a fresh look at state shinto

American Academy of Religion

A Fresh Look at State ShintoAuthor(s): Wilbur M. FridellReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 547-561Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1462824 .Accessed: 11/09/2012 08:01

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JAAR 44/3 (1976) 547-561

A Fresh Look at State Shinto WILBUR M. FRIDELL

Abstract

Because of its extreme political sensitivity, the Japanese phenomenon retrospectively called State Shinto was the object of very little critical study during the "State Shinto period" itself (1868-1945). This was especially true of Japanese scholars; and among foreigners, even Daniel Holtom's excellent work focused too narrowly on the nationalistic roles of Shinto shrines.

Now that more objective postwar studies are appearing, it is possible to reappraise the place of State Shinto (a) within the Shinto world; and (b) beyond the Shinto world, in the larger context of Japanese nationalism.

Within the Shinto world, this essay deals particularly with the relationship between State and Shrine Shinto because of the distressing tendency of Western scholars to confuse, or virtually equate, these two types of Shinto during the pre-1945 decades. Granted, there were large areas of overlap between them, but also significant areas of divergence.

Moving beyond the Shinto world as such, State Shinto is placed within the broader context of Japanese nationalism as a whole. While State Shinto did in fact serve as one major component of Japanese nationalism, it combined with extra- Shinto elements (e.g., Confucianistic ethics) under the larger umbrella of kokutai (national essence, characteristics). It is more comprehensively accurate, therefore, to speak of "kokutai nationalism" than of "Shinto nationalism."

Until such fundamental relationships as these are clarified, research in prewar Shinto will inevitably suffer confusions and ambiguities. This article is a quest for orientation in these matters.

HERE is a certain confusion, especially in Western-language Japanese studies, as to the nature and role of what we have come to call State Shinto in the pre-1945 modem period of Japanese history. This is true within the

Shinto world, where we need clarification regarding the relation of State Shinto to other types of Shinto (such as Shrine Shinto) during those decades. It is also true

WILBUR M. FRIDELL is Associate Professor of Japanese religion in the Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara. He is the author of Japanese Shrine Mergers, 1906 - 12 (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973). He has published articles in Monumenta Nipponica and the Journal of Asian Studies, and he reviews for the Journal of the American Oriental Society.

547

548 WILBUR M. FRIDELL

beyond the Shinto world as such, as we attempt to understand State Shinto as one component in the larger context of Japanese nationalistic life and thought.

What follows is an effort to help illumine these matters in their broad outlines. It is predicated on the belief that we do well to step back and get the overall view as a guide to continued detailed studies. In that sense, this is a quest for orientation. Detailed studies, both by myself and many others, have brought me to the point where I feel the need for some kind of panoramic survey from the vantagepoint of the present.

We may begin by recognizing that, in Shinto studies, the years 1868-1945 are generally designated the "State Shinto period." What do we mean when we call these decades the State Shinto period? We do not mean, of course, that the national-state-imperial dimensions of Shinto tradition were important only during this modern time-span. Such things as saisei itchi (union of religious ceremony and government) and the mythological sanctification of the Imperial House obviously go back to very ancient times, and have operated to one extent or another in all periods of Japanese history. Neither do we suggest that, in saying "State Shinto," we have exhausted the meaning of Shinto for the modern prewar era. Other types of Shinto, such as Folk Shinto and Sectarian Shinto, played significant roles during the "State Shinto period."

What we do mean in designating 1868-1945 the "State Shinto period" is simply that, during these decades, Shinto elements came under a great deal of overt state influence and control as the Japanese government systematically utilized shrine worship as a major force for mobilizing imperial loyalties on behalf of modern nation-building. During that period of time state facts were the big facts in Shinto life.

I

THREE CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARS

Before taking up State Shinto as such, it is important to consider the larger context within which it operated in the State Shinto period. I shall do this by discussing the contributions of three contemporary scholars who have influenced my thinking in this area. The first is Robert Ellwood, Jr. of the University of Southern California.

I have long felt that some of the finest insights in the Shinto field have come through a broad sociological analysis of the data. Now Ellwood confirms my own intuition with the following statement in what might be called the Durkheimian tradition. I quote from Ellwood's book, The Feast of Kingship:

Shinto is not basically rites of productivity in the fields, much less the 'nature- worship' of earlier commentators. While such secondary meanings, rightly interpreted, may not be excluded, it is essential to understand that the fundamental thrust of Shinto, ancient and modern, is sociological. That is, it is concerned with the life of social groups, from hamlet to nation, and their collective symbols and sources of power.'

Implicitly recognized here is the fact that Shinto, with its powerful group orientation, has contributed much to the sanctification of basic Japanese collectivities. At the grassroots level Shinto has functioned in homes, and has been

'Robert Ellwood, Jr., The Feast of Kingship, Accession Ceremonies in Ancient Japan (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973), pp. 42-43. Italics added.

A FRESH LOOK AT STATE SHINTO 549

the primary religious focus of local community life. Local communities, typically hamlets, have acquired a certain sanctity through such practices as religious festivals and the worship of hamlet ancestors as sacred kami (spirits, deities). At the national level, mythology has both reflected and sustained the view that Japan (and its rulers) were sacrosanct. Thus, especially during the State Shinto period, basic groups from home-and-hamlet to the nation itself were viewed as "holy communities"2 charged with sacred noumenal overtones. These groups, together with their sacral symbols and revered heads, constituted "religion" in a genuinely authentic Japanese mode. Indeed, as one gets behind the forms of conventional institutionalized religion to the heart of Japanese sacred values, it becomes increasingly difficult to draw a clear distinction between what is "religious" and what is "social."

We turn next to Edward Shils and his illuminating concept of a sacred center at the teart of societies. While Shils wrote with Western societies primarily in mind, I believe his observations throw considerable light on the prewar Japanese scene. Shils' opening statement runs essentially as follows:

Society has a center . ... The centre, or the central zone, is a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the centre of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the society. It is the centre because it is the ultimate and irreducible; and it is felt to be such by many who cannot give explicit articulation to its irreducibility. The central zone partakes of the nature of the sacred.3

Shils elaborates on this by saying that a society is informed by a central value system, which takes its impetus from the sacred center. This value system is espoused by the elites of society, who identify themselves with the sacred center and share its charismatic authority. The sacred center is grounded in a cosmic order, which serves as transcendent norm and ultimate legitimation both for the central value system and the central institutional system (e.g., economic, political, ecclesiastical and educational institutions). Kinship and family systems, of smaller radii, are microcosms of the central institutional system and tend to buttress it. To varying degrees, people feel a need to belong to the transcendent order and to participate in the sacred center. This they do through contact with society's sacred symbols, even if only intermittently on special occasions. Many people are more or less apathetic about the sacred center, its values and symbols, while a few may be outright alienated or hostile. It is, however, the nature of the authority enjoyed by society's elite to be expansive: that is, the elite wish to obtain universal acceptance within their society of the sacred order and norm of which they are the privileged custodians; and they undertake activities which promise to maximize that acceptance.

As suggested above, Shils' basically Western analysis does not fit the Japanese case in every respect. For instance, the idea of transcendence would have to be handled very carefully in the Japanese situation, and a special role would have to be recognized for the revered heads of basic social groups. Nevertheless, there is much in Shils' contribution which is useful in explicating that sanctity which the Japanese have so characteristically found in the social matrix.

2Borrowed from Joseph Kitagawa. See his Religions of the East (enlarged ed., Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), ch. I.

3Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," in The Logic of Personal Knowledge, Essays Presented to Michael Polyani on his Seventieth Birthday, 11th March 1961 (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), p. 117. I am grateful to Delmer Brown for introducing me to this article.


Adapted to the Japanese scene during the State Shinto period, the sacred center would be the inseparable complex of state-nation-emperor, grounded in the cosmic order of kokutai (literally, nation-body; national structure, character, polity, essence, characteristics).4 Kokutai took the physical "nation-body" and lifted it to the metaphysical level of that universal structure within which Japanese national life worked out its destiny. It was a brilliant mystical ideal, elusive and appealing, sanctioned by the national myths intimately associated with ancient Shinto tradition.

The central Japanese value system stressed, above all, loyalty to the sacred center of state-nation-emperor. Within the central institutional system, all institutions were seen as units of a pyramiding family-state, or family-nation (kazoku kokka), over which the emperor presided as the supreme national father- figure. Kinship groups, which served as microcosmic prototypes for the national family, trained the Japanese people in basic filial piety. This supported the central value system, in that filial piety extended to the national level found its highest expression in emperor-loyalty. The elites of society were those political and intellectual leaders who stood closest to the emperor and spoke in his authoritative name. Symbols through which the people participated in the sacred order were such things as the national flag, imperial rescripts and portraits, Shinto shrines with their ethnic architectural and ritual forms, etc.5

To one degree or another, between 1868-1945, Japan's national leaders were able to arouse the loyalties of the people through appeals to the sacred order- center-values. All Japanese subjects and institutions were expected to support and conform to sacred kokutai as the cosmic norm and context within which they lived and worked as a national family. Any who harbored inner reservations were at least required to give outer, formal compliance to the kokutai ideal. Those few alienated deviants who actually stood against kokutai had to be neutralized.

The third scholar from whom I wish to borrow is the recently deceased William P. Woodard, who has advanced the notion of a "Kokutai Cult" as the chief focus for national loyalties, especially during the latter part of the State Shinto period (1930's, to 1945). If understood loosely and not in a tight institutionalized sense, I believe the concept of a Kokutai Cult can be extremely useful as a broad framework within which to locate various elements in the pre-1945 nationalistic scene.

As defined by Woodard, the Kokutai Cult was "Japan's emperor-state- centered cult of ultranationalism and militarism."6 It was a conglomerate of nationalistic elements which included important dimensions of Shinto, but was not limited to Shinto. Thus, in addition to shrine worship and festivities, it

4Kokutai was an old term lifted to prominence in the State Shinto period as the epitome and organizing principle of all national sentiments and ideals. It was enshrined in the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), and acquired increasing force as the Japanese people moved through the ultranationalistic years of the 1930's and 1940's.

On kokutai, see David M. Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan, Political Thinkers of the Tokugawa Period, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), Appendix D.

5On family-state, loyalty and filial piety, see my article, " 'Family-State' (kazoku kokka): An Imperial Ideology for Meiji Japan," East Asian Occasional Papers (II), Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 4, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, July, 1970), pp. 144-55. For an analysis as to how Shinto supported national familism and emperor-loyalty, see my book, Japanese Shrine Mergers, 1906- 12: State Shinto Moves to the Grassroots (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973), pp. 60-79.

6William P. Woodard, The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-52 and Japanese Religions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 11.


included such things as: commitment to the constitutional pronouncement that the emperor was "sacred and inviolable"; ethics (shaishin) indoctrination in the schools; solemn ceremonial veneration in the schools of the Imperial Rescript on Education and the imperial portraits; the observance of national holidays; Confucian socio-ethical patterns; etc. There were, of course, important Shinto dimensions to some of these things, but as a group they were not primarily Shintoist in nature. The Kokutai Cult incorporated a broad range of principles and practices which stretched beyond the Shinto world as such.7

Woodard's distinction between Shinto and the total reach of Japanese nationalism should come as no surprise, for we have known for some time that there were many extra-Shinto elements in the wider nationalistic picture. Yet there has persisted a curious tendency to think and speak of "Shinto nationalism" without integrating it within the larger scene. One reason, no doubt, is that that larger scene (the vast, complex phenomenon of modern Japanese nationalism) has been an elusive thing to get hold of; and I find that, in giving it a name (Kokutai Cult), William Woodard has helped me to get a handle on it. The broad context within which State Shinto operated has shifted into sharper focus, with the consequence that the relationship between State Shinto and other factors in the total picture is now more clearly delineated.8

We have touched on the thought of three scholars, Ellwood, Shils and Woodard. The three complement each other, and together suggest a fruitful analysis of modern State Shinto. We may summarize by saying that Ellwood sets the basic approach in terms of sacred groups from hamlet to nation. Shils' insights suggest, in the Japanese case, a sacred center (state-nation-emperor), cosmically grounded in kokutai. Woodard specifically points ot a Kokutai Cult as the

7Woodard's distinction between Shinto and the larger Kokutai Cult is quite explicit. See, for instance, p. 11 where he says,

The Kokutai Cult was not a form of Shinto. It was a distinct, separate, and independent phenomenon. It included elements of Shinto mythology and ideology and it utilized Shinto institutions and practices, but this did not make it a form of Shinto.

The point comes up again when Woodard discusses the process whereby Dr. William K. Bunce, Chief of the Religions Division of the Allied Occupation, drafted the postwar "Shinto Directive":

Had any of his advisors been able to explain that the main problem was not Shinto nationalism but kokutai nationalism or extremism, the drafting would have been simpler. . ." (p. 62).

Finally, Woodard's description of the various facets of the Kokutai Cult (see esp. pp. 12-13) touch on many elements which are not essentially Shintoist in nature. Some of these have been mentioned above.

81 would add that the Kokutai Cult should probably be seen as a type of civil religion for its particular time-span. I plan to go into this on another occasion, but I believe a good case can be made to show that something like a civil religion has operated in Japan from ancient times; that it has drawn on native patterns of thought, feeling and valuation at a very deep (often unconscious) level; and that, while there has been much mutual spillover and mixing between civil religion and the discrete religious traditions (Buddhism, etc.), more often than not civil religion has taken precedence over the traditions. During the modern prewar period Japanese civil religion was consciously promoted, in the form of the Kokutai Cult, as a national faith for all Japanese regardless of their private religious affiliations. Indeed, it functioned as a kind of super-faith for the nation, serving to unify and motivate Japanese subjects during a period of sustained national crisis. I have certain difficulties with the expression "civil religion" as applied to the Japanese case; but that discussion will have to be reserved for another time.


overarching context within which State Shinto ideas and institutions functioned in the pre-1945 decades.

THE SHINTO WORLD AND THE KOKUTAI CULT

We have come to the point where we can illumine more concretely the relationship between State Shinto and the larger context of the Kokutai Cult. In so doing, we will also identify the major constituent elements within State Shinto itself and attempt to clarify their interrelatedness in the total Shinto scene.

Our three most important concerns will be with Shrine Shinto, State Shinto, and the Kokutai Cult. Although refinements will be made to fill out the picture, quite broadly it will be shown that (1) Shrine Shinto was one component, among others, of the larger phenomenon which we call State Shinto; and (2) State Shinto, in turn, was one component among others of the still larger umbrella of the Kokutai Cult. The three related to each other somewhat as concentric arcs, each successively more inclusive than the other.

Although I recognize the risk of distortion inherent in any diagram of complex human institutions, I believe it may be useful to pursue the analysis with the aid of Figure 1. Here I summarize the principal elements in the Shinto world, as well as their relationship to the Kokutai Cult, during the State Shinto period. While the focus is on column B (State Shinto), I have included column C (Sectarian Shinto) to round out the Shinto picture; also column A, as suggestive of those many extra- Shinto elements which operated as part of the larger Kokutai Cult. This diagram is by no means a complete survey of the religio-ideological scene: for that, one would need to locate the Buddhists, Christians, Communists, etc. ad infinitum. The intent here is rather to clarify relationships (1) within Shinto, and (2) between Shinto and the Kokutai Cult.

Working from Figure I and drawing on all that has been said to this point, I will now offer short, simple definitions for the terms basic to this discussion. In order to emphasize the three most important terms (Shrine Shinto, State Shinto, and Kokutai Cult), they have been capitalized in the section which follows, also capitalized and boxed in Figure 1. (The descriptions which follow are understood to apply during the State Shinto period.)

KOKUTAI CULT - That broad complex of values, symbols, beliefs, institutions and practices through which the Japanese people participated in the sacred center of Japanese life (state-nation-emperor), all grounded in the cosmic order of kokutai (national structure, essence). As a focus of national life, the Kokutai Cult became increasingly explicit over the prewar decades, reaching its culmination in the ultranationalistic period from the early 1930's to 1945.

STATE SHINTO (Kokka Shint56)- Those Shinto elements which were under Japanese state or imperial supervision/ control, and which were fundamentally supportive of the Kokutai Cult: primarily Imperial Household Shinto, the Ise shrines, shrines for the war dead, and (with qualifications) Shrine Shinto.9

9A pattern evolved whereby the government was able to give preferential treatment to these various types of shrines, as over against ordinary religious bodies (those associated with Buddhism, Christianity and Sectarian Shinto). Article 28 of the Meiji Constitution (1889) would normally have precluded any such special treatment, for it guaranteed a certain freedom of religious belief, with the implicit corollary that there would be no establishment of religion. The

Figure 1

State Shinto and the Kokutai Cult (in the State Shinto period)

KOKUTAI CULT

-hn-\ A B C \

Extra-Shinto elements (or elements not STATE SHINTO Folk groups lumped by the state into the primarily Shintoist in nature) which were category of:

fundamentally supportive of the Kokutai (Shinto elements fundamentally "Sectarian (Ky5ha) Shinto" Cult. supportive of the Kokutai Cult)

1. Imperial Household Shinto Not essentially state-oriented; but, for the Meiji Constitution 2. Grand Shrine of Ise most part, rendered increasingly Imperial Rescript on Educ. 3. Shrines for the war dead supportive of the Kokutai Cult over the Veneration of Rescript & 4. SHRINE SHINTO (the shrine State Shinto period.

imperial portraits system proper) National holidays (a) Government and National Ethics (shuishin) texts Shrines

in the schools

cin the schools , (b) "People's Shrines" "Sectarian Shinto" groups

Confucian patterns, e.g.

/__- filial piety / Folk patterns as the historical base (including

Patriotic societies ... etc. / 0 Folk Shinto)

tEl

r O O

p

C,,

0 0

tEl C,

0


Imperial Household Shinto (Kashitsu Shinto) - Rites conducted at three shrines within the palace grounds, as functions of the Imperial Family. The three shrines are dedicated to Amaterasu-6-mikami, to the sacred spirits of deceased emperors, and to all the kami of heaven and earth.

Grand Shrine of Ise - Actually a complex of shrines in Mie Prefecture, the principal enshrined deity being Amaterasu-6-mikami (so-called "Sun Goddess"), the high ancestral kami of the Imperial Family and chief of all Shinto kami. A focus of national reverence. The apex of shrines, above and beyond the shrine system proper (see SHRINE SHINTO, and note 10).

Shrines for the war dead (shokonsha; gokoku jinja) - Shrines set aside especially for the enshrinement of the spirits of the war dead. Came under government support and supervision in 1874-75 as sh5konsha, or "spirit invoking shrines" (through rites, spirits of the war dead were called back from the spirit world to receive the homage of the living). In 1939, their designation was changed to gokoku finja, or "country protecting shrines." By 1945, a total of 148 such shrines existed, the chief being Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, which enshrined the spirits of all who died in the imperial cause. The emperor himself worshipped at Yasukuni on special occasions.

SHRINE SHINTO (Jinja Shinto) - That form of Shinto which centered in the shrine system proper, as nationalized under the modern Japanese state; the tens of thousands of traditional shrines in the land which served regional and local communities. 10

Sectarian Shinto (Kyaha Shinto) - Popular religious movements originating in unsettled modern times, chiefly from the mid-19th century. Designated by the Japanese government as Kyoha Shint6 groups, but some more Shintoistic in nature than others; also, a good deal of religious syncretism. Characteristically focused around the religious experience of charismatic founder-leaders, with emphasis on the salvation of the individual believer. Clearly distinguished by government authorities from the shrines of Shrine and State Shinto.

III THE KOKUTAI CULT: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SUPPORTS

Having identified and defined the key elements involved in the State Shinto authorities got around this by making a careful distinction between the shrines and the religions. (For instance, only the shrines could be called jinja, shrines; whereas the institutions of Sectarian Shinto had to be called ky5kai, churches.) While it could not be denied that there were in fact authentic religious dimensions to shrine life, the authorities played these down and steadily maintained that,for administrativepurposes, the shrines would not be treated as religious bodies. They thus circumvented the restrictions of Article 28 by declaring that, in the case of the shrines, the article simply did not apply. This freed the state to elevate the shrines to a privileged position in national life (in effect, above the religions), as an important component of the Kokutai Cult.

Note: The qualifications on the participation of Shrine Shinto in the State Shinto phenomenon will be discussed in the section, "State and Shrine Shinto: patterns of relationship."

'0Although shrines are central to most forms of Shinto, we limit the designation "Shrine Shinto" to those shrines in the shrine system proper, as distinguished from special shrines in categories by themselves - such as Ise, Imperial Household Shinto, and shrines for the war dead. (For more on this, see the section entitled, "State and Shrine Shinto Distinguished.")

When I speak simply of the "shrine system," it is to this shrine system proper that reference is made. The prewar organization of that system fell into two main divisions: (1) Government and National Shrines (kankoku-heisha, or kansha for short), usually large and imposing and of explicit national-imperial significance; and (2) "People's Shrines" (minsha), the great mass of shrines from prefectural rank and below, most of them small local shrines in towns, villages and hamlets.


world, I would like in this final section to make several general observations. According to the official Japanese national image, nothing stood outside

kokutai or the Kokutai Cult, Ideally, every dimension of Japanese life was understood to fall within the cosmic scope of the great national norm and its institutional manifestations. As a matter of fact, however, some elements of national life were more fundamentally supportive of kokutai than others. Thus, in Figure 1, columns A and B are marked off by solid lines to indicate that they were primary kokutai supports, while column C is drawn with a dotted line to convey the idea that the nationalistic roles of Sectarian Shinto groups were more secondary in nature.

Much more study must be made of the complex variables of the thirteen bodies which comprised the category of Sectarian Shinto. It can be said, however, that the most fundamental concern in these groups was in the area of personal religious faith. National interests were more or less forced on them by the state in return for official recognition. While national themes took on increasing prominence as the State Shinto period progressed, historically the initial raison d'etre of these sectarian groups was not nationalistic.

STATE SHINTO COMPONENTS AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

Of the four elements I have listed as components of State Shinto (Figure 1, p. 553), the first three were perhaps under closest national control and influence. Much the same could be said of the government and national shrines, that upper layer of elite shrines in the shrine system proper (Shrine Shinto). Government support for and control over the many local "Peole's Shrines" was less consistent or complete.

We may sketch in briefest outline some major phases of government policy toward these State Shinto components during the State Shinto period. Japanese authorities sought (1) to develop the rites of Imperial Household Shinto, making them models for the shrines of Shrine Shinto; (2) to tie Ise Shrine closer to Imperial Household Shinto, and to encourage Ise worship among the people; (3) to nationalize and increase the number of shrines for the war dead, with Yasukuni Shrine as the focus for this type of popular reverence; and (4) to nationalize all the shrines of Shrine Shinto, making them state institutions for the generation and expression of nationalistic loyalties. Policy toward (4a) Government and National Shrines involved government support and recognitio of both shrines and priests, with ritual content closely tuned to national-imperial themes; while the general intent in relation to (4b) "People's Shrines" was to draw them ever more tightly into the State Shinto complex."

STATE AND SHRINE SHINTO DISTINGUISHED

There has been an unfortunate tendency to confuse, even equate, two major dimensions of the pre-1945 Shinto world: namely, State Shinto and Shrine Shinto. This is particularly apparent in Western writings.

I"My book, Japanese Shrine Mergers, 1906-12, deals with policy (4b) during the late Meiji years. In a recent article I analyze some of the major dimensions of both policies (4a and 4b) over the entire stretch of the formative Meiji period, 1868-1912: see "The Establishment of Shrine Shinto in Meiji Japan," Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, 2, 2-3 (June-September, 1975), pp. 137-68.


The confusion may have begun with Daniel Holtom, who in his very influential book, The National Faith of Japan, referred to "Shrine Shinto, also called State Shinto."'2 The same equation of State and Shrine Shinto is reflected in the "Shinto Directive" of 1945, which addressed itself to that part of the Shinto world which it termed "a nonreligious national cult commonly known as State Shinto, National Shinto, or Shrine Shinto."'3 Elsewhere in the same directive, both Kokka Shinta (State Shinto) and Jinja Shint5 (Shrine Shinto) are given as Japanese equivalents for the single English expression State Shinto.'4 William K. Bunce,15 Wilhelmus Creemers,'6 and even William Woodard'7 proceed to equate the two for the State Shinto period (although Bunce and Woodard do make the qualification that State Shinto was the same as Shrine-Shinto-nationalized).

I find I must disagree with this distinguished company on this one point, and argue for a more carefully drawn definition of prewar Shrine Shinto as constituting a part of State Shinto, but not its entirety. In short, the two were not coterminous.

The problem hinges on how broadly one defines Shrine Shinto during the State Shinto period. If one were to define Shrine Shinto as containing all components of State Shinto, one would indeed be justified in saying (with Bunce and Woodard) that the shrines of Shrine Shinto, as nationalized under the state, constituted the whole of State Shinto.

The major difficulty with such a broad definition of Shrine Shinto is that it would of necessity subsume such institutions as Imperial Household Shinto, the Ise shrines, and shrines for the war dead as sub-categories of the Shrine Shinto system. The most serious problem here is the inclusion of Imperial Household Shinto under the rubric of Shrine Shinto. On the contrary, it was clearly a special category of Shinto in its own right; and here I am following the lead of such diverse Japanese Shinto scholars as Ono Soky6 and Murakami Shigeyoshi, both of whom describe State Shinto as compounded of Shrine Shinto and Imperial Household Shinto (the two distinguished).'8 In other words, Imperial Household Shinto is seen as a distinct type of Shinto, not a sub-category of Shrine Shinto. By thus differentiating Imperial Household Shinto from Shrine Shinto, already

12Daniel C. Holtom, The National Faith of Japan (reprint, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1965), p. 6. Originally published, 1938.

'3Quoted in Wilhelmus H. M. Creemers, Shrine Shinto After World War II (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 221.

141bid., p. 219. 15William K. Bunce, Religions in Japan (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1955), p. 166. '6Creemers, Shrine Shinto, p. 58, where he says, "Shrine Shinto, or State Shinto." '7William P. Woodard, "The Occupation and Shrine Shinto," in Proceedings of the

Conference on Shinto Since 1945 (Claremont: Blaisdell Institute, 1965), p. 11:

Thus State Shinto consisted of the faith and observances of Shrine Shinto during the period in which the shrines were nationalized. For all intents and purposes the meaning of the two were identical at that time.

Also, on p. 10 of his book:

State Shinto (Kokka Shinta or Kokkateki Shinta is identical with Shrine Shinto except that under it the shrines and the priests were nationalized. ..

'8Ono Soky6, Shinto, the Kami Way (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1962), p. 15; Murakami Shigeyoshi, Kokka Shinta (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1970), p. 16 and passim. Imperial Household Shinto came under the administration of the Imperial House, rather than the government.


Shrine Shinto is reduced to one component of State Shinto. State Shinto was the broader category, including within it both Shrine Shinto and Imperial Household Shinto (as well as other types; see Figure 1). Shrine Shinto, on the other hand, was a narrower category which did not include these other elements. In short, State and Shrine Shinto were not coterminous, which fact precludes their equation.

One could stop right here, and the point would have been made. A similar case, however, can be made for the independence from Shrine Shinto of the Ise shrines and the shrines for the war dead. Ise came under certain special government regulations designed for it alone; moreover, it has always been regarded by the Japanese people as standing above and beyond the shrine system as such, in a unique category by itself. Shrines for the war dead were likewise treated as a special type of shrine. As a group, they had certain rites authorized for them alone. The chief of these shrines, Yasukuni, was even administered by the Army and Navy, rather than by the ordinary shrine office in the Ministry for Home Affairs.

If we thus separate out Ise and the shrines for the war dead, as well as the shrines of the Imperial Household, we come to the most carefully drawn (and from my point of view most correct) definition of pre-1945 Shrine Shinto: it consisted simply of the great mass of ordinary shrines in the "shrine system proper." This definition would be diagrammed as follows:

Figure 2 Shrine Shinto

(in the State Shinto period)

SHRINE SHINTO consisted of: The shrine system proper a. Government and National Shrines b. "People's Shrines"

All nationalized as

Other types of shrines (outside Shrine STATE SHINTO Shinto):

Imperial Household Shinto The Ise shrines Shrines for the war dead

From this it should be clear that Shrine Shinto was not coterminous with State Shinto, but was rather one of its components - a major one for sure, but still only a part of the larger whole.

STATE AND SHRINE SHINTO: PATTERNS OF RELATIONSHIP

Having distinguished State and Shrine Shinto, it may be helpful to sketch the overall profile of their interrelationships:


Figure 3

State and Shrine Shinto (in the State Shinto period)

1. Imperial Household Shinto

A 2. Ise shrines STATE

3. Shrines for the war dead SHINTO (A & B)

B m 4a. Government & National Shrines (upper level of

Shrine Shinto)SHRINE O SHINTO

(B & C)

C 4b. "People's Shrines" (lower level of Shrine Shinto)


In Figure 3, A is that dimension of State Shinto which did not include the shrine system proper (Shrine Shinto), but rather those other State Shinto elements earlier delineated in Figure 1 as Imperial Household Shinto, the Ise shrines, and shrines for the war dead.

B is that part of State Shinto which overlapped Shrine Shinto, consisting of the large Government and National Shrines of obvious national-imperial import (4a of Figure 1).

C is a broad area within the shrine system where the drawing of a line between State Shinto and Shrine Shinto becomes rather complex. It consists of the many "People's Shrines" (4b of Figure 1), which were officially a part of State Shinto but in reality only partially integrated into the state system. The great bulk of these shrines centered in local hamlets, villages, towns, and city neighborhoods, and their chief interests were traditionally of a local folk nature: health, crops, community solidarity, etc. Now, it was the policy of the Japanese state to promote national-imperial consciousness at this level, to reach down and draw these grassroots shrines as much as possible into national shrine life. This intent is indicated by the vertical arrows in the figure. Efforts directed toward the implementation of this policy, however, were only partially successful.

The situation in area C is clarified if we make the important distinction between the state's formal-official definition of the shrines on the one hand, and their actual nature or function on the other. Both are vital to the historical record, but they must not be confused. According to official policy, all shrines within the entire shrine system (Shrine Shinto) were nationalized, and as such were regarded as state institutions with the mission of exalting national symbols and values. If such were in fact the case, all of Shrine Shinto (B and C) would indeed be included within State Shinto. Actually, however, this official definition of the shrines should be seen more as a statement of intent which was only partially realized during the State Shinto period. At the level of Government and National Shrines (B), it was realized rather substantially. At the level of "People's Shrines" (C), however, it was a somewhat different story. Even though these shrines were included in national shrine programs, even though many of them claimed national-imperial ties, and even though their parishioners often responded positively to certain overtures of recognition from the state - in spite of these national factors, the local orientation of "People's Shrines" remained stubbornly strong. Here the melding of State and Shrine Shinto was never in fact complete.19

We may conclude that there were at least two reasons why State and Shrine Shinto were not coterminous during the State Shinto period. First, as elaborated in the previous section, there were components of State Shinto which stood outside Shrine Shinto: Imperial Household Shinto, the Ise shrines, and shrines for the war dead. Second, there was that vast spread within Shrine Shinto itself which, while it did not exactly stand outside of State Shinto, was never fully incorporated into the state complex: the many "People's Shrines."

The second of these points (the incomplete nationalization of the shrine system) should warn us against any purely national definition of Shrine Shinto during the period under discussion. Taken together, the two points set forth distinctions between Shrine and State Shinto which should effectively negate any attempt to make a simple eqation between the two: there were major areas both of overlap and of divergence.

'9In my book on shrine mergers, I discuss the government's failure to meld the two in the late Meiji years. Although in later years up to 1945 greater progress was made along these lines, all evidence I have seen suggests that a full fusion of State Shinto with local shrines was never achieved.


THE EXPRESSION KOKKA SHINTO (STATE SHINTO)

This last observation about State Shinto is as much attitudinal as substantive in nature. It has to do with the way we perceive the State Shinto phenomenon, and it turns on the Japanese expression Kokka Shint5.

Kokka is a noun meaning state or nation, and the most satisfactory translation of Kokka Shint5 is one which grammatically preserves its nominal form. It is for this reason that I prefer the translation "State Shinto," which can be understood as a nominal compound. (Nation Shinto would be awkward; and National Shinto or Statist Shinto would be adjectival, not nominal.)

I have with some reluctance capitalized the English word "state" to give us the compound proper noun State Shinto, comparable to other major types of Shinto: Shrine Shinto, Imperial Household Shinto, Sectarian Shinto, etc. I say with reluctance because this simple act of labeling tends to reify what in actual fact was a dynamic, fluxing complex of events, thought patterns and institutional forms.

Reification takes place, of course, whenever we label anything. I am particularly sensitive about it in this instance, since what we now in retrospect call Kokka Shint5 was not an easily definable, neatly boundaried enclave, but a conglomerate of nationalistic values and patterns which shaded off into many related phases of Japanese life. Seen in this way, it might better be thought of as a focus than a prescribed area.

An inquiry into the use of the Japanese expression Kokka ShintJ may help us to avoid unnecessary reification of this prewar State Shinto phenomenon. While the matter is open to further investigation and verification, there is evidence that the nominal compound Kokka Shint5 is a postwar term which was rarely if ever used by the Japanese themselves during those decades which we designate the State Shinto period.

Fujiya Toshio says quite flatly, "The expression Kokka ShintJ originated after the Pacific War. . ."20 The postwar Shinto Dictionary, moreover, is explicit about this, stating that Kokka Shint5 was not a term used by the Japanese before the conclusion of the Pacific War, but rather a new postwar expression which gained general currency after it was employed by the occupation authorities.21 It is also instructive to learn that, while the prewar Shinto Encyclopedia lists an entry for Kokkateki (National) Shint5 (adjectival form),22 it contains no entry for Kokka (State) Shint5 (nominal form). It is only with the postwar Shinto Dictionary that the nominal expression Kokka ShintO makes its first appearance. 23 My own research bears this out, for I have come across no written evidence to suggest that Kokka Shint6 was used by the Japanese prior to 1945.24

In the discussion above I distinguished nominal and adjectival forms of expression for the reason that I believe nominal forms to be more reifying than adjectival. Somehow Kokka (State) Shint5 has a harder, more rigidly conceptual ring to it than the softer, looser expression Kokkateki (National) Shint5.

20Fujiya Toshio, "Kokka Shint6 no seiritsu" (The Realization of State Shinto), in Kokka to shakyv (State and Religion), vol. I of Nihon shakyvshi k5za (Series on Japanese Religious History) (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1959), p. 215.

21Anzu Motohiko, ed., Shint6jiten (Osaka: Hori Shoten, 1968), p. 417. 22Shint6 daijiten (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1939), 2:47. 23Anzu Motohiko, ed., Shinta jiten, pp. 406, 417. 24Of course, Daniel Holtom used the nominal English expression State Shinto in his prewar

writings, as did Kat6 Genchi. But they did it as scholarly observers writing in a foreign language. My concern here is not with the historians, but with the history-makers.


It may be that what I have described here is more or less standard for any historical sequence as it is viewed, first at the time of its happening, and later after it has become crystalized in historical retrospect. All historical events are dynamic, flowing happenings at the time of their occurrence, and only afterward become hardened into conceptual entities. In the Japanese case under consideration, this reifying process is represented by the progression from the adjectival expression Kokkateki Shint5 to the nominal expression Kokka ShintO.

What is being suggested here, of course, is that, as historians, we will produce a richer, more colorful, more authentic account of past events if we hold as much as possible to what might be called primary terms: namely, expressions employed by the prewar Japanese themselves. If we thus speak as they spoke, we will actually shift our focus beyond generic terms altogether, whether adjectival or nominal. For the prewar Japanese were not inclined to employ generic labels of any sort, much preferring simply to speak in concrete, particularistic fashion of "the shrines" (finja).

Are we to conclude from this that a secondary term such as Kokka (State) Shint5 must be dropped from our vocabulary on the grounds that it was not used by the Japanese themselves at the time? Not at all. As historians, it is quite legitimate for us to have recourse to broad umbrella terms which have come into vogue after the fact, as events are seen in retrospect. Indeed, there would be great confusion in the record if we could not refer comprehensively to such epochs as the French Revolution, the Protestant Reformation, the State Shinto period, etc. Each of these is a term which was coined ex post facto, and which encapsulates a whole range of historical phenomena more satisfactorily than any single primary term contemporaneous with the events under discussion.

So we employ a secondary term like State Shinto without apology. True, it has the disadvantage that, as a nominal expression once removed from the facts, it moves in the direction of reification. But its great advantage is that it catches up in one convenient term an entire complex of events and thought patterns which would be difficult to encompass with any other comparable expression. And the whole point of this discussion is to emphasize that the reification which lurks in the expression Kokka (State) Shint5 is minimized when we realize that it is, indeed, a secondary and not a primary term.

The final word, therefore, is an appeal of sorts. Let us always be clear, in our discussions of "State Shinto," that it is in fact a secondary term. In other words, let us never imply in our writing that a concept "State Shinto" was operational in the minds of prewar shrine leaders as a formal category of thought. Let us leave no doubt that the term is a scholarly expression which has been applied after the fact, and not a notion which functioned in the political arena of the time. Only by differentiating ex post facto labels from the actual data of history can we work our way beyond the labels to recapture a living past.25 Such an approach will help free us from reified conceptualization, in favor of concrete particularity. And of the two modes of perception, there is no question in my mind which comes closer to the Japanese way of thinking.

25Most of the English-language works which deal with State Shinto should be reexamined with this point in mind. These would include: William K. Bunce, ed., Religions in Japan (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle: 1955), p. 166; Kishimoto Hideo, ed., Japanese Religion in the Meiji Era (Tokyo: Obunsha, 1956), p. 94; Joseph M. Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 213-14; Sakamaki Shunz6, "Shinto: Japanese Ethnocentrism," in The Japanese Mind, ed. Charles Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 30; H. Byron Earhart, Japanese Religion: Unity and Diversity (Encino: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1969), p. 79; and Joseph J. Spae, Shinto Man (Tokyo: Oriens Institute for Religious Research, 1972), p. 22.

a fresh look at state shinto

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