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European Security

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Not another ‘grand strategy’: what prospects forthe future European security strategy?

Ion Berindan

To cite this article: Ion Berindan (2013) Not another ‘grand strategy’: what prospectsfor the future European security strategy?, European Security, 22:3, 395-412, DOI:10.1080/09662839.2013.808189

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.808189

Published online: 12 Nov 2013.

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Not another ‘grand strategy’: what prospects for the future Europeansecurity strategy?

Ion Berindan*

European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj, Romania

(Received 19 November 2012; final version received 21 May 2013)

The article advocates that the current proposals for a new European securitystrategy aim to a similar or even more ambitious strategy than the original 2003one, calling in effect for a European ‘grand strategy’ in world affairs. Taking intoaccount the original aims and consequent results of the initial European securitystrategy and related documents, it argues that the European Union (EU) was notand is still not prepared to undertake a security project of such scope due tosevere limitations in terms of structure, capabilities and learning curve, now andin the near future. Rather than insisting with an approach that produced verylittle, the EU should abandon the traits of a grand strategy in favour of a morerealistic and restrained project that could focus on security matters in itsneighbourhood including the problematic Russian and Turkish issues whilerelying on better transatlantic relations and true multilateralism.

Keywords: European security strategy; grand strategy; European security

In 2011 a group of researchers from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs

engaged in a comprehensive analysis on the future prospects of a new European

Security Strategy (ESS) (Andersson et al. 2011). In their view, the time was ripe for a

new ESS based on several arguments: a new European Union (EU) budget cycle, the

review of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 10th anniversary of

the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP). Furthermore, the analysis has

pointed out to the changes in the European and transatlantic security policies and

the institutional transformations that followed the Lisbon Summits of 2010. A

similar case is made by Margriet Drent and Lennart Landman a year later in one of

the Clingendael Policy Briefs (Drent and Landman 2012). According to Drent and

Landman (2012, p. 2), the 2003 ESS is outdated, unable to connect threats and has

blurry ends and means. However, when probing such an idea on Brussels’ corridors a

drive in the opposite direction becomes apparent. Arguments like ‘we are tired of

talking strategy’ and ‘don’t open a can of worms’ seem to prevail on certain euro-

offices advocating restraint. They operate under the premise that strategy would be

better devised in periods of reflection rather than in the heat of the crisis (Andersson

et al. 2011, p. 8). Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign

Affairs and Security, questioned the ‘wisdom of producing more paper and stressed

the need to deliver’ (Drent and Landman 2012, p. 1). There are voices backing

Ashton’s comment favouring actions over words. Many still believe achievable the

*Email: ionberindan@gmail.com

European Security, 2013

Vol. 22, No. 3, 395�412, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.808189

# 2013 Taylor & Francis

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goals set in the original ESS and want to implement what was agreed upon rather

than come up with new strategic thinking (Andersson et al. 2011, p. 7). However,

digging in around a strategy already questioned by the European Council’s 2008

Report on the Implementation of the European security strategy (RIESS) would

prove counterproductive. At the same time, finding a common strategic ground in

times of crisis among a significantly increased number of countries seems very

unlikely. Keeping in mind the efforts undertaken in 2003 to reach a consensus, a newESS should command a certain degree of cautiousness. Anand Menon goes even

farther calling the ‘need for a new strategy . . . not merely unproductive, but

counterproductive’ considering a document agreed by all 27 member states to be

‘flaccid and couched in generalities’ (Menon 2012).

Nevertheless, there is a general feel, inside the academia and European policy

think-tanks, that beyond timeliness and opportunity, a new ESS is essential not only

for the future European security and defense policies but for the very perception of

the EU as a political and security actor on a global scale. The Union has assumed in

2003 a set of responsibilities in the fields of human development and security,

counter-terrorism or drug smuggling and an iteration of its commitment for a ‘better

world’ would be beneficial. To achieve this ultimate purpose several courses of

actions were suggested: reinvigorate, revise or reinvent (Andersson et al. 2011),

reviewing and completing (Silvestri 2008, Biscop 2011) or imitating (Drent and

Landman 2012). Ultimately, each carry value and may prove beneficial for the

process of devising a new security document. At this stage it is important to have asmany outlooks as possible. Since the suggestions tend to cover ‘all corners’ it would

be difficult not to. They are all pointing towards making the old, or a new, ESS work

and deliver.

What surfaces from these possible approaches though, beyond the different

solutions proposed, is the perception of the ESS as a ‘grand strategy’ document.

Both officials and analysts seem to be caught by the mirage of a European grand

strategy to measure up with EU ambitions at the global scale. Sven Biscop sees the

ESS ‘operating at grand strategic level . . . in grand strategic framework’ (Biscop

2011, p. 4). One year later, Biscop calls for a European ‘grand strategy’ altogether

(Biscop 2012). Drent and Landman include the very definition of grand strategy in

their recommendations ‘A new European security strategy should be forward looking

and prioritise among interests, threats, partners and tie them to the capabilities

needed for influencing outcomes’ (Drent and Landman 2012, p. 5). Stefano Silvestri

considers that in order for the EU be a security actor it needs ‘a credible global

security strategy (that) should therefore be assessed not only in terms of intentions

but of capabilities as well’ (Silvestri 2008, p. 10), again another vision of a grandstrategy. Finally, Andersson et al. openly suggest grand strategy as a third alternative

to reinvent the ESS, possibly starting from a ‘blank slate’ (Andersson et al. 2011,

p. 31). This trend may even gather momentum as the analysts cited are highly

regarded specialists in European security and foreign affairs matters with significant

contributions in the field.

However, before embarking onto an approach of this magnitude it would be wise

to consider or reconsider some of the initial premises. World power is not an abstract

concept. It defines the ability, not necessarily the willingness, of a state to impose its

will alone when and where its interests dictate without the need for outside help. It

can shape, single handed, the international security situation in a way that affects

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others significantly. It can ultimately ignore the international community or make

pay dearly the states or institutions challenging its actions. In the case of the US

willingness to impose change is evident. Their last several grand strategies underline

how the world is today and how it should look like in the future.Some countries like the US and Russia reasserted their status acting in Iraq and

Georgia. Other states are considered susceptible of a similar status. China is the best

candidate but has yet to prove its willingness and capabilities to act like one. Is the

EU qualifying for the status of world power? Certainly not. It does not have the

willingness to act alone as self-imposed multilateralism would prevent it and, most

certainly, does not have the capabilities to do so. Why then a ‘grand strategy’? What

purpose can a ‘grand strategy’ serve for an EU that is still not better than the sum of

its parts?The paper argues that a ‘grand strategy’ for the EU would be premature today

and in the near future. It contends that the EU is still a power in the making and the

process is susceptible to continue for a significant period of time. Consequently,

instead of devising a grand strategy for what it is considered a well-established global

power, the future European security document should focus on the steps to be taken

so that it has an honest chance to become one, placing the emphasis on internal

transformation and not outside interference. Devising a ‘grand strategy’ without

being a great power is superfluous. Reaching the status of world power without aseries of clearly defined security strategies is difficult. In the current state of

liminality the EU needs regular reassessment of its security policies � through regular

ESS documents that set clear goals and milestones � for a successful passage to world

power status (and capabilities). This much-needed time frame would also allow for

strengthening and refining a common security culture, alas almost absent today.

Therefore, developing a new ESS should transcend the questions of timeliness and

opportunity and focus on the goals and means to achieve it.

A grand strategy for Europe � the 2003 ESS

There are significant differences between strategy and grand strategy, particularly in

scope and means. A ‘grand strategy’ means going beyond the military realm to

include the expression of power in the sphere of economy and finance, technology

and diplomacy in times of peace is the most important one. It is an approach that has

developed over time. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s definition focused mainly on

wartimes, considering that the grand strategy’s role was to ‘co-ordinate and direct allthe resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political

object of the war’ (Liddell Hart 1991, p. 322). The understanding of grand strategy

has evolved to include several interpretations pertaining to both peace and war. For

Peter Feaver, Chair of the American Grand Strategy Programme at Duke University,

grand strategy should blend history and political science, public policy and

economics. Colin Gray considers grand strategy to be the ‘purposeful employment

of all instruments of power available to a security community’ (Gray 2007, p. 283).

Probably the most comprehensive interpretation comes from Joe Bassani’s definition,a more modern and refined interpretation of ends and means, set in a distinct reality,

which completes the meaning of strategic thinking: ‘grand strategy provides the

linkage between national goals and actions by establishing a deliberately ambiguous

vision of the world as we would like it to be (ends) and the methods (ways) and

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resources (means) we will employ in pursuit of that vision’ (Bassani 2005 p. 10).

Bassani’s interpretation derives from the American pursuit for a new world order, a

before and after, vision that successively appears in NSS in latest years. American

strategic discourse consistently speaks of the world ‘as it is’ and the way ‘it shouldbe’, the very essence of grand strategy. The ESS follows the same rationale and

consequently similar patterns have emerged.

Considering the above, one can easily identify the ‘grand strategy’ approach of

the ESS. The first European strategic document specifically calls for increased

capabilities, military, civilian and diplomatic in order to address the threats identified

(Council of the European Union 2003, p. 12). This approach bears the marks of

grand strategy as envisaged by Liddell Hart. The ESS talks about ‘more resources for

defense and more effective use of resources’. Liddell Hart underlines the need for‘grand strategy to calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power’.

The ESS points out to values of democracy and human rights. Liddell Hart

emphasises the moral dimension and the positives of a ‘good cause’. The ESS

advocates stronger diplomatic capability and a consolidation of national and

European diplomatic efforts. Liddell Hart speaks as well about diplomatic and

financial pressure. Finally, and essentially, the ESS constructs a specific vision of the

future and the steps Europe has to take to get there, much as Bassani’s personal

interpretation. Looking side by side, the ESS bears both the features of LiddellHart’s and Bassani’s interpretation like all the grand strategies of today do. However,

different ends lead to different means. In the case of the ESS the ends have

substantially contributed to the development of a rather controversial development.

Doing the right thing for the wrong reasons? � the ESS in context

It is important to understand how the ESS evolved into a ‘grand strategy ‘document.

One political analyst was pointing out in a report back in February 2002 that the EUsecurity policies between 1998 and 2001 have witnessed a process of ‘Brusselsisation’

(Bono 2002, p. 44). The report draws attention that decisions were not the outcome

of a grand political and military strategy but rather the product of a series of ad hoc

reactions to the Kosovo war, to domestic and international pressures kick-started by

the Saint Malo Summit. In December 1998 a new direction in European security was

taking course: ‘the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for

analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic

planning’ (Franco-British Saint Malo Declaration 1998). However, the Kosovo crisiswas soon to be followed by another one that would test the strength of the

transatlantic ties. The 9/11 attacks imposed a completely new set of criteria for

assessing international threats taking center stage over the Balkans crisis and its

particulars. Following a sequence of tragic events the EU, caught off guard twice, has

been pushed to assume an international stance and to act accordingly. If before the

terrorist attacks in 2001 the EU was preparing for addressing future crisis by

strengthening their military capabilities, soon after it was redirecting much of its

attention to terrorism and transnational crime.The turning point in European security policy has been marked by the second

War with Iraq. The US lost most of the sympathy triggered by the 9/11 attack in a

quite short time span. Moreover, it handled its European allies carelessly in the

months preceding the intervention. The Bush administration turned with a

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vengeance against Saddam Hussein’s regime in utter disregard for international law

or any other actors and interests in the region be they friend or foe. George W. Bush’s

unilateralism added significant tensions to an already delicate situation. The

American blunt division of Europe in an old and a new one only added insult to

injury, enough for the French president to remark caustically that the Central and

Eastern countries lost a great opportunity to keep their mouth shut right before the

largest enlargement of the Union. Essentially the Iraq crisis became the source forone of the major rifts in the history of the transatlantic security community. In an

effort to mend fences Javier Solana announced officially the ESS in late 2003.

This sequence of events contributed significantly in shaping the ESS into more of

a ‘grand strategy’ document, in close tune with the US vision. The ESS has been a

product of a series of reactions to outside threats and events indirectly related to the

EU. In fact, rallying Europeans around a common security agenda, that would cater

American security interests as well, severely diminished the efforts focused on a

genuinely European strategic project. The ESS borrowed significantly from the

American 2002 national security strategy (NSS), particularly by identifying similar

threats, a strategy devised in a time of crisis and institutional transformation. The

2002 NSS was designed to take into account the newly established Department of

Homeland Security, an umbrella under which American security agencies were to

combat terrorism. Unfortunately the ESS has mimicked in part a document aimed at

rebuilding the confidence of the most powerful nation in the world according to a

strategic culture build over the last 50 years (Greathouse and Miner 2009, p. 2).The ESS included references to terrorism and asymmetric threats much similar to

the NSS. However, it did not manage to brush off completely the ‘superpower’ tone

present in the NSS, appearing to assume, as the US, a leading role in the

international security arena. The ESS states that ‘the EU is inevitably a global

player’ (ESS, p. 1). Unavoidability does not equal capability and a misjudged sense of

duty should not have let the ESS attempt to match what is essentially a deliberate

choice of American policy-makers for primacy (Posen and Ross 1997, pp. 30�43).

A closer examination of the ESS uncovers a generous document, covering a wide

array of issues. The first two chapters were focused on ‘global challenges and key

threats’ setting strategic objectives to be addressed. Along terrorism and the

proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), threats like malnutrition

and disease emphasised the human dimension of the ESS, a distinct feature and a

testament to Europe’s ‘soft power’. The EU played the multilateralism card (Council

of the European Union 2003, p. 9), advocating the involvement of other actors,

countries and regional and international institutions in the stabilisation and peaceprocesses in and around its neighbourhood. Multilateralism was one of the distinct

features of the ESS in opposition to the American approach at the time.

Considering the initial premise, the ESS turned to be a rather different document

than expected. In the late 90s, the European security policies gained momentum as

the Union became involved at regional and international level. Consequently, the

ESS should have become the expression of its new found role in world affairs, a

coronation of the expertise acquired during the Balkan crisis and later on through

the ESDP. Specifically the St. MaloJoint Declaration stated: ‘the Union must have

the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means

to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international

crises.’ (Franco-British Saint Malo Declaration 1998). Basically, as part of the

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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the ESDP was to deal with all matters

regarding EU security, giving birth to an entire new set of operational structures

bound to materialise ESDP policies under the direct supervision of the members’

states. From the five key threats in the ESS, terrorism, proliferation of WMD,

regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime, at least four would hardly need

any credible and substantial high-readiness military forces of 60,000 men deployable

for 60 days as the 1999 initiative envisaged. History exposed the questionable recordof armed forces deployed against organised crime in Italy in 1992 and against

terrorism in 1969 in Northern Ireland. It is unclear what soldiers could have done to

improve the situation in Haiti, a failed state par excellence. Iraqi WMD conundrum

and the general reluctance to employ military actions, first against North Korea and

then Iran, is a testament to the value of armed intervention in tackling proliferation.

Contrarily, military preparedness would have a significant impact in stopping

regional conflicts, like the one in the Balkans in the 90s, which actually triggered the

initiative in the first place. With four out of five threats unmanageable by military

force the ESS has in fact rendered the 1999 initiative economically unviable and

financially unsustainable.

‘Brusselsisation’ became even more apparent with the initiation of the ESDP. The

ESDP was not a creation of the 25- or 27-member states. In 2003, the biggest

enlargement wave was near completion, suggesting that the old members were

pushing to setup policies in a very tight time frame and thus consciously, or not,

excluding a significant number of member states from the decision process. The ESSwas speaking in the name of a Europe of 25, yet the 10 new members were to adhere

to an ESS in which they could not exercise any veto power. Many of them, former

communist states, were perceiving security in a much narrower classical sense, closer

to NATO, and consequently rallying behind the US. In terms of security, their

attachment to a defensive alliance like NATO was by far a better option leaving little

suspense about the consequences of a rupture between the old and new Europe. It

was only a matter of time and circumstances before the new member states in the east

would close ranks around the US position in total disregard to the European

solidarity claimed by the ESS.

Nothing spells ‘great power’ better than an ambitious vision of international

amplitude: ‘an active and capable EU would make an impact on a global scale’

(Council of the European Union 2003, p. 14). However, this new found appetite for

international involvement lacked any foundation except for the questionable

colonialist past and in almost complete absence of a common security culture.

For a viable ‘grand strategy’ to emerge, the security strategy should have beenbacked up by a new continental strategic culture completely separate from the recent

history. Since strategic culture is the basis for strategic planning and not the other

way around (Gray 1999, p. 68) meant that the ESS had little experience to be based

on. For a distinct strategic culture to evolve, the ESDP would have needed a much

longer and more consistent successful record than what was possible to be achieved

in a short four-year period, a caveat that the EU was well aware. A specific reference

in the ESS stressed the importance of developing a strategic culture: ‘we need to

develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust

intervention’ (Council of the European Union 2003, p. 11).

At the same time, the development of a common European security culture was

in direct competition with national security cultures giving birth to a set of internal

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but manageable problems. Externally, the international posture assumed by the ESS

was complicated by the colonial past some of the national security cultures carried.

Former colonies may have been justifiably wary about EU’s international involve-

ment that would cover neo-colonialist ambitions under the mask of a benevolent,human-rights-friendly EU.

Finally, the EU has been involved willingly in a process of constructing a security

community inside a security community, specifically a semi-amalgamated European

security community inside a pluralist transatlantic, NATO-centric, security commu-

nity (Berindan 2012, pp. 33�37). This very process weakened the focus of European

policies and strategies, and the Berlin Agreements only partially addressed the

problems created by this process. Consequently, the EU security policies and the ESS

have fallen victim to the vacillations between a pure European approach and anintegrated transatlantic one (Biscop et al. 2009, pp. 8�9). Since the EU has been in a

constant state of alert in order to not step on NATO’s shoes, all its security policies

including the ESS have been voluntarily constrained leaving the EU prone to favour

its soft-power approach.

Should the EU’s security and defense policies be conceived based on the initial

Saint-Malo premises, the ESS would have proved to be a much needed steering wheel

capable of making Europe count in world affairs as a world power.

As shown, adverse international circumstances, specifically the 9/11 terroristattacks in New York, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq led to a rift in transatlantic

relations. This prompted shortly after a desire in the EU to make peace with its most

important ally. Unfortunately the Europeans used the ESS more as an instrument to

mend fences with the US rather than as a document serving their own interests in the

long run. The transatlantic alliance was not facing its first crisis (Risse 2008, p. 81)

and for sure there were better ways to alleviate differences than by using the ESS as a

medicine.

There was also an unjustifiable sense of urgency. Delaying the adoption of the ESSfor only one year would have given the opportunity for the new member states to

exercise more influence over the final form and content of the document. More visibility

in the ESS and the EU policies in general, of smaller countries would muffle some of the

fears the EU is just a cover for former great power interests in Africa or Asia.

Finally, without the St. Malo objectives met, the EU had to rely on NATO assets

and consequently acquiesce a junior partner position inside the transatlantic relation,

essentially a self-imposed boundary that does more harm than good to the relation

itself. The US stressed numerous times the need for Europeans to step up to the plateand balance the burden-sharing responsibility of the transatlantic security as a whole.

If the EU aimed for world power status with the 2003 ESS it definitely did a poor

job. However, the 2008 RIESS seemed to steer in another direction.

Evaluating a ‘grand strategy’ � the 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS

The RIESS has proven to be a milestone, altering in part the perception of ESS as

‘grand strategy’. From the very beginning the report stands by the ESS in terms ofrelevance, underlining that its aim is to reinforce not replace it (Council of the

European Union 2008, p. 3). This is true in part. Not all the threats identified in the

ESS are found in the RIESS. While the RIESS identifies, like the ESS, proliferation

of WMD, terrorism and organised crime as threats, it leaves outside failed states and

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regional conflicts adding others: cyber-security, energy, climate change. The issue of

failed states and regional conflicts is treated in a separate chapter � Security and

development nexus (Council of the European Union 2008, p. 8). New areas of security

interest like piracy and small arms and light weapons (SALW) and cluster munitions

and landmines make way in the report. A significant part of the document is dedicated

to the neighbourhood policies and ESDP missions (RIESS 2008, pp. 6�7). The issue

of ‘effective multilateralism’ is well developed in the RIESS and builds on the originaldocument, a constant focus in both security documents. Considering that new

identified threats as cyber-crime, climate change and energy security can only be

addressed by a concerted multilateral approach, underlining its role was paramount.

Unfortunately, the effective multilateralism’s implementation poor record prompted

the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to acknowledge, in lower

voice, that ‘multilateral institutions and frameworks have come under severe strain,

and their effectiveness in preventing conflict and guaranteeing peace has often been

questioned’ (Vasconcelos 2009, p. 14).

Overall, we can consider the RIESS marks a voluntary departure from the ‘grand

strategy’ approach of the original document. Otherwise, why a report on the

implementation of a document would introduce so many new coordinates? Should it

not be restrained to evaluate the actual implementation of what was decided five

years earlier?

Changes are evident, surpassing content alone. First, the report has no mention

to one rather important aspect present in the ESS: the development of a strategic

culture and, furthermore, fails to mention the contribution of ESDP missions to itsestablishment. The absence of strategic culture in the RIESS may even imply that the

EU has in fact abandoned the idea of developing a common strategic culture

altogether, a key ingredient in developing a future European ‘grand strategy’.

Secondly, the report changes the ESS not only in content but also in scope. The

global dimension of European security is almost abandoned in favour of a regional

one underlining, besides the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and ESDP

successes, the need for a greater engagement with the neighbourhood (Council of the

European Union 2008, pp. 9�10). In fact the great power outlook of the original

document is significantly toned down to more achievable and in some cases more

pressing issues like energy security � a must after the gas crises in the winters of 2006

and 2008.

Finally, the RIESS makes a return to the issue of capabilities (Council of the

European Union 2008, p. 9) beyond the generalities of the ESS. It mentions

Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams and underlines the role of appropriate

and effective command structures and headquarters capability, strategic airlift,

helicopters, space assets and marine surveillance and the support role of theEuropean Defence Agency (EDA).

Is the 2008 RIESS a reinforcement of the ESS? The report bears too many new

elements and places the emphasis on quite a different approach, enough to encourage

the reader to interpret it in a different manner. The prominence of the neighbourhood

policies, the absence of the strategic culture imperative, new threats like climate

change or cyber-crime that do not necessarily command world stature to be

addressed, the reinforced idea of multilateralism present throughout the document,

a less Atlanticist discourse and a refocus on military capabilities make the RIESS a

significantly different security document. Most importantly, it lacks the formulae

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bearing the mark of a ‘grand strategy’. More than a report on the implementation of

the ESS, the RIESS may be considered a revised security strategy, possibly in better

tune with the actual stature of the EU in the world than the ESS.

The European approach to security

The ESS has borrowed significantly in content and tone from its American

counterpart, including the ‘grand strategy’ posture. The problem is that the NSS

and the ESS have different arguments for their existence. Historically, the first

strategic document, the NSC-68, appeared during the Truman presidency. This

means more than 60 years of strategic thinking in terms of security.

A closer look at the origins of the NSS shows that the document has been imposedon the US President by the Congress, the first one being prepared by Ronald Reagan

in 1987. However, the NSS is more of a statement of intent with public relations value,

laying down the principles that guide US strategy in the short to medium term. The

American NSS is complemented by an entire set of policies, strategic and operational,

put forward by different departments of the administration: Department of Defense’s

Quadrennial Defense Review, the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and

Development Review, the Homeland Security Department’s Quadrennial Homeland

Security Review and several different specialised agencies that submit documents andreports like the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review, Nuclear Posture

Review, Ballistic Missile Defense Review, Space Posture Review, National Defense

Strategy and the National Military Strategy (Conely et al. 2011, p. 16). Politics set

goals, institutions devise strategies and policies to make things happen, bringing

together a large number of agencies that create an intrinsic value of the process

(Conely et al. 2011, p. 16). These documents are implemented quite recently and could

have served as examples for the European policy-makers for the 2003 ESS as follow-

up instruments for propping up and refinement of strategic objectives.Comparatively, the first major post-9/11 articulation of European grand strategy

(Nelson and Bodurian 2011, p. 93) benefited from supporting strategies in a rather

distinct way. Some parts of the ESS were reinforced by additional documents dealing

with terrorism and WMD, specifically the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD

in 2003 and EU Counter-terrorism Strategy in 2005. Other parts like regional

conflicts, state failure and organised crime were to be addressed by the ENP of 2004.

The ENP structured EU policies towards its immediate and near abroad. This

was a specific attempt to stabilise its borders and establish privileged, bilateral,relations with 16 countries making for its unique trademark the ‘soft-power’

approach. Double the size of the ESS, the ENP set a series of clear objectives

building on several existing instruments like the Partnership and Cooperation

Agreements and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also known as the ‘Barcelona

Process’. These objectives were to be addressed by action plans ranging from ‘shared

values’ to ‘justice and home affairs’ to ‘energy and transportation’. Unlike the ESS,

the ENP talked numbers and provided a clear set of instruments and institutions to

manage them. The ENP has been followed up by three other region-specificdocuments, the Union for the Mediterranean (UM), the Black Sea Synergy (BSS)

and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) further increasing the detailed approach of the

ENP. The generous margin of manoeuvre in picking the ‘right’ instrument or

institution according to particular objectives has been found in the ENP.

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The specific regional focus of the ENP became the most important and best

developed part of the ESS separating it almost completely from the other objectives

stated in 2003. ENP has in part substituted the strategic nature of the ESS with a

more restrictive and at the same time more convenient approach to European

security interests. At the same time, different strategic points present in the ESS have

been left dormant as they were excluded from the ENP and its soft-power approach.

Consequently, the ENP took the limelight of the EU’s security strategy, benefiting

from different and regionally focused sub-strategies: EaP, BSS and the UM and clear

implementation instruments making it a viable strategic alternative to the ESS.

Without playing the ‘grand strategy’ card, the ENP matched the real capabilities of

the EU, not the ambitions of the ESS, being better calibrated to actually serve its

security interests. Should the ENP or an extended security document integrate Russia

and Turkey it could even qualify for a mini ‘grand strategy’, again in tune with the

actual abilities of the EU.

Unfortunately, Russia and Turkey, the two most important hard powers in the

immediate neighbourhood, were excluded from the ENP on the basis of separate and

privileged partnerships. The EU did not follow up with significant policy documents

regarding policy implementation on the ‘four-spaces’ negotiated with the Russian

Federation. European soft power hit the stone wall of Russian ambitions in its near-

abroad, a flagrant failure in the EU grand plan towards its neighbor. In a 59-page

document review of the progress of the four spaces, Georgia’s loss of sovereignty over

a significant part of its territory is mentioned in a one-and-half paragraph (European

External Action Service 2011, p. 1). On the other hand, the European soft touch

significantly improved the record of democratisation and human rights in Turkey.

Without being a complete success Turkish accession negotiations bore fruit. The only

problem is that Turkey is only dealt with through that mechanism which precludes

any other form of discussion including strategic issues, defense and security. Since the

US is pivoting towards Asia-Pacific (Biscop 2012) Europe needs a refocus too. Nick

Witney, the former head of the EDA, suggested that the EU should take the initiative

and engage Turkey, and Russia, in security matters (Witney 2011). Since the ESS

places multilateralism at the cornerstone of its security strategy it would only make

sense to develop relationships on all issues of bilateral interest. The ESS missed the

opportunity to engage Russia only for the RIESS to acknowledge it five years later,

placing the emphasis on ‘common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule

of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and

objectives’ (Council of the European Union 2008, p. 10), the actual four spaces

negotiated with the Russians in 2003. It is hard to quantify how much the EU lost

because of this omission. Maybe the situation in Georgia would be different today if

ESS would have dedicated an entire chapter to engaging Russia strategically. In a

similar vein, failing to acquiesce the strategic importance of Turkey may have

hampered the EU’s leverage in the Middle East. Another kind of relation with

Turkey may have prevented the Mavi Marmara crisis or provided a different

European weight in the negotiations in the Iranian nuclear stalemate. Unfortunately,

all these account for speculations only. Fact is the world in general, and our partners,

in particular the US, judge the EU not only for what we have done but, maybe more

importantly, for what we have not.

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EU security policies � hitting the targets, missing the goals

Through the ESDP, the EU attempted to create a common strategic culture, a key

ingredient of any ‘grand strategy’. The ESDP allowed the EU to get involved abroad

in over 20 missions in the last decade from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Tchad,

Somalia and Afghanistan gathering an invaluable expertise in a vast array of security

issues. The EU’s ability to manage crisis, particularly through its civilian crisis

management, was so successful that even the US asked the Europeans to share it.

European involvement in the field meant better chances for stabilisation, peace and

security where it intervened. The question is the following: has this success brought us

closer to become a world power? Is the EU really using this pool of knowledge and

expertise to achieve the goals set by the ESS or the RIESS? The EUISS’ extensive

evaluation of the ESDP best captured the difficulties of making use of the accumulated

experience � good and bad � in these years. The authors underline how difficult it is

sometimes to rise to the expectations: ‘while not detracting from its considerable

achievements, it has to be acknowledged that in some cases the gap between the

discourse and practice of ESDP has been significant. The aim should be to fill this gap

over the next ten years, and move even further than that’. (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 404).Like the US, the EU has established a set of institutions responsible for

addressing different security situations. The EEAS has been established in order to

meet the Lisbon objectives. Mainly focused on regional and international issues these

policies support the effort for internal security of the EU as well, particularly in areas

like human security, including trafficking, organised crime and terrorism. The

Stockholm Programme suggested that an ‘account should also be taken of the

impact it may have on relations with the Union’s neighbourhood and particularly

with the candidate and potential candidate countries, since internal security is

interlinked with the external dimension of the threats’ (Council document 5620/11).

Practically, the policies and institutions set by the EU cover almost all major aspects

of security. The CFSP functions through the Political and Security Committee while

its internal security structure counterpart is managed by the European Standing

Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security. Even more structures

unfold as we go deeper into the operational area like the European Union Military

Staff (EUMS) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) both

integrated into EEAS. Institutional integration into the EEAS counts also the Joint

Situation Center responsible for assessing external threats. Unfortunately, at the

lower echelons there seems to be a lack of cooperation/synergy. Many of these

institutions are integrated vertically, unlike the American system, meaning that

contributions are screened and filtered by institutions up the ladder preventing thus

the creation of a poll of resources at top level: ‘planning documents should include at

the earliest stage not only the strategic objectives of EU action, but also a shared

perspective on the division of labour between EU actors � whether ESDP missions

or Community instruments � and the definition of effective coordinating mechan-

isms between them’ (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 406). The EU seems to suffer not from a

lack of vision but rather of a fragmentation (Grevi et al. 2009, p. 406) and in some

cases of ambiguity of the policies it advocates.

Such fragmentation on one hand and overlapping on the other cast doubts about

how strategic the European security really is. Beyond the term ‘strategic’ showing on

an increasing number of policies the EU has in fact shown little strategic vision.

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Apparently the EU is incapable of putting an end to the development of new policies

and instruments whether the actual security environment asks for them or not. Some

of these strategic documents are revised and/or completed with new instruments,

sometimes are renamed and revamped in an effort to make them more appealing.Their efficiency and effectiveness are put to the test successively and, if the results are

less than expected, they suffer the same process over and over again. In case of

flagrant failure they are simply left dormant indefinitely. Maybe a process of

evaluation and consolidation would help better integrate and coordinate the security

policies at different levels.

Finally, no matter how successful different policies and instruments may be in

different theatres of operations and what level of integration and effectiveness they

reach if they do not address and contribute, in part or in full, to the goals set byfuture ESS’s or to the development of a continental strategic culture.

For the moment the EU has a difficulty to pinpoint the areas where its

contribution may add value to international affairs. The EU has scored some

successes in different parts of the globe, but they are neither concentrated nor

focused enough to make for a solid strategic approach. Missions in Aceh, Sudan,

Congo, Somalia, the Palestinian Territory or Afghanistan are so different not only in

their scope but in the means to be employed that it is hard to make for the

foundation and structure of a comprehensive approach beyond the close neighbour-hood. Serious steps should be taken to improve the record of the EDA while the

EUMC and the EUMS should be involved from the very beginning in the drafting

process of a new security strategy. Strategic planning and resource allocations should

ultimately validate political will and not the other way around. Policies and

instruments should eventually hone a set of value-added, distinct features, which

would allow the EU to assume, if and where needed, a leading role in the world.

Effective multilateralism � the cornerstone of EU security policies

Effective multilateralism represents a very important part of the European ‘grand

strategy’, being present in both the ESS and the RIESS. Without effective

multilateral partnerships, threats like cyber-security, climate change or organised

crime cannot be tackled effectively. Those are but few of the issues that need

international collaboration. Established economic actors and emerging economies

must be engaged in various issues. Privileged partnerships with China, India and

Brazil are important as are those with smaller countries that need support in theimmediate neighbourhood or farther away. It is obvious that no single country can

solve today’s stringent problems and the EU ambition to strengthen its record of

effective multilateralism is commendable.

In many cases though, the EU ambitions to develop multilateral partnerships

with countries and international security institutions were unsuccessful. Advancing

policies and taking decisions before the interested parties have a say in the matter

became a pattern in EU foreign policy. The EU fell in the trap of its own soft-power

successful policies regarding EU candidate states. They had to fulfil a set of criteriain order to be accepted. There was no need for discussions or negotiations. The EU’s

‘take it or leave it’ policy was, in reality, not so soft and, once the enlargement process

stopped, became utterly counterproductive. Without the prospect of becoming

members, not even in a very distant future, countries and political leaders have very

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little incentives to accommodate EU strategies that discard their interests and

agendas. How different is the ‘take it or leave it’ approach from the American or

Russian ones? Furthermore, despite the much acclaimed multilateralism the EU

failed to engage strategic partners and rally support for its different regional,

neighbourhood policies. The EU was unable to secure some kind of Russian support

for its EaP. Turkey was completely ignored even though its strong ties with

Azerbaijan and adverse relations with Armenia made it an unavoidable actor for

regional stability. The EU, like Russia, seems to conceive its strategies in utero

(Gomart 2008, p. 1) in utter disregard to the multilateralism it so much treasures.

In fact, for an EU championing multilateralism the very understanding of the

concept is peculiar, severely undermining its credibility in front of its partners. For

instance, the EU has claimed that it wants to engage international institutions

including the UN and the OSCE (Council of the European Union 2008, p. 11). The

security situation in Georgia became an issue for the EU after the Russian invasion

in the summer of 2008. Before the incident the Russian blunt occupation of a

significant part of a sovereign state flied under the EU radar. Why? Is it because the

situation in Abkhazia was managed by the UN and the one in South Ossetia by the

OSCE? Why the EU preferred to broker a cease-fire directly with Russia, therefore

excluding everyone else from the process � including the US that actually flexed its

military muscle to stop an escalation of the conflict? Another example of EU’s

debatable effective multilateralism is the issue of the SALW. Identified as a distinct

threat in the 2008 RIESS, the document is pointing out to closer cooperation with

UN while forgetting to mention the OSCE! What exactly is wrong with the OSCE

array of mechanisms and projects that deal with SALW and ERW? EU officials

recognised the OSCE expertise and advances in the matter as early as 2005. An ideal

partner to address this problem, it includes practically all EU states, the US, Russia

and Ukraine, the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia � accounting for the

majority of SALW exporters of the world. Why is the need to internalise a problem

much better addressed by someone else, incidentally an international security

institution, supposedly an important partner in the EU partnerships for effective

multilateralism? For someone preaching multilateralism this need for ownership and

exclusivity is surprising. Critics go even further pointing out EU’s inability to make

its voice heard inside the OSCE � a possible reason for this internalisation � in which

the values rhetoric does not impress countries that are still willing to use force to

settle disputes. ‘If the EU really believes in ‘‘effective multilateralism’’, it should learn

to use its power in the OSCE’ (Vasconcelos 2009, p. 52) is a strong statement but

points out to a certain inflexibility Europe is displaying in its partnerships.

Internalisation and ownership do not help in establishing, maintaining and

managing partnerships, the EU effectively sabotaging its own ‘grand strategy’.

The ability to engage not only political will from others but also financial means,

military capabilities, manpower and expertise should be the norm. Consequently,

international engagement would gather public support easier knowing that others

contribute from their own pockets too. Brokering peace, stability and security with

help from as many partners as possible, involving US hard muscle, Japanese

financing and the like, would be much more effective and in line with European true

capabilities. However, indiscriminate involvement for the ‘greater good’ of humanity

in general is neither realistic nor sustainable in the eyes of the European public or

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their respective financial ministers. Therefore, as in the case of the ESDP missions,

selective multilateralism would be desirable.

A changing security environment � united we stand?

Security strategies and, to a lesser extent, ‘grand strategies’ are challenged by

constant international security developments. The change brought by the Arab

spring gave EU the impetus to complement its soft power with a significant hard-power approach. The Franco British-led European campaign, opens a new chapter in

European security. Even if the Europeans succeeded, if only just, in the theater of

operations in Libya proves that the EU is willing and able to influence the outcome

of events in the Mediterranean. Tomas Valasek was right in pointing out that a new

division of labour between NATO and the EU is taking place in the Mediterranean

(Valasek 2011, p. 3). However, the military operations in Libya mark also divisions

inside the EU. Hard power should be a European matter in which not only those

willing � France and UK � and able � Germany, Italy, Sweden, Netherlands � canhave a say. It should be as integrated as its soft-power approach. ‘Coalitions of the

willing’ may harm intra-European relations first in the domain of security and may

spill over to other areas. The technological, financial and industrial gap between

those able and the rest of the countries inside the EU is immense. Capable countries

should support with all their technological and industrial might the European

common defense and possibly guide the less advanced EU countries in developing

support roles if not their operational capabilities. Future strategies should emphasise

strengthening the EU capabilities as a whole and not set objectives that can,theoretically, be fulfilled by few.

The Libyan crisis is not a singular example. A closer look at the changing security

environment points to a rather distressing problem. Every time the security

environment changes significantly, cracks appear inside the Union. The Russian

gas crisis found EU countries on different sides: those dependent on Russian gas and

those with alternative sources. The Iraq invasion divided the EU in countries in

favour and countries against the US intervention. The Palestinian Authority’s bid for

a seat at the UN is probably the latest example of EU cacophony, ultimately a tokenof how ‘effective’ the EU’s contribution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be.

What prospects for the future ESS?

Officially, overambitious agendas have been postponed for now. Exception makes

Sweden that enlisted the support of Italy, Spain and Poland instructing their national

think-tanks to devise a European Global Strategy. One could speculate about the

reasons behind the Swedish initiative. Sweden contemplates more and more a

rapprochement to NATO or even applying for full membership. Whether it probes

the EU security agenda or just looks for an excuse to join the alliance is difficult to

say. However, the response from other European states to this initiative shows that

chances to jump-start a continental debate on the topic are slim.The inability to be proactive to the changing environment is the most serious

threat to the EU. Acknowledging realistically ones’ shortcomings should be only the

beginning of a deeper analysis of the prospects of becoming a significant player. A

realistic timetable for achieving set objectives is also desirable. Currently, a change in

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the security status-quo almost automatically breeds division amongst Europeans,

incapacitating the European grand plan in part or in full.

Every time divisions occur inside the EU, analysts call for more coherence among

the European states. Not enough coherence is the usual suspect asking for moreintegration among the EU states. ‘Building on common interests’ seemed to be the

best option for avoiding divisions. Logic dictates that common interests should

trigger common responses thus avoiding possible divisions. However, such a degree

of integration among the 27 � soon 28 � European states is not possible in the near

future. Forcing it upon the peoples and countries of Europe would not only be

undemocratic but might even trigger adverse responses. Furthermore, some analysts

criticise the EU for being too much inward-looking calling crises a wake-up call.

They underline the need for the EU to change the way it assesses the internationalsystem (Vasconcelos 2009, pp. 48�49) alas without offering an alternative.

In the interest of developing a solid ‘grand strategy’ we should explore alternative

approaches. What if instead of looking for what brings us together we try to identify

what keeps us apart? Since many of the changes are systemic (Vasconcelos 2009, p.

49), therefore bound to happen over a considerable timespan, maybe we can identify

them in due time, evaluate their impact and the possible divisions that may induce

and negotiate an intra-European response before they happen. This would be

Europe’s best bid and the way to turn reactiveness to pro-activeness, a point whereanalysts agree on (Coolsaet and Biscop 2004, p. 9). ‘We’ll cross that bridge when we

get there’ approach is the perfect recipe for perpetrating divisions and let crises

surprise us. Even better, as the power and influence of the EU grow, we could act, in

conjunction with the US, to alter the future, not least making for an outstanding

effective multilateralism.

Ways to address systemic changes and crises should find a permanent spot in any

future ESS. The EU has been built on the idea of common interests and values.

However, managing the security environment is not comparable. While cohesion andcoherence would continue to advance EU construction inside, divisions may be a

good starting point for addressing EU interests from inside out.

Conclusion

What would have happened if a ‘grand strategy’ asked for military overspending in

a time when a significant proportion of its population is in dire need? The financial

crisis would have exposed a ‘grand strategy’ as a luxury most of Europe cannotafford now or in the near future. The proponents of the grand strategy approach

would have had a difficult time explaining their choice in front of their constituents.

Europe has again turned on its own in the hope of salvaging its own skin and

that of the less fortunate countries at the periphery. In the meantime, human and

security tragedies still unfold in regions close to EU’s borders and far away each

and every day.

Consequently, officials need options, analyses or a starting point for addressing

future challenges. The future ESS is one of them. To options like reinvigorate, reviseor reinvent, review and complete or imitate, the European Global Security initiative

adds a poll of opinions and analyses that range from considering a new ESS

unnecessary and unhelpful (Menon 2012) to a mandatory optimism in devising a

new European ‘grand strategy’ (Biscop 2012). This paper stands in between the two.

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For reasons presented earlier, the EU should not be considered a world power

yet. However, since the 2003 ESS assumed the tone and scope of a world power

consequently embracing a ‘grand strategy’ approach, this analysis started from the

premise that the EU is set to become a world power and future security strategies

should point in that direction. World power and stature would probably gather

consensus from all 27 members rather easily.

First, a new ‘grand strategy’ may indeed be unnecessary and unhelpful and, at

this point, be unsound and poorly implemented. However, a set of security strategies

dealing with sectorial issues each addressing specific areas of interest may prove

beneficial. The ENP is probably the best example of a successful one, and possibly a

model to follow. These need not be linked. Each strategy should be evaluated at

regular intervals of three to five years maximum. Budgets, specific institutions or

instruments should be assigned to supervise them and, where possible, each should

carry some criteria of evaluation from the very beginning.

Europe has a number of important issues to mitigate at its own doorstep and two

very important actors to engage, Russia and Turkey, for the resolution of pending

conflicts. Belarus, the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey, the Azeri-Armenian

conflict and Nagorno-Karabakh, the integrity and sovereignty of Georgia are all

very important tests the EU has to pass with flying colours before assuming a more

prominent stance in world affairs. A distinctive security strategy, beyond the four

spaces negotiated with Russia and the membership negotiations with Turkey, is

crucial. The EU does not have the slightest chance to emerge as a serious regional or

international contender as long as Europeans do not close ranks on Russia and

Turkey.Beyond the close neighbourhood Europe has to decide on a set of geographical

priorities. Running over to solve conflicts in Central Africa is not the real answer

even if desperate situations would welcome a European involvement. The mere fact

that African governments are much easier to tackle than Russia or Turkey is

counterproductive. Finding consensus only on issues thousands of miles away has to

change. Over time fresh voices from less ambitious countries in the EU will gain

more leverage in the overall construction of European foreign, security and defense

policies effectively toning down overambitious projects and approaches.

The EU needs to set in place a distinct strategy to breed a continental security

culture able to integrate the expertise of the ESDP/CFSP and develop a set of

instruments centred on eliminating divisions on a variety of real and probable

scenarios.

The Austrian take on a future ESS has several interesting points. The EU should

consider a specific strategy addressing the development of a European Military

Doctrine, a European Information Strategy and possibly ways for a deeper

integration of European armies. In return, this should be integrated into a bigger

strategy aiming for the development of general EU capabilities and the EDA. Of

course, the temptation to consolidate all these strategies under a ‘grand strategy’

umbrella will always exist. The Austrian document succumbed to such an approach

suggesting that the future ESS ‘should be the conceptual-strategic superstructure for

both defining sub-strategies and action plans (e.g. proliferation, fight on terror,

dealing with ‘‘rogue states’’)’ (Reiter and Frank 2004, p.3). While this is ultimately

desirable, Menon rightfully points out the inability of the 27 to reach a consensus. In

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the meantime, the rule of the lowest common denominator should not be allowed to

take over as it did in the original ESS.Beyond geographical focus, the EU should decide what policies are prepared �

literally � to lead and when is prepared to follow and in what circumstances. The EU

should be prepared to waive ownership to other international actors, states included,

better prepared to act on specific missions or areas. Not all missions need the EU’s

political lead. Some may just need expertise, financing or just a powerful voice to

speak for their account. Effective multilateralism is developed not only by EU

initiatives but also by a certain degree of openness towards other initiatives. In turn

this would breed a significant amount of good-will and help enrich its image of soft

power. Maybe a strategy or set of norms and instruments addressing this issue

should be developed and even institutionalised.

These are but few of the actual sectorial strategies that could be developed in

order to insure the transformation of the EU in a world or global power, for which a

‘grand strategy’ would indeed make sense. They do not aim to shape the world

differently, do not commit the EU to unreasonable expectations of performance and,

more importantly, they are sufficiently restricted in scope to be evaluated and

ultimately altered as needed.However, Europeans can find a common voice in restating the values, norms and

aspirations, a positive example in the world and a dependable actor and partner. A

new European Security (not grand) Strategy could easily concentrate on these. Almost

completely depleted of strategic substance, the NSS is a statement of American values,

a reassuring pat on the back for their partners and allies that the US will uphold their

international commitments. Why should not the ESS follow its example?

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions andcomments.

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