9/11 and a new epoch in the national...

9/11 AND A NEW EPOCH IN THE NATIONAL BUDGET?

By James L. True Lamar University

Email: [email protected]

This paper uses Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to investigate whether national government responses to the attacks of 9/11 constitute a new epoch in the scope of government. Jones, Baumgartner, and True (1998) previously discovered three postwar epochs: characterized as a period of postwar experimentation, a period of robust government growth, and a period of restrained growth. Historical budget data indicate that 9/11 was part of a “macropunctuation” that broke with the old trend of constrained growth and slowly growing scope of government. It cannot be determined a priori whether this macropunctuation marks a one-time deviation, a return to an epoch of robust growth, a return to an epoch of experimentation, or something entirely new. On the other hand, the defense budgets currently associated with the War on Terrorism do not yet constitute a major departure from past defense budget levels, and impressionistic comparisons between present spending and that of World War II are not supported by the budget record. The past may be prologue to the present in many ways; but, in terms of the budgetary scope of the national government, the present departs from the past of the last 26 years.

Prepared for presentation at the October 10-12, 2002, Annual Meeting Of the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management

[Draft – please do not cite without permission]

2

This paper describes previous epochs in the annual budgets of the

national government and uses Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to examine

whether government responses to the 9/11 attacks constitute a new epoch. It

finds that 9/11 was a macropunctuation that marked the end of an epoch of

restrained growth and slowly expanding scope that had endured since 1975.

On the other hand, post-9/11 increases in defense spending did not

constitute a policy punctuation for this issue area because they do not yet

signal a large-scale departure from previous defense budgets. An expansion

of the War on Terrorism to include a new War in Iraq would be such a

policy punctuation, but it is not yet clear that such an expansion will occur.

Some observers compare the 9/11 attacks with those on Pearl Harbor,

but this paper finds that, at least to date, the changes in the scope and scale

of government and national defense changes after Pearl Harbor were

magnitudes larger than those following 9/11. To appreciate budget results as

an analytical tool for examining the scope and scale of government changes,

we turn first to the study of previous epochs.

EPOCHS IN THE BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Jones, Baumgartner, and True (1998) found evidence for three

budgetary epochs since World War II. These epochs marked, first, a post-

war period of experimentation; second, a period of robust growth and high

3

expectations; and, third, a period of constrained growth and reduced

expectations. They seemed to reflect changed conceptions of the proper role

of government --- of what government should and should not do, of what it

should attempt, and how much it should be trusted (See also Dodd 1994;

Kelly 1994; and Kingdon 1995). Although particular conceptions may

change slowly or rapidly, the budgetary outputs that reflected the shifts

between them changed relatively abruptly. Jones, Baumgartner, and True

(1998) called these shifts “macropunctuations”. In the national budget, they

appear to reflect a major change in the scope of what government is

expected and attempting to do.

This paper extends the data and methodology of Jones, Baumgartner,

and True (1998) to examine whether the national changes associated with

the 9/11 attack and the War on Terrorism constitute a new macropunctuation

and a departure from the previous scope of what was expected from and

attempted by the national government.

The analyses are based upon annual percentage changes in real budget

authority for the programmatic subfunctions of the national budget (The

Budget of the United States Government hereafter Budget). Programmatic

subfunctions exclude subfunctions that contain large amounts of credit

activity, offsetting collections, or government-wide contra-accounts, such as

4

Mortgage Credit, Deposit Insurance, or Interest Received by On-budget

Trust Funds. (See Appendix for a list of programmatic and financial

subfunctions, and a more complete explanation may be found at

http://dept.lamar.edu/polisci/faculty%20research.htm as part of the Tracking

the Purposes of Government Project). Because the percentage changes in the

remaining programmatic subfunctions contained a great many outliers, the

analyses depend upon the median changes. That is to say, the median annual

percentage change is taken as the typical change in any given fiscal year.

Figure 1 portrays these median percentage changes for the period 1948-

1995.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Jones, Baumgartner, and True interpreted these changes to represent

epochs of (1) postwar experimentation, FY 1948-1955; (2) robust growth

and government expansion, FY 1956-1973; and (3) constrained growth and

slowed government expansion, FY 1975-1995. The typical annual change

for the epoch of robust growth ranged from 2 to 13 percent of real growth

with a trend average of 6.3 percent.

[INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE]

The timing of the second epoch was surprising until one considers

Eisenhower’s New Look in Defense, the military forces for massive

http://dept.lamar.edu/polisci/faculty research.htm

5

retaliation, passage of the Interstate Highway Act, and the multiple national

responses to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik (see Greenstein 1982 and

Dodd 1994). Before the War in Vietnam and the Great Society of the

Johnson administration, there were the bombs and highways of the second

Eisenhower administration.

The macropunctuation between the second and third epochs was

marked by the end of the War in Vietnam, Nixon budget impoundments, the

Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, the War Powers

Resolution, and the Nixon resignation. Over the 1970s, many of the

programs that constitute mandatory spending were indexed, removing them

from the politics of election-year credit claiming and placing them on a

financial autopilot (Weaver 1988). The typical annual change for the epoch

of constrained growth that followed ranged from minus 5 to plus 6 percent

with a trend average of 1.4 percent.

Extending the data and methodology through FY 2000 made no

difference in description or trend of the third epoch. The typical annual

change remained within 3 ½ percent of the continuing trend average of 1.4

percent. When more subfunctions grow than shrink, the scope of

government is expanding. The government budget continued to growth in

6

real terms through FY 2000, but its typical rate of growth remained

generally constrained in comparison with that of the second epoch.


In one sense, analyzing past budget results is like sailing in the dark

with a lantern only in the stern. The sailor can only look at the wake to see if

we have made a turn. But, if the lantern can see far enough and the turn is

large enough, even a lantern in the stern will discover it.

What can this budget analysis tell us about a new epoch after 9/11?

FY 2001 ended just a few weeks after the 9/11 attacks, leaving little time in

the fiscal year for government responses. There is, however, an interesting

comparison between the budget authority estimates made before the attacks

and the actual FY 2001 results reported after them


In February 2001, the new Bush administration estimated

subfunctional budget authority figures for the fiscal year that was underway.

The median percentage change in those estimates was 5.5 percent,

comparable to the typical changes in FY 1983 and 1985 and in line with the

previous trend. However, when the budget authority figures were reported in

February 2002, the actual median change for FY 2001 was 10.3 percent.


7

Clearly one year does not make a trend, but just as clearly our sailing

boat has made a turn. This analysis of annual changes in subfunctional

budget authority indicates that the actual figures for FY 2001 depart from

the previous trend of constrained growth. As might be expected, there were

post-attack increases in Air Transportation, Disaster Relief, Law

Enforcement, and General Property and Records Management.

The underlying trend in typical national budget changes from FY

1975 through FY 2000 does not provide a good description of the typical

subfunctional result for FY 2001. The 2001 median departs from the past. It

leaves the old epoch behind, but our “lantern in the stern” has no way of

forecasting whether this departure is a one-year aberration (a deviation in the

terms of Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966) or the start of a new trend.

Typical growth of 10 percent could fit with the epoch two trend of robust

growth. It could fit with the epoch one trend of experimentation. Or it could

be something entirely new.

What we can say that we could not say before making this analysis is

that national government spending has stepped out of the previous pattern.

The epoch of restrained growth that lasted for twenty-five years through

unified and divided governments and through Democratic and Republican

8

control of the White House was broken by 9/11. The scope of government

has changed.

The particular focus of much of the government response to 9/11 is

security. Yet does the current macropunctuation does not appear to be driven

solely by a spillover from defense spending. We next examine the issue area

of national defense.

POLICY PUNCTUATIONS IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

A policy punctuation is a major change in policy that affects one or a

few related issue areas. The scale of the change must be large, but its scope

is limited to a single issue area, such as air transportation, or to a few related

issue areas, such as ground transportation, water transportation, and air

transportation within the function of Transportation. If the attack of 9/11 is

closely associated with a major redirection in policy that primarily affects

the related issue areas of national defense, it could be accurately

characterized as not only a macropunctuation in the scope of government but

also as a policy punctuation in the scale of resources devoted to national

defense.

There have been policy punctuations in national defense in the past.

The national budgets for defense since World War II reflect several policy

punctuations. True (2002) examined seven episodic events along with

9

several other continuous or recurring factors as potential influences on

annual national defense budget authority from FY 1946 through FY 1998. I

found that only four of the episodic influences on defense budget authority

could be accurately characterized as policy punctuations. These punctuations

were associated with the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea and

U.S. participation in the War in Korea, the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

and U.S. participation in the War in Vietnam, the 1979 Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan and subsequent “Reagan defense build-up”, and the 1991

Persian Gulf Resolution and U.S. participation in the War in Kuwait. One

can argue that the indirect influences on American society from these

defense policy punctuations were larger than their direct influences on the

national budget; however, these punctuations clearly constituted sharp

changes from previous defense spending.

The cited punctuations were policy punctuations, rather than

macropunctuations. They did not immediately redefine the epochs in which

they occurred because their influence was initially concentrated in only

defense and foreign affairs. These were policy punctuations that were

reflected primarily in the defense budget results. What about 9/11?

Tables 1 and 2 provide budgetary comparisons of 9/11 and the War on

Terrorism with the War in Korea and the War in Vietnam. They use budget

10

authority for National Defense (Function 050). This function contains

Department of Defense (DoD) military spending for the Army, Navy, Air

Force, and Marines as well as spending for many intelligence activities,

spending for defense materiel stockpiles, and spending for atomic energy

defense activities. The author has converted all figures to constant FY 2001

dollars based upon the chained GDP deflator data in Historical Table 10-1 of

the FY 2003 Budget. The budget authority data is available through the

Policy Agendas Project of the Center for American Politics at

http://depts.washington.edu/ampol/navResearch/research.shtml or from the

author.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Fiscal year 1951 U.S. budget authority for defense tripled after the

June 1950 invasion of South Korea and rose again by 14 percent in FY 1952.

In contrast, budget authority for defense for FY 2001 and 2002 reflect much

more modest increases. FY 2002 is estimated to be four percent higher than

in FY 2001, which was six percent higher than FY 2000. Note that the pre-

9/11 estimate for defense for FY 2001 was $311 billion while the post-9/11

report of actual defense budget authority was $329 billion. In the first

complete year of the War in Korea, defense commanded sixteen percent of

U.S. production. In the first year after 9/11, defense was estimated to

http://depts.washington.edu/ampol/navResearch/research.shtml

11

command 3 ½ percent of U.S. production. To date, post-9/11 U.S. defense

does not portray a scale of increase comparable to the policy punctuation

from Korea. What about Vietnam?

Table two provides a comparison between defense spending during

the early years of U.S. participation in the War in Vietnam and defense

spending before and after 9/11. In real terms, the budget authority after the

War on Terrorism began exceeds that of the early years of Vietnam. Defense

in the 1960s made up a larger share of a smaller U.S. government, and the

increase in defense BA from FY 1965 to 1966 was twenty-four percent.

Defense in the 2000s started from a somewhat higher base, but increases of

six and four percent do not clearly mark a large-scale departure from the

past. (A possible expansion of current defense spending to include a new

War in Iraq is discussed in the section below.)

[INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE]

A CHANGE IN BOTH SCALE AND SCOPE: 12/07/41 AND 9/11/01?

Many journalists and public figures have compared the changes in

citizen and government attitudes and practices after the 9/11 airline attacks

on the United States with the changes that took places after the December

1941 attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Television specials herald the day that

changed America. Benazir Bhutto (2002), for example, drew a direct

12

comparison between the two surprise attacks. Such comparisons may be apt

in terms of citizen attitudes; yet such comparisons are overdrawn---at least

from the perspective of the national budget. The U.S. responses to Pearl

Harbor, and the public expectations for the national government and its

actions were nothing short of cataclysmic.

The Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. declaration of war against Japan,

and the German declaration of war against the U.S. drew this country into

World War II and spurred the national government to take extraordinary

actions. Among other things, these actions included an enormous expansion

of the U.S. military and large-scale growth of the national government.

Starting from a reduced base, the World War II growth in the U.S.

military and the war materiel for it and its allies was astounding. The U.S.

government, under the Roosevelt administration, had been working to arm

America and to re-position forces since 1940, and it had been edging into

more provocative military and diplomatic moves (Preston and Wise 1979;

Murray and Millett 2000). The 1940 exchange of U.S. destroyers for British

bases, basing of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor, and Congressional passage

of a peacetime draft in 1940 and the Lind-Lease program in 1941 marked the

U.S. transition from “a benevolent neutrality” to “a state of passive

belligerency” (Preston and Wise 1979:301). Yet the change from passive

13

belligerency to war was even more dramatic. After Pearl Harbor, military

spending quadrupled and quadrupled again. By FY 1943 (July 1942 through

June 1943), national defense spending made up 85 percent of all government

outlays and 37 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product that had itself

almost doubled since 1940. At the same time, total federal outlays grew

from 10 percent of GDP to 44 percent (See Table 3 for details). In short,

government spending and government practices sharply and greatly changed

after the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941.

[INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE]

On the other hand, the post-9/11 increases in military and

government-wide spending indicate increases from previous spending, but

they pale in comparison to the changes after Pearl Harbor. The March 6,

2002, Congressional Budget Office current budget baseline projections for

FY 2002 called for federal outlays of $2,001 billion. When estimates for the

economic stimulus package (H.R. 3090, signed on March 9, 2002), the Farm

Bill (H.R. 2626, signed on May 13, 2002), and the Homeland Security Act

(S. 2452, yet to be signed) are added to the current budget baseline, the

administration’s February outlay estimate of $2,052 billion seems to be a

reasonable approximation. But, as Table 4 indicates, estimates of national

14

defense and federal outlays for FY 2002 do not show the doubling, tripling,

or quadrupling associated with Pearl Harbor and World War II.

[INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE]

Three important caveats are in order. First, there was a difference in

the fiscal year timing of the attacks. Second, the War on Terrorism might be

expanded to include a War in Iraq. Third, the essential unpredictability in the

inter-actions among events, institutions, and outputs in government

precludes all but the broadest out-year estimates of what a War in Iraq would

cost.

First, the 1941 and 2001 timing of fiscal years was different. Half of

FY 1941 was after the December 7th attack, and less than three weeks of FY

2001 remained after the September 11th attack.

Second, if we assume that the post 9/11 War on Terrorism becomes a

war on Iraq, current estimates of an increase of $150 to $200 billion in

spending for national defense would nonetheless fall short of the World War

II experience. National defense outlays for FY 2003 would soar to around

$580 billion, and overall national government outlays would be about $2.3

billion. National defense outlays would then constitute 25 percent of the

national budget and 5 percent of GDP, not the 73 percent of the budget and

18 percent of GDP it did in FY 1942. Between FY 1941 and FY 1942, total

15

government outlays doubled, from commanding 12 percent of GDP to 24

percent. Adding an assumed $200 billion for a war for Iraq and $40 billion

for the economic stimulus package, farm bill, homeland security, and other

related areas would increase the national government’s share of GDP from

20 percent to 22 percent in FY 2003, compared with the 24 percent of GDP

it commanded in FY 1942. If the assumption of a $240 billion increase in

estimates for FY 2003 proved to be correct, the post-9/11 War on Terrorism

and an FY 2003 War in Iraq would still fall short of the national cataclysm

that was World War II.

Third, punctuated equilibrium theory holds that complex interactions

create great unpredictability. For True, Jones, and Baumgartner (1999:111),

A full appreciation of the complexity and changing interactions of the American policy process convinces us that individual-level predictions about policy outcomes will be possible only to the extent that either we can choose areas and periods for study that avoid the periods and areas of positive feedback and punctuations or we limit our “predictions” to periods when we can know after the fact what were the successful mobilizations.

A War in Iraq would expand the scale of current policy and budget

changes, but the essential unpredictability of such a change in advance of its

occurrence should make any analyst reluctant to accept a priori estimates of

the scale of U.S. defense spending. The broad estimate above is offered only

as a first approximation for comparing the 9/11 attack and government

16

responses with the scope and scale of the Pearl Harbor attack and World

War II responses. In that regard, a new War in Iraq would constitute a policy

punctuation for national defense comparable to the punctuation from the

War in Vietnam. However, if defense spending increased as broadly

estimated above, it and the 9/11 attack that preceded it would not but of the

same scale and scope as those that followed Pearl Harbor.

FINDINGS

This paper extended earlier work on budgetary epochs to examine the

likelihood that the 9/11 attacks are generating a new budgetary epoch that

reflects a widespread change in the expected scope of government. Using

subfunctional budget authority data has allowed us to characterize national

spending since World War II into three previous epochs: experimentation

from 1948 through 1955; robust growth and rapidly expanding scope from

1956 through 1974; and constrained growth and slowly expanding scope

from 1976 through 2000.

The budget results from FY 2001 and estimates for FY 2002 indicate

that government responses to 9/11 are indeed leaving the previous epoch

behind. In the terminology of Jones, Baumgartner, and True (1998), 9/11

constitutes a macropunctuation. But its future is not known. Whether it

marks a one-time deviation, a return to an epoch of robust growth, a return

17

to an epoch of experimentation, or the beginning of something entirely new

cannot be known at this time. There is an essential unpredictability to the

many and changing interactions in government. What can be said now is that

9/11 has sundered the old epoch of constrained growth and slowly growing

scope. The past may be prologue to the present, but this budgetary present

has departed from the epoch of the past.

Conversely, 9/11 has not yet created a policy punctuation in national

defense---at least insofar as defense budget totals are concerned. Actual and

estimated growth in defense spending since 9/11 has been important, but it

does not yet mark the large-scale changes of previous policy punctuations in

national defense. An expansion of the War on Terrorism to include a new

War in Iraq would constitute such a punctuation in this issue area, but it is

not yet certain such an expansion will occur.

Comparisons between the 9/11 attack and the War on Terrorism with

the Pearl Harbor attack and World War II were found to be overdrawn. The

changes in the scale and scope of defense and the scale and scope of

government in World War II were nothing short of cataclysmic. Nine/eleven

has made some important changes in the scope of the purposes of the

national government. Indeed this paper argues that 9/11 has launched the

national government out of twenty-five-year epoch of restrained growth.

18

However, the 9/11 macropunctuation pales in comparison with the changes

made by Pearl Harbor and World War II.

APPENDIX

Programmatic Subfunctions: In this analysis, programmatic subfunctions are those whose budget histories reflect more complete transactions and thereby provide a better foundation for programmatic analyses than those categorized as financial subfunctions. Programmatic subfunctions include the following: National Security Subfunctions 051 Department of Defense-Military 053 Atomic energy defense activities 054 Defense-related activities 151 International development and humanitarian assistance 152 International security assistance 153 Conduct of foreign affairs 154 Foreign information and exchange activities Discretionary Domestic Subfunctions 251 General science and basic research 252 Space flight, research, and supporting activities 271 Energy supply 272 Energy conservation 274 Emergency energy preparedness 276 Energy information, policy, and regulation 301 Water resources 302 Conservation and land management 303 Recreational resources 304 Pollution control and abatement 306 Other natural resources 352 Agricultural research and services 376 Other advancement of commerce 401 Ground transportation 402 Air transportation 403 Water transportation 407 Other transportation 451 Community development 452 Area and regional development 453 Disaster relief and insurance 501 Elementary, secondary, and vocational education 503 Research and general education aids 504 Training and employment 505 Other labor services 506 Social services 552 Health research and training 554 Consumer and occupational health and safety 604 Housing assistance 703 Hospital and medical care for veterans 705 Other veterans benefits and services 751 Federal law enforcement activities

19

752 Federal litigative and judicial activities 753 Federal correctional activities 754 Criminal justice assistance 801 Legislative functions 802 Executive direction and management 803 Central fiscal operations 804 General property and records management 805 Central personnel management 806 General purpose fiscal assistance 808 Other general government Mandatory Domestic Subfunctions 351 Farm Income Security 502 Higher Education 551 Health Care Services 571 Medicare 601 General Retirement and Disability 602 Federal Employee Retirement and Disability 603 Unemployment Compensation 605 Food and Nutrition Assistance 609 Other Income Security 651 Social Security 701 Income Security for Veterans 702 Veterans Education, Training, and Rehabilitation Financial Subfunctions: Subfunctions whose budget records reflect large amounts of credit activity, offsetting collections, or government-wide contra-accounts. Such subfunctions were excluded from programmatic project analyses. Financial subfunctions include: 155 International financial programs 371 Mortgage credit 372 Postal Service 373 Deposit insurance 704 Veterans Housing 809 Deductions for offsetting receipts 902 Interest received by on-budget trust funds 903 Interest received by off-budget trust funds 908 Other interest 951 Employer share, employee retirement (on-budget) 952 Employer share, employee retirement (off-budget) 953 Rents and royalties on the outer continental shelf 954 Sale of major assets 959 Other Undistributed Offsetting Receipts

20

Fig 1. Median Pct C

hange, FY 1948-1995

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 201948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

Fiscal Year

Annual Percentage Change

Fig 2. Median Pct C

hanges, FY 1948-1995

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

Fiscal Year

Percentage Change

Annual Median

Epoch Average

21

Figure 3. Median Pct C

hange, FY 1948-2000

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Fiscal Year

Percentage Change

Annual Median

Epoch Average

Figure 4. Median Pct C

hange, FY 1948-2001

-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Fiscal Year

Percentage Change

Annual Median

Epoch Average

February 2001 Estimate of

FY2001

BA

22

Figure 5. Median Pct Changes, FY 1948-2001

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Fiscal Year

Ann

ual P

erce

ntag

e C

hang

e

Annual Median

Epoch Average

February 2002 Report of Actual FY 2001 BA

23

Table 1. National Defense Budget Authority for Two Periods

In Billions Constant FY 2001 Dollars: Korean Attack and the 9/11 Attack

North Korean Attack Sept 11, 2001 Attack FY

1950 FY

1951 FY

1952 FY

2000 FY

2001 FY

2002 (Est.)

National Defense BA

$99B $317B $361B $311B $329B $343B

Total Natl. Govt. BA

$371B $529B $573B $1,896B $1,988B $2,040B

Natl. Def. as % of Total Govt. BA

27% 60% 63% 16% 17% 17%

Natl. Def. as % of GDP

5.7% 16.4% 17.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.4%

Total Natl. Govt. as % of GDP

21.4% 27.4% 28.4% 19.0% 19.6% 20.1%

Gross Domestic Product

$1.7T $1.9T $2.0T $10.0T $10.2T $10.1T

Sources: Budget authority data compiled by the author and Tables 5.1 & 10.1, FY 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government

24

Table 2. National Defense Budget Authority for Two Periods

In Billions Constant FY 2001 Dollars: War in Vietnam and 9/11 Attack

War in Vietnam War on Terrorism FY

1965 FY

1966 FY

1967 FY

2000 FY

2001 FY

2002 (Est.)

National Defense BA

$241B $300B $327B $311B $329B $343B

Total Natl. Govt. BA

$639B $736B $808B $1,886B $1,988B $2,040B

Natl. Def. as % of Total Govt. BA

38% 41% 41% 16% 17% 17%


7.6% 8.8% 9.2% 3.1% 3.2% 3.4%


20.1% 21.6% 22.7% 19.0% 19.6% 20.1%


$3.2T $3.4T $3.6T $10.0T $10.2T $10.1T

Sources: Budget Authority data compiled by the author and Tables 5.1 & 10.1, FY 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government

25

Table 3. National Government Outlays, Before and After Pearl Harbor

In Current Year Dollars FY 1940 FY 1941 FY 1942 FY 1943 National Defense Outlays

$1,660M $6,435M $25,658M $66,699M

Total Natl. Govt. Outlays

$9,468M $13,653M $35,137M $78,555M

Natl. Def. as % of Outlays

17.5% 47.1% 73.0% 84.9%


1.7% 5.6 17.8 37.0%

Total Natl. Govt. as Pct of GDP

9.8% 12.0% 24.4% 43.6%

Source: Historical Tables 3.1 & 10.1, FY 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government

26

Table 4. National Government Outlays for Two Periods in Current Year

Dollars

Dec 7, 1941 Attack Sept 11, 2001 Attack FY 1940 FY 1941 FY 1942 FY

2000 FY 2001 FY 2002

(Est.) National Defense Outlays

$1,660M $6,435M $25,658M $294.5B $308.5B $348.0B

Total Natl. Govt. Outlays

$9,468M $13,653M $35,137M $1,789B $1,864B $2,052B

Natl. Def. as % of Outlays

17.5 47.1 73.0 16.5 16.6 17.0


1.7 5.6 17.8 3.0 3.0 3.4


9.8 12.0 24.4 18.4 18.4 19.8


$97B $114B $144B $9,744B $10,151B $10,362B

Source: Historical Table 3.1 & 10.1, FY 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government

9/11 and a new epoch in the national...

Documents