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Wireless Security
Ryan HaylesJonathan Hawes
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Introduction
WEP– Protocol Basics– Vulnerability– Attacks– Video
WPA– Overview– Key Hierarchy– Encryption/Decryption
WPA2– Overview– Encryption/Decryption
Dictionary Attack
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WEP Protocol Basics
Based mostly on the RC4 Stream Cipher Single symmetric key CRC checksum to protect integrity
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WEP Vulnerability
Problem: Keystream Reuse
WEP’s Solution: Per Packet IVs
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WEP Vulnerability Cont.
WEP and 802.11 standards recommends (not requires) the IV be changed after every packet.
No standard to generate IVs
IV field is 24 bits, forcing a busy connection to exhaust all IVs in less than a half a day
Random 24 bit IV will be expected to have a collision after transmitting 5000 packets (Birthday Problem)
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WEP Vulnerability Cont.
Consequences:– Keystream for corresponding IV is obtained
– 1500 bytes for each of the 224 possible IVs
– 24GB to construct a full table, which would enable the attacker to immediately decrypt each subsequent ciphertext
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WEP Attacks
The FMS Attack (2001)– First key recovery attack– Base on predictable headers• Attack can compromise the first few bytes
of the keystream• Leads to correlations in other bytes
– 4-6 million packets needed to succeed with probability greater or equal to 50%
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WEP Attacks Cont.
The Korek Attack (2004)– Based on the FMS Attack, but extended with
16 more correlations between the first few bytes of an RC4 key, keystream, and the next key byte.
– Reduced the number of packets needed to 700,00 to succeed with probability greater or equal to 50%
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WEP Attacks Cont.
The PTW Attack (2007)– Extends both FMS and KoreK– Process every packet and cast votes for
likelihood of key– The key is generally close to having the most
votes• Test each key for correctness
– Reduced the number of packets needed to 35,000-40,000 to succeed with probability greater or equal to 50%
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WEP Attacks Cont.
The Chopchop Attack– Allows an attacker to decrypt the last m bytes by sending m * 128 packets to the network.
– Does not reveal the root key
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WPA Overview
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)– Security standard developed after WEP’s
vulnerabilities had been exposed and successfully attacked
– Development was a collaborative effort between the Wi-Fi Alliance and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
– Purpose was to be an immediate solution while the long-term solution (802.11i/WPA2) was being finished
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WPA Overview Cont.
WPA strengthened WEP by:– Including authentication using 802.1X framework
(commercial systems) or a passphrase (home systems)
– Creating a key hierarchy out of the master key– Doubling the size of the initialization vector (IV)
used during encryption– Including a more robust data integrity algorithm
(Michael)
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WPA Overview Cont.
A session consists of:– Authentication of the client to the access point
(802.1X/passphrase)– 4-way handshake to exchange key values and
generate the key hierarchy– Data session to send encrypted information using
the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)• RC4 for encryption• Michael for integrity checking
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WPA Key Hierarchy
Key Hierarchy consists of a master key and session keys– Master key, called the Pair-wise Master Key, is
derived from either an 802.1X key or from the passphrase
– Session keys, collectively called the Pair-wise Transient Key, are derived from the master key
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WPA Key Hierarchy Cont.
Pair-wise Transient Key is segmented into:– Key Confirmation Key and Key Encryption Key
used during the 4-way handshake– Temporal Keys (2) used during the data session
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WPA Encryption
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WPA Decryption
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WPA2 Overview
Wi-Fi Protected Access 2– Security standard developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance
and is an implementation of IEEE’s 802.11i– Uses the same authentication process, 4-way
handshake, and key hierarchy as WPA– Replaces TKIP with the Advance Encryption
Standard (AES) CCMP protocol• AES in Counter-Mode for encryption• AES in Cipher Block Chaining-Message
Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) for integrity checking
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WPA2 Encryption
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WPA2 Decryption
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WPA/WPA2 Attack
Offline Dictionary Attack Overview:– Master key is generated using:
• Passphrase and SSID– Session keys are generated using:
• Master key, MAC address of client, MAC address of access point, nonce from client, and nonce from access point
– Attacker’s goal is to reproduce the key hierarchy to access the network
– Attacker needs to capture SSID, MAC addresses, and nonces and perform a dictionary attack to find the passphrase
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WPA/WPA2 Attack Cont.
Offline Dictionary Attack Capture:– Listen for access point broadcasts
• Recovers SSID– Passively sniff the network for the 4-way
handshake• Recovers MAC address of client, MAC address of
access point, nonce from client, nonce from access point, and a MIC (derived from session key (KCK) and handshake messages)
– Attacker has captured all necessary values and is ready to perform dictionary attack offline
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WPA/WPA2 Attack Cont.
Offline Dictionary Attack Method:– Perform dictionary attack on passphrase to
generate master key using:• Dictionary file (passphrase) and captured SSID
– Generate session keys using:• Master key, captured MAC addresses, and captured
nonces– Generate MIC using:
• Session key (KCK) and captured handshake messages
– Verify MIC against captured MIC• Recovers passphrase and key hierarchy
– Attacker can access the network