis approach was unnecessarily confrontationaland a mistake.)

The SOCF command staff met on a Thursdayand decided they would lock down the prisonbeginning the following Monday morning anddo the skin testing by force if necessary. Thenext day, Friday, memos about the lockdownwere drafted and requisitions for extra supplieswere prepared, most of which were typed byinmate clerks. The inmate population knew thatthe lockdown would begin Monday morning,and they used Saturday to plan a disturbancethat would start on Sunday.

On the afternoon of Sunday, April 11, 1993, twocorrectional officers and a recreation officerwere in the L-block corridor as more than 100inmates from L–6 returned from the recreationfield. Another 180 inmates from L–2 and L–7and 60 inmates released on passes were alsopreparing to enter L-corridor from the yard. Anadditional 100 or so inmates from K–6 werealso on the recreation yard at this time. A totalof 76 security posts, including towers and con-trol centers, were scheduled during the secondshift on any day at SOCF; 68 of these postswere staffed on Easter Sunday.

Lucasville Prison Riot: OhioDepartment of Corrections


1 Only the prison riots in Santa Fe, NM, and Attica, NY, causedmore casualties.

262


At approximately 3 p.m., as L–6 inmatesentered L-corridor from the yard, a group ofthem launched an assault on an officer, quicklyovercoming him by shear force of numbers. Asother inmates filed in from the yard, they joinedthe melee, assaulting other staff in the area.Inmates outnumbered staff so greatly that thestaff’s initial security and control objectiveswere soon replaced by the need to survive andto keep the uprising from spreading to otherparts of the institution.

The riot was now under way. Within 15 minutesof the initial attack, the inmates gained controlof L-corridor and the keys that opened all thedoors to all of the blocks within L-corridor.They also took hostages and neutralized theremaining staff inside the block by capturingthem or forcing them out of the area.

Chronology of Events

Day 1: Sunday, April 11, 1993

12 noon. Recreation period begins. In-mates from L–2, L–6, L–7, and K–6—approximately 400 inmates—are allowed toenter the yard. Approximately 60 additionalinmates are also given passes for the yard.

2:50 p.m. An announcement to “close” the yardis broadcast over the public address (PA)system.

2:55 p.m. The PA announcement to clear theyard is repeated.

3 p.m. Inmates from L–6 (maximum security,level 4) begin to enter L-corridor.

3:03 p.m. Several inmates attack the corridorofficer and gain possession of the keys thatopen the doors to all of the blocks on L-corridor.

The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility hadbeen a troubled prison since it opened.Lucasville is located in the most isolated,rural, and poorest part of southern Ohio, aregion that has more in common with theAppalachian area of Kentucky across theOhio river than with the northern tier ofindustrialized cities in Ohio such asCleveland, Akron, Toledo, and Canton. Themix of relatively unsophisticated rural whitestaff and streetwise, urban black inmateswas problematic from the beginning. Racerelations at the prison were bad, and theprison had experienced more than 20 homi-cides in its relatively short history beforethe Easter Sunday riot began. In mostcases, the inmates serving the longestterms in the Ohio prison system were geo-graphically the most distanced from theirfamilies, making visiting difficult and infre-quent. Because of an antiquated phoneswitch, inmates had extremely limitedaccess to pay phones. Moreover, althoughthe prison held the most serious of thestate’s 40,000 inmates, it was run not like amaximum-security institution, but more likea relatively open medium-security prison.The new warden had changed some of thatbut had lost support among staff and in thelocal community by proving to be seriousand professional on issues such as use offorce.

Section 6. Case Studies: Lucasville Prison Riot

263

3:04 p.m. Inmates attack four officers nearlysimultaneously. One officer calls controlcenter 1 and reports “a fight in L-corridor.”

3:05 p.m. Control center 1 radios all units “Wehave a fight in L-corridor.”

3:06 p.m. The shift commander responds to thecall and is immediately attacked upon enter-ing L-corridor. An additional lieutenant alsoresponds and is attacked.

In leaving to respond to the call, the sergeantfrom J-block encounters inmates beating anofficer with a side-handled baton (PR–24)and broom handle near L–6.

Control center 1 radios a report that twoman-down alarms have gone off in L-block.

3:07 p.m. Both lieutenants and the sergeantfight their way through L-corridor.

Control center 1 receives a call that an offi-cer needs help in L-block.

A recreation officer in K-block calls forstretchers after seeing injured officers cross-ing the yard from L-block to K-block.

3:08 p.m. Control center 1 calls the Ohio StateHighway Patrol for assistance.

3:12 p.m. The two lieutenants and the sergeantsucceed in fighting their way to the lowercrash gate in L-corridor. They order controlcenter 3 to close the crash gate.

3:15 p.m. A lieutenant radios control center 1,advising them that “the inmates have takenL-side.” Inmates are heard chanting “Wehave the keys.”

3:05–3:15 p.m. Efforts to call key staff on beep-ers are hampered because the staff membermaking the calls does not realize that atouch-tone line is required to activate beep-ers and is using a rotary phone line.

Some L-block officers run to the rear stair-well of L–5 as they have been trained to do.One officer is attacked in L–6 but managesto fight his way past the crash gate justbefore it is closed. Another officer is takenhostage when he enters L-corridor.

3:15–4:15 p.m. Tower guards are instructed tobreak the seals on their guns. Correctional

When the shift commander (a lieutenant)and the only other lieutenant in the institu-tion both responded to the fight in progressalong with a sergeant and all three wereengaged in hand-to-hand combat andinjured, the control center and the institu-tion were left with no one at the helm. Acorrectional officer might have “stepped upto the plate” to take charge and organizethe response to the expanding emergency,but no one did. In the first 20 to 40 minutesof the disturbance—the traditional windowthat determines how much of an institutionis lost and how many inmates becomeinvolved—SOCF was operating with no onein charge. When the shift commander final-ly did fight his way out of the cell blocksand get back to the control center, he wasbadly beaten, had broken bones, and wasin no condition to exercise commandauthority. Other reports from the institutionindicate that the first high-ranking adminis-trator to get to the institution in response tocallbacks ended up in a tower, divorcedfrom the action, and exercised no directionor command.

264


officers with shotguns take position at con-trol center 3 to prevent L-block inmates fromadvancing further.

One officer calls for help from the L–5 rearstairwell where he and another officer havetaken refuge. He makes contact with controlcenter 1 on four occasions. No one is sent torescue the officers.

The chaplain arrives at control center 1 andoffers his assistance. The officer from theL–5 stairwell calls control center 1 a fifthtime. A different person takes the call andimmediately takes an armed team to attempta rescue through the exterior L–5 door.

Using a weight-lifting bar taken from thegym, inmates break through the unreinforcedconcrete block of the L–5 rear stairwell, cap-turing the two officers just as the rescueteam arrives at the exterior door—1 hourafter the first call for help.

Inmates break through the rear L–2 stairwellwall, capturing another officer and an

inmate. The inmate is savagely assaultedand murdered in front of the officer. (Theinmate’s body is dumped in the yard the fol-lowing day. An autopsy reveals 163 stabwounds and major skull fractures.)

Another officer calls the control center fromthe rear L–4 stairwell seeking assistance forhimself and a second officer. No one answersthe phone. He tries to call for help a secondtime. Someone answers the phone, thenhangs up. By now, inmates have smashed thewindow out of the stairwell door and arespraying the two officers with a fire extin-guisher. The inmates manage to smashthrough the concrete block wall and take theofficers hostage, beating them severely in theprocess.

Inmates erect a barricade against the lowercrash gate in L-corridor to prevent or delayan assault from the control center 3 area.

Officers lock down K-block inmates wherev-er they are—in their cells, the shower, or thedayroom—to permit additional staff to

The housing units at SOCF are two stories high with solid ceilings between the two floors ratherthan open tiers. The front of each cell block opens onto a main housing corridor. At the rear ofeach housing block is a two-story stairwell with steel security doors on each of the two floors.Officers carry keys to those doors and are trained from the time they begin working at SOCF toretreat to the stairwell if they are in trouble on the housing block and cannot get to the main corri-dor. Once locked in the stairwell, the officer can use the phone there to call the control center,which, in theory, would then dispatch a group of staff to rescue the officer. The rescue staff wouldenter the stairwell via an additional security door from the yard to the first floor of the stairwell.Block officers do not carry keys to that door because doing so would breach the security envelope.

A number of officers used the stairwells exactly as they had been trained to do. However, althoughsome officers called the control center many times over more than an hour, no staff were dis-patched to rescue them. All of the officers in the stairwell were eventually beaten and/or takenhostage by inmates after the inmates broke through the unreinforced ceramic concrete blockconstruction of the walls surrounding the stairwell security doors.


265

respond to the crisis and reduce the chancesfor spread of the riot.

Later, tactical response and disturbance con-trol teams are deployed to K-block to placeall prisoners back in their cells.

4 p.m. The prison duty officer, a unit manager,arrives at the institution. L-block inmatescross the yard and scale a fence, gainingaccess to the exterior of K-block. Inmates inthe yard smash a window in K-block andobtain food and blankets from K-blockinmates.

As inmates advance across the yard to K-block, armed officers in the towers and in K-block are instructed by the control centernot to fire.

4:15–5:15 p.m. The inmates have taken a totalof 11 officers hostage. They assess hostageinjuries, determine that one officer is serious-ly injured, and, fearing his death, makearrangements with prison staff to place himin the L–8 stairwell for rescue by an armedteam. The rescue is carried out.

Inmates secure copies of the prison’s negoti-ation and disturbance control manuals from aunit manager’s office.

The SOCF negotiation team is assembled tonegotiate with the inmates, who are nowfirmly in control of L-complex.

5 p.m. The SOCF disturbance control team isassembled (one member is a hostage).

5:15 p.m. The major makes calls to all L-blockrear stairwells but receives no answer.

5:45 p.m. The SOCF tactical response team isassembled.

7:30 p.m. K-block officers use belly chains tosecure doors in the M–1 gym becauseinmates now have M–2 keys, which alsoopen M–1 doors.

9:16 p.m. Inmates release one correctional offi-cer due to the seriousness of the injuries hesustained in the takeover. The officer is lifeflighted to Grant Hospital in Columbus,Ohio.

10:36 p.m. Inmates release another correctionalofficer who has serious head injuries, and theofficer is transported to the hospital.

11:02 p.m. The bodies of five slain inmates areplaced in the yard and retrieved a short timelater by prison officials.

11:22 p.m. Another seriously injured correction-al officer is released and taken to the hospi-tal. The inmates have now released four ofthe hostages.

Day 2: Monday, April 12, 1993

1:45 a.m. The last of the inmates roaming in theyard are cleared and placed in K-block,which now has as many as 10 inmates to acell.

After the riot, serious controversy aroseabout whether the warden had been calledand when. Control center staff said thatthey made several attempts to reach thewarden by telephone at home and by pager.The warden testified that he had beenavailable by phone and pager and that noone had tried to contact him until hoursafter the riot had begun. In the final analy-sis, the warden did not arrive at SOCF untilapproximately 4 hours after the riot hadstarted.

266


10:15 a.m. A reporter from the Cleveland PlainDealer is selected by lot to act as an inter-mediary in inmate negotiations. Prison offi-cials cut off his telephone conversation withan inmate spokesperson when the inmatesfail to confirm that all hostages are safe.

10:35 a.m. The body of another inmate is putout in the prison yard and retrieved.

Day 3: Tuesday, April 13, 1993

10 a.m. Prison staff discover the body of aninmate in a K-block cell. (Later accountssuggest that this inmate was murdered byother inmates because his nephew gaveassistance to a correctional officer during theriot.)

4 p.m. A disturbance erupts in K–8, the closestK-block wing to L-complex, as inmates inL–1 shout encouragement to the K–8inmates to join the riot. Prison staff dis-charge tear gas to quell the disturbance andbegin to transport inmates from K-block toother institutions.

Day 4: Wednesday, April 14, 1993

3:50 a.m. A police helicopter crashes whilepatrolling the prison complex. Three personssuffer minor injuries.

9 a.m. Inmates hang a sheet from L-block win-dows displaying the message that they willkill a hostage if their demands are not met.Inmate demands include single cells, moreeducational opportunities, and additionalvisitation periods.

12 noon. The Governor of Ohio calls up theOhio National Guard to provide perimetersecurity at SOCF.

5 p.m. Prison authorities provide food to theinmates in L-block in exchange for assur-ances that two hostages will be given pre-scription drugs they take for preexistingmedical conditions.

Day 5: Thursday, April 15, 1993

12:20 p.m. Inmates throw the body ofCorrectional Officer Robert Vallandinghamout of L-block. Officer Vallandingham’s

Media representatives using telephoto lenses and binoculars could read the demands and threatsthat inmates had painted on sheets and hung out the prison windows. Prison officials were com-municating intermittently with media representatives in a briefing area. When the media asked adeputy public information officer about the time ultimatums and the threat to kill a hostage, sheresponded that the inmates had been making such threats and ultimatums since the beginning ofthe disturbance and that there was no reason to think these were more serious than the earlierdeadlines and threats. Her statements were broadcast and heard in the cell blocks, where inmateswere monitoring media coverage on televisions and radios. Shortly thereafter, inmates took OfficerVallandingham, a young officer very popular with both inmates and staff, from his cell and executedhim in cold blood. They then threw his body out to prison staff. Most staff and many other observersbelieve this execution was the direct result of the blatant mistake in dealing with the media. Itshould be emphasized that the deputy public information officer had no training in media relationsduring a crisis and that the department had neither policy nor procedure for such situations.


267

body is recovered and removed from theprison grounds.

8:20 p.m. In return for being allowed to make alive radio broadcast—their second of theday—inmates release a hostage.

Day 6: Friday, April 16, 1993

2:15 p.m. In return for a live television broad-cast, inmates release another hostage. Duringthe television broadcast, a Muslim inmate

repeats the inmates’ demand for eliminationof forced racial integration of cells at SOCF.

Day 7: Saturday, April 17, 1993

10:40 a.m. In response to inmate demands,prison officials summon another televisioncrew for a live broadcast, but negotiationsfall through. Prison officials provide inmateswith additional food and water, along withmedicine for the hostages.

3:40 p.m. Bulldozers are moved to the prisonperimeter, ostensibly to collapse any tunnelsbeing dug by inmates.

Day 8: Sunday, April 18, 1993

Prison officials invite Cleveland lawyer Niki Z.Schwartz (no relation to one of the authors ofthis guide), who has previously representedinmates in lawsuits against the prison system, toSOCF to aid in negotiations with the inmates.

Prison authorities play an audiotape containingmessages from the five remaining hostages forthe hostage families.

Day 9: Monday, April 19, 1993

3:50 p.m. Inmates hang another sheet from L-block windows with a message saying,“State lying to you. We’re willing to end thisordeal and want to meet face to face with ourattorney.”

Attorney Schwartz continues to consult withinmates through prison negotiators.

9 p.m. Throughout the night, in a scenario remi-niscent of the Branch Davidian complex situ-ation in Waco, Texas, prison authoritiesbroadcast taped messages to the inmates inL-complex over loudspeakers, advising themof the warden’s agreement to their demands.

More than half the prison population atSOCF was locked down and was notinvolved in the insurrection. However, staffthroughout the prison were extremely emo-tional and angry and treated the uninvolvedinmates so badly that new rioting threat-ened to break out in uninvolved portions ofthe prison on at least two occasions. Inresponse to a request from the State ofOhio, NIC sent a top administrator fromanother state to SOCF as an advisor. Thisconsultant, who had considerable experi-ence with prison crises and riots, ended uphelping to manage the unaffected areas ofthe prison. In attempting to prevent retalia-tion against inmates who were not involvedin the rioting, the consultant had an intenseconfrontation with one of the prison’s topmanagers. Prison staff continued to mal-treat the uninvolved inmates even after theriot ended on day 11. The prison remainedon the verge of additional violence for sev-eral weeks, with the threat coming frominmates who had not been involved in theriot itself.

268


Day 10: Tuesday, April 20, 1993

12 noon–3 p.m. Three inmates and AttorneySchwartz meet with members of the prisonnegotiating team at a table set up in theprison yard.

7:45 p.m. Attorney Schwartz advises reportersthat an agreement is close at hand.

Day 11: Wednesday, April 21, 1993

2:50 p.m. Warden Tate and Attorney Schwartzannounce that an agreement has beenreached, ending the siege.

3:30–10:40 p.m. Inmates begin leaving L-complex through the M–2 gym door andare escorted to K-block for processing bymembers of the Ohio State Highway Patrol.

Two additional inmates are murdered in L-complex by other inmates.

10:40 p.m. As the last of the inmates clear L-block, the remaining hostages walk outto their freedom.

Lessons Learned1. Emergency plans and procedures must be

realistic, practical, and well known to staff.The emergency plans at SOCF met none ofthese criteria. They were out of date, contra-dictory in places, and generally inadequatefor dealing with a major emergency. How-ever, the quality of the emergency plansturned out to be irrelevant because staff hadnot been trained in them and did not knowthem. Inevitably, staff found themselves try-ing to invent emergency response proce-dures and strategies in the midst of thecrisis.

2. Without effective leadership, other aspectsof emergency preparation may not matter. Inthis riot, some staff were taken hostage

and/or beaten simply because no one wouldtake command and act decisively. Hourslater, when the warden arrived and exertedstrong leadership, the nature of the situationbegan to change in favor of staff, although itwas too late to undo much of what hadalready occurred.

3. Professionalism must be established fromday to day, long before a crisis occurs.Professionalism cannot be developed in themiddle of an emergency. At SOCF, retalia-tion against inmates made a tragic situationworse and actually increased the risksinvolved in the emergency operation itself.

4. Leadership can be extraordinarily painfuland emotional. Officer Vallandingham’sbody was waiting for the coroner in a corri-dor when an oncoming shift of officersarrived and entered the institution throughthe same corridor. That group of staff thenhappened to encounter the warden, who wasaway from his office. The officers pleadedwith the warden to authorize an assault andto end the situation at any cost. The wardenknew that this decision would be popularregardless of the outcome. He also knewthat the remaining hostages were being heldin three separate groups by three differentinmate factions and that at least two of thegroups of hostages were being moved peri-odically to keep their location unknown.Ordering an assault would have been tanta-mount to a death warrant for the remaininghostages, and the warden would not do it.Several days later, the remaining hostageswere released without further physical harm.Neither the strength the warden’s decisionrequired nor the toll it took on him can beoverestimated.

5. Although negotiations did lead to a nonvio-lent surrender and the release of the remain-ing hostages, the negotiation process andthe negotiators themselves were highly


269

unpopular with staff. In fact, the negotiatorshad to be escorted out of the institutionunder armed guard because of the staff’sreaction. Correctional staff need to under-stand the role and mission of negotiatorslong before an incident occurs.

6. If staff do not quickly recognize the severityof an emergency and immediately start toisolate and contain it, the emergency canescalate very quickly. Interviews of the riot-ers indicated, as has been true in some othermajor insurrections, that they did not expectthe riot to be as “successful” as it was or tolast as long as it did. The inmates neverthought they could successfully take overthe entire cell block.

7. Officers in the housing units were allowedto carry keys that opened several differentdoors in their housing units and some doorsin other areas of the institution. This prac-tice violated the security concept of theprison design and posed a serious securityrisk.

8. Under the policy at the time, the shift com-mander did not have the authority to orderan armed assault. Such orders required theapproval of a duty officer, who at the timewas a unit manager. The duty officer wasnot at the institution when the riot started.Any thoughtful review would have revealedthe existing policy to be deeply flawed.

9. Emergency preparedness training for allstaff is important and necessary. At the timeof the riot, preservice training for SOCFstaff included 1 hour of critical incidenttraining, in which staff were advised onmethods of handling fight situations, med-ical emergencies, and disturbed inmates, and1 hour of hostage situation training that con-sisted of advice on “how to be a goodhostage.” The tactical team received an ini-tial 24 hours of training from senior staff,but after that, most training was conducted

on their own time and there was no clear-cutpolicy on purchasing of equipment andclothing.

10. Use-of-force policies must be well thoughtout, written, and disseminated to all staffand should be given considerable emphasisduring preservice training. Although towerofficers in the early stages of the riot wereinstructed to break their gun seals, SOCFhad no clear policy or direction regardingthe use of tower weapons. One tower officerwas reported to have stopped L-blockinmates who were approaching K-block bythreatening to shoot, but it was not clear thatany of the tower officers knew whether orunder what circumstances to shoot, otherthan in the case of a direct order or to pre-vent inmates from breaching the perimeterfence.

11. Contrary to popular correctional thinking,rival gangs worked together in this riot tomanage negotiations, hostages, and L-block.For the 11 days of the crisis, the SunniMuslims, Arian Brotherhood, and BlackGangster Disciples managed L-block in away similar to the way in which the prisonnormally was managed. They divided intoareas, had intermediaries, assigned guardduties, locked up their worst offenders, andeven traded the hostages back and forth,based on which group would do the best jobin guarding them. They operated an infir-mary and did a reasonably fair job of sutur-ing some inmate wounds.

12. Inmate work assignments must be reviewedwith regard to access to confidential infor-mation. Inmate workers at SOCF had jobsthat allowed them to read or hear sensitiveinformation concerning prison operationsand policies. Inmates worked in the cap-tain’s office, where they had access to staffrecords, and in unit offices, where they hadaccess to telephones, sensitive information

270


regarding other inmates, and institutionaldocuments like the disturbance controlmanual.

13. It is generally accepted that staff who treatinmates badly may be targeted in a riot.Officer Vallandingham, the officer killedduring the siege, was not among those hatedby the inmates. By all accounts, he wasquite well liked. The Ohio State HighwayPatrol could not identify any personalvendetta against Officer Vallandinghamto justify his being targeted for death.

14. Media relations are a crucial, even life-and-death, part of emergency operations.Preparation for media relations during anemergency should be serious and extensive,and the procedures developed should becarefully distinguished from day-to-daymedia relations. During the SOCF incident,several problems arose with the media inaddition to the tragic mistake that led to themurder of Officer Vallandingham. At thestart of the riot, a helicopter from a TV

station flew so close to the prison that nego-tiators could not make out the demandsinmates were yelling over a bull horn. Onanother occasion, a helicopter from anotherTV station went aloft to televise a live shotof SWAT units crawling over cell blockroofs preparing to take up positions shouldthe order come for an assault.

15. The aftermath of an emergency can be thelongest and most difficult part of respondingto an emergency. Just the prosecution of theinmates involved in the Lucasville riot wasoverwhelming. Investigators gathered morethan 4,000 pieces of evidence, 7,000 photos,more than 120 videos, and countless hoursof audiotape and conducted more than 1,200interviews. Eventually, the state successfullyprosecuted 48 of the 50 cases presented incourt.

16. Normality may not return for years.Investigations were still continuing 3 yearsafter the riot.

271

On Friday morning, August 18, 1989, at about9:15 a.m., a helicopter entered the main com-pound of the Arkansas Valley CorrectionalFacility (AVCF) near Ordway, Colorado, andlanded on the ballfield of the prison’s mainrecreation yard. Within seconds, two inmatesentered the helicopter and it rose, turned, andflew out of sight. At approximately 6 p.m. thatday, the two escapees and their two femaleaccomplices were located driving in a rentaltruck toward Holdredge, Nebraska. A shootoutwith police ensued, after which both inmatesand both women were taken into custody inHoldredge.

The AVCF is a modern, medium-security stateprison that opened in 1987. At the time of theescape, AVCF staff had become used to seeinghelicopters from two television station newsoperations flying near the facility, and both ofthose helicopters were similar in appearance tothe jet helicopter that made the intrusion onAugust 18.

The helicopter appeared to have circled thefacility prior to crossing the perimeter and enter-ing the compound. Officers on the perimeterreported the helicopter as it crossed the perime-ter of the facility but not before that. At the timethe helicopter entered the compound, there were15 to 20 inmates on the main recreation yardand five staff members outside the buildings

supervising inmates. When the helicopter landedon the ballfield, two inmates immediatelyentered the helicopter and two staff membersran toward it, getting quite close before it tookoff. The staff members who approached the heli-copter were able to give descriptions of the malepilot and two female passengers.

The prison superintendent was in his officeoverlooking the recreation yard when the initialradio report indicated the helicopter entry to thefacility. The superintendent gave immediateorders that if the helicopter lifted off, theperimeter officers were to stop or disable it withlethal force. He repeated this order two moretimes during the next minute, but no shots werefired. No armed posts at AVCF have sightlinesor fields of fire to the ballfield. Given the heli-copter’s path of ascent and departure from thearea, one of the two towers at best had a partial-ly obstructed view. The position of the armedperimeter vehicle was also such that it was notable to fire at the helicopter, in part because ofobstruction from the fence fabric. The othertower officer should have had a clear view ofthe helicopter once it rose over the ballfield andshould have been able to fire several shots butdid not. He was suspended pending investigationand subsequently discharged.

Staff estimates of the total time the helicoptertook from initially crossing the perimeter ofthe facility to taking off from the ballfield andbeginning to leave the institution ranged from 15to 30 seconds. Estimates placed the helicopter’s

Helicopter Intrusion/Escape:Colorado Department of Corrections


272


speed when taking off from the ballfield andclimbing at 40 to 50 miles per hour, acceleratingto 90 to 100 miles per hour as it turned to leavethe compound. Staff witnesses reported that itwas also clear that the two inmates were waitingfor the helicopter when it arrived, perhaps with-in 10 feet of the spot where it touched down.There were reports that the inmates wore dis-tinctive bright clothing that could serve as a sig-nal or beacon for the helicopter.

The facility called an emergency count within5 minutes of the escape, at 9:20 a.m. The emer-gency count was completed at 9:32 a.m., and theidentities of the two escapees were confirmed.Department headquarters and the Colorado StatePatrol were both notified of the escape atapproximately 9:30 a.m. The prison remainedlocked down (except for inmate kitchen help)until lunch hour. The incident was entered intothe National Crime Information Center (NCIC)system and state warrants were issued quickly.“Wanted” fliers with pictures were alsodisseminated.

The facility duty officer left the facility to par-ticipate in the search, although the facility’s pro-cedures in the event of an escape call for theduty officer to remain at the prison and com-plete a specific checklist of responsibilities.Most of these responsibilities were handled bythe shift commander. Both prison investigatorsalso left the facility to participate in the search,hampering the development of intelligenceabout the escapees. For example, the escapees’cell was secured immediately after the emer-gency count, but the cell was not searched untilthe investigators returned.

The search itself quickly became problematic.AVCF procedures called for the use of struc-tured search teams for any escape. In thisinstance, the structured search teams were notused, perhaps because of the unusual nature ofthe escape. Six vehicles and 14 staff left the

institution on the search, and only half of thosestaff were designated search team members. Theprimary search commander and all three desig-nated relief commanders joined this initialsearch. If the search had continued hours longer,no relief commander would have been available.Once the search vehicles were more than 30miles north of Ordway, they lost all radio com-munication with the facility control center. Car-to-car communication was also difficult toimpossible. Outside law enforcement agencieswere able to provide some information to theinstitution about the status of the search vehi-cles, but the search commander had no informa-tion about vehicle positions or directions. Twosearch vehicles were participating without theknowledge of the search commander.

The AVCF armory officer was not in the facilityat the time of the escape, so the shift command-er assigned an alternate. It was subsequently dis-covered that several weapons had been takenfrom the armory without an armory officerpresent for proper weapons assignment anddocumentation.

Within 45 minutes of the escape, the facility dis-cussed the situation with the Air National Guardcommander, who immediately made helicoptertraining flights available to help with the search.The airborne surveillance from the Air NationalGuard and the Colorado State Patrol was extreme-ly helpful with the search effort and with thecoordination of communications.

At 9:46 that morning (31 minutes after theescape), a small local airport aviation companyreported that a blue and white helicopter withtwo women and a male pilot aboard had landedat 8:40 a.m. and refueled. At 10:09 a.m., a coun-ty sheriff’s office radioed that the helicopter wasspotted on the ground some 35 miles north ofthe prison and that suspects had been seen run-ning to a yellow rental truck. A press releasewas authorized at 10:24 a.m. At 10:40 a.m., the

Section 6. Case Studies: Helicopter Intrusion/Escape

273

helicopter and pilot were located near an aban-doned farmhouse. A National Guard helicopterwas dispatched and, 10 minutes later, the prisonreceived information that the pilot had been tiedup but was unharmed and that the two womenand two inmates were armed. The prison deter-mined that an older Volkswagen was registeredto one of the inmates’ wives, and at 11:40 a.m.,the superintendent issued an all points bulletinfor this car and its license plate. Prison officialsspeculated that the Volkswagen might be insidethe rental van.

By midafternoon, the escape response at theprison was focusing on the planning of theescape and attempting to confirm the identitiesof the two women involved. At 2:30 p.m., thesuperintendent interviewed the two officers whohad gotten within a few feet of the helicopterbefore it lifted off. One of them confirmed theidentity of one of the female passengers as thewife of one of the two inmates. He recognizedher from her visits to the prison.

As is often the case in such situations, therewere a number of rumors, false starts, and mis-understandings. The sheriff of Arapahoe County,Colorado, had suggested at 10:30 a.m. that afemale former deputy sheriff who had been firedfrom Arapahoe County for becoming involvedwith a jail inmate there might have beeninvolved in the escape. The intelligence opera-tion had been focusing on whether this formerdeputy sheriff might be the wife of one of thetwo inmates or might be involved in the escapeusing an alias. At 4:30 p.m. the sheriff’s officeadvised the prison that the female ex-deputysheriff and her attorney had appeared there toverify she was not involved in the escape.

When the police found the helicopter pilot, hewas untied and claimed he had been able to cutthe ropes using a pocket knife. The police ini-tially were very skeptical. They reported to theprison that the pilot was likely a collaborator in

the escape, and brought him to the jail as a sus-pect. It was not until mid- to late afternoon thatit became clear that the pilot was an innocentvictim.

By late afternoon, information about the charter-ing of the helicopter had become more clear.The helicopter had been chartered out of theCentennial Airport, but the two women whochartered it were actually picked up at the near-by La Junta Airport. They got on the helicoptercarrying large bags and presumably tookweapons from the bags once the helicopter wasin flight. Because Centennial and La Junta arenot commercial airports, no metal detectors orother commercial aviation security precautionsare in place. It was also learned that the charteroriginally had been arranged for 2 days earlierbut had been canceled by the helicopter compa-ny because of bad weather. The charter compa-ny operator remembered that one of the womenhad become irate when the earlier charter wascanceled and that both were upset when theFriday morning charter was running 10 to 15minutes late.

At 6:15 p.m., one of the department administra-tors was advised that the evening televisionnews had just reported a shootout in Holdredge,Nebraska. Calls to the Holdredge PoliceDepartment were initially frustrating, as theColorado Department of Corrections (DOC) wasadvised that the Nebraska State Patrol was han-dling all information about the incident. TheColorado DOC was unable to get an immediatestatus report. By 7:30 that evening, the DOChad detailed information from the NebraskaState Patrol and had verified that both inmatesand their female accomplices were in policecustody.

The day after the escape, the prison confirmedinformation that one of the two women involvedhad been a criminal justice student at a Coloradocollege and had done volunteer work at another

274


Colorado prison the year before as part of aninternship. As an assistant to a case manager,she conducted tutoring and case managementtesting of inmates behind closed doors. She wasterminated by that prison in November 1988,and in March 1989 she appeared at AVCF withpapers indicating she had married an inmate(one of the two escapees) “by proxy.” The otherfemale accomplice was the wife of the secondinmate.

Lessons Learned1. Most of the problems encountered had to do

with failures to follow the prison’s estab-lished plans, policies, and procedures forescapes, rather than with inadequacies in theprocedures themselves. The initial responseof AVCF after the escape, including thelockdown, emergency count, and identifica-tion of the escapees, was fast, orderly, andeffective.

2. Even with detailed planning, any majoremergency will give rise to some unantici-pated problems. An extraordinary situationsuch as the one presented here will demandquick and creative responses. For example,the search vehicles might have been effec-tive if the inmates left the prison premisesby car, but because of the speed and point-to-point nature of the helicopter’s flight, theprison search effort was hours behind theescapees.

3. The problem with the duty officer, theinvestigators, and the relief search com-manders all inappropriately joining thesearch underscores the importance of awell-trained, well-practiced, disciplinedresponse to a major emergency. The longprison tradition of every available staffmember responding to an alarm and tryingto get to the scene as quickly as possibleworks against the kind of disciplined

response necessary for managing a majoremergency.

4. Prison security is designed from the insideout, rather than from the outside in. Prisonsthat may be extremely secure against thetypical inmate escape attempt may be highlyvulnerable to an assault from the outside. Itis important for every prison to conduct aninformal survey of its security againstassaults from the outside. The answers toquestions such as the following may beenlightening:

● Which security systems would beineffectual in the event of an outsideassault?

● What areas of the prison might civilianaccomplices breach or disable?

● How easily could someone throw in aweapon to a waiting inmate?

● Could a heavy vehicle simply drive overperimeter fences?

● How might an aircraft-assisted escapebe planned?

5. Procedure should require perimeter posts tonotify the shift commander whenever an air-craft is flying unusually low or appears tobe approaching the facility. (A number ofprisons and jails in this country are adjacentto airports and very close to establishedflight paths. For those institutions, notifica-tion should be limited to aircraft that appearto be out of established flight paths andflight patterns.)

6. The prison had not seriously contemplated ahelicopter escape, although more than 20such escape attempts from American jailsand prisons occurred during the preceding10 years. Helicopter escape attempts remainsomewhat exotic because of the planningrequirements but not necessarily because ofresources. In 1989, the five-passenger jet

Section 6. Case Studies: Helicopter Intrusion/Escape

275

helicopter used in this escape was charteredfor $475 an hour, well within the realm ofpossibility for many inmates’ friends andfamily members.

7. Policy questions about the use of lethalforce to prevent helicopter escapes remaindifficult and somewhat controversial. Thereis some consensus that lethal force shouldnot be directed at a helicopter that is appar-ently trying to land within a prison com-pound, in part because the pilot in an escapeattempt will almost always turn out to be acivilian hostage or because the helicoptermight be having mechanical problems andsimply trying to find a safe place to land.There is also some consensus that the bestway to deal with a potential helicopterescape is to prevent inmates from approach-ing and boarding a helicopter that is hover-ing or has landed. Many states specify thatlethal force may be used against inmateswho ignore verbal orders and/or warningsand attempt to move toward or get on boardsuch a helicopter. There is less consensusabout how to respond if a helicopter is tak-ing off with inmates on board. The compet-ing priorities of protecting the communityagainst inmate escapes versus the risk thatlethal force will kill the civilian hostagepiloting the helicopter and the risk that thehelicopter might crash into occupied build-ings and cause a large-scale loss of life haveled to different policies on this question.

8. This situation was extraordinary in that thesuperintendent actually saw the escape inprogress and was able to issue orders to uselethal force. Most escape attempts that canbe stopped with lethal force will not allow

time for orders from a superior officer. Anofficer on a perimeter post will typicallyhave to make a very quick decision aboutlethal force based on the agency’s use-of-force policy and the officer’s prior training,experiences, and expectations.

9. The situation described here, in which anofficer was properly ordered to use lethalforce but did not shoot, is more commonthan might be predicted. Some officers will“freeze up” and not fire, and it is not possi-ble to predict who will and who will not fireuntil the situation occurs.

10. The prison should have several staff who areintimately familiar with the armory, its con-tents, its organization, and its procedures.Otherwise, the institution may have anemergency when the designated armory offi-cer is unavailable, and critically importantweapons or other equipment may not beavailable for staff or may not be adequatelyaccounted for once the incident is over. Inaddition, staff at and above the shift com-mand level should have more than a passingfamiliarity with the contents and organiza-tion of the armory.

11. An intelligence operation may be as impor-tant to solving an escape as the escape postsand search procedures.

12. Communications systems are seldom ade-quately tested for emergencies. Interagencycompatibility problems with communica-tions systems are often unaddressed untilafter a serious incident in which communi-cations proved to be a major barrier.

277

On Sunday, September 22, 1991, inmates of themaximum-security compound (“Max”) of theMontana State Prison (MSP) rioted for severalhours. Five inmates were killed and several wereseriously injured. Five staff members weretrapped and held hostage in a shower area forthe duration of the riot.1

A riot at Max originating in the yard wasplanned at least as far back as late July 1991and likely was being actively considered asearly as May or June. Inmate discussion of aMax riot was common by the first days ofAugust 1991. Inmate interview data were con-sistent with the conclusion that almost all of theinmates in the Max building knew that a seriousriot was imminent and that it would start in theyard. Not all of the inmates knew the exactdetails of the plan.

Beginning of the RiotAt approximately 10 a.m. on Sunday, September22, Max’s five floor officers, including the ser-geant, began to “bring the yard in.” One of thethree fenced exercise areas (“cages”) of the EastYard was empty, and one of the three West Yardcages held a single inmate. The other four cageseach contained three inmates. The officersmoved the three inmates in the middle cage ofthe West Yard through the middle cage gate andbrought them back into the Max building

through the yard door, leaving both the cagegate and yard door open.

As the floor officers took the three inmates backto C-block, nine of the ten inmates left in theWest Yard cages broke off pieces of fence infour separate locations, allowing all nineinmates to gather in the center cage on the westside. (For a substantial but unknown period oftime before September 22, four portions of thefence had been prestressed by being workedback and forth.) Because the gate to this cageand the yard door to the west side of the Maxbuilding itself had been left open, the inmateshad clear access to the inside of the building,and all nine hurried in, rushing the west unitcontrol cage. A few split off and ran toward theeast unit control cage (the satellite control cage).

Two inmate orderlies were working in the corri-dor, and the two sliding corridor doors had beenleft open. The inmates from the yard used plas-tic buckets filled with sand for putting out ciga-rettes to jam both doors open. They now hadcontrol of the corridors and floor area aroundboth control cages; however, they could not getonto any of the six living units (“blocks”).

Almost immediately, the inmates grabbed metalfire extinguishers and portable telephones andbegan attacking the two control cages. Theysoon broke the plate glass glazing that protectsthe polycarbonate security material (Lexan).When this glazing shattered, the control cageofficers believed that the Lexan was giving way

Riot at Max: Montana State Prison

1 This case study is abstracted from “Riot at Max,” the full reporton the incident prepared by a seven-member AdministrativeInquiry Team organized by the National Institute of Corrections atthe request of the State of Montana.

278


and that they were about to be taken hostage.The officers in both control cages now climbedladders that lead to escape hatches on the roof.

The west unit control cage officer had lockedthe five floor officers into C-block. These offi-cers observed the inmates build fires frominmate clothes and blankets and move themagainst both control cages. The fire at the main

control cage (west) was extinguished by auto-matic sprinklers, but the fire at the satellite(east) cage burned intensely against the cagedoor and window, melting an area of thewindow in the control cage door. Inmates thenapparently used a broom handle to make orenlarge a hole in the partially melted windowand reached through this hole to the control

The first Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge was one of the original western territorial prisons, aswere legendary old institutions such as the prison at Florence, AZ, and Colorado’s Old Max inCanyon City. The current facility opened in 1977, a few miles from the old prison.

The institution occupies a 58-acre site surrounded by thousands of acres of state land. Its perime-ter is secured by a double fence topped with razor ribbon and five towers that are staffed 24 hoursper day. There are 58 acres inside the perimeter fence; the institution includes 838 cells. An addi-tional 40 inmates are housed in a single dormitory. There are three primary compounds within theperimeter fence:—Low Security Compound; the High Security Compound; and the MaximumSecurity Compound (“Max”). Max, a single building, is divided into two sides, east and west, eachof which has a unit control room and three 16-cell, two-level podular living units (“A,” “B,” and “C”on the west side and “D,” “E,” and “F” on the east side).

In theory, inmates only leave their own compound to go to the infirmary or the Religious ActivitiesCenter. Food is brought into Max on insulated carts, and the inmates receive their meals in theircells. Staff, official visitors, and inmate visitors all use the same single entrance to the administra-tion building and are searched at the front of the first floor of that building.

At the time of the riot, the average age of the inmate population at Max was 29; the average sen-tence was 28 years. The population was primarily white. Native American inmates constitutedbetween 18 and 20 percent of the total population, and African American and Hispanic inmateseach accounted for less than 2 percent. Before the riot, the number of inmates at MSP rangedbetween 1,150 and 1,196.

In 1991, MSP had 428 authorized staff positions (404 inside the main institution and 24 at the ranchor in industries), of which 275 were uniformed security staff. The inmate to staff ratio in 1990 was2.76 to 1, up slightly from 1980, when it was 2.7 to 1. The institution had six or seven Hispanic staffand four Native American or part Native American staff, but no African American staff. There were14 female correctional officers, including one at the rank of sergeant.

Section 6. Case Studies: Riot at Max

279

cage keys, which had been left in the inside ofthe door lock. Once the inmates were inside thetwo control cages, they had access to every liv-ing unit and cell in the building.

Initial Emergency ResponseConditions in Max were deteriorating rapidly.Water on the floor was ankle deep in someplaces, and smoke from the fires was gettingthicker in the building. The smoke evacuationsystem was inoperative. Part of a sophisticatedfire alarm system that included both the com-mand post power override switches for the con-trol consoles and an intrusion alarm system thatmonitored the status of the building’s three roofhatches and three external doors, it had beenbroken for months, but security staff had notbeen notified of the problem.

When the shift commander heard that two offi-cers were on the roof of Max, he detailed avail-able staff to the Max compound. Some of theresponding officers helped the control cage offi-cers leave the roof. By the time the officers gotdown from the roof, about 10 minutes after theriot began, smoke was coming out of the roofescape hatches. The control cage officers con-firmed that the sergeant and the four floor offi-cers were locked in C-block and safe at leasttemporarily. The shift commander then radioedthe staff surrounding the Max building to reportback to the command post. At about this time,administrative notifications were begun, startingwith the warden.

Before they received the order to return to thecommand post, the officers around Max hadheard an inmate yelling that the inmates weretrying to break into the control cages and that ifthey did so, the protective custody (PC) inmateswould all be dead. Staff observed one PCinmate in his cell appearing bloody and beaten,an inmate trying to break into a counselor’s

office, and inmates beating on the control cagewindows with mop handles and other instru-ments. When the group of staff reported back tothe command post, they believed the floor offi-cers were in one of the lower C-block cells.

The first top administrator to arrive was theassociate warden (AW) for treatment. He did notassume command of the institution but workedin parallel with the shift commander, concentrat-ing on events inside Max. The AW directed twostaff members to take an AR–15 rifle and a .357revolver, go to the lower level of C-block inMax, break out a window of the cell where thefloor officers were hiding, and use the weaponsto cover their escape. The two officers broke outa window in lower C–7, but the cell was empty.Inmates in an adjoining cell wrote a note to theofficers saying that the staff members were inthe lower C shower room, which has no externalwindow.

Two other officers were sent to the basementcrawl space beneath the Max building. Theyfound water and smoke problems on both sidesof the building and heard screaming and holler-ing coming from the east side, whereas the westside was relatively quiet. At about this time,staff around the building heard inmates scream-ing that the inmates had taken over the controlcages. One inmate wrote a note saying that allof the inmates were out. These events appearto have occurred some time between 10:30 and11 a.m.

The warden arrived at approximately 10:40 a.m.and went to the command post. He waited untilthe shift commander had a few free moments tobrief him, then assumed command clearly anddecisively. Shortly after 11 a.m., the wardenasked for blueprints of the Max building anddirected the assistant commander of theDisturbance Control Team (DCT) to meet withhis team leaders and other necessary staff to

280


develop a preliminary plan for retaking the Maxbuilding.

At about this time, a sergeant in the commandpost succeeded in reaching an inmate in one ofthe control cages by phone. The inmate demand-ed that the inmates be allowed to meet with themedia and told the sergeant that they wouldthrow a letter over the fence to the media andthat they had control of the officers and the PCinmates. MSP’s single trained hostage negotiatorwas not yet on the scene. Eventually, however,the negotiator replaced the sergeant and negotia-tions continued intermittently throughout theincident, providing additional information aboutconditions and events inside the Max building.The negotiations held out the potential for reso-lution without force and were later used as adiversion to help cover the approach of the DCTassault team.

At approximately 11:15 a.m., the wardenassigned a captain to contact the state cabinetsecretary and keep his office briefed. At 11:20a.m., the negotiator called the inmates, tellingthem that it was difficult to reach the mediabecause it was Sunday. At 11:45, the inmatescalled back, demanding that correctional officersmove away from the building and fence outsideMax or they would bring up a correctional offi-cer hostage and cut off his head. Ten minuteslater, the negotiator told the inmate on the phonethat media people would be brought in to speakwith the inmates if staff could surround thebuilding and contain the incident.

Most of MSP uses low-band radios, and theprison authorities were concerned that theinmates in Max could monitor these. The war-den ordered all available high-band radios to becollected and distributed to key staff members,who were assigned code names.

Disturbance Control Team Retakes MaxBy approximately noon, the rest of MSP hadbeen locked down. Medical facilities had beenchecked and readied for emergency cases. Aphysician was standing by, ambulances had beenrequested, and the first ambulance had arrived atthe institution. Towers had been double postedand additional high ground spotters and/orsnipers had been deployed.

The DCT assistant commander returned to theDCT assembly and dressing area in the armoryas additional DCT members continued to arrive,were briefed, and outfitted themselves. DCT hadestablished their plan for retaking Max. Theyplanned to use an institution fire truck to carrythe team to the back of the building, where theywould enter through the back door. As a diver-sion, they planned to introduce a staff memberinto the Max compound with a video cameraand tell inmates that it was a media person. Inpreparation for this plan, an institution fire truckwas driven to the warehouse, where most of itsequipment was removed so it could carry theteam.

In the meantime, the command post received areport that a beaten and bloody inmate had beenseen at the Max sally port. The negotiator calledthe inmates and asked to arrange the removal ofthe injured inmate, offering to turn off the waterto the automatic sprinklers. The inmates on thephone denied the request and repeated theirdemand to communicate with the media. Theyalso said that lights were failing and ceilingswere coming down in the building because ofthe water. The warden’s decision to assault Maxappears to have followed the inmates’ refusal tonegotiate over the injured inmate’s release.

In preparation for the assault, radio call signswere reviewed and confirmed and airspace over


281

the prison was restricted. DCT was reminded tomove directly to C-block, where the staffhostages were believed to be held. The warden,who had previously agreed with the secretary’soffice to clear any actions that might be lifethreatening, used the open briefing line betweenMSP and the secretary’s office to discuss theimpending start of the assault. The secretary(and through him, the Governor’s office) hadbeen in regular contact with the warden and bythen was well aware of the broad parameters ofthe plan.

The plan was put into action at approximately1:10 p.m. The negotiator called the west controlcage to inform the inmates that a media personwas coming in to take pictures. Then, the actingdirector of the Corrections Division, who hadbeen onsite for some time but was unknown tothe inmate population, was given a video cam-era and went into the Max compound. However,the DCT team was unable to effect an entry asplanned. When they got to the back of the build-ing, they were unable to locate the proper keyon the emergency key ring. They also found thatthe inmates had used belly chains, padlocks, andother restraints to barricade the doors. Even theproper key would not have allowed a quickentry.

The backup plan involved going down from theroof and in through the exercise cages in theMax yard. When DCT members got onto theroof they found this was unworkable becausethe inmates had also chained shut the yard gatedoor. The team pried open the roof escapehatches, which had also been barricaded, andthrew small pyrotechnic tear gas canisters intothe west and east control cages. Entry teams,heavily armed and wearing gas masks, wentdown the ladder into the west control cage. Asmembers of DCT entered the cage, they realizedthat inmates on the loose in the west side ofMax were unaware of their presence. When

sufficient DCT officers were in the cage, theywent directly to C-block, ordering all inmatesencountered to strip and lie down in place onthe floor. Unarmed DCT members secured theinmates with flex cuffs under gun coverage fromother DCT staff.

DCT reached the lower C-block shower roomwithout meeting inmate resistance and found thefive staff hostages still locked in but physicallyunharmed. The tear gas was too thick to escortthe five hostages, who did not have gas masks,to the front door of Max, and the sally port areainside the front door was also barricaded. DCTmembers retreated to C-block with the staffhostages and took them out through the roofescape hatch of the west control cage.

When the floor officers had seen that theinmates were taking over the control cagesand retreated into the lower C-block show-er, they took an inmate mattress anddragged it through the water on the floorand then used that to provide a barrierbetween the open grill of the shower doorand the rioting inmates. Recognizing thatthe hostages’ view was partially blocked bythe mattress, the inmates hung a blanket orcurtain in front of the shower door to fur-ther obscure the hostages’ view of theinside of Max. On the two occasions whenthe inmates requested keys from hostagestaff, the officers tried low-level verbalresistance until the inmates began tothreaten to burn the officers out of theirshower room. Under duress, the officerscooperated, but only enough to preventbeing attacked.

282


Inside Max, the DCT members regained controlof the building by securing one block at a time.They encountered no inmate resistance. Theonly incident of note occurred when a DCTmember fired a warning shot with his revolverinto the cell door of an inmate who was notcomplying. That was apparently the only shotfired on the day of the riot.

Inmates told DCT members clearing the westend of C-block that PC inmates had been killed.Moving to the east side, the officers found fourdead inmates lying on lower D-block and oneon upper D-block, along with a surviving PCinmate in very serious condition with a cutthroat and another who had barricaded himselfinto his cell. All indications are that DCT quick-ly recognized the importance of maintainingthe integrity of the crime scene and identifieda command-level staff member to secure thescene. DCT found two other PC inmatesunharmed in the unit laundry room. These

inmates had used the washer and dryer to barri-cade the door and had protected themselves byspraying marauding inmates with laundrybleach. Another inmate was found badly beaten,but alive, just inside the front door.

Staff RetaliationAs DCT finished the job of taking control of theremaining areas of Max and searching them,DCT members stripped and flex-cuffed theinmates on each block. The inmates from ablock were then taken out in a group to the frontdoor of Max and handed over to the restraintteam waiting outside. Inside Max, groups ofinmates secured by flex cuffs lay on the floorunder DCT gun coverage. Most were naked.The corridors were filled with water, smoke, andtear gas, and the floors were thick with brokenglass from various shattered interior windows.

As DCT officers led groups of mostly nakedinmates to the front door, many suffered glasscuts on the bottoms of their feet. Inmatesalleged that DCT officers beat, kicked, or usedbatons on inmates who were in restraints andoffering no resistance. A substantial number ofinmates were treated later that day for injuriesother than cuts to the feet.

Outside Max, a sergeant had been assigned toassemble and coordinate a restraint team. By thetime DCT entered Max, this group of officershad grown to 60 or 70 in number. The wardenhimself led the restraint team as they ran intothe Max compound in a double line that assem-bled on either side of the front door of Max.Inmates referred to this group of staff as the“gauntlet.” The Administrative Inquiry Team2

received numerous, consistent inmate

Protective custody (PC) inmates, who wereused as the unit orderlies, were in frequentcontact with Max inmates. Some staff werecareless about maintaining confidentialityregarding inmate informants, even teasinginmates about being “snitches” or “rats.”

Some inmates reported that “getting thesnitches” was a primary goal of the riotfrom the outset. Others said that the initialplan was simply to take over the west sideof Max and the east side if possible, per-haps taking some floor officers hostage inthe process. According to this view, theinmates did not expect to gain access tothe control cages and the murders of thePC inmates were crimes of opportunity.

2 The seven-member investigative team NIC assembled some 3weeks after the riot, at the request of the Montana Governor’soffice and the state attorney general’s office.


283

allegations that the inmates exiting Max, nakedand handcuffed behind their backs, were forcedto run through this gauntlet while the officers inthe double receiving lines hit, kicked, tripped, orswung batons at the inmates. Subsequently, threeseparate staff members verified that handcuffedinmates coming through the gauntlet were insome cases kicked, punched, or hit with batons.

The inmates were then taken to “No Man’sLand” (a yard area under gun coverage fromtowers). They were placed face down on theground, handcuffed behind their backs. Thesmall number of inmates still dressed werestripped at this point, and flex cuffs werereplaced with steel handcuffs. Inmates allegedstaff abuse also took place here, primarily in theform of staff kicking inmates as they lay on the

floor. Two of the three staff that confirmed theabuse in the gauntlet also confirmed the abuse ofinmates in No Man’s Land. Inmates were on theground for 6 to 7 hours, until they were movedto the Reception Unit between 8 and 9 p.m.Approximately 55 inmates were secured inReception.

Treatment of Inmates After the RiotThe warden made sure that medical staff wereonsite and mobilized before the assault on Maxtook place. As inmates came out of Max afterthe riot, gurneys were brought up near the build-ing’s front door, and very seriously injuredinmates were put on the gurneys and promptly

MSP had serious systemic problems long before the riot. Staff salaries were unrealistically low(the beginning annual salary for a correctional officer in 1991 was $15,563, at least 15 percentbelow the national average), staff turnover was somewhat high (just over 19 percent in fiscal year1991), and staff training was inadequate (there was no separate item in the budget for training).Correctional officers were not entitled to hazardous duty retirement or line-of-duty death benefits,although both of these accrued to state law enforcement officers. Critical policies and procedureswere inappropriate, contradictory, or lacking (for example, MSP had no use-of-force policy) andother policies were regularly ignored. Security was inconsistent and, in many cases, far from rigor-ous. Perhaps most importantly, staff had no shared understanding of the institution’s mission, goals,or values.

Staff professionalism at MSP was poor. Some staff regularly swore at, with, and about inmates.Taunting and demeaning of inmates was common, and little supervisory accountability wasenforced at any level. Inmates housed in Max at the time of the riot described a pattern of physicalabuse by staff; inmates who had been housed in Max during the years immediately preceding theriot but were no longer housed there corroborated this complaint. The inmates had little redress, asMSP’s inmate grievance system was unmanaged and ineffectual and lacked credibility with theinmate population. The inmate disciplinary system also was poorly designed and inconsistentlyadministered. Medical services were another source of widespread dissatisfaction and angeramong the inmates, exceeded perhaps only by the parole board process. Overall, conditions withinMax could only be described as harsh.

284


taken to area hospitals. Inmates with less seriousinjuries were taken from No Man’s Land to theinfirmary. Of these inmates, the five or six mostseriously injured stayed in the infirmary and theothers were treated and then returned to NoMan’s Land.

The short-term stepdown plan, arrived at in thelate afternoon and evening of September 22,included the decision to move the new intakeinmates out of the Reception building and usethis unit for the 50 to 65 displaced Max inmates.The institution would remain on total lockdownfor the near term. A long-term stepdown planwas formed in the following weeks.

Max inmates held in the Reception Unit allegedthat they were subjected to the following abusesfor the first several days:

● Neither clothing nor mattresses were provid-ed, and the inmates were denied hygieneitems (e.g., toothbrush, toilet paper, tissues)and showers.

● Inmates were fed only two meals a day.

● CapStun (pepper spray) was used on inmateswho refused to talk with the attorney gener-al’s investigative staff.

● Inmates were denied access to phones, mail,visitors, legal material, and legal counsel for3 weeks.

● Some inmates were left naked and hog-tiedon the floor for extended periods.

Official inquiry corroborated many of these alle-gations. The Reception Unit log confirms thatthe Max inmates were left naked and withoutmattresses for 4 to 5 days, although they didhave blankets. The log first mentions towels,which would allow the inmates to wash intheir cells, 4 days after they were moved toReception. Showers appear not to have beenallowed until October 15, more than 3 weeksafter the riot.

Inmates were fed two meals a day, consistingmainly of cold sandwiches, primarily because ofthe complete lockdown. Without inmate workersin the kitchen, MSP was unable to produce regu-lar meals. Even the treatment staff was put towork making sandwiches in order to feed theinstitution’s 1,100 inmates, and the improvisedkitchen staff worked 12-hour shifts.

The Administrative Inquiry Team found thatthe Max inmates held in Reception were notallowed phone calls, visits, recreation, personalpossessions, or legal materials. Furthermore, theReception Unit log reflects no attorney visits orphone calls to any Max inmate prior to October4 and only a few legal calls or legal visits duringthe remainder of the 3 weeks they were held inReception. During the week that the Admin-istrative Inquiry Team was onsite, the attorneysof a few inmates from Max petitioned the court,claiming that the inmates essentially were beingheld incommunicado. The court directed MSP toallow these clients to see their lawyers immedi-ately for unlimited lengths of time during work-ing hours Monday through Friday.

The inmates’ most serious allegation was thatseveral inmates were hog-tied naked and left inthat position for a long period of time. TheAdministrative Inquiry Team learned that theMax inmates began to be noisy and verballyabusive by September 27, after which theReception Unit log includes intermittent entriesabout groups of inmates becoming loud orshouting obscenities. Management regarded thisactivity as a serious threat of further violence.The warden met with four of his top staff mem-bers to decide how to respond. They concludedthat they had to do something preventative anddecided to place six inmates the staff hadidentified as ringleaders in full restraints for24 hours. The top managers understood fullrestraints to mean using handcuffs and leg ironsto hog-tie someone naked on the floor. The MSP


285

policy statement on use of restraints defines “fullrestraints” as “the use of handcuffs with bellychains and leg cuffs.”

DCT was assembled in case there was strongresistance from the inmates who were to beplaced in full restraints. The six inmates werestripped, hog-tied, and left naked on the floorof their cells with instructions not to move orstruggle against the restraints. The applicationof the restraints began shortly after 9 p.m. onOctober 9. None of the inmates put up any seri-ous resistance, and DCT left the unit shortlyafter 10 p.m. The restraints were initially left onfor between 5 and 7 hours and after that wereremoved for 10 to 15 minutes at approximately3-hour intervals. During one break, shortlybefore noon the next day, October 10, therestraints were apparently removed for morethan half an hour to allow the inmates to eat.After about 23 hours, five of the six inmateswere released from the hog-tie position. One ofthe inmates had wriggled in order to get hishands below the level of his buttocks. He wasreminded that he had been told not to move orchange position and was left hog-tied for anadditional 24 hours.

When the physician member of the Adminis-trative Inquiry Team examined four of theinmates involved, more than 2 weeks after therestraints had been removed, he found substan-tial handcuff wounds and indication of probableinjury to superficial nerves on the hands of allfour inmates. His prognosis was that the hand-cuff skin wounds would heal with no greaterresidual injury than superficial scarring and thatany impairment of nerve function would proba-bly not be irreversible. However, because apossibility of permanent nerve damage stillremained, he recommended a neurologicalconsultation for each of the inmates whocomplained of numbness in their hands.

The Reception Unit log also shows other inci-dents in which inmates were chained, put inrestraints, and/or had their coveralls taken fromthem. Nothing indicates that these inmates weresuicidal. In these cases, various requirements ofthe MSP policy statement on restraints were vio-lated. Mandatory reports were not written, med-ical and security checks were not performedand/or were not logged, and treatment staff werenot consulted.

Staff Support ServicesMembers of the prison’s treatment and counsel-ing staff provided psychological screening forstaff on the day of the riot. The five staff takenhostage and the two staff members who hadescaped at the beginning of the riot were seenfirst, followed by all DCT members and anyother staff member who had observed the bodiesof the dead PC inmates or the murder scene, orwho gave any indication of being traumatized.Every staff member sent for psychologicalscreening was seen at least twice.

Approximately 1 week after the riot, the treat-ment staff organized a meeting for staff families.At this meeting, spouses were able to expresstheir fears that a husband or wife would bekilled in the prison, and feelings about theinmate deaths and the staff hostages were alsoexplored. Due to heavy publicity in the smalltowns and rural area surrounding MSP, no onecould avoid the topic, including young children.Thus, the meeting also gave some attention tohow to discuss something like the riot withyoung children.

The staff who had been held hostage, includingthe two who escaped initially, were away fromwork for approximately 3 weeks, during whichthey received regular counseling. When theyreturned to work, they did not go back to Max,but were assigned to positions where they would

286


not have contact with inmates. A group counsel-ing session was established to allow them to talkwith each other about their adjustment.

The treatment and counseling staff wrote severalmemos that were distributed to all staff. Thesememos dealt with topics such as grief, death,fear, and hostage situations and identified someof the more frequent kinds of problems that staffor family members might be experiencing,thereby giving staff license to acknowledgethose problems.

Lessons Learned1. No matter how a “supermax” (super maxi-

mum-security) unit is built or operated, riotsand inmate takeovers are never impossible.

2. If the tone of an institution is angry andharsh prior to a disturbance, the disturbanceitself may quickly turn brutal and bloody.

3. No prison should operate without an emer-gency plan.

4. A committed and dedicated prison tacticalteam may be extremely effective, even with-out the benefit of sophisticated equipment orextensive training.

5. Chronic lapses in following day-to-daysecurity procedures and security policiescan render an otherwise relatively securefacility extremely vulnerable.

6. Potential warning signs and other intelli-gence suggesting a serious incident is immi-nent must be carefully evaluated, eventhough any institution will generate its shareof false rumors about impending problems.

7. A perceived unreasonable delay in provid-ing information and access to the media canquickly turn both the news coverage and theeditorial comment about a correctionalemergency more negative than necessary.

8. Thoughtful attention to the needs of trauma-tized staff and staff families in the aftermathof a major emergency will be much appreci-ated. Such efforts may be effective even inthe absence of prior planning or prior recog-nition of their importance.

9. Strong leadership from the person in chargemay be the most important need during amajor prison emergency.

10. It is important that postemergency measuresnot be perceived as punitive by thoseinmates who have not taken part in thedisturbance.

11. Staff retaliation after an emergency is morelikely when staff professionalism is ques-tionable before the emergency and whenpositive, hands-on leadership from adminis-trators and middle managers is lacking.

12. Maintenance problems with security sys-tems must be widely communicated to secu-rity staff.

13. All staff involved in an emergency situationmust write individual, detailed reportsbefore completing their tour of duty, and asupervisor or manager should review eachsuch report for adequacy and clarity andeither document approval of the report priorto relieving the staff member or return thereport to the staff member for additions orcorrections.

14. In the aftermath of a major emergency,inmates’ basic needs and rights (e.g., cloth-ing, food, attorney visitation) should be metas quickly as is practically consistent withsecurity needs.

15. Protective custody inmates should not be inregular contact with administrative segrega-tion and disciplinary inmates, particularlywithin a maximum-security unit.


287

16. Maximum-security inmates should not beallowed regular access to outside exerciseareas without visual supervision from staff.

17. A tactical team’s contingency plans forassault or hostage rescue will seldom go

exactly as planned. Unanticipated problemsare the rule, not the exception. The teamshould have a “plan B” in case “plan A”proves unworkable, and both plans mayneed to incorporate great flexibility.

289

Renz Correctional Center is a medium-sized(average population 550 inmates), high-securityprison for female offenders situated within theflood plain of the Missouri River. The prisonwas opened in 1961 as Renz Farm and is affect-ed when the Missouri flood stage reaches 29feet.

In 1993, early spring flooding was very seriousalong much of the watershed of the Missouriand Mississippi Rivers. Eight counties in easternMissouri were designated as disaster areas byPresidential declaration. The early spring floodswere followed by continued rainy weather andsome flooding in the late spring and early sum-mer. Renz fine-tuned its evacuation plans andprepared for evacuation several times during thespring and early summer.

By late June, the facility had moved first floorproperty and equipment off the floor and hadbegun to move some critical property out of theinstitution. The river continued to rise, and onJuly 2, the Missouri Department of Correc-tions (DOC) began to evacuate inmates to theChillicothe Correctional Center and the CentralMissouri Correctional Center. Evacuation of allinmates took 2 days and was accomplishedwithout violence, injuries, or escapes.

The Central Missouri Correctional Center wasunder a federal court order that imposed a popu-lation cap of 1,000 inmates. The DOC was ableto obtain quick verbal permission from the courtto exceed this cap because of the emergencyevacuation and subsequently received a formalorder granting the emergency exemption fromthe cap.

After the inmates were evacuated, correctionsstaff used boats to reenter the facility andremove as much equipment as possible. Theymoved other property and equipment to thesecond floor of the three-story main prisonbuilding.

When the Missouri River reached a crest ofapproximately 35 feet in mid-July, the staff wereinitially optimistic that the institution would becleaned up, repaired, and eventually reoccupiedin spite of the substantial damage. That wasnot to be the case. Heavy rains continuedunabated in the northern part of the state, andthe Missouri River began to rise again toward a new crest.

At the end of July, the river finally crested at38.6 feet. Even after the crest, the water took along time to recede. A 32-foot-high levy thatprotected the Renz complex was flattened, andafter the water receded a new lake, 15 feet deepand spanning 15 acres, was left on the property.


The 1993 Midwest Floods: MissouriLoses Renz Correctional Center

290


Inspections revealed that the Renz facility wascompletely incapacitated and that restorationwould be neither practical nor cost effective.Most of the property and equipment that hadbeen moved to the second floor was lost to theflood waters. The river had raged through theRenz complex with such force that the entire 9-foot-high security fence, including 4,000 feetof razor ribbon, was lost to some unknown loca-tion downriver. The flood waters had remainedso long that locks and other security devicesthroughout the facility had rusted and werebeyond repair. Storage tanks had disappeared,and the compressor room had collapsed. Thefood service and medical units sustained seriousdamage.

The evacuation and rehousing of inmates fromRenz was not the only emergency with whichthe DOC had to contend. The floods cut off allroad access to the Algoa Correctional Center,and employees had to be ferried by boat to workand back. The rising flood waters in downtownJefferson City threatened the Jefferson CityCorrectional Center (the old Missouri StatePenitentiary), and inmates at that facility workedat sandbagging efforts within and around theprison as well as at other public buildings withinJefferson City.

During the course of the spring and summerfloods, well over 1,000 inmates helped in com-munity efforts to save flooded areas, sandbagand reinforce threatened levies, and clean upflood damage. All of Missouri’s 16 state prisonswere extensively involved in these efforts. TheMissouri DOC documented more than 4,000hours of staff time supervising inmates in com-munity assistance efforts during and after thefloods.

One hundred seventy-eight staff from the DOC’sBoard of Probation and Parole and 661 proba-tioners and parolees from 28 of 29 districtoffices also contributed significantly to flood

relief efforts across the state. Staff completed1,638 hours and also contributed food, drygoods, and cash to relief projects. Probationersand parolees contributed 9,875 hours of reliefwork. Probationers ordered by the courts to per-form community service contributed significant-ly to this effort.

Lessons Learned1. The Missouri DOC’s preexisting emergency

preparedness system and facility emergencyplans provided an appropriate and practicalframework for the emergency response tothe floods. In particular, the detailed evacua-tion plans at the facility level proved to beinvaluable.

2. Inmate populations were kept well advisedabout the status of the floods, and theinmate reaction was one of cooperation andassistance.

3. The lack of a statewide communicationssystem meant that various state agenciescould not monitor each other’s radio trafficor transmit to each other throughout theemergency.

4. Communications were taxed throughout theemergency, and access to phone lines wasoften a determining factor in responding tothe emergency.

5. As has been the case during earthquakes,cellular telephones were one of the mostvaluable items during the floods.

6. Staff needed to be kept informed aboutmany issues outside the affected facility,including road closings, emergency assis-tance if their homes were affected, and theavailability of counseling and support.

7. Staff involved in the planning needed to bebriefed regularly. Maintaining staff meetingswas difficult but important. As extra help

Section 6. Case Studies: The 1993 Midwest Floods

291

became available, staff from the affectedfacility assumed supervisory and manage-ment roles, and outside staff were used insupport roles and for logistical help.

8. Coordination between the DOC, countyjails, and community correctional facilitiesshould include planning for large-scale natu-ral disasters. In particular, county and localfacilities must have plans for temporaryholding facilities and temporary transporta-tion if they cannot use DOC facilities ortransportation for an extended period oftime.

9. The planning for moving inmates, staff, andequipment from the facility that was beingevacuated proved far better than the plan-ning for handling the inmates at the receiv-ing institutions.

10. Access to inmate files and other inmateinformation and to the roster system forscheduling staff was compromised by theemergency. Backup systems would havebeen invaluable, and planning in these areasproved inadequate.

11. Comprehensive maps indicating emergencyroutes and primary choices for evacuationroutes would have been most helpful duringthe floods, as would some sort of ID cardsystem for those with major roles in theemergency response.

12. It is important for the Department to be ableto document each request for assistance, theexternal agency it has asked for help, andthe progress of the task.

13. Supplies of emergency food and water wereinadequate to allow the remaining Renzstaff to work within the facility after theinmates were evacuated.

14. Emergency supplies were inadequate forthe length and severity of the emergency.Security and accountability for the supplieswere both poor.

15. The Department needed more heavy equip-ment (e.g., forklifts, dump trucks, flat trail-ers) than it was able to locate during theemergency.

16. The DOC director’s leadership was clearand evident as departmental resources weremade available for community assistancewherever possible.

17. Staff efforts to assist with local communityproblems were extraordinary. Most of theseefforts were voluntary.

293

While there were no escapes or fatalities, thetaking of hostages and the seizure of the towerreveal critical—and correctable—flaws inArizona’s prison system.

In the early morning hours of Sunday, January18, 2004, inmates Ricky K. Wassenaar, serving26 years in prison, and Steven J. Coy, serving alife sentence, attempted to escape from theMorey Unit of the Lewis Prison Complex locat-ed near Buckeye, Arizona, 50 miles southwestof Phoenix.

The Morey Unit, which opened in January 1999,is a cellblock-style facility that houses 840inmates (designed capacity: 800). The unit hous-es a diverse population of Level 2, 3, and 4inmates, including “protective segregation”inmates, i.e., those who are considered danger-ous or in personal danger are segregated fromthe general prison population. The protectivesegregation population, and the number ofinmates serving life sentences (100), at Morey isthe largest of any unit in Arizona’s correctionssystem.

The two inmates subdued the two correctionalofficers on duty and seized the unit’s tower trig-gering a 15-day standoff, the longest prisonhostage situation in the nation’s history.

An account of the hostage taking and the negoti-ations that led to the inmates’ surrender and the

safe release of both hostages follows, along witha summary of findings and recommendationsaimed at preventing future crises and addressingsignificant operational, administrative, and fiscalissues related to the Arizona Department ofCorrections.

The Hostage TakingAt 2:30 a.m. on January 18, the 19 members ofan inmate kitchen work crew at the Morey Unitwere released from their housing units to reportfor duty at the Morey kitchen.

At approximately 3:15 a.m., the kitchen officewas occupied by Correctional Officer KennethMartin and a female civilian kitchen employee.1

A member of the kitchen work crew, inmateRicky K. Wassenaar, entered the kitchen officethrough the open door. Another inmate, StevenJ. Coy, followed him in, positioning himself inthe kitchen office doorway and blocking theonly exit.

Wassenaar and Coy Seize the Kitchen

Wassenaar was armed with a “shank,” a home-made knifelike weapon. Wassenaar approachedMartin, produced the shank,2 and told him that

The Morey Unit Hostage IncidentThe Arizona Governor’s Blue Ribbon Panel Report on

Preliminary Findings and Recommendations

May 4, 2005

Reprinted with permission of the Arizona Department ofCorrections.

1 Martin was the only officer assigned on duty in the kitchen,consistent with facility operations and procedures.

2 The two inmates underwent a pat-down search by CorrectionalOfficer John Cooper before they left their housing unit. However,they were not patted down, as required by post order, upon arriv-ing at the kitchen. Further, at the time this report was prepared, itwas not known whether or not the two inmates were escorted fromtheir housing unit to the dining facility.

294


“this is an escape” and “I’ve got nothing tolose.” He ordered Martin to remove his uniformshirt (to which Martin’s Department ofCorrections identification card was attached)and boots. After Martin complied, Wassenaarhandcuffed Martin to a cage in the toolroominside the kitchen office. The other inmate, Coy,who also possessed a shank, brought the femaleworker into the toolroom, ordered her to liedown on her stomach, and tied her hands andfeet together with electrical wire.

With Martin and the female kitchen workerimmobilized, Wassenaar and Coy left the tool-room for a short time and then returned. Coyremoved Martin’s pants and gave them toWassenaar, who put on Martin’s uniform, boots,and jacket and then shaved off his beard with anelectric razor.3 Wassenaar asked Martin for thekitchen telephone number, and Martin complied.

Wassenaar went to the kitchen work area, wherehe advised the other inmate kitchen workers of

his escape attempt and invited them to join him.When none of them, including the inmatesworking outside on the loading dock, acceptedhis invitation, he locked them in the kitchen drystorage area.

At about 4:15 a.m., an hour after he first enteredthe kitchen office, Wassenaar left the kitchencarrying a 30-inch stainless steel stirring paddle.Coy remained in the kitchen office. Wassenaarwalked through the dining area and exited intothe Morey Unit’s Red Yard, using Martin’s keyto unlock the door. Shortly after Wassenaar leftthe kitchen area, inmate Coy sexually assaultedthe female kitchen worker.

Wassenaar Seizes the Tower

At about 4:20 a.m., Wassenaar approached theRed Yard gate area that surrounds the 20-foottower and pressed the access buzzer in the inter-com box at the gate. Upstairs in the tower wereCorrectional Officers Jason N. Auch and JaneDoe.4 Auch looked at the monitor and, seeingwhat he believed to be a fellow correctionalofficer, buzzed the gate open, allowingWassenaar to enter the tower area. Wassenaarthen approached the lower tower door, which,like the entrance gate, was also locked andremotely controlled by Auch. Auch buzzed thedoor open.5

Auch went to the stairs to meet his presumedcolleague. Wassenaar kept his head down as heclimbed the stairs. As he neared the top helooked up, and Auch realized that he did notrecognize the individual approaching him.Before Auch could react, Wassenaar struck himwith the stirring paddle, fracturing Auch’sorbital bone and temporarily incapacitating him.

Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex, Buckeye, Arizona

3 The razor belonged to Wassenaar. At the time this report wasprepared, it was not determined how the razor made its way intothe kitchen.

4 “Jane Doe” is a fictitious name used to protect the femaleofficer’s identity.

5 The post order for the tower (PO 051) did not require positiveidentification procedures.

Section 6. Case Studies: The Morey Unit Hostage Incident

295

Unarmed, Officer Doe attacked Wassenaar, whooverpowered Doe and cuffed her hands behindher. Wassenaar forced Doe and Auch to tell himwhere the weapons were, how to operate them,and how to operate the control panel. Wassenaarthen ordered Auch to the lower part of thetower.6

Coy Remains in the Kitchen

At about 4:45 a.m., with the escape attemptstill unknown to Morey Unit authorities,Correctional Officer Robert D. Cornett arrivedin the kitchen to relieve Martin, 45 minutesahead of Cornett’s scheduled 5:30 a.m. shift. Itstruck him as odd that food was on the countersbut he did not see any inmate kitchen workers.He saw Coy standing by the “food trap,” apassthrough that is used to slide trays betweenthe kitchen and the dining area. Coy’s head wasin the trap, and he seemed to be talking withsomeone. Cornett and Coy had a brief conversa-tion, and Cornett walked past Coy toward thekitchen office. As Cornett made his way up theramp to the kitchen office, Coy approached himfrom behind, pressed a shank against Cornett’swaist, and ordered Cornett to keep going.Cornett did so.

Entering the toolroom, Cornett saw the boundfemale worker face down on the floor andMartin handcuffed to the front of the toolrack.Coy took away Cornett’s handcuffs and radio,handcuffed Cornett to the right side of the tool-rack, and went to the dining area. A few minuteslater, the kitchen phone rang. Coy returned,picked up the receiver, said, “CO II Martin,” andhung up. (It is possible that Wassenaar placedthe call from the tower.)

A few minutes later, a call came in on Martin’sradio from Correctional Officer Coy C. Kelley,checking on Martin’s welfare. Coy held theradio to Martin’s mouth and, complying withCoy’s instruction, Martin responded by saying“Code Four” (indicating “situation normal”).

Kelley also radioed the tower requesting clear-ance to move inmates across the yard. Doe,following Wassenaar’s orders, advised Kelleythat the yard was not clear, effectively denyingKelley’s request.

Officer Observes “Horseplay”

Nevertheless, at about 4:50 a.m., CorrectionalOfficers Kelley and Elizabeth M. Debaughescorted inmates Jack R. Hudson, Jr., andMichael Sifford from Building Two to earlyrecreation and chow. Their route took them pastthe tower where Wassenaar held his two captives.

As the officers and inmates walked past thetower on the Blue Yard side of the “spline” (aprotected walkway) that separates the two yards,Kelley looked in the window at the base of thetower. The lights were out, and Kelley saw twocorrectional officers wrestling or engaged inwhat he later termed “horseplay.” In fact, whathe unknowingly witnessed was Officer Auchlying handcuffed on the floor of the lower tower.

Kelley later told investigators that he tried to getinto the Blue Yard tower gate but that the gatewas not operational, and that he tried to contact

6 Tower personnel have access to weapons (an AR–15 assault rifle,a 12-gauge shotgun, and a 37mm launcher), but the weapons wereneither loaded nor readily available to the officers.

The Lewis Prison Complex. The 800-bed Morey Unit (circled) opened in January 1999.

296


the officers in the tower via the speaker box.Kelley and Debaugh proceeded toward thekitchen (Hudson had already continued to thedining area, and Sifford, who did not wish toeat, went directly to his job in the recreationalarea.).

Kelley and Debaugh entered the dining facilityat 4:53 a.m. Hudson placed his personal itemson one of the tables and went to the food trap.Hudson knocked on the door of the food trap,and when no food appeared Kelley and Debaughalso knocked. The officers then tried to radioMartin, telling him to open the kitchen door.There was no response.

At approximately 4:54 a.m. Kelley againknocked on the food trap and Debaugh sat at thefirst table in the chow hall. After no response atthe food trap, Kelley joined Debaugh at the firsttable. Inmate Coy opened the food trap and saidsomething that sounded like, “Heidi, Heidi, Ho.”Kelley told Inmate Coy he needed to talk toMartin. Inmate Coy said, “Alright,” and closedthe trap. Kelley told Debaugh he believed hesaw something through the tower window anddid not feel right about it. Debaugh attempted tocontact the tower via her radio and received noresponse. After waiting a few minutes, Kelleyradioed Martin again and received no response.

The Chase From the Dining Facility

Five minutes after arriving at the dining facility,Kelley and Debaugh, who were standing justoutside the kitchen door, heard the rattle of keysfrom the other side of the door. At approximate-ly 4:59 a.m., Cornett opened the kitchen door atthe direction of Inmate Coy, who was standingbehind Cornett. Cornett believed he was open-ing the kitchen door for Inmate Thunderhorsebut found Kelley and Debaugh instead. OfficerCornett later stated that he decided to try to getaway from Inmate Coy to get help for the otherstaff in the kitchen.

Cornett ran into the dining area past Kelley andDebaugh, yelling “Call IMS, call IMS.” (AnIncident Management System report alerts staffof a situation requiring attention.) Coy followedand pinned Kelley against a wall. When Kelleytried to jerk the shank from Coy’s hand, Coyslashed Kelley’s face with the shank and pushedhim to the floor.

Coy then followed Cornett, who fled throughthe exit door onto the Blue Yard. Debaughradioed an alert on her radio advising that anofficer was down and an inmate was chasinganother officer on the yard. Her report activatedthe unit’s IMS. Kelley and Debaugh then pur-sued Coy.7

The chase took them near the tower, to a pointclose to the blue gate entrance to the tower area,where Coy was stopped by several officersresponding to Debaugh’s IMS. Coy threatenedthe officers with his shank. The officers orderedCoy to drop his weapon and lie on the ground.After initially refusing to comply with theirorders, Coy finally lay down with his armsspread, but he did not release the shank. As theofficers approached him, he got back to his feetand again swung his shank at the officers. A cou-ple of corrections officers attempted to subdueCoy with pepper spray, but, it was ineffective.

Wassenaar Foils Coy’s Capture

Before the officers could take further action,Wassenaar, standing 20 to 25 feet away behindthe blue gate near the base of the tower, firedthrough the blue gate an undetermined numberof rounds (most estimates ranged from nine toten) from an AR–15 rifle toward Jones and theother officers. Seeing what appeared to be a

7 Immediately after DeBaugh issued the IMS, a male voice on theradio replied, “Negative, negative, negative.” It is possible that thevoice belonged to Wassenaar, trying to discourage responses to theIMS. Whether it was Wassenaar or a correctional officer, the “neg-ative” response may have contributed to the belief among someofficers that the IMS was a drill instead of an actual alert.


297

uniformed correctional officer holding the rifle,Jones asked the shooter whom he was firing at.Wassenaar shouted, “You, (expletive).” Jonesdirected all officers to clear the yard. Coy,standing alone in the yard, went to the Bluetower gate, from where Wassenaar let him intothe tower. Wassenaar and Coy were now in con-trol of the tower and of their hostages, Auch andDoe. Shortly after entering the tower, Coy sexu-ally assaulted Officer Doe.

In all, Wassenaar fired approximately 14 riflerounds during the early stage of the incident—approximately nine from the lower tower and atleast five from the upper tower. While it mayseem remarkable that Wassenaar’s shots, fromrelatively close range, failed to hit any humantargets, it is likely that firing through the gaterestricted his ability to effectively aim theweapon.

As the other officers withdrew to theAdministration building, Kelley, Debaugh,Jones, and Sgt. Andrew J. Kneidel ran to thedining facility, locked the outer door, and wentto the kitchen. Kneidel found Martin and thefemale worker in the kitchen office. The officersalso found and performed a head count of theinmates who had been locked in the dry storagearea. All officers and inmates were removedfrom the dining facility by the Tactical SupportUnit.

At the Administration building, Jones went intothe Deputy Warden’s conference room and start-ed to account for his staff. Two officers weremissing: Auch and Doe.

DOC ResponseCaptain Michael Forbeck was conductingperimeter checks at the Lewis Complex when heheard the shots fired by Wassenaar. After beingbriefed on the situation, Forbeck believed therewas a risk of the two inmates rushing the

Administration area, armed with weapons storedin the tower, in an attempt to escape. He organ-ized a defense of the Administration area, withshotguns loaded with birdshot. He also contact-ed the other Lewis units; ordered a Complex-wide shutdown; ordered Tactical Support Unit(TSU) assistance for the Morey Unit; andnotified the Buckeye Police Department, theMaricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and the localfire department.

At 5:25 a.m. on January 18, approximately 25minutes after Debaugh issued her IMS from theMorey dining facility, Department of Corrections(DOC) Southern Regional Operations DirectorMeg Savage received a page from the LewisComplex, advising her of a serious, unspecifiedinmate disturbance. Within the hour:

● The duty officer at the Lewis Complex wasadvised of the hostage situation, as wasDOC Division Director Jeff Hood, who, inturn, notified Lewis Complex WardenWilliam Gaspar.

● The DOC Tactical Support Unit (TSU),based at Perryville, was activated and placedon standby.

● DOC contacted the Arizona Department ofPublic Safety (DPS) to request the assign-ment of hostage negotiators.

Shortly after 6:30 a.m., Dennis Burke, Chief ofStaff to Governor Janet Napolitano, was notifiedof the incident. He in turn notified the Governorand other key staff members. DOC DirectorDora Schriro, who was out of state at the timeof the incident, returned to Arizona and arrivedat the Command Center at 11:30 a.m. TheCommand Center had been established earlier inthe morning at DOC headquarters in Phoenix.

The DOC Inmate Management System (IMS)policy establishes a command structure torespond to critical incidents. The incidentis managed locally by the onsite Incident

298


Commander (IC) and, depending on theseriousness of the situation, also from CentralOffice by the agency Incident Commander.During the Morey hostage situation, three com-mand centers were established: two onsite com-mand centers (one to manage the eventsoccurring in the tower and another to managethe day-to-day complex operation and complexperimeter security and coordinate tacticalmaneuvers occurring at the Lewis Complex RastUnit), in addition to the agency command center.

At the Lewis Complex, by 7:45 a.m. TSUsnipers were positioned on buildings surround-ing the tower, and DPS hostage negotiators,operating under DOC authority, and a DPSSWAT team were onsite. A Command Post wasset up in the Warden’s conference room. (By thetime the incident was resolved, a total of 30negotiators had been deployed—10 of whomactually conducted negotiations—from DPS,DOC, the Phoenix, Tempe, and Glendale policedepartments, the Maricopa County Sheriff’sOffice, and the FBI.)

Over 16 law enforcement agencies providedsupport and assistance during the course of theincident:

● DPS deployed over 230 officers, with a coreelement during the incident of about 75detectives and officers and surveillancespecialists.

● The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Officeprovided over 100 field force personnel.

● The FBI assigned approximately 100personnel.

One FBI commander noted that at any giventime at Lewis there was over 300 years of expe-rience in seeking negotiated and/or tacticalsolutions.

From the moment they were deployed, the tacti-cal teams were authorized to utilize their use-of-force policies.

TimelineThe following summary chronology and time-line of the 15 days of the hostage situation con-tains approximate times, and the panel willcontinue to examine the various accounts andwill supplement any significant discrepancies asthey are discovered.

Sunday, January 18

7 a.m. Wassenaar phones Captain BarbaraSavage, Morey Unit Chief of Security, toadvise her that Auch has a head injury andneeds medical attention. Wassenaar wantsto trade Auch for a lieutenant or sergeant.Savage refuses. Wassenaar demands a heli-copter and a pizza. He also warns that ifeither of the inmates is killed, the other willkill the hostage officers.

8:05 a.m. A DPS negotiator makes phone con-tact with Wassenaar. The call lasts sevenminutes.

8:20 a.m. Wassenaar demands that he receivehandcuff keys and that he be allowed to talkto Warden Gaspar and Governor Napolitano.He repeats his demand for a helicopter.

8:20–11:20 a.m. Negotiators have variousconversations with Wassenaar, in which hebacks off from his demand for a helicopter,demands an AM/FM radio, describes thehostages’ injuries, and allows officers tospeak briefly to one hostage.

11:19 a.m. Negotiators on the phone withWassenaar play a tape-recorded messagefrom his sister, pleading for him to end thesituation peacefully.


299

11:38 a.m. Negotiators share with Wassenaar theplan to deliver a handcuff key in exchangefor bullets.

12:36 p.m. Wassenaar demands to talk to atelevision news crew.

12:30–5:30 p.m. Various phone conversationsoccur between negotiators and Wassenaar.

5:25 p.m. A DPS robot delivers an AM/FMradio to the inmates.

Throughout the day, the Special Operations Unitof the Arizona Department of Public Safetydeveloped a series of detailed, comprehensivetactical resolutions of the hostage situation,based on a variety of scenarios.

Evening. Negotiations continue on conditionsfor delivering a key to the inmates.

Monday, January 19

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continuefrom time to time throughout the day.

6:52 a.m. DPS robot delivers a radio battery forthe two-way radio already in the tower, plusone handcuff key, a radio charger, andcookies.

7:52 a.m. Inmates return the handcuff key alongwith three shotgun shells and nonlethal rub-ber ball rounds used for crowd control.

1:08 p.m. DPS robot delivers cigarettes, hygienesupplies, bottled water, and styrofoam cups.

1:18 p.m. Inmates turn in wooden, nonlethalprojectiles.

3 p.m. At the Command Center, GovernorNapolitano and key staff members receivetheir daily briefing from DOC DirectorSchriro, key DOC staff, and interagency per-sonnel (Governor’s daily briefing) along with

periodic phone updates throughout the dayand night.

Tuesday, January 20


12:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

1:22–1:38 p.m. DPS robot delivers one handcuffkey, bottled water, soap, coffee, and ciga-rettes. In return, inmates allow negotiators tovisually confirm the correctional officersbeing held.

9:51 p.m. DPS robot delivers cheeseburgers,french fries, soft drinks, cigarettes, and cof-fee. In return, inmates turn in numerous typesof prescription drugs, two handmade shanks,a canister of Mace, and a cartridge for a37mm firearm.

11 p.m. A health and welfare check is conductedwith hostages via two-way radio.

Wednesday, January 21


8 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

12:20 p.m. DPS robot delivers Tylenol and threesmall cups. In return, inmates return two pep-per spray gas canisters.

12:22 p.m. Inmates fire pepper spray gas intothe yard after they discover that a nearbyfence had been cut.

7:29 p.m. Negotiators receive voice confirma-tion of the alertness of both hostages.

300


Thursday, January 22


9:30 a.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

10:29 a.m. Wassenaar asks to speak to a televi-sion reporter, answering questions thereporter would fax to him.

12:15 p.m. Negotiators give inmates InterstateCompact letters from other states to review.

3:20 p.m. Both correctional officers appearbriefly on the roof, allowing for a visualwelfare inspection.

9:30 p.m. Governor’s daily briefing.

Friday, January 23



4:50 p.m. Wassenaar demands to speak to areporter on live radio.

8:45 p.m. Negotiators discuss with Wassenaarthe terms of releasing one correctionalofficer.

Saturday, January 24



3:15 p.m. DPS robot delivers roast beef, driedbeans, summer sausages, tortillas, potatochips, soft drinks, cheese, tuna, mayonnaise,and candy bars. This represents half of thefood the inmates requested. The other halfwould be delivered after the safe release ofan officer.

3:20 p.m. First hostage release. The inmatesrelease Correctional Officer Auch from thetower (negotiators had made several over-tures to the inmates to release Officer Doefirst). He is examined by medical personneland interviewed by TSU members beforebeing transported by ground ambulance andhelicopter to Good Samaritan Hospital inPhoenix. Auch was treated for injuries,including an orbital fracture that requiredsurgery. He was also interviewed at the hos-pital by members of the DOC CriminalInvestigation Unit, who were gatheringinformation to support the eventual criminalreferral against the two inmates.

3:38 p.m. SWAT team members deliver secondhalf of the food request: cheeseburgers,french fries, pizzas, cigarettes, and cheese.

7:15 p.m. Negotiators hear the voice ofCorrectional Officer Doe during a conversa-tion with Coy, confirming her alertness.

Sunday, January 25

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continuefrom time to time throughout the day. Familymembers of one inmate arrive in Arizona toserve as third-party intermediaries.

10 a.m. At the Command Center, GovernorNapolitano and key staff members receivetheir daily briefing from DOC DirectorSchriro, key DOC staff and interagency personnel.

Monday, January 26




301

Tuesday, January 27



5:05–5:10 p.m. SWAT team members delivertowels, blankets, and washcloths. In return,inmates move Doe to the observation deck,making her visible to negotiators for a wel-fare check.

5:32 p.m. Wassenaar asks to be interviewed onradio as a term of his release, as confirma-tion that the State will make good on theterms.

Wednesday, January 28

Negotiations via phone and/or radio continue onand off throughout the day. Family members ofthe other inmate arrive in Arizona to assist innegotiations.


12:28 p.m. SWAT team members deliverhygiene products for the inmates and Doe inreturn for a health and welfare check of Doe.

2:21 p.m. Negotiators hear Doe in the back-ground of a phone call with Wassenaar,confirming her alertness.

Thursday, January 29



3:40 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinna-mon rolls, tortillas and cigarettes, in returnfor a health and welfare check of Doe con-ducted by a paramedic.

10 p.m. Governor and key staff meet withDirector Schriro and key DOC staff regard-ing the progress of negotiations, including ademand by Wassenaar to be interviewed onradio. The Governor recommends that theradio interview of Wassenaar not be playedlive without an agreement by the inmates tosurrender and release Officer Doe safely.

Friday, January 30



3:36 p.m. SWAT team members deliver cinna-mon rolls, Pedialite, Gatorade, and ciga-rettes, in return for a health and welfarecheck of Doe.

7:16 p.m. Doe is interviewed by a physician fora health and welfare check.

Saturday, January 31


10 a.m. Key staff to the Governor receive thedaily briefing at the Command Center fromDirector Schriro and key Corrections staffand interagency personnel.

3:56 p.m. SWAT team members deliver anonion, bread and Gatorade.

5:22 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the observationdeck holding a shotgun backwards in hisright hand.

7:17 p.m. Doe is interviewed via phone by aphysician for a health and welfare update.

8:08 p.m. SWAT team members deliver tuna,Pedialite and cigarettes.

302


Sunday, February 1

9:20 a.m. A third-party intermediary, an uncleof inmate Coy, is on the phone.

10:04 a.m. Wassenaar identifies the negotiatorwith whom he wants to deal and discussessurrender demands. Additional demands aremade once the designated negotiator isonsite.

10:14 a.m. Doe’s voice is heard; she says thatshe is “fine.”

11:04 a.m. Cigarettes are delivered to inmates.

11:29 a.m. Inmates make demands:

● Turn on power for bathroom access.

● Wassenaar: talk to his sister.

● Coy: hear a tape of his ex-wife.

● Property in van.

● Paperwork confirming no DOC or coun-ty custody for future court proceedings.

● Clothing.

● Steak, beer, and pizza.

11:52 a.m. Governor Napolitano arrives atCentral Command.

12:35 p.m. Negotiators play a tape of Coy’s ex-wife.

12:51 p.m. Doe is observed on the roof of thetower with Wassenaar. She does not leavehatch area.

1:26 p.m. Call with Wassenaar’s sister.

2:04 p.m. Wassenaar calls to say that the poweris not turned on, there will be no contact withDoe, and he will have additional demands in24 hours. If, by that time, the power is notturned on and the additional demands are notmet, there will be no contact for 48 hours,and he will have additional demands.

2:39 p.m. The power is switched on.

2:46 p.m. Wassenaar fires 37mm multiple batonrounds (nonlethal).

2:57 p.m. Wassenaar reports no power.

3:13 p.m. Two inmate uniforms, includingunderwear, socks, and shoes, and copies ofrevised paperwork are delivered to theinmates. Wassenaar states that he may havedisabled the power in the tower. Steaks,baked potatoes, beer, and soft drinks aredelivered to the tower.

3:39 p.m. DOC Director Schriro gives theGovernor a status report.

3:41 p.m. A key is delivered to the inmates toallow them to access the first floor to use thebathroom and to clear obstacles and traps tofacilitate opening the door and the exit of theinmates and hostage.

3:47–4:18 p.m. The key is determined to beunusable, and a second key is delivered.

4:25 p.m. Coy is seen at the hatch.

4:39 p.m. Governor Napolitano calls for anupdate.

5:16 p.m. Contact is initiated to discussspecifics of the surrender process. Coy saysto call back.

5:19 p.m. Governor returns to CentralCommand.



5:52 p.m. Wassenaar calls. There is discussionabout the specifics of exiting the tower.


303

6:17 p.m. Wassenaar appears on the roof in anorange uniform, signifying that the door isclear for opening by the tactical team.

6:20 p.m. The tactical team approaches thetower, opens the door and props it open witha sandbag. The team then retreats approxi-mately 10 yards.

6:25 p.m. Hostage situation comes to an end.Wassenaar walks out with his hands up. Hecomplies with the order to turn around andlay on the ground and is restrained. Doeexits the tower next; she is recovered by atactical team and removed to the Administra-tion building and an awaiting ambulance.Coy exits the tower and is taken into custodyand restrained.

6:32–7:08 p.m. Doe is examined and treated inthe ambulance. She is then flown by helicop-ter to Good Samaritan Hospital in Phoenix,where she is treated for injuries sustainedduring the hostage incident, interviewed byDOC Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU)investigators, and reunited with her family.

6:51 p.m. Governor Napolitano and DirectorSchriro depart the Lewis Complex for GoodSamaritan Hospital.

7:34 p.m. Wassenaar and Coy are taken to theMorey Unit’s Blue side visitation striparea/noncontact visitation area, where theyare photographed by DOC CIU investigators,strip-searched by Bureau of Prison (BOP)personnel, and provided with BOP jump-suits. Their clothing and other evidenceseized from the inmates are placed in con-tainers and maintained by a CIU specialinvestigator.

Medical staff check the inmates’ vital signsprior to transportation to the federal correc-tions institution in Phoenix, where they areisolated from each other.

Wassenaar and Coy are served with searchwarrants for personal characteristics by aDOC criminal investigator. The search war-rant is executed by SANE (Sexual AssaultNurse Examiner) staff from ScottsdaleHealth Care, who collect the sexual assaultprotocol as directed by the search warrant.

Wassenaar and Coy are advised of theirMiranda rights. Wassenaar invokes his rightto counsel, and Coy declines to be ques-tioned.

Findings and RecommendationsGovernor Napolitano’s February 10, 2004,action plan for investigating the incident at theMorey Unit included the appointment of anAdministrative Review Panel made up of lawenforcement and corrections professionals to:(a) reconstruct the sequence of events leading upto the inmates’ seizure of the Morey Unit tower,(b) identify issues that directly or indirectly con-tributed to the incident or could give rise to sim-ilar incidents, and (c) recommend practices toimprove security and staff safety.

The Administrative Review Panel comprised:

● Roberto Villaseñor, Assistant Chief, TucsonPolice Department.

● John Phelps, Deputy Director, ArizonaOffice of Homeland Security.

● Michael Smarik, Division Director, SupportServices, Arizona Department ofCorrections.

The Administrative Review Panel consulted withthe following subject matter experts throughoutthe review process: Lt. John Stamatopoulos,SWAT and Bomb Commander, Tucson PoliceDepartment; Thomas McHugh, Administrator,Criminal Investigations Bureau, ArizonaDepartment of Corrections; and Greg Lauchner,Administrator, Special Services Bureau, ArizonaDepartment of Corrections.

304


Many of that panel’s recommendations areincorporated into this section, and the BlueRibbon Panel acknowledges, with deep grati-tude, the painstaking and professional manner inwhich the Administrative Review Panel fulfilledits mission.

Contents: This preliminary report’s findingsand 69 recommendations are presented in anorder that parallels the chronology of theattempted escape and hostage taking. The issuesdiscussed are:

● A. Inmate security.

● B. Yard security.

● C. Kitchen security and procedures.

● D. Tower security, procedures, and usage.

● E. Defensive tactics, techniques, and procedures.

● F. Communications.

● G. Individual and unit response.

● H. Interagency delivery of tactical,intelligence-gathering, and negotiation activities.

● I. Resolution of the hostage situation.

● J. Administrative, policy, and budget issues.

A. Inmate Security

Lethal weapons in the possession of inmatesconstituted a leading causative factor in thehostage situation.

Finding: Inmates were searched upon departurefrom their housing unit, but the kitchen securitypost order requiring a pat-down search of theinmate kitchen crew upon arrival was not fol-lowed. This provided an opportunity for inmatesto retrieve weapons or other contraband secretedin the yard and to go undetected at the kitchen.8

Finding: Officers conducted hurried and less-than-adequate pat-down searches of Wassenaar,Coy, and the other members of the inmatekitchen crew. The panel concluded from otherofficer statements and indicators that the qualityof this pat-down search was not unusual.

Finding: Same-sex pat-down searches arepreferable but not mandated.

Finding: Although the panel could not deter-mine how the shanks in this incident were madeor brought into the dining facility, it is clear thatwithout their use Wassenaar and Coy’s effective-ness would have been greatly reduced.

Recommendations

1. Review and enforce search procedures uponarrival at the kitchen. Determine whereother gaps in search coverage may exist thatwould provide inmates opportunities to pickup contraband and weapons as they transitareas.

2. DOC should continue to practice cross-gender pat-down searches when necessary.

3. Establish a Special Contraband Squad(SCS), either statewide or with one squad ineach of the two regions, the sole function ofwhich would be to conduct random, unan-nounced searches of prison units for contra-band and weapons. SCS searches would besupported by the latest available detectionequipment technology and trained canines.The SCS would be specially trained in thelatest detection methods, uses of equipment,and methods employed by inmates to secretcontraband. The selected unit would be

8 It is possible that the shanks were hidden in the kitchen.Although records indicate that a contraband search of the kitchenoccurred at 1:00 a.m., there is no evidence as to the quality andextent of the search. The inmates may have had their weaponswhen they left the housing unit (which would indicate that the pat-down was insufficient), or the weapons were in the yard, or theweapons were in the kitchen, possibly implicating an absentcivilian kitchen worker.


305

placed on lockdown as soon as the SCSarrives onsite, and the SCS would beaccompanied by unit mid-level and base-level supervisory staff during the search. Allareas of the selected unit would be searchedduring the lockdown. No shift change ormovement of inmates would be permittedduring the search. Only those officials withan absolute need to know would be informedof the pending search and then only at thelast minute.

4. All incoming staff, contractors, and visitorsand their possessions should be scannedand/or searched for contraband prior togaining access to the unit. If contraband isdetected, discretionary progressive punitivemeasures should be imposed, ranging froma warning to dismissal and/or prosecution.

5. All post orders should be reviewed to assurethat explicit direction is given relative toinmate search requirements prior to move-ment within the unit perimeter and when theinmate returns from travel outside the unit.The review should focus on minimizing theability of inmates to access hidden contra-band prior to entering less secure areas.Consideration should be given to changingsearch methods on a random rotational basisto disrupt predictability. Search require-ments should be strictly enforced by super-visory personnel, including personalunannounced oversight.

6. Shanks are a continual and recurring prob-lem in the corrections world. Current proce-dures and methods for preventing themanufacture and uncovering the conceal-ment of fabricated weapons must be empha-sized and regularly tested. Additionally,DOC should consider whether state-of-the-art detection systems not already employedcould be brought to bear in this area.Technology notwithstanding, the last lineof defense for the detection of fabricated

weapons is the individual vigilance andcompetence of correctional officers andtheir leaders.

7. DOC should review protocols for unit con-traband searches to emphasize thorough-ness, unpredictability and consistency.

B. Yard Security

Finding: Inmates may hide weapons or contra-band under gravel.

Recommendation

8. Consider removing gravel or other softmaterials from the yards and replacing themwith a more stable groundcover that is lesslikely to provide cover for weapons orcontraband.

C. Kitchen Security and Procedures

The following factors created conditions in thekitchen area that significantly compromisedsecurity and, thus, contributed to the incident.

Finding: The inmates were too familiar withofficer routines.

Finding: Kitchen duty was inappropriate for thetwo violent offenders.

Finding: Kitchen office door was left unsecure.Open access to the kitchen provided the oppor-tunity for inmates to take control of unit person-nel, communications systems, and weapons.

Finding: Delivery of kitchen utensils requiredhand-to-hand delivery via open kitchen officedoor. The doors to the kitchen and toolroommust be opened to pass kitchen tools to inmates.It became impractical and inconvenient torepeatedly open and lock those doors when thekitchen was active.

306


Finding: Kitchen post required only one officer.Inmates could easily overpower the solitary offi-cer on duty during the graveyard shift, unob-served by the rest of the unit. When the incidentbegan, Correctional Officer Martin by himselfwas in charge of 19 inmates.

Finding: The kitchen area was unmonitored.Although the dining halls outside the kitchenareas were monitored by video cameras, therewere no audio or video monitors in the kitchenarea.

Finding: A contract kitchen worker was absentwithout explanation on the morning of the inci-dent and has refused to cooperate with theinvestigation.

Recommendations

9. Rotate inmates’ work assignments andschedules so that they have less opportunityto familiarize themselves with officers’routines and work habits.

10. Dangerous inmates should be limited intheir work assignments, and inmates withlife or long-term sentences should be strictlylimited in their range of job duties.

11. DOC or other appropriate authorities shouldinterview the contracted kitchen stafferswho worked at the Morey Kitchen for atleast six months preceding the hostageincident. Any potential complicity shouldbe thoroughly investigated.

12. The door to the Kitchen Office shouldremain locked at all times unless it isopened to allow a correctional officer toenter or exit. A standoff distance should beestablished in the kitchen that an inmatecannot cross. If this area is occupied, thedoor should remain locked until it is clear(e.g., a line painted red at the entrance to theramp that leads up to the office).

13. DOC should consider methods that willeliminate the need to pass kitchen utensilsin a hand-to-hand manner. For example, apassthrough security drawer to deliverutensils, operated by the kitchen officer,could be installed.

14. Utensils and tools should be secured. Thisaction may be less necessary at low-levelunits, but the administration at such unitsshould utilize caution before implementingsuch a policy.

15. Two correctional officers should be postedin the kitchen area at all times.

16. Place high-resolution video cameras in thekitchen area to provide visibility of inmateactivities from the facility’s main controlarea. Camera feed should be live-monitoredinstead of merely being recorded for after-the-fact review.

D. Tower Security, Procedures, and Usage

The following factors created conditions regard-ing access to the central tower that significantlycompromised security.

Finding: Excessive tower access points exist.Multiple entryways into the tower providedinmates opportunities for access. (Wassenaarentered from the Red Yard, Coy from the Blue.)

Finding: There were no established positiveidentification protocols.

Adult Prison Population

• There are approximately 32,000 inmates in the DOC system.

• There are 6,146 CO IIs.


307

Finding: The tower was subject to multiple usesfor which it was not intended. Uses includedstorage of a variety of items, including medicinefor distribution to inmates. The panel believesthat this offered inmates opportunities to gatherintelligence about the tower, such as design,layout, the function of the spline gates anddoors, etc.

Finding: Inmate movements were not observedfrom the tower. There is no evidence to indicatethat the movement of Wassenaar, Coy, and otherkitchen crew inmates was observed by officersas they moved from their housing units to thekitchen. Wassenaar’s exit from the kitchen andmovement to the tower was also unobserved.Such lack of observation provided opportunitiesfor inmates to circumvent security and reducedthe unit’s situational awareness.

Finding: Tower post duties were inadequatelydefined. Post order duties lacked specificity anddid not clearly require observation of the yardat all times, particularly when inmates werepresent.

Finding: Post order instructions regardingweapons deployment were not followed. OfficerDoe reported that she could not reach theAR–15 to defend herself from Wassenaar. Evenif she had reached it, the weapon was unloadedas directed by unit supervisors.

Recommendations

17. DOC should review the need to staff thecentral towers at Lewis and other architec-turally similar institutions in the DOCsystem.

Recommendations 17–26 should be consideredif a decision to staff the central tower iscontinued.

18. Nonremovable listening devices should beinstalled in the tower.

19. DOC should improve cameras, cameralocation and lighting at all controlled entrypoints to the tower to allow for positiveidentification of persons seeking entry.

20. The tower should be accessed only at oneentry point. The panel recommends limitingaccess from the Administration buildingspline. Lewis Post Order 051 should berevised to include specific instructions onentry and exit from the tower. The practiceof “buzzing in” people from the upper floorsor not confirming identification on a face-to-face basis should be considered a seriousbreach of performance standards.

21. On the longer term, DOC should review theoperational and tactical merits of maintain-ing lethal and less-than-lethal weapons andmunitions in a central tower location withina secured perimeter.

22. DOC should require post-specific trainingpertaining to the tower.

23. Only shift-assigned tower staff, tower reliefstaff and shift supervisors should be allowedto access the tower without the shift com-mander’s direct approval.

24. DOC should review tower design and makemodifications necessary to allow full opera-tions from the second level.

25. DOC should review, modify as needed, andstrictly enforce tower post orders to ensureconsistency of tower operation, with empha-sis on security.

26. The tower should always be staffed withtwo qualified officers, both armed withsidearms at all times. When granting accessto the tower, one officer should remain atthe observation level while the second offi-cer acquires positive identification.

27. Tower and munitions should be kept at “atthe ready” at all times when the tower isstaffed. Weapons stands are probably the

308


most effective way of keeping weaponsready accessible.

E. Defensive Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures

Finding: Correctional officers were unable todefend themselves or others using individual orsmall unit defensive tactics. This was a majorfactor in the ability of the inmates to subdueofficers, escape capture and seize the tower.

Finding: Use of OC pepper spray canisters wasineffective. Studies have shown that it is nearlyimpossible to use pepper spray to thwart anattack by an individual armed with an edgedweapon, where the attacker is closer than 21 feetfrom the intended victim. Further, an OC canis-ter is an ineffective tool against a knife becauseit is not possible to get close enough to producethe desired results.

Finding: Post Order 051 is inconsistent withDepartment Order 804 Inmate Behavior Control.Six sections specify when an officer is author-ized to use lethal force. Section 1.2.6 is the onlysection that discusses serious bodily harm;9 allother authorized uses of lethal force have to bepredicated on a belief that an inmate is attempt-ing to use lethal force or attempting escape.Unfortunately, “serious bodily harm” is notcontained in PO 051. Section 051.06.8.1 reads,“Deadly force is justified when it is immediatelynecessary to protect any person from attempteduse of unlawful deadly physical force by anoth-er and to prevent an escape.” As the “ultimatesafeguard,” the tower officer and all staff musthave confidence and trust in each other. Theymust trust that, if they are attacked by an inmateposing a threat and showing intent of seriousbodily harm, lethal force will be authorized.

Recommendations

28. Modify PO 051.06.8.1 to includeDepartment Order 804.07.1.2.6. Reinforcethe knowledge and understanding of thatorder in training and exercises.

29. Consider adding other, more effective less-than-lethal weapons for day-to-dayoperations of correctional officers. Thisconsideration should be to integrate suchsystems into standard operations rather thanlimiting those capabilities to specialsituations.

30. All DOC employees and contractors whodirectly interface with inmates shouldreceive realistic training in self-defense tac-tics. Such training should be integrated intoinservices refresher training programs.

31. Correctional officers should receiveenhanced and realistic training in hand-to-hand, weapons, and small-unit defensivetactics. Such training should be integratedinto inservices training. Consider requir-ing minimum qualification standards andrecognition/certification programs foradvanced proficiency, which would beconsidered in assignment decisions andoperational planning.

F. Communications

Finding: Monitoring throughout the facilitydoes not appear to take full advantage oftechnology.

Finding: Officers have little ability to covertlyrequest assistance. After they were takenhostage, Officers Martin and Doe were forced torespond over unit communications systems toother officers in the facility. Their forcedresponses falsely indicated that they weresecure. 9 “. . . when it is necessary to prevent an inmate from taking

another person hostage or causing serious bodily harm to anotherperson . . .”


309

Recommendations

32. DOC should review current communicationsystems with the emphasis on improvingperformance. Such review should includereducing dead areas, the benefits of encryp-tion, specialized distress capability, batterydependency, and radio durability.

33. DOC should review units’ audio and visualmonitoring capabilities and consider retro-fitting key facilities with embedded sensorsand cameras for regular monitoring ofactivities.

34. Establish a simple distress signal. Evidencesuggests that inmates had gathered intelli-gence on communication procedures andradio codes. A distress signal would there-fore need to sound natural and part of aroutine response.

35. DOC should also consider investment inpersonnel monitoring—“man-down” orpersonal alarm—systems.

G. Individual and Unit Response

Finding: Correctional officers lacked situationalawareness. The collective lack of awarenessregarding this incident not only affected facilitysecurity but exposed officers and facilityemployees to harm.

Finding: There was ineffective response to anarmed inmate in the dining area. When Coyexited the kitchen, there were three officers inthe dining area. Officers were not equipped ortrained to respond effectively as a team to anarmed inmate.

Finding: Many officers failed to respond appro-priately to IMS calls. The frequency and mannerin which IMS simulations occur led to compla-cency on the part of most officers on duty at thetime of this incident. No codes or practices existto differentiate between an IMS simulation andactual occurrence.

Finding: Many officers in the Morey Unit haveless than a year in uniform.

Recommendations

36. Training (IMS simulations) should not occurduring duty hours. Occasionally, if supervi-sors want to test the performance of theirstaff on a fire drill or lockdown, on-unittraining would be recommended. However,training designed to test and evaluate tacti-cal responses, arrest procedures, use oflethal and less-than-lethal force, and evenmedical response should never be conductedwhere it could compromise security or beviewed by inmates. Exceptions may bemade only with the written approval of theDOC Director. Training should be as realis-tic as possible, but there should be no doubtin any staff member’s mind about whethera situation is a simulation or a real event.This is accomplished by never blendingduty assignments with training scenarios.

37. DOC sergeants must be recognized as afocal point of the agency and given thepower to address issues immediately. Thefirst-line supervisor is the unit’s eyes andears and can identify training deficiencies,operational issues and performance prob-lems. The sergeant should be highly visibleas he or she moves about the unit and con-ducts surprise inspections at various posts;this would help to eliminate reported unau-thorized visits to the tower and the leavingof assigned posts. It would also help addressthe allegations of officers bringing food intothe unit from outside the prison, proppingdoors open, conducting quick and ineffec-tive pat searches, etc.

38. On-duty training opportunities should beexplored, such as daily training items thatare presented and discussed at briefings orwhen supervisors conduct inspections.These training items can consist of incident

310


scenarios that are read or presented, requir-ing officers to discuss their answers withtheir supervisors.

H. Interagency Delivery of Tactical,Intelligence-Gathering, and NegotiationActivities

Finding: State and local law enforcementagencies regularly convene to practice tacticalmaneuvers. DOC does not routinely participatein those activities, nor do those activities regu-larly occur on the grounds of a State prisoncomplex.

Finding: State and local law enforcementagencies do not regularly convene to practicenegotiations. DOC does not participate in thoseactivities when they do occur, nor do thoseactivities occur on the grounds of a State prisoncomplex.

Finding: DOC and State and local law enforce-ment agencies do not know enough aboutState correctional facilities’ amenability tointelligence-gathering technologies and tacticalmaneuvers.

Recommendations

39. DOC and State and local law enforcementagencies should regularly convene to prac-tice tactical maneuvers. Some scenariosshould be conducted regularly on thegrounds of a State prison complex.

40. DOC and State and local law enforcementagencies should regularly convene topractice negotiations.

41. DOC, with assistance from federal, Stateand local law enforcement agencies, shouldevaluate DOC’s physical structures to iden-tify in advance of untoward events theiramenability to intelligence collection andtactical maneuvers. This information shouldbe kept onsite at each institution and updat-ed regularly.

I. Resolution of the Hostage Situation

Finding: It is the policy of DOC that there areno negotiations with hostage takers. Despite thatpolicy, in the situation at the Morey Unit therewere ongoing negotiations during the entire 15days.

Finding: With regard to the tactical response,the panel received testimony from correctionalemployees (who were not part of the tacticalteams) that they had heard of opportunities touse lethal force toward the two inmates duringthe standoff, but they were foregone due toalleged counterinstructions from superiors. Thistestimony was later refuted by numerous mem-bers of tactical teams, including both lead

Tactical Rules of Engagement forDouble Hostage Situations

1. Both inmates on roof, 100% positive identification, clear shot: Green light, shoot to kill.

2. One inmate with both hostages on roof, 100% positive identification, clear shot: Green light, shoot to kill.

3. Inmate, 100% positive identification, appears with lethal force directed at hostage(s): Green light, shoot to kill.

4. Inmate appears with lethal force, non-threatening: Red light, do not shoot.

5. Inmate appears on roof with one hostage: Red light, do not shoot.

In options 2 and 3, activation will also initi-ate the assault on the tower.


311

commanders of the tactical operation, DPSColonel Norm Beasley and Maricopa CountySheriff’s Office Assistant Chief Jesse Locksa.Indeed, Beasley categorically stated to thepanel, “There was never an opportunity to tacti-cally resolve this situation through sniper fire.”

Finding: DOC’s decision to transfer the inmatesout of their system is a common correctionsmanagement practice after hostage situations.This practice preserves the integrity of thestatewide security system; diminishes theinmates’ status in the prisoner society; andreduces potential legal liability. Indeed, DOChouses approximately 100 inmates from otherstate systems, including several as a result of theLucasville, Ohio, prison hostage incident in theearly 1990s.

Recommendations

42. DOC should review the communicationsthat occurred between negotiators and tacti-cal staff relating to the cutting of the fenceat the base of the Morey tower.

43. Due to the uniqueness of the situation andthe virtually impenetrable characteristics ofthe tower, the lack of acceptable tacticalsolutions available to authorities made nego-tiations a practical necessity. To be consis-tent with other law enforcement andcorrectional agencies, DOC should elimi-nate its nonnegotiation policy.

44. The use-of-force provisions of the rules ofengagement (above) were appropriate andshould be applied to future situations wheretheir use may be applicable.10 At the MoreyUnit, circumstances did not permit theexercise of those provisions.

J. Administrative, Policy, and BudgetIssues

Inmate Classification

Finding: The DOC inmate classificationsystem11 is cumbersome and unreliable and hasnot been evaluated since the 1980s. Other cor-rectional jurisdictions have developed moreeffective and efficient systems.

Recommendations

45. DOC should assess its inmate classificationneeds and seek national assistance in theenhancement, overhaul or replacement of itspresent system. DOC’s policies and proce-dures regarding protective segregation shouldbe reviewed as part of the assessment.

46. Public and Institutional (P&I) scores shouldbe more closely examined, and the officerswho work with an inmate should havemeaningful input into that inmate’s score.

47. Classification scores should be lessvulnerable to override.

48. Create a system that better ensures thatmore dangerous inmates do not work insensitive areas.

Inmate Assessment, Programming, andReentry

Finding: Good prison security and managementrequire more than just good correctional offi-cers; it takes a team approach.

Recommendation

49. DOC should evaluate the methods by which,upon intake, it assesses offenders’ crimino-genic and programming needs. It should fur-ther endeavor to provide appropriate levels

10 After the first hostage was released, the tactical rules of engage-ment were revised to reflect the change of circumstances.

11 Classification determines an inmate’s housing situation, workassignments, recreational opportunities, and supervision levels.

312


of programming in areas such as mentalhealth treatment, drug treatment and educa-tion. Programming should also be enhancedto assist offenders in successfully reenteringsociety upon release from prison.

Training

Finding: Testimony received from DOCemployees strongly suggests that uniformed andcivilian staff are undertrained and, in somecases, untrained in many areas, some critical.

Recommendations

50. As appropriate to carry out their responsibil-ities and ensure their personal safety, offi-cers, supervisors and civilian employeesshould receive continuing education andpractical training in areas that include, butare not limited to, the following: self-defense, weapons training, hostage situa-tions, post-specific training, weapons andcontraband searches, Fire Arms TrainingSimulator (FATS), cross-training with otherlaw enforcement agencies, Arizona PeaceOfficer Standards & Training (POST) certi-fication, and structured on-the-job trainingand mentoring.

51. At the Correctional Officer TrainingAcademy (COTA), cadets should receiveone full additional week of training dedicat-ed to self-defense and receive additionaltraining in hostage situations, rape preven-tion, and weapons.

52. Standards for admission to and graduationfrom COTA must not be compromised inresponse to vacancy rates or other tempo-rary situations.

53. New COTA graduates should enter serviceas a CO I. After a defined probationary peri-od, and additional on-the-job training, theyshould become eligible for promotion to COII.

54. DOC should implement a comprehensiveand systematic “Back-to-Basics” (B2B) pro-gram to ensure that core elements of securi-ty are being adhered to across the board.The B2B initiative should be designed toenable every prison to review security inregard to layout, personnel, habits, tradi-tions, training and other issues. B2B shouldinclude interviews with line staff to findout how they actually do the job and howthey should do the job, so that it can bedetermined whether security is being

Correctional Officer Turnover

A DOC survey covering the two-year periodfrom November 2001 through October 2003reveals the following:

• There are 6,146 CO IIs in the DOC system.

• There were 1,721 CO II resignations during the survey period.

• Not adjusting for multiple resignations from the same position, the two-year turnover rate was approximately 28%.

• 570 of the 1,721 resignations (33%) occurred during the employees’ first 12 months on the job.

• 1,008 of the resignations (58%) occurred during the first two years.

• 1,268 of the resignations (73%) occurred during the first three years.

• Only one in four CO IIs had more than three years of experience.

Source: Governor’s Office of StrategicPlanning & Budgeting


313

compromised by not adhering to postorders, or whether officers have devised abetter way to get desired results.

55. Civilian employees should receive trainingto help them understand and function safelyin a prison work environment.

Experience and Staffing

Finding: Inexperienced officers, when placedtogether in high-risk settings, are more likely tofail in the performance of their core functionsthan if they are teamed with more experiencedofficers.

Finding: Correctional facilities are understaffed.Correctional officer positions remain unfilledwhile the prison population grows every month.At the Lewis Prison Complex, of which theMorey Unit is a part, about 200 (or 19%) of the1,029 officer positions are vacant, on some daysforcing management to scramble to provide theminimum coverage. Of the 800-plus positionsthat are filled, half of the officers have two yearsor less of service (including their seven weeksof training at COTA). In many instances, juniorofficers are led by other junior officers whohave been prematurely promoted in order tomeet pressing needs. At the time of the hostagetaking, 14 of the 20 officers on duty were hiredin 2003 (i.e., had one year or less of experience).

Recommendations

56. DOC should formalize the blending of expe-rienced and inexperienced officers, leadingto “mentor/student” bonding that canenhance long-term officer success andretention. The mentoring program shouldbe formalized as a structured, agencywideCorrectional Training Officer (CTO) pro-gram that features formal training andrewards for experienced officers, at alllevels and positions, who act as mentors.

57. Additional staffing is necessary for allassignments within DOC in order to combatfatigue and burnout and to foster properemployee inservice training needs. Current“bare bones” staffing does not allow for theremediation of any of the above.

Pay, Recruitment, and Retention

Finding: DOC officers are underpaid, both inabsolute terms and in comparison to the payscales of other jurisdictions. The DOC pay scaleleads to family hardships, low morale and highattrition. A sergeant with ten years of experiencetestified at a public forum that he would be eli-gible for Food Stamps and AHCCCS benefits ifhis annual income were only $933 less. He alsosuffered a pay cut when he was promoted (mostsergeants are paid less than the officers theysupervise).

Finding: The Nevada Department of Correc-tions, which offers higher officer pay, recentlyset up a recruiting station at a Circle K near theCOTA facility outside of Tucson to lure acade-my graduates. After being trained at a cost toArizona taxpayers, half of the class went towork for the State of Nevada.

Finding: There is pay inequity between newrecruits and experienced officers. Elimination ofthe “Correctional Officer I” position during theprevious Administration created a situation inwhich a recent academy graduate enters serviceas a CO II, perhaps earning as much as a veter-an officer at the same grade.

Finding: Standards have been lowered. Qualifi-cations for sergeant have been diminished inrecent years in order to fill vacancies at thatlevel.

314


Recommendations

58. DOC should undertake a comprehensiveanalysis of its pay scale, including a com-parison with the pay scales of federal,county and municipal correctional entities inArizona and of surrounding states.

59. DOC should consider the reinstatement ofmerit increases and longevity pay.

60. DOC should restore the CO I position, reex-amine the qualifications for Sergeant, andundertake a comprehensive review ofDOC’s promotional policies to ensure theyare based on merit and performance, not“good old boy” relationships.

61. Pay must be commensurate with experienceand merit, and any promotion should resultin higher pay.

62. DOC should consider ways of communicat-ing to the public the difficulty of and dangerassociated with correctional service.

63. Survivors of officers killed in the line ofduty should receive benefits comparable tothe families of police officers and firefighters.

Professionalism

Finding: At the time of the hostage situation,the Morey Unit suffered from complacency anda general lack of professionalism. While moststaff performed admirably during the incident,there were many administrative errors in the

preceding months and years. During the panel’sinvestigation it became evident that numerousdeficiencies in supervision and performancecontributed to the hostage situation.

Recommendations

64. The DOC Director should utilize all avail-able information to determine what, if any,disciplinary action or change of assignmentis appropriate for those staff involved.

65. A systemwide review should take place todetermine whether this problem is pervasivein the system and, if so, to identify andimplement steps that could remedy theproblem.

Operational Audits

Finding: In 2000, DOC discontinued the prac-tice of conducting comprehensive operationalaudits of prison facilities.

Recommendation

66. Operational audits should be reinstated tohelp ensure effective management of prisonfacilities.

Staff/Inmate Communication

Finding: Good staff/inmate communication isimportant to maintaining good prison securityand operations.

Recommendations

67. DOC is encouraged to take steps to reviewcurrent policies, practices, and protocolsthat promote indirect, as opposed to direct,supervision of offenders and that inhibitgood communication between officers andoffenders.

68. DOC should consider piloting a prisonmanagement system, such as “Unit

Starting Compensation for Correctional Officers

Base Hiring Incentive Pay Bonus1 Bonus2 Total

DOC $24,950 $2,600 $2,495 $30,045Maricopa County 31,000 0 0 31,000

1Generally expires after the second year of service.2Available only to CO IIs at Lewis, Florence and Eyman.


315

Management,” at a prison that is architec-turally and operationally receptive to sucha concept.

Sentencing

Finding: The DOC system suffers from over-crowding. In the last year, DOC has set thehighest records of overcapacity and the Lewisfacility has regularly housed inmates in excessof its design capacity.

Recommendation

69. The State of Arizona should undertake acomprehensive review of its sentencingstatutes.

ConclusionThe hostage-taking incident that occurred at theMorey Unit was a tragic event that resulted inserious physical and emotional injury to correc-tional officers and facility employees. Likeother prison crisis situations in Arizona andelsewhere, it demonstrated the incredible dan-gers and challenges faced by correctionsprofessionals every day.

The two inmates exploited a series of small butcritical gaps in security that were further com-pounded by institutional complacency and a col-lective lack of situational awareness. Once facedwith the reality of the deadly situation inside thetower—the facility’s most secure and impenetra-ble feature—correctional officers and theirleaders responded quickly and effectively toestablish the conditions that ultimately led to thesuccessful release of hostages and recapture ofinmates without loss of life.

The lessons learned from this incident revalidatethe necessity of adequately and properly resourc-ing corrections operations. Of equal importanceis the need to acquire the essential qualities of acompetent and proud organization. Such quali-ties can be obtained only by investing in the peo-ple that dedicate themselves to the correctionsmission. They must be well trained and well led;and recognized often and fairly compensated.Although one can never guarantee that such anincident will not occur again, the panel believesthat much can be done to reduce that risk.

316


Incident CommandDirector Schriro

PIO: Jim RobideauVictim Rights: Dan LeveyLegal/Legislative Liaison: Amy BejelandLaw Enforcement Liaison: Bill Lackey Jerry Dunn

SupportSally DelbridgeJoy Swanson

Christinia CooperDumi Erno

Vanessa EnglishHeather Price

Judi Book

RecorderInv. Buchanan

Inv. MorrisInv. TokoshInv. Kelleigh

Jeff Nordaune

AdministrationDay: Mike SmarikSwing: Todd GerrishGY: John Martinez Rich Bluth Ed Encinas

OperationsDay: Charles MoorerSwing: David CluffGY: Judy Frigo

PlanningDay: James KimbleSwing: Donna ClementGY: Lyle Broadhead

LogisticsDay: James KimbleSwing: Chuck McVickerGY: Judy Frigo

DOC Central Office United Command Structure


317

Arizona DOC Unified CommandDirector Schriro

Environmental Quality ControlJohn Hallahan

Tower DeputyIncident Commander

Gaspar 0900–2100Rollins 0600–1800

Flanagan 2000–0800

Liaison(Runner)

Gay 0800–1800Fizer 2000–0800

(Family)O’Neil 0800–2000

Advisor SROD Savage

Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Outside Agencies

Fall Within This Command Structure

Operations

Staging

Unit Ops

Bachman Ops

Buckley Ops

Rast Ops

Barchey Ops

Morey Ops

Stiner Ops

Planning

Documents

Admin. Logistics

Medical Unit

Food Services

CISD

Family

Hostage

Staff

RecorderAlex Benlein

Normal Abble

Incident CommanderJeff Hood, Division Director,

Offender Services

InstitutionalIncident Commander

Vigil 1700–0500Hennessy 0500–1700

InterpreterTrujillo 1000–2200

IntelInvestigations

Tactical Negotiator

PIOBartos

Lewis Unified Command Structure

319

On August 21, 1992, information from the U.S.Weather Service suggested that a tropical stormnamed Andrew was taking a route that might hitthe Bahamas and then South Florida. TheFlorida Department of Corrections (DOC) sentout a teletype advising managers throughout theDepartment to monitor the storm’s progress. Italso advised each facility within the Departmentto designate a contact person in case the threatworsened. At Dade Correctional Institution (CI),the superintendent directed the duty officer, theshift officers in charge, and the control roomofficers to monitor the storm’s development byall means possible, including weather bandradio, commercial radio, and TV.

On Saturday, August 22, the tropical storm hadstrengthened into Hurricane Andrew. Its project-ed path continued to target Florida’s southeastcoast. At Dade CI, the superintendent and assis-tant superintendent went to the institution tosupervise the securing of the compound. Inmateworkers were used to remove loose items fromthe ground or to tie down or otherwise secureequipment. The superintendent also organized acontingency plan for a department heads’ meet-ing at 9 a.m. the following day to discuss evacu-ation plans.

On Sunday morning, August 23, the hurricanewas so imminent that the state government acti-vated its Emergency Operations Center and

began to evacuate low-lying areas along thesoutheast coast. DOC headquarters called ameeting of key personnel from the facilitieswithin the likely path of the hurricane to beginpreparation of those institutions. An immediatedecision was made to direct a small facility inthe Florida Keys, Big Pine Key Road Prison, toevacuate north out of the Keys to LantanaCorrectional Institution. That evacuation wascompleted without incident over the course ofthe next 9 hours.

At Dade CI, department heads and supervisorsreported for the 9 a.m. hurricane preparationmeeting. The superintendent decided to evacuateDade Work Camp (with 293 medium- andminimum-custody inmates) to the main prisonunit. Two inmates were moved to a local hospi-tal because of the seriousness of their healthproblems.

By midday Sunday, Hurricane Andrew carriedwinds of more than 150 miles per hour andseemed highly likely to strike Florida at FloridaCity, which would subject Dade CI to the fullforce of the center of the hurricane. Dade islocated 20 miles west of the coast but is only6 feet above sea level, and the force of the hurri-cane winds was expected to create a coastalwater surge of 12 feet or higher that could travelmany miles in from the coast. At 2 p.m., theDepartment decided to evacuate all inmatesfrom Dade CI to other state institutions.

Hurricane Andrew: FloridaDepartment of Corrections


320


To accommodate the approximately 1,000inmates from Dade CI, DOC located space atfive other state prisons. Two of these potentialtransfer sites were then eliminated because theyalso were close to the storm’s projected path andin potential danger. The Central FloridaReception Center was added to the list of receiv-ing institutions, and all available transfer busesand vans within the Department were dispatchedtoward Dade CI to begin transferring inmates:approximately 100 to Glades CI, 150 to MartinCI, 450 to the South Florida Reception Center,250 to the Central Florida Reception Center, andapproximately 100 to another state facility.

DOC also decided that the 76 inmates at thesmall Copeland Road Prison should be evacuat-ed to Hendry CI—a situation it quickly assessedas a timing problem. Although DOC had ade-quate transportation, space, and other resourcesto house the relocated inmates on an emergencybasis, it was not immediately clear that theseresources could be put in play in time to stayahead of the approaching hurricane.

At Dade CI, classification staff began to sortinmate transfers by custody level and psycho-logical profile. The administration decidedto move all close-custody inmates first, withminimum- and medium-security inmates to fol-low. Staff gathered inmate folders and medicalrecords to transport with the inmates. Vehiclesecurity was arranged at the rear gate of theinstitution, and additional perimeter securitywas added. The institution’s business managerprovided security staff with maps outlining thetravel routes to the various receiving institutions.Security staff were divided into teams forscreening inmates, searching inmates, andescorting them to the departure area. As the lastof the inmates were evacuated out of Dade CI,staff members at the institution began to preparefor the hurricane. Emergency supplies were

gathered, and staff prepared to ride out the hur-ricane in the administrative offices and themedical area.

At 10:30 p.m. on Sunday, the last inmates beingevacuated arrived at the Central FloridaReception Center. Approximately 1,000 inmateshad been moved on short notice to locations allover the southern half of Florida with noinjuries to staff or inmates and no escapes. AtDade CI, the superintendent sent staff home toevacuate their own families. A small number ofstaff volunteered to stay at the institution to pre-vent possible looting or poststorm damage. Atthe South Florida Reception Center the decisionwas to “defend in place” rather than to evacuateinmates. Staff were called to the institution tohelp maintenance staff tie down or secure equip-ment judged to be vulnerable to wind damage.Food and water were stockpiled within the dor-mitories, and handcuffs were distributed becausetransport to segregation housing would not bepossible during the storm.

When the hurricane hit, it caused only moderatedamage to DOC facilities, with the exception ofDade CI, where the damage was severe. Noother facilities were rendered uninhabitable. AtDade, sections of the roof were ripped away,allowing the wind-driven rain to soak largeareas of the facility. Windows were broken, theperimeter fence was essentially destroyed, andsome outbuildings were completely destroyed.The skeleton staff who stayed at the institutionduring the storm were shocked at the extent ofthe damage.

Late on Monday, August 24, some Dade CI staffreturned to the institution from the SouthFlorida Reception Center to try to help theremaining staff get to safety. They organized aconvoy to get staff out of the institution to theirhomes. The superintendent and assistant super-intendent toured the institution grounds with

Section 6. Case Studies: Hurricane Andrew

321

other staff to assess the damage and thenattempted to make contact with DOC headquar-ters or another institution to request help. Anindividual correctional officer arrived fromBroward CI. He had been sent to find out thestatus of Dade CI and had walked 5 miles to getto the institution because of the condition of theroads.

In addition to the damage it did to the institu-tion, the storm completely destroyed the homesof approximately 400 Department staff mem-bers. The following day, Tuesday, August 25,the secretary of corrections, along with theassistant secretary for operations and the inspec-tor general of the Department, arrived at DadeCI to thank the staff for their efforts in complet-ing the evacuation and to pledge support andassistance with the many personal problems thestaff were experiencing. The next day, August26, a meeting was held at DOC’s central officeto begin developing plans for rebuilding DadeWork Camp (target for completion: 45 days) andthe main prison.

On August 25, the day after the storm, the CivilAir Patrol established a radio communicationspost at Dade CI, the state fire marshal arrived,and a National Guard unit set up camp on thegrounds to provide perimeter security. DOC ini-tiated a number of recovery programs for staff,including providing free gasoline, water, ice,clothing, food, and household goods, as avail-able. The administrative building of the mainunit was kept open as a shelter for staff andfamily members who were without housing.Tools, roofing materials, electric generators, andother supplies were made available to employ-ees at no charge. The Department also coordi-nated applications for Federal EmergencyManagement Agency funds and established atoll-free number for staff and their families touse in arranging assistance.

DOC began to identify temporary housing loca-tions for homeless staff and their families—atotal of 1,000 people—and coordinated dona-tions of money to assist them. It also made amajor effort to keep track of and communicatewith the staff who were on special assignmentsto other institutions. Many of these staff hadstorm damage problems with their homes orother difficult situations resulting from the hurri-cane. Actual reconstruction work on Dade CIand the Dade Work Camp was initiated within48 hours after the damage assessment wascomplete.

Lessons Learned1. The Florida DOC’s comprehensive emer-

gency planning system provided an appro-priate framework for responding to thespecifics of the hurricane.

2. Because of the uncertainty of the hurri-cane’s path and the risks involved in evacu-ating large numbers of high-securityinmates, it was not practical to evacuateseveral institutions, nor was it practical toevacuate days before the storm hit. Thesecircumstances made fast, clear decisionmak-ing and leadership critically important forDOC once the storm’s landfall was certain.

3. Staff performed admirably at many loca-tions throughout the state, despite greatstress on some individual staff members.Staff gave first priority to their duty to DOCand the state, even in cases where theirhomes were threatened or the fate of lovedones was uncertain. Numerous staff volun-teered for particularly hazardous duty, suchas remaining at Dade CI for the duration ofthe hurricane. Individual acts of bravery andcompassion were common.

322


4. Inmate cooperation was apparent throughoutthe hurricane and its aftermath and wasessential to the evacuation and to the opera-tion of partially disabled facilities after thehurricane. DOC’s commitment to keepinginmates well informed contributed to thiscooperative spirit.

5. With some emergencies, particularly sometypes of natural disasters, the aftermath maybe more challenging than the response tothe event itself.

6. After the hurricane struck, communicationwith the most seriously damaged areas ofthe state was initially impossible andremained very difficult for a long time.Cellular telephone service was disabled (asituation that has not always occurred withother natural disasters, such as floods andearthquakes), because so many transmitterand repeater locations were damaged oversuch a wide area.

7. Approximately 2 weeks after the hurricane,22 staff from Dade CI still had not reportedto the institution or the Department. In amatter of days, DOC organized teams to gointo the local community to search for thesestaff. After the search teams failed to locateany of the 22 missing staff, further effortswere instituted to try to find them.

8. Because of the difficulty in establishingcommunication after a natural disaster, facil-ities should establish a date, time, and placefor staff to report before they leave duringan evacuation. For similar reasons, facilitiesshould establish a toll-free number foremergency assistance and disseminate thatnumber to staff before the actual event.

9. A mechanism for tracking employees tem-porarily assigned to different facilitieswould be a useful addition to the FloridaDOC’s emergency plan.

10. After the hurricane, the problems of dealingwith large numbers of homeless staff weremore difficult in many ways, and requiredmore creativity, than the formidable prob-lems of repairing badly damaged facilities.

11. When a large-scale evacuation of inmates isanticipated, DOC authorization of an emer-gency inmate processing and receivingpolicy will give the receiving institutionsflexibility in intake procedures. Alternatively,such an emergency policy may be a regularpart of a Department’s emergency plans.

12. Whenever practical, medical records shouldaccompany evacuated inmates to the receiv-ing institution. As a backup, it is helpful ifsome basic medical information is availablein a database or online so that it can beaccessed from any institution.

13. Lack of potable water will become a crisisfor an institution long before food delays orcold food cause serious problems. Also,arranging for food from external sourcesduring a communitywide emergency is fareasier than arranging for large quantities ofpotable water.

14. Departments should be prepared to movefood items from one facility to another and,if possible, should have at least one vehicle(a 24-foot truck, for example) designated forfood service use only.

15. Emergency plans should include provisionsfor an expert team that can evaluate fooditems for contamination and spoilage in thewake of a natural disaster.

16. The absence of attendance and leave recordsmay put the Department in a difficult posi-tion with regard to issuing paychecks. Thedistribution of paychecks to employees inthe aftermath of a communitywide disastermay also be challenging, and depositingpaychecks directly to bank accounts maynot be possible either if electronic fund

Section 6. Case Studies: Hurricane Andrew

323

transfers are not available, as was the casein Florida during the aftermath of HurricaneAndrew. In such emergencies, the Depart-ment may have to make arrangements topay employees in cash.

17. Emergency purchasing authority may be anabsolute necessity following a large-scaledisaster.

User Feedback Form

Please complete and return this form to assist the National Institute of Corrections in assessing the valueand utility of its publications. Detach from the document and mail to:

Publications FeedbackNational Institute of Corrections320 First Street N.W.Washington, DC 20534

1. What is your general reaction to this document?

______Excellent ______Good ______Average ______Poor ______Useless

2. To what extent do you see the document as being useful in terms of:

3. Do you believe that more should be done in this subject area? If so, please specify the types of assistance needed.____________________________________________________________________

4. In what ways could this document be improved? ________________________________________________

5. How did this document come to your attention? ____________________________________________

6. How are you planning to use the information contained in this document?__________________________

7. Please check one item that best describes your affiliation with corrections or criminal justice.If a governmental program, please also indicate the level of government.

_____ Citizen group _____ Legislative body_____ College/University _____ Parole_____ Community corrections _____ Police_____ Court _____ Probation_____ Department of corrections or prison _____ Professional organization_____ Jail _____ Other government agency_____ Juvenile justice _____ Other (please specify)

8. Optional:

Name: ____________________________________________________________________________

Agency: ____________________________________________________________________________

Address: __________________________________________________________________________

Telephone:__________________________________________________________________________

Useful Of some use Not useful

Providing new or important information

Developing or implementing new programs

Modifying existing programs

Administering ongoing programs

Providing appropriate liaisons


✂

National Institute of CorrectionsAdvisory Board

Collene Thompson CampbellSan Juan Capistrano, CA

Norman A. CarlsonChisago City, MN

Michael S. CaronaSheriff, Orange CountySanta Ana, CA

Jack CowleyAlpha for Prison and ReentryTulsa, OK

J. Robert FloresAdministratorOffice of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency PreventionU.S. Department of JusticeWashington, DC

Stanley GlanzSheriff, Tulsa CountyTulsa, OK

Wade F. Horn, Ph.D.Assistant Secretary for Children and FamiliesU.S. Department of Health and

Human ServicesWashington, DC

Byron Johnson, Ph.D.Department of Sociology and AnthropologyBaylor UniversityWaco, TX

Harley G. LappinDirectorFederal Bureau of PrisonsU.S. Department of JusticeWashington, DC

Colonel David M. ParrishHillsborough County Sheriff’s OfficeTampa, FL

Judge Sheryl A. RamstadMinnesota Tax CourtSt. Paul, MN

Edward F. Reilly, Jr.ChairmanU.S. Parole CommissionChevy Chase, MD

Judge Barbara J. RothsteinDirectorFederal Judicial CenterWashington, DC

Reginald A. Wilkinson, Ed.D.DirectorOhio Department of Rehabilitation

and CorrectionColumbus, OH

B. Diane WilliamsPresidentThe Safer FoundationChicago, IL

www.nicic.org