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A Comparison of Renewable Energy Financing in Europe and North America

INTRODUCTION

In August 2007, the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) published a technical paper, Investment and Financial Flows to Address

Climate Change, which estimated that USD200-210 billion in additional investment will be

required annually by 2030 to meet global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets.1

New Energy Finance, which tracks deals in the renewable energy sector, believes that annual investment

in new renewable energy capacity is set to rise by two to four and a half times between now and 2030.2

In a technical paper entitled “Public Finance Mechanisms to Mobilise Investment in Climate Change

Mitigation”, the United Nations Environmenal Protection Agency (UNEP), observes that the lion’s share

will need to come from the private sector and that it will require substantial additional public funding to

mobilise and leverage that private capital.3

This paper aims to examine what is required in terms of financial incentives and vehicles to

mobilise private capital into renewable energy projects. It will focus on three broad areas, the first

being an examination of the government policies surrounding renewable energy in Ontario and Europe,

particularly as they relate to feed-in-tarrifs (FITs). As the rate of return is an essential factor in any

investment decision, half the paper will be devoted to examining the current FIT regime in Ontario, and

drawing comparisons with FIT regimes in Europe. The second area will be a review of deal structures

for renewable energy projects in Ontario and Europe, outlining the various financial tools used. After

this initial overview of traditional forms of financing, there will be a discussion of what the UNEP has

1 Cited in Maclean, John et al (2008), Public Finance Mechanisms to Mobilise Investment in Climate Change Mitigation, United Nations Energy Program, Sustainable Energy Finance Initiatives. Pg. 5.2 New Energy Finance (April 23 2013). Strong Growth for Renewables Expected through to 2030. Pg. 1.3 supra note 1, pg. 5.

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termed “Public Finance Mechanisms”, namely financing vehicles by which government investment is

used to leverage private sector capital. The expected ratio of public to private capital leveraged for each

mechanism will be included. The third area will discuss the national and supra-national banks and

financial institutions which provide financial support to renewable energy projects in Europe. This paper

will conclude with an evaluation of the Ontario FIT regime, including the proposed changes to the

regime, and will discuss whether it would be possible in Ontario to simulate the financing vehicles

employed in Europe to better leverage private capital for renewable energy investment projects.

I. GOVERNMENT POLICIES AROUND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN ONTARIO AND EUROPE

1. Criteria for policies around investment into renewable energy

The finance sector approaches investment in renewable energy in the same manner as any

other investment, and financial institutions want to make a return proportional to the risk they

undertake. The renewable energy sector utilises finance from across the entire risk-reward spectrum.4

At the present time, the risk profile of many renewable energies is such that they are only an attractive

investment option if they are the subject of fairly wide-ranging regulation. Industry watchers have

noted that they are only marginally competitive with conventional fuel energy, due to an absence of

economies of scale, as well as the in-built subsidies which conventional fuels enjoy. Furthermore,

lenders may be unfamiliar with these new types of energies, and therefore take an overly cautious

approach in investing in renewable energy projects.5 In light of these facts, commentators are

unanimous in stating that government policies around renewable energies must be carefully thought

4 Justice, Sophie (December, 2009). Private Financing of Renewable Energy—A Guide for Policymakers. United Nations Environment Programme, Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative. Pg. 5.

5 ibid, pg. 15.

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out, and investment will flow to those countries or markets with the most effective policy regime.6

Several authors have delineated the specific qualities such policies must have, and they include the

following: clear, unambiguous policy objectives with clear enforcement provisions, a stream-lining of

policy and regulations across all aspects of the deal, from planning approval to delivery, political stability

across a project-relevant time period, and carefully designed incentive or support mechanisms to

achieve set objectives.7 These incentives need to be financially worthwhile, sustain the the financing

horizon of the deal for its time period, and be implemented by a legally stable regulatory framework, to

build confidence for investing in long-life capital-intensive projects.8 As succintly stated by Deutsche

Bank Climate Change Advisors, the policies must provide “TLC”: transparency, longevity and clarity.9

2. Feed-in Tarrifs (FITS) in Ontario and Europe

In parts of Europe and Ontario, this criterion of incentive has been answered by the

establishment of feed-in-tarrifs, or FITS. 10 Launched in 2009 by the Ontario Liberal government in

conjunction with the Green Energy and Green Economy Act11 , Ontario’s FIT Program is the first of its

kind in North America12, and is modelled after its German counterpart. Administered by the Ontario

Power Authority (OPA), it provides guaranteed pricing for electricity production, and these tarrifs are

designed to provide developers with a reasonable return, in addition to their project costs.13 In so doing,

the province aims to fill the production gap left behind by a planned phase-out of coal-fired plants by

6 Hamilton, Kristy (2009). Unlocking Finance for Clean Energy: The Need for “Investment Grade” Policy, Chatham House. Pg. 8.7 ibid at pg. 16.8 ibid.9 Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors (2009), Paying for Renewable Energy: TLC at the Right Price - Achieving Scale through Efficient Policy Advice. Pg. 5.10 ibid, pg. 6.11 Green Energy Act, 2009, S.O. 2009 c. 12. 12 Anonymous (June 2011), Fit for purpose? Project Finance and Infrastructure Finance. Pg. 1.13 ibid, pg. 5.

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2014 and use local content rules to boost the local economy (although in a ruling of May 24 2013, the

WTO found against Ontario in a complaint by Europe and Japan that the “Minimum Required Domestic

Content Level ” provisions of section 8.4 (a) of version 2.1 of FIT rules violates GATT ). 14 In Ontario, a

developer of renewable energy enters into a FIT contract with the OPA, whereby the OPA agrees to pay

the developer a fixed rate per kilowatt hour of energy produced. The developer connects its energy

generated system to the grid, and the OPA pays the developer the agreed-upon rate for the duration of

the contract. For France, Germany and Spain, internal rates of return (IRR’s) tend to be 7 – 10%.

Ontario’s IRR is approximately 11%, designed to reflect a debt/equity ratio of 30/70%.15

All literature on FITs is unanimous in citing that a successful FIT program must set expectations

and reduce investor risk. Most importantly, the FIT contract must ensure investors can predict their

returns, and rely on these numbers for a sufficiently long period.16 Deutsche Bank Climate Change

Advisors17 compared the features of FIT contracts in Europe, along with the Ontario FIT, and distill what

they believe to be essential elements of a successful FIT program, and which are found in both versions

2.1 and 3.0 of the FIT Contract and FIT Rules for small-scale generation projects. These include

guaranteed payments, found at section 8.1 of the Rules (Price Schedule), particularly subsection (a)

which states that « (…) any revisions shall not affect FIT Contracts previously executed. The price

applicable in respect of a FIT Contract shall be the price as posted on the date of publication of the Offer

List that contains the Application corresponding to such FIT Contract. » , and section 9.2 of the Rules

(Alternate Payment Schedule), which states that “Notwithstanding other parties being involved in the

settlement process, the OPA shall remain liable to the Supplier for the Contract Payments », as well as

section 8.2 of the s (Price Escalation) which foresees payment increases in accordance with the

14 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds412_e.htm15 ibid, pg. 6.16 ibid, pg. 8.17 supra note 9.

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Consumer Price Index. Under the new version 3.0 of the FIT Rules, large-generation projects will

respond to RPFs issued by the OPA.

With regard to element of long contract duration, which is also listed as an important element

and referred to at section 8.1 (a) of both versions of the Rules, commentators maintain that “Canada is

best known, and most dear, to renewables developers for its 20- to 25-year contracts with highly-rated

public utilities.” While Canada's provinces each operate their own renewables regime, they all offer

generous offtake structures that make them the envy of their UK and US peers. The head of alternative

energy at investment bank Ambrian in London argues returns are higher in the UK, for example, but

companies target Canada because of the stable revenues. "They trade the longer duration [contracts]

against the lower tariff."18

However, before granting renewable energy generators a contract, the OPA looks for a track

record and tangible net worth . According to OPA tender documents: "[A] proponent must demonstrate

that it has successfully financed another generation facility within the last 60 months that is at least 50%

of the contract capacity of the proposed [facility]." It also asks that one equity provider account for at

least 20% of the project cost, a deposit of $25,000 per MW of capacity up to a maximum of $1 million,

and a standby letter of credit from a bank with a minimum credit rating. Likewise, BC Hydro typically

does not ask for a security deposit but does request a proposal submission fee, depending on the size of

the project, and a non-refundable registration fee of $5,000, and financing commitments as part of each

bid.19

3. Criticism of FITs

18 Byrne, Katy (February 2009), Tarrifs of Terror, Project Finance and Infrastructure Finance. Pg. 29 – 3019ibid

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Commentators do not deny the positive attributes of fixed tarrifs, namely greater certainty of

revenue, which is reflected in the strong number of deals done and sustained market growth where

tarriffs are used. Entrepreneurs and smaller scale investors have been able to enter the market, and

differentiating the tariffs by technology, as is the case in Ontario, has promoted diversification. 20

However, tariffs are not without criticism.

a) The burden to taxpayers

Although prices have decreased for solar power under FIT 3.0, rates for wind have increased and

those for biogas and renewable biomass have increased.21 Although the prices guaranteed by the OPA to

renewable energy developers vary by technology, they are all being subsidized by the government. The

Ontario Progressive Conservative Party has argued that electricity prices are too high, and there is no

room for competition to drive down prices. In response, many observers say that a Liberal government

would likely lower, or even entirely cut, tariff prices over time, allowing the holders of contract offers to

go through the development cycle, as has been the case for similar regimes in Europe. Under FIT 3.0,

large-scale renewable energy projects will be bid in response to RFPs. Nonetheless, the future of the

programme seems uncertain if there is a change in provincial government.22

b) The danger of retroactive tariff adjustments

Following the introduction of FITs and the rapid expansion of the Spanish solar photovoltaic

industry in 2008, Spain announced in 2010 that it would re-evaluate its FIT system and retroactively

reduced the amounts that would be paid to power generators with long-term contracts 23 by as much as

20 supra note 6 at, p. 24.21 http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/sites/default/files/news.22 Sayles, Robin (Sep 2010), FIT-ted up, Project Finance and Infrastructure. 23 supra note 9 at p. 29.

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30%, and cap overall market size.24 Not only did this change modify the economics of the project

financing on which developers relied, it reduced support for the European renewable energy as a

whole.25 In January 2011, ASIF, Spain’s leading solar energy industry association, announced it would

sue the Spanish government over the reductions.26 Similarly, in 2011 the Czech Republic changed the

terms of its FITs for projects that had already been implemented in 2009 and 2010.27

These events have been attributed as much to faulty tariff design as to setting the tariffs at

unsustainably high levels. In contrast, Germany prescribed stepped tariff reductions (digressions) have

produced steadier growth. Although the original period of high tariffs in Spain kick-started significant

industry activity, the 2008 changes diverted capital away from Spain (at that time towards Italy, also

with a solar FIT). While such dramatic events have yet to be seen in Ontario, it underscores the

importance of design details such as tariff duration, inflation indexing and the degree of market

segmentation (and capping, as the FIT 2.1 rules present an essentially uncapped market). The 2010

Spanish experience highlights the overall cost borne by the tax-payer, and the overall political

unsustainability of the mechanism.28

II. DEAL STRUCTURES IN RENEWABLE ENERGY

1. Project Finance through private debt and equity

As discussed in the first part of this paper, a properly incentivized FIT regime offering a

reasonable rate of return is essential to providing impetus for renewable energy projects. The

construction of large-scale renewable energy projects can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, which

comes primarily through project financing by way of major banks and banking syndicates. A smaller

24 Liebreich, Michael (Sept. 1 2009). Feed-in-tarrifs – Solution or Time-bomb? New Energy Finance VIP Comment. Pg. 1.25 ibid.26 supra note 24 pg. 59.27 ibid pg. 59.28 Ibid.

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portion comes from equity from the project developers and sponsors, as well as private equity investors

and private equity funds that make both project and corporate equity investments.29

The diagram below illustrates the breakdown between debt and equity on renewable energy

deals between 2002 – 2008 on a global level.30 As seen, a negligible amount of renewable energy asset

financing also comes from the issuance of bonds, which would require the bonds be rated as investment

grade.31

Although venture capital investors typically do not play a role in financing the construction of

renewable energy assets, venture investors fund promising renewable energy technologies in the initial

stages of the commercialization process. 32 In general, venture capital intervenes in the earlier life-stage

of a technology, between the research and development up to the demonstration phase, and can open

29 MARS Market Insights, (2010), Financing Renewable Energy – Accelerating Ontario’s Green Energy Industry. Pg. 10.30 ibid. Reproduced from Greenwood, Chris et al. (2009). Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investment 2009: Analysis of Trends and Issues in the Financing for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. Pg. 36. 31 supra note 29.32 supra note 29 at pg. 11.

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bottlenecks in deal flow.33 Public markets offer indirect financing to renewable energy projects by

channelling capital to renewable energy technology manufacturers and project developers.34

2. Public Finance Mechanisms

UNEP has suggested that the following “Public Finance Mechanisms” could be more widely

employed by the public sector to leverage private sector investment in renewable energy by several

multiples.35

a) Credit lines

UNEP suggests these can be offered by governments at nominal rates to encourage borrowing in

targeted sectors. They often address the lack of liquidity to meet medium to long-term financing

requirements in markets where high interest rates are seen as a barrier. Credit lines work well with

both large- and medium- scale grid-connected renewable energy projects and typically fund a defined

portion including the long-term component of project loans. However, the amount of commercial

financing leveraged by a given amount of public funding is relatively low, generally in the 2–4 times

range. 36

b) Subordinated debt

Subordinated or junior debt is debt which ranks behind other debt should a company fall into

bankruptcy or liquidation. It can substitute for and reduce the amount of senior debt in a project’s

financial structure, thus addressing the debt-equity gap and reducing risk from the senior lender’s point

of view. It can also reduce project sponsor equity requirements set by senior lenders. It is typically in

the range of 10-25 percent of a project’s sources of funds, and mostly intended to support small scale

33 supra note 29.34 supra note 29 at pg. 11.35 supra note 1.36 supra note 1 at pg. 29.

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renewable energy projects. However, subordinated debt facilities only obtain moderate fund

mobilisation by supporting and leveraging senior debt. Subordinated debt can also be structured in a

different form such as convertible debt or preferred shares. 37

c) Guarantees

The use of guarantees is appropriate when lenders have adequate medium to long-term

liquidity, but are unwilling to provide financing. A guarantee mobilises funding by sharing in the credit

risk of project loans the lenders make with their own resources. Guarantees are generally only

appropriate in financial markets where borrowing costs are at reasonable levels and where

a good number of lenders are interested in the targeted market segment. Typically guarantees are

partial, that is they cover a portion of the outstanding loan principal with 50-80 percent being common.

This ensures that the lenders remain at risk for a certain portion of their portfolio to ensure prudent

lending. Guarantees can achieve low to high leverage depending on how they are structured, and

depending on their target market segment. 38

d) Project loan facilities

Loan facilities are created by governments as special vehicles to provide debt financing directly

to projects, whereas credit lines which reduce the lenders risk.39 UNEP states that project loan facilities

are warranted in situations where there are large numbers of economic projects that are unable to

make it to financial closure because local lenders lack the capacity or liquidity to provide the needed

financing. UNEP rates the leverage potential of loan facilities as only medium, however the availability

37 supra note 1 at pg. 30.38 ibid.39 supra note 1 at pg. 31.

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of project finance capital can greatly improve access to other forms of financing for clean energy

projects.

e) Soft loan programmes

Soft loans are bridge loans often used during the pre-commercialization stages and during actual

project preparation, when the development risks are high and loans from lenders are difficult to

access.40 Run by quasi-public entities, soft loan programmes provide debt capital at

concessional interest rates. Generally they do not require collateral although matching funds are often

needed to ensure strong commitment from the developers. Soft loan programmes allow deferred

repayment until such time that the ventures reach the operation and revenue-generating stages. In

most cases, debt is forgiven if the ventures do not materialize. The Green Municipal Investment Fund

(GMIF) which is run by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities is an example of a soft loan facility

which helps renewable energy projects come to fruition by providing very early stage capital.41

III. EUROPE: LOAN GUARANTEES, ON-LENDING AND CO-LENDING FROM NATIONAL AND

SUPRANATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFRASTRUCTURE BANKS

Supra-national financial institutions in Europe such as the European Investment Bank, the

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the financial arm of the European Commission

act on pan-European energy policy directives to mobilize substantial capital to support major renewable

energy projects. 42 Their effectiveness comes from reducing commercial bank risk by providing loan

guarantees and funds for on-lending to national commercial banks. They do so by borrowing funds on

40 ibid.41 ibid.42 supra note 29 at pg.13.

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the capital markets, which they lend on favourable terms to projects furthering EU policy objectives,

such as providing financing to projects that enhance Europe’s energy security and increasing the share

of renewable energy in the EU’s energy mix.43

1. FIDEME

In 2003, the French environment agency ADEME and the French commercial bank Natixis

launched FIDEME, a €45 million public-private mezzanine fund aimed at addressing the funding gap that

had prevented the establishment of wind and other renewable energy projects in France. By helping

commercial lenders reduce their risk, the double leverage structure allowed France’s environment

agency to mobilize an amount of capital 20 times greater than its own contribution. The mechanism

employed was as follows: ADEME contributed €15 million to FIDEME as a subordinated tranche within

the fund, which then provided subordinated financing to commercial banking syndicates, helping to

attract senior lenders. FIDEME has financed 30 renewable energy projects and created more than 300

MW of energy generation capacity.44 According to MARs, these projects represent more than a third

accounted for more than a third of France’s total wind energy generation capabilities. Even more

encouraging is that Natixis has since launched its second FIDEME fund, this time on a fully commercial

basis, since the renewable market in France has matured beyond the need for public financial support

from ADEME.45 Announced in June of 2008, EuroFIDEME, a €250 million fund, has dedicated 60% of its

assets for the provision of subordinated debt to projects, while the remaining 40% will be invested as

equity, either in renewable energy projects or in project development companies. The fund has an EU-

wide mandate, but focuses on opportunities in southern Europe. 46

43ibid.44 supra note 29 at pg. 14.45 ibid.46 Ibid.

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In 2010, EDF Energies Nouvelles, a French developer of renewable energy projects, entered into

a memorandum of understanding with the EIB, which would allocate €500 million, with the balance

being provided by commercial banks, to establish a financing vehicle for a portfolio of solar photovoltaic

projects in France and Italy. Given the volume of the project portfolio, and based on financing terms

established for two pilot projects funded in early 2010, subsequent projects will replicate these financial

structures, which simplify and streamline the funding process for future projects funded by the

partners.47

2. Belwinds off-shore wind project

Another example of strong EIB support in the renewables sector is the Belwind offshore wind

project being developed by a consortium of Belgian and Dutch investors off the Belgian coast. This

marked the first time that the EIB assumed project finance risk for an offshore wind farm. 48 The project

is being financed with €482.5 million in non-recourse debt, with a maturity of 15 years after

construction, and a €63.43 million non-recourse mezzanine facility. The Belwind project involves a

broad set of private and public financing institutions. The EIB is providing €300 million to the 165 MW

project, half of which is being guaranteed by Eksport Kredit Fondend (EKF), Denmark’s state export

credit agency. Once Belwind, which will be the largest Belgian offshore windfarm,49 becomes

operational, the electricity it generates will be sold to Electrabel, Europe’s fifth largest energy generator

and distributor, under a long-term FIT contract. As stated by MARs, the Belwind deal exemplifies the

typical interplay of public and private financing institutions, insurers, energy purchasers, carbon credit

47 ibid.48 www.eib.org/projects/press/200949 ibid.

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sales (which falls outside the scope of this paper) and FITs that characterize most major renewable

energy projects in Europe.50

3. Tax credits, tax exemptions and low-interest loans

Several European countries provide generous tax exemptions, tax credits and low-interest loans

for the development of renewable energy projects. In addition to providing a sustainable development

tax credit, France, for example, provides low interest loans to support the purchase of renewable energy

infrastructure. The Netherlands provides tax exemptions through an energy investment deduction

scheme, which Dutch companies that invest in sustainable energy and/or energy efficient equipment

receive a tax credit of up to 44% of the purchase and production costs, up to a maximum of €111

million. Other Dutch incentives include exempting generators from the eco-tax levied on electricity

consumption and providing low-interest loans from designated “Green Funds.”51 Germany’s national

infrastructure bank, the KfW, and German regional and community banks also provide incentives to

small-scale projects.

CONCLUSION

According to New Energy Finance, no other type of regime can boast the success stories of FITs

for small-scale renewable energy generation.52 However, the long-term liabilities created by FITs fall on

the utilities, who in turn pass them through to electricity users via higher power prices. For example,

existing projects covered by FITs in Germany will drive up the cost of electricity by 1.1 eurocent/kWh for

the next 22 years. The situation in Spain, previous discussed, has resulted in the taxpayer paying for a

colossal off-balance-sheet liability: one year’s construction of solar power in Spain created a government

50 supra note 29 at pg. 14.51 supra note 29 at pg. 16.52 supra note 24.

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liability equivalent to 8% of its national debt.53 New Energy Finance admits that although the average

system prices can be corrected, there will always be a mispricing of renewable energy, as there is no

mechanism in a FITs system to ensure that government price controls will be able to correctly price

renewable energy as it progresses down the cost experience curve, or undergoes price spikes due to

supply-side bottlenecks. Looking into the future, as renewable energy continues to grow as a

proportion of the energy mix, FITs will essentially spell price controls over electricity, stiffling

competitiveness and growth.

Is this a risk for Ontario as well? The recent changes to FIT version 3.0 suggest that the regulator

is aware of these potential pitfalls, and is taking steps to avoid them. Large-scale projects will now have

to bid for acceptance into the FIT program, hopefully resulting in “price discovery”, which may possibly

need to be averaged out in the event of any rogue bids, or bids that otherwise undercut the market.

While a state-run auction may not be ideal, it will hopefully avoid the drama regarding retroactively

dimished FITs as occurred in Spain, as well as avoiding price controls exerting an anti-competitive effect

on the electricity market. It has been suggested that a central funding pool – grants, tax breaks and a

loan guarantee scheme or the like – would reduce the apparent cost to electricity consumers to a

politically acceptable level, at least until renewable energy becomes more nearly cost-competitive with

other sources.54

How should Ontario mobilise private capital? Ontario does not have the benefit of the

government-backed public funding mechanisms to help mobilise private lending by reducing risk, nor

does it enjoy the sponsorship of national or supra-national “green” banks or institutions. However,

some see opportunity for Ontario to provide Canada-wide leadership in renewable energy finance, as

the first region to adopt an uncapped feed-in tariff in North America.55 Compared to US banks, Canadian

53 ibid.54 supra note 24.55 supra note 29.

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financial institutions are well positioned in that they are relatively solvent, and have experience

financing the development and operation of large resource-based projects. There are many ways that

Canadian lenders can become more comfortable with investing in these new technologies: start with

smaller projects to gain experience; only working with certain technologies/partners/regions; working

alongside experience foreign renewable energy lenders/developers; and so on.56 As an example of what

it sees as excessive reticence, MARs cites several Canadian banks that are prepared to work with

renewable energy developers having at least five years experience, however the incentives program has

only been in existence for three! Ultimately, the reticence of Canadian lenders may be unfounded in

that many of the renewable energy technologies have rigorously proven their value and “bankability” in

Europe, and have been steadily generating investor returns in other countries for decades. The success

of the original FIDEME fund (and its successor funds) exemplifies this, and the new Ontario FIT seems to

be positioned to avoid the mistakes made by certain European countries. However, since the Ontario

FIT regime is modelled closely on the German scheme, it is probable that German banks will continue to

play a lead role in financing large-scale renewable energy projects in Ontario.57

Ultimately, there may be a lesser degree of public involvement in the issue of renewable

energies compared to Europe, resulting in little political will to establish “green banks” and other

institutions available to European Union member states. In fact, strong local opposition to wind farms

suggests that the Canadian public may not have fully embraced the way the new energy landscape will

take form. Hopefully as globalization continues to help information spread, Ontario and Canada as a

whole can continue to benefit from the experiences of our European neighbours, without replicating

their mistakes.

56 ibid.57 supra note 29.

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REFERENCES

Anonymous, (June 2011) Fit for purpose? Project Finance and Infrastructure Finance.

Byrne, Katy (February 2009), Tarrifs of Terror, Project Finance and Infrastructure Finance.

Deutsche Bank Climate Change Advisors, (2009) Paying for Renewable Energy: TLC at the Right Price - Achieving Scale through Efficient Policy Advice. Green Energy Act, 2009, S.O. 2009 c. 12.

Hamilton, Kristy (2009). Unlocking Finance for Clean Energy: the need for “Investment Grade” Policy, Chatham House.

Justice, Sophie (December, 2009). Private Financing of Renewable Energy—A Guide for Policymakers. United Nations Environment Programme, Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative.

Liebreich, Michael (Sept. 1 2009). Feed-in-tarrifs – Solution or Time-bomb? New Energy Finance VIP Comment. Pg. 1.

Maclean, John et al (2008), Public Finance Mechanisms to Mobilise Investment in Climate Change Mitigation, United Nations Energy Program, Sustainable Energy Finance Initiatives.

MARS Market Insights, (2010), Financing Renewable Energy – Accelerating Ontario’s Green Energy Industry. Pg. 10.

New Energy Finance (April 23 2013). Strong Growth for Renewables Expected through to 2030.

Ontario Power Authority, Feed-in Tarrif Program, FIT Contract and Rules, Version 2.1 and 3.0

Sayles, Robin (Sep 2010), FIT-ted up, Project Finance and Infrastructure Finance