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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRILATERAL

COOPERATION ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN

INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND THE

PHILIPPINES: INCREASING OF

SECURITY COOPERATION TO REDUCE

MARITIME PIRACY AT SULU SEA

Faculty of Humanities President University in partial fulfillment

of the requirements of Bachelor Degree in International Relations

Major in Strategic and Defense Studies

MPLEMENTATION OF TRILATERAL



PHILIPPINES: INCREASING OF MARITIME


MARITIME PIRACY AT SULU SEA (2016

By

Sri Ariani 016201400192

A thesis presented to the



Major in Strategic and Defense Studies

2018

MPLEMENTATION OF TRILATERAL



ARITIME


2016-2017)



II

THESIS ADVISER

RECOMMENDATION LETTER

This thesis entitled “The implementation of Trilateral Cooperation

Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines: Increasing of

Maritime Security Cooperation to Reduce Maritime Piracy at Sulu Sea

(2016-2017)” prepared and submitted by Sri Ariani in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of Bachelor in the Faculty of Humanities, has been

reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be

examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, Indonesia, 15 May 2018

Recommended and Acknowledge by,

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph. D

Thesis Adviser

I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, MSc.

Thesis Adviser

III

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis, entitled “The implementation of Trilateral

Cooperation Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines:

Increasing of Maritime Security Cooperation to Reduce Maritime Piracy at

Sulu Sea (2016-2017)” is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, an original

piece of work that has not been submitted, either in whole of in part, to another

university to obtain a degree.

Cikarang, 15 May 2018

Sri Ariani

IV

PANEL OF EXAMINERS

APPROVAL SHEET

The Panel of Examiners declare that the thesis “The implementation of

Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines: Increasing of Maritime Security Cooperation to Reduce

Maritime Piracy at Sulu Sea (2016-2017)” that was submitted by Sri Ariani

majoring in International Relations from the Faculty of Humanities was assessed

and approved to have passed the Oral Examinations on 18 May 2018.

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D

Chair – Panel of Examiners

I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, MSc.

Thesis Adviser

Anggara Raharyo, S.IP., M.PS.

Examiner

V

ABSTRACT

Sri Ariani, International Relations 2014, President University Thesis Title: “The implementation of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines: Increasing of Maritime Security Cooperation to Reduce Maritime Piracy at Sulu Sea (2016-2017)” Nowadays Sulu Sea is becoming the core of geopolitics issues between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The three countries are looking at Sulu Sea as the strategic environment which has the substance of their national security interest, but the maritime security condition at Sulu Sea has no longer stable after the existence of Abu Sayyaf Group. In this thesis will explain about the agreement of maritime security cooperation which is called as the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement in preserving Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines national security interests at Sulu Sea. The agreement has been initiated by the minister of foreign affairs of those three countries in order to their common concern about the threat that has been conducted by the Abu Sayyaf Group. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines as the three countries who agreed in the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement at Sulu Sea recognize the threat in the maritime areas is maritime piracy such as ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom that could threatened their national security interest as well as their sovereignty at sea. Therefore in order to overcome the maritime piracy at Sulu Sea, the three countries implement the initiatives that have been agreed. Keywords: Sulu Sea, Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf Group, maritime piracy

VI

ABSTRAK

Sri Ariani, International Relations 2014, President University Thesis Title: “The implementation of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines: Increasing of Maritime Security Cooperation to Reduce Maritime Piracy at Sulu Sea (2016-2017)” Saat ini Laut Sulu menjadi pusat permasalahan geopolitik antara Indonesia, Malaysia dan Filipina. Ketiga negara tersebut memandang Laut Sulu sebagai lingkungan strategis yang memiliki kepentingan substansial pada keamanan nasional mereka, tetapi kondisi keamanan maritim di Laut Sulu tidak lagi stabil setelah keberadaan Abu Sayyaf Group. Di dalam skipsi ini akan menjelaskan tentang kesepakatan kerjasama keamanan maritim yang disebut sebagai Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement dalam mempertahankan kepentingan keamanan nasional Indonesia, Malaysia, dan Filipina di Laut Sulu. Kesepakatan telah diprakarsai oleh Menteri Luar Negeri ketiga negara tersebut untuk kepedulian bersama mereka tentang ancaman yang telah dilakukan oleh Abu Sayyaf Group. Indonesia, Malaysia, dan Filipina sebagai tiga negara yang setuju dalam Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement di Laut Sulu menyadari bahwa ancaman di wilayah maritim adalah pembajakan maritim seperti pembajakan kapal dan penculikan untuk mendapatkan uang tebusan yang dapat mengancam kepentingan keamanan nasional serta kedaulatan mereka di laut. Karena itu untuk mengatasi pembajakan maritim di Laut Sulu, ketiga negara melaksanakan inisiatif yang telah disepakati. Kata kunci: Laut Sulu, Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement, Indonesia, Malaysia, Filipina, Abu Sayyaf Group, pembajakan maritim

VII

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

After 3.5 years of college, finally I have reached this stage. This is where

the struggle begins, where I have to fight for my own future. Sometimes I wonder

and realize that time is passing by, I just entered college and now I almost finish it.

Indeed, there are a lot of valuable experiences and lessons that I learned which

certainly increased my maturity in thinking, acting, and behaving. I have met

many people who brighten up my university life; they inspired me, taught me the

values of friendship, and certainly made it very difficult to say good-bye.

First of all I would like to express my gratitude to Allah SWT for his

infinite blessings so I could complete this undergraduate study. Allah has given

me a family who loves me unconditionally and cares for me sincerely. So, my

deepest appreciation for my father Nusyirwan, mother Yulismawarti, my sisters

Dian Eka Putri and Melisa Aurora. You are the most precious treasure, which

cannot be replaced by anything in this world. I would also say thank you for all

the big families for all the supports and believe on me.

My sincere gratitude to the best lecturer I have ever met, Prof. Banyu

Perwita who has been guiding me for almost 3 years. Your patience and

dedication in guiding the students will never be forgotten. May God always give

you health and blessings of all your good deeds to us. My sincere thanks also goes

to Mr. Dharma Agastia who has guided me in composing this thesis. I hope

success will always follow your career and everything you do in life.

My sincere gratitude to the best chief of sub-directorate that I have ever

met during internship, Colonel Oktaheroe Ramsi, who has shared his experience

and helped me to finish my thesis. Then my big thanks for all the staffs in

Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia especially in Directorate

General of Defense Strategy that I cannot mention one by one who has gave me a

lot of knowledge and best experiences.

My university life was wonderful because of my real best friends since the

first year until we finally graduate together (Amen). You guys have proved me

VIII

that time reveals your true friends, who always be there for the happiest day to the

saddest day of my university life. So, my warmest hugs for my friends who

always support and encourage me, Tania and Widya Dwi Rachmawati. My

roommates during university life before the real life hit me so hard, Syifa Afiah

and Nuraini Ulandari. Then for my friends Fahri Surya Altakwa, Darysa Zolla

Elpanda, Kalvin, Intan Apriani, Genoveva Elena Chairul, Silvia Chayadi, Nisa

Nabila, and Akila Paravathi thank you to fulfill my story in this university. Then

also for my Minangnese family that I found in here, Fadhlan Imam Vidani, Okie

Fiandri, Ventika Aurora Pratiwi, Mulyani Fitri, and Ginsi Trianesti thank you for

everything.

And also for my defense squad, thank you for being my classmate for

several semesters, Cici, Oki, Mita, Jojo, Elji, Nada, Aulia, and Agung let’s have

another trip! Then for the IR Badminton and Volley Family, it is such a pleasure

for me to practice and playing together with you guys.

Finally, I would like to thank everybody who has become an important

part of my life journey. I always pray for your success, health, and happiness. Do

not forget to keep in touch!

Cikarang, May 2018

Sri Ariani

IX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RECOMMENDATION LETTER ...................................................................................... II

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY .............................................................................. III

PANEL OF EXAMINERS APPROVAL SHEET ............................................................. IV

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ V

ABSTRAK ......................................................................................................................... VI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................ VII

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... IX

List of Diagrams ............................................................................................................... XII

List of Graphs .................................................................................................................. XIII

List of Pictures ................................................................................................................. XIV

List of Tables ................................................................................................................... XVI

CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

I.1 Background ................................................................................................................ 1

I.2 Problem Identification ............................................................................................... 7

I.3 Statement of problem ................................................................................................. 9

I.4 Research Objectives .................................................................................................. 9

I.5 Significance of Study ................................................................................................. 9

I.6 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 10

I.6.1 Maritime Security ............................................................................................. 11

I.6.2 Regional Security Complex Theory ................................................................. 13

I.6.3 Maritime Diplomacy ......................................................................................... 16

I.6.4 Cooperative Maritime Diplomacy .................................................................... 17

I.6.5 Maritime Piracy ................................................................................................ 18

I.7 Scope and Limitation of Study ................................................................................ 20

I.8 Research Methodology ............................................................................................ 21

I.9 Structure of Thesis ................................................................................................... 21

I.9.1 CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 21

I.9.2 CHAPTER II : Strategic Environment of the Sulu Sea. ................................... 22

X

I.9.3 CHAPTER III : The Overview of Maritime Security Cooperation of Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines towards Sulu Sea. ...................................................... 22

I.9.4 CHAPTER IV : The Implementation of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines’s Maritime Security Cooperation at Sulu Sea in the near Future. .......... 22

I.9.5 CHAPTER V : Conclusion. .............................................................................. 22

CHAPTER II ..................................................................................................................... 23

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE SULU SEA ........................................... 23

II.1. Sulu Sea as the Strategic Environment for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines .................................................................................................................... 23

II.2 The Common Interest of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in order to

Secure Their National Security Interest at Sulu Sea. .................................................... 26

II.2.1 The National Security Interest of Indonesia at Sulu Sea ................................. 30

II.2.2 The National Security Interest of Malaysia at Sulu Sea .................................. 37

II.2.3 The National Security Interest of the Philippines at Sulu Sea ......................... 41

II.2.4 The Cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines on Facing

the Abu Sayyaf Groups in the Sulu Sea. ................................................................... 46

II.3 Threat Assessment of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines at Sulu Sea ......... 50

II.3.1 The Presence of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as the actor of ship hijacking and

kidnapping for ransom at Sulu Sea (2016-2017) ...................................................... 53

CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................... 56

THE OVERVIEW OF MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION OF INDONESIA,

MALAYSIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES TOWARDS SULU SEA ................................. 56

III.1 Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines at Sulu Sea .................................................................................................. 56

III.1.1 Trilateral Meeting on 5 May 2016 ................................................................. 58

III.1.2 Trilateral Meeting on 26 May 2016 ............................................................... 60

III.1.3 Trilateral Meeting on 20 June 2016 ............................................................... 61

III.1.4 Trilateral Meeting on 2 August 2016 ............................................................. 62

III.1.5 Trilateral Meeting on 1 October 2016 ............................................................ 63

III.1.6 Trilateral Meeting on 16 November 2016 ...................................................... 64

III.2 Perspectives of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines on Maritime Security

Cooperation at Sulu Sea by Having Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement.................... 65

III.2.1 Indonesian Perspectives ................................................................................. 65

III.2.2 Malaysian Perspective.................................................................................... 66

III.2.3 The Philippines Perspective ........................................................................... 68

XI

CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................... 70

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES’

MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION AT SULU SEA IN THE NEAR FUTURE 70

IV.1 The Implementation of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement at Sulu Sea ............ 70

IV.1.1 Trilateral Maritime and Air Patrol in Sulu Sea as an Action to Response the

Ship Hijacking and Kidnapping for Ransom ............................................................ 70

IV.1.2 The Establishment of Maritime Command Center in Each Nations of

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines near Sulu Sea ............................................ 77

IV.2 Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines Military Deployment to Support the

Implementation of Maritime Security Cooperation at Sulu Sea ................................... 79

IV.2.1 Naval Force Capabilities ................................................................................ 80

IV.2.2 Air Force Capabilities .................................................................................... 85

CHAPTER V .................................................................................................................... 92

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 92

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 94

XII

List of Diagrams

Diagram 1.1 The Flow of Theoretical Framework………………………………11

XIII

List of Graphs

Graph 2.1 Indonesia Export Towards Philippines……………………………….34

Graph 2.2 Philippines Export Towards Indonesia……………………………….44

XIV

List of Pictures

Picture 1.1 The location of Indonesia …………………..………………………...1

Picture 1.2 The Location of Sulu Sea…………………………………………...…5

Picture 1.3 Matrix of Maritime Security…………………………………………11

Picture 2.1 Map of Sulu Sea…………………………………………………...…24

Picture 2.2 Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum……………………………….32

Picture 2.3 Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone………………………………43

Picture 2.4 Security Threats from Abu Sayyaf Group towards Indonesia, Malaysia

and the Philippines; and Shipping Lanes in Tri Border

Area………………………………………………………………….48

Picture 2.5 Abu Sayyaf Group Activity………………………………………….50

Picture 2.6 Philippines Kidnapping……………………………………………....53

Picture 3.1 Timeline of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement Meeting…………..58

Picture 4.1 Defense Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

officially announced the launching of trilateral Maritime Patrol at

Tarakan Naval Base…………………………………………………71

Picture 4.2 Suggested Patrol Route along Transit Corridor within Area of

Maritime Interest………………………………………………...…73

Picture 4.3 The three countries conduct port visit………………………………..74

Picture 4.4 Defense Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

officially announced the launching of trilateral Air Patrol at Subang

Air Force Base……………………………………………………..75

Picture 4.5 The opening of Maritime Command Center in Tarakan……………..77

Picture 4.6 KRI Sidat-851………………………………………………………..82

Picture 4.7 KD Baung-3509……………………………………………………...83

Picture 4.8 PS-38 BRP General Mariano Alvarez patrol in the Sulu Sea………..85

XV

Picture 4.9 Boeing 737 Camar Emas Penjaga Kedaulatan………………………87

Picture 4.10 Aircraft that Malaysia used in the Trilateral Air Patrol………….…89

XVI

List of Tables

Table 1.1 The Number of Maritime Piracy at Sulu Sea…………………………...3

Table 2.1 Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines National Security Interest and

Threat Perceptions in the Sulu Sea……………………………………28

Table 3.1 Progress of the Formulation an agreement by Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines………………………………………………………...64

Table 4.1 The initiatives and implementation of Trilateral Cooperation

Arrangement…………………………………………………………..79

Table 4.2 The Capabilities of Naval Force from Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines………………………………………………..…………...80

Table 4.3 The Air Forces Capabilities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines……………………………………………………….……86

I.1 Background

Picture 1.1 the location of Indonesia (Source: Google Maps)

Indonesia is one of the largest

more than 17000 islands

and Australia contin

important oceans which are Indian and Pacific oceans

maritime border with 9 nations.

challenges as coastal states. The seas seen as an invisible border will easily

lead to maritime security issues. Indonesia as the largest coastal state also has

to aware with the maritime security issues, because 4 of

choke points in the world

are located in Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, and Makassar

1 nationsonline.org, k. (1998).Online Project. [online] Nationsonline.org. Available at: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_map2.htm [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018].

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION


Indonesia is one of the largest archipelagic states in the world consisting

more than 17000 islands. It is located between two continents which are Asia

and Australia continental. As well Indonesia located between two

oceans which are Indian and Pacific oceans. Indonesia

maritime border with 9 nations.1 Those nations also have many common

as coastal states. The seas seen as an invisible border will easily


to aware with the maritime security issues, because 4 of the

in the world are located in Indonesia territory. The choke points

located in Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, and Makassar

nationsonline.org, k. (1998). Political Map of Indonesia - Maritime Southeast Asia

roject. [online] Nationsonline.org. Available at: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_map2.htm [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018].

1


in the world consisting

wo continents which are Asia

located between two most

. Indonesia also shares a

Those nations also have many common

as coastal states. The seas seen as an invisible border will easily


the geo-strategic

. The choke points

located in Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, and Makassar

Maritime Southeast Asia - Nations

http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_map2.htm [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018].

2

Strait.2 Therefore, these choke points as the geo-strategic will often traversed

by the ships that want to go to Indonesia and vice versa.

Southeast Asia region has a huge maritime area and it has an important

role in almost every aspect of the living for all Southeast Asia Countries. The

Southeast Asia maritime also give a big contribution to the flow of economic

in the world,3 not to mention about the exclusiveness of maritime geography

in Southeast Asia region. The geographical location of the Southeast Asia

region has long been of strategic importance, particularly in the arenas of

international geopolitics and global economy,4 that is why this situation made

of maritime areas is not secure from the threats because it also gives the

opportunities to the non state actors to do crime at sea.

From the maritime security outlook we can see that the crime at sea has

turned out to be more complex, and because of that the issues of maritime

security could cause danger to every coastal states and its territory which will

categorized as maritime piracy. According to the United Nations Office on

Drug and Crime (UNODC) Maritime piracy is not a trafficking issue, it is

violent of a greedy crime. The term of “piracy” encompasses two distinct

sorts of offences: the first is robbery or hijacking, where the target of the

attack is to steal a maritime vessel or its cargo; the second is kidnapping,

where the vessel and crew are threatened until a ransom is paid.5

In the article 101 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) 1982 also mentioned about the definition of piracy which is any

illegal acts of violence or arresting, or any act of destruction committed for

2 Rakernas INKINDO Pembangunan Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia. (2016). Majalah INKINDO, [online] (65), pp.3-4. Available at: http://inkindo-dki.org/inkindo-Mag-E65-rev.pdf [Accessed 5 Feb. 2018]. 3 Chin, C. (2017). What Are the Opportunities for ASEAN?. Yale Insights. [online] Available at: https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/what-are-the-opportunities-for-asean [Accessed 9 Mar. 2018]. 4 Fan Wing, D. (n.d.). The Evolution of ASEAN : The Trend towards Regional Cooperation. [ebook] p.82. Available at: http://www.edb.gov.hk/attachment/en/curriculum-development/kla/pshe/references-and-resources/history/IA_Lecture_5_eng.pdf [Accessed 9 Mar. 2018]. 5 UNODC (2010). TOCTA Report 2010. Maritime Piracy. [online] p.193. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/9.Maritime_piracy.pdf [Accessed 24 Jan. 2018].

3

private ends by the crew or the passengers of private ship on the high seas

against another ship in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.6 There are

lots of maritime piracies that can threaten maritime security in the coastal

state, but in this case it will focus on the ship hijacking which is kidnapping

the ship’s crew to get ransom.

The significant number of maritime piracy in the Southeast Asia

Waterways happened in 2015,7 and there are also includes several number of

piracies happened at Sulu Sea. Therefore the ship hijacking and kidnapping

for ransom at the Sulu Sea will be the main factor that will be analyses from

the Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines government’s role and

contribution in term of reducing the maritime piracy, because it is threatening

maritime security and interfere the regional trading route. On the table below

are the increasing number of ship hijacking and the kidnapping for ransom at

Sulu Sea in 20158 until 20169 and has been decreased in 201710.

Table 1.1 The Number of Maritime Piracy at Sulu Sea

2015

No. Month of Incident Vessel Name Type of Incident

1 03 April 2015 Voge Fantasy (Liberia) Berthed Board 2 07 March 2015 MV Brahms (Malta) Attempted Boarding 3 20 March 2015 MV Amis Wisdom (Panama) Attempted Boarding 4 26 July 2015 MT Silver Dubai (Panama) Attempted Boarding 5 10 October 2015 MV CECILIA V (Mongolia) Attempted Kidnap

6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (1982). 3rd ed. [ebook] Montego Bay: United Nations, p.61. Available at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf [Accessed 5 Feb. 2018]. 7 ICC International Maritime Bureau (2017). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ship. Report for the Period 1 January -31 December 2016. [online] London: ICC, p.5. Available at: http://www.nepia.com/media/558888/2016-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf [Accessed 31 Mar. 2018]. 8 ICC International Maritime Bureau (2016). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ship. Report for the Period 1 January -31 December 2015. [online] London: ICC, p.32-48. Available at: https://www.anave.es/images/documentos_noticias/2016/2015_annual_imb_piracy_report.pdf [Accessed 19 May 2018] 9 ICC International Maritime Bureau (2017). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ship. Report for the Period 1 January -31 December 2016. [online] London: ICC, p.31-38. Available at: http://www.nepia.com/media/558888/2016-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf [Accessed 31 Mar. 2018] 10 ICC International Maritime Bureau (2018). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. report for the period 1 january - 31 Desember 2017. [online] London: ICC, pp.33-35. Available at: https://www.icc-ccs.org/reports/2017-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf [Accessed 31 Mar. 2018].

4

2016

1 14 February 2016 Fishing Boat (Filipina) Kidnap at Sea

2 26 March 2016 TB Brahma (Indonesia) Kidnap at Sea

3 01 April 2016 TB Massive 6 (Malaysia) Kidnap at Sea

4 15 April 2016 TB Henry & TB Cristi Kidnap at Sea

5 02 June 2016 Ever Prosper & Ever Dignity (Malaysia) Hijack & Kidnap at Sea

6 22 June 2016 TB Charles (Indonesia) Kidnap at Sea

7 09 July 2016 Fishing Boat (Indonesia) Kidnap at Sea

8 18 July 2016 TB (Malaysia) Kidnap at Sea

9 25 July 2016 TB SSE Charlotte (Tuvalu) Attempted Boarding

10 10 September 2016 Fishing Boat (Malaysia) Kidnap at Sea

11 27 September 2016 Fishing Boat (Malaysia) Kidnap at Sea

12 20 October 2016 MV Dongbang Giant no.2 (Korsel) Kidnap at Sea

13 05 November 2016 Fishing Boat (Malaysia) Kidnap at Sea

14 06 November 2016 Yacht (Jerman) Kidnap at Sea

15 11 November 2016 MV Royal 16 (Vietnam) Kidnap at Sea

16 19 November 2016 Fishing Boat (Malaysia) Kidnap at Sea

17 23 November 2016 MV Ken Toku (Panama) Fired Upon

18 20 Desember 2016 FB Ramona 2 (Filipina) Kidnap at Sea

2017

NO. Month of Incident Vessel Name Type of Incident

1 03 January 2017 MV Ocean Kingdom (Filipina) Fired Upon

2 09 January 2017 Fishing Boat (Filipina) Fired Upon

3 19 January 2017 Fishing Boat (Malaysia) Kidnap at Sea

4 19 February 2017 MV Giang Hai (Vietnam) Kidnap at Sea

5 23 March 2017 TB Super Shuttle (Filipina) Kidnap at Sea

6 14 October 2017 Fishing Boat (Filipina) Kidnap at Sea

Besides that, the writer also wants to explain on how Indonesia’s

governments increase the Maritime Cooperation with neighboring countries

to support the doctrine of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) as one of

Indonesia’s vision. It is very fundamental to represents a national vision and

development agenda to rebuild the country’s maritime culture and expand its

economy. The concept of GMF also signifies a new strategic doctrine that

projects Indonesia to become a maritime power with considerable diplomatic

influence. 11 It is also to identify the approaches to support Indonesia’s

security needs in reducing maritime piracy at the Sulu Sea because it is

essential to Indonesia as a form of protection the maritime security.

11 Gindarsah, I. and Priamarizki, A. (2015). INDONESIA’S MARITIME DOCTRINE AND SECURITY CONCERNS. RSIS, [online] p.2. Available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PR150409_Indonesias-Maritime-Doctrine.pdf [Accessed 11 Mar. 2018].

The doctrine of GMF is one of the visions from President Joko Widodo at

the beginning of

GMF will not only

of the Republic o

Affairs but also have to supported by all the institutions

this issue that to achieve the

one of the steps to support it is to reduc

territory. Maritime piracy at

actor, that makes

tackling this issue concerning to the maritime security and

navigation at Sulu Sea, because Sulu Sea also is one of the shipping lanes that

very often pass through by ships.

Sea is located in the north

Picture 1.2 the location of Sulu Sea (Source: Google Maps)

12 Shekhar, V. and Liow, J. (2014).and Obstacles Ahead. [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesiaobstacles-ahead/ [Accessed 13 Mar. 2018].13 Parameswaran, P. (2016).Challenges. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/confrontingthreats-in-the-sulu-sulawesi


the beginning of his campaign for presidential election.12

will not only handled by the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries

of the Republic of Indonesia, with the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime

Affairs but also have to supported by all the institutions which ar

to achieve the doctrine. In order to achieve the GMF vision,

one of the steps to support it is to reduce the maritime piracy in the Sulu Sea

Maritime piracy at the Sulu Sea was conducted by the non state

actor, that makes Indonesia and neighboring countries have to reducing and

this issue concerning to the maritime security and for


very often pass through by ships.13 As we can see in picture

Sea is located in the northeast of Borneo Island of Indonesia and Malaysia

e location of Sulu Sea (Source: Google Maps)

ekhar, V. and Liow, J. (2014). Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies,

and Obstacles Ahead. [online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesia-as-a-maritime-power-jokowis-vision

/ [Accessed 13 Mar. 2018]. Parameswaran, P. (2016). Confronting Threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: Opportunities and

Challenges. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/confrontingsulawesi-seas-opportunities-and-challenges/ [Accessed 11 Mar. 2018].

5


The doctrine of

Marine Affairs and Fisheries

f Indonesia, with the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime

which are related to

In order to achieve the GMF vision,

e the maritime piracy in the Sulu Sea

onducted by the non state

ing countries have to reducing and

for the freedom of


1.2 below, Sulu

and Malaysia.

Indonesia as a Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, Strategies,

vision-strategies-and-

Sulawesi Seas: Opportunities and Challenges. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/confronting-

challenges/ [Accessed 11 Mar. 2018].

6

The Sulu Sea territory has been used by the non state actors to accelerating

the ship hijacking and kidnapping to fund their activities and fulfilling their

needs. The non state actors use kidnapping people are for ransom operations

as a means of financial support and raising money for survival.14 Based on the

table 1.1 in 2016, there are 16 cases of kidnapping around Sulu Sea. The non

state actors who did the ship hijacking and kidnap for ransom that are belongs

to the Philippines area. This issue have made Minister of Foreign Affairs of

the Republic Indonesia conveyed that kidnapping the ship’s crew and

hijacking ship of Indonesia absolutely intolerable and request to the

government of the Philippines to be able to guarantee the security in the Sulu

Sea territory.15 Based on maritime piracy incidents that have occurred in the

Sulu Sea, the perpetrator is a non-state actors namely as Abu Sayyaf Group.

The ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom by the ASG began in the half

of 200716 and it is still continuing until 2017.

Abu Sayyaf Group known as the ASG is one of the jihadist group part of

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the ASG trying to make an

independent Islamic state which is located in the southern of Philippines.

Founded in the early 1990’s as a Filipino Muslim (Moro) terrorist

organization, the Abu Sayyaf Group emerged as a more violent Islamist

alternative to the stagnated political movements of the Moro National

Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. 17 Therefore to

14 Fellman, Z. (2011). Abu Sayyaf Group. Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program Transnational Threats Project, [online] 5, p.6. Available at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111128_Fellman_ASG_AQAMCaseStudy5.pdf [Accessed 11 Mar. 2018]. 15 Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia (2016). Menlu RI Bahas Pembebasan Sandera dengan Menlu Filipina di Manila. [online] Available at: https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/siaran-pers/Pages/Menlu-RI-Bahas-Pembebasan-Sandera-dengan-Menlu-Filipina-di-Manila.aspx [Accessed 26 Feb. 2018]. 16 Fellman, Z. (2011). Abu Sayyaf Group. Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program Transnational Threats Project, [online] 5, p.6. Available at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/111128_Fellman_ASG_AQAMCaseStudy5.pdf [Accessed 4 Mar. 2018]. 17 Ibid., p.1.

7

establish an independent Islamic state, one of the things that they do is ship

hijacking and kidnapping for ransom to fund their needs.

The Ship Hijacking at Sulu Sea happened in the end of 2015 when the

Vietnamese attack by the Filipino pirate who is from the non state actors18

and it is continuing until 2017. Based on the IMB piracy reports 2016 there

are 150 vessels boarded, 7 hijackings, 22 attempted to attacks but failed, and

12 vessels fired upon and the number of hostages reach to 151 persons.19 In

this thesis, the writer will focus on the time period of 2016 until 2017 since

the Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines started to aware with the ship

hijacking and kidnapping for ransom at the Sulu Sea.

In the reducing of maritime piracy at Sulu Sea, Indonesia established

cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines or well known as Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines. This cooperation planning meant to secure and

prevent the Sulu Sea from the any crime at sea such as, transnational crime,

armed robbery, terrorism, kidnapping, and especially in ship hijacking. The

cooperation acts called as the Trilateral Maritime Patrol 20 as a form to

implementing the Trilateral Cooperation Agreement and the increased

intelligence sharing and joint patrols.

I.2 Problem Identification

The thesis will focus on the maritime security cooperation between

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in term of reducing maritime piracy

to secure the Sulu Sea. Through the implementation of Indonesian maritime

18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015). Remarks by MOFA Spokesperson Le Hai Binh on a reported attack on fishing vessel QNg 95861 TS of Quang Ngai Province in the vicinity of the Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelago. Vietnam: Pressroom - Spokesperson's statement. 19 International Maritime Bureau (2017). IMB report: Sea kidnappings rise in 2016 despite plummeting global piracy. [online] London & Kuala Lumpur: international Chamber of Commerce. Available at: https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/imb-report-sea-kidnappings-rise-2016-despite-plummeting-global-piracy/ [Accessed 25 Mar. 2018]. 20 Seng, T. (2017). Minilateralism: A Way out of ASEAN’s Consensus Conundrum?. ASEAN Focus: The FUture of ASEAN, [online] (5), p.9. Available at: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/WEB-ASEANFocus-0917.pdf [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018].

8

security governance in the era of President Joko Widodo, it is also to raise the

doctrine of GMF to highlight the economic potential of Indonesia’s vast sea

territory. In past three years under Jokowi’s leadership showed that foreign

investment in Indonesia has been increased, and its increase about 19.2

percent in 2015.21 The significant of positive development is in the economy

maritime, particularly in the infrastructure sector. The development of the

infrastructure is only in the part of aquaculture, the welfare fisherman and law

enforcement such as drowning fishing boat for who did the illegal fishing

(fleet).22 However this is not fully accompanied by the development in the

sector of maritime security. In addition, non-traditional maritime threats such

as piracy and armed attacks on ships may adversely affect vision Indonesia to

become the center of global economic connectivity, especially in the

development of maritime industry and maritime services sector.

Besides to support the doctrine of becoming GMF, first Indonesia has to

decreased maritime piracy and make sure that the shipping lines are safe from

threats. Maritime security issues become one of the major threats to the

development of Indonesia’s security interests. 23 Since the crime at sea is

increasing in 2016 especially at the Sulu Sea,24 therefore Indonesia should

increase and develop its maritime safety to ensure a more secure at the sea

territories.

21 Chen, Q. (2017). Indonesian president Jokowi: A reform-minded leader | GRI. [online] Global Risk Insights. Available at: https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/01/president-jokowi-reform-minded-leader/ [Accessed 5 Feb. 2018]. 22 Kementerian Sekretariat Negara RI (2017). Laporan 3 Tahun Pemerintahan Joko Widodo - Jusuf Kalla. Jakarta: http://presidenri.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/FINAL_LAPORAN-3-TAHUN.pdf, pp.36-38. 23 Sebastian, C., Habir, A. and Roberts, C. (2015). Indonesia's ascent. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.34. 24 ICC International Maritime Bureau (2017). Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ship. Report for the Period 1 January -31 December 2016. [online] London: ICC, p.5. Available at: http://www.nepia.com/media/558888/2016-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf [Accessed 31 Mar. 2018].

9

I.3 Statement of problem

Based on point I.2 in elaborating the problem identification this thesis is

about maritime security issue in Sulu Sea following by the contribution of

Indonesia and neighboring countries which are Malaysia and The Philippines

in practicing TMP as a cooperation and raising the doctrine of GMF by

Indonesia. As a result, to conclude the statement of problem of this thesis is:

“How did Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines conduct

cooperative maritime diplomacy as a part of regional maritime security

cooperation to reduce the maritime piracy at Sulu Sea during 2016-

2017?”

I.4 Research Objectives

The research objectives on this thesis will divide into two that are focus on:

1. To understand the Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in order to

reducing ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom in the case of

maritime piracy at Sulu Sea.

2. To examine on how Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines ensure the

maritime security at Sulu Sea and shared their common interest to

increase maritime security cooperation in the region.

I.5 Significance of Study

This thesis has main point of study that hopefully can fulfill knowledge

and information to the public and academic community in regards to the

mention:

Enhance the understanding of Indonesian government’s contribution and

cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines in order to maintaining

10

national security and reducing maritime piracy in case of ship hijacking and

kidnap for ransom at the Sulu Sea.

I.6 Theoretical Framework

There are lots of international relations theories and concepts that related

to the point of view one country in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

cooperation in the form of maritime security. In international relations

maritime security still one of the newest buzzword. There is no accurate

definition for maritime security up until now. But in this thesis, the writer will

try to explain the maritime security for a coastal state.

The definition of maritime security as well as a form of threats to the

maritime security has become the topic for a lot of academic debate. However,

despite the lack of a generally accepted definition of maritime security,

governments, organizations, institutions and scholars have attempted to

define maritime security and its elements. The International Maritime

Organization (IMO) also has explained the distinction between maritime

safety and maritime security. IMO declared that ‘maritime safety refers to

preventing or minimizing the occurrence of accidents at sea that may be

caused by substandard ships, unqualified crew or operator error,’ whereas

maritime security ‘is related to protection against unlawful, and deliberate,

acts’25. Therefore the writer will use the theoretical framework of Maritime

Security as an umbrella with the system to seek security in term of

cooperation in sub regional with the Regional Security Complex Theory, and

continue with several concepts on current strategic environment conditions in

Indonesia. Those concepts are about Maritime Diplomacy, Cooperative

Maritime Diplomacy and Maritime Piracy concept in order to strengthen the

theoretical framework of this thesis.

25 Klein, N., Mossop, J. and R. Rothwell, D. (2010). Maritime Security. [ebook] USA: Routledge, p.6. Available at: http://s1.downloadmienphi.net/file/downloadfile4/206/1392207.pdf [Accessed 27 Jan. 2018].

Diagram 1.1 The Flow of Theoretical Framework

I.6.1 Maritime Security

Throughout the maritime security concept, in this part also explain

about the concept of cooperative maritime diplomacy and the maritime

piracy. Thes

before that we have to understand about each of these concepts.

Picture 1.3 Matrix of Maritime Security (Bueger, 2015)

From the matrix above,

concepts which a

security, and national security.

Diagram 1.1 The Flow of Theoretical Framework

I.6.1 Maritime Security



piracy. These concepts will often be discussed in the next chapter, but


Picture 1.3 Matrix of Maritime Security (Bueger, 2015)

From the matrix above, maritime security have interrelated

concepts which are marine environment, economic development, human

security, and national security. Maritime security also includes in the

11



e concepts will often be discussed in the next chapter, but


have interrelated

re marine environment, economic development, human

Maritime security also includes in the

12

issue of economic development, since the sea have an important role in

the global economic development.26

Maritime security also categorize as the non-traditional security

which is the security objectives include intrastate security problem and

transnational security problem involving non state actors as a threat to the

international peace. As mentioned above, the definition of maritime

security still debatable and not clear yet. Then in here, the writer will try

to set the definition of maritime security. The concept of maritime

security refers to both preventive and responsive measures to protect a

country’s maritime security from unlawful intervention or acts. 27

Maritime security can also be defined as protection of the maritime

territory of a country and its infrastructure, economy, environment, and

society from threats or dangerous actions at sea.28

Besides that, from the new United States maritime strategy

perspective. According to the new U.S. maritime strategy, maritime

security can define as the conception and safeguarding of security at sea

which is essential to decreasing threats short of war, including piracy,

terrorism, weapon proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illegal

activities. Countering these irregular and transnational threats protect our

homeland, enhance global stability, and secure freedom of navigation for

the benefit of all nations.29 Basically the concept of maritime security is

a form of a state defense in ensuring the security of its maritime territory

from various crimes at sea.

26 Perwita, A. and Agastia, I. (2016). Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. 1st ed. Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu, p.5. 27 Krause, J. and Bruns, S. (2016). Routledge handbook of naval strategy and security. 1st ed. London: Routledge, p.13. 28 Moreno Lax, V. and Papastavridis, E. (2017). Boat refugees and migrants at sea. Leiden: Brill NIjhoff, p.37. 29 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs U.S. Department of State (2005). The National Strategy for Maritime Security. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs.

13

Maritime Security is also a transnational issue which requires

cooperation, coordination and joint framework among countries, 30

particularly neighboring countries. In the perception of maritime security

communities, the state actors also jointly securitize the threats which are

considered as maritime security threats and develop a common

understanding on the tools needed to manage the threats. It deals with

how a maritime security threat in a certain regions, which in this case is

about threats at the Sulu Sea.

I.6.2 Regional Security Complex Theory

Regional Security Complexes are a principal expected component

of international security.31 It has become security regimes or security

communities, and the discourses of security that have shifted away from

both states and military issues. And in yet others, the state framework

itself is coming apart at the closures, giving prominence to sub-state and

super state actors. 32 On how one group of not very democratic

developing countries in Southeast Asia managed to generate a substantial

regional security regime, 33 the states within regions have sought to

initiate cooperative security projects through regional institutions and

share the same underlying desire to minimize the assistance required

from extra-regional powers and solve their own problems, on their own

terms, from within. 34 In the case of maritime piracy in Sulu Sea;

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines initiated to make cooperation in

order to secure their territorial water.

30 ASEAN (2005). Indonesian Perspectives on Regional Cooperative in Maritime Training. ANNEX M. [online] India: Asean Regional Forum Workshop, p.3. Available at: http://www.asean.org/uploads/archive/arf/13ARF/WS-Maritime-Security/Annex-M.pdf [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]. 31 Buzan, Barry. and Wæver, Ole. (2003). Regions and powers. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.12. 32 Ibid., p.19 33 Ibid., p.21 34 Cruden, Michaela. (2011). Regional Security Complex Theory: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. [pdf] New Zealand, p.14. Available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/29199640.pdf [Accessed 20 May 2018].

14

The concept of regional security complexes covers how security is

clustered in geographically shaped regions. Security concerns do not

travel well over distances and threats are therefore most likely to occur in

the region. The security of each actor in a region interacts with the

security of the other actors. There is often intense security

interdependence within a region, but not between regions, which is what

defines a region and what makes regional security an interesting area of

study. Within the terms of Regional Security Complex Theory, Regional

Security Complexes define themselves as substructures of the

international system by the relative intensity of security interdependence

among a group of units, and security indifference between that set and

surrounding units. One of the purposes of Regional Security Complex

Theory is to combat the tendency to overstress the role of the great

powers, and to ensure that the local factors are given their proper weight

in security analysis.35

The possible forms that regions can take are derived from the

concept of the Regional Security Complex, not from the existing debate,

and the various domestic and global causal factors are those that are

directly part of security, such as domestic vulnerabilities, not domestic

politics and society in all its complexity. The concept of the Regional

Security Complex plays a stronger role in construction and is allowed to

define the possible orders on the outcome side and to select the relevant

parameters on the input side. 36 A major point of Regional Security

Complex Theory is to separate the global and regional security dynamics

in order to see what each looks like separately, and then to see how they

interact with each other. Then the operationalization of Regional Security

Complex theory is founded on a disciplined separation not only of the

global level from the regional one, but also of each RSC from all the

others. The reason for doing this is to cast maximum light on the

35 Buzan, Barry. and Wæver, Ole. (2003). Regions and powers. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.46-47. 36 Ibid., p.79

15

distinctiveness of security dynamics at each level and within each

Regional Security Complex, so that the interplay between levels and

among regions can itself be investigated as a distinct subject.37

Therefore theory of regional security complexes is organized

around the relative importance of territorially coherent subsystems

defined by interlocking patterns of securitization, but non-territorial

security constellations exist too. To get to these, the first step is a general

mapping of security by ‘levels’; the second is to look for security

dynamics that the levels set-up has marginalized. This procedure is not

generally problematic. Security dynamics of any sort, whether rhetorical

or physical, are usually pretty clear and not easily hidden.38 Thus, the

demand of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in particular ocean

especially Sulu Sea is depend on Each other who have the common

interest, mutual threat perception, limited capacity to solve the problem

in unilaterally, and have common goals in cooperation.

A Regional Security Complex may be defined as a set of units

whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization or both are so

interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or

resolved from one another. Buzan argues that within the framework of

Regional Security Complex Theory, “regions are not given by geography

or culture or patterns of current events, or the whims of analysts, local

discourses about regionalism. Regional Security Complexes are socially

constructed by their members, whether consciously or unconsciously by

the ways in which their processes of (de)securitization interlock with

each other.” And thus, while Regional Security Complexes may be

durable, they are not permanent – “they can therefore be changed by

changes in those processes though the scope for change may well be

37 Ibid., p.81-82 38 Ibid., p.462

16

conditioned by the relative depth or shallowness of the way in which the

social structure of security is internalized by the actors involved.”39

I.6.3 Maritime Diplomacy

Maritime diplomacy is not usually intended to lead to war, but

rather to signal to allies and rivals the intent of one’s policies and

capabilities of one’s security forces. Its proceeds are created through

warranty, prevention or perfection, but maritime diplomacy has often

failed if it leads to war.40 Maritime diplomacy also one of a term that

related to a broad range of maritime or water activities in which case the

main task force exists in the navy of a sovereign state. In the period of

peace maritime diplomacy is conducted to influence the behavior of other

countries in the context of interactions that occur in the territorial waters.

Therefore maritime diplomacy remains a unique and useful tool for

navies and governments worldwide, and one that continues to be utilized

to further state interests.41

As President of the Republic of Indonesia Joko Widodo said, through

maritime diplomacy, Indonesia invites all partners to work collectively in

the field of maritime. In the same time together with all of partners,

Indonesia could reduce the sources of crime at sea such as, illegal fishing,

violation of sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy, and marine

pollution.42 Maritime Diplomacy also becomes one of the main pillars in

the development of maritime security in Indonesia including the use of

maritime diplomacy in responding to security interferences, but before

that Indonesia also needs to develop the infrastructure and a lot of

preparation from the various devices who involved in the implementation

of maritime diplomacy in the context of reducing maritime piracy.

39 Ibid., p.481 40 Le Miere, C. (2015). Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, p.3. 41 Ibid., p.3 42 Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia. (2015). In: KTT Asia Timur. [online] Jakarta: Kantor Staf Presiden. Available at: http://www.presidenri.go.id/berita-aktual/indonesia-sebagai-poros-maritim-dunia.html [Accessed 25 Mar. 2018].

17

The vision of GMF become a doctrine that make maritime diplomacy is

necessary to achieve the national interest, namely to realize a sovereign

Indonesia in the field of politics, independent in the economic field,

sovereign in the field of defense, with a geo-strategy background as a

maritime country. Therefore maritime diplomacy is one of Indonesian

government ways to create cooperation between Malaysia and the

Philippines to reduce ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom at the

Sulu Sea.

I.6.4 Cooperative Maritime Diplomacy

Cooperative maritime diplomacy can therefore be an attempt to

support soft power through the use of hard power assets. In fact,

cooperative maritime diplomacy could possibly be well described as ‘soft

maritime diplomacy’, contrasted with the “hard maritime diplomacy” that

involves gunboats launching limited disciplinary operations against

disobedient fleets.

One of the goals of a cooperative maritime diplomatic mission is

the regular port visits by naval forces to nations great and small is often

intended to build diplomatic influence and strengthen alliances. Training

exercises aim is to build capacity within less capable or knowledge

navies, but also have the additional benefit of reinforcing a friendship

and making the naval forces more compatible. Joint exercises or

maritime security operations may also strengthen connections between

allies or reassure potential rivals as to the non-threatening nature of one’s

navy. Cooperative maritime diplomacy can therefore also be designed to

build coalitions, support allies through capacity building, training and

harmonization of techniques and build confidence among nations wary of

one’s naval power.43 In line with the maritime policy to become the GMF,

43 Le Miere, C. (2014). Maritime diplomacy in the 21st century. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, pp.8-9.

18

Indonesia supports and welcomes every phase of the overall level of

cooperation for the development of maritime potential.

Cooperative maritime diplomacy includes a variety of activities

that involved a lot of potential actors. Nevertheless the possibility to

gather the similarities between these operations, missions and agencies is

to compile a more cohesive definition of the effort itself. 44 All of

cooperative maritime diplomacy events aim to share common pool of

political goals. In every occasion a state is trying to create confidence,

coalitions/alliances, and influence. The aim of cooperative maritime

diplomacy is not to bully, prevent or force, nor to forcefully persuade.

Instead, it uses the tools of attraction, collective choice, and inspiration to

persuade or convince other governments.45

Indonesia cannot carry out its own diplomacy process but it needs

communication process with related actors. In the case of maritime

piracy at the Sulu Sea, Indonesia should have a deal into agreements with

Malaysia and the Philippines to cooperate in reducing ship hijacking. But

before that, Indonesia also have to be more understand with the scope of

ship hijacking issue that will become the focus of cooperative maritime

diplomacy which is concerned with the GMF vision and Indonesia’s

national interests in running cooperative maritime diplomacy. There are

many cooperative maritime diplomacy opportunities that can

accommodate the national security. Therefore, as an archipelagic country,

Indonesia should see the sea as a connector not as a separator especially

in cooperative maritime diplomacy.

I.6.5 Maritime Piracy

Throughout maritime security, maritime piracy is one of the threats

that will be further discussed in this thesis. Maritime piracy well known

with the pirates at sea, the history of piracy has been around since 14th

44 Ibid., p.10 45 Ibid., p.11

19

BC, and the ship hijacking emerged in the coast of Somalia. Nowadays

piracy become a global challenge that involves the conception of

organization and new legal structures to deal with the problem posed by

rising in the global, but it was disorganized, government environment, on

the other hand piracy is also a local problem for a country, and firmly

rooted in the exact conditions that agreed to emergence.

According to the book of Contemporary Maritime Piracy in

Southeast Asia by Adam J. Young, define piracy as an act of boarding or

attempting to board or any ship with the intent to commit theft or any

other crime and with intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of

that act, excepting those crimes that are shown or strongly suspected to

be politically motivated.46 It may be reasonable to believe that piracy has

existed for as long as the oceans were practiced for commerce and it is

also has damaging effects on people its intended is commerce.

There are three modern business models for piracy. First is kidnap

and ransom. Ransoms are one form of direct economic cost of piracy, it

is an acts as destabilizing effect on local politics in the region when it

increases, such as in the case of ship hijacking at the Sulu Sea, the pirates

kidnap the ship crews to ask for ransom. Second is stealing the vessels

and/or its cargo and the last is robbing valuables from vessels in short

attacks.47 These model of piracy related to the environment costs which

are largely hypothetical, and yet the potential for environment

devastation is alarming. They are also vulnerable to catastrophic damage

due to open fires or potentially explosive munitions fired at them and an

environmental disaster will ensue, it can cause massive environmental

damage where the one of the strategic transit points could close for an

indefinite period.

46 Young, A. (2007). Contemporary maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. 1st ed. Leiden, The Netherlands: International Institute for Asian Studies, pp.24-26. 47 Haywood, R. and Spivak, R. (2012). Maritime piracy. Abington, Oxon: Routledge.

20

Maritime Piracy is a global problem that manifests itself where

pirates can find a relatively safe haven, access to the sea, and a weak or

corruptible government. Pirates are primarily motivated by economic

gain to fund their activity, even when the act has some political benefit

for others.

The states also acknowledge that to deal with piracy needs

international cooperation. The United Nations (UN) system is designed

to organize international cooperation in a consistent approach by bringing

the UN invested with the power of scope into relations with various

autonomous and complementary organizations which is invested through

sectoral powers. Therefore, to combat piracy there needs to be shared

global efforts, although it is not something to be desired, piracy offers the

world an opportunity to enhance global institutions and mechanism that

can be both challenge piracy and foster cooperation between states on

other global issues.

I.7 Scope and Limitation of Study

Due to the time limitation from 2016 until 2017 which Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines was started the regional cooperation on the

maritime piracy case at the Sulu Sea. The cooperation began with the purpose

to secure the regional waters in tri border area of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines to reduce the rise ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom at

Sulu Sea.

The scope of study in this thesis will focus on the Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines maritime security cooperation, in case of ship hijacking and

kidnapping for ransom to ensure maritime security at Sulu Sea. Then the

implementation of their cooperation will also part of this thesis. While this

case is a maritime security, the writer will take the Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines maritime strategy perspectives based on their policy and

21

agreement, on which level this case will be solved and what this cooperation

would do for the Sulu Sea in the future.

I.8 Research Methodology

The thesis will use the method of exploratory-analytical research as the

research methodology. This method was mentioned by CR Kothari book in

Research Methodology: Method and Techniques (2nd Revised Edition) which

has explained:

“Exploratory research studies are the research with objectives to gain familiarity with a phenomenon or to achieve new insight into it” and “analytical type of research is type of research in which researcher has to use facts or information already available, and analyze these to make a critical evaluation of the material.”48

Therefore, based on the background that has stated above, the objective of

this exploratory-analytical research is to analyze on how crime at sea trigger

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to secure Sulu Sea and decrease the

maritime piracy during 2016 until 2017 based on the available data on the

topic and writer analysis.

I.9 Structure of Thesis

I.9.1 CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION

In brief explanation about the issue in this thesis that will discuss in the

first chapter which consist of several components as follow: background,

problem identification, statement of problem, research objectives,

significance of study, theoretical framework, scope and limitations of the

study, research methodology, and structure of the thesis. This chapter is

intended to make reader understand with the basic information about this

48 Kothari, C. (2004). Research and Methodology Methods and Techniques (Second Revised Edition. [ebook] New Delhi: New Age International (P) Limited, Publishers, pp.2-3. Available at: http://www.modares.ac.ir/uploads/Agr.Oth.Lib.17.pdf [Accessed 20 Jan. 2018].

22

thesis. Besides that, the writer also expects the reader to get knowledge and

information about what being discussed within this thesis.

I.9.2 CHAPTER II : Strategic Environment of the Sulu Sea.

The second chapter will explain about the reason why Sulu Sea becomes

an important region for Indonesia Malaysia and the Philippines to secure from

piracy. The focus of this chapter is to analyze why the geography of Sulu Sea

being strategic region for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

I.9.3 CHAPTER III : The Overview of Maritime Security Cooperation of

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines towards Sulu Sea.

In this chapter the writer will trying to explain about the overview of

maritime security cooperation of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It

will more focus on the purpose and interest from each country towards

maritime security at the Sulu Sea.

I.9.4 CHAPTER IV : The Implementation of Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines’s Maritime Security Cooperation at Sulu Sea in the near

Future.

The Fourth chapter discuss about the implementation of cooperative

maritime diplomacy arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines. The analysis will focus on the Trilateral Maritime Patrol at the

Sulu Sea.

I.9.5 CHAPTER V : Conclusion.

As the last chapter, it is will enclose with the conclusion of the overall

issue in this thesis.

23

CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE SULU SEA

II.1. Sulu Sea as the Strategic Environment for Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines

This chapter discusses about the existence of Sulu Sea as the strategic

environment for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines as the countries of

trilateral cooperation in the region. Strategic environment is the correlation

between geography, geopolitics and geostrategic of a region. These ideas are also

determined by three geographic factors: trade routes, centers of resources, and

state borders. The trade routes and center of resources are concern in geopolitics,

and the state borders that are influencing the geostrategic aspect of this strategic

environment.49

A strategic environment is simply about how a region could influence

politically and economically toward the state nations.50 As a strategic environment,

Sulu Sea is not only as the place for Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia’s

national security interests. But the recent condition of Sulu Sea also threatening

the security of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the Southeast Asia. It is

because their threat perception in Sulu Sea is about the existence of Abu Sayyaf

Group as the main actor for the ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom in the

region. In this chapter, the writer is going to talk on how the Sulu Sea could

influence the politics, economy and military of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines. It is also about how the existence of Abu Sayyaf Group threatening

49 Grygiel, J. (2006). Great powers and geopolitical change. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.21. 50 Millner, A. and Ollivier, H. (2016). Beliefs, Politics, and Environmental Policy. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, [online] 10(2), pp.226-227. Available at: https://academic.oup.com/reep/article/10/2/226/1753376 [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018].

the security of the three countries and their national security interests in the Sulu

Sea. 51

Picture 2.1: Map of Sulu Sea.

The geographical position of the Sulu Sea is also one of the factors that

support the national power of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Phili

based on the 9 elements of national power from Hans J. Morgenthau which are

natural resources, industry capacity, geography, population, military preparedness,

national morale, national character, the quality of the government and the qualit

of diplomacy, and it is depend on how that nation state maximize all those

elements. 53 It can become the most important aspect to embody the national

security interests of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the Sulu Sea.

51 Wada, D. (n.d.). The Current State of Maritime Security and CWS Role in the Celebes and Sulu Seas ｜海洋情報 FROM THE OCEANS. [online] Spf.org. Available at:

https://www.spf.org/oceans/analysis_en/c120652 Chang, C. (2017). The DialectRelations. Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, [online] 3(1), p.374. Available at: http://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/ezfiles/122/1122/img/2374/CCPS3(1)2018]. 53 Sempa, F. (2015). Hans Morgenthau and the Balance of Power in Asia. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/hans[Accessed 30 Apr. 2018].

rity of the three countries and their national security interests in the Sulu

1: Map of Sulu Sea.


support the national power of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Phili



national morale, national character, the quality of the government and the qualit


become the most important aspect to embody the national


The Current State of Maritime Security and CWS Role in the Celebes and Sulu

FROM THE OCEANS. [online] Spf.org. Available at:

https://www.spf.org/oceans/analysis_en/c1206-2.html [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018].Chang, C. (2017). The Dialectic Characteristics of Policies for AsiaPacific Regional

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, [online] 3(1), p.374. Available at: http://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/ezfiles/122/1122/img/2374/CCPS3(1)-Chang.pdf [Accessed 24 Apr.

Hans Morgenthau and the Balance of Power in Asia. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/hans-morgenthau-and-the-balance[Accessed 30 Apr. 2018].

24

rity of the three countries and their national security interests in the Sulu


support the national power of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines;52 it is



national morale, national character, the quality of the government and the quality


become the most important aspect to embody the national


The Current State of Maritime Security and CWS Role in the Celebes and Sulu

2.html [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018]. Pacific Regional

Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International

hang.pdf [Accessed 24 Apr.

Hans Morgenthau and the Balance of Power in Asia. [online] The Diplomat. balance-of-power-in-asia/

25

Strategic geographical position also determines the sustainability of the three

states economic activities at Sulu Sea. 54

Based on the geographical position, the Sulu Sea is part of the Pacific Ocean.

Where it bounds by northeastern Borneo on the southwest and the southwestern

island of the Philippines.55 Therefore, in geographically, Sulu Sea is belong to the

Philippines, but it located in the three border areas which are Indonesia, Malaysia,

and The Philippines, and the coordinates of Sulu Sea location is in Latitude: 11°

52' 59.99" N and Longitude: 121° 52' 59.99" E.56

Meanwhile geopolitics is the factor from human within geography. The

geopolitical situation is the result of widely defined technological interactions and

geography, which modify the economic, political and strategic interests of the

location. For example, new routes are discovered or development and

implementation of new communication technologies. Therefore, geopolitics

describes the geographic distribution of routes and economies natural resources.57

In addition, geopolitics will determine whether Sulu Sea includes in the strategic

location or not, and it is also becoming the part of the geographic distribution

from the center of resources and line of communications that giving value to the

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines based on their strategic importance in the

environment of Sulu Sea.58

Then geostrategic part of geopolitics which is principally guided by the

geographical factors and it also describes where a country concentrates its efforts

54 Despi, D. (2017). Sea Power in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for the Philippine Navy. Asian Politics & Policy, [online] 9(4), pp.583-596. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/aspp.12344 [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018]. 55“Sulu Sea.” Sea, Pacific Ocean. Accessed on April 15, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/place/Sulu-Sea. 56 Geographical Names. (2007). Sulu Sea: Philippines. [online] Available at: https://geographic.org/geographic_names/name.php?uni=10250901&fid=5003&c=philippines [Accessed 30 Apr. 2018]. 57 Grygiel, J. (2006). Great powers and geopolitical change. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.22. 58 Seng, T. (2017). Minilateralism: A Way out of ASEAN’s Consensus Conundrum?. ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, [online] 17(5), p.9. Available at: https://think-asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/7463/WEB-ASEANFocus-0917.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018].

26

by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activities.59 The underlying

assumption is that the state has limited and inadequate resources. Thus they

should focus politically and militarily on certain areas in this world. Geostrategy

also describes a state desire and does not deal with motivation or decision-making

processes.60

The Sulu Sea is known as the alternative way to the Indian Ocean through

some of the existing choke points in Indonesia. The territorial water of Sulu Sea is

a larger marine ecosystem in the tropical seas in Asia. Sulu Sea is a part of the

waters in the territory of the Philippines which is directly bordering with

Indonesia and Malaysia. The territorial waters of Sulu have strategic value and are

used for the benefit of many countries.61

Thousands of oil tankers and merchant ships crossed the line. Then it is also

because of the potential location, and the high intensity of sea activity, this route

faces a number of threats, such as territorial violations due to its precise position

on the borders of three countries, and the piracy problem of ships hijacking and

kidnapping of ship crew members for ransom.62

II.2 The Common Interest of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines in order to Secure Their National Security Interest at

Sulu Sea.

Based on the maritime piracy issues at the Sulu Sea has involved Indonesia,

Malaysia and the Philippines. These three countries have an initiative to make a

regional maritime cooperation. In the maritime regional cooperation they shared

common interests at Sulu Sea to achieve their goals in term of cooperation. Then 59 Grygiel, J. (2006). Great powers and geopolitical change. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.22. 60 Ibid., 61 Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf. 62Jung, Ki Suh. “To Defeat Piracy in the Sulu Sea, Look to Land.” May 3, 2017. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/03/to_defeat_piracy_in_the_sulu_sea_look_to_land_111300.html.

27

through the good cooperative diplomacy in ASEAN ways they can share common

interests and make a deal to secure their national interests at Sulu Sea.63

The national strategic areas in terms of defense and security interests are for

the maintenance of state security and defense based on national geostrategy. The

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines already has the defense bases

surrounding the Sulu Sea in maintain their interests, and also agreed by the

defense ministers of each country to make easier and facilitate the maritime

regional cooperation that has been established.64

Sulu Sea is significant for the states in Southeast Asia, because in each year

there are around 3.900 vessels passed through the region which includes $40

billion goods inside the vessels. The vessels are mostly the Crude Oil Tanker,

with the area of activity in the Indo-Malacca Strait. This route is not only

significant for Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. But for the other states, the

Sulu Sea route is the way of transportation for their oil tankers from one state to

another. Not only oil tankers, but also their trading fleets are also using the Sulu

Sea routes for their economic activities. Because of the potential opportunities in

the Sulu Sea many actors are competing to maintain their national security

interests in the region, one of them is the Abu Sayyaf Groups as the non-state

actor in which trying to gain benefits from the Sulu Sea region.65

But before we are going further to the explanation of Abu Sayyaf as the

threat assessment for Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in the Sulu Sea, it is

better for us to talk about each state national security interests in the Sulu Sea, or

basically the reasons on why Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are

cooperating to maintain their national security interests in the region. Basically,

those states have the same national security interests in the Sulu Sea. It is mostly

about the existence of significant trading routes in the region, which not only used

63Dianne Faye Co Despi. “Sea Power in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for the Philippine Navy.”Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/aspp.12344. 64Ibid. 65Ibid.

28

by the Southeast Asia countries but also states like China and Japan, as their

transportation route trade goods and minerals to the ASEAN states.66

Table 2.1: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines National Security Interests

and the Threat Assessments in the Sulu Sea.

Economy Politic

National

Security

Interests

Indonesia

For trading (mineral and

goods) such as export

and import,

transportation routes and

fisheries, Sulu Sea

becomes the most

strategic sea lanes for

Indonesia.67

In order to protect the

citizen and Indonesia

sovereignty from any

threats and possible

exploration, Indonesia

conducting cooperation

with littoral countries

around Sulu Sea.68

Malaysia

Malaysia has marine eco-

tourism, fisheries, in

Sulu Sea and also as the

transportation route to

trading such as goods,

palm oil and electronic

products specifically to

the Philippines.69

By initiate the

cooperation Malaysia can

improve the military

relation with Indonesia

and the Philippines in

facing maritime piracy

and also protecting the

people and Malaysia

sovereignty.70

The

Philippines

The Philippines also

concerning about the

Same as Indonesia and

Malaysia, the Philippines

66 MA. Ongpin, Isabel. “The Sulu Sea: Vast, Beautiful, Dangerous.” January 20, 2017. http://www.manilatimes.net/sulu-sea-vast-beautiful-dangerous/307802/. 67 “Boundary and Territory Briefing.” Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/download/?id=210. 68 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia (2015). Indonesian Defense White Paper. Jakarta, p.36. 69 “Maritime Security in the Sulu Sea.” Maritime institute of Malaysia. Accessed on April 17, 2018. http://www.mima.gov.my/index.php/research/maritime-security-and-diplomacy-msd/sea-views-msd?download=7:maritime-security-in-the-sulu-sea-lessons-from-the-past 70 “Southeast Asia’s Treacherous Waters.” Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/southeast-asias-treacherous-waters

29

fisheries, marine

protection and have trade

between Indonesia and

Malaysia by using Sulu

Sea as the transportation

route.71

also want to protect and

defend its state to keep

stable and secure their

territorial integrity.72

Threat

Assessments

Indonesia

“For safety and security reasons ... all ships must

sail in the recommended corridors and avoid conflict

areas or waters (around) the southern Philippines

and east Malaysia. – Tony Budiono, Ministry of

Transportation”73

Malaysia

The Malaysian state of Sabah has shut down its cross

border trade with one of the province in southern

Philippines based on the spate of brave kidnappings

by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) within its

territory.74

The

Philippines

The urging to conduct trilateral patrol cooperation in

order to maintain its national security interest to in

facing the existence of Abu Sayyaf Group in the

region.75

71 DeVantler, Lyndon. Alcala, Angel. and Wilkinson, Clive. “The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea: Environmental and Socioeconomic Status, Future Prognosis and Ameliorative Policy Options.” ResearchGate. May 20, 2014. Accessed April 17, 2018. 72 Macaraig, Mynardo. and France-Presse, Agence. “Abu Sayyaf: A Philippine Nightmare.” February 28, 2017. Accessed on April 22, 2018. http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/02/28/17/abu-sayyaf-a-philippine-nightmare. 73 reuters. (2016). Indonesia to resume some coal shipments to Philippines amid piracy.... [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security-philippines-idUSKBN12U0EQ [Accessed 2 May 2018]. 74 The Manila Times Online. (2016). Malaysia closes PH cross border trade - The Manila Times Online. [online] Available at: http://www.manilatimes.net/malaysia-closes-ph-cross-border-trade/256324/ [Accessed 2 May 2018]. 75 Banlaoi, R. (2017). The persistence of the Abu Sayyaf Group. [online] Institute for Autonomy and Governance. Available at: http://iag.org.ph/index.php/blog/1362-the-persistence-of-the-abu-sayyaf-group [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018].

30

II.2.1 The National Security Interest of Indonesia at Sulu Sea

“The protection of Indonesia citizens overseas will continue to be improved, Indonesia was confronted by great challenges with the upsurge of kidnapping cases of Indonesians in the in the Sulu Sea, its importance for every country to safeguard their territorial water. – Retno L.P. Marsudi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic Of Indonesia”76

Indonesia is a democratic and the largest archipelagic country in the

Southeast Asia. Indonesia is also located in the middle of the cross-roads

between the Indian and Pacific Oceans between the Asian and Australian

continents. 77 Indonesia also controls the four of the world’s seven major

maritime checkpoints, including the Malacca Strait. 78 It means that the

economic, political and military lifeline of the Asia-Pacific region depend on

the stability, foreign policy and geopolitics of Indonesia (Rabasa and Chalk,

2001: Laksamana, 2011).79

The development of Indonesian strategic environment depends on the

increasingly escalated symptoms and whether there are issues in the region that

become the attention to the world.80 The strategic environment also about how

the region could influence the security dimension of the state nation. Thus, the

understanding of the strategic environment dynamics as the important factor in

formulating Indonesian policies and strategies of their national defense to

support the making and the implementation of policy related to Maritime

Fulcrum.81

76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2017). Annual Press Statement Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Retno L.P. Marsudi. Jakarta, p.5. 77“Indonesia’s Security Challenges: Problems and Prospect to Improve National Security.” Accessed on April 22, 2018. http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/AP%20Hong%20Kong%202016/Archive/f07111eb-6f7d-442a-9197-db7321c9ebe6.pdf. 78Ibid. 79Ibid. 80“Indonesian defense white paper.” Approved by the defense minister. Regulation No. 23/2015. November 20, 2015. Accessed on April 19, 2018. https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2015-INDONESIA-DEFENSE-WHITE-PAPER-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf. 81Ibid.

31

Based on the Indonesian Defense White Book 2015, the Indonesian

government stated that in order to achieve their national goals and protect the

national interests, the Ministry of Defense established number of factors as a

threat, to decide which action is suitable to maintain their national security

interests while facing the threat towards the country.82

The national security interests of Indonesia itself, based on the

Indonesia Defense White Book 2015, are maintaining the Republic of

Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.83 In which it is going

to be about,

The protection of Indonesia and the homeland security, protect Indonesia and its people physically from forceful threats and possible exploitation, to educate and promote general welfare and participate in the establishment of world order.84

The Indonesia government believes that in order to maintain their

national security interests, they need to deploy a non aggressive and expansive

activity in the strategic environment. They believe to use the diplomacy that is

going to be supported by modern military force.85

Thus, one of the Indonesian policy in maintaining their maritime region

is known as the Global Maritime Fulcrum or GMF, in which they have seven

core pillars in order to accelerate the implementation of this vision. The seven

core pillars are an expansion of five pillars which consists of:

“(i) management of maritime resources and human resources development; (ii) maritime defense, security, law enforcement and safety at sea; (iii) maritime governance; (iv) maritime economy, infrastructure and welfare

82 Ibid. 83“Indonesian defense white paper.” Approved by the defense minister. Regulation No. 23/2015. November 20, 2015. Accessed on April 19, 2018. https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2015-INDONESIA-DEFENSE-WHITE-PAPER-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf. 84Ibid. 85Ibid.

32

improvement; (v) maritime spatial management and environmental protection; (vi) nautical culture; and (vii) maritime diplomacy.”86

Picture 2.2: Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum.87

“The vision is primarily serves domestic economic purposes by enhancing inter-island connectivity through infrastructure development and protecting maritime resources to fuel Indonesia’s economy.”88

The Global Maritime Fulcrum has a significant impact towards

Indonesia’s strategic outlook, in which it highlighted and prioritized maritime

86Marzuki, K. (2017). Indonesia’s National Sea Policy: Concretising the Global Maritime Fulcrum. [online] Rsis.edu.sg. Available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CO17052.pdf [Accessed 17 Apr. 2018]. 87swatsecuritysystems (2018). GLOBAL MARITIME FULCRUM: THE WAY FORWARD. [image] Available at: http://swatsecuritysystems.com/info/15040/global-maritime-fulcrum-the-way-forward [Accessed 17 Apr. 2018]. 88Marzuki, Keoni Indrabayu. “The Meaning of Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum.” February 22, 2018. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-14a-meaning-indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum.

33

defense and security issues.89 The vision of GMF reflects the evolution in

Indonesia’s security outlook that prioritizes the country’s strategic

environment. 90 Even though the GMF known as a foreign policy, but the

implementation of this policy is also related with the defense aspects of

Indonesia. The GMF is going to impact the defense budget, expenditures and

procurement priorities of Indonesia. 91 The example could be taken from

Jokowi’s decision and commitment to increase the budget for navy and defense

spending to 1.5% of the total Indonesia’s GDP.92

Then, based on the GMF vision we could see that through this GMF

policy, which stated that the policy is about the defense capabilities of

Indonesia. The Indonesian government is in their way on strengthening their

military capabilities and presence in the Sulu Sea. In order to also preserve

their maritime security and their maritime domain awareness in the Sulu Sea.

The vision of GMF also presents the opportunity in the development and

incorporation of naval defense concepts (the Archipelagic Sea Defense

Strategy and Indonesia’s Maritime Defense Strategy) as part as the border

strategy.93 In order to maintain the security of Indonesian border as well the

Sulu Sea as their strategic environment.

II.2.1.1 Economic Interest

“Sulu sea has become one of the strategic sea lanes for Indonesia trading activities. Today, the volume of goods at the Sulu Sea is still low. There are around 10 cargo vessels each days. But as the export from Indonesia towards the Middle East keep growing. The Sulu Sea is going to be

89Ibid. 90Ibid. 91“Maritime Security in the Sulu Sea.” Maritime institute of Malaysia. Accessed on April 17, 2018. http://www.mima.gov.my/index.php/research/maritime-security-and-diplomacy-msd/sea-views-msd?download=7:maritime-security-in-the-sulu-sea-lessons-from-the-past 91 Ibid. 92Ibid. 93“The Meaning of Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum.” CSIS. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-14a-meaning-indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum.

significant on Indonesia economy. Pakar Asosiasi Logistik Indonesia.”

The Indonesia economic interests in the Sulu Se

the fisheries, trading and transportation route in Sulu Sea in order to

maintain Indonesia’s national security interests in the region. Indonesia has

significant trading activities towards the state in the Southeast Asia. The

trading is basically about the mineral and goods of Indonesia towards the

other states in Southeast Asia. Which could be seen from the fact that there

are around $40 billion worth of cargo passes through the area annually,

which one of them is in coal exports towar

estimated around $700 million until $800 million in Indonesia.

Graph 2.1: Indonesia Export towards Philippines.

The exports to Philippines from Indonesia has increased to $489.12

million in January from $482.76 million in D

shows us that one of Indonesia’s biggest revenue comes from trading

activities with the Philippines through the Sulu Sea. The reason I keep

94 Dursin, K. (2016). Ancaman Abu Sayyaf: Mengapa Laut Sulu penting untuk Indonesia?. [online] Rappler. Available at: https://www.rappler.com/indonepenting-untuk-indonesia [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018].95Kapoor, Kanupriya. and Mogato, Manuel. “Indonesia Says Coal on Hold for Philippines after seven sailors abducted.” June 24, 2016. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/usphilippines-after-seven-sailors96Arief Hidayat, Mohammad. “Menlu: Laut SuluAccessed on April 15, 2018. https://www.viva.co.isulawesi-perairan-strategis

significant on Indonesia economy. – Dr. Nofrisel SE, MM., Ketua Dewan Pakar Asosiasi Logistik Indonesia.”94

The Indonesia economic interests in the Sulu Sea is basically about




s basically about the mineral and goods of Indonesia towards the



which one of them is in coal exports toward Philippines which could be

estimated around $700 million until $800 million in Indonesia.

1: Indonesia Export towards Philippines.96

exports to Philippines from Indonesia has increased to $489.12

million in January from $482.76 million in December 2016. The graph



Ancaman Abu Sayyaf: Mengapa Laut Sulu penting untuk Indonesia?.

[online] Rappler. Available at: https://www.rappler.com/indonesia/131543-mengapaindonesia [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018].

Kapoor, Kanupriya. and Mogato, Manuel. “Indonesia Says Coal on Hold for Philippines after seven sailors abducted.” June 24, 2016. Accessed on April 17, 2018.

.com/article/us-indonesia-security/indonesia-says-coal-on-holdsailors-abducted-idUSKCN0ZA06S.

Arief Hidayat, Mohammad. “Menlu: Laut Sulu-Sulawesi Perairan Strategis dan Rawan.” Accessed on April 15, 2018. https://www.viva.co.id/berita/dunia/769105-menlu

strategis-dan-rawan.

34

Dr. Nofrisel SE, MM., Ketua Dewan

a is basically about




s basically about the mineral and goods of Indonesia towards the



d Philippines which could be

estimated around $700 million until $800 million in Indonesia.95

exports to Philippines from Indonesia has increased to $489.12

ecember 2016. The graph



Ancaman Abu Sayyaf: Mengapa Laut Sulu penting untuk Indonesia?. mengapa-laut-sulu-

Kapoor, Kanupriya. and Mogato, Manuel. “Indonesia Says Coal on Hold for Philippines after

hold-for-

Sulawesi Perairan Strategis dan Rawan.” menlu-laut-sulu-

35

encouraging the high amount of income coming from trading with the

Philippines is because of the fact that Sulu Sea located in the middle of

Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia.

In which every trading activities are going to pass through the Sulu

Sea route. The Sulu Sea is becoming the route of transportation for

Indonesia trade activities. Based on the statement of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Retno L.P. Marsudi, the Sulu Sea is

very significant for Indonesia due to the fact that Sulu Sea is one of the

economically strategic regions for Indonesia. There are around 55 million

ton metrics of goods as well 18 million people passing through the Sulu Sea

routes in each year.97

Not only in terms of trading and transportation, but for Indonesia, the

role of Sulu Sea is also about the source of their fisheries aspects. In

Indonesia estimated fisheries sector could contributed until 2% towards the

economic aspects of Indonesia’s GDP. There are around 43.000 boats

operating in North Sulawesi and more than 26.000 in East Kalimantan

alone.98

Maintaining the security of Sulu Sea is important for Indonesia in

order to keep their economic activities and development in the Sulu Sea.

Even after the existence of Abu Sayyaf Group in the Sulu Sea. 99 If

Indonesia is not well-prepared in term of maintaining their security in the

Sulu Sea, it is going to affect Indonesia amount of GDP and their national

security interests in the region.

97Arief Hidayat, Mohammad. “Menlu: Laut Sulu-Sulawesi Perairan Strategis dan Rawan.” Accessed on April 15, 2018. https://www.viva.co.id/berita/dunia/769105-menlu-laut-sulu-sulawesi-perairan-strategis-dan-rawan. 98“Boundary and Territory Briefing.” Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/download/?id=210. 99 Dinarto, D. (2018). Reformasi Tata Kelola Keamanan Maritim Indonesia di Era Presiden Joko Widodo. [online] Reasearchgate.net. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309726899_Reformasi_Tata_Kelola_Keamanan_Maritim_Indonesia_di_Era_Presiden_Joko_Widodo [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018].

36

II.2.1.2 Indonesia Political Interests in Sulu Sea

“The protection of Indonesian citizens overseas will continue to be improved over time...Indonesia is confronted by great challenges with the upsurge of kidnapping cases of Indonesians in the Sulu Sea and in Malaysian waters. In the meeting with Malaysia and the Philippines, Indonesia also reaffirmed the importance of establishing a trilateral cooperation to safeguard security in Sulu and Sabah waters. – Retno L.P. Marsudi, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.”100

Sulu Sea is being one of Indonesia strategic region in term of their

economy. In which Sulu Sea is going to be the meeting point of the trading

activities of Indonesia and their partner countries. Many people, vessels

with their goods or minerals are passing through the Sulu Sea as their

trading and transportation routes. After the existence of Abu Sayyaf Groups

and their piracy and kidnapping activities in the region. Indonesia believe

that they are being threatened by the existence of the ASG itself.101

One of the Indonesian national security interests is to protect

Indonesia sovereignty and its people physically from forceful threats

and possible exploitation. 102 Based on the situation in the Sulu Sea,

Indonesian sovereignty and their people security is being threatened by the

existence of Abu Sayyaf Groups. Where they are targeting the slow moving,

low freeboard vessels like tugboats and fishing twalers, even now the Abu

Sayyaf Groups are getting bolder in targeting a bigger ships as their

victims.103 It resulted to the kidnapping of Indonesian citizens for ransom.

This is the strong reasons for Indonesian government in order to maintain

their national security interests, especially in the Sulu Sea.

The presence of Abu Sayyaf Groups in Sulu Sea could be

categorized as the transnational crime. Transnational crimes are those

100Marsudi, Retno L.P. “Annual Press Statement: Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republis of Indonesia. ” January 10, 2017. Accessed on April 18, 2018. https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/pidato/menlu/Documents/PPTM-2017-EN.pdf. 101Ibid. 102 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia (2015). Indonesian Defense White Paper. Jakarta, p.36. 103“Is this the most dangerous backwater in the world?” March 30, 2017. Accessed on April 18, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39252503.

37

crimes occurred across the national border of Indonesia. Transnational

crimes also include crimes that take place in one country, but their

consequences significantly affect other country.104 It is like even the crime

happened in Philippines, this crime is going to affect the other countries,

like Indonesia as one of the victims of hijacking and kidnapping by the

armed group based in the Southern Philippines waters.105

The kidnapping of Indonesian citizens and piracy in Sulu Sea is

going to give a significant issue for the Indonesian maritime security. On

how the activities of Abu Sayyaf Groups in Sulu Sea is going to impact the

Indonesia’s credibility in international system. If Indonesia could not handle

the activities of Abu Sayyaf Groups in the Sulu Sea. It is going to decrease

the other states trust towards Indonesia. It is going to results on hesitation of

other states to send their merchant vessels to Indonesia through the Sulu

Sea.106 This situation is going to decrease the trading (export and import)

activities of Indonesia, which is going to impact Indonesian economic

development.

II.2.2 The National Security Interest of Malaysia at Sulu Sea

“Sabah has been a sensitive subject for Malaysia for various reasons. Mostly

on the threat of terrorism, as the existence of Islamic State and other related

terrorist groups like the ASG whom could pose a threat to Southeast Asian

states. - Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein, Malaysian Defense Minister.”107

Malaysia is also having their national security interests in the Sulu Sea. It

specifically taken place in Sabah, a Malaysian region bordering the Sulu Sea. It

was stated in Malaysia’s national defense policy that Malaysia is going to

protect the security of Sabah region, as their national security interests even 104“Indonesia’s role in handling maritime piracy in ASEAN.” December 31, 2016. Accessed on April 20, 2018. https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/12/31/055831617/Indonesias-Role-in-Handling-Maritime-Piracy-in-ASEAN. 105Ibid. 106Ibid. 107Parameswaran, P. (2018). Malaysia Spotlights Expanded Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/malaysia-spotlights-expanded-sulu-sea-trilateral-patrols/ [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018].

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under the presence of Abu Sayyaf Group as the threat perception in Sulu

Sea.108

Based on the Malaysia’s National Defense Policy, their primary objectives

is to protect and defend Malaysia national interests which form the foundations

of Malaysia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic prosperity. 109

Based on this defense policy also, we could conclude that Malaysia has

geographical interests which are core areas; offshore economic interests; and

strategic waterways and airspace. 110 The core areas encompass Malaysia’a

landmass of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak; as well their territorial

waters and airspace above them.111


“Sabah and Sarawak is being Malaysian Economic Corridors. Through the

well-diversified economy, we have been able to raise our real gross

docmestic product by 110 times – Datuk Len Talif Salleh, Chief Minister’s

Department of Malaysia. ”112

The economic aspect of Malaysia in the Sulu Sea could be seen also

from Malaysia’s East Coast of Sabah has the key ingredients to be promoted

as a marine eco-tourism destination that can earn bug revenues for Malaysia

itself, as well increase the socio-economic development to the region.113 The

marine eco-tourism in Sabah has been a key economy for the state, which

generated around RM 5.2 billion in revenue or as 8.5% of Sabah’s total

GDP.114

108“Malaysia’s National Defense Policy.” Accessed on April 22, 2018. http://www.mod.gov.my/images/mindef/lain-lain/ndp.pdf. 109Ibid. 110Ibid. 111Ibid. 112“Malaysia Day: Economic Corridors: Game Changer for Sabah Sarawak.” April 3, 2017. Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://themalaysianreserve.com/2017/04/03/malaysia-day-economic-corridors-game-changer-for-sabah-sarawak/. 113Khalid, Nazery. and A. Sebastian RMN, Martin. “A Hidden Pearl: Harnessing the Full Potential of Marine Eco-Tourism in East Coast of Sabah.” East Coast of Sabah can be positioned and promoted as a world-class marine eco-tourism destination through a holistic approach. Accessed on April 17, 2018. http://www.mima.gov.my/phocadownloadpap/seaviews/78.A%20hidden%20pearl.pdf. 114 Ibid.

39

The government of Malaysia, believe that tourism is one of the

National Key Economic Areas (NKEA) which can generate a high income,

value adding activities as well inclusive manners in order to transform the

nation’s economic into a fully developed nation by the year of 2020.115 The

Malaysian government also believes that the marine tourism is potentially

increasing their tourism receipts and generated the kind of economic

activities that fit their goals of NKEA.116

Not only tourism, but the Sulu Sea is also a very rich fishing

ground for large and small pelagic as well as bay and coral reef fishes,

providing livelihoods to the coastal inhabitants and food for the entire

region and beyond, it includes potential fish yield of 675,380 metric tons of

fishes in the region.117 It is very significant for Malaysia in order to maintain

their homeland security.

In this part the writer is going to talk about the trade between

Malaysia and the Philippines, because basically it is more likely to use and

pass through the Sulu Sea from Malaysia to the Philippines. The trade

between Malaysia and Philippines in 2015, could reach $4.5 billion or about

3.6% of the country’s total foreign trade.118 The exports to Malaysia could

amounted to $1.2 billion while the imports from Philippines could reach

around $3.4 billion.119 The traded goods are electronic products, palm oil,

mechanical equipment, appliance, and metal goods based on the information

from the Malaysia Trade.120

115Ibid. 116Ibid. 117“Sulu Celebes Sea Sustainable Fisheries Management: What is the project about?” Philippines UNDP. Accessed on April 17, 2018. http://www.ph.undp.org/content/philippines/en/home/operations/projects/environment_and_energy/Sulu-Celebes-Sea.html. 118Gavilan, Jodesz. “Fast Facts: What Binds the Philippines and Malaysia.” November 9, 2016. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/151736-philippines-malaysia-relationship-fast-facts. 119Ibid. 120Ibid.

40

II.2.2.2 The Political Interests of Malaysia in Sulu Sea

“This endeavour is being pursued because we realize that threats to security in that sea cannot be handled by any one nation alone. – Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein, Malaysian Defense Minister.”121

Same as Indonesia and the Philippines, the political interests of

Malaysia in Sulu Sea is how to protect and maintain their national security

interests in the region. Based on the Malaysia’s national defense policy,

Malaysia realized that they has to defend the Sabah region from the non-

traditional security issues, which is the presence of Abu Sayyaf Group. In

the Malaysia’s defense policy stated that ASG carries out kidnapping for

ransom to fund their activities in the Southern Philippines.122 Their activities

have security implications to Malaysia, specifically for Sabah region.123 It

concerned the Malaysia government over possible collaboration and

cooperation network between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and ASG in the

Southern Philippines.

Malaysia’s national defense policy stated that piracy and armed

robbery cases in the Sulu Sea need to be continuously monitored because it

could resulted to economic crisis in the region.124 Specifically this incident

is more likely to influence the trading activities of Malaysia and their

economic partners. Like what happened between Malaysia and Philippines,

when Malaysia state of Sabah has shut down its cross border trade with

Tawi-Tawi province in Southern Philippines due to the kidnapping by the

Abu Sayyaf Group within its territory.125

121“Hishammuddin: Sulu Sea security cooperation vital for Sabah.” December 20, 2016. Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://www.malaymail.com/s/1276355/hishammuddin-sulu-sea-security-cooperation-vital-for-sabah. 122“Malaysia’s National Defense Policy.” Accessed on April 22, 2018. http://www.mod.gov.my/images/mindef/lain-lain/ndp.pdf. 123Ibid. 124Ibid. 125“Malaysia Closes PH cross border trade.” April 15, 2016. Accessed on April 22, 2018. http://www.manilatimes.net/malaysia-closes-ph-cross-border-trade/256324/.

41

Thus, Malaysia believes that they have to boost their military ties

with Indonesia and of course the Philippines to face the existence of terrorist

group, piracy, kidnapping and criminal activities in Sulu Sea.126 The three

countries are now considering to establish a high security corridor along the

Sulu sea and Sabah to tackle the piracy menace which has resulted in

several attacks and kidnappings this year.127

II.2.3 The National Security Interest of the Philippines at Sulu Sea

“Our quest must not only focus on ensuring stability of the State and the security of our nation. Our ultimate goal must be the safety and well-being of our people. – Senator Benigno S. Aquino III, Peace and Security Forum. April 22, 2010.” 128

The national security policy of the Philippines are clearly stated that the

government envisage the Philippines in the future have to develop into “a

secure and prosperous nation where in the people’s welfare, well-being, ways

of life and core values”.129 The National Security Policy is a statement of

principles that should guide national decision-making and determine courses of

action to be taken in order to attain the state or condition wherein the national

interests, the well-being of the Philippines people and institutions, and their

sovereignty as well territorial integrity are protected and enhances.130

The purpose of the National Security Policy is to identify the strategic

priorities to establish the correct balance between the existences of resources

and defense to maintain their national security interests. 131 The National

126“Southeast Asia’s Treacherous Waters.” Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/southeast-asias-treacherous-waters 127“Feature: Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia mull high Sulu sea corridor to curb piracy.” December 9, 2016. Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://www.platts.com/latest-news/shipping/singapore/feature-malaysia-philippines-indonesia-mull-high-27727345. 128 “Sulu Celebes Sea Sustainable Fisheries Management: What is the project about?” Philippines UNDP. Accessed on April 17, 2018. http://www.ph.undp.org/content/philippines/en/home/operations/projects/environment_and_energy/Sulu-Celebes-Sea.html. 129 National Security Council (2017). National Security Policy. Manila, p.4. 130 “National Security Policy: Securing the Gains of Democracy, 2011-2016.” Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://www.nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP-2011-2016.pdf. 131 Ibid.

42

Security Policy focuses on four key elements which are Governance, Delivery

of Basic Services, Economic Reconstruction and Sustainable Development,

and the last one if the Security Sector Reform.132

Based on the nation security policy, the Philippines believe that they

have to ensure the stability and security of their nation, it is also about the

Philippines territorial integrity, which means that the Philippines government

has the responsibilities and right to protect and defended their land, marine and

sub marine features and resources within their territory from invasion and

illegal incursions and resource exploitation.133 If we correlated the Philippines

national security policy and the case in Sulu Sea, we could see that the

Philippines national security policy is being threatened by the existence of Abu

Sayyaf Groups in which they are disturbing the stability and security of

Philippines in the Sulu Sea. Where they were kidnapped other states’ citizens,

piracy of vessels passing through the region and threatening the coastal tourists

resorts in the south and neighboring Malaysia.134


“This (piracy) poses a real problem for regional trade. As the Chinese economy slow down, intra-regional trade becomes all the more urgent… it also opens a can of legal worms that has not been previously been wrestled with in Southeast Asia,-Zachary Abuza, Professor at National War College.”135

Philippines with a coastline longer than Australia’s, claims an

exclusive economic zone of EEZ of 2.27 million square kilometers. The

Philippines EEZ is about the fisheries and trading activities in the region.

The Philippines obtain their 60-70% of their animal protein from marine

132 Ibid. 133 Macaraig, Mynardo. and France-Presse, Agence. “Abu Sayyaf: A Philippine Nightmare.” February 28, 2017. Accessed on April 22, 2018. http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/02/28/17/abu-sayyaf-a-philippine-nightmare. 134Ibid. 135Chandran, N. (2016). The latest threat to Asian trade? Rampant piracy in the Sulu Sea. [online] CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/22/forget-trump-china-sulu-sea-piracy-is-threat-to-asia-trade.html [Accessed 22 Apr. 2018].

fishes (McManus 2000).

fishery aspect is significant for the economy of their

the security of the Philippines citizens itself.

Picture 2.3: Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone.

136DeVantler, Lyndon. Alcala, Angel. and Wilkinson, Clive. “The SuluEnvironmental and Socioeconomic Status, Future Prognosis and Ameliorative Policy Options.” ResearchGate. May 20, 2014. Accessed April 17, 2018.

fishes (McManus 2000).136Same like Malaysia, Philippines also believe that

fishery aspect is significant for the economy of their homeland. It is about

the security of the Philippines citizens itself.

: Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone.

DeVantler, Lyndon. Alcala, Angel. and Wilkinson, Clive. “The Sulu-Sulawesi Sea:

Environmental and Socioeconomic Status, Future Prognosis and Ameliorative Policy Options.” archGate. May 20, 2014. Accessed April 17, 2018.

43

Same like Malaysia, Philippines also believe that

homeland. It is about

Sulawesi Sea: Environmental and Socioeconomic Status, Future Prognosis and Ameliorative Policy Options.”

Graph 2.2: Philippines Exports towards Indonesia.

It is not only about the fishery aspect, but the economic interests of

Philippines is also about the trade happened in the Sulu Sea. Based on the

table we could see that the Indonesia imports from Philippines reach the

highest point in March 2016 and it reaches the lowest point in November

2016, but it increases again in Janu

Philippines exports toward Indonesia is basically because of the existence of

Abu Sayyaf threat in the Sulu Sea, as well after the kidnapping of seven

Indonesian sailors in the region. Indonesia believe that they need

trading with Philippines until they could maintain the security in Sulu Sea

based on the statement of Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi,

“The trading with the Philippines will be extended until there is guarantee for security from th

137“National Security Policy: Securing the Gains of Democracy, 201115, 2018. http://www.nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP138“Indonesia imports from Philippines.” Ahttps://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/imports139Kapoor, Kanupriya. and Mogato, Manuel. “Indonesia says coal on hold for Philippines after seven sailors abducted.” June 24, 2016. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/usphilippines-after-seven-sailors140Abuza, Zachary. “Trilateral Maritime Patrols in the Sulu Sea: Asymmetry in Need, Capability and Political Will.” July 6maritime-patrols-sulu-sea

: Philippines Exports towards Indonesia.137





2016, but it increases again in January 2017.138 The reason of low point of



Indonesian sailors in the region. Indonesia believe that they need

trading with Philippines until they could maintain the security in Sulu Sea


“The trading with the Philippines will be extended until there is guarantee for security from the Philippines government”140

“National Security Policy: Securing the Gains of Democracy, 2011-2016.” Accessed on April

15, 2018. http://www.nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP-2011-2016.pdf.“Indonesia imports from Philippines.” Accessed o April 17, 2018.

https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/imports-from-philippines. Kapoor, Kanupriya. and Mogato, Manuel. “Indonesia says coal on hold for Philippines after

seven sailors abducted.” June 24, 2016. Accessed on April 17, 2018. //www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security/indonesia-says-coal-on-hold

sailors-abducted-idUSKCN0ZA06S. Abuza, Zachary. “Trilateral Maritime Patrols in the Sulu Sea: Asymmetry in Need, Capability

and Political Will.” July 6, 2016. Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://cimsec.org/trilateralsea-asymmetry-need-capability-political-will/26251.

44





The reason of low point of



Indonesian sailors in the region. Indonesia believe that they need to hold the

trading with Philippines until they could maintain the security in Sulu Sea139,


“The trading with the Philippines will be extended until there is guarantee

2016.” Accessed on April 2016.pdf.

Kapoor, Kanupriya. and Mogato, Manuel. “Indonesia says coal on hold for Philippines after

hold-for-

Abuza, Zachary. “Trilateral Maritime Patrols in the Sulu Sea: Asymmetry in Need, Capability , 2016. Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://cimsec.org/trilateral-

45

II.2.3.2 Political Interest of the Philippines in Sulu Sea

“There’s a need for us (the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia)... to talk about this (trilateral cooperation in Sulu Sea) seriously and to put stop to it because it has somehow paralyzed the trade and commerce in the area. – Rodrigo Duterte, the President of the Philippines.”141

International terrorism and transnational crime have given a significant

threat towards the security of the Philippines itself. In their national security

policy, Philippines stated the two problems are a persistent global threat that

know no borders, nationality or religion, and operate outside the rule of

law.142 In this case, the Philippines faces threats from the Abu Sayyaf Group

(ASG) which remains as the foremost group actively are influencing the

socio-political and economic disruptions.143

The Southern Philippines and the surrounding region has been

strategically important region for the Abu Sayyaf Group. The Southern

Philippines became the focus of Philippines government due to that reason.

It is also influencing the political and economic relations between the

Philippines with their partner states. One of the example is when the

Malaysia decided to shut their cross border between Malaysia and

Philippines; as well when Indonesia declared that they are not going to

conduct any activities in the Sulu Sea towards Philippines before the

government of the Philippines has stated the official statement that Sulu Sea

and Southern Philippines are safe enough to be traversed by Indonesia.144

This is the reason on why the Philippines need to conduct the trilateral

cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia, in order to maintain their national

141 Rider, D. (2017). Focus on the Sulu Sea | Maritime Security Review. [online] Marsecreview.com. Available at: http://www.marsecreview.com/2017/03/focus-on-the-sulu-sea/ [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018]. 142Ibid. 143Ibid. 144“Annual Press Statement Minister for Foreign Affairs of the republic of Indonesia: Retno L.P. Marsudi.” 2017. Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/pidato/menlu/Documents/PPTM-2017-EN.pdf.

46

security interests in the region as well to face the existence as well activities

of the Abu Sayyaf Groups in the Southern Philippines and the Sulu Sea.145

II.2.4 The Cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines

on Facing the Abu Sayyaf Groups in the Sulu Sea.

“With the signing of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement (TCA), we are confident that the sea routes will be safe for commercial ships and the maritime community in this region,- Deputy Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Datuk Anuwi Hassan.”146

In order to protect their strategic environment and maintain their national

security interests in the Sulu Sea. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines

believe that they need to maintain a cooperation to face the threat assessment in

the Sulu Sea. Those three countries established a cooperation known as the

Trilateral Maritime Patrol between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines,

which was initiated by the three countries government in order to face security

challenges associated with each country’s border waters.147

“The Trilateral Maritime Patrol (TMP) would be implemented in the Sulu Sea, involving the Malaysian Armed Forces, the Philippines Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Armed Forces to ensure that the militants did not use the waters to enter Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The Joint effort was also to tackle piracy, kidnappings and armed robberies in the Sulu Sea. – Malaysian Defense Mnister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein.”148

145 Banlaoi, R. (2017). The persistence of the Abu Sayyaf Group. [online] Institute for Autonomy and Governance. Available at: http://iag.org.ph/index.php/blog/1362-the-persistence-of-the-abu-sayyaf-group [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018]. 146Daud, N. (2017). TCA to face maritime crimes and threats in Sulu Sea region. [online] Malaysia World News. Available at: https://www.malaysiaworldnews.com/2017/05/16/tca-to-face-maritime-crimes-and-threats-in-sulu-sea-region/ [Accessed 23 Apr. 2018]. 147Mckirdy, Euan. Quiano, Kathy. and Watson, Ivan. “Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines launch joint patrols to tackle ISIS threat.”June 19, 2017. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/19/asia/indonesia-malaysia-philippines-isis/index.html. 148Thestar.com.my. (2017). Military initiative with Philippines and Indonesia launched - Nation | The Star Online. [online] Available at: https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/06/10/military-initiative-with-philippines-and-indonesia-launched/ [Accessed 23 Apr. 2018].

47

The Philippines Defense Secretary, Mr. Delfin Lorenzana also stated that,

“These operations allow for patrol team to carry out hot pursuits in other countries, and also provide the assurance the patrol team will receive support from the other countries,”149

Defense Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ryamizard Ryacudu also added that

“The Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement gives us the opportunity to prove how capable we are of handling our own security and defense matters.’150

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines agreed that they recognized the

growing security challenges in the Sulu Sea, like the armed robbery against

vessels, kidnapping, transnational crimes and terrorism in the region,

particularly in reference to the maritime areas of common concern.151They

afraid that the Sulu Sea is going to be the ‘new Somalis’, due to the increasing

activities of Abu Sayyaf in the region. The three countries agreed that the areas

they want to protect are known as the global shipping highways, due to the fact

that there are about 70% until 80% of all the oil imported by China and Japan

which is going to pass through the Sulu Sea.152

149MalayMail News Article.(2017). Three-way air patrol initiative for safer borders - MalayMail News Article. [online] Available at: http://epaper.mmail.com.my/2017/10/13/three-way-air-patrol-initiative-for-safer-borders/ [Accessed 23 Apr. 2018]. 150Ibid., 151Cochrane, Joe. “Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines to Bolster Security at Sea.” May 5, 2016. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/world/asia/indonesia-malaysia-philippines-naval-patrols.html. 152Ross, Eleanor. “Philippines launches piracy patrols with Malaysia and Indonesia in Sulu Sea.” March 9, 2017. Accessed on April 17, 2018. http://www.newsweek.com/philippines-launches-piracy-patrols-malaysia-and-indonesia-south-china-sea-565675.

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Picture 2.4: Security Threats from Abu Sayyaf Groups towards Indonesia,

Malaysia and the Philippines; and Shipping Lanes in the Tri-Border Area.

II.2.4.1 Trilateral Cooperation of Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines in order to maintain the Security of the Sulu Sea

“The series of piracy attacks accompanied by kidnapping that occurred frequently in the Sulu Sea waters have had a huge impact on surrounding coastal countries… and have pushed us to conduct a coordinated patrol among three countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines), – Gatot Nurmantyo”153

Based on the reciprocal expectation and high responsibility from all

sides, the three defense leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

153 Kabiling, G. (2017). PressReader.com - Connecting People Through News. [online] Pressreader.com. Available at: https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/manila-bulletin/20170620/281505046213720 [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018].

49

has agreed to support the operational of Standard Operating Procedures in

affirming Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement.154

The trilateral security cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and

the Philippines has been evident since the formalization of a trilateral

cooperation arrangement called the Agreement of Information Exchange

and Establishment of Communication Procedure. 155 The purpose of this

agreement is to strengthen the security cooperation regarding the

transnational criminal issues like the terrorism, money laundering,

smuggling and maritime piracy.156 There are several developments in order

to strengthen the trilateral cooperation, in which one of them is the trilateral

maritime cooperation agreement in order to strengthen comprehensive

regional maritime security efforts within the tri-border area.157

The framework of this cooperation is about the coordinated sea patrols,

naval and army exercises, designated patrol corridors and intelligence

sharing, as well agreement on potential sea and air surveillance routes.158 In

addition to this aspect, the littoral states have also agreed to initiate joint

army training for the formation of a joint special task force committed to

responding to the threat in the maritime region of the three countries.159

154 Department of National Defense – Republic of the Philippines (2016). Defense Ministers affirm Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement. [online] Available at: http://www.dnd.gov.ph/PDF%202016/Press%20-%20Trilateral%20Meeting%20Statement.pdf [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018]. 155Ramos, Reginald. “Philippines: Shifting Tides in the Sulu-Celebes Sea.” Accessed on April 17, 2018. Perth U.S. Asia Center. April 2017. Vol. 4. http://perthusasia.edu.au/getattachment/Our-Work/Insight-Series-Vol-4-Sulu-Celebes/PU-017-Shifting-Tides-WEB.pdf.aspx?lang=en-AU. 156Ibid. 157Ibid. 158Ibid. 159Ibid.

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II.3 Threat Assessment of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines at Sulu Sea

Picture 2.5: Abu Sayyaf Groups Activity.

Until today, the international system has reported cases of maritiime piracy

which took place in the Southeast Asia, specifically in Indonesia, Malaysia and

Philippines waters. The region was also known as the pirate safe haven, due to the

high activities of piracy and kidnapping by the terrorist group in the region.160

Around 1200 ISIS operatives are in the Philippines, including 40 from Indonesia. The terrorism threat in this region (Sulu Sea) has evolved into an unprecedented immediate leve of emergency, - Indonesia’s Defense Minister, Gen.

160Rommel C. Banlaoi. “The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience in the Southern Philippines.”Accessed on April 22, 2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-sources-of-the-abu-sayyafs-resilience-in-the-southern-philippines/.

51

Ryamizard Ryacudu on Security forum in Singapore called the Shangri-La Dialogue.”161

“This terror threat (kidnapping for ransom and ship hijacking) targeting Asia-Pacific is the top security threat in the region (Sulu Sea) today – even more than North Korea. – Malaysian Defense Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein.”162

“I hope the long-mooted campaign around the Sulu Sea ‘keep the sailors safe and also prevent the movement of terrorist from one place to another’ in an area (Indonesia or Malaysia) with very porous borders. - Delfin Lorenzana, Philippines Defense Secretary”163

The threat assessment felt by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in

the Sulu Sea is the existence of terrorist organizations which have found their safe

havens in the surrounding island in the Sulu Sea. The purpose of their actions is to

recruit, train, operate and remain concealed from the world. 164 “The terrorist

organizations in the Sulu Sea are hosts to ethnic and religious conflicts, a greater

challenge for local authorities and providing a safe haven for these organizations

to operate.”165 Some of those organizations have used the traditional pirate tactics

in order to fund their operations to reach their own interests.166

“Abu Sayyaf is known as the most violent and lethal Muslim separatist group in the Philippines with enhanced capabilities to wage traditional bombing activities, conduct maritime attacks and suicide terrorist missions.”167

Abu Sayyaf seeks to establish an independent state in western Mindanao

and the Sulu Archipelago, which dominant by the Muslim in the south of

161 Maresca, T. (2017). ISIS expands foothold in Southeast Asia with Philippine siege. [online] USA TODAY. Available at: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/06/10/philippines-islamic-state-isis-southeast-asia/102704672/ [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018]. 162Guiterrez, N. (2017). Experts, ministers: Marawi proves ISIS a threat to Southeast Asia. [online] Rappler. Available at: https://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/171855-marawi-isis-terrorism-joint-patrols [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018]. 163 Peel, M. and Vasagar, J. (2017). SE Asian island nations take aim at pirates and militants. [online] Ft.com. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/787e3590-18f6-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87 [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018]. 164H Caceres-Solari, Andres. Captain of the United States Marine Corps. B.S., University of New Hampshire. “Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines Security Cooperation in the Celebes Sea.” Naval Postgraduate School. June, 2008. Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483611.pdf. 165Ibid. 166Ibid. 167Howard and Sawyer. “Terrorism and Counterterrorism.”, 554.

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Philippines. 168 Their ideology is based on the group’s eponymous founder,

Adburajak Janjalani, a.k.a. Abu Sayyaf.169 It was all because of the ethnic and

religious conflict (which leads to a separatists movement) around the region, but

the threat for the three countries not specifically because of the ethnic and

religious conflict, it is just a supporting evidence. But the threats come towards

from the disorder and chaos caused by the escalation of violence provides

terrorists and criminals with a safe haven.170

Abu Sayyaf is originated and began their operations in the southern

Philippines, in particular the Basilian province.171 Their action in the Sulu Sea as

the terrorist organization was first supported by the poverty conditions and the

widespread unemployment with estimation of 30%.172 Those aspects made the

leader of the Abu Sayyaf could easily recruiting the unskilled and unemployed

people whom willingly to do anything for money and survive in the region. Not

only by recruiting unskilled and unemployed people to increase the number of

their member. But, Abu Sayyaf successful kidnappings also lead to the

recruitment of teachers, students and also tourists they could find in the region.173

Abu Sayyaf has increased their activities to include munitions trading and

received arms, training and other supports from Al Qaeda and terrorist groups

located in the Middle East.174 The training was mostly conducted by Al-Qaeda in

guerrilla warfare, military operations, and the making of bombs in order to

support their attempts in the Sulu Sea region. 175 Abu Sayyaf has reportedly

committed 378 terrorist activities resulting on 288 deaths of the civilian. The

168“Abu Sayyaf Group. The Overview.” Accessed in April 15, 2018. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/abu-sayyaf-group-asg. 169ibid. 170Ibid. 171G. Hutchison, Billye. “Abu Sayaf.” The Counterproliferation Papers. Future Warefae Series No. 49. USAF Counterproliferation Center. Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518942.pdf. 172Ibid. 173G. Hutchinson, Billye. “Abu Sayyaf.” The Counterproliferation Papers. Future Warfare Series No. 49. USAF Counterprolifeartion Center. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518942.pdf. 174 Ibid. 175“Abu Sayyaf Group. The Overview.” Accessed in April 15, 2018. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/abu-sayyaf-group-asg.

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kidnapping activities of Abu Sayyaf resulted in total 640 cases with 2,076

victims.176 The spread of Abu Sayyaf’s activities in the Philippines may connected

by commonalities in goals, attraction of large sums of money, and the media

attention given to effective groups operations.177

II.3.1 The Presence of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as the actor of ship

hijacking and kidnapping for ransom at Sulu Sea (2016-2017)

Picture 2.6: Philippines Kidnapping.

Abu Sayyaf is actually one of the terrorist groups in the Sulu Sea. Their

activities on piracy and kidnapping are actually their sources of terrorism

financing. It is true, after we knew about the kidnapping of Malaysian and

176 Ibid. 177 Ibid.

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Indonesian citizens which resulting on the ransom payment which reach the

number of $ 4 million. With that amount of money, we could see how much

the Abu Sayyaf Groups could have to increase their power and presence in the

region.178

The existence of Abu Sayyaf and their actions in hijacking and kidnapping

really give a significant changes to the security of the Southeast Asia,

especially Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines due to their position

surrounding the Sulu Sea. It was all begin in March 26, 2016. When the

militants of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has begun their spate of maritime

kidnappings in the Sulu Sea. Where three vessels of Indonesia and one

Malaysian tugboat were hijacked and around 18 of sailors were taken as

hostages.179 The ASG also threatened to behead the hostages if no ransom was

paid by the state nation.

Malaysia was then released their sailors by releasing payment around

$2.97 million, Indonesia for $1.06 million and the final four were released by

$319.000 ransom.180 Even if the hostages were released and the ransoms were

paid. The terror in the Sulu Sea has not ended yet. The following threat

happened in June 20, 2016. Where Indonesian tugboat was boarded and there

were 7 of its 13 crews were taken as hostages by the ASG. The ASG was

demanding around $4.8 million as the ransom for the release of the 7 men.181

This situation is going to threat the security of Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines strategic environment, as well the security of their economic

partners. Because the victims of piracy are also international shipping

companies, large multinational corporations, and as well the citizens of other

178 Abuza, Z. (2016). Trilateral Maritime Patrols in the Sulu Sea: Asymmetry in Need, Capability, and Political Will. [online] Center for International Maritime Security. Available at: http://cimsec.org/trilateral-maritime-patrols-sulu-sea-asymmetry-need-capability-political-will/26251 [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018]. 179 Rider, David. “Sulu Sea Patrols Analysis.” Published on July 7, 2016. Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://www.marsecreview.com/2016/07/sulu-sea-patrols-analysis/. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid.

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nations.182 It will influence the trust of stakeholders as their partners in term of

economy, as well in term of defense, it will influence the security of each

state’s homeland security.

If the state nation border security is not strong enough to be able on

maintaining the activity of the terrorist groups, they could easily entering the

state. The worst possibilities are going to be the massive killing towards the

citizens of the state, and the recruitment of one state’s citizens which will

increase their presence and activities in the region. It could easily help them to

reach their goals on creating their own state in the region. Even after we knew

that Abu Sayyaf Group is supported by ISIS, the branches are going to be

helping the ISIS to increase the influence in the international system.183

182 Gunaratna, Rohan. “Abu Sayyaf’s Renewesd Capabilities in the Philippines.” November 15, 2016. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.benarnews.org/english/commentaries/asia-pacific-threat-update/gunaratna-november-11152016164021.html. 183 Ibid.

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CHAPTER III

THE OVERVIEW OF MARITIME SECURITY

COOPERATION OF INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND THE

PHILIPPINES TOWARDS SULU SEA

III.1 Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement between Indonesia,

Malaysia and the Philippines at Sulu Sea

The Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement is a form an agreement of

maritime security cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines at

Sulu Sea.184 This security cooperation is very important to the safety of those

countries from harmless international trade and transportation route in there.185

The existence of Abu Sayyaf Group has made those three countries feel

threatened.186 Thus the urging of cooperation is really needed to secure their

region and have to create the Joint Work Group immediately before they took an

action in order to reducing maritime piracy in there. The parties of Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines underline the importance of longstanding

cooperation in the political, economic, and security sectors. This cooperation is

fruitful and mutually beneficial for these three countries, both bilaterally and

multilaterally.187

184 Ikrami, Hadyu. (2017). INDONESIA-MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINES COOPERATION IN COMBATING MARITIME CRIMES: LESSONS FROM THE MALACCA STRAITS PATROL AND THE ROLE OF ASEAN. [online] Cil.nus.edu.sg. Available at: https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Hadyu-Ikrami_Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-Cooperation-in-Combating-Mar....pdf [Accessed 5 May 2018]. 185 Cáceres-Solari, Andrés H. (2008). INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND THE PHILIPPINES SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE CELEBES SEA. [ebook] Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, p.1. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA483611 [Accessed 5 May 2018]. 186 Ibid., 187 NajibRazak.com. (2017). Joint Statement of the 12th Malaysia – Indonesia Annual Consultation. [online] Available at: https://www.najibrazak.com/bm/blog/joint-statement-of-the-12th-malaysia-indonesia-annual-consultation/ [Accessed 30 Apr. 2018].

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Basically, the three countries have desire to commitment in promoting

peace, the stability and ensuring security in the region, and also to make sure that

the sustainability of economic growth in these countries is conducive. The

security challenges nowadays are arising from ship hijacking, kidnappings, and

terrorism in the region, especially these security challenges are referring to the

maritime areas of common interest to the three countries which is Sulu Sea.188

Based on the timeline below, we can see the milestone of the framework

of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement is an outline of sincerity the three countries

in overcoming maritime piracy at Sulu Sea, and it is strengthened by the direct

statement from Deputy of Navy From Malaysia, Vice Admiral Datuk Anuwi

Hassan in the Fourth Regional Law of Armed Conflict at Sea Workshop in Sungai

Basi Camp, Kuala Lumpur.189

“We must change our perception from threats to opportunities despite the uptrend of non-state actors in maritime violence in the Sulu Sea that has rampantly conducted kidnap for ransom, - Deputy Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Datuk Anuwi Hassan”190

188 OBP. (2016). Piracy and Robbery Against Ships in Asia | SOP 2016. [online] Available at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/se-asia [Accessed 28 Apr. 2018]. 189 Daud, Norila. (2017). TCA to face maritime crimes and threats in Sulu Sea region. [online] Malaysia World News. Available at: https://www.malaysiaworldnews.com/2017/05/16/tca-to-face-maritime-crimes-and-threats-in-sulu-sea-region/ [Accessed 5 May 2018]. 190 Ibid.,

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Picture 3.1: Timeline of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement Meetings (Source:

Facebook Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia)191

III.1.1 Trilateral Meeting on 5 May 2016

This Cooperation established on the immediate steps to deal with security

issues in the maritime areas of common concern between Indonesia, Malaysia,

and the Philippines in Yogyakarta, 5 May 2016.192

Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement began by the meeting of 3 Minister of

Foreign Affairs of the Republic Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Secretary of Foreign

Affairs of the Philippines.193 It is also attended by the Commander in chief of the

191 Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia (2017). Chronology TRILATERAL AIR PATROL (TAP).. [image] Available at: https://www.facebook.com/KementerianPertahanan/photos/a.177980242212832.43686.177194982291358/1676970632313778/?type=3&theater [Accessed 19 May 2018]. 192 Kemlu.go.id. (2016). Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia - Joint Declaration of Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Forces of Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines. [online] Available at: https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/Pages/Joint-Declaration-Foreign-Ministers-and-Chiefs-of-Defence-Forces-of-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines.aspx [Accessed 29 Apr. 2018]. 193 Ibid.,

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Armed Forces of Indonesia, Chief of Defense Force of Malaysia, and the Flag

Officer in Command one of the staff from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.194

The three ministers also regretted the kidnapping of innocent civilians by

armed groups around the maritime territory of mutual concern with the three

countries including Indonesian, Malaysian and the Philippines citizens.195 In this

case, they underline that protecting the lives, welfare, and rights of their citizens

based on international law, and also their respective domestic laws and regulations

is important.196

Concerning about the security challenges also undermine trade trust,

particularly in the movement of commercial shipping, goods, and people in the

maritime areas of common concern (Sulu Sea) to the Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines.197 Therefore, sooner or later it will give the negative impact to the

economic activities and welfare of the surrounding communities.

From Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines sides reaffirmed their

efforts to enhance the cooperation based on the agreement on the establishment of

communication procedures between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

government and the exchange of Information in order to strengthening the

collaboration and cooperation between its military to deal with the growth of non

traditional security challenges in the Sulu Sea region.198

194 Ibid., 195 Ayuningtyas, Kusumasari. (2016). Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines Vow to Combat Sea Piracy Together. [online] BenarNews. Available at: https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/trilateral-talks-05052016141940.html [Accessed 1 May 2018]. 196 Ibid., 197 Kemlu.go.id. (2016). Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia - Joint Declaration of Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Forces of Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines. [online] Available at: https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/Pages/Joint-Declaration-Foreign-Ministers-and-Chiefs-of-Defence-Forces-of-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines.aspx [Accessed 29 Apr. 2018]. 198 Sheany. (2017). Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines Agree to Step Up Cooperation to Combat Terrorism | Jakarta Globe. [online] Available at: http://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-malaysia-and-philippines-agree-to-step-up-cooperation-to-combat-terrorism/ [Accessed 1 May 2018].

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The three countries held a joint working group to discuss about the

progress and deal with the situation at Sulu Sea.199 Therefore they agreed to

implement several actions on the Trilateral Cooperation at Sulu Sea based on the

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).200 First is to conduct patrol between the

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines region around Sulu Sea with the first

modal by using existing mechanism. Secondly is to provide an immediate

assistance to the people and ships which is in danger in the maritime areas of Sulu

Sea.201 Third is to create a national focal point among the three countries in order

to facilitate the timely sharing an intelligence and information. Then the last one is

to establish a hotline of communication among Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines to facilitate a better coordination in case of emergency and security

threats.202

III.1.2 Trilateral Meeting on 26 May 2016

Then in May 26th 2016, the three countries and joint working group have

established on joint maritime patrols to counter the potential threats in the Sulu

Sea. The initiative of this cooperation is also one of the important steps in order to

control crime at sea and riding pirates in Sulu Sea, some of region that is related

with Abu Sayyaf Group.203 These three countries are also aware of the possibility

of losing their sovereignty by doing this patrol, since the Indonesia Foreign

Minister Retno Marsudi has stated that,

199 Update Philippines. (2017). Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines to conduct joint maritime security patrols - Update Philippines. [online] Available at: https://www.update.ph/2017/04/indonesia-malaysia-philippines-to-conduct-joint-maritime-security-patrols/17083 [Accessed 4 May 2018]. 200 Guerra, Gustavo. (2017). Indonesia/Philippines/Malaysia: Agreement on Patrolling Shared Maritime Border | Global Legal Monitor. [online] Loc.gov. Available at: http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/indonesiaphilippinesmalaysia-agreement-on-patrolling-shared-maritime-border/ [Accessed 1 May 2018]. 201 Abuza, Zachary. (2016). Trilateral Maritime Patrols in the Sulu Sea: Asymmetry in Need, Capability, and Political Will. [online] Center for International Maritime Security. Available at: http://cimsec.org/trilateral-maritime-patrols-sulu-sea-asymmetry-need-capability-political-will/26251 [Accessed 1 May 2018]. 202 Ibid., 203 Feige, Johannes. (2016). Joint naval patrols bode well for Asean anti-terror fight. [online] The Straits Times. Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/joint-naval-patrols-bode-well-for-asean-anti-terror-fight [Accessed 6 May 2018].

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“Any cooperation should be agreed without anyone sacrificing their sovereignty and the negotiations will continue until we can find the mutual understanding and are capable of joint cooperation.”204

Furthermore, the spokesman for the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for

Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Mr. Agus R. Barnas also stressed that,

“Each country will patrol in their own territory in the border areas of the three countries, but this patrol will be integrated”205

III.1.3 Trilateral Meeting on 20 June 2016

Based on the trilateral meeting between three Defense Ministers in Manila,

20 June 2016, they have the same opinion to adopt the Malacca Strait Patrol as a

model for the trilateral cooperation, in order to deal with the growing security

challenges in Sulu Sea.206 Therefore, the ministers have planned and decided for

the armed forces and the related agencies or institutions to look at the principle

that they have deliberated below: 207

a. Coordinating activities between the militaries of three countries, should

focus on maritime security;

b. Establishment of joint military command posts at the selected location in

each country include ad hoc military liaisons on board;

c. Trilateral maritime and air patrol will be held in the maritime areas of

common concern;

d. The trilateral maritime patrol working group have to set the operational

directions and Maritime Command Center should established by

respective countries;

204 Ibid., 205 Ibid., 206 Bernama (2016). M'sia, Philippines, Indonesia agreed to establish trilateral maritime patrols. [online] The Borneo Post. Available at: http://www.theborneopost.com/2016/06/20/msia-philippines-indonesia-agreed-to-establish-trilateral-maritime-patrols/ [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 207 Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines (2016). press - Trilateral Meeting among the Defence Ministers of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. [online] Available at: http://dnd.gov.ph/PDF%202016/Press%20-%20Trilateral%20Meeting%20among%20the%20Defence%20Ministers%20of%20the%20Philippines,%20Malaysia%20and%20Indonesia.pdf [Accessed 6 May 2018].

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e. The transit corridor that will serve as a special sea lane for sailors entering

the waters of Sulu Sea which will be a common concern for three countries;

f. Regarding information and intelligence sharing is concerning in the

common concern of maritime area at Sulu Sea; and

g. The mechanism of trilateral database sharing.208

The Brig. Gen. Restituto Padilla also reaffirmed that the patrols will not only

help kidnapping and piracy in the high seas but also can address our porous

borders by conduct a better patrol to prevent abduction in the Sulu Sea. Then he

also added about the importance of information and intelligence sharing between

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.209

“so hindi kinakailangang manghimasok sa bawat bansa at makialam (it is not necessary to invade each country and intervene) because we’re all sovereign nations… and the best weapon is rely on the exchanges of information..”210

III.1.4 Trilateral Meeting on 2 August 2016

After that in Bali on August 2nd 2016, the three ministers of Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines have agreed to finalize and implement the Standard

Operating Procedures (SOPs) on maritime patrol and spotting the beginning of

official coordinated joint sea patrols.211 The trilateral ministerial gathering in Bali

was meant to ‘add and strengthen’ the initiatives 212 that have signed the

Framework on Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement in Jakarta on July 14th 2016.213

208 Ibid., 209 Kabiling, Genalyn. (2017). PH, Indonesia, Malaysia open borders in pursuit of criminals. [online] Manila Bulletin News. Available at: https://news.mb.com.ph/2017/06/20/ph-indonesia-malaysia-open-borders-in-pursuit-of-criminals/ [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 210 Ibid., 211 Sapiie, Marguerite Afra. (2016). Indonesia to start joint sea patrols with Malaysia, Philippines. [online] The Jakarta Post. Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/02/indonesia-to-start-joint-sea-patrols-with-malaysia-philippines.html [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 212 Arshad, Arlina. (2016). Jakarta, KL and Manila to start joint patrols in Sulu Sea. [online] The Straits Times. Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jakarta-kl-and-manila-to-start-joint-patrols-in-sulu-sea [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 213 Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines (2016). Defense Ministers affirm Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement. [online] Available at: http://www.dnd.gov.ph/PDF%202016/Press%20-%20Trilateral%20Meeting%20Statement.pdf [Accessed 6 May 2018].

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The discussion is on how to execute the ‘Framework on Trilateral

Cooperation Agreement among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines’ on the

Sulu Sea Patrol Initiative.214 Then it is also to implement identification for the

sailing ships in Sulu Sea, therefore those ships can be tracked and monitored from

the Maritime Command Center.215

“The cooperation comes in handy in facing security challenges in border waters which had been disrupted lately, - Minister of Defense Ryamizard”216

III.1.5 Trilateral Meeting on 1 October 2016

At the same time with the ASEAN-US Defense Dialogue in Hawaii on

October 1st 2016, the three minister of defense Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines agreed on having joint air patrols, even though their armed forces has

finalize the limitations for the maritime patrol upon transit corridor of each

country as the common concern of maritime areas at Sulu Sea.217 The cooperation

between the three countries is motivated by the need in order to tackle the

increasing of the kidnapping for ransom and ship hijacking event at Sulu Sea. The

meeting has changed into a platform to address other emerging common concern

in the maritime areas of Sulu Sea for the defense ministers.218

214 Parameswaran, Prashanth. (2016). New Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols Officially Launched in Indonesia. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/new-sulu-sea-trilateral-patrols-officially-launched/ [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 215 Arshad, Arlina. (2016). Jakarta, KL and Manila to start joint patrols in Sulu Sea. [online] The Straits Times. Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/jakarta-kl-and-manila-to-start-joint-patrols-in-sulu-sea [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 216 Setiawan, B. (2016). Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines Discuss Maritime Security. [online] En.tempo.co. Available at: https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/08/02/056792569/Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-Discuss-Maritime-Security [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 217 Mangosing, Frances. (2016). Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia agree on exploring joint air patrols. [online] The Jakarta Post. Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2016/10/03/philippines-indonesia-malaysia-agree-on-exploring-joint-air-patrols.html [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 218 PressReader (2016). Phl, Malaysia, Indonesia agree on Joint Air Patrols. [online] Available at: https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/the-freeman/20161005/281994671990443 [Accessed 6 May 2018].

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Besides that, the ministers of defense also get political support from

Presidents Joko Widodo, Rodrigo Duterte and Prime Minister Najib Razak as the

political leader of those three countries.219

III.1.6 Trilateral Meeting on 16 November 2016

On 16 of November 2016 the Trilateral Meeting of Defense Ministers was

held in Vientiane, Lao PDR. This meeting was conducted while the ASEAN

Defense ministers also have a retreat in Lao PDR.220 They have agreed on the

maritime safety corridor, formed Maritime Command Center in each country,

discussing on the further of sea marshal, make a planning in order to supporting

joint air patrols, make an arrangement of the joint exercise which will involving

air and ground elements, and the last is discuss for further Standard Operating

Procedure of the joint exercises by the Joint Working Group.221 Therefore the

Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines has to begin right away.222

Table 3.1: Progress of the formulation an agreement by Indonesia, Malaysia and

the Philippines.

Timeline Progress

5 May 2016 First Meeting

26 May 2016 Agreed on Joint Maritime Patrol

20 June 2016 The Maritime Command Center Establishment

14 July 2016 The Signing of Framework of Trilateral Cooperation

219 Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines (2016). 4th Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting among PH, Indonesia and Malaysia. [online] Available at: http://www.dnd.gov.ph/PDF%202016/Press%20-%204th%20Trilateral%20Defense%20Ministerial%20Meeting%20among%20PH,%20Indonesia%20and%20Malaysia.pdf [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 220 Ikrami, Hadyu. (2017). INDONESIA-MALAYSIA-PHILIPPINES COOPERATION IN COMBATING MARITIME CRIMES: LESSONS FROM THE MALACCA STRAITS PATROL AND THE ROLE OF ASEAN. [online] Cil.nus.edu.sg. Available at: https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Hadyu-Ikrami_Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-Cooperation-in-Combating-Mar....pdf [Accessed 5 May 2018]. 221 Ibid., 222 Ibid.,

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Arrangement

2 August 2016 Finalize the Standard Operating Procedure document for

Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation

1 October 2016 Agreed on Joint Air Patrol

16 November 2016 The encouragement to Commence the Trilateral

Cooperation Arrangement into Action soon.

III.2 Perspectives of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines on

Maritime Security Cooperation at Sulu Sea by Having Trilateral

Cooperation Arrangement

III.2.1 Indonesian Perspectives

“The Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement gives us the opportunity to prove how capable we are of handling our own security and defense matters.-Defense Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ryamizard Ryacudu. ”223

In the perspective of Indonesia, the maritime security cooperation is really

needed when there are crimes at sea that Indonesia cannot overcome it by

themselves. Indonesia has to build up maritime security cooperation by active in

diplomacy. Indonesia has to maximize its bargaining position at least in particular

fields of interest. Indonesia should actively strengthen maritime security

cooperation as a preventative measure, not only reacting when significant threats

arise.224

The security threats that Indonesia facing is about the existence of Abu

Sayyaf Group, where the Abu Sayyaf Group activity bother the national interest of

Indonesia and littoral state which are Malaysia and the Philippines in surrounding

Sulu Sea. The defense minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ryamizard Ryacudu emphasize

on the cooperation is very useful in facing security threats that had recently begun

223MalayMail News Article.(2017). Three-way air patrol initiative for safer borders - MalayMail News Article. [online] Available at: http://epaper.mmail.com.my/2017/10/13/three-way-air-patrol-initiative-for-safer-borders/ [Accessed 23 Apr. 2018]. 224 Dinarto, D. (2016). Indonesia Needs to Step up Its Fight Against Maritime Piracy. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indonesia-needs-to-step-up-its-fight-against-maritime-piracy/ [Accessed 7 May 2018].

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surfacing in the maritime borders, it also set on guarantee the maritime security

against maritime piracy as an offering.225

Beside that Indonesia also have a vision about the Global Maritime

Fulcrum where this vision become the strategic outlook for Indonesia. It highlight

and prioritize the maritime defense and security issues in Indonesia.226 Therefore,

to achieve the Global Maritime Fulcrum Vision, Indonesia needs the Trilateral

Cooperation Arrangement to realize that vision.

In the Defense White Paper of Indonesia (on 2015) also have written that

Indonesia believes in cooperation, where it can help the nations to overcome

issues such as Maritime Piracy at Sulu Sea. Then if it is considered as the

necessary the deployment of military capabilities in Sulu Sea will release as the

supporting aspect in order to maintain their power at Sulu Sea.227

III.2.2 Malaysian Perspective

“With the signing of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement, we are confident that the sea routes will be safe for commercial ships and the maritime community in this region,- Deputy Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Datuk Anuwi Hassan.”228

Malaysia is in facing the same threats that littoral states have in the Sulu

Sea region. The threat in that region is about the existence of Abu Sayyaf Group

who doing maritime piracy such as ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom. The

defense minister of Malaysia have stated that the threat cannot handled by one

225 Defenseworld.net. (2016). Indonesia Proposes Establishment Of Trilateral Military Post - ANTARA News. [online] Available at: http://www.defenseworld.net/news/16745/Indonesia_Proposes_Establishment_Of_Trilateral_Military_Post___ANTARA_News#.WvAwF4iFO00 [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 226 Marzuki, Keoni Indrabayu. “The Meaning of Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum.” February 22, 2018. Accessed on April 17, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-14a-meaning-indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum. 227 “Indonesian defense white paper.” Approved by the defense minister. Regulation No. 23/2015. November 20, 2015. Accessed on April 19, 2018. https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2015-INDONESIA-DEFENSE-WHITE-PAPER-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf. 228Daud, N. (2017). TCA to face maritime crimes and threats in Sulu Sea region. [online] Malaysia World News. Available at: https://www.malaysiaworldnews.com/2017/05/16/tca-to-face-maritime-crimes-and-threats-in-sulu-sea-region/ [Accessed 23 Apr. 2018].

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nation, that is why the littoral state should make a maritime security cooperation

in order to overcome this threats.

In the Malaysia’s National Defense Policy have mentioned about their non

traditional security issues regarding the presence of ASG whose carry out

kidnapping for ransom to support their activities, and ASG activities have an

involvement to the security of Malaysia in Sabah.229 The incidence of piracy has

been increase which is it can have an adverse effect on the economic sector in the

region. It can be happens if only the authorized parties failed to cease the security

issues. Besides that, the extra power (Malaysian Armed Forces) in regional also

has shown that they have an interest to expand their area of responsibility to

Southeast Asia with the purpose to held a patrol anti-piracy.230

To fulfill the regional cooperation, Malaysia realized that they also need

assistance from the external parties and nations states that are located outside

Malaysia’s region. The assistance can be such a support to facilitate moral and

physical training, transfer of technology, and equipment supply.231 Regarding this

effort Malaysia has taken steps to build up and strengthening relations between

countries outside the region.232

Therefore, as the urging to decrease maritime piracy at Sulu Sea, the

littoral states include Malaysia create an agreement to make the stability as the

common concern in maritime areas. In this case, Malaysia will continue to work

in improving and developing the capacity of the Malaysia Armed Forces as well

as enhancing the responsiveness to the defense and patriotism between people.233

229 Ministry of Defence Malaysia (2010). Malaysia's National Defence Policy. Kuala Lumpur, pp.3-4. 230 Ahmad, Rajali HJ. (2004). SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE. [pdf] Malaysia, p.6-7. Available at: http://www.asean.org/uploads/archive/arf/12ARF/8th-HDUCIM/Doc-7.pdf [Accessed 27 Apr. 2018]. 231 SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY. (2012). [pdf] Malaysia: Ministry of Defense of Malaysia, p.3. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157119/Malaysia%20-%20summary%20of%20defence%20policy.pdf [Accessed 27 Apr. 2018]. 232 Ibid., 233 Keling, M., Ajis, M., Shuib, M., Othman, M. and Md.Som, H. (2011). THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS IN MANAGING MILITARY AND DEFENCE

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III.2.3 The Philippines Perspective

“I hope that the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia will tighten security through the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement signed by the three countries in July last year (2016). The agreement aims to decrease crimes, including kidnapping, ship hijacking and the transit of terrorists in the Sulu Sea.-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Lt. Gen Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero.”234

Based on the national interest of the Philippines in the context of strategy,

the Philippines must implement measures planned to defend their territorial

integrity while maintaining relatively good relations with countries in the region

to stay away from the increasing of tension, and complete the efforts in supporting

a conducive environment for trading activity. 235 Therefore, the existing

geopolitical background describes pragmatic policies or trading with carefulness

in dealing with security issues.236

In fact, the Philippines also have the same issue towards maritime piracy at

Sulu Sea as a threat with Indonesia and Malaysia. The three countries also found

the national security interest which are economic and political interest regarding

the activity of Abu Sayyaf Group in the region.237

In the National Security Policy of the Philippines also mentioned about the

major policies toward external security challenges, 238 which is increase the

defense capability by having modernization program to the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, controlling the arrangements of security, and under the administration DEVELOPMENT. International Journal of Business and Social Science, [online] 2(12), p.186. Available at: http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._12;_July_2011/20.pdf [Accessed 28 Apr. 2018]. 234 REYES, DEMPSEY. (2017). Philippines urges tighter Asean border control - The Manila Times Online. [online] The Manila Times Online. Available at: http://www.manilatimes.net/philippines-urges-tighter-asean-border-control/360969/ [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 235 “National Security Policy: Securing the Gains of Democracy, 2011-2016.” Accessed on April 15, 2018. http://www.nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP-2011-2016.pdf. 236 Galang, Mico A. (2017). The New Philippine National Security Policy and the Asia-Pacific. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/the-new-philippine-national-security-policy-and-the-asia-pacific/ [Accessed 1 May 2018]. 237 Banlaoi, R. (2017). The persistence of the Abu Sayyaf Group. [online] Institute for Autonomy and Governance. Available at: http://iag.org.ph/index.php/blog/1362-the-persistence-of-the-abu-sayyaf-group [Accessed 25 Apr. 2018]. 238 Galang, Mico A. (2017). The New Philippine National Security Policy and the Asia-Pacific. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/the-new-philippine-national-security-policy-and-the-asia-pacific/ [Accessed 1 May 2018].

69

of President Duterte also highlights in the fundamental of agreement security with

partner countries.239

By agreed on the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement, it is like the first

step for the three countries, especially for the Philippines to prevent and secure the

tri border area from Abu Sayyaf Group on the sea that could be a potential target

of kidnapping.240 Therefore, Rodrigo Duterte as the President of the Philippines

urge Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines leaders to talk about the Trilateral

Cooperation Arrangement seriously as a form of maritime security cooperation in

order to decrease the maritime piracy at Sulu Sea.241

239 Ibid., 240 Tarrazona, N. (2017). Philippine Forces Hunt Terrorists at Sea. [online] The Maritime Executive. Available at: https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/philippine-forces-hunt-terrorists-at-sea#gs.nUj3lsw [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 241 Rider, D. (2017). Focus on the Sulu Sea | Maritime Security Review. [online] Marsecreview.com. Available at: http://www.marsecreview.com/2017/03/focus-on-the-sulu-sea/ [Accessed 24 Apr. 2018].

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CHAPTER IV

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND

THE PHILIPPINES’ MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

AT SULU SEA IN THE NEAR FUTURE

IV.1 The Implementation of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement

at Sulu Sea

Since the joint working group on Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement

began in on May 5th 2016 and initiated by the governments of three countries, it is

keep improving the maritime security cooperation at Sulu Sea. This cooperation is

inspired by the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol as the successor, which has succeed to

reduce the piracy, robbery, kidnapping and hijacking in the Malacca Strait as the

one of the busiest waterway.242 Thus the initiative has showed the pledges as a

first step in improving the security planning in the region where the Abu Sayyaf

Group action has possessed major economic impact to the littoral state.243

IV.1.1 Trilateral Maritime and Air Patrol in Sulu Sea as an Action to

Response the Ship Hijacking and Kidnapping for Ransom

Trilateral Maritime and Air Patrol is the result of Trilateral Cooperation

Arrangement agreement that finally take into action by the three countries. The

Trilateral Maritime Patrol has launched on 19 June 2017 in Naval Base of

242 Joibi, N. (2016). Joint Sulu Sea patrols set to kick off after trilateral meeting. [online] The Jakarta Post. Available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2016/07/15/joint-sulu-sea-patrols-set-to-kick-off-after-trilateral-meeting.html [Accessed 5 May 2018]. 243 Macleod, A. (2017). Can the Sulu Sea become more secure with a new initiative? | GRI. [online] Global Risk Insights. Available at: https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/10/can-sulu-sea-become-secure-new-initiative/ [Accessed 5 May 2018].

71

Indonesia which is at Tarakan244 and followed by the launching of Trilateral

Air Patrol on 12 October 2017 in Air Base of Malaysia which is at Subang245.

IV.1.1.1 Launching of Trilateral Maritime Patrol

Picture 4.1: Defense Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines officially announced the launching of trilateral Maritime Patrol at Tarakan Naval Base.246

After several times on delayed, the Trilateral Maritime Patrol in

Sulu has been launched in Tarakan on 19 June 2017.247 As the Trilateral

Maritime Patrol of procedures has been established it is also include the

improvement of Information and intelligence sharing.248 By launching

the Trilateral Maritime Patrol, it is also followed by the activated of

244 Gunawan (2017). Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines Begin Joint Maritime Patrols. [online] BenarNews. Available at: https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-patrols-06192017181048.html [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 245 Bernama (2017). Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philipines to jointly air patrol over Sulu Seas. [online] The Borneo Post. Available at: http://www.theborneopost.com/2017/10/13/malaysia-indonesia-the-philipines-to-jointly-air-patrol-over-sulu-seas/ [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 246 Gunawan (2017). Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines Begin Joint Maritime Patrols. [online] BenarNews. Available at: https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/indonesia-patrols-06192017181048.html [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 247 Ibid., 248 Zack, Justin. (2017). Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines launch Trilateral Maritime Patrol. [online] Thestar.com.my. Available at: https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/06/19/malaysia-indonesia-and-the-philippines-launch-trilateral-maritime-patrol/ [Accessed 6 May 2018].

72

Maritime Command Center in each littoral country which are at Tarakan

for Indonesia, Tawau for Malaysia, and Bongao for the Philippines.249

In this launching, it is not only attend by the defense ministers

from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines but they also invite the

Singapore’s senior Minister of State for defense and Foreign Affairs, Mr.

Maliki Osman and the Brunei’s Deputy Defense Minister, Mr. Abdul

Aziz Haji Mohammad Tamit as the observer.250

The launching of trilateral maritime patrol as the immediate

response to show the efforts of three countries in enhancing regional

security in the course of decreasing maritime piracy as a threats at Sulu

Sea. 251 Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines also have agreed to

conduct coordinated maritime patrol as one of the broader plan to tackle

the increasing of security challenges in Sulu Sea.252

249 Ibid., 250 Chan, Francis. and Soeriaatmadja, Wahyudi. (2017). Joint Sulu Sea patrols launched; info-sharing from S'pore next. [online] The Straits Times. Available at: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/joint-sulu-sea-patrols-launched-info-sharing-from-spore-next [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 251 Wee, Vincent. (2017). Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines launch joint patrols in Sulu Sea amid terror threat. [online] Seatrade-maritime.com. Available at: http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/asia/indonesia-malaysia-and-the-philippines-launch-joint-patrols-in-sulu-sea-amid-terror-threat.html [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 252 Ibid.,

Picture 4.2: Suggested Patrol Route along Transit Corridor within Area of Maritime Interest

The Trilateral Mar

warships of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, the patrol that held

along the naval base in Tarakan, Northern Borneo as well to show the

launching of Coordinated Maritime Patrol to boost maritime securit

the Sulu Sea.

The Three Countries also have the first port visit in November

2017. This activity was held in Tawi

this activity is that we implement border security cooperation to prevent

253 Saad, Fadm Mohd HatimCooperation : Interoperability Initiatives and Its Impact on Regional Cooperation. [online] Alumniportal.usnwc.edu. Available at: http://www.alumniportal.usnwc.edu/s/1767/images/gid2/editor_documents/ras_malaysia/2.0_fadm_hatim_ms_and_ss_maritime_security_cooperation_and_intssionid=054d02d0-f289-4e7d254 Tubeza, P. (2017). Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines launch naval patrols. [online] Globalnation.inquirer.net. Available at: http://globalnation.inqmalaysia-philippines-launch

2: Suggested Patrol Route along Transit Corridor within Area of Maritime Interest 253

The Trilateral Maritime Patrol conducts several maneuvers by the



launching of Coordinated Maritime Patrol to boost maritime securit

the Sulu Sea.254


2017. This activity was held in Tawi-Tawi, Philippines.


adm Mohd Hatim. (2018). Straits of Malacca and Sulu Sea Maritime Security

operability Initiatives and Its Impact on Regional Cooperation. [online] Alumniportal.usnwc.edu. Available at: http://www.alumniportal.usnwc.edu/s/1767/images/gid2/editor_documents/ras_malaysia/2.0_fadm_hatim_ms_and_ss_maritime_security_cooperation_and_interoperability.pdf?gid=2&pgid=61&se

4e7d-9938-3c7a00c68d3d&cc=1 [Accessed 8 May 2018].Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines launch naval patrols. [online]

Globalnation.inquirer.net. Available at: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/158135/indonesialaunch-naval-patrols [Accessed 7 May 2018].

73

2: Suggested Patrol Route along Transit Corridor within Area

itime Patrol conducts several maneuvers by the



launching of Coordinated Maritime Patrol to boost maritime security in


Tawi, Philippines. The purpose of


Straits of Malacca and Sulu Sea Maritime Security operability Initiatives and Its Impact on Regional Cooperation. [online]

http://www.alumniportal.usnwc.edu/s/1767/images/gid2/editor_documents/ras_malaysia/2.0_fadmeroperability.pdf?gid=2&pgid=61&se

3c7a00c68d3d&cc=1 [Accessed 8 May 2018]. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines launch naval patrols. [online]

uirer.net/158135/indonesia-

74

acts of piracy, and how the governments of these three countries ensure

marine users feel safe and comfortable passing through the Sulu Sea.255

Picture 4.3: The three countries conduct port visit256

255 Santoso, D. (2018). Latihan Bersama Port Visit Indomalphi. [online] LANCER DEFENSE. Available at: https://lancerdefense.com/2018/04/05/latihan-bersama-port-visit-indomalphi/ [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 256 Ibid.,

75

IV.1.1.2 Launching of Trilateral Air Patrol

Picture 4.4: Defense Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the

Philippines officially announced the launching of trilateral Air Patrol at

Subang Air Force Base.257

The first of Trilateral Air Patrol among Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines has launched in the 12 October 2017. The Trilateral Air

Patrol is also the second part of the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement

to complete the first part which is Trilateral Maritime Patrol that has been

launched last June in Tarakan Naval Base.258

The three countries have decided to implement the monthly

rotation for the joint Trilateral Air Patrol, as Malaysia the first nation that

leads the action as well as the host of launching Trilateral Air Patrol.

Then for December, joint Trilateral Air Patrol will lead by the

257 Bernama (2017). Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philipines to jointly air patrol over Sulu Seas. [online] The Borneo Post. Available at: http://www.theborneopost.com/2017/10/13/malaysia-indonesia-the-philipines-to-jointly-air-patrol-over-sulu-seas/ [Accessed 6 May 2018]. 258 Ibid.,

76

Philippines and subsequently Indonesia in January 2018.259 The three air

forces also have made the commitments on the deployment schedule,

where each country who takes turn in leading Trilateral Air Patrol will

use their own military capabilities with other nations patrol teams aboard.

This patrol will be watched from maritime command center in each

country.260

In the launching of Trilateral Air Patrol defense minister of

Malaysia, Mr. Hishammudin stated that,

"We must be vigilant and stringent in our efforts to address and eradicate these growing security challenges. With the successful implementation of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement, we can prove to the world that this is the way forward."261

The statement from defense minister of Malaysia emphasize on the

essential of the coordination and confidence in Trilateral Air Patrol

between the three countries in order to maintain peace and security at

Sulu Sea.262 Then this patrol will be held twice a month, it is also as a

form of raising the domain maritime awareness between Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines in the common concern of maritime areas

which is Sulu Sea.263

259 Ibid., 260 Mangosing, Frances. (2017). PH, Malaysia, Indonesia launch trilateral air patrols over Sulu Sea. [online] Globalnation.inquirer.net. Available at: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/160853/global-nation-philippine-news-updates-islamic-state-malaysia-indonesia-air-patrol [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 261 Naidu, Sumisha. (2017). First joint air patrols over Sulu Sea launched by Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia. [online] Channel News Asia. Available at: https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/first-joint-air-patrols-over-sulu-sea-launched-by-malaysia-9304708 [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 262 Wakefield, F. (2017). PH, Malaysia, Indonesia launch trilateral air patrol vs terrorism. [online] Manila Bulletin News. Available at: https://news.mb.com.ph/2017/10/16/ph-malaysia-indonesia-launch-trilateral-air-patrol-vs-terrorism/ [Accessed 7 May 2018]. 263 Bernama (2017). Malaysia leads Philippines, Indonesia in Sulu Sea air patrol | The Malaysian Insight. [online] Themalaysianinsight.com. Available at: https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/21967/ [Accessed 7 May 2018].

77

IV.1.2 The Establishment of Maritime Command Center in Each Nations of

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines near Sulu Sea

Picture 4.5: the opening of Maritime Command Center in Tarakan264

The inauguration of the Maritime Command Center Tarakan is an effort

made by the three countries in following up the Joint Declaration in Yogyakarta,

to realize security in the Sulu Sea and surrounding areas.265 This inauguration also

symbolizes to the Maritime Command Center Tawau in Malaysia and Bungao in

the Philippines. Along with the inauguration of Maritime Command center in

Naval Base of Indonesia at Tarakan, it is automatically also as the beginning of

the Information and intelligence sharing.

The communications control that exists between Maritime Command

Center Tarakan in Indonesia, Tawau and Bungao is the center of Information and

Intelligence Sharing which is an important factor in supporting the

264 PUSPEN MABES TNI (2017). Panglima TNI: Maritime Command Center Wujudkan Keamanan Perairan Sulu | WEBSITE TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA. [online] Tni.mil.id. Available at: http://www.tni.mil.id/view-114834-panglima-tni-maritime-command-center-wujudkan-keamanan-perairan-sulu.html [Accessed 8 May 2018]. 265 Ibid.,

78

implementation of Trilateral Maritime and Air Patrol of the three countries.266 The

establishment of Maritime Command Center in each city in the three countries is

expected to be able to reduce and minimize the possibility of incidents that may

occur in the waters and the concern of the three countries.267

The Maritime Command Center in three countries has satellite for real

time exchange information from each Maritime Command Center country. In

Maritime Command Center each country is using Automatic Identification

System on all vessels that passing through the transit corridor.268 Therefore, all

information is directly exposed in a large screen in order to monitor any ships that

passing through the Sulu Sea as the ships report to the Maritime Command

Center.269 Then it will automatically emit the radar on board and be captured

directly by the Maritime Command Center satellite and it will be seen that the

ship passes through the Maritime Command Center in real time.270

Defense minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Ryamizard Ryacudu

stated about the importance of cooperation and the Trilateral Cooperation

Arrangement agreement by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

"In order to overcome this threat, Indonesia along with the Philippines and Malaysia have taken concrete cooperation measures through the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement platform in the Sulu Sea, activities have been carried out in coordinated joint patrols, both at sea and air"271

266 Ibid., 267 Purwanto, Heri. (2017). Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines sign inscription of maritime command center - ANTARA News. [online] Antara News. Available at: https://en.antaranews.com/news/111458/indonesia-malaysia-philippines-sign-inscription-of-maritime-command-center [Accessed 8 May 2018]. 268 Mashita, Nani. (2017). Maritime Command Center untuk amankan wilayah perairan Sulu. [online] LensaIndonesia.com. Available at: https://www.lensaindonesia.com/2017/06/19/maritime-command-center-untuk-amankan-wilayah-perairan-sulu.html [Accessed 8 May 2018]. 269 Director of Marine, Sabah Region (2017). Ship Reporting System. [online] Available at: http://www.marine.gov.my/jlm/pic/article/service/notice/notice/Sabah/2017/NTMSBH142017.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2018]. 270 Ibid., 271 Sasongko, Agung. (2018). Ryamizard Sampaikan Pentingnya Keamanan Sektor Maritim. [online] Republika Online. Available at: http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/18/03/16/p5o7rx313-ryamizard-sampaikan-pentingnya-keamanan-sektor-maritim [Accessed 13 May 2018].

Table 4.1: The initiatives and implementation of Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement.272

IV.2 Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines Military

Deployment to Support the Implementation of Maritime Security

Cooperation at Sulu Sea

In this section, the writer will explain about the deployment of Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines militaries in S

is one of the actions that will give a significant impact following by the Trilateral

Cooperation Arrangement as the agreement between those three countries and the

implementation of their initiatives. This is also one o

three countries start to prove the military capabilities that they have in the

strategic environment such as Sulu Sea. Therefore, the military deployment by

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in Sulu Sea divided into two,

the naval force and the air force. Both forces practice the patrol that has been

agreed in order to maintain the common concern of maritime area at Sulu Sea

which is security, and their common national security interests.

272 Saad, Fadm Mohd HatimCooperation : Interoperability Initiatives and Its Impact on Regional Cooperation. [online] Alumniportal.usnwc.edu. Available at: http://www.alumniportal.usnwc.edu/s/1767/images/gid2/editor_documents/ras_malaysia/2.0_fadm_hatim_ms_and_ss_maritime_secssionid=054d02d0-f289-4e7d

he initiatives and implementation of Trilateral Cooperation

onesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines Military


Cooperation at Sulu Sea


Malaysia, and the Philippines militaries in Sulu Sea. The deployment of military



implementation of their initiatives. This is also one of the next steps, where the



Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in Sulu Sea divided into two,



which is security, and their common national security interests.

adm Mohd Hatim. (2018). Straits of Malacca and Sulu Sea Maritime Sec

Cooperation : Interoperability Initiatives and Its Impact on Regional Cooperation. [online] Alumniportal.usnwc.edu. Available at: http://www.alumniportal.usnwc.edu/s/1767/images/gid2/editor_documents/ras_malaysia/2.0_fadm_hatim_ms_and_ss_maritime_security_cooperation_and_interoperability.pdf?gid=2&pgid=61&se

4e7d-9938-3c7a00c68d3d&cc=1 [Accessed 8 May 2018].

79

he initiatives and implementation of Trilateral Cooperation

onesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines Military



ulu Sea. The deployment of military



f the next steps, where the



Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in Sulu Sea divided into two, which are



Straits of Malacca and Sulu Sea Maritime Security Cooperation : Interoperability Initiatives and Its Impact on Regional Cooperation. [online]

http://www.alumniportal.usnwc.edu/s/1767/images/gid2/editor_documents/ras_malaysia/2.0_fadmurity_cooperation_and_interoperability.pdf?gid=2&pgid=61&se

3c7a00c68d3d&cc=1 [Accessed 8 May 2018].

80

IV.2.1 Naval Force Capabilities

In order to maintain the national security interest of Indonesia, Malaysia,

and the Philippines in the common concern of maritime areas in Sulu Sea, and

also to show the existence of three countries in that region. Likewise the presence

of Abu Sayyaf Group that categorize as a threat in Sulu Sea, the three countries

have to build up the military capabilities in there. Therefore, air forces capabilities

are really needed when the Trilateral Maritime Patrol held by Indonesia, Malaysia,

and the Philippines.

Table 4.2: The Capabilities of Naval Force from Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines.

Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines

Base Tarakan Tawau Bongao

Capabilities

KRI Sidat-851 Kapal Diraja (KD)

Baung - 3509

PS-38 BRP

General Mariano

Alvarez

KRI FKO-368 KD Todak FF.16 BRP Ramon

Alcaraz

KAL Bunyu

IV.2.1.1 Indonesia

Trilateral Maritime Patrol has been launched in Tarakan, Indonesia. The

launching of this patrol also has to support by the outstanding navy force

capabilities. The defense minister of Indonesia stated that,

“I am grateful and give my highest appreciation to the TNI Commander and the ranks who have prepared the plan for the launch of this Trilateral

81

Maritime Patrol very well, with the involvement of TNI procurement together with the Malaysian and the Philippines Armed Forces,”273

Indonesia currently is focus on the ‘green water’ capability, in

consequence of their maritime background. Then Indonesia’s navy procurement

focuses on modern frigates, corvettes that provide anti-ship missiles. It is also

such an effort to enhance the coastal fighter and improved the capability to set up

the troops within Area of Maritime Interest in Indonesia. Nowadays there are

some critical gaps about anti-submarine warfare, long-range maritime surveillance,

and subsurface capability. For the future plan, Indonesia’s navy procurement will

focus on the ‘blue water’ capability.274

Nowadays Indonesia’s Navy Procurement has 213 ships in all categories,

which are consist of 11 major surface combatants, 11 ships for mine warfare and

countermeasures, 72 patrol and coastal combatants, 5 major amphibious ships, 26

landing ships, 54 landing craft, 2 submarines and 32 logistics and support vessels.

However, many of these ships are outdated and need to be replaced soon.275

Therefore in order to support the Trilateral Maritime Patrol that has been

lauched in June 2017 at Tarakan, Indonesia use KRI Sidat-851, KRI FKO-368,

and KAL Bunyu.276

273

Penerangan, Dinas. (2017). KOARMATIM - SATGAS TRILATERAL MARITIME PATROL INDOMALPHI BERHASIL BEBASKAN PEMBAJAKAN DI KM. BUNGA TERATAI. [online] Komando Armada RI Kawasan Timur. Available at: https://koarmatim.tnial.mil.id/satgas-trilateral-maritime-patrol-indomalphi-berhasil-bebaskan-pembajakan-di-km-bunga-teratai/ [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 274 Chand, Naresh. (2014). Indonesian Navy on the Threshold of Modernisation - SP's Naval Forces. [online] Spsnavalforces.com. Available at: http://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=343 [Accessed 10 May 2018]. 275 Ibid., 276 Penerangan, Dinas. (2017). KOARMATIM - SATGAS TRILATERAL MARITIME PATROL INDOMALPHI BERHASIL BEBASKAN PEMBAJAKAN DI KM. BUNGA TERATAI. [online] Komando Armada RI Kawasan Timur. Available at: https://koarmatim.tnial.mil.id/satgas-trilateral-maritime-patrol-indomalphi-berhasil-bebaskan-pembajakan-di-km-bunga-teratai/ [Accessed 9 May 2018].

82

Picture 4.6: KRI Sidat-851 (Source: Col.Oktaheroe Ramsi S.IP, M.Sc)

IV.2.1.2 Malaysia

As the three countries who agreed on the Trilateral Cooperation

Arrangement, Malaysia also prepared to join the Trilateral Maritime Patrol in Sulu

Sea. The capabilities of Royal Malaysian Navy were built up a force that can

perform the part of ‘blue water’ that also carries out the patrolling on the inshore

and coastal areas.277

The Royal Malaysian Navy also keep modernize the level of their

capabilities. In the future plan of Royal Malaysian Navy, they have upgrade

Laksamana class Corvettes in the weapon systems and sensors. The increasing of

Royal Malaysian Navy is into a balanced maritime force which is has proficiency

to performing its role efficiently.278 In 2009-2010 the Royal Malaysian Navy have

a pair of Scorpene-class Submarines.

In 2011 Royal Malaysian Navy also received a major modernization in

increasing its capabilities. The Royal Malaysian has signed the agreement to build

277 Chand, N. (2017). Royal Malaysian Navy - SP's Naval Forces. [online] Spsnavalforces.com. Available at: http://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=458 [Accessed 10 May 2018]. 278 Ibid.,

83

six new frigate-grade ships called as the Second Generation Littoral Ship Patrol,

with the first delivery expected in 2019. Those ships will have the same size as the

Lekiu-class.279 Then by 2018 Malaysia’s coast guard will have 41 ships that will

develop its defense capabilities at sea.280

In the performing of Trilateral Maritime Patrol, Royal Malaysian Navy used two

ships which are KD Baung-3509 and KD Todak.281 These ships are expected to

secure the area of maritime interest Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the

Sulu Sea.

Picture 4.7: KD Baung-3509 (Source: Col.Oktaheroe Ramsi S.IP, M.Sc)

279 Vuving, A. (2017). Tracking Malaysia’s Force Build-up in the South China Sea | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. [online] Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Available at: https://amti.csis.org/tracking-malaysias-force-build-up/ [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 280 Ibid., 281 Penerangan, Dinas. (2017). KOARMATIM - SATGAS TRILATERAL MARITIME PATROL INDOMALPHI BERHASIL BEBASKAN PEMBAJAKAN DI KM. BUNGA TERATAI. [online] Komando Armada RI Kawasan Timur. Available at: https://koarmatim.tnial.mil.id/satgas-trilateral-maritime-patrol-indomalphi-berhasil-bebaskan-pembajakan-di-km-bunga-teratai/ [Accessed 9 May 2018].

84

IV.2.1.3 The Philippines

“Our nations would continue to face challenges, and I could count on the military to keep the Philippines safe. There are no shortcuts to success. We will continue to face challenges as we trudge the noble path of building a stronger and safer nation.- President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte.”282

The defense minister of the Philippines is expecting that the program of

Self Reliant Defense Posture Program can provide the military equipment for the

Armed Forces of the Philippines modernization program.

“This is where our maritime defense industries are called upon to participate,- Defense Minister of the Philippines, Mr Delfin Lorenzana”283

The Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement that has been agreed by

Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and conduct a Trilateral Maritime Patrol

in their territorial water and maritime border. This situation make the governments

of Philippines have to increase their military modernization. The governments

hope that the Philippines have great capabilities with their neighbors in

overcoming the maritime piracy issue at Sulu Sea.284

In order to conduct the Trilateral Maritime Patrol, the Philippines use two

ships which are PS-38 BRP General Mariano Alvarez and FF.16 BRP Ramon

Alcaraz.285

282 Kabiling, Genalyn. (2017). Duterte vows to sustain AFP’s modernization program. [online] Manila Bulletin News. Available at: https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/03/20/duterte-vows-to-sustain-afps-modernization-program/ [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 283 Tarrazona, Noel. (2017). Philippine Shipbuilders to Help Modernize Military. [online] The Maritime Executive. Available at: https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/philippine-shipbuilders-to-help-modernize-military#gs.g=SDwDc [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 284 Ibid., 285 Pike, John. (2016). Philippine Navy Equipment. [online] Globalsecurity.org. Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/navy-modernization.htm [Accessed 9 May 2018].

85

Picture 4.8: PS-38 BRP General Mariano Alvarez patrol in the Sulu Sea (Source:

Col.Oktaheroe Ramsi S.IP, M.Sc)

IV.2.2 Air Force Capabilities

The function of Air Force is similarly with the Naval Force in the case of Sulu

Sea. The capabilities that air force has are to complete the maritime security cooperation

from space and it is providing the countries with air power. The air patrol in the Sulu Sea

will be prepared by Long Range Patrol Aircrafts or any practical properties that are will

be used in conducting the operations. Talking about air patrol capabilities, both Indonesia

and Malaysia have such capabilities to conduct air patrol operations especially under the

86

agreement which the Philippines is presently lacking where its Long Range Patrol

Aircrafts procurement project will surely cover by Indonesia and Malaysia.286

Table 4.3: The Air Forces Capabilities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines

Base Sultan Hasanuddin Subang -

Capabilities

Boeing 737

inspection Air

Strategic Squadron

5.

CN235 -

Sukhoi Su-27/30

aircraft. 287 C13OH

IV.2.2.1 Indonesia

Minister of Defense affirmed that for Indonesia, maritime security is an

implementation of the agenda that has been declared by President Joko Widodo to

make Indonesia as the Global Maritime Fulcrum.

"One of the main frameworks is the development of maritime defense forces, causing Indonesia to prioritize the increase of TNI capabilities especially to increase the number of Alutsista that will be used by the Navy and the Air Force,-Defense Minister of the Republic Indonesia, Mr. Ryamizard Ryacudu"288

286 Fonbuena, Carmela. (2014). Bidding for PAF's P5.9-B long-range patrol aircraft fails. [online] Rappler. Available at: https://www.rappler.com/nation/65882-long-range-patrol-aircraft-bidding-fails [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 287 Portal Pelopor Wiratama. (2017). LANUD SULTAN HASANUDDIN TERUS DUKUNG TRILATERAL MARITIME PATROL. [online] Available at: http://peloporwiratama.co.id/2017/06/22/lanud-sultan-hasanuddin-terus-dukung-trilateral-maritime-patrol/ [Accessed 8 May 2018]. 288 Fitriani, A. (2018). Menhan Ryamizard Paparkan Pentingnya Keamanan Maritim Di Australia. [online] rmol.co. Available at: http://keamanan.rmol.co/read/2018/03/16/330952/Menhan-Ryamizard-Paparkan-Pentingnya-Keamanan-Maritim-Di-Australia- [Accessed 13 May 2018].

87

Since the Trilateral Air Patrol has established and launched, through the command

from the commander of Sultan Hasanuddin air base the first air marshal TNI

Bowo Budiarto confirmed that,

“Sultan Hasanuddin air base ready to support the Trilateral Maritime Patrol by deploying two flight planes, one flight each of Boeing 737 Strategic Air Strategic Squadron 5 and one flight Sukhoi aircraft SU-27/30 Air Squadron 11 wing Air 5 Sultan Hasanuddin air base.”289

Picture 4.9: Boeing 737 Camar Emas Penjaga Kedaulatan (Source: Google Images)

Besides that, the air forces capabilities of Indonesia keep increasing.

Usually, Indonesia import the air forces capabilities from Russia and United

States, Republic of Korea and some Eurofighter Typhoons from England. Then

for the latest capabilities that Indonesia buy is Sukhoi SU-35(Flanker E) from

Russia.290

The newly inaugurated air force officers will assigned in the air base of the

outermost Indonesia that under development. The development of the air base in

the outermost region is also based on Nawacita's program President Mr. Joko

Widodo, is the "Global Maritime Fulcrum". 291 In which are development of

289 Santoso, Dian Eko. (2017). Lanud Sultan Hasanuddin Dukung Trilateral Maritime Patrol. [online] LANCER CELL. Available at: https://lancercell.com/2017/06/24/lanud-sultan-hasanuddin-dukung-trilateral-maritime-patrol/ [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 290 Pike, John. (2018). Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Udara (TNI AU) Indonesian Armed Forces - Air Force. [online] Globalsecurity.org. Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/auri-modernization-fighter.htm [Accessed 8 May 2018]. 291 Saragih, Anggaraman. (2017). TNI AU Bersiap Menyambut Alutsista Baru, Termasuk Su-35. [online] JakartaGreater. Available at: https://jakartagreater.com/tni-au-bersiap-menyambut-alutsista-baru-termasuk-su-35/ [Accessed 13 May 2018].

88

connectivity between the islands, thus it is necessary to implement the TNI power

synchronization with the program. It is in line with the coming of the main tool of

defense system (Alutsista), which is jet fighter Sukhoi 35, new Hercules Type C,

the placement of radar equipment, and the adding 12 number of radar thus

Indonesia have 32 radars overall.292

IV.2.2.2 Malaysia

The Royal Malaysia Air Force is well equipped since 2007, but they keep

improve the capabilities. In the end of 2011 Royal Malaysia Air Force have the

Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter thypoon, and Saan Gripen for Malaysia’s Multi-role

Combat Aircraft. Besides that Malaysia still has need up to 4 Airborne Early

Warning and Control Aircraft, even the funding of some this requirement not

allocated yet.293

During current situation at Sulu Sea, Malaysia is tent to focus on maritime

patrol aircraft rather than multi role combat aircraft. 294 The maritime patrol

aircraft become the number one priority for the Royal Malaysian Air Force.

Therefore, it needs a lot of maritime surveillance; it is molding to the reiterate

pirate attacks on shipping in Sulu Sea, including the kidnapping of ship crews.

But the Royal Malaysian Air Force currently operates just two maritime patrol

aircraft’s.295

In order to support the Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement that has been

implemented since the first launching of Trilateral Maritime Patrol and followed

by the Trilateral Air Patrol as the complement. Malaysia has prepared the Air

Force Capabilities to support the Trilateral Air Patrol. Thus, an efficient modern

292 Ibid., 293 Pike, John. (2017). Royal Malaysian Air Force - Modernization. [online] Globalsecurity.org. Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/malaysia/airforce-modernization.htm [Accessed 8 May 2018]. 294 Sipalan, Joseph. (2017). Exclusive: Malaysia shelves plan to buy new fighter jets - defense.... [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-defence-exclusive-idUSKBN19Y17X [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 295 Chuanren, C. (2017). Malaysia Again Says It Will Boost Maritime Surveillance. [online] Aviation International News. Available at: https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2017-03-29/malaysia-again-says-it-will-boost-maritime-surveillance [Accessed 13 May 2018].

air force working in close

device for peace and security in the region.

“Malaysia will have two military transport aircraft which are a CN 235 and C130 H that would be used during the Trilateral Air Patrol, Armed Forces Chief Raja Mohamed Affandi Raja Mohamed Noor.”

Picture 4.10: Aircraft that Malaysia uTwitter MINDEF Malaysia)

Therefore it is clear enough that

purchasing the new equipm

296 AM, Ziinine. (2017).[online] Malaysia World News. Available at: http://www.malaysiaworldnews.com/2017/03/22/malaysiastrategies-says-hishammuddin/ [Accessed 13 May 2018].297 Wahari, Hata. and Sherman, Ray. (2017).Patrols. [online] BenarNews. Available https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/malaysia[Accessed 9 May 2018]. 298 Ministry of Defense Malaysia (2017).Patrol (TAP).. [image] Available at: https://twitter.com/MINDEFMalaysia/status/915435443071590400 [Accessed 19 May 2018].

air force working in close cooperation with its nation’s partners is a powerful

device for peace and security in the region.296

“Malaysia will have two military transport aircraft which are a CN 235 and C130 H that would be used during the Trilateral Air Patrol,

ces Chief Raja Mohamed Affandi Raja Mohamed Noor.”

Picture 4.10: Aircraft that Malaysia used in the Trilateral Air Patrol (Source: Twitter MINDEF Malaysia)298

Therefore it is clear enough that the Malaysia constraint f

purchasing the new equipment. The acquisition of new, highly-capable assets was

AM, Ziinine. (2017). Malaysia in need for modern air force as strategies, says Hishammuddin.

[online] Malaysia World News. Available at: aysiaworldnews.com/2017/03/22/malaysia-in-need-for-modern-hishammuddin/ [Accessed 13 May 2018].

Wahari, Hata. and Sherman, Ray. (2017). Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines Launch Joint Air Patrols. [online] BenarNews. Available at: https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/malaysia-militants-10122017135323.html

Ministry of Defense Malaysia (2017). Pesawat yang digunakan dalam Operasi Trilateral Air

Patrol (TAP).. [image] Available at: er.com/MINDEFMalaysia/status/915435443071590400 [Accessed 19 May 2018].

89

cooperation with its nation’s partners is a powerful

“Malaysia will have two military transport aircraft which are a CN 235 and C130 H that would be used during the Trilateral Air Patrol, - Malaysian

ces Chief Raja Mohamed Affandi Raja Mohamed Noor.”297

sed in the Trilateral Air Patrol (Source:

constraint faces in

capable assets was

Malaysia in need for modern air force as strategies, says Hishammuddin.

-air-force-as-

Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines Launch Joint Air

10122017135323.html

Pesawat yang digunakan dalam Operasi Trilateral Air

er.com/MINDEFMalaysia/status/915435443071590400 [Accessed 19 May 2018].

90

an even greater priority now following the signing of the trilateral patrol

agreement with Indonesia and the Philippines.299

IV.2.2.3 The Philippines

While in Trilateral Air Patrol, the Philippines is still having no specialized

for maritime aircraft. It will likely use the aircraft Lockheed Martin C-130

Hercules airlifter.300 However, the Philippines’s in 2016 defense budget is P117.5

billion ($2.5 billion), and a total of P90.9 billion will finance the military’s

upgrade program until 2017, the highest military spending the country has seen in

two decades.301 Through the budgets they hope can buy a squadron of fighter jets,

two frigates, a number of twin‐engine long‐range patrol aircraft, and aerial

surveillance radars.302

The modernization program of the Philippines Air Forces will continue to

gain more strength by acquiring additional attack and combat utility and autopilot

airborne vehicles to strengthen the existing Philippines Air Force assets.303 It is

triggered by the most of Philippines airspace that currently unprotected due to the

Philippines Air Force’s lack of capabilities.304

The Philippines will keep increasing the air force capabilities and the

military’s reliable defense posture for the need of maritime domain awareness.305

299 Parameswaran, P. (2017). What Does Malaysia’s Air Force Need?. [online] The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-does-malaysias-air-force-need/ [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 300 Yeo, M. (2017). Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines target ISIS in trilateral air patrols. [online] Defense News. Available at: https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/10/13/malaysia-indonesia-and-philippines-target-isis-in-trilateral-air-patrols/ [Accessed 9 Ma y 2018]. 301 Deogracias, Charmaine. (2016). Modernizing the AFP & Duterte's Priorities. Asia Pacific Bulletin, [online] (350), p.1. Available at: https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb350.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35782 [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 302 Ibid., 303 Dizon, Nikko. (2017). Duterte to continue Air Force modernization. [online] Newsinfo.inquirer.net. Available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/910944/duterte-to-continue-air-force-modernization [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 304 21st Century Asian Arms Race. (2017). Here Is The 14-Year Modernization Plan Of The Philippine Air Force. [online] Available at: https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2017/12/08/here-is-the-14-year-modernization-plan-of-the-philippine-air-force/ [Accessed 13 May 2018]. 305 De Castro, Renato Cruz. (2017). Developing a Credible Defense Posture for the Philippines: From the Aquino to the Duterte Administrations. Asian Politics & Policy, [online] 9(4), pp.541-

91

President Rodrigo Duterte, in the 48th anniversary celebrations of the 250th

Presidential Airlift Wing held at the Villamor Airbase in Pasay City 14 September

2016, stated that,

“I had no use for military jets like F-16s which were acquired by the previous administration. There is no plan to fight with other countries. I would rather have “propeller-driven planes" that can be used in the “anti-insurgency" and “anti-terrorism campaign" in this country.”306

Then in the end of November 2017, Philippines just ordered 6 A-29 Super

Tucano light attack for the Philippines Air Force. This aircraft will be set up to the

close air support, surveillance, counterinsurgency missions and air-to-air

interception. Those planes are expected will deliver in 2019. 307 The defense

minister of the Philippines also announces that the Philippines Air Force will get

the two long range air patrol panes from United States. The type of plane is

Cessna 208B Caravan with Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, where

it can utilize to patrol at Sulu Sea.308

563. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/aspp.12353 [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 306 Pike, John. (2018). Philippine Air Force (PAF) Modernization. [online] Globalsecurity.org. Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/paf-modernization-fighters.htm [Accessed 9 May 2018]. 307 Ibid., 308 Bajo, Anna Felicia. (2017). Lorenzana: PHL to receive two US patrol planes. [online] GMA News Online. Available at: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/619593/lorenzana-phl-to-receive-two-us-patrol-planes/story/ [Accessed 13 May 2018].

92

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Sulu Sea is one of the strategic environments for Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines. This strategic environment is the most important for maritime

security of those three countries especially in their common national security

interest. The common concern of this three countries which are have the same

interest in economics and politics that make those countries agreed to make an

agreement on Trilateral Cooperation Arrangement. The economic activities of

three countries in Sulu Sea mostly are about trading, transportation route, fisheries,

marine eco-tourism, and marine protection. The trading usually also between the

littoral state which is Indonesia with Philippines and Malaysia with Philippines.

In political interest, due to the increasing of the ship hijacking and

kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Sulu Sea is no longer secure

for the economic interest for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The three

countries are threatened by the existence of Abu Sayyaf Group in there, which is

considered as the threat perception. The increasing number of maritime piracy that

Abu Sayyaf Group has done, make Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines insist

on maritime security cooperation in order to secure their strategic environment.

The other specifically national security interest of Indonesia is about the

implementation of Global Maritime Fulcrum vision that is primarily serves

domestic purposes by enhancing inter-island connectivity through infrastructure

development and protecting maritime resources to increase Indonesia’s economy.

Meanwhile Malaysia also has the national security interest which is focus on the

marine eco-tourism development in the Sabah region. Then with the Philippines

which is focus on ensuring the stability and the security of its nations which is

also about the Philippines territorial integrity.

Followed by the ministry of foreign affairs from Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines includes the commander in chief of their armed forces which are

93

attend the immediate joint working group of Trilateral Meetings. The meetings

were held in order to maintain their national security interest and overcome the

threat perception in the Sulu Sea. After doing several meetings, in this joint group

the three countries take the initiative to have several activities in order to

overcome the maritime piracy such as ship hijacking and kidnapping for ransom

which is conducted by the Abu Sayyaf Group. The initiatives consists of Trilateral

Maritime and Air Patrol, establish the Maritime Command Center, and

Information and Intelligence sharing regarding piracy at Sulu Sea.

Therefore, based on the research, the implementation of Trilateral

Cooperation Arrangement by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines agreement

towards Sulu Sea is already have the progress in order to maintaining their

national security interest at Sulu Sea. We know that the military capabilities of the

three countries are not comparable for Abu Sayyaf Group capabilities. On the

other hand the maritime security cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines will not bring to an end in here, but it will keep improving as long

as needed in pressing security issues by having cooperation.

94

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