a critique of lehrer's coherentism: the need to go beyond acceptance

A Critique of Lehrer's Coherentism: The Need to Go beyond AcceptanceAuthor(s): Bruce RussellSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Apr., 1992), pp. 89-97Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320298 .

Accessed: 24/06/2014 22:21

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: AnInternational Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.40 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:21:50 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320298?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


BRUCE RUSSELL

A CRITIQUE OF LEHRER'S COHERENTISM:

THE NEED TO GO BEYOND ACCEPTANCE

(Received in revised form 12 May, 1991)

The idea that knowledge is justified true belief is an attractive one. But Gettier counterexamples have forced everyone to either abandon that idea or to modify or add to it. Keith Lehrer's work can be understood as an attempt to modify or add to it. For Lehrer knowledge is, roughly, undefeated justified true belief.

I will argue that Lehrer's account offers neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of knowledge. The problem is that by limiting himself to what a person accepts, and certain modifications of that, Lehrer is both unable to avoid certain Gettier counterexamples and to prevent misleading evidence from undercutting justification and destroying knowledge where, intuitively, it is present.

Lehrer considers himself a coherentist with respect to both justification and defeat. Instead of beliefs he talks of acceptances where acceptances are functional states that have "a functional role in thought, inference and action."' More specifically,

To say that a person accepts -that p, crudely reformulated, is to say that he is in a certain kind of functional state which typically arises when a person reflectively judges that p with the objective of judging that p if and only if p. (p. 253)

A person S is personally justified in accepting that p just in case p coheres with what S accepts, with S's acceptance system, that is, with the system of statements of the form: S accepts q, S accepts r, etc. A competitor of p is some statement that makes it less reasonable for S to accept p. S's acceptance of p will cohere with S's acceptance system just in case nothing competes with p or, if it does, the competitors are either beaten or neutralized by what S accepts. A competitor is beaten if, given the other things the person accepts, it is more reasonable to accept the statement in question than the competitor. A competitor is neutralized for S if there is something S accepts which when conjoined

Philosophical Studies 66: 89-97, 1992. ? 1992 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



90 BRUCE RUSSELL

with the competitor does not compete with p and it is just as reasonable for S to accept that conjunction as to accept the competitor alone.

Let me illustrate these notions by way of the following example. Let p = John owns a station wagon. Assume that given the other things S accepts it is reasonable for S to believe that most bachelors do not own station wagons. Then

C = John is a bachelor

is a competitor to p. Suppose S accepts

B 1 = there is a marriage certificate on file at the county courthouse which indicates John is married.

Then B 1 beats p for S if it is more reasonable for S to accept p than C on B1 and the rest of what S accepts. Now suppose S accepts

B2 = John has been seen driving around in a station wagon and Father O'Hare is a trustworthy person who has said that John owns a station wagon.

Then B2 neutralizes C since the conjunction of C and B2 does not compete with p, and it is as reasonable for S to accept C and B2 as to accept C alone.

Lehrer suggests that an account of comparative reasonableness can be given in terms of comparative expected epistemic utility (pp. 253, 266). The expected epistemic utility of a statement is a function of the subjective probabilities that attach to that statement and the utilities and disutilities that depend on whether that statement is true or false. The suggestion that comparative reasonableness can be understood in terms of comparative epistemic utilities seems unpromising given that people's subjective probability estimates can themselves be quite unreasonable (think, for instance, of people who put great faith in whatever is written in the National Enquirer). But Lehrer thinks that judgments of comparative reasonableness are more fundamental, and clearer and more useful for purposes of applying his theory, than judgments of comparative expected epistemic utility (p. 253). So comparative reasonableness is left unanalyzed by Lehrer in his most recent writings.

To return to the main point, for Lehrer a person S is personally justified in accepting p just in case it is more reasonable for S to accept



CRITIQUE OF LEHRER'S COHERENTISM 91

p, given the other things S accepts, than to reject it. Of course, being personally justified in accepting p is not sufficient for knowledge even if p is true. Gettier counterexamples can be used to show this. To take a Gettier-type example offered by Lehrer himself, Smith sees Nogot driving around in a Ford and Nogot tells Smith he owns a Ford and shows him what looks to be a certificate of ownership on a Ford. On this basis Smith is justified in believing that Nogot owns a Ford. Since that implies that someone who works in his office owns one, and Smith realizes it does, he is justified in believing that someone in his office owns a Ford. So on the basis of what Smith accepts, it is more reasonable for him to accept than to reject that someone in his office owns a Ford. Although his fellow office worker, Havit, does own a Ford, given that Nogot doesn't own one, Smith does not know that someone in his office owns a Ford - despite being personally justified in accepting that someone does.

To respond to Gettier counterexamples, Lehrer requires for knowledge that a person not only be personally justified in accepting some statement but that such justification be undefeated were certain altera- tions made in his acceptance system. To be undefeated, the justification must remain even when what the person accepts falsely is omitted, or replaced by acceptance of the denial of that falsehood. That means that Smith's justification must remain undefeated even were he to accept that Nogot does not own a Ford. Lehrer contends that it is more reasonable for Smith to accept that no one in his office owns a Ford than to accept that someone does if he accepts that Nogot does not own a Ford. Hence, on Lehrer's account, and in line with our intuitions, Smith does not know that someone in his office owns a Ford - even though it is true and he is justified in accepting it.

For Lehrer knowledge is undefeated justified true acceptance, where justification requires that it be more reasonable to accept the relevant statement than its competitors, both relative to what one actually accepts and to what one would accept if one's false acceptances were omitted or replaced by acceptances of their denials.

Does Lehrer's account give both necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? As regards sufficiency, couldn't there be a case where, say, Smith accepts nothing false, is personally justified in accepting that someone in his office owns a Ford, that justification is undefeated in



92 BRUCE RUSSELL

Lehrer's sense, yet Smith lacks knowledge? Or perhaps there is a case where Smith is personally justified despite accepting something false but where his justification would remain even when that falsehood is omitted or replaced by acceptance of its denial. Lehrer has posed a dilemma for anyone who tries to construct such examples (p. 256).2

There will always be a competitor to what Smith accepts, say, the statement that the evidence that Nogot owns a Ford is deceptive. Now either Smith accepts something that beats or neutralizes that competitor or he does not. If he does not, then he lacks even personal justification (and so this won't really be a Gettier counterexample) and so knowledge. If he does, then what he accepts that beats or neutralizes that competitor will be false and when what is false is omitted or replaced by what is true, Smith will no longer be justified in accepting the relevant statement, say, that someone in his office owns a Ford.

Let's see how Lehrer has applied this schema to actual examples. Richard Feldman has offered a modification of the Smith-Nogot case in which Nogot does own a Ford as a result of just having won one in the lottery, though Nogot does not realize this and is still trying to deceive Smith.3 So Smith does not accept something false in accepting that Nogot owns a Ford. Lehrer says that the following is a competitor to Smith's accepting that someone in his office owns a Ford:

C: The evidence that Nogot owns a Ford is deceptive.

He contends that to be personally justified in accepting that someone in his office owns a Ford Smith must also accept something that beats or neutralizes this competitor and what he accepts to handle the competitor must be false. But suppose Smith accepts the true

B: The evidence Nogot has presented me in the past has not been deceptive and Nogot's past behavior is a good sign of his current behavior.

While B does not logically entail the denial of C, it does allow what Smith accepts to beat C because it undercuts C.4 As far as personal justification goes, this case is parallel to one where Jones has good reason to believe that John owns a station wagon and good reason to accept Bi, that there is a marriage certificate on file indicating John is married. In that case, B1 helps p beat the relevant competitor (by




undercutting it) in exactly the same way that B helps what Smith accepts beat the competitor in this case.

When supplemented with the assumption that Smith accepts the true B, Feldman's example shows that Lehrer's conditions are not sufficient for knowledge. In that example Smith's personal justification rests on no falsehoods. So nothing will change when falsehoods are omitted or replaced by their denials. Hence, the justification is also undefeated. But contrary to what Lehrer's view implies, Smith does not know someone in his office owns a Ford because his belief that someone does rests on inadequate evidence, even if Smith has no reason to believe it is inadequate.

Let us now ask whether Lehrer's account offers necessary conditions of knowledge. Here I think the answer is also no. Feldman and I independently saw that the well-known Tom Grabit case, originally constructed by Lehrer and Paxson, seemed to show that Lehrer's conditions aren't necessary. Smith sees Tom Grabit steal a book from the library but he does not realize that Tom's demented mother has falsely said that Tom was far away at the time and his identical twin was in the library. "The question," as Lehrer says, "is whether the fact that Mrs. Grabit said what she has deprives Smith of knowledge" (p. 260).

Feldman and I argued that intuitively it does not, but that on Lehrer's account it could. That is because Smith might accept that Mrs. Grabit did not say any of the things she did about Tom and his twin and not accept anything about her mental state or the veracity of her statements. When that false statement is replaced by the true statement that Mrs. Grabit did say those things, then it would seem that it would be more reasonable for Smith to believe that Tom did not steal the book than that he did. In other words, it would seem that, on Lehrer's view, Smith's justification would be defeated and so he lacks knowledge.

Lehrer responds by distinguishing two versions of the Tom Grabit case (pp. 268-9). In the one Smith accepts that no one who knows Tom well enough to know whether he took the book said that he did not take it. In the other Smith does not accept that no one close to Tom said he didn't steal the book. Lehrer contends that it is only in this case that it is clear that Smith knows Tom stole the book. But his theory will



94 BRUCE RUSSELL

yield the same result since it is more reasonable for Smith to trust his senses than to believe without evidence that Mrs. Grabit, or anyone else close to Tom, said he did not steal the book. Hence, Smith will be personally justified in accepting that Tom stole the book and, since he accepts nothing false, his personal justification will not be defeated.

Let us, then, consider the first version of the Grabit case where it is assumed that Smith accepts that no one close to Tom said he did not steal the book. In the first version there is no problem about Smith's personal justification since the following competitor:

K: Someone who knows Tom said he did not steal the book.

is beaten by what Smith accepts, namely, that no one close to Tom said that Tom didn't steal the book. So the only question is whether Smith's justification is defeated when in some member of his ultra-system he accepts that someone close to Tom did say that he did not steal the book.

Lehrer says that what we think about that will depend on how reasonable we think it is for Smith to accept

N: The person who said that Tom did not steal the book is in error.

If we think it reasonable for Smith to accept N, then we will think Smith knows Tom stole the book; if we don't, we won't. And Lehrer's theory will yield the same results since in the first instance K will be neutralized and in the second it will not (nor, let us assume, will it be beaten).

Lehrer also says that whether we think it reasonable to accept N or not will depend on whether we think perception more reliable than testimony. The case to focus on is one where we think the testimony of someone close to a person about that person's whereabouts is more reliable than perception, that is, a case where we think it is not reasonable for Smith to accept N. According to Lehrer's theory that will be a case where Smith's acceptance will be defeated and so a case where he lacks knowledge.

But on reflection I think we would say that Smith knows. Compare this case to one where a nurse takes Jones' temperature with a perfectly good mercury thermometer that shows that Jones' temperature is over 100?F. Suppose Jones' temperature is indeed over 100?F. Suppose the




nurse justifiedly accepts that electronic thermometers are generally more accurate than mercury thermometers and that no one has taken Jones' temperature with an electronic thermometer which shows that Jones' temperature is under 100?F. However, someone has done just that with a defective electronic thermometer. Then surely the nurse knows that the patient's temperature is over 100?F. How can the evidence from a faulty thermometer of which she knows nothing, and can be expected to know nothing, undercut the solid foundation she has for her true belief about Jones' temperature?

But this case is exactly parallel to the version of the Grabit case under discussion. A competitor to

p*= Jones' temperature is over 100 ?F

1S

K*= An electronic thermometer said Jones' temperature was under 100 'F.

While we can assume that the rest of what the nurse accepts makes it more reasonable for her to believe p* than K*, so she is personally justified in accepting p*, Lehrer has to worry that K* will defeat the nurse's justification for p*. Given what Lehrer said about the Grabit case, one would think that that depends on whether it is reasonable for the nurse to accept the following:

N* = The electronic thermometer that gave a reading of over 100 'F is in error.

But surely it was assumed in the initial description of the case that the nurse accepted nothing that would make it reasonable for her to believe that if a reading had been taken with an electric thermometer it would have been in error, say, because it would have been defective. And so there will be nothing in her acceptance system which can carry over to her ultra-system and make it reasonable for her to accept N* once she accepts that an electronic thermometer said that Jones' temperature was under 100 'F. Still, I believe, there is a strong and widely shared intuition that, given the evidence of the highly trustworthy mercury thermometer and the fact that Jones' temperature is over 100 F, the nurse does know that Jones' temperature is over 100 'F. The unknown



96 BRUCE RUSSELL

readings of defective thermometers don't matter. That will be true whether electronic thermometers are generally more reliable than mercury thermometers or not. And a similar thing will be true in the Tom Grabit case regardless of whether a mother's testimony is generally more reliable than perception or not. Even if we believe that electronic thermometers are generally more reliable than mercury ones, and that a mother's testimony is generally more reliable than perception on questions concerning the whereabouts of her children, and so have no reason to believe N* and N are true, I think we will judge that the nurse and Smith have knowledge in the respective examples. The unknown testimony of a deranged mother is no different from the unknown readings of a defective thermometer and neither undercuts knowledge.

Apart from intuitions is there any plausible theory that can be appealed to in defense of the claim that Smith knows Tom stole the book and the nurse knows Jones has a temperature of over 100?F? I think the following is at least an initially plausible account of knowledge which would provide such a defense: S knows p just in case p is true, S accepts p, p is the result of a reliable acceptance producing mechanism that S has reason to believe is reliable and there is no other such mechanism available to S, or of which S should be aware, that would lead S to accept not-p. Because of the italicized clause, this account won't be open to the counterexamples that plague standard versions of reliabilism, examples involving a belief producing mechanism (such as clairvoyance) which is in fact reliable but which has not been "checked out" against other modes of perception, the testimony of others, etc.5

What the Gettier and Tom Grabit examples show, I think, is that Lehrer's view is too subjective. The Gettier example shows that a person may lack knowledge even though, relative to what that person accepts, he is completely justified in accepting what he does, that is, even though he has undefeated, justified true belief. And the Grabit case shows that a person can have knowledge even though, relative to what the person accepts, there are potential defeaters that can neither be beaten nor neutralized. The conclusion to be drawn is that one cannot offer an adequate account of knowledge, as opposed to justification, if one starts only from what the person actually accepts. It is still an open question as to what else is needed, but surely something is.6




NOTES

1 Keith Lehrer, "Coherence and the Truth Connection: A Reply to My Critics," The Current State of the Coherence Theory: Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence Bonjour With Replies (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), ed. John W. Bender, p. 270. Pagination in the text is to this essay. For more on acceptance, see Lehrer's "Knowledge Reconsidered," Knowledge and Skepticism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1989), ed. Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer, pp. 134-7. 2 My formulation of the dilemma is slightly different from Lehrer's but it captures what Lehrer says in different words. I In "Lehrer's Coherence Theory of Knowledge,' in The Current State of the Coherence Theory, p. 74. Feldman notes that Paul Moser also discusses these sorts of examples. 4 Lehrer says with respect to Smith's acceptance of the following statements:

1. Nogot, who works in his office, says he owns a Ford, etc. - 2. It is not the case that Nogot, who works in the office, owns a Ford.

3. Someone in the office owns a Ford.

that C is a competitor to 3 which cannot be beaten or neutralized (p. 268). In an unpublished paper, Richard Feldman argues that the reason Lehrer gives for his claim that it is more reasonable to accept C than 3, relative to this acceptance system, is not persuasive. But even if it were, in Feldman's example where Nogot has unknowingly won a Ford in a lottery the relevant acceptance system would contain 2, the statement that Nogot does own a Ford, and, I am assuming, B - which would beat C. So what Lehrer says about the above acceptance system is beside the point for the case under discussion. 5 See Laurence Bonjour's The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 1985), Ch. 3 for examples of the sort I have described. 6 I want to thank Richard Feldman and Matthias Steup for comments on earlier versions of this paper and discussions which led up to those versions. Keith Lehrer offered helpful criticisms on a later version of this paper for which I am grateful. I am especially grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal who made detailed and penetrating criticisms of the penultimate draft of this paper.

Department of Philosophy Wayne State University College of LiberalArts Detroit, MI 48202 USA



a critique of lehrer's coherentism: the need to go beyond acceptance

Documents