8 hadrian gorun

8/10/2019 8 Hadrian Gorun

1/10

Analele Universitii Constantin Brncui din Trgu Jiu, Seria Litere i tiine Sociale, Nr. 2/2008

Annals of the Constantin Brncui University of Trgu Jiu, Series Letters and Social Sciences, No. 2/2008

91

Doctrina Truman (1947)

expresie a politicii de

containmenta

Statelor Unite ale Americii

Hadrian G. Gorun

Dup ncheierea celui de al doilea rzboi

mondial, care s-a soldat cu nfrngereaGermaniei naziste, asistm la o trecere de lamultipolarism la bipolarism n relaiileinternaionale. Cele dou mari puteri,Statele Unite ale Americii i UniuneaSovietic( U. R. S. S. ), - care se vor afirmadupa doua mare conflagraie a lumii- , vormarca evoluiile consemnate n afacerilemondiale dup1945, fiind principalii actoricare vor performa pe scena internaional.Coaliia Naiunilor Unite, care a fiinat pe

parcursul rzboiului a fost perceput dectre mai muli exegei ca nefireasc,ntruct era compus din dou democraiioccidentale veritabile, anume S. U. A. iMarea Britanie, pe de o parte, i un simbolal totalitarismului de stnga, UniuneaSovietic, pe de altparte. Numai dorina iinteresul de a ngenunchea maina de rzboigerman, care prea invincibil, adusese pecele trei puteri cu regimuri complet diferiten aceeai tabr. Dup ndeplinirea

dezideratului comun, zilele alianei deconjuncturerau numrate.

Datorit sectuirii, epuizrii idevastrii n conflict a Angliei i a Franei,la nivel mondial responsabilitile vor fi

preluate aproape integral de ctre S. U. A.i U. R. S. S.. [Milza, P. , Berstein, S. ,

Istoria secolului XX. Lumea ntre rzboi i

pace 1945 - 1973 , Editura Bic ALL,Bucureti, 1998, Traducere Marius Ioan,vol. II, p. 144]. Aadar, coaliia NaiunilorUnite s-a destrmat dup conflictul

Truman Doctrine (1947)

expression of the containment

policy of the United States of

America

Hadrian G. Gorun

After the end of World War II,which resulted in the defeat of NaziGermany, one can assist to a shift from

bipolarism to multipolarism ininternational relations. The two great

powers, United States and the SovietUnion (USSR), - which will distinguishthemselves after the second worldconflagration - will mark the developmentsrecorded in world affairs after 1945, beingthe main actors who will perform on theinternational scene. The Coalition of theUnited Nations, which existed during thewar was seen by several historians asunnatural, since it was composed of twogenuine Western democracies, namely U.S. A. and the United Kingdom, on the onehand and a symbol of leftisttotalitarianism, the Soviet Union, on theother. Only the desire and interest indefeating German war machine, whichseemed invincible, had brought those three

powers with completely different politicalregimes in the same alliance. After thecarrying out of the common desideratumthe days of the alliance were counted.Because of exhaustion and devastation ofEngland and France during the conflict,global responsibilities will be taken overalmost entirely by U. S. A. and U. S. S. R..[Milza, P. , Berstein, S. , History of the XXcentury. The world between war and

peace, 1945 - 1973, Bic ALL Publishing,

Bucharest, 1998, Ion Marius Translation,vol II, p. 144]. So the coalition of the


2/10



92

mondial, cele dou mari puteri situndu-sepe poziii de for. Cuvntarea fostuluiprim-ministru britanic Winston Churchill,inut la 5 martie 1946 la UniversitateaFulton, din Missouri, cunoscut n

istoriografie i ca discursul cortinei de fieri replica liderului sovietic IosifVisarionovici Stalin au marcat originile aceea ce s-a numit rzboiul rece. Churchill s-a artat nelinitit n privinaexpansionismului sovietic, manifestat cu

pregnan prin instalarea unor guvernecomuniste marionete n toate stateleocupate de ctre Armata Roie, ca i nzona sovietica Germaniei. El pleda pentru

perpetuarea alianei dintre S. U. A. i

Commonwealthului britanic, pentru aprentmpina ameninarea potenialreprezentat de sovietci. [Kissinger, H. ,

Diplomaia, Editura BIC ALL, Bucureti,1998, Traducere: Mircea tefancu, RaduParaschivescu, p. 388]. Reacia liderului dela Kremlin nu s-a lsat ateptat, Stalinacuzndu-l pe Churchill c dorete s

provoace un nou rzboi i comparndu-lchiar cu Hitler. [Fontaine, A. , Istoriarzboiului rece. De la Revoluia dinOctombrie la rzboiul din Coreea 1917 1950, Editura Militar, Bucureti, 1992,Ediie ngrijit, traducere i note de GeorgePotra i Delia Rzdolescu, vol . II, pp. 27-28]. Va ncepe o lungperioadde conflictmocnit, n cursul creia au existat i ctevacrize violente, parte din ele periferice,denumite astfel deoarece au avut loc la

periferia sistemului internaional bipolar,cei doi coloi mondiali neconfruntndu-se

n mod direct.Pe scurt, rzboiul rece a reprezentato nfruntare nonmilitar n sensul c nu aexistat un conflict militar de mari proporiii direct ntre cele dou blocuri, celoccidental i democratic, dominat de ctreS. U. A i cel comunist, al crui hegemon afost Uniunea Sovietic. Dar rzboiul rece aavut i conotaie militardacne gndim laasidua cursa narmrilor pe care a generat-o.

Rzboiul rece a antrenat dougrupuri de state cu ideologii i sisteme

United Nations disintegrated after theworld war, the two great powers weresituated on positions of force. The speechof former British Prime Minister WinstonChurchill, held on 5 March 1946 at Fulton

University, Missouri, known inhistoriography as iron curtain speech andthe reply of Soviet leader IosifVisarionovici Stalin marked the origins ofwhat was called Cold War. Churchill wasworried regarding Soviet expansion clearlymanifested through the installation ofcommunist puppet governments in allstates occupied by Red Army, as in theSoviet zone of Germany. He advocated the

perpetuation of the alliance between U. S.

A. and British Commonwealth, to preventthe potential threat represented by SovietUnion. [Kissinger, H. , Diplomacy, BICALL Publishing, Bucharest, 1998,Translation: Mircea tefancu, RaduParaschivescu, p. 388]. Reaction from theKremlin leader has not been waited a longtime. Stalin accused Churchill that hewanted to provoke a new war and evencompared him with Hitler. [Fontaine, A.,

History of the Cold War. From October

Revolution to the war in Korea 1917 -1950, Military Publishing, Bucharest,1992, edition wake, translation and notes

by George and Delia Rzdolescu Potra,vol. II, pp 27-28]. It will begin a long

period of latent conflict, during whichthere were several violent crisis, some ofthem peripherical, named like this becausethey took place at the periphery of bipolarinternational system. There was no direct

confrontation between the two greatpowers of the world.In short, the Cold War represented a

non-military confrontation, in the sensethat there was no direct military conflict

between the two blocks, the Western anddemocratic block, dominated by U. S. Aand the communist one, whose hegemonic

power was the Soviet Union. But the ColdWar had a military character and if wethink of the important arms race.

Cold War has involved two groupsof countries with ideology and political


3/10



93

politice i economice totalmente opuse, pede o parte sistemul occidental, care

promova valorile democratice, diversitateapolitic, pluripartidismul, libertateaindividual, drepturile ceteneti, o

economie bazat pe libera concuren, iarpe de alt parte sistemul comunist, impusde ctre U. R. S. S. democraiilor popularedin Europa Central i de Est, dealtminteristate satelite aduse la supunere prinintermediul dublului proces de sovietizarei satelizare. n acestea din urm,monopartidismul din viaa politic a dus laconfundarea premeditat a partidului custatul. Drepturile individuale eraurespectate doar la modul declarativ n

realitate fiind flagrant nclcate. Asuprapopulaiei greu ncercate de privaiuni,opresiunea, teama i teroarea erauexercitate i ntreinute constant de ctre o

poliie politic, care constituia stlpul dendejde al tuturor regimurilor totalitareindiferent de orientare i care n blocul estica purtat diferite denumiri dar menirea sa eraaceeai ( NKVD i GPU, n U. R. S. S. subStalin; Securitatea Poporului i apoiSecuritatea Statului n Romnia; STASSI nGermania de Est, AVH n Ungaria etc).Sistenul comunist a instituit o economiecentralizat i planificat, de tip nchis,autarhic i etatist, anihilnd prin coerciie

proprietatea i iniiativa privat. nconcepia lui Raymond Aron, ar exista cincielemente principale care definesc regimultotalitar: 1. un partid deine monopolulactivitii politice; 2. partidul monopolisteste animat sau este narmat cu o ideologie,

creia i confer o autoritate absolut icare, prin urmare, devine adevrul oficial alstatului; 3. pentru a rspndi acest adevroficial, statul i rezerv la rndul su undublu monopol, monopolul mijloacelor deconstrngere i pe cel al mijloacelor deconvingere, n vreme ce ansamblulmijloacelor de comunicare, pres, radio,televiziune este condus i comandat dectre stat i de ctre cei care l reprezint; 4.majoritatea activitilor economice i

profesionale sunt controlate de ctre stat,devnind ntr-un fel parte integrant a

and economic systems totally opposed, onthe one hand Western system, which

promoted democratic values, politicaldiversity, more parties in political life,individual freedom, human rights, an

economy based on free competition and onthe other hand, the communist system,imposed by the U. S. S. R. , in fact populardemocraciesof Central and Eastern EuropeHowever, in fact satellite states whichadopted Soviet political and institutional

pattern and were brought to obedience. Inthis kind of states, there was a single

political party and this party meant thestate. Individual rights were respected justtheoretically and declaratory. In reality,

they were flagrantly violated. Theoppression, fear and terror were constantlyexercised and maintained by a political

police, which constituted the useful andtrustful instrument of all totalitarianregimes regardless of orientation. In theEastern block the political police woredifferent names but the way of action wasthe same ( NKVD and GPU, in the USSRunder Stalins rule, People's Security andlater Security of the State or simplySecuritate in Romania; STASSI in EastGermany, AVH in Hungary etc.). TheCommunist system has set up a centralized

planned economy, a closed, autarchic,using coercion to annihilate ownership and

private initiative. In the design ofRaymond Aron, there are five mainelements that define the totalitarianregime: 1. party holds monopoly of

political activity; 2. monopolist party is

animated or is armed with an ideology,which gives it an absolute authority andwhich, therefore, the truth becomes theofficial truth of the state; 3. to spread thisofficial truth, the state reserves a doublemonopoly, the monopoly of the means ofcoercion and the means of persuasion,while the entire means of communication,

press, radio, television are headed andordered by the state and by those whorepresent the state; 4. most professional

and economic activities are controlled bystate becoming in a way an integral part of


4/10



94

statului, iar dat fiind faptul c statul esteinseparabil de ideologia sa, aceste activitisunt parte integranta adevrului oficial; 5.dat fiind c orice activitate va deveniactivitate de stat i fiindc va fi supus

ideologiei, o eroare comis n cadrul uneiactiviti economice i profesionale estesimultan o greeal ideologic, de aicirezultnd o politizare, o transfigurareideologic a tuturor erorilor posibile aleindivizilor i prin urmare, o teroare att

poliieneasc ct i ideologic. [Aron, R. ,Democraie i totalitarism, Editura AllEducational, Bucureti, 2001, Traducere deSimona Ceauu, pp. 212 213]. RaymondAron definete n antitez cele dou tipuri

de regimuri, democratice, specifice bloculuivestic i totalitare specifice bloculuisovietic: pe de o parte, avem concurena,constituionalismul, pluralismul grupurilorsociale i statul partidelor, iar pe de alt

parte, monopolul, revoluia, absolutismulbirocratic i statul partizan, care mai estedenumit i statul ideologic. [Carpinschi, A., Doctrine politice contemporane, EdituraMoldova, Iai, 1992, p. 55 56].

Aadar, rzboiul rece s-a desfuratpe trm politic, economic, ideologic, alcursei narmrilor. La 22 februarie 1946,George F. Kennan, nsrcinatul cu afaceri alAmbasadei Statelor Unite la Moscova arealizat o amplanaliza politicii sovietice,documentul intitulat n mod sugestiv LongTelegram fiind unul dintre actelefundamentale ce contureazcadrele politiciide containment, care ad -literam ar nsemna

stvilire, ndiguire, barare. Washingtonul

avea ca misiune stvilirea expansiuniicomunismului de tip sovietic. PotrivitTelegramei Lungi a diplomatului american,

politica extern sovietic i avea surseleadnci n nsi sistemul sovietic, fiind unamalgam de zel ideologic comunist iexpansionism arist de mod veche. Stalin

privea puterile occidentale ca iremediabilostile. Din timpuri imemoriale, Imperiularist rus a urmrit s i extindteritoriul.Au ncercat s i impun i s

permanentizeze dominaia asupra Poloniei.Petrogradul a considerat Bulgaria n sfera

the state, and given that the state isinseparable from its ideology, theseactivities are an integral part of the officialtruth, 5. Given that any activity will

become activity of state and will be subject

of ideology, an error committed as part ofan economic and professional activity issimultaneously an ideological mistake,resulting in a politicizing, an ideologicaltransfiguration of all possible errors ofindividuals and consequently, a terror both

police and ideological. [Aron, R. ,Democracy and totalitarianism, AllEducational Publishing House, Bucharest,2001, Translated by Simona Ceauu, pp212 to 213]. Raymond Aron defined

antithetically the two types of regimes,democratic, western and that specific tototalitarian Soviet Bloc: on the one hand,we have competition, constitutionalism,

pluralism of social groups and state parties,and on the other hand, monopoly,revolution, bureaucratic absolutism and the

partisan state, which are also known as theideological one. [Carpinschi, A. , Thecontemporary political Doctrine,Publishing Moldova, Iasi, 1992, p. 55 to56].

Thus, the Cold War had a political,economic, ideological character. On 22February 1946, George F. Kennan therepresentative with business of the UnitedStates Embassy in Moscow has made anextensive analysis of Soviet policy. Thedocument called the Long Telegram issuggestive because it frameworks thecontainment policy that would mean

stvilire, ndiguire, barare. The authoritiesfrom Washington had the mission tocontain the expansion of Soviet - stylecommunism. According to Long Telegramof the U.S. diplomat, Soviet foreign policyhad its sources deep in the Soviet systemitself, being an amalgam of communistideology and old - fashioned tsaristexpansionism. Stalin considered Western

powers as irremediably hostile. Fromimmemorial time, Russian Empire of the

tsars has sought to expand its territory. Ittried to impose and make eternal its


5/10



95

sa de influen[Kissinger, H. , op. cit., pp.393 394] i a cutat sobin autoritateaasupra unor puncte strategice precumStrmtorile Bosfor i Dardanele i oraulConstantinopol, fosta capital a Imperiului

Otoman. Autoritile americane trebuiau sfie pregtite pentru o lupt dificil i deuzur, ntruct obiectivele i principiilecelor dou superputeri ale sistemuluiinternaional nu se puteau pune n vreun felde acord.

Un document nc i maisemnificativ pentru teoretizareaconceptului de containment a fost articolul

publicat n 1947 n revista Foreign Affairsi semnat X, autorul su fiind de fapt

acelai George Kennan. Articolul s-aintitulat The Sources of Soviet Conduct, ncare explic faptul c ostilitatea fa dedemocraii era inerent naturii structuriiinterne sovietice n faa creia politicileconciliatorii occidentale erau lipsite deeficien. ( Ibidem, pp. 398-399). n opinialui Kennan, care n calitate de fost diplomatla Moscova luase contact la faa locului icunotea realitile sovietice, elementul

principal al ntregii politici americane fade U. R. S. S. trebuie s fie o ndiguire petermen lung, rbdtoare dar ferm iurmrind cu atenie tendinele expansionisteale Uniunii Sovietice. Acesteia era necesars i se opun o puternic for n orice

punct n care i vor arta semnele voineide a nclca interesele unei lumi panice istabile. ( Boniface, P. , Relaii Est Vest1945 1991, Institutul European, Iai,1999, p. 13. ) Aadar, prin doctrina de

containment, S. U. A. nu vor ncerca s-iforeze pe sovietici s se retrag din rilesovietizate i satelizate. Uniunea Sovietictrebuia mpiedicat s i extind influenai n alte zone importante. Prin urmare,misiunea Statelor Unite era aceea de a seopune oricrui nou progres sovietic subaspectul influenei politice.

Rzboiul civil din Grecia, n care s-au confruntat forele comuniste i celeregaliste, - susinute de ctre armata

englez- , a stat la baza doctrinei Truman [Fontaine, A. , op. cit. , p. 46], cea dinti

domination over Poland. Petrogradconsidered Bulgaria in its sphere ofinfluence [Kissinger, H. , op. cit. , pp. 393to 394] and sought to gain authority oversome strategic points such as Straits Bosfor

and Dardanelles and the city ofConstantinople, the capital of the formerOttoman Empire. The U.S. had to be

prepared for a difficult and wear fight,since the objectives and principles of thetwo superpowers of the internationalsystem could not put in any kind ofagreement.

A document even more significantto explain concept of containment was anarticle published in 1947 inForeign Affairs

review. This article was signed X, but itsauthor was actually the same GeorgeKennan. Kennan entitled the article TheSources ofSoviet Conduct, which explainsthe fact that hostility towards democracywas inherent in the nature of Sovietinternal structure before which theconciliators Western policies were lackingefficiency. (Ibid, pp 398-399). As adiplomat in Moscow, Kennan was the manwho knew the best Soviet realities. Theelement of the entire U. S. policy towardsU. S. S. R. had to be a long - termcontainment, patient but firm and watchingcarefully expansionist trends of the SovietUnion. It was necessary to oppose toRussians a strong power "at any point inwhich they will show signs of willingnessto violate the interests of a peaceful andstable world." (Boniface, P. , Westrelations - West 1945 - 1991, The

European Institute, Iai , 1999, p. 13.)Thus, S. U. A. will not try to force theSoviets to withdraw from the countrieswhich were in their spheres of influence.Soviet Union had to be prevented fromexpanding their influence in otherimportant areas. Therefore, the mission ofthe United States was to oppose any newextension of Soviet political influence.

Civil war from Greece, in whichCommunist and royal forces were

involved- the latter backed by the Englisharmy- , constituted the base for Truman


6/10



96

manifestare pe continentul european apoliticii americane de ndiguire, confruntatcu tendina de extindere a comunismului.Comunitii au fost sprijinii de ctre uneledin statele satellite ale Moscovei precum

Bulgaria, Iugoslavia i Albania.n S. U. A. , evoluiile n plan internpreau favorabile desfurrii unei politiciexterne mai enrgice. n ianuarie 1947,secretarul de stat James Byrnes a fostnlocuit de ctre generalul George Marshall.[ Duroselle, J. B. ,Histoire diplomatique de1919 nos jours, Paris, 2001, p. 467]. inoul preedinte al S. U. A. , Harry Trumannlocuitorul lui Franklin Delano Rooseveltncdin 1945 s-a dovedit a fi mult mai activ

n domeniul extern i foarte important, maipuin concesiv i mai intransigent dectpredecesorul su. Peter Calvocoresi afirmc prin doctrina Truman Statele Unite au

preluat rolul Marii Britanii de a sprijiniGrecia i Turcia i l-au raionalizat ntermeni anticomuniti. [Calvocoresi, P. ,

Politica mondialdup1945, Editura Allfa,Bucureti, 2000, p. 198]. Totodat, deciziadin martie 1947 de sprijinire material aGreciei i Turciei, cunoscutdrept doctrinaTruman, a anticipat planul Marshall derefacere a economiei europene cu fonduriamericane, care a survenit la doar trei lunimai trziu i care s-a nscris n aceleaidemersuri de a evita ca Europa de Vest scadpradcomunismului.

La sfritul anului 1946 i lanceputul lui 1ui 1947, Marea Britaniedispunea n Grecia de un numr de 40.000de oameni i care furniza att guvernului de

la Atena ct i celui de la Ankara opreioas asisten de factur militar ifinanciar. n februarie 1947, americanii i

britanicii s-au pus de acord cdin punct devedere militar i strategic, Grecia i Turcianu ar trebui lsate s intre n sfera deinfluena Moscovei. [www. trumanlibrary.org, Summary of telegrams from Greece,Poland and the USSR, February 25, 1947].

Curnd, Cabinetul englez a adus lacunotina Washingtonului c n scurt timp

va fi obligat srenune la programul su deajutorare financiar i economic a Greciei

doctrine [Fontaine, A. , op. cit. , p. 46],which was the first manifestation of theAmerican containment policy on theEuropean continent. It faced the expansionof Communism. The Communists were

supported by some of Moscow's satelliteStates, as Bulgaria, Yugoslavia andAlbania.

In U. S. A. , internal developmentsseemed favourable to deployment of aforeign policy more determined. In January1947, Secretary of State James Byrnes wasreplaced by General George Marshall.[Duroselle, J. B. ,Histoire diplomatique de1919 nosjours, Paris, 2001, p. 467]. Thenew president of the U. S. A. , Harry

Truman, who replaced Franklin DelanoRoosevelt in 1945, proved to be moreactive in the field of external and veryimportantly, more intransigent than his

predecessor. Peter Calvocoresi states thatthe United States took over the role of theUnited Kingdom to help Greece andTurkey and they have rationalized it in anti- Communist terms. [Calvocoresi, P. , TheWorld Politics after 1945, AllfaPublishing, Bucharest, 2000, p. 198].Meanwhile, the decision of March 1947which provided material support to Greeceand Turkey, known as Truman Doctrine,anticipated the Marshall plan for recoveryof European economy with U.S. funds.This plan, adopted three months later

joined the actions designed to avoid thefall of the Western Europe underCommunist rule.

At the end of 1946 and early in

1947, the UK had a number of 40,000people in Greece and provided a valuablemilitary and financial assistance to thegovernment from Athens and Ankara. InFebruary 1947, Americans and Britishwere put agree that from military andstrategic point of view, Greece and Turkeyshould not be allowed to enter the sphereof influence of Moscow. [ www.trumanlibrary. org, Summary of telegramsfrom Greece, Poland and the USSR,

February 25, 1947].Soon, the English Cabinet brought


7/10



97

i c trupele sale vor fi retrase ncepnd culuna martie 1947. n aceste condiii,Secretarul de Stat al SUA, generalul GeorgeMarshall, a primit un apel disperat din

partea cabinetului grec, apel care solicita

asisten financiar, economic i experiamericani. n opinia Atenei, ajutorulamerican era vital pentru ca independenastatal a Greciei s fie prezervat. Greciareclama de urgen sprijinul american din

pricina lipsei stringente pe care populaiacivil o resimea n privina alimentelor,combustibilului i mbrcmintei. Obinereaacestor bunuri era indispensabil pentruinstaurarea linitii i securitii interne,condiie sine qua non a refacerii economice

i politice. Mai mult, autoritile greceti aureclamat din partea S. U. A. un personaladministrativ, economic i tehnicspecializat. [Idem, Suggested Draft of thePresidents message to the Congress on theGreek Situation, March 7, 1947]. Anglia nua mai fost n msurssusinnici suportuleconomic i financiar al Turciei apelnd laS. U. A. i n privina acestei ri.

Grecia i Turcia constituiau teritoriicu importan geo-strategic sporit, iarsituaia dificil a Greciei a fost accentuatdin pricina instabilitii politice interne.

De aceea, preedintele americanHarry Truman cerea Congresului s ofereexecutivului suficient autoritate pentru aextinde ajutorul i asupra Turciei. [Ibidem].

Nevoia punerii n practic a politicii destvilire se fcea simit aadar i n

privina Turciei, o ar aflat nproximitatea Greciei din punct de vedere

geografic. Am putea afirma c avem de aface n acest sens cu ncercarea de punere npractica unei teorii a dominoului avant lalettre, teorie enunat ulterior de JohnFoster Dulles i aplicat n cazulPeninsulei Indochina. Teoria dominoului

preciza c intrarea unui stat sub controlsovietic putea antrena cderea unui alt statvecin sub influena Moscovei, precum

piesele unui joc de domino. Tocmai deaceea, cucerirea puterii de ctre comuniti

n Grecia putea avea repercusiuni negativen ceea ce privete Turcia i Orientul

to the attention of Washington that shortlySoon, the Cabinet English brought to theattention of Washington that will shortly

be forced to give up its program offinancial and economic aid to Greece and

that its troops will be withdrawn sinceMarch 1947. In these circumstances, theSecretary of State of the U.S. GeneralGeorge Marshall, had received a desperatecall from the Greek cabinet, call requestingfinancial, economic assistance andAmerican experts. In the opinion ofAthens, American aid was vital for the

preservation of the Greek independence.Greece asked an immediate assistance

because of the lack of food, fuel and

clothing. Getting these goods was essentialfor the establishment of peace and internalsecurity, a sine qua non condition ofeconomic and political recovery.Furthermore, the Greek authorities havecomplained about the U. S. A.administrative, economic and technicalexperts. [Idem, Suggested Draft of thePresident's message to the Congress on theGreek Situation, March 7, 1947]. Englandwas not any longer able to sustaineconomic and financial support of Turkeycalling on U. S. A. in this country too.

Greece and Turkey constitutedterritories with increased geo-strategicimportance, and the difficult situation ofGreece has been accentuated because ofinternal political instability.

Therefore, U.S. President HarryTruman asked Congress to provide enoughauthority to executive to extend aid for

Turkey. [Ibid]. The need to implement thepolicy of containment was also feltregarding Turkey, a country locatedgeographically in the proximity of Greece.One could say that there is an attempt to

put into practice a theory of domino beforethe letter, the theory set out later by JohnFoster Dulles and applied in case ofIndochina Peninsula. The theory of domino

predict that the entry of a state underSoviet control could lead to the fall of

another neighboring state under theinfluence of Moscow, such as parts of a


8/10



98

Apropiat, iar S. U. A. , prototip aldemocraiei occidentale aveau datoria s seopun prin susinerea material a rilorsusceptibile sintre n orbita Kremlinului.

Dup cum apreciaz Henry

Kissinger [Kissinger, H. , op. cit. , p. 397]n discursul su adresat Congresului,preedintele Truman are o viziunewilsonian asupra realitilor punnd nopoziie dou moduri de via, un mod devia bazat pe voina majoritii, instituiilibere, guvern reprezentativ, libertateaexprimrii i a religiei, dreptul de rezistenla opresiunea politic. Cellalt mod de viaeste fundamentat pe impunerea voinei uneiminoriti asupra majoritii, pe controlul

presei i a altor mijloace de comunicare dectre o minoritate, pe teroare i peoprimare. Erau aadar puse n evidencteva dintre caracteristicile primordiale aleregimurilor democratice, deosebite completde cele ale regimurilor totalitare de extremastng. Harry Truman a acuzat UniuneaSovieticde nclcarea promisiunii asumatela Ialta cu privire la organizarea de alegerilibere i corecte i crearea de instituii iguverne democratice i reprezentative nrile aflate n sfera sa de influen. Numaic noiunile de democraie i democraticerau percepute complet diferit la Moscovai la Washington. Statele Unite, socotea

preedintele Truman, trebuiau s susinpopoarele libere care rezist tentativelor desubjugare ale unor minoriti sau

presiunilor din afar[...]. Cred ctrebuie sajutm popoarele libere s i cldeascdestinele dup cum doresc. [ www.

trumanlibrary.org, Rough Draft of thePresidents message to Congress in regardto Greece, March 9, 1947]. Pe de altparte,considera c srcia, mizeria i foameteaconstituiau terenul propice pe care se

puteau dezvolta germenii totalitarismului.Doctrina Truman, expus

Congresului american n 12 martie 1947,preconiza acordarea unui ajutor de 250milioane de dolari Greciei i 150 milioanede dolari Turciei. Cele dou camere vor

vota cu o largmajoritate proiectul de lege,iar ulterior, la 22 mai 1947, preedintele

game of dominoes. That is why, theconquest of power by the Communists inGreece could have negative repercussionsregarding Turkey and the Near East. U. S.A. , the prototype of Western democracy

had a duty to oppose by supporting thecountries susceptible to enter orbit ofKremlin.

As Henry Kissinger appreciates[Kissinger, H. , op. cit. , p. 397] in hisspeech addressed to Congress, PresidentTruman has an wilsonian vision of therealities because he put in opposition twoways of life, a way of life based on the willof the majority, free institutions,representative government, freedom of

expression and religion, the right to resistpolitical oppression. The other way of lifeis founded on the imposing of the will of aminority over the majority, the control ofthe press and of other means ofcommunication by a minority, terror andoppression. Some of the primarycharacteristics of democratic regimes weretherefore emphasized, being completelydistinct of those of totalitarian regimes ofthe left extreme. Harry Truman accusedSoviet Union because it did not respect the

promises assumed at Yalta, regarding theorganization of free and fair elections andthe creation of democratic institutions andrepresentative governments in thecountries from its sphere of influence. Butthese concepts of democracy anddemocratic were perceived differently inMoscow and in Washington. The UnitedStates, as President Truman considered,

"had to support free peoples which resistattempts of domination of minorities oroutside pressures [...]. I think we shouldassist free peoples to build their destiniesas they wish."[www. trumanlibrary. org,Rough Draft of the President's message toCongress in regard to Greece, March 9,1947]. On the other hand, he consideredthat poverty, hunger and dirt constituted

proper land that could grow germstotalitarianism.

Truman Doctrine, exposed to U.S.Congress on 12 th March 1947, foresaw an


9/10



99

promulga legea care aeza Statele Unite navangarda luptei anticomuniste n lume. Cutoatinfuzia puternicde capital i materialamerican, rzboiul civil n Grecia nu ancetat din pricina micrii de guerill a

rebelilor comuniti pn la nceputul lui1948, cnd Stalin a neles c nu juca ocarte ctigtoare i a ordonat autoritiloriugoslave spuncapt oricrui sprijin. Unan mai trziu, naltul comandament alarmatei regale, organizat cu strnsacolaborare a misiunii militare americane,condusde ctre generalul Van Fleet, va fiinvestit cu puteri excepionale.Conductorul iugoslav Iosip Broz Tito,anatemizat ntre timp de ctre Cominform,

a decis n iulie 1948 nchiderea frontierei isistarea definitiv a ajutoarelor pentruinsurgenii de extrem stnga, care vorcapitula n 1949, unii dintre ei refugiindu-sen Bulgaria i Albania. ( Fontaine, A. , op.cit., pp. 51-53; Duroselle, J. B. , op. cit., p.468)

Doctrina Truman reprezint ceadinti i una dintre cele mai semnificativemanifestri ale politicii americane decontainment, care se va aplica i pecontinentul asiatic n timpul rzboiului dinCoreea ( 1950 1953).

Abstract: Trumans Doctrine

(1947) expression of the containment

policy of the United

States of America

Trumans Doctrine is the first andone of the most important manifestations ofthe containment policy of the United States

of America. U. S. A. wanted to prevent themarch of the Communism in Europe and inthe world. George Kennan was the authorof the theory of containment, explained inhis Long Telegram and in his article calledThe Sources of Soviet Conduct. TrumansDoctrine stipulated a financial and materialaid for Greece and Turkey. These twocountries had to resist the trials of theCommunists to reach the power. TheAmerican president said there were two

completely different ways of life: one wayof life was based upon the will of the

aid of 250 million U.S. dollars for Greeceand an aid of 150 million U.S. dollars toTurkey. The two Chambers of theCongress will vote with a large majoritythe draft bill, and subsequently on 22 May

1947, the President promulgated the lawwhich placed the United States in thevanguard of the fight against Communism.Despite the infusion of American moneyand material the American civil war inGreece is not terminated because of themovement of guerilla of the communistrebels until early 1948. Then Stalinunderstood that he did not play a winningcard and ordered authorities fromYugoslavia to give up any support. A year

later, the high command of the royal army,organized with the close collaboration ofU.S. military mission, led by General VanFleet, will be invested with exceptional

powers. Yugoslav Leader Iosip Broz Tito,meanwhile condemned by Cominform,decided in July 1948 closure of the borderand final stop aid to insurgents of leftextreme, which will surrender in 1949. Afew of them went in Bulgaria and Albania.(Fontaine, A., op. cit., pp 51-53; Duroselle,JB, op. cit., p. 468).

Truman Doctrine is the first andone of the most significant manifestationsof the U.S. containment policy, which will

be also applied on the Asian continentduring the Korean War (1950 to 1953).

Abstract: Trumans Doctrine

(1947) expression of the containment

policy of the United

States of AmericaTrumans Doctrine is the first andone of the most important manifestations ofthe containment policy of the United Statesof America. U. S. A. wanted to prevent themarch of the Communism in Europe and inthe world. George Kennan was the authorof the theory of containment, explained inhis Long Telegram and in his article calledThe Sources of Soviet Conduct. TrumansDoctrine stipulated a financial and material

aid for Greece and Turkey. These twocountries had to resist the trials of the


10/10



100

majority, being distinguished by freeinstitutions, representative government, freeelections, guarantees of individual liberty,freedom of speech and religion and freedomfrom political oppression. The second way

of life was based upon the will of aminority forcibly imposed upon themajority. It relied upon terror andoppression, a controlled press and radio,fixed elections and the suppression of

personal freedoms.

Communists to reach the power. TheAmerican president said there were twocompletely different ways of life: one wayof life was based upon the will of themajority, being distinguished by free

institutions, representative government, freeelections, guarantees of individual liberty,freedom of speech and religion and freedomfrom political oppression. The second wayof life was based upon the will of aminority forcibly imposed upon themajority. It relied upon terror andoppression, a controlled press and radio,fixed elections and the suppression of

personal freedoms.

8 hadrian gorun

Documents