a de facto cooperation? the increasing role of the european union in improved relations between...

Original Article

A de facto cooperation? The increasing role of theEuropean Union in improved relations betweenGeorgia and Turkey

Can E. MutluSchool of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa K1N 6N5, Canada.

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract This article focuses on the role of the European Union (EU) in theimprovements in GeorgiaTurkey cooperation. In particular, it examines how theEUs separate interactions with both Georgia and Turkey, under two differentframeworks accession negotiations and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),respectively have contributed to a de facto cooperation between two countries.

While studying the cooperation in issue-areas such as energy, trade, taxation,transportation and mobility regimes, this article poses the question: Do the EUsinternational socialization projects such as the ENP and the enlargement process

result in improved bilateral relations among countries participating in theseprogrammes? Building upon a geopolitical interpretation of the variable geometrymodel of European integration, this article argues that, while the EU, as an

international agent, has managed to establish multiple spheres of attraction thatreach beyond its external borders, these spheres of attraction have also cultivatedthe emergence of a complex interdependence structure.

Comparative European Politics (2011) 9, 543561. doi:10.1057/cep.2011.16;published online 11 July 2011

Keywords: European Union; enlargement; European Neighbourhood Policy; Turkey;Georgia; foreign policy

Introduction

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was introduced in 2004 as a

framework for the development of a new relationship [with neighbouring

countries to the European Union] which would not, in the medium-term, include

a perspective of membership or a role in the Unions institutions (European

Commission, 2003, p. 5). Since the launch of the ENP, the European Com-

mission has also initiated The Black Sea Synergy to increase the role and

r 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790 Comparative European Politics Vol. 9, 4/5, 543561www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/

influence of the European Union (EU) as a potential-builder in the Black Sea

basin (European Commission, 2007a). While the successes and failures of the

ENP as a post-enlargement policy are debated elsewhere (Smith, 2005, Zaiotti,

2007, Dimitrovova, 2008, and various articles in this volume), this article

specifically looks at an instance where the EUs separate interactions with

Georgia and Turkey under two different frameworks accession negotiations

and the ENP framework, respectively have significantly contributed to an

emergent trend of cooperation between two countries in issue-areas such as

trade, taxation, energy and transportation. Consequently, the main question

posed in this article is: Do the EUs international socialization (Schimmelfennig

et al, 2006) projects such as the ENP and the enlargement process contribute to

improved regional bilateral relations among participating countries?

A number of factors such as the end of the Cold War, the economic

considerations for building energy pipelines, change in governments in

both countries and consequent geostrategic calculations, as well as Turkeys

constrained relations with its other North-eastern neighbour Armenia,

have significantly contributed to the rapprochement between Georgia and

Turkey. However, alongside these factors, the relationship between these

two neighbouring countries has been furthered, both in terms of the number

of areas of cooperation and the institutionalization of relations, by a mutual

sense of belonging to Europe and aspirations for membership of the EU.

Policy reforms and transformation of quotidian practices associated with the

EU in both Georgia and Turkey improved economic, political and technical

cooperation between these countries.

Methodologically, this study relies on tracing institutional developments

that is, establishment of treaties, institutions and multi-dimensional bilateral

relations between Georgia and Turkey since the end of the Cold War, as

well as analysing the official discourses and highlighting changes in patterns

of practices. Moreover, building upon a geopolitical interpretation of the

variable geometry model of European integration (Stubb, 1996), this article

argues that, as a consequence of the accession negotiations, the ENP and

policy reforms associated with these processes, the EU has established multiple

spheres of attraction that extend beyond its external borders. Moreover,

as an externality, these spheres have cultivated the emergence of a complex

interdependence structure (Keohane and Nye, 1977) between countries

participating in these socialization processes. Georgia and Turkey have been

selected, in particular, due to different frameworks through which they interact

with the EU. As least-likely cases, cooperation between these two countries and

the increasing role of the EU in this interaction provides an interesting case for

the constitutive role of the EU in providing assistance to increasing bilateral

ties and normalized relations between countries in the European neighbour-

hood. The EUs constitutive role refers to the socializing effect of the Union

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in shaping policies and practices in its immediate periphery through various

policy reform processes in economic, political and technical areas, as well as

implementation and standardization of various practices in these neighbouring

countries.

Throughout the article, two terms are used to develop the main theoretical

insights: European integration as variable geometry and complex interdepen-

dence. Alexander Stubb (1996) defines the term variable geometry as the mode

of differentiated integration which admits to unattainable differences within

the main integrative structure by allowing permanent or irreversible separation

between a core of countries and lesser developed integrative units (p. 287).

As a differentiated integration model, the variable geometry provides a

valuable insight into understanding cooperation and light integration

occurring under the ENP framework and the kind of Union Turkey should

expect to join in the future such as restrictions on the freedom of mobility for

Turkish citizens and delayed entry into the Euro and Schengen areas. Similarly,

the principle behind the ENP resulted in the expansion of various spheres of

attraction into the neighbouring non-EU states to the East and South of the

Union. According to Andrew Moravcsik, the EUs

strongest constitutional prerogatives still [lay] almost exclusively in

the area of trade in goods and services, the movement of factors of

production, the production of and trade in agricultural commodities,

exchange rates and monetary policy, foreign aid and trade-related

environmental, consumer and competition policy. (Moravcsik, 2002,

p. 607)

Based on Moravcsik s insight, we can see how expanding certain internal zones

of the Union, such as energy or trade, through policy reform into the neigh-

bouring countries would benefit the stability and prosperity of the EU while

still remaining close to the constitutional prerogatives of the Union. Whereas

the variable geometry model is helpful in understanding the functioning

and dynamics of the ENP and the accession talks, the concept of complex

interdependence is helpful in understanding the emerging pattern of coopera-

tion between Georgia and Turkey. According to Keohane and Nye (1977),

complex interdependence has three main characteristics: (1) the presence of

multiple channels of communications, (2) an absence of hierarchy among issues

that connect two countries, and (3) the avoidance of military force in

interactions. These characteristics manifest themselves differently. Multiplicity

of channels of communication is measured by an assessment of bilateral

interactions between government officials in annual bilateral meetings and

through different international organizations as well as at the level of non-

governmental organizations, businesses and private foundations, among other

A de facto cooperation?

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civil society organizations. But more importantly, [t]hese actors are important

not only because of their activities in pursuit of their own interests, but also

because they act as transmission belts, making government policies in various

countries more sensitive to one another (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 26).

Similarly, the absence of hierarchy among issues is often a result of their

interconnectedness. To give an example, establishing trans-border relations on

transportation results in cooperation on the broader question of mobility such

as visa regimes. In other words, the interconnectedness of issues often results in

issue-linkages that transcend the domestic/international divide that has

traditionally created a hierarchy among issues. Finally, we can assess the role

of the military by looking at the militarization of the border and the role of

the military in consulting with the foreign policy-makers, as well as by looking

at the practices at and discourses on the border. According to Keohane and

Nye (1977) [t]he three main characteristics of complex interdependence give

rise to distinctive political processes, which translate power resources into

power as control of outcomes (p. 29). Building on the variable geometry

and complex interdependence theories and focusing on the specific case of

GeorgiaTurkey relations, this article argues that the EU as an agent of

international socialization contributed to the emergence of the complex

interdependence structure between these two countries. By specifically focusing

on four policy clusters (1) energy, (2) human mobility and transportation,

(3) military cooperation, and (4) trade and business this article makes the case

for the EUs constitutive role in the emergence of a complex interdependence

between Georgia and Turkey.

This article proceeds as follows. The next section looks at the legal

framework of EUGeorgia and EUTurkey relations and assesses the level of

interaction between these two countries and the EU. The following section

covers emerging patterns of cooperation between Georgia and Turkey and

assesses whether or not the EU has a role in shaping these patterns.

The Contractual Basis of the EUs Relations with Georgia and Turkey

Since the early 1990s, the EU has emerged as an influential regional actor in

Central and Eastern Europe. With a number of foreign policy tools in its

arsenal accession, privileged partnership and effective methods such as

conditionality-driven policy reforms and gradual social-learning (Checkel,

2001), the EU has managed to bring about gradual social, political and

economic change to its immediate periphery (Grabbe, 2001; Vachudova, 2005;

Schimmelfennig et al, 2006). In the case of the most recent round of

enlargement, the EU has demonstrated its willingness to integrate the Central

and Eastern European countries (CEECs) into the Union in return for stability

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and security of its internal mechanisms and institutions. In return, following

the 2004 and 2007 rounds, the EU acquired a new borderline to the East, with a

set of countries that required significantly more economic and socio-political

assistance than the CEECs, yet caused higher risk in terms of their potential to

de-stabilize the internal solidity of the Union. As inclusion, which was the

preferred foreign policy tool until the last round of enlargements, was not an

immediate option, the EU had to create a new policy alternative that was

capable of re-establishing the conditionality structures without an actual

carrot or a golden carrot. This is a difficult predicament faced by the EU

today how to manage the periphery of the Union without fully extending

the privileges of full membership. This question of alternative integrations is

the basis of what is referred to as the accession quandary between the EU and

its recently acquired neighbours in this volume (see in particular Verdun, Ruffa

and Chira in this volume).

The ENP framework was introduced to maintain the EUs status as an agent

of international socialization (Schimmelfennig et al, 2006) capable of

preserving its existing conditionality processes and establishing a new type of

contractual relation (Tocci, 2008) with neighbouring countries that will not be

joining the EU in the medium term. On the one hand, while the Turkish bid

can be seen as a if not the cause of the post-accession quandary, Turkey

EU association does not fall under the changes that occurred as a result of

the policy reformulations following this predicament. On the other hand,

EUGeorgia relations have been affected by the changes to EU foreign policy

in the context of the 2004 enlargement. Consequently, Georgia and Turkey

offer two very different case studies in terms of their contractual relationship

with the EU.

While Tocci (2008) looks at the EUs capacity as a peace-maker in Georgia

and Turkeys internal conflicts, this article takes her point further and

suggests that the EUs contractual relations with both countries has granted it

considerable potential not only to promote its economic, political and social

objectives that are set out by the existing treaties of the Union, but also to

contribute to the emergence of a complex interdependence structure between

Georgia and Turkey. However, the role of the EU is not the only factor

contributing to the improved relations between these two countries. Economic

interests present in oil and gas transportation, new governments in both

countries with new national/regional geopolitical strategies that differ from

their respective traditional state security doctrines, Georgias shift away from

the Russian sphere of influence, and Turkeys zero-problems foreign policy

with its neighbours (Davutoglu, 2010), among other factors, all play an

important role in improved relations between these two countries.

Given these simultaneous economic, social and political developments, the

constitutive role of the EU in improving bilateral ties between Georgia and



Turkey might seem secondary. However, the EUs role as a constitutive

agent is especially visible in the areas of trans-border relations, energy and

transportation due to simultaneous EU-driven policy reforms in these areas in

both countries. These reforms have two consequences. First, similarities in

these policy reforms facilitate interactions between these two countries as they

eliminate for the most part technical issues that prevent interactions or

make them costly. Second, association with the EU creates a sense of belonging

with regard to the EU and its institutions in particular and European practices

in general. This sense of belonging on both sides of the border, in return, is a

social capital that contributes to the improved relations. The amount of social,

economic and political capital invested in the European aspirations of both the

Georgian and Turkish governments becomes clear by looking at the history of

relations between the EU and these countries.

Turkey has been aspiring to become a member of the EU for almost five

decades now. Turkish relations with the EU date back to the initial Turkish

application to become an associate member of the European Economic

Community (EEC) in 1959 and then to the signing of the Ankara Agreement in

1963. Currently, the TurkeyEU association is situated within the enlargement

framework and is part of ongoing accession talks based on the Negotiations

Framework signed in 2005 and revised under the Accession Partnership

document signed in 2008. As a part of the accession talks with Turkey, the EU

opened 13 acquis chapters in 2005. Since then, as a result of the disputes

surrounding the Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and opening of

its airports and seaports to Cypriot planes and vessels, 7 chapters that were

opened in 2005 were frozen as of 2006. However, although there have been

issues regarding the accession talks and the freezing of certain chapters,

Turkeys historical commitment to Europe and the decades of cooperation

during the Cold War have resulted in the integration of Turkey into more

functional European networks such as transportation, telecommunications and

energy, as well as joining the Council of Europe in 1949 and establishing the

Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in 1995.

Georgia gained its independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet

Union. However, Georgia remained within the Russian sphere of influence.

As a result, Tbilisi maintained a foreign policy doctrine in line with Russian

interests in the region. Following the Rose Revolution1 in 2003, however,

Georgia has adopted a more Western perspective by aspiring to be a member

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the near future and the

EU in the medium term while moving out of the Russian near abroad.

Georgias contractual relationship with the EU is based on the Partnership and

Cooperation Agreement of 1999 (European Commission, 2007b, p. 5) and the

more recent ENP action plan and the associated European Neighbourhood

Partnership Instrument (ENPI), adopted in 2006 and 2007, respectively. ENP

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and ENPI have been put in place to develop deeper economic integration

and to strengthening bilateral political cooperation, including on foreign and

security policy (European Commission, 2007b, p. 5) between Georgia and

the EU. Under this framework, the EU provides expertise and guidance to the

Georgian government on judicial and legislative matters ranging from the

fight against corruption and organized crime to environmental regulations

and standardization of certain consumer goods and so on. This process is

conducted similar to the way in which the EU conducts its enlargement,

through the implementation of the Acquis Communautaire the body of EU

legislation that forms the legal basis of the European integration and through

policy harmonization and (de)regulation associated with the negotiations over

the acquis. Moreover, the Europeanization2 of Georgias socio-political and

economic landscape since the Rose Revolution has contributed to, first, the

normalization of relations, then to bilateral cooperation and finally to the

emergence of a complex interdependence structure between Georgia and

Turkey. In this sense, while Turkeys willingness to cooperate with Georgia

on issues such as energy, transportation, telecommunications and security

has contributed to the emergence of a complex interdependence structure, the

transformation that occurred in Georgia has had more of an impact on the

bilateral relations between the two countries by radically transforming

Georgian foreign policy. Moreover, as a part of the ENP action plan with

Georgia, the EUs active pursuit of policy reform in areas such as energy,

transportation, regional cooperation, improvements in business and invest-

ment climate has contributed to the advanced relations between Georgia and

Turkey.

According to the variable geometry model of European integration, while

neither Georgia nor Turkey is a full member of the EU, their commitment to

certain European projects such as the BakuTbilisiCeyhan (BTC) crude oil

and natural gas pipeline, as well as the proposed NABUCCO pipeline project

and participation in certain European institutions such as the Council of

Europe, has demonstrated that they belong to Europe in certain issue-areas.

In both Georgia and Turkey, Europe represents higher standards, as well as

peace, prosperity and good government. In this sense, images or actions that

represent a belonging to Europe either as an ideal or as a polity equal social

capital, and are widely used by both Georgian and Turkish officials.

Sometimes this sense of belonging is presented through the subliminal in

the form of backdrop to images, such as the instances of Mikheil Saakashvili

giving interviews and holding press conferences in front of EU flags in Tbilisi.

In other cases such as energy pipelines, trans-continental transportation or

communication networks the connection is physical, and thus apparent.

Regardless of the form of connection, this sense of belonging, when combined

with the other economic, social and political factors contributing to improved



relations, can be seen as strong enough of a motivator to accelerate the

emergence of a complex interdependence structure. Participation in such a

structure not only improves the relations between both countries, but also

demonstrates their capacity to cooperate and normalize relations across a

border that has traditionally been a prone to conflict. By doing so, both

countries are confirming the spirit of cooperation and normalization that is at

the core of the European integration project.

Love thy Neighbour? Emergence of a Complex Interdependence Structurebetween Georgia and Turkey

Since the early 1990s, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations between

Georgia and Turkey have improved significantly. A number of social, economic

and political factors have contributed to this rapprochement between the two

countries. Construction of energy pipelines (Karagiannis, 2004), the new Turkish

foreign doctrine of zero-problems with its neighbours as a pursuit of regional soft-

power status (Fotiou, 2009), under the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/Justice and

Development Party (AKP) government since 2002, and the impact of the recently

created Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (Gultekin-Punsmann, 2009)

as an institutional manifestation of this new foreign policy doctrine, among others,

have all been acknowledged as outcomes, if not causes, of improved bilateral

relations between the two countries. This article furthers the discussion on this

matter by proposing the constitutive role of the EU as a contributing factor to the

improved relations between Georgia and Turkey. Policy reforms driven by the

EUs contractual relations with Georgia under the ENP framework and

Turkey under the enlargement framework have had a positive impact on the

bilateral relations between the two countries.

According to Judith Kelley (2006), in its functioning the ENP is not very

different than the enlargement process. From the use of action plans, regular

reports and negotiations to the larger conceptualization and use of socializa-

tion and conditionality, the development of [the European Neighbourhood]

policy shows significant mechanical borrowing from the enlargement strategies

(p. 29). Similar to Kelleys point, Tocci (2008), looking at the internal conflicts

within Georgia and Turkey, argues that both Turkey, as an accession candidate,

and Georgia, as an ENP partner, have dealt with their respective internal

conflicts with the social, political and technical assistance from the EU tied to

incentives of the conditionality process. Building upon Kelleys observations and

Toccis case study, this section of the article argues that beyond the immediate

internal effects of the accession talks and the ENP partnership, these processes

significantly contribute to the emerging cooperation between neighbouring

non-member states Georgia and Turkey in this case.

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International socialization processes that result in policy reform, such as the

EU accession talks, the ENP Action plan and human rights and democratic

reforms conducted under the mandate of the Council of Europe, result in the

enlargement of spheres of attraction that form the basis of the variable

geometry model. As a constitutive international actor, the EU creates spheres

that extend beyond its borders, first and foremost to ensure the stability,

security and prosperity of its internal zones and consecutively its interactions

with both neighbouring countries with no medium-term prospects for

membership and candidate countries. This article conceptualizes these spheres

as European spaces that are established through international socialization

processes such as the ENP and the enlargement process; these European spaces

extend beyond the established borders of the EU. Moreover, the expansion of

these spaces towards non-members and candidates significantly contributes to

the emergence of a complex interdependence structure between neighbouring

countries that interact with the EU under different frameworks. In the case of

the relations between Georgia and Turkey, improving relations since the end

of the Cold War have already been furthered by the constitutive role of the

Union and policy reforms associated with it.

The current state of relations between Georgia and Turkey differs

significantly from the historical realities of the region. During the height of

the Cold War, the Turkish decision to join NATO and the Western Bloc

resulted in the fracture of Turkeys relations with its North-Eastern neighbours

the Soviet Socialist States of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. During this

period, trans-border interactions were reduced to a minimum and both sides

regarded each other with suspicion (Pelkmans, 2006). Following the dissolu-

tion of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the status quo has changed. While

the current relations between the two countries is not, by any criteria,

comparable to the situation during the Cold War, which was fuelled by

broader geopolitical underpinnings of the Cold War era, dramatic transforma-

tion of the scope and nature of relations presents a valuable benchmark to

understand the significance of these improvements. Once the Iron Curtain was

lifted, the relations between Georgia and Turkey progressively improved, and

Turkey recognized an independent Georgia in 1991. The first treaty signed

between the newly formed Republic of Georgia and Turkey was a Treaty on

Friendship and Co-operation, which was signed in 1992 (Karagiannis, 2004,

p. 14). Since then, both Georgia and Turkey have tried to capitalize on their

geostrategic potential by adjusting their foreign policy objectives in the region.

This trend was furthered by the landslide election of the Adalet ve Kalkinma

Partisi (Justice and Development Party) in 2002 and the Georgian Rose

Revolution in 2003. Both of these changes in government brought political elite

with strong opinions with regard to further integration with the EU, and in

the Georgian case NATO membership as well. In this re-calculated basis, as an



avenue for economic development as well as for furthered GeorgianTurkish

cooperation, energy emerged as the catalyst for cooperation.

Energy

In the case of Europe, Russia is currently the primary oil and natural gas

provider. As it once again became apparent with the renewed tensions over the

role of the Ukraine as a transit country and the political control over Gazprom

the Russian energy monopolist Russian power and influence is no longer

measured in ballistic missile accuracy or bomber production but in miles of

pipeline constructed and barrels per day exported (Baran, 2002, p. 131). There

are costs and risks associated with putting all ones eggs in the same basket.

These costs and risks are at the core of energy security and diversity.3

Consequently, energy-producing countries and countries on pipeline routes in

Europes neighbourhood have gained further geopolitical importance.

Even though the oil reserves in Siberia are still considered to be the main

source of Russian oil, and hence the main supplier for European consumers, the

reserves of oil and natural gas under the Caspian Sea are an important

alternative (Karagiannis, 2004). Until the construction of BTC, Russian

Gazprom and its subsidiaries had total control over the means of transportation

for the Caspian crude oil and natural gas. As a result, the Georgian and Turkish

governments have increased their efforts in order to establish closer ties to

cooperate over the BTC pipeline to transfer landlocked Caspian energy to the

world markets (Karagiannis, 2004; Winrow, 2007). As a direct challenge to the

Russian hegemony over the transportation of Caspian energy, BTC has raised

tensions between Russia, Turkey, Georgia and the United States. Moscow saw

the project as US interference with the Russian near abroad, whereas the United

States and the EU for that matter saw BTC as an opportunity to secure valuable

energy resources without increasing the Russian political leverage. Turkey, as a

main stakeholder in the project, saw the establishment of BTC as an occasion to

establish itself as a transit country in the EastWest energy corridor. The

prospect of BTC not only meant a strategic position in the EastWest energy

corridor, but also a physical connection to Europe. Upon completion of BTC,

Georgia and Turkey became de facto participants to the European energy grid.

In the case of Georgias relations with the EU under the ENP and ENPI

protocols the energy issue appears to be a central theme. For reasons connected

to energy security and energy diversification policies of the EU, Georgias

geographic location has proven to be a strategic one. Under the Priority Area

8 of the ENP action plan, the EU acknowledges the significance of Georgia as

a transit country and hopes to encourage the development of diversified

infrastructure connected to development of Caspian energy resources and

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facilitate transit (European Commission, 2006, p. 11). Similarly, under the

ENPI, the European Commission encouraged the development of diversified

infrastructure connected to the development of Caspian energy resources

and their transit, as well as harmonising the energy-related legal/regulatory

framework, plus technical norms and standards, with those of the EU

(European Commission, 2007b, p. 23).

Along the same lines, under the pre-accession assistance framework, the EC

provides considerable direct support to the Turkish energy sector, in particular

in the areas of legislative alignment and institution building. Similarly, the

EU has been taking a number of efforts to strengthen Turkeys position as a

transit country by actively participating in projects of common interest for

Trans-European Energy Networks as well as regional formations, which will

contribute to security of [energy] supply (European Parliament, 2006). While

these Trans-European Energy Networks seem to support the argument of

spheres of attraction, the cooperation between Georgia and Turkey leading

up to and since the construction of the BTC and BTE pipelines, as well as

the proposed NABUCCO pipeline, has increased the volume and quality of

partnership in the area of energy. While the significance of economic interest in

the construction of these energy pipelines is undeniable, for Georgia, Turkey

and the BTC consortium, since the initial construction of the BTC pipeline

in 2005, the adaption of EU regulations, increased technical assistance and

EU-related policy reforms in both countries energy sectors have facilitated the

construction of future pipelines such as BTE and proposed NABUCCO

pipelines, and have paved the way for further cooperation in other sectors.

The border: Mobility and transportation

The synergy that resulted in the planning and execution of BTC has been a major

catalyst for improved relations between Turkey and Georgia. Along with their

support for cooperation leading to the construction of the BTC pipeline, the EU

has also pushed for regional cooperation over environment, education, border

management and transportation under Priority Area No. 5 of the ENP action

plan with Georgia. Regional cooperation in these areas requires the adoption of

both new legislation and policy revisions, and we suggest that increased regional

cooperation be correlated with policy reforms. While the field of education still

remains at the core of what is deemed to be a national policy, cooperation over

movement of people and transportation has been blooming.

There have been significant changes to the mobility regime governing the

trans-border movement of Georgian and Turkish citizens. Since the end of the

Cold War, the frozen relations among trans-border ethnic communities

of Adjar, Hemshin, Laz and ethnic Georgians living in Turkey have been



re-initiated and the groups have created trans-national cultural networks

(Toumarkine, 1995; Simonian, 2007). These connections have also resulted in

increasing flows of people, business transactions, ideas and so on as well as

the emergence of a borderland clout between the two countries. The initial

suspicion and distrust, following the fall of the Iron Curtain, of Georgians

towards Turks (Pelkmans, 2006) seem to have remained in the past. These

feelings were essentially based on two factors. First, closure of the Georgia

Turkey border, mixed with decades-long propaganda from both sides

during the Cold War, created certain myths and misconceptions about the

other side of the border. Second, the actions of Turkish businesspeople

following the fall of the Iron Curtain were opportunistic, and their desire to

make quick and easy profit at the expense of the Georgian economy created a

certain image of Turkish businesspeople in Georgia that damaged the image of

Turks and Turkey. Two developments since the opening of the border have

resulted in a change in these perceptions. First, changes in the geopolitical

realities of the region have pushed Georgia away from Russian influence; this

provided the basis for improved relations at the level of diplomatic relations.

Second, these improved relations were followed by a change in the business

practices of Turkish businesspeople. On top of the existing trade relations,

Turkish businesses have started to invest in the Georgian economy directly;

this shift in strategy improved the image of Turkish businesses in Georgia.

This trend of good neighbourly conduct is present in several recent initiatives

that would have been deemed impossible two decades ago. In a recent joint

initiative, the Georgian and Turkish governments waived visa requirements for

travels of duration shorter than a month between the two countries. As a result

of this initiative, it is easier for businesspeople, tourists and people who live in

this borderland to go across the border for business, travel or shopping. This

facilitation of easier movement between the two countries, with a visa waiver

agreement, also resulted in the creation of cooperation in transportation.

Moreover, the upgrade and renovation of the Batumi and Tbilisi Airports were

made possible by Turkish financial aid. The renovation of Batumi Airport

turned out to be an especially interesting case. Through the construction of a

complementary terminal in the town of Hopa on the Turkish side of the

border Turkish citizens are now able to travel to the rest of Turkey via

Batumi. This development has made air travel much more viable for Turkish

citizens living along the border to Georgia.

The next, proposed, step in cooperation in the field of transportation is the

construction of a highway between Poti and Turkey; alongside the develop-

ments in air travel, this will improve transportation between the two countries.

Following the coastal route, the highway will facilitate movement within and to

the region while improving ties between local communities. Georgias decision

to align itself with the West has played a significant role in the transformation

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of relations between Georgia and Turkey. The policy-reform processes under

the ENP and the accession framework, and adaption of standards of

governance, have harmonized different policy fields between the two countries,

creating in some instances new internal spaces while in other instances

incorporating Georgia and Turkey into existing European spaces.

Military cooperation

NATOs Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme is providing a unique platform

for the Turkish and Georgian armies to cooperate. Currently, the Georgian

military is trained and equipped by NATO forces under Turkish and American

supervision. According to NATO, the essence of the PfP programme is the

partnership formed between each partner country and NATO. Cooperation is

tailored according to the individual countrys needs, abilities and ambitions, and

jointly implemented with the government (NATO, 2007). In the case of Georgia,

owing to the countrys strong desire to join the alliance, NATO has initiated an

intensified dialogue with Georgia that oversees the major reforms required by

NATO before an offer of membership. These requirements:

[I]nclude a functioning democratic political system based on a market

economy; fair treatment of resolution of disputes; the ability and willingness

to make a military contribution to the Alliance and to achieve interoper-

ability with other members forces; and a commitment to democratic civil-

military relations and institutional structures. (NATO, 2007, p. 3)

This programme is especially important for Georgia. In the hierarchy of short-

and long-term goals, the Georgian government places joining NATO ahead of

EU membership, as national security is a more pressing issue than economic

integration. Renewed Russian influence and military presence in Russias near

abroad has alarmed both the EU and NATO officials. As seen by the 2008

RussiaGeorgia war, Russia is willing and capable of engaging in military

operations in its near abroad. In light of active Russian military presence in

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, NATO is unwilling to expand the scope of its

relations with Georgia beyond assistance under the PfP and intensified

dialogue frameworks to full membership in order to prevent any possibility of

direct conflict with the Russian Federation.

Trade and business

The improved relations between Georgia and Turkey also manifest themselves

in the fields of business and trade. Today, the initial Turkish economic



opportunism has been replaced with increasing direct Turkish investment in

and trade with Georgia. The cooperation leading to the BTC project has

contributed to the standardization of certain economic regulations. A pipeline

project like BTC requires a great deal of investment today, as a result of

increased global awareness and sensitivity. Corporations and financial

institutions such as creditors and investment groups require certain standards

to be in place before investing money in such projects. In the case of BTC,

investors required certain business, human rights and environmental standards

to be in place before committing money to the project. Requiring high

standards served to ensure that their investment in the construction of BTC did

not directly result in human rights abuses or environmental disasters, and

was not being wasted by corruption. Consequently, the construction of

BTC brought the standardization of business practices such as accounting,

pay rates and so on that are required to run a trans-national business such as

the transportation of oil and natural gas from Baku to Ceyhan.

Economic relations have prospered further since the construction of BTC.

Today, while the EU is still Georgias largest trading partner, Turkey has

replaced Russia as Georgias primary trading partner. According to the

Turkish Foreign Affairs ministry website:

Since 2003, bilateral economic relations between Georgia and Turkey

have intensified. In 2003 bilateral trade volume increased by 77 per cent

to reach 427 million dollars and continued increasing thereafter. Today

(2007), the yearly trade volume between Georgia and Turkey exceeds 830

million dollars, making Turkey the leading trade partner of Georgia.

(Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

This trend continued in 2007 as the trade between Georgia and Turkey

increased to 899.6 million USD (GEPLAC, 2007). The change in economic

relations also improved the image of Turks and Turkey in Georgia. In 2007,

both countries signed a Free Trade and Avoidance of Double Taxation

Agreement (GEPLAC, 2007), which has facilitated the increase in trans-border

flows.

In summary, while the construction of the BTC pipeline has initiated

intensified cooperation between Georgia and Turkey, the EU through ENP

and accession frameworks has facilitated institutionalization of cooperation

and standardization of practices in these policy areas. Today, the role of the

EU in the emergence of this significant cooperation is visible in the adaption of

EU regulations and associated practices ranging from EU-driven policy

reforms in both countries energy sectors to visa waiver for travels of duration

shorter than a month. Similarly, we trace this trend of institutionalized

cooperation in the Free Trade and Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreement,

Mutlu


which facilitated the increase in trans-border flows of capital in the form of

direct investment and trade.

Conclusions

Although neither Georgia nor Turkey is fully integrated with the EU, under

the ENP and accession frameworks respectively both countries have

initiated policy reforms to harmonize their national legislation with the Acquis

Communautaire of the Union. Harmonization of policies with the EU has

resulted in the subscription of Georgia and Turkey to European standards in

areas such as energy, transportation, business and trade. Moreover, inclusion

into these European spaces which also function as European spheres of

attraction has contributed to the emergence of a complex interdependence

structure between Georgia and Turkey. As suggested throughout this article,

the constitutive role of the EU in improving relations between these two

countries was not the only definitive factor. The economic benefits of oil and

gas transportation, the new national/regional geopolitical strategies of the

Georgian and Turkish governments, and the closed border between Turkey

and Armenia all play an important role in improved relations between Georgia

and Turkey. Would relations between the two countries have intensified,

given existing cooperation through different channels, in the absence of closer

ties with the EU? The answer would probably be yes. However, rather than

focusing on causal relations or the role of the EU as a catalyst, this article has

focused on the constitutive role of the Union in this trend of cooperation.

While the EUs role in this emergent regional dynamic might have been less

than significant initially, as seen by the empirical data presented in this article,

the Union has emerged as an influential actor by contributing to this emerging

trend of cooperation. Consequently, the remarkable transformation of

GeorgianTurkish relations demonstrates an instance of the broad reach of

European spaces and the externalities of the socialization project conducted by

the EU. The improved bilateral relations between the two countries resemble

what Keohane and Nye referred to as the complex interdependence structure.

As proposed in the introduction, the existence of a complex interdependence

structure is assessed through the existence of three main characteristics: (1) the

presence of multiple channels of communications, (2) an absence of hierarchy

among issues that connect two countries, and (3) the avoidance of military

force in interactions. In the case of the relations between Georgia and Turkey

all of these three characteristics are present to some degree. In terms of multiple

channels of communications, a shift in foreign policy of both Georgia and

Turkey, as well as the increased interaction at the level of transnational NGOs,

businesses and trans-border communities, demonstrates both the depth of



interactions and the diversity of issues discussed in these interactions. Similarly,

in the case of an absence of hierarchy in issues, while the field of energy might

seem like the more important policy area as the catalyst of improved rela-

tions since the construction of the BTC pipeline, cooperation in the areas of

business, military, trade and transportation has improved remarkably. Today,

energy is no longer the most important policy area in relations between

Georgia and Turkey. Finally, in terms of avoidance of military force in

interactions, changes in both practices and regulations have demonstrated a

trend in de-militarization of neighbourly relations between the two countries.

In terms of practices, both the cooperation at NATO level under the Pf P

programme and the de-militarization of the borderland as seen by the

changes in mobility practices are an indication of this trend.

Similarly, in terms of leadership in this bilateral structure, while the regional

power of Turkey is undeniable, both the depth and scope of relations between

Georgia and Turkey would suggest that Turkey does not exercise hegemonic

power but would rather forgo short-run gains in bargaining in order to

secure the long-run gains associated with stable international regimes

(Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 231). In other words, regional stability and

continuous interactions with the EU, as well as cooperation in the fields of

business, energy, trade and transportation, among other things, overcome

short-term gains that might otherwise present themselves.

Although it is clear that the end of the Cold War played a significant role in

the change of relations between these two countries, two consequent factors

contributed to this transformation. First, the emergence of the EU as a

regional actor in the Black Sea basin has provided a common purpose as well

as a platform for anchoring bilateral relations between the two countries.

Moreover, Turkish accession talks with the EU and Georgias interaction with

the EU under the ENP framework have contributed to further development of

relations. Second, cooperation at different levels of interaction as well as

different issue-areas have both widened and deepened the scope of relations.

The role of the EU in this relationship might seem secondary, but the

externalities of Georgian and Turkish interactions with the EU have affected

bilateral relations between two countries in a constructive manner that enabled

the emergence of a complex interdependence structure. As the prospect of EU

membership results in harmonization and standardization of certain economic,

legal and political policy areas, certain European spheres expand to include

Georgia and Turkey, consequently resulting in bilateral cooperation between

the two countries. Moreover, the improved bilateral relations between Georgia

and Turkey not only improve the relations between the countries, thus proving

to be economically beneficial, they are also improving Turkeys chances of

joining the EU, as the EU considers such normalization of relations to be a

positive development (European Commission, 2008).

Mutlu


However, the presence of the EU as a catalyst is both a boon and a curse.

On the one hand, association with the EU is a blessing, in the sense that

without a common social purpose and a sense of belonging which was

established following the geopolitical decisions in both Georgia and Turkey to

align with the EU neither country would have pressed for such levels of

cooperation. On the other hand, as long as the EU remains vague about the

prospect of membership, neither country will extend its commitment to

establishing a substantial regional organization in the Black Sea basin or the

Southern Caucuses that could facilitate further regional cooperation. As a

result, the relations will be kept at the level of semi-formal structures such as

the so-called platforms and dialogues and so on. Regardless of the impact of

the EU on the further institutionalization of relations, overall, both countries

are enjoying ever-closer relations in a wide range of areas from energy to the

environment to mobility. While the cooperation between the two countries has

emerged from the cooperation leading up to the BTC pipeline, the constitutive

role of the EU has been a significant actor in furthering cooperation and

improvement of relations between Georgia and Turkey.

About the Author

Can E. Mutlu is a PhD candidate at the School of Political Studies at the

University of Ottawa. He is a member of the International Collaboratory on

Critical Methods in Security Studies. His recent research appears in the

European Journal of Social Theory and Environment and Planning D: Society

and Space.

Notes

1 The end of the Eduard Shevardnadze era came with his resignation from the post of presidency

on 2223 November 2003 (Fairbanks, 2004; Coppieters and Legvold, 2005; Areshidze, 2007;

MacKinnon, 2007) following a hotly contested election and the series of protests known as the

Rose Revolution which created a great deal of public pressure to force Shevardnadze to resign.

Unlike Shevardnadze, his successor Mikheil Saakashvili pursued a completely pro-Western

foreign policy and aggressively pursued membership primarily of the NATO and possibly of

the EU in the distant future through aligning the country with a Western course by conducting

legislative and judicial reforms.

2 The number of EU flags behind President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia during his media

interviews and his meetings with the world press. These images are clearly worth a thousand

words, as they represent a sense of belonging to Europe and Europeanness that emerged in

Georgia since the so-called Rose Revolution one of the coloured revolutions that finalized

the term of Eduard Shevardnadzes term in office as the president of Georgia.

3 Energy security and diversity are not new terms; their origins go back to the Oil Crisis of 1973. In

1972, Arab oil-exporting countries imposed an embargo on the countries supporting Israels



Yom Kippur War. The 1973 crisis highlighted the dependency of the West on energy exports. A

similar energy crisis occurred in the early days of 2006 when the Russian state-owned gas

company Gazprom and the Ukrainian government were unable to reach an agreement on the

price of natural gas and payment of the accumulated Ukrainian debt. As a result, Gazprom cut

the flow of natural gas through Ukraine, which resulted in a significant gas shortage in Europe as

most European natural gas comes from Russia through the Ukraine. Since then, the EU and its

member states have been searching for alternative sources of energy to diversify their energy

portfolio.

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