A CONTEMPORARY VALIDATION OF CONFUCIAN PRINCIPLES

Orlanda R. Brugnola

© 1996, 2002, 2004, 2005 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

In the process of doing some work on the theories of John Rawls’ notion of pure procedural justice (see Appendix), a fascinating prospect emerged: the possibility of developing a contemporary method of validating an ancient philosophical principle. Such opportunities are rare, to be sure, and the temptation proved irresistible.

This paper will examine some philosophical principles articulated by the Chinese sage Confucius. A contemporary philosophical problem, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its solution in the context of iterated replays of strategies in a computer tournament will be considered. The most robust strategy will be shown to embody the Confucian principles previously discussed and those principles will be shown to be the basis for a viable economic practice in adhering societies. Reference will be made to research by biologists studying cooperative behavior. Implications for public policy will be suggested. [N.B. The older orthography for Chinese terms has been retained, as many of the citations are from works which used the older system.]

Approximately 2500 years ago, the Chinese sage Confucius (Kong Zi or Kung Fu-tzu) articulated some principles of interaction which were based on his acute observation of human behavior: The Master said, “There are presumably men who innovate without possessing knowledge, but that is not a fault I have. I use my ears widely and follow what is good in what I have heard; I use my eyes widely and retain what I have seen in my mind.”1 1 D.C. Lau, trans., Confucius, The Analects, (New York, Dorset Press, 1979), p. 89 (Book VII, 28).

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His words were variously reinterpreted over the centuries until Confucianism became a pervasive religious and social persuasion in China and Korea, informing government and daily life.2 Despite changes, which included the sage’s, deification and the insertion of extraneous and contrary doctrines in his discourses, certain fundamental elements of his thought have survived and are in fact manifest in contemporary Korean and Chinese societies. It is the task of this paper to suggest that some of Confucius' principles can be seen to have been rigorously tested through the use of computer tournaments and that the results of those tournaments in turn can be shown to be mirrored in the successful social endeavors in adhering communities. Very simply, we can trace the kernel of Confucian thought to the principle of reciprocity and its ramifications. As Fingarette's little masterpiece, Confucius––The Secular as Sacred, 3 has shown, Confucius was no stuffy, authoritarian traditionalist, but, rather, a social reformer with an intense vision of the possibilities of the individual's influence on the social fabric. Fingarette skillfully articulates the original Confucian perspective and shows us how Legalist insertions and distortions have worked to alter our perception of Confucian principles. Certainly of overriding importance in Confucian thought is the concept of jen [rendered frequently as ren in contemporary orthography] which has been variously translated as “humaneness,” or “Good, Humanity, Love, Benevolence, Virtue, Manhood, Manhood-at-Its-Best, and so on.”4 Karl Jaspers remarked that the nature of man which is called jen (and which Jaspers refers to as “humanity and morality in one”) is made up of ideograms, which mean “man” and “two” which is to say, “to be human means to be in communication.”5 Indeed, the virtues are, in Confucius' understanding “dynamic” ones, e.g., shu (mutuality in human relations) and hsin (good trust/good faith toward others) rather than inner, static ones such as “purity.”6

2 Huston Smith, The World's Religions, (New York, Harper Collins, 1991), p. 158. 3 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius––The Secular as Sacred, (New York, Harper & Row, 1972.) 4 Ibid. p. 37. 5 Karl Jaspers, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), p.49. 6 Ibid., p.55.

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This jen comes about when the individual has mastered li. Li, meaning specifically “rite” or “ceremony,” refers to “the explicit and detailed pattern of that great ceremony which is social intercourse, the humane life.”7 It is in his notion of li, that Confucius reveals his philosophical attitude toward what we might term “responsibility.” Fingarette puts it well:

The root of “responsible” is of course not “cause” or “produce” but “respond”; the root question is: Who must respond for the way things go? One who is obligated to respond for the ways things go will have some actual or potential causal connection with the ways things go, but not everyone who has a causal connection with the way things go is obligated to respond for how they do...On this view, “responsibility” ought to be considered merely as a matter of diagnosing past causes in order to influence future events; sanctions and reward are assignable anywhere in the human causal chain that promises future prevention...8

Certain that a person could form character through will, Confucius' attitude could find echo in Kant, 24 centuries later:

Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, he is to become. Either condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could not be held responsible for it and could therefore be morally neither good nor evil.9

Confucius was immensely practical about human interaction. Rejecting both the Mohist attitude of universal acceptance and love and the Legalist approach, which emphasized punishment and reward as the only unsentimental approaches to government, Confucius suggested simply that a good turn merited a good turn and an injury merited “straightness” or justice.10 His principle of “lovingkindness” articulated a negative form of the Golden Rule, i.e. do not do to others what you

7 Ibid., p.20. 8 Ibid., p.25. 9 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T.M. Greene and H.H. Hudson (New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960) p. 40. 10 Lau, p. 129 (Book XIV, 34).

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would not like yourself.11 Urging always that one should act in good faith, and saying of the Good Man (chun tzu, “gentleman”):”...every look that he composes in his face must betoken good faith...”12 Confucius nevertheless believed that wrong-doing merited immediate attention and justice:

Is the man not superior who without anticipating attempts at deception or presuming acts of bad faith, is nevertheless, the first to be aware of such behavior?13

Confucius did not deny the importance of judgment in human affairs, but he was as much or more concerned with the individual's own obligations to maintain standards of fairness. [This characteristic was evident in his personal habits and endeavors as well as in his discourse. The story is told that when hunting, he never loosed an arrow at a bird sitting on a branch, i.e. not on the wing, nor did he fish with a net, despite his very humble circumstances.] And yet Confucius insisted on flexibility in the process of judging ones' fellows: “If one sets strict standards for oneself and makes allowances for others when making demands on them, one will stay clear of ill will.14 He was flatly opposed to litigation as a method for resolving injury.15 Litigation relies on legalistic manipulations rather than on good will and responsiveness, and was thus a method that Confucius' own observations discredited:

If they are so quick to bring charges, why is it that I've yet to see anyone who could see his own misdeed and bring the charge to himself?16

11 Arthur Waley, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York, Vintage, 1938), p. 162 (Book XII, 2). 12 Ibid., p.133 (Book VIII, 4). 13 Lau, p.129 (Book XIV, 31). 14 Lau, p. 134 (Book XV, 15). 15 Fingarette, p.33. 16 Ibid., p 33.

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And so he mediated as much as possible: “I try to get the parties not to resort to litigation in the first place.”17 It is thus hardly surprising that Confucius rejects vengefulness: “The Master said, 'Po Yi and Shu Ch'i never remembered old scores. For this reason they incurred little ill will.'“18 and suggests “To attack evil as evil and not as evil of a particular man, is that not the way to reform the depraved?”19 However, he does emphasize firmness: “Unbending strength, resoluteness, simplicity and reticence are close to benevolence.”20 At the same time Confucius also rejects simplistic notions of benevolence:

Tzu-hung said, “If there were a man who gave extensively to the common people and brought help to the multitude, what would you think of him? Could he be called benevolent? The Master said, “It is no longer a matter of benevolence with such a man. If you must describe him, 'sage' is, perhaps the right word...Now on the other hand a benevolent man helps others to take their stand in so far as he himself wishes to take his stand, and gets others there in so far as he himself wishes to get there. The ability to take as analogy what is near at hand can be called the method of benevolence.21

And without rejecting material comforts, he nevertheless expressed disdain for excess: “Extravagance means ostentation, frugality means shabbiness. I would rather be shabby than ostentatious.”22 Finally, things worth doing are worth being patient about:

On becoming prefect of Chu Fu, Tzu-hsia asked about government. The Master said, “Do not be impatient, you will not reach your goal. Do not seek only petty gains. If you are impatient, you will not reach

17 Lau, p. 115 (Book XII, 13). 18 Lau, p. 80 (Book V, 23) 19 Lau, p. 116 (Book XII, 21). 20 Lau, p. 123 (Book XIII, 27) 21 Lau, p. 85 (Book VI, 30). 22 Lau, p. 91 (Book VII, 36).

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your goal. If you seek only petty gains, the great tasks will not be accomplished.”23

To summarize, it can be said with confidence that Confucius advocated the following basic principles for human interaction: a) always initiate action in good faith b) be alert to circumstances and strong in responding to injury with justice c) be forgiving rather than vengeful d) be simple in communication e) do not seek material advantage over others f) progress is not always made immediately but comes with perseverance. It is these principles, which this paper shall suggest have an operational validity recently demonstrated by the solutions offered to the philosophical problem known as the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a problem first discovered by Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950. It was later formalized by Albert W. Tucker. The original problem concerned accomplices in crime who are encouraged to confess and implicate each other by means of a promise of reduced sentences. Douglas Hofstadter has helpfully recast this problem as follows:

Assume you possess large sums of some item (money, for example) and want to obtain some amount of another item (stamps, groceries, diamonds). You arrange a mutually agreeable trade with the only dealer of that item known to you. You are both satisfied with the amounts you will be giving and getting. For some reason, though, the exchange must take place in secret. Each of you agrees to leave a bag at a designated place in the woods and to pick up the other's bag at the other's designated place. Suppose it is clear to both of you that you will never meet or have further dealings with each other again. Clearly there is something for each of you to fear, namely that the other one

23 Lau, p. 121 (Book XIII, 17).

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will leave an empty bag. Obviously, if you both leave full bags, you will both be satisfied, but equally obviously it is even more satisfying to get something for nothing. You are therefore tempted to leave an empty bag. In fact, you can even reason it through with seeming rigor this way: “If the dealer brings a full bag, I'll be better off having left an empty bag, because I'll have gotten all I wanted and given away nothing. If the dealer brings an empty bag, I'll be better off having left an empty bag, because I'll not have been cheated. I'll have gained nothing but lost nothing either. Thus it seems that no matter what the dealer chooses to do I'm Better off leaving an empty bag. And so I'll leave an empty bag.” The dealer, meanwhile, being in more or less the same boat (although at the other end of it), thinks analogous thoughts and comes to the parallel conclusion that it is best to leave an empty bag. And so both of you, with your impeccable (or seemingly impeccable) logic, leave empty bags and go away empty-handed. How sad, because if you had both just cooperated, you could each have gained something you wanted to have. Does logic prevent cooperation? That is the issue presented by the Prisoner's Dilemma.24

The problem offered can be examined if one constructs a “payoff matrix” such as the one below: Player B cooperates defects cooperates (3,3) (0,5) Player A defects (5,0) (1,1) The number 3 is referred to as the “reward for mutual cooperation (R)” and the number 1 is the “punishment (P)” while 5 is the “temptation (T)” and 0 is the “sucker's payoff (S).” The conditions are: (1) T > R > P > S and (2) (T+S)/2<R The first condition makes the argument that it is better for a player to defect no matter what the other player does, and the second condition demonstrates that if

24 Douglas R. Hofstadter, “Metamagical Themas: Computer tournaments of the Prisoner's Dilemma suggest how cooperation evolves,” Scientific American, v. 248, no. 5 (May 1983), p.16.

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the two players are in a out-of-phase alternation of cooperation and defection, a player will do worse than if cooperating. By means of such a matrix, players' moves can thus be scored. It is therefore possible to devise a strategy to “play” this game, and therefore to set up a computer “tournament” in which the robustness of strategies may be examined through many generations of interaction. Such a tournament was devised in 1979 by Robert Axelrod, who received fourteen entries of various lengths in a diverse array of computer languages. Each strategy's program submitted engaged all other strategy programs and a clone of itself 200 times. The tournament was run five times to correct for certain statistical fluctuations. The upshot of this tournament was that the shortest strategy program of all won, a program called (somewhat misleadingly) TIT-FOR-TAT, submitted by psychologist Anatol Rapoport (University of Toronto). This strategy was simple: cooperate on move 1, thereafter do whatever the other player did on the previous move. Because it begins by cooperating, TIT-FOR-TAT is referred to as a “nice” strategy, one that defects only when “provoked.” Axelrod noted that the analysis of the tournament's results indicated that: “...there is a lot to be learned about coping in an environment of mutual power. Even expert strategists from political science, sociology, economics, psychology, and mathematics made the systematic errors of being too competitive for their own good, not forgiving enough and too pessimistic about the responsiveness of the other side.”25 Axelrod then proceeded with a second computer tournament. Prior to it, he solicited entries by making available the complete analysis of the first tournament. He received 62 entries from six countries and eight different academic disciplines. TIT-FOR-TAT was again entered and again was the winner. This second tournament was subject to a wide variety of “subjunctive replays.” These included one called an “ecological tournament” which involved a cascade of hypothetical replays with each environment determined by the results of the preceding replay:

...if you take a program's score in a tournament as a measure of its “fitness,” and if you interpret “fitness” to mean “number of progeny in the next generation” and finally if you let “next generation” mean

25 Ibid., p. 21f.

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“next tournament,” then what you get is that each tournament's results determine the environment of the next tournament –– and successful programs become more numerous in the next tournament. This kind of iterated tournament is called ecological because it simulates ecological adaptation (the shifting of a fixed set of species' populations according to their mutually defined and dynamically developing environment) as contrasted with the mutation-oriented aspects of evolution, where new species can come into existence.26

After 1000 generations in the ecological replay, TIT-FOR-TAT not only did exceptionally well, but had a greater rate of growth than any other program. Axelrod pointed out that TIT-FOR-TAT won “...not by beating the other player but by eliciting behavior from the other player that allowed both of them to do well.”27 The strategy of TIT-FOR-TAT can be described as follows: a) act in good faith [cooperate on the first move] b) respond to injury with justice [defect in response to defection] c) be forgiving [return to cooperation on the move following a provoked defection] d) be simple [use a strategy which can be “comprehended” readily] e) do not seek advantage over others [use a strategy which does not “win” but which elicits mutually beneficial cooperative behavior] f) be patient, persevere [a strategy which elicits cooperation will gain ground in an environment with a majority of defectors] It is obvious that the strategy offered by TIT-FOR-TAT is in alignment with the Confucian principles presented previously. TIT-FOR-TAT never causes the initial breakdown of a situation of trust. In analyzing the first tournament, Axelrod had noted that:

First there is the direct effect of a choice. This is easy since a defection always earns more than a cooperation. Second are the indirect effects, taking into account that the other side may or may not punish a defection....But third is the fact that in responding to the

26 Ibid., p.24. 27 Loc. cit.

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defections of the other side one may be repeating or even amplifying one's own previous exploitative choice. Thus a single defection may be successful when analyzed for its direct effects and perhaps even when its secondary effects are taken into account. But the real costs may be in the tertiary effects when one's own isolated defections turn into unending mutual recriminations. Without their realizing it, many of these [non-nice] rules actually wound up punishing themselves. With the other player serving as a mechanism to delay the self-punishment by a few moves, this aspect of self-punishment was not perceived...28

Confucius' attitude towards those who try to take advantage of others (e.g. the non-nice strategies of TIT-FOR-TAT) was that they would indeed work their own downfall: “That a man lives is because he is straight [just]. That a man who dupes others survives is because he has been fortunate enough to be spared.”29 As we can see, the strategy of TIT-FOR-TAT begins with an action in good faith, and then merely mirrors the other player's first move on TFT's second move, returning to its good faith stance on the third move. If the other player acts in good faith also, the exchange continues to both parties' advantage. If the other player defaults, TFT merely recoups what it has lost, seeking no further redress. In fact the outcome of the entire encounter through every generation is dependent on the other player's response to TFT's utter fairness. Nothing compels TFT to be unfair. TFT never acquires more than its opponent. And TFT has a salutary effect on the playing environment, encouraging cooperation to the mutual benefit of itself and other players. The TIT-FOR-TAT strategy is in keeping with the environment of mutuality or reciprocity so important in the Confucian understanding of the nature of a benevolent social dynamic. Marriage vows in a Confucian context, for example, commit the couple to mutual trust (hu xien), mutual help (hu ju), mutual love (hu ai), mutual respect (hu jing) and mutual forgiveness (hu lyang), thus affirming within the most basic social unit the fundamental principle of reciprocity.

28 Hofstadter, p. 20. 29 Ibid., p. 84 (Book VI, 19).

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Lest it be assumed that such mutuality and cooperation is a philosophical abstraction in all but individual cases, a brief examination of some economic practices is in order. Although little known or understood by the dominant culture in the United States, Asian immigrants, particularly Koreans, have long employed a technique for raising capital in the face of commercial banking reluctance to loan. The technique is that of a rotating credit association, called a kye in Korean, hui in Chinese, and ko, tanomoshi or mujin in Japanese. Such associations existed also amongst the Yoruba as esusu and emerged in the West Indian communities as susu, “the meeting,” “boxi money,” and were thence brought to the United States and Britain's West Indian communities under a variety of names. There are several varieties of styles of rotating credit associations within each tradition.30 Clifford Geertz has derived a basic model of rotating credit associations from a diversity of traditions and Shirley Ardener has refined it somewhat as: “an association formed upon a core of participants who agree to make regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation.” These associations may differ with regard to membership criteria, size, organization, and types of funds, as well as transferability, deductions and sanctions imposed on members.31 Some such associations employ a lottery to determine payout, or sealed bids promising a particular interest rate. For the most part, however, those participating in such an association do not receive more from the arrangement than they put in, but they receive it in a lump at an agreed-upon time when it is most helpful. The opportunity such rotating credit associations afford in the raising of modest capital has functioned fairly well in the United States although not perhaps as well as in the countries of origin where cultural diversity does not exert such emphatic pressures on individuals in the scramble for economic viability. Obviously in poor rural and urban economies such associations offer those who can barely scrape together a small amount on a week-to-week basis to plan for and make significant purchases. A striking element in most of these arrangements is the lack of a written contract. Unfortunately, there have been instances of 30 For a full discussion see Ivan H. Light, Ethnic Enterprise in America: Business and Welfare Among Chinese, Japanese and Blacks (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), pp. 22-44. 31 Ibid., p. 22.

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defalcation of such associations in some communities, notably the Korean community in Los Angeles. This phenomenon was extremely uncommon in the countries of origin and may be attributable to some of the stresses alluded to before. The defalcations, but also particularly the uncertainty of Korean immigrants about the legality of such arrangements have eroded confidence in recent years. However both social kye' s and mutual-aid kye's which “emphasized 'individual economic betterment' without, however losing track of the sense of mutuality and sharing”32 continue to be a source of cooperative financial endeavor. It is hardly surprising that such mutual endeavor should have evolved robustly in countries influenced so profoundly by Confucian principles with their emphasis on reciprocity. It would be interesting to study the factors, which have mitigated against the adoption of the susu in the larger African American community, despite its success among West Indians. In lecturing on this subject to culturally diverse groups in several settings I have found the very concept of the susu to be met with disbelief and distrust except by West Indians and Asians who are nevertheless reticent on a subject, which they perceive to be the target of ridicule or harassment. In his article on TIT-FOR-TAT, Hofstadter notes that:

There are really three aspects of the question 'Can cooperation emerge in a world of egoists?' The first aspect is: How can cooperation get started at all? The second is: Can cooperative strategies survive better than their non-cooperative rivals? The third is: Which cooperative strategies will do best, and how will they come to predominate?33

Hofstadter relays Axelrod's conclusions about the computer tournaments. In brief, an “invasion” by not just one but by even a small cluster of cooperating organisms can give cooperation a “toehold” if they respond as TIT-FOR-TAT does. Such strategies with the attributes of “niceness,” provocability, forgiveness, and clarity will be robust and multiply. The stability of cooperation is demonstrated by the inability of an invasion of defectors to successfully penetrate a world of cooperators.

32 Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles 1965-1982 (Berkeley, University of California Press), p 244-259. 33 Hofstadter, p. 20.

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One is reminded of Confucius' belief that “If you set an example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect?”34 So profound was this belief that “the gentleman (chun tzu) helps others to realize what is good in them”35 that he was certain that it was the key to good government: “In administering your government...just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good.”36 He also believed in what we well might now (as a result of our exposure to the success of TIT-FOR-TAT) call the robustness of this stance: “...after a state has been ruled for a hundred years by good men it is possible to get the better of cruelty and to do away with killing.”37 Robert Axelrod went on to write about the feasibility and stability of cooperation in The Evolution of Cooperation.38 In addition to a full description of the computer tournaments, which Hofstadter summarized, Axelrod considers some historical material and makes suggestions about the promotion of cooperation. With William D. Hamilton he discusses the evolution of cooperation in biological systems. This discussion is largely theoretical in nature. 39 However, it is in the biological realm that some of the most promising evidence for the evolution of cooperation is to be found. In 1988, Robert Axelrod collaborated with Douglas Dion in an article which examined population dynamics and structure, again largely in a theoretical framework.40 In 1992, zoologists Nowak and Sigmund continued the theoretical discussion at the most rigorous level in their discussion of heterogeneous populations.41 Their simulations and analysis surprisingly indicate that TIT-FOR-TAT appears to move evolution away from defection, but that this turn leads not to the prevalence of TIT-FOR-TAT but towards even greater generosity and that

34 Lau, P. 115 (Book XII, 17). 35 Lau, p. 115 (Book XII, 16). 36 Lau, p. 115 (Book XII, 19). 37 Ibid., p.120 (Book XIII, 11). 38 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, Basic Books, 1984) 39 Ibid., pp. 88-105. 40 Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion, “The Further Evolution of Cooperation,” Science, v. 242 (December 9, 1988), pp. 1385-1389. 41 Martin A, Nowak and Karl Sigmund, “Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations,” Nature, v. 355 (January 16, 1992), pp. 250-252.

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“TIT-FOR-TAT's strictness is salutary for the community but harms its own.” In concluding they note:

TFT acts as a catalyzer. It is essential for starting the reaction towards cooperation. It needs to be present, initially, only in a tiny amount; in the intermediate phase, its concentration is high; but in the end, only a trace remains.42

Another researcher, Godfray, has illuminated the issue of forgiveness in the context of a TIT-FOR-TAT (TFT) type analysis, this time with a grounding in the realm of real creatures –– vampire bats. Godfray summarizes Nowak and Sigmund's work and refers to the “generous tit-for-tat” or GTFT strategy in which an animal:

...always responds to past cooperation but instead of always responding to defection by further defection, it forgives defection on a proportion (q) of occasions. ...a population adopting this strategy...with q=1/3 cannot be invaded by strategies with different probabilities of forgiveness.43

Godfray notes that, in nature:

...vampire bats cannot guarantee finding a meal every night, but on nights when they do not find food they are often fed by successful bats in the same colony. If the two bats are related then the theory of kin selection can account for the evolution of altruistic behavior such as this. The altruism of unrelated individuals is, however, much harder to explain...natural selection may favor altruism among non-relatives if the two participants meet on a number of occasions so that reciprocal altruism can spread in a nonaltruistic population. It may be far easier for strategies of reciprocation to invade in nature than in computer tournaments if, at least initially, there is a high probability of interactions between relatives.44

42 Ibid., p.252. 43 H.C.J. Godfray, “The evolution of forgiveness,” Nature, v. 355 (January 16, 1992), p. 206-207. 44 Ibid., p. 206.

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Since Godfray's report, Malcom Browne notes that other biologists are also examining the role of cooperation. Manfred Milinski has studied stickleback behavior. These fish “send out” scouts to approach a potential predator as closely as possible and then “report back” to the school. By using an ingenious mirror system, Milinski studied the scouts' response to their imagined partners. Scouts whose perception was that their partners kept pace, were intrepid. Scouts who perceived a “defection” by their partner often returned without completing their scouting mission.45 James Shapiro studies the cooperative behavior of single-celled organisms. According to Browne, Shapiro believes that “Cooperation exists at every level of biological organization and is as ancient as life itself.” In 1989, Fred P. Heald, working at the George C. Page Museum in Los Angeles, discovered that many fossil remains of Smilodon californicus, a type of saber-tooth cat, revealed many disabling wounds and illnesses.46 With the help of Christopher A. Shaw, Dr. Heald concluded that the saber-tooths who had suffered broken legs, dislocated hips and bone infections, were in chronic pain for months and years and could not have hunted for themselves. The researchers believe that the big cats may have been brought food by other saber-tooths or were allowed to feast on scraps of the kill even though the usual pattern of feeding involved terrible squabbles which themselves may have caused many of the injuries.47 Godfray and other biologists thus present a teaser for the further study of the implications of Axelrod's work. The theoretical basis has been laid. It is to be hoped that field observation will further enlarge our understanding of these issues in the future. As we have seen, the principles set forth by Confucius can be validated as an interactional style, which fosters cooperation. However damaged his legacy may be by the misunderstandings and manipulations of the centuries, it nevertheless remains a persuasive incentive. Confucian principles can be tested and hold up as

45 Browne, “Biologists Tally Generosity's Rewards,” New York Times, April 14, 1992, p. C8. 46 Monastersky, Richard. “Social Sabertooth Survivors,” Science News, Nov 11, 1989, v. 136 no. 20, p. 318. 47 Mydans, Seth. “Saber-Tooth Social life: Primeval Compassion,” New York Times, Sep 26, 1989, C1, C6.

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incorporating a sound, robust strategy for generating a cooperative, mutually beneficial environment. What then, are the implications for public policy? Since rational, enlightened self-interest is a primary requirement of participation in a just society according to theorist John Rawls, a fundamental task must be the education of individuals as to the most successful strategies in their interactions with others. Of course this kind of education is most helpful when begun in childhood. We know from Axelrod's researches that adults find it difficult to believe that TIT-FOR-TAT is the most successful strategy for the Prisoners Dilemma. It is suggested that instruction in this matter be begun in primary school and that it be coupled with the conflict-resolution curricula presently being implemented in many schools. TFT and mediation are extremely important tools in education for cooperative lifestyles. TFT can teach children that their welfare is ensured most by cooperative behavior. By developing conflict resolution skills they learn that acting formally as a mediator helps them to be aware of the mutual obligations of disputing parties and the process of resolution which is not only fair but finally emotionally satisfying to each. Since 1988, this writer has been engaged in designing methods by which “at-risk” inner-city youth can communicate with one another and learn to deal with critical life issues.48 In 1999, she completed a grant proposal to develop a conflict resolution curriculum for youth who use the services of various community-based organizations but who are not candidates for the group methods usually employed in teaching conflict resolution skills.49 By 2004, Educators for Social Responsibility had been offering such curricula in New York City schools on a routine basis. When children learn and master such skills, they have done what 48 See, for example: Drew, Naomi. Learning the Skills of Peacemaking, (Rolling Hills, CA, Jalmar Press, 1987); Judson, Stephanie. A Manual on Nonviolence and Children, (Philadelphia, New Society Publishers, 1984); Kreidler, William J. Creative Conflict Resolution, (Glenview, Scott Foresman and Company, 1984). N.B. In 1988 Orlanda Brugnola, with Seth Chaiklin, conceived and founded The New York Youth Network, a not-for-profit telecommunications project based at Teachers College, Columbia University. NYYN was specifically designed to provide access to computer and telecommunications for at-risk youth at community-based organizations. The Network’s focus was on life issues: relationships. parenting, health, employment, education. NYYN was a unique electronic outreach, the first such network in the United States. In 1993, NYYN developed an on-line curriculum about HIV/AIDS for the State of New York.

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Confucius called the hardest thing––it is then that humaneness is present as a fact in their being with others. Rawls, would without doubt, find ideal that society in which members’ decision-making is spontaneously conducive to fairness for all, i.e., in which people want to be fair. Confucius understood from his study of children that fairness and generosity can be learned and that an adult who has learned the rituals of mutual concern will experience these concerns as spontaneous and totally congruent with his/her will. The task, then, is to find those methods, which can help us to accomplish an ethos of fairness.

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APPENDIX

In his 1977 critique of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, Robert Wolff discusses the paradoxes inherent in Rawl's notion of pure procedural justice.

...in the case of perfect or imperfect procedural justice, we have a criterion for determining the right or just outcome of a procedure independently of the procedure. We can then judge whether the procedure always, usually, rarely, or never produces the objectively correct result. In the case of pure procedural justice, on the other hand, the justice of the outcome consists entirely in the fact that fair procedures have been employed. Many alternative outcomes can––indeed, perhaps every possible outcome––can under the right circumstances be pure procedurally just, and under the wrong circumstances purely procedurally unjust...the crucial fact about pure procedural justice is that the fairness is in the doing.50

Wolff continues by pointing out that

If the fairness of the two principles of justice consists in the fact that they are the outcomes of a purely procedural bargaining game, then that bargaining game must be carried out in order for the principles to be just...The outcome of a game is certain, and can be known in advance, if and only if there is no need to play the game and the outcome cannot be described as an instance of pure procedural justice...Rawls must choose: either he can claim that the bargaining game is not an example of pure procedural justice, or fairness...or he can claim that the bargaining game is an example of pure procedural justice, in which case he cannot in principle claim to know in advance how the game will turn out. 51

Wolff is convinced that Rawls, in striving for absolute universality, “...abstracts from all that is characteristically human and social” and that the result is “...a model of a choice problem that is not sufficiently determined to admit of solution, and neither historical nor human enough to bear a useful relationship to the real issue of social theory.”52 It is Wolff's conclusion, which this writer feels may be 50 Wolff, Robert Paul. Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A theory of Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 177. 51 Ibid., p. 178. 52 Ibid., p. 179.

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properly addressed and refuted by an examination of a specific problem and its historical and socioeconomic relevance. As we can see, the strategy of TIT-FOR-TAT conforms to the requirements of a pure procedural justice. The strategy begins with an action in good faith, and then merely mirrors the other player's first move on TFT's second move, returning to its good faith stance on the third move. If the other player acts in good faith also, the exchange continues to both parties' advantage. If the other player defaults, TFT merely recoups what it has lost, seeking no further redress. In fact the outcome of the entire encounter through every generation is dependent on the other player's response to TFT's utter fairness. Nothing compels TFT to be unfair. TFT never acquires more than its opponent. And TFT has a salutary effect on the playing environment, encouraging cooperation to the mutual benefit of itself and other players. As Wolff noted, “...the crucial fact about pure procedural justice is that the fairness is in the doing.”53 We see that players using TFT as a strategy meet Rawls' requirements for the members of a society engaged in his bargaining game:

1. They make decisions on the basis of enlightened self-interest, and are capable both of discovering their own preferences and of evaluating with reasonable success the consequences of their and others' actions.

2. They have similar needs and interests, or at least needs and interests that make self-interested cooperation among them rational. 3. They are “sufficiently equal in power and ability to guarantee that in normal circumstances none is able to dominate the others.” 4. They are not envious which is to say, “the bare knowledge or perception of the difference between their condition and that of others is not, within limits and in itself, a sources of great dissatisfaction.”54

53 Wolff, p. 177. 54 Wolff, p. 28.

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And we see that the strategy itself answers the problem created by the dubious probability of Rawls' fourth characteristic of the players in his bargaining game, the absence of envy. TFT and GTFT, the even more generous strategy, encourage cooperation, and therefore mutual success and the relinquishing of envy and its concomitant behaviors.

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