5 emergency/abnormal procedures
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Table of Contents
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Chapter 5 Page i
5 EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL PROCEDURES ............................... 1
5.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
5.2 ELECTRICALLY POWERED/CONTROLLED COMPONENT FAILURE 2
5.3 QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK (QRH) ............................................. 2
5.3.1 Reduced Power Operations ............................................................. 3
5.3.2 Warnings, Cautions and Notes ........................................................ 4
Warnings ............................................................................................ 4
Caution ............................................................................................... 4
Notes .................................................................................................. 4
5.4 FAILURE MANAGEMENT ....................................................................... 5
5.5 CHECKLIST PRIORITY ........................................................................... 5
5.6 MASTER WARNING AND CAUTION CANCELLATION ......................... 6
5.7 MEMORY ITEMS ...................................................................................... 7
5.8 CIRCUIT BREAKERS .............................................................................. 8
5.8.1 K1 Bus Tie Reset ............................................................................... 8
5.9 QRH USAGE ............................................................................................ 8
5.10 EMERGENCY COVER CHECKLIST (ECCL) .......................................... 9
5.10.1 General ............................................................................................... 9
5.10.2 ECCL Code Index .............................................................................. 9
5.11 ABNORMALITIES DURING TAKE-OFF ................................................ 10
5.11.1 Criteria for Rejected Take-off ........................................................ 10
5.11.2 Rejected Take-off ............................................................................ 10
5.11.3 Procedure - Captain ........................................................................ 11
5.11.4 Procedure - First Officer ................................................................. 12
5.11.5 Rejected Take-off Considerations ................................................. 12
5.11.6 After a Rejected Take-off ................................................................ 13
5.11.7 Wheel Brake Cooling ...................................................................... 13
5.11.8 Continued Take-off .......................................................................... 13
5.11.9 Rejected Take-off Profile ................................................................ 14
5.12 BRAKE FIRES ........................................................................................ 15
5.13 ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE MANAGEMENT AT OR ABOVE V1 .................... 15
5.13.1 Responsibilities ............................................................................... 18
5.13.2 Engine Failure on Take-off Profile ................................................. 19
5.13.3 Standard Calls and Actions – Engine Failure ............................... 20
5.13.4 Engine Indications after Engine Failure ........................................ 24
5.13.5 Standard Calls and Actions – Engine Fire Warning
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(With No Power Loss) 25
5.14 SINGLE ENGINE CLIMB ....................................................................... 26
5.15 ENGINE FAILURE IN FLIGHT ............................................................... 26
5.15.1 Considerations ................................................................................ 26
5.15.2 Automatic Relight Flight Characteristics ...................................... 28
5.15.3 Power Levers ................................................................................... 28
5.15.4 Use of Bleed Air Following an Engine Failure/Shutdown ........... 28
5.16 ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE (OEI) APPROACH PROCEDURES ...... 29
5.16.1 Configuration ................................................................................... 29
5.16.2 Engine Failure/Fire During Approach ........................................... 29
5.16.3 One Engine Inoperative Landing Procedure ................................ 30
5.17 ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE GO-AROUND
PROCEDURES ...................................................................................... 31
5.17.1 OEI Go-Around/Missed Approach Profile ..................................... 32
5.17.2 OEI Go-Around/Missed Approach Calls and Procedures ........... 33
5.17.3 Missed Approach Procedures When Operating at Reduced Power
34
5.18 FLAPLESS LANDING ............................................................................ 35
5.18.1 Recommendations .......................................................................... 35
5.19 EMERGENCY DESCENT ...................................................................... 36
5.19.1 General ............................................................................................. 36
5.19.2 Emergency Descent Procedure ..................................................... 36
5.19.3 Post Emergency Descent Considerations .................................... 38
5.19.4 Emergency Descent Profile ............................................................ 39
5.20 DOUBLE ENGINE FLAMEOUT ............................................................. 41
5.21 TAWS/GPWS WARNING IN FLIGHT .................................................... 41
5.22 TCAS ...................................................................................................... 42
5.22.1 General ............................................................................................. 42
5.22.2 Traffic Advisory (TA) Actions ........................................................ 42
5.22.3 Resolution Advisory (RA) Actions ................................................ 42
5.23 OVERWEIGHT LANDING ...................................................................... 44
5.24 OVERSPEED WARNING ....................................................................... 45
5.25 UNRELIABLE AIR DATA ...................................................................... 45
5.26 FLIGHT IN TURBULENCE .................................................................... 46
5.26.1 General ............................................................................................. 46
5.26.2 Notification to the Flight Attendant ............................................... 46
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5.26.3 Altitude ............................................................................................. 46
5.26.4 Speed ................................................................................................ 46
5.26.5 Attitude and Trim ............................................................................ 46
5.26.6 Power Settings ................................................................................ 47
5.26.7 Autopilot ........................................................................................... 47
5.26.8 Shoulder Harness and Seat Belts .................................................. 47
5.26.9 Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) .................................................... 47
5.27 WAKE TURBULENCE ........................................................................... 48
5.27.1 General ............................................................................................. 48
5.27.2 Takeoff .............................................................................................. 48
5.27.3 Approach .......................................................................................... 49
5.28 STALL RECOVERY ............................................................................... 51
5.28.1 General ............................................................................................. 51
5.28.2 Stall Identification ........................................................................... 51
5.28.3 Recovery from Stall Warning or Stall ............................................ 52
On Stall Identification ................................................................... 52
5.29 UNUSUAL ATTITUDE/UPSET RECOVERY .......................................... 53
5.29.1 General ............................................................................................. 53
5.29.2 Recovery Procedure from Excessive Roll .................................... 53
Recovery from Excessive Roll ..................................................... 53
5.30 WINDSHEAR .......................................................................................... 54
5.30.1 General ............................................................................................. 54
5.30.2 Avoidance ........................................................................................ 54
5.30.3 Definitions ........................................................................................ 54
Windshear .................................................................................... 54Overshoot Shear .......................................................................... 55Undershoot Shear ........................................................................ 55Crosswind Shear ......................................................................... 55
5.30.4 Take-off ............................................................................................ 55
5.30.5 Landing ............................................................................................ 56
5.30.6 Wind Shear Escape ......................................................................... 56
Phraseologies .................................................................................. 57
5.31 PILOT INCAPACITATION ...................................................................... 58
5.32 MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL) & CONFIGURATION DEVIATION
LIST (CDL) 59
5.32.1 General ............................................................................................. 59
5.32.2 Flights operating under an MEL .................................................... 59
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5.33 ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE TAXIING ................................................ 59
5.34 JUMP SEAT PASSENGERS ................................................................. 59
5.35 POWER INTERRUPTIONS/FLUCTUATIONS ....................................... 61
5.35.1 Power Fluctuations Due to Icing ................................................... 61
5.35.2 SAAB 340 Power Interruption Report Form ................................. 62
5.35.3 Uncommanded Engine Operation ................................................. 64
5.36 OPERATIONS IN ASH OR DUST .......................................................... 64
5.36.1 Operations in Volcanic Ash ........................................................... 64
5.36.2 Operations in Organic Ash or Dust ............................................... 65
5.37 EMERGENCY COVER CHECKLIST ..................................................... 66
5.38 MEMORY ITEMS .................................................................................... 68
5.38.1 Starting ............................................................................................. 68
5.38.2 Engine Failure After V1 ................................................................... 68
5.38.3 Engine Fire ....................................................................................... 68
5.38.4 Uncommanded Engine Operation In Flight .................................. 69
5.38.5 Uncommanded Engine Operation On The Ground ...................... 69
5.38.6 Engine Shut Down .......................................................................... 69
5.38.7 Compressor Stall ............................................................................ 70
5.38.8 Air Conditioning Smoke ................................................................. 70
5.38.9 Avionics or Electrical Smoke or Fire ............................................. 70
5.38.10 Rapid Depressurisation .................................................................. 70
5.38.11 Tail Pipe Hot .................................................................................... 70
5.38.12 Cargo Compartment Smoke .......................................................... 70
5.38.13 Hydraulic Light On .......................................................................... 71
5.38.14 Hydraulic Fluid Loss ....................................................................... 71
5.38.15 Elevator System Jammed ............................................................... 71
5.38.16 Aileron System Jammed ................................................................ 71
5.38.17 Flap Fault ......................................................................................... 71
5.38.18 Emergency Evacuation ................................................................... 72
Captain’s Duty ................................................................................. 72
First Officer’s Duty .......................................................................... 72
5.38.19 Both Engines Flame Out ................................................................ 72
If Engine Restarts ............................................................................ 72
If Engine Does Not Restart ............................................................. 72
5.38.20 Loss of Both Generators ................................................................ 73
5.38.21 Unreliable Speed and/or Altitude Indications ............................... 73
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Introduction
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5 EMERGENCY/ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
An ‘Emergency/Abnormal Condition’ may be any malfunction or situation not routinely encountered
during the normal course of aircraft operation. It may or may not necessitate the conduct of an
emergency/abnormal procedure, depending on the nature and seriousness of the condition.
An ‘Emergency/Abnormal Procedure’ is a generic term, which includes procedures described in
the aircraft Flight Manual and Aircraft Operating Manual as Emergency or Abnormal.
The first priority in dealing with any emergency/abnormal condition is to maintain control of the
aircraft. There must never be any doubt as to who is controlling or monitoring the aircraft’s flight
path. When carrying out any procedures detailed within this chapter, as is the case during all
stages of flight, one crew member must be assigned the prime role of “flying the aircraft”. It is
expected that when available maximum use of the autopilot will be made.
The Captain is ultimately responsible for determining, in consultation with the First Officer, an
appropriate course of action. The First Officer must therefore ensure that any actual or impending
abnormality is brought to the attention of the Captain. Should the Captain be absent from the flight
deck, the First Officer will initiate appropriate action and then notify the Captain as soon as
possible.
Following any in flight emergency or abnormal condition the Captain must be satisfied that all
safety considerations have been addressed in a suitable manner before he considers such factors
as commercial significance and engineering support.
If the engine fails, or some other serious problem occurs then the flight becomes an emergency or
abnormal operation depending on the seriousness of the situation. In these circumstances the
Captain can do whatever is necessary to safely complete the flight.
The decision to make a ‘Mayday’ or ‘Pan’ call belongs to the Captain who must assess the
seriousness of the emergency. As a guide, it is standard Company policy to make a ‘Pan’ call for
OEI operations.
In any abnormal/emergency configuration, once any Memory Items and/or Emergency/Abnormal
Checklists have been completed the Captain will nominate who will be the PF for the continuation
of the flight.
The Captain must assume, or assign to the First Officer the responsibility of monitoring and
maintaining a safe flight path during the execution of the relevant procedure. The Captain should
ensure that the applicable procedures are coordinated and actioned with minimum distraction.
The First Officer is responsible for bringing to the Captain’s attention any discrepancy or
irregularity, which has not been covered before the aircraft is stabilised for approach and landing.
He is also required to remain aware of the configuration of the aircraft, it’s flight path, altitude and
any ATC clearances applicable. If the Captain elects to continue the approach then he should
ensure that sufficient time is available to resolve all discrepancies, complete all checklists in an
unhurried manner and stabilise the aircraft by the initial approach fix or final descent point.
If, for any reason, a crew member is not confident that all abnormalities have been adequately
resolved then he/she must bring this to the attention of the Captain immediately.
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All Abnormal/Emergency Checklists and briefings should be completed as far as possible before
the aircraft descends below the minimum safe altitude, the minimum sector altitude or leaves the
holding pattern of any approach procedure.
No approach whether visual or instrument should be commenced until all necessary checklist
items have been completed.
Where an abnormal/emergency occurs after an approach has been commenced, a go-around/
missed approach should be considered. If this abnormal/emergency condition requires checklist
items to be completed, then a go-around/missed approach should be commenced without delay,
unless this would expose the aircraft to additional risk.
The Captain must be aware of the fuel status and remaining endurance at all times.
If at any time the Captain or First Officer becomes uncertain of the situation of the aircraft then the
Captain must take action to resolve the situation. This may involve making a missed approach. If
there is any confusion about the configuration, altitude, track or position of the aircraft or any other
matter then the Captain must take immediate action to remove the confusion and restore the
aircraft to a safe and stable flight condition.
The aircraft’s flight path control is paramount prior to commencing any emergency or abnormal
procedure. Normally the PF will continue to control the aircraft. If the Captain decides to take
control he/she will command “Taking over” and the First Officer will respond, “Handing over”.
Vice versa applies if the PF decides to relinquish control of the aircraft. Once control of the aircraft
is established, identification of the failure will occur followed by confirmation.
Most procedures written in this chapter are for ‘conventional’ abnormalities or emergencies. It is
not possible to cover every contingency. When the situation arises and there are no procedures in
the emergency/abnormal checklist the Captain should take whatever action necessary, with the
help of the First Officer and the Flight Attendant, to ensure that all possibilities are covered. The
aim is for a successful recovery from a potentially hopeless situation. This can be achieved by
sound judgment, the application of knowledge, experience and common sense.
5.2 ELECTRICALLY POWERED/CONTROLLED
COMPONENT FAILURE
Any circuit breaker, except those noted in section 5.8 which has opened during flight operations
and is accessible to the flight crew, may be reset once. Should the same circuit breaker open
again, it shall be left open for the duration of the flight, unless further reset attempts are allowed
according to the QRH.
5.3 QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK (QRH)
Each pilot has a copy of the QRH available to them in the flight deck. The Emergency Checklist is
pink and the Abnormal Checklist is yellow.
The QRH is intended to be performed in a read and do manner and as such need NOT be
committed to memory. The only exceptions are the Memory Items which are highlighted by an
asterisk.
It is expected that the flight crew possess sufficient knowledge to select the correct checklist. The
flight crew is further expected to have a thorough understanding of what is accomplished by
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performing a certain item in the checklist. Checklist items not considered obvious and other
relevant operational aspects are presented on the page above and below the checklist.
It is not possible to cover all combinations of malfunctions and events in the checklists. With some
exceptions, the QRH covers single failures. If multiple unrelated failures should occur, the flight
crew may have to combine in parts, or in whole, different checklists and exercise sound judgement
to determine the safest course of action.
Unless otherwise indicated in the checklists, manipulation of levers, switches, etc. refers to the
affected engine and/or system. Prior to shutting down or switching off vital items like engine, fuel,
generator etc. the appropriate lever, handle or switch shall be verified by both pilots. No
annotations specifying these items are included in the checklists.
QRH are call sign specific. The aircraft must not depart unless the correct checklist is on board.
5.3.1 Reduced Power Operations
When a procedure calls for the Power to be Reduced the continued operation should be regarded
as a One Engine Inoperative (OEI) operation which includes landing at the nearest operationally
suitable airport using OEI configuration and landing speeds. Apply OEI OPERATION checklist. Set
power to 20-30% tq on the bad engine to reduce propeller drag; maintain this power until landing
flare where both power levers should be retarded as for normal landing.
NOTE
Should circumstances require additional power do not hesitate to
use both engines as required.
Set CL to max before landing, since landing distances are based on this. In addition, if the CL is in
a position other than MAX with a running gas generator, aircraft characteristics during landing will
differ from what is normally experienced.
After an engine malfunction has been rectified e.g. an engine has been shut down, restarted and is
subsequently running normally, Normal Procedures apply. This also applies if an engine which in
accordance with a checklist procedure has been operated on Reduced Power (20-30% Tq) and the
power in accordance with procedures has been restored.
NOTE
When restoring power on one engine make sure that the
AUTOCOARSEN switch is in OFF until both PLs are at
approximately the same power lever angle (PLA) - then Normal
Procedures apply.
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5.3.2 Warnings, Cautions and Notes
Warnings
WARNING
A warning immediately precedes or follows an operating
procedure or maintenance practice which, if not correctly
followed, could result in loss of life or personal injury.
Caution
CAUTION
A caution immediately precedes or follows an operating
procedure or maintenance practice which, if not correctly
followed, could result in damage to or destruction of
equipment, or corruption of data.
Notes
NOTE
A note immediately precedes or follows an operating procedure,
maintenance practice or condition that requires highlighting.
Information contained in notes may also be safety related.
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Failure Management
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5.4 FAILURE MANAGEMENT
Where available the autopilot should be engaged prior to conducting QRH procedures. If required
turn the Dome Light on prior to reading the checklist.
Prior to actioning any procedures ensure the malfunction is positively identified before any action
is taken, and under no circumstances shall control of the aircraft be compromised. To ensure that
the correct procedure/drill is performed the PNF will identify the malfunction and the PF will
confirm the identification.
Most of the PF attention should be directed to flying the aircraft, however he/she must also be kept
informed. It would be appropriate for the PNF to delay reading of the checklist procedure until the
PF is in a position to monitor and assist if required.
Confusion is often a problem area when conducting QRH procedures. Checklist procedures must
not be rushed. It is important crews conduct checklists in a careful and controlled manner.
To avoid checklist disruption, it may be of benefit for the PF to guard the radios. This will be at the
Captain’s discretion.
Prior to conducting checklist procedures, ensure all Master Warnings and Cautions are silenced.
This includes the AP disconnect alert.
NOTE
If there is sufficient time available prior to reaching the
acceleration altitude (normally with a high acceleration altitude)
the PNF may identify and cancel warnings and cautions and
contact may be made with ATC. This must not interfere with other
required actions at the acceleration altitude.
If circumstances dictate that failure management can not be completed prior to landing, it is
recommended that the aircraft be brought to a stop on the runway and the relevant procedures
and/or checklist completed. Once failure management procedures have been finalised, the aircraft
may be taxied clear of the runway.
Considering the above, where the flight crew considers the failed system not critical to safety or
controllability, the aircraft may vacate the runway. In this case further taxi must not be commenced
until relevant failure management procedures have been completed.
5.5 CHECKLIST PRIORITY
Where appropriate the following checklist priority should be used:
1. Memory Items
2. Check Performance
3. Circuit Breakers
4. QRH – Emergency Checklist / ECCL
5. QRH – Abnormal Checklist, and
6. Normal Checklist.
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5.6 MASTER WARNING AND CAUTION
CANCELLATION
The identification and confirmation of a master warning or caution must be by reference to prime
indications e.g. engine indications, warning and fault lights. The correct identification procedures
are listed as follows:
Step 1 PNF to call “Master Warning and/or Master Caution”
NOTE
In the case of major failures i.e. engine failure after take-off,
engine fire, double engine flameout etc. that require immediate
action, the PNF should call the failure without reference to Master
Warnings or Cautions. After confirmation by the PF the Memory
Items are to be conducted.
When time allows the Master Warnings and Cautions should be
cancelled. Master Warning shall be identified before Master
Cautions.
Step 2 PNF to identify Master Warning(s) and/or Master Caution(s) related problems on CWP.
MASTER
WARNING
and
or
MASTER
CAUTION
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Memory Items
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Step 3 PNF to identify CWP related failure on the overhead panel (if applicable).
In the case of multiple warnings and cautions, each individual CWP alert must be identified prior to cancelling.
Step 4 PF to confirm the failure and request cancellation of Master Warning(s) and / or Master Caution(s) .
Step 5 PNF cancels Master Warning(s) and or Master Caution(s).
The following example highlights the correct procedure in identification of and cancellation of
Master Warnings and/or Cautions.
PNF “Master Caution – Ice Protection – Left AC GEN”.
PF “Confirmed, Cancel”.
5.7 MEMORY ITEMS
Memory Items require immediate crew response and therefore must be committed to memory.
Checks requiring immediate action are annotated by an asterisk next to the item.
If an emergency or abnormal situation occurs and Memory Items are required, the PNF will call the
item and place his or her hand on the appropriate lever, switch etc. and call the action to be taken.
The PF will confirm the item and then the PNF will action it.
For example:
CALL BY CALL IND ICATES
“Identify the failure” PF
“Left engine failure” PNF PNF checks all the engine instruments and confirms
the left hand engine has failed
“Confirmed, engine
failure Memory Items”
PF Both crew have positively identified the problem
PF is ready to conduct Memory Items
“Left Power Lever-
reduce 20 – 30%”
PNF PNF places his or her hand on the item to be actioned
“Confirmed” PF After confirmation the PNF shall action the item
“Left Condition Lever -
fuel off”
PNF PNF places his or her hand on the item to be actioned
“Confirmed” PF After confirmation the PNF shall action the item
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5.8 CIRCUIT BREAKERS
Following completion of the Memory Items (if applicable), and after checking performance, both
pilots shall check their respective CB’s. The PF shall then request the appropriate QRH checklist or
ECCL. This must not interfere with flight path monitoring.
NOTE
Resetting of the following Circuit Breakers (identified by yellow
caps), is not permitted:
J-16 (L STBY PUMP PWR)
J-15 (L STBY PUMP CONTROL)
J-13 (L QTY)
R-13 (R STBY PUMP PWR)
R-14 (R STBY PUMP CONTROL)
R-12 (R QTY)
5.8.1 K1 Bus Tie Reset
Resetting of K1 - (ELEC PWR RESET BUSTIE) should only be completed as directed by QRH
procedures.
5.9 QRH USAGE
After the failure has been positively identified the PF shall request the appropriate checklist. The
checklist shall be identified by name followed by the specific checklist item, if known e.g.
“Abnormal Checklist - Hydraulic Light ON”.
The PNF shall use the index to identify the specific page number. The PNF shall call “Hydraulic
light ON page A 25”.
The checklist must be announced by title and checklist notes must be read before proceeding with
the checklist. The additional information provided outside the checklist box is for information
purposes only and as such is not required to be read. It shall only be read if time permits. The
checklist procedure begins with either a number (1) or a black diamond.
Each black diamond is asking a specific question relating to the failure. The PNF must ensure he/
she has carefully assessed the question before proceeding. If the black diamond represents the
problem, proceed with the checks listed. If the first diamond is not associated with the problem
proceed to the next black diamond. A checklist is not completed until reading, “End of
procedure”. It is important that the pilot reading the checklist checks for any “Before Landing/After
Landing” checks that may be included.
QRH items (except Memory Items) shall be read and actioned by the PNF. A self challenge and
response technique is required. For example, PNF will read the challenge, “Left Bleed Valve”
followed by the response “Closed”. After the challenge and response is completed the item shall
be actioned.
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Emergency Cover Checklist (ECCL)
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CAUTION
Unless otherwise indicated in the checklists, manipulation of
levers, switches etc. refers to the affected engine and/or
system. Prior to shutting down or switching off vital items
such as engine, fuel, generator etc. the appropriate lever,
handle or switch shall be verified by both pilots. Such items
are not annotated in the checklists.
5.10 EMERGENCY COVER CHECKLIST (ECCL)
5.10.1 General
The Emergency Cover Checklist is a Company designed document to be used only when an
engine has been shutdown in flight, either as a result of a Precautionary Shutdown Procedure or as
a result of Engine Failure or Fire Memory Items being actioned. In short, it is used only when the
gas generator has stopped, the propeller is feathered and a OEI landing is to be made.
The Emergency Cover Checklist replaces the following SAAB 340 documentation:
1. QRH - Emergency Checklist - Engine Failure,
2. QRH - Emergency Checklist - Engine Fire,
3. QRH - Abnormal Checklist - Engine Shutdown, and
4. QRH - Abnormal Checklist - OEI Operation.
When actioning the ECCL the PNF is required to commence at the beginning of the ECCL and
work through each checklist irrespective of when the failure occurred.
For OEI go-around/missed approach only perform checklists in white (After Shutdown, Descent &
Approach and Final Checklists).
5.10.2 ECCL Code Index
The Emergency Cover Checklist is colour coded to represent checklist requirements. The following
colour coding applies:
Pink = Read and do.
White = Challenge and response required.
Blue = Procedures for crossfeed operation - Read and do.
QQQQ = Memory Items.
s = Critical item requires confirmation from PF to ensure correct switch.
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Abnormalities During Take-off
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5.11 ABNORMALITIES DURING TAKE-OFF
5.11.1 Criteria for Rejected Take-off
Any of the following events occurring before V1 may be cause to reject the take-off:
1. Failure to achieve predicted minimum take-off power,
2. 944º C ITT Exceeded (B model only),
3. Engine Failure/Fire,
4. Illumination of a Master Warning CWP,
5. Structural failure, or
6. Directional control problem.
NOTE
The decision to reject a take-off remains the prerogative and
responsibility of the Pilot-in-Command. An AML must be raised for
any unexplainable configuration Master Warning occurring above
80 kts.
5.11.2 Rejected Take-off
Rejected take-offs have often been considered by pilots to be of little concern. At low speed, this
may be the case. Early recognition and proper communication is vital to ensure the take-off is
aborted in the low speed regime (< 80kts). For example, a failure of the CTOT system (including
switch failure) should be recognised at or about 60kts; rejecting the take-off from such speeds is
easily handled.
At high speed, there is little room for error. On short runways, hot and high conditions and at high
take-off weights, immediate and correct action is required. It is important for all pilots to understand
the seriousness of a rejected take-off at high speed and clearly determine what emergencies/
abnormalities require a reject and what can be ignored during this critical phase of flight
A reject at or near V1 could result in an overrun off the end of the runway, a brake fire, burst or
deflated tyres, or even a serious accident.
All pilots must ensure throughout the take-off that conditions, aircraft and engine settings, gauges
and flight instruments are all monitored carefully. Either pilot, on recognising a failure or problem
requiring a rejected take-off, must call “Failure”.
The Captain may call, “Stop” or “Go” at the point when a decision is made to either reject or
continue the take-off.
Flight crew must consider (in the case of a fire warning, severe vibration or engine damage):
• Stopping into wind or positioning the fire on the downwind side of the aircraft, where
possible, and
• Stopping on the runway if the aircraft is on fire, rather than exiting onto a taxiway.
Recognition of the failure and commencement of rejected take-off procedures must be
commenced by V1. As a general principle, the Captain shall consider the aircraft committed to
continue the take-off once V1 has been attained.
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5.11.3 Procedure - Captain
Recognition by either pilot is followed by the call “Failure”. The Captain may call “Stop” or “Go”.
1. Control Aircraft.
2. Immediately retards the PL’s to Flight Idle, then slowly and cautiously into Ground Idle.
Simultaneously apply maximum steady braking.
3. Transfer to nose-wheel steering as soon as possible to assist in directional control.
4. Captain may apply reverse thrust when the Beta Lights are on (caution must be exercised
when applying reverse thrust with OEI).
5. Bring the aircraft to a stop. Set the park brake.
6. Announcement to Flight Attendant and passengers;
• Evacuation Unlikely
If the Captain believes an evacuation is unlikely, he/she must command
immediately using the PA system:
“This is the Captain. Everyone remain seated!”
• Evacuation Likely
If the Captain believes an evacuation is likely, he/she must command immediately
using the PA system:
“This is the Captain. Flight Attendant to your station!”
7. Confirm the failure (Identification by First Officer and/or Captain).
8. If required, carry out any Memory Items.
9. Obtain relevant information (i.e. Flight Attendant, Tower, Visual Inspection etc.).
10. Assess the seriousness of the problem (i.e. Fire/brake fire structural damage or a minor
problem etc.).
11. Decide on the most appropriate action:
• QRH,
• Evacuation – Emergency or Normal Disembarkation, or
• Vacate or remain on the runway.
12. Issue the following crew instructions as appropriate:
• First Officer
“Evacuation Drills”, and
Flight Attendant (via PA)
“This is the Captain. Evacuate! Evacuate!”, or
• Flight Attendant (via PA)
“Flight Attendant stand down, Flight Attendant stand down”.
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5.11.4 Procedure - First Officer
1. Look for the Beta lights - call “Beta Lights” or ‘Negative Beta Light” as appropriate.
2. At the same time apply forward pressure on the control column and place ailerons into
wind.
3. Radio call “(call-sign)….. Stopping”.
4. Once the aircraft has come to a stop select CTOT off and GND OPS.
5. Assist in identification/emergency/abnormal procedures or evacuation drills.
6. If vacating the runway - lock the controls and complete the After Landing Scan-Action
Flow.
5.11.5 Rejected Take-off Considerations
1. Retard the PL’s to FI prior to lifting the PL latches, otherwise the PL’s will be locked and
cannot be retarded below FI.
2. OEI – When reverse thrust is applied there will be a resulting swing towards the live
engine. Directional control may be difficult even with nose wheel steering. Exercise caution
when applying reverse when OEI.
3. Maintain maximum braking until the aircraft will be assured of stopping in the remaining
runway available.
4. Apply constant brake pressure (do not pump the brakes).
5. Low speed rejected take-offs may not require maximum braking.
6. Prior to taxiing off the runway the First Officer must complete the After Landing Scans. This
will ensure that the CTOT is off and the Gust Locks are engaged.
7. Do not rush to vacate the runway. Bring the aircraft to a stop and correctly assess the
situation. When certain it is safe to do so vacate the runway. Overheated tyres may deflate
after stopping. Delaying unnecessarily on the runway may create another problem. Always
ensure the aircraft is safe to proceed. The QRH should be considered prior to vacating the
runway. The After Landing Checklist would normally be completed after vacating the
runway.
8. Rejected take-offs may result in burst tyres and or a Brake Fire. When a high-speed
rejection has occurred refer to the Brake Cooling Chart (QRH – White Pages). Whenever
possible with hot wheels position chocks on the aircraft wheels and release the brakes.
9. Prior to moving from parked position ensure the First Officer has completed the After
Landing Scans.
10. When clear of the runway complete the outstanding checklists (i.e. QRH and After Landing
Checks).
11. If an overrun appears likely, the First Officer shall activate the three emergency switches.
12. If a rejected take-off is due to an engine fire after completion of engine fire Memory Items
and an evacuation is required discharge opposite engine’s fire extinguisher prior to pulling
associated fire handle.
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5.11.6 After a Rejected Take-off
If all the tyres remain inflated another take-off may be considered provided:
1. The brakes have been allowed to cool for the minimum brake cooling time (BCT). If the
minimum time is used and the subsequent take-off is rejected expect deflated tyres.
2. If the energy of the RTO performed lies in the Caution Zone or Warning Zone, a
maintenance inspection in accordance with AMM, including a check of the wear pins, must
be performed before subsequent take-offs.
3. After rejection from lower energy levels perform a visual inspection of the wheels and
brakes, including a check of the wear pins, and apply brakes one or two times to check for
correct function before subsequent take-offs.
Take-offs that are rejected from low speeds (<60kts) and use ‘normal’ braking do not require a
visual inspection prior to departure.
QRH white pages contains conservative data. Refer to AOM2 for more detailed information.
5.11.7 Wheel Brake Cooling
The wheel brake system is designed to absorb the energy induced by a rejected take-off from V1 at
MTOW. Actual rejected take-off tests have shown that thermal fuses may blow, resulting in one or
more flat tires when absorbing high energy levels, but no other damage to the wheels and brakes
is likely to occur.
If the brakes are hot it is preferable (if possible) not to set the park brake until the brakes have
cooled down. The wheels have thermal fuses that melt and deflate the tires if overheated (this is to
prevent explosion of the tires).
It should be noted that many brake applications at lower speeds and or weights or long taxiing at
high weights and or speed may heat up the brakes enough to make the thermal fuses melt.
WARNING
Approach the main gear with caution, from the front or rear
only. Do not approach for minimum 30 minutes or until the
thermal plugs melt if the energy of the RTO performed lies in
the BCT “WARNING ZONE”.
5.11.8 Continued Take-off
Should the Captain decide to continue with the take-off, after the “Failure” call he should call
“Go”.
As discussed in the take-off briefing the PF will continue to manoeuvre the aircraft. A change of
controls should not be made, unless the safety of the aircraft is in jeopardy.
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5.11.9 Rejected Take-off Profile
“ST
OP
”
“BE
TA
LIG
HT
S”
or
if o
ne o
r both
Beta
lig
ht
fail
to illu
min
ate
”N
EG
AT
IVE
BE
TA
LIG
HT
S”
Either
pilo
t “F
AIL
UR
E”
Cap
tain
Fir
st
Off
icer
Move p
ow
er
levers
in
to G
I and a
pply
ma
x
bra
kin
g
Tra
nsfe
r to
nose
wh
eel
ste
erin
g a
s s
oo
n a
s
possib
le.
Gently a
pp
ly
revers
e t
hru
st
if
requ
ired.
Once t
he a
ircra
ft h
as
com
e t
o a
com
ple
te
sto
p s
et
the p
ark
bra
ke.
Apply
forw
ard
pre
ssure
on t
he
contr
ol co
lum
n a
nd k
eep w
ing
s level,
check B
eta
lig
hts
.
Once t
he a
ircra
ft h
as
com
e t
o a
com
ple
te
sto
p.
Sele
ct
CT
OT
to O
FF
and G
ND
OP
S.
Assis
t C
apta
in in
ide
ntificatio
n/e
merg
ency o
r a
bnorm
al
pro
ce
dure
s o
r evacu
atio
n d
rills
.
“(C
ALL S
IGN
) S
TO
PP
ING
”
If a
ble
to v
acate
th
e r
un
wa
y.
“TH
IS I
S T
HE
CA
PT
AIN
, F
LIG
HT
AT
TE
ND
AN
T
TO
YO
UR
ST
AT
ION
” or
“TH
IS I
S T
HE
CA
PT
AIN
, E
VE
RY
ON
E R
EM
AIN
S
EA
TE
D”
“ID
EN
TIF
Y T
HE
F
AIL
UR
E”
“……
. (E
NG
INE
FA
ILU
RE
) M
EM
OR
Y I
TE
MS
”
CO
NT
RO
L
LO
CK
S A
ND
A
FT
ER
LA
ND
ING
CH
EC
KLIS
T”
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5.12 BRAKE FIRES
1. Set park brake. If park brake cannot be set apply full pressure on the non fire side wheel
and apply full nose wheel steering towards the fire side wheel.
2. Advise ATC (where required) of brake fire and request assistance.
3. Maintain power at or above FI power on fire side engine (sufficient to maintain an airflow to
blow the flames aft and not upwards).
4. Prepare the cabin for an evacuation and specify only the use of exits opposite to the wheel
fire.
5. Where a Rescue Fire Service is available, if practical, await the Fire Tender’s arrival at the
aircraft and allow them to position correctly prior to shutting down both engines and if
required carry out the Evacuation Drills.
6. Where a Rescue Fire Service is not available shut down both engines and carry out the
Evacuation Drills.
5.13 ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE MANAGEMENT
AT OR ABOVE V1The SAAB 340, like other aircraft in its class, has specific engine out performance data which is
predicated on the aircraft being operated in the optimum configuration.
Little or no account is provided for factors such as individual pilot skills, crew coordination,
turbulence or “in service” condition of the aircraft. These factors, of course, may be critical if an
engine fails before the aircraft has accelerated to enroute climb configuration. It is with these
considerations in mind, and with due regard to the Captain’s right to adopt alternative courses of
action should circumstances dictate, that standard procedures have been devised to cover this
emergency.
NOTE
The first priority in dealing with any emergency/abnormal condition
is to maintain control of the aircraft. There must never be any
doubt as to who is controlling or monitoring the aircraft’s flight
path.
If an engine failure/fire occurs at or above V1 proceed in accordance with Standard Operating
Procedures.
It is considered desirable that the PF at the time of the occurrence should continue to fly the
aircraft. This principle in no way overrides the Pilot-in-Command’s prerogative to take control of the
aircraft at any time he considers such action desirable or necessary.
It is important the aircraft remains within the surveyed area of the CDP. In order to achieve this,
positive control inputs will be required to counter the initial asymmetric yaw and roll. Upon positive
control, maintain wings level, ensure the skid ball is centred and engage yaw damper, check
attitude and airspeed.
Correct identification of the failed engine and confirmation of autocoarsening must be performed
accurately. Based on the performance criteria, (CAO 20.7.1B) there is no need to rush this
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process. The PNF is required to continually monitor the status of the autocoarsen system. If the
propeller does not autocoarsen or the system fails an immediate engine shutdown is required.
It is important that flight crews understand the significance of a propeller that has not
autocoarsened. Moving the condition lever into the fuel off position should feather the propeller
and an immediate improvement in performance will be evident. If performance is not improved the
PNF must without delay turn the autocoarsen OFF and activate the appropriate manual feather
pump. Confirmation must be received by the PF prior to activation.
In order to maximise performance, accurate speed control is required. V2 – V2 + 10 must be
maintained up until the acceleration altitude. If in the correct speed range, do not reduce speed to
V2 as this will degrade performance and control. After the acceleration altitude, maintain
VENROUTE (VENROUTE+10 in icing conditions) until the aircraft has reached a safe altitude (MMA/
MSA/LSA).
In order to maintain the correct airspeed the PF should press vert sync once the desired airspeed
is achieved. This is particularly important with Flap 15 selected.
When setting Max Power, ensure the CTOT setting is only increased to reflect the Rated power
figure quoted on the TOLD card. For the SAAB 340B, performance is based on take-off power +
7% (APR) therefore, the PNF must ensure the required TRQ is achieved. If the required TRQ (max
power) is not achieved by the CTOT the PNF shall advance the PL to obtain the required Rated
Power plus 7%.
In addition to flying the aircraft, the PF in conjunction with the PNF must always consider the
performance of the aircraft. If minimum performance requirements are not being achieved
immediate action is required. Refer Jeppesen Terminal - Gradient to Rate Table.
When dealing with an engine failure and fire, conduct the engine fire Memory Items without delay.
If the fire is not associated with power loss, it is preferable to continue to at least the AEO flap
retraction altitude (400 ft) before carrying out the engine fire Memory Items. Where possible the
AP should be engaged prior to conducting this procedure. Prior to shutting down the engine ensure
airspeed is not less than VENROUTE +10 kts. After the engine has been secured, airspeed should
be adjusted to maintain the OEI best angle of climb speed (VENROUTE) and ½ bank selected.
The primary role of the PNF is to monitor the flight path of the aircraft and assist the PF where
possible. When time permits the PNF should cancel the Master Warnings and Cautions associated
with the failure or fire. Each warning and caution shall be individually identified and confirmed by
the PF before cancelling. The PNF should identify Master Warnings first, followed by Master
Cautions. Where possible this process should be conducted after the PF has the aircraft stabilised
and prior to the acceleration altitude (work load permitting).
The autopilot is certified for use at all operational speeds (V2 and above). Maximum use of the
autopilot is encouraged throughout all OEI procedures. Prior to engaging the autopilot, the PNF
must ensure the correct modes are set on the MSP. Do not engage the autopilot in GA and PITCH
modes – HDG and IAS are recommended.
Do not allow checklist requirements to interfere with the primary task of flying the aircraft. The
ECCL should be read only after the AP (if available) has been engaged and BOTH crew members
are in a position to perform the required checks. The ECCL shall normally be performed upon
request from the PF.
Throughout all OEI departures engine limitations must be observed. It is the responsibility of the
PNF to monitor timing.
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For an engine failure occurring above 400 ft AGL, adjust speed to climb at VENROUTE(VENROUTE+10 in icing conditions) to the appropriate MMA/MSA/LSA. If necessary apply Max
Continuous Power (MCP).
If there is no evidence of severe malfunction such as failure to autocoarsen, uncontained engine
fire, severe power plant damage such as separation etc, wait until after the acceleration altitude
before shutting down the failed engine.
When setting MCP, wind the CTOT off slowly before turning the system off. It is important the PNF
monitors both the TRQ and ITT gauges, ensuring TRQ is set initially at not above 100% and ITT is
not above 944º C (B model) 917° C (A model). It is recommended that two hands be used to set
the power, one hand on the PL and the other on the CTOT switch/knob.
The PNF shall then adjust MCP as per the MCP chart (inside cover of QRH).
Following an engine failure/fire, extreme caution must be taken to ensure that the correct engine is
shutdown. Before each action required to shut down an engine (and if necessary, activation of the
fire extinguishing system) the PF must confirm that the PNF has his hand on the correct switch,
lever, etc. before actioning.
Leave MCP set until speed has stabilised in level flight to enable an assessment of available
performance.
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5.13.1 Responsibilities
The Pilot-in-Command is responsible for ensuring the requirements of CAO 20.7.1B are satisfied.
These include:
1. Terrain clearance is assured until reaching either the enroute LSALT or departure
aerodrome LSA.
2. Item 1 can be complied with should an engine failure occur at any time after V1 or lift off, or
encountering non-visual conditions.
3. If a return to the departure aerodrome is not possible, that the aircraft performance and fuel
availability is adequate to enable the aircraft to proceed to a suitable aerodrome, having
regard to terrain, obstacles and route distance limitations.
NOTE
• For the 340B “MAX POWER” is defined as “RATED
POWER” +7%.
• For the 340A “MAX POWER” is defined as “RATED
POWER”.
• Any time there is an engine fire warning during the take-off
phase, whether associated with an engine failure or not, the
warning should be silenced by the PNF after confirmation
from the PF.
• If the engine fire is associated with power loss carry out the
Engine Fire Memory Items immediately.
• If the engine fire is not associated with power loss conduct
the Memory Items at the AEO flap retraction altitude and
after the autopilot has been engaged. In order to prevent
large autopilot oscillations accelerate the aircraft to
minimum VENROUTE +10 prior to shutting down the engine.
After the engine has been secured continue climbing at
VENROUTE to the acceleration altitude.
• Rudder/Roll trim may be used at any time by the PF or he/
she may call “Rudder/Roll trim left (or right)” and the
PNF shall activate the trim until the PF calls “Stop rudder/
roll trim”.
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5.13.2 Engine Failure on Take-off Profile
LP
RP
PF
PNF
“TAKINGOVER”
-IFPF
“HANDINGOVER”
-IFPNF
“80KNOTS”
“SELECTED,
MAXPOWERSET,
½BANKON”
“POSITIVERATE
GEARUP
MAXPOWER”
“SELECTED”
“YAWDAMPER
ON”
OEI
ACCALT
“TAKINGOVER”
-IFPF
“HANDINGOVER”
-IFPNF
“FLAPATZERO
ENROUTE/
ENROUTE+10....”
OR
“FLAPZERO....”
“SELECTED
ENROUTE/
ENROUTE+10....”
THEN
“FLAPATZERO”
“FLAPZERO”
“AUTOPILOTON”
(IFREQUIRED)
“AUTOPILOTON
HEADINGINDICATED,
½BANKON”
“LEFT(ORRIGHT)
ENGINEFAILURE”
“CONFIRMED,
ENGINEFAILURE
MEMORYITEMS”
“EMERGENCY
COVER
CHECKLIST”
“IDENTIFY
THEFAILURE”
“ROTATE”
“V1”
ROTATETO:
9-11FLAPZERO
8-10
ATVPRESS
VERTSYNC.
FLAP15
2
“CHECK
CIRCUIT
BREAKERS”
CHECK
PERFORMANCE
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5.13.3 Standard Calls and Actions – Engine Failure
PF PNF
Control aircraft.
At VR rotate as for a normal take-off to reach V2 by 35 ft above the runway.
Pitch to 8o (Flap 15) or 10o (Flap Zero) nose up.
Press Vert Sync button.
Monitor altitude, speed, flight path and engine instruments throughout the climb.
When positive rate of climb is achieved, call “Positive rate, gear up, max power”.
Check positive rate of climb.
Select gear up.
Set CTOT to rated power or advance P/L to max power.
Select both Flight Directors on.
Call “Selected, max power set, ½ bank on”.
Monitor the engine gauges.
Confirm that the prop has autocoarsened by checking that the prop gearbox oil pressure is below the green arc and correct CWP indications are displayed.
Ensure balance ball is centred, call “Yaw damper on”.
Select yaw damper on, call “Selected”.
If there is any doubt that the propeller has failed to autocoarsen, either pilot may call “Negative autocoarsen”.
“Confirmed, engine failure Memory Items”.
In the case of failure and fire.
Call “Confirmed, engine fire Memory Items”.
If there is any doubt that the propeller has failed to autocoarsen, either pilot may call “Negative autocoarsen”.
Carry out the engine failure Memory Items by placing a hand on the appropriate lever and, upon confirmation by the PF, action the item.
Check all engine gauges and call “Left (or right) engine failure and fire”.
Silence the Fire Bell and carry out the engine fire Memory Items.
Maintain runway heading or as specified by the CDP.
Climb to the acceleration altitude at a min speed of V2. The Autopilot is available at all operational speeds.
Continue monitoring altitude, speed, flight path and engine instruments throughout the climb.
Identify Master Warnings/Cautions when called for by PF (time permitting).
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NOTE
Autopilot may be selected at speeds of V2 and above only after the
aircraft has been trimmed in roll.
Lower the pitch attitude by 1-2o. To accelerate to VENROUTE. If a long acceleration segment is required, call “ALT” and use the ALT function on the MSP. If the autopilot is engaged select ALT or use the electronic speed bug to accelerate to VENROUTE.
DO NOT ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO DESCEND.
(if already at VENROUTE, continue climb).
At Flap Zero speed call “Flap Zero”.
Accelerate to VENROUTE or VENROUTE+10 (in icing conditions and call “Indicated”.
Call “Autopilot on” (if not already selected).
At the acceleration altitude:
If flaps are at zero call “Flap at zero, Enroute .....” (e.g. VENROUTE = 136).
“Flap at zero, Enroute +10 .....” (in icing conditions)
or
If flaps are at 15 call “Flap Zero.....” (e.g. Flap Zero {VFL UP/VFL UP + 10 in icing conditions}127).
Select ALT mode on MSP and call “ALT”.
Select Flap Zero and call “Selected, Enroute ..... ” (e.g. VENROUTE = 136) or “Selected, Enroute+10 .....” (in icing conditions). Leave hand on flap lever until flaps are indicating zero.
When flaps indicate zero call “Flap at zero”.
Select IAS and respond “Indicated”, confirm in HDG mode on the MSP.
Select the autopilot on and call “Autopilot on, heading, indicated, ½ bank on”.
Confirmation of engine failure and shutdown procedures shall be conducted at or above the acceleration altitude if autocoarsening has occurred.
Call “Identify the failure”.
“Confirmed, engine failure Memory Items”.
Check Performance
“Check Circuit Breakers”. Check and reset any tripped Circuit Breakers.
“Emergency Cover Checklist”.
Check all engine gauges and call “Left (or right) engine failure”.
Action the Memory Items.
Check Performance
Check and reset any tripped Circuit Breakers.
Retrieve and action the ECCL.
PF PNF
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NOTE
After an engine failure, the prop RPM gauge on that side will read
zero when the engine has spooled down, irrespective of actual
prop RPM.
In general autocoarsening can be recognised by:
• Aircraft performance and controlability in accordance with the single engine climb
requirements.
• Oil pressure below the green arc on the prop gearbox oil press gauge.
• Illumination of the AC GEN light on the overhead panel and the ICE PROT ���� light on the
CWP.
also
With Dowty Rotol propellers (A and B, silver spinner)
• Audible fluctuating propeller RPM. Individual propeller blades can be seen now and then.
• A recurrent light vibration caused by continuously decreasing and increasing drag on the
side of the failed engine.
With Hamilton Sunstrand propellers (WT, black spinner)
• The propeller may continue to rotate slowly. This should not be mistaken for a failure to
autocoarsen.
• Fluctuating propeller RPM will not occur,
Windmilling without autocoarsening can be recognised by:
• Prop gearbox still has normal oil pressure (green arc).
• High drag on the side of the failed engine which makes the aircraft difficult to control, while
aircraft performance is well below the requirements for single engine climb.
• A possible illumination of the green autocoarsen ARM light and/or the amber autocoarsen
light on the CWP.
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The following Master Warning and Cautions will be annunciated for an engine failure on take-off
and subsequent autocoarsening.
• Master Warning – L/R ENGINE OIL PRESS
• Master Cautions – ICE PROT-FUEL-ELEC-AIR COND
NOTE
AIR COND light will not be on if the BLD VALVE is set at AUTO.
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5.13.4 Engine Indications after Engine Failure
Assume Left Hand Engine Failure and Autocoarsening has occurred (B Model illustrated).
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5.13.5 Standard Calls and Actions – Engine Fire Warning
(With No Power Loss)
PF PNF
Carry out normal rotation. Call “Positive rate, gear up, max power”.
“Confirmed” (and “Cancel” if required).
Confirm positive rate and select gear up.
Set CTOT to rated power or advance power levers to max power.
Call “Selected, max power set”
When the transit light extinguishes select yaw damper on. Call “Yaw damper on”.
Adjust heading bug if required.
Call “Engine fire”.
Silence the fire bell.
At the Flap Zero speed (VFL UP/VFL UP + 10 in icing conditions), call “Flap Zero”.
At VENROUTE +10 press Vert Sync.
Call “Flight Director, autopilot on”
(Normally below 400 ft for Flap Zero AEO take-off).
At flap retraction altitude (400 ft AGL) call “Flap at zero” if flaps are already at zero
or
“Flap Zero....” (e.g. Flap Zero {VFL UP/VFL UP + 10 in icing conditions}127)
Select Flap Zero and call “Selected”. Leave hand of flap lever until flaps are indicating
zero.
When flaps indicate zero call “Flap at zero”.
Select both Flight Directors on and engage autopilot.
Call “Autopilot on, heading, indicated, ½ bank on”.
Call “Identify the failure”.
Call “Confirmed (or call “Negative” if incorrect), engine fire Memory Items”.
In order to prevent large autopilot oscillations accelerate to a minimum of VENROUTE +10 prior to shutting down the engine.
After engine is shut down adjust airspeed to maintain best OEI gradient of climb (VENR/VENR+10 in icing).
Check performance.
“Check Circuit Breakers”. Check and reset any tripped Circuit Breakers.
“Emergency Cover Checklist”.
Respond “Left (or right) engine fire”.
Carry out the engine fire Memory Items.
Check performance.
Check and reset any tripped Circuit Breakers.
Retrieve and action the ECCL.
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5.14 SINGLE ENGINE CLIMB
From the acceleration altitude to the MMA, MSA or LSALT climb at VENROUTE. If further climb is
desired, higher speeds may be used if sufficient single engine performance is available.
NOTE
The best OEI gradient speed (Flap Zero) is VENROUTE. The best
OEI gradient speed (Flap Zero) in icing conditions is
VENROUTE +10 KIAS.
5.15 ENGINE FAILURE IN FLIGHT
5.15.1 Considerations
CAO 20.6 specifies the considerations applicable to the continuation of flight in the event of an
engine failure and ATS notification.
Company policy requires that for engine-out operations a landing should be made at the nearest
operationally suitable airport at which a safe landing can be made.
The Pilot-in-Command may elect to proceed to an airport of his or her selection instead of the
nearest operationally suitable airport if, upon consideration of all relevant factors, he or she deems
such action to be safe and operationally acceptable.
These factors shall include the following:
1. the nature of the malfunction and the possible mechancial, systems or handling difficulties
which may be encountered if the flight is continued,
2. the availability of the inoperative engine if required,
3. altitude, aircraft weight, and usable fuel at the time of engine stoppage,
4. distance to be flown coupled with the performance availability (refer to Chapter 6 -
Performance and Flight Planning),
5. relative characteristics of airports available for landing including approach aids available,
6. weather conditions enroute and at possible landing points,
7. ATC congestion,
8. type of terrain, and
9. familiarity with the airport to be used.
All in-flight engine failures shall be handled according to the ECCL.
After an engine failure in flight crews must disconnect the autopilot and re-trim the aircraft prior to
re-engaging the autopilot. This is to ensure the autopilot does not hold trim forces in case of an
unexpected autopilot disconnect.
After an engine failure crews should consider setting MCP and drift down flight procedures (if
required) at VENROUTE (+10 in icing) with ½ bank on or VENROUTE +10 (+20 in icing) with ½ bank
off. After the above considerations, power and profile requirements should be addressed.
Additional information regarding single engine service ceiling and drift down can be found in
Chapter 6 – Performance and Flight Planning.
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After an engine has been shutdown the Aileron Mistrim (AIL) indication may illuminate due to the
changes in the roll force input required by the autopilot. These forces will vary with changes in
speed.
For OEI only if the AIL mistrim indication appears on the EFIS be prepared for trim transients and
disengage the auto pilot and yaw damper. Retrim the affected channel and reengage the auto pilot
and yaw damper. If the AIL mistrim indication continues apply failure management procedures.
It is Company policy that no approach be commenced until the Pilot-in-Command is satisfied that
all normal, QRH or ECCL procedures have been completed, as far as possible, prior to the
commencement of the approach.
WARNING
Unnecessary flight and aircraft manoeuvring below VMM is to
be avoided.
NOTE
Above the MSA the autocoarsen system is switched off. Should an
engine failure occur the decay in airspeed will be rapid. The decay
in airspeed must be controlled by increasing the power on the
operating engine and feathering the failed engine’s propeller.
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5.15.2 Automatic Relight Flight Characteristics
A flameout with automatic relight will cause a yawing movement and a rolling movement first in one
direction, then in the other. The size of these transients depends on the time of the event.
Control of the aircraft in this situation is no different from a power loss situation. However, when the
automatic relight occurs, the aircraft rapidly returns to a symmetric power condition.
Should a flameout and automatic relight occur with the Autocoarsen switch in the on position, the
propeller will move towards the coarse pitch before relight. When relight occurs, an over swing in
torque may occur and should, if possible, be noted by the flight crew.
5.15.3 Power Levers
Whenever an engine has been shutdown, and not before the memory items have been confirmed
by the relevant checklist, crews may use both Power Levers together in the normal manner. In any
case, the Power Levers should be “married” prior to an approach to ensure they are both advanced
for the go around if required.
5.15.4 Use of Bleed Air Following an Engine Failure/Shutdown
Following an engine failure/shutdown the use of bleed air for airconditioning and pressurisation is
generally recommended.
Prior to selecting the operating bleed valve switch to AUTO ensure performance is adequate and
no limits will be exceeded. This may require delaying selection until established in cruise or
possibly not at all. Bleed valves must be CLOSED prior to making an approach to land.
NOTE
Drift down charts are calculated with the operating engine bleed
valve CLOSED (ECS off) below 10,000 ft. If drift down
performance is not limiting, the bleed valve may be left in AUTO. If
drift down performance is limiting, the bleed valve must be
CLOSED.
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5.16 ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE (OEI) APPROACH
PROCEDURES
5.16.1 Configuration
A single engine approach conducted correctly presents no difficulty.
Whenever an abnormal condition exits, normal procedures should be carried out as far as
possible, therefore, configure the aircraft in the same manner as for a normal two engine approach.
The only difference is that Flap 7 is selected prior to the IAF instead of Flap 15. Refer to Chapter 3
Normal Operating Procedures for the normal two engine approach procedures for Precision and
Non Precision Approaches.
Notwithstanding the above, if the Captain believes the proposed or current configuration imposes
an unacceptable performance restriction, the configuration must be changed immediately.
During OEI visual and instrument approaches, selection of gear or flap may be delayed until the
commencement of descent. If this is to be the case then the PF must brief the PNF prior to the
approach.
5.16.2 Engine Failure/Fire During Approach
The PF will call “Identify the failure”. The PNF must confirm the failure/fire with torque,
temperature, CWP indications and in the case of engine fire, the fire handle, and call, “Left (or
right) engine failure/fire”. The PF will call, “Confirmed (or Negative if incorrect) engine failure/
fire Memory Items”. With the autocoarsen switch off (for a circling approach with the landing gear
up) autocoarsening will not occur, therefore Engine Failure Memory Items must be completed
without delay in order to feather the propeller. In the case of the A model aircraft at low power
settings with the autocoarsen switch to ON, the propeller will not autocoarsen, however advancing
the Power Lever (above the 64° PLA) will trigger an autocoarsen.
Following an engine failure/fire, extreme caution must be taken to ensure that the correct engine is
shutdown. Before each action required to shut down an engine (and if necessary, activation of the
fire extinguishing system) the PF must confirm that the PNF has his hand on the correct switch,
lever, etc. before the PNF actions them.
After an engine shutdown, crews should consider performance implications without delay. This
should include flap and gear positions. The PF will advance the power levers as necessary to
maintain the required flight path, at a minimum VMM. If added performance is required set MCP
(Condition lever must be at Max).
Following an engine failure during an approach the primary considerations are to fly the aircraft
accurately including remaining on track and not descending below any altitude restrictions.
If there is a possibility the cloud base/visibility may be below minima, the approach should be
discontinued once the propeller has been feathered and tracking ensures terrain clearance.
Diversion to an alternate should then be considered.
Where an abnormal/emergency occurs after an approach has been commenced, a go-around
should be considered. If this abnormal/emergency condition requires checklist items to be
completed then a go-around should be commenced without delay unless this would expose the
aircraft to additional risk.
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Although either pilot may call “Going around” the Pilot-in-Command is ultimately responsible to
decide if the approach should continue or not and shall advise the other pilot if this is contrary to
what was called.
NOTE
If an engine should fail on short final or after Flap 35 has been
selected the approach and landing may be completed. Time and
altitude permitting, flaps may be retracted to 20° and a VFA 20 + 10
applied.
5.16.3 One Engine Inoperative Landing Procedure
Landing with an engine inoperative does not present any special problems as sufficient power is
available and performance is good as long as the approach and landing is planned properly.
A landing must not be made unless all checklist items have been completed in accordance with
either the ECCL or the QRH.
During any emergency situation it is important to stay as close as practicable to the normal flight
profile. This is especially true for an asymmetric approach and landing which should be flown to the
normal profile.
Assuming there are no other malfunctions, Flap 20 shall be used for all OEI landings.
When conducting an approach for landing, the aircraft must be stabilised in the landing
configuration no later than 300 ft AGL. Airspeed must be within a speed range of VFA to VFA + 10
with a rate of descent of not more than 1,000 fpm.
In order not to “float”, it is important power is reduced to flight idle at the threshold crossing height.
Touch down as for normal landing, however, care must be exercised with the use of beta and
reverse.
Prior to the landing flare, the yaw trim should be centred (trim zero).
When the aircraft is firmly on the ground, lower the nose wheel (gently) on the runway and
SLOWLY retard the power levers into beta, applying brakes as necessary.
Directional control can be maintained by rudder, symmetrical braking and differential braking (if
required).
Use of reverse thrust should be restricted as the “swing” towards the operating engine may
become uncontrollable. In the event that the aircraft does swing move the power lever towards
flight idle.
Once the aircraft has come to a complete stop, assuming no evacuation is required, the Captain
should set the park brake and announce over the PA “This is the Captain, everyone remain
seated”.
After the completion of all required landing actions the Captain should consider a further PA to
reassure the passengers and provide any further pertinent information.
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5.17 ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE GO-AROUND
PROCEDURES
Where possible OEI go-around procedures should be avoided. If a go-around is required it shall be
performed without delay.
In order to facilitate APR function (B model only), the Autocoarsen should be on for all OEI
approaches. If CTOT is used it is important the PNF ensures the APR has functioned correctly.
To prevent engine limitations being exceeded the following Standard Operating Procedures apply:
1. The FAF shall be used to annotate the earliest position during an instrument approach in
which the CTOT may be used to conduct a go-around procedure.
2. Prior to the FAF the power shall be set manually without the use of CTOT. The PF shall
advance the PLs manually (set MCP if required).
3. If conducting a visual approach the CTOT system may be used at or below 1,000 ft AGL.
The PNF shall ensure all engine limitations are strictly adhered to, especially torque and ITT.
As the power is advanced it is important the PF applies positive control inputs. During power
application and the initial configuration change, it is desirable for the aircraft to track straight ahead.
Use both hands on the control column. Large inputs of both aileron and rudder are required to
maintain control and correct tracking.
Low pressure bleed valves must be closed for all OEI approaches. Should a go-around be required
the high pressure bleed valves must also be closed to ensure that max power is available.
If an engine fails during an approach the low pressure and high pressure bleed valves must be
closed prior to initiating a go-around.
When calculating the CTOT setting, ensure the “Bleeds Closed” figure is set.
CAUTION
Both pilots must constantly monitor OEI performance. If
minimum climb performance is not being achieved corrective
action must be implemented immediately.
NOTE
On a OEI G/A, positive rate of climb may not be achieved until the
gear is retracted. Only delay retracting the gear if contact with the
ground is likely.
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5.17.1 OEI Go-Around/Missed Approach Profile
At M
DA
(IL
S,
RN
AV
[G
NS
S])
or
MA
P (
VO
R, N
DB
)
PN
F -
“M
INIM
A
N
IL S
IGH
TIN
G”
PF
-
“G
OIN
G A
RO
UN
D”
PN
F -
“F
LA
P 7
SE
LE
CT
ED
,
PO
WE
R S
ET
,
GE
AR
SE
LE
CT
ED
UP
,
YA
W D
AM
PE
R O
N,
½
BA
NK
ON
”
MD
A
Esta
blis
hed in
clim
b
PF
-“E
ME
RG
EN
CY
C
OV
ER
CH
EC
KL
IST
”
Min
400 ft A
GL
PN
F -
“F
LA
P Z
ER
O…
.”
PF
-
“F
LA
P Z
ER
O”
PN
F -
“S
EL
EC
TE
D” then
“F
LA
P A
T Z
ER
O”
Min
1000 ft A
GL
PF
-“S
ET
MA
X C
ON
TIN
UO
US
PO
WE
R”
At V
EN
RO
UT
E
(VE
NR
OU
TE +
10 in icin
g c
ond
itio
ns)
PF
-“H
EA
DIN
G (
or
NA
V)
IN
DIC
AT
ED
”
PN
F -
“H
EA
DIN
G (
LR
N1
)
IND
ICA
TE
D”
PF
-
“A
UT
OP
ILO
T O
N”
PN
F -
“A
UT
OP
ILO
T O
N,
H
EA
DIN
G (
or
LR
N1),
IND
ICA
TE
D,
½
BA
NK
ON
”
MA
P
MA
X 1
50 k
ts U
NT
IL G
EA
R IS
UP
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5.17.2 OEI Go-Around/Missed Approach Calls and Procedures
PF PNF
“Going around”. Press go-around button. Advance PLs (to one o'clock position or 80% without CTOT).
Place BOTH hands on the control column.
Rotate to climb attitude 6.4°.
Ensure the Cavalry Charge is silenced prior to the yaw damper being engaged.
Automatically upon hearing the call “Going around”, select Flap 7, select CTOT switch to APR (B Model) or ARM (A Model), select gear up with speed at or below 150 KIAS. When the gear is up, select yaw damper on. Select/ensure both Flight Directors are on and ½ bank on.
Call each item as it is actioned, “Flap 7 selected (or “Flap at zero”), power set, gear selected up, yaw damper on, ½ bank on”.
NOTE
The PNF shall only select CTOT from the FAF or its equivalent. If conducting a visual approach CTOT may be selected from at or below 1,000 ft AGL.
Ensure TRQ, ITT and gear limits are not exceeded.
At VENROUTE (VENROUTE +10 in icing conditions) call “Heading, indicated”
For RNAV (GNSS) only: call “Nav, indicated”.
Select HDG and IAS and call “Heading, indicated”.
For RNAV (GNSS) only: Select NAV and IAS and call “LRN1, indicated”.
“Autopilot on”. Check correct modes and select autopilot on. Call “Autopilot on, heading (or LRN1) indicated, ½ bank on”.
For RNAV (GNSS) only: call “Enter missed approach”.
Enter the missed approach in the FMS and call “Entered” (no confirmation is required by the PF).
Call, “Flap Zero”.
At flap retraction altitude (400 ft AGL) call “Flap Zero ....” (e.g. Flap Zero {VFL UP/VFL UP + 10 in icing conditions}127).
Select Flap Zero and call “Selected”. Leave hand on flap lever until flaps are indicating zero.
When flaps indicate zero call “Flap at zero”.
Minimum1,000 ft AGL, call “Set max continuous power”.
Set max continuous power.
Call “Emergency Cover Checklist”.
Do not allow the actioning of the Checklist to divert attention away from monitoring of flight path and maintaining a vigilant lookout.
Read from the ECCL, the After Shutdown, Descent and Approach and Final Checklists (those in white).
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CAUTION
Throughout the missed approach procedure it is important
engine limitations are not exceeded. MCP must be set within
5 minutes of setting take-off power.
5.17.3 Missed Approach Procedures When Operating at Reduced
Power
Some emergency/abnormal procedures require an engine to be operated at reduced power (ie. 20-
30% torque). It is assumed if this is the case, OEI procedures will be adopted.
When operating under reduced power the ECCL MUST NOT BE USED. In this case the QRH
shall be used. All items must be actioned in accordance with checklist requirements.
In the event of a go-around BOTH engines may be required to meet performance requirements. If
this is the case, do not hesitate in advancing BOTH PL’s.
Due to a possible lag in P3 pressure, the engine operating under reduced power may start to
autocoarsen as the power lever is advanced. As P3 pressure increases the propeller will
uncoarsen. To ensure this does not occur smooth and gentle operation of the PL is required when
advancing power.
WARNING
Operations with the PL at FI are not recommended, as the
drag is greater than a feathered propeller. Do not commence
a G/A with one PL at FI.
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5.18 FLAPLESS LANDING
A flapless landing is regarded as an abnormal procedure and as such careful planning is required,
especially in relation to additional landing distances requirements. It is the responsibility of the
Pilot-in-Command to decide what relationship between landing distance required and available
landing field length shall be acceptable.
5.18.1 Recommendations
• Flapless landing is to be considered as an abnormal procedure.
Check abnormal checklist (FLAP FAULT or FLAPS light on).
• If possible execute a straight-in approach.
• Maintain the normal approach profile of 3o.
• If circling approach, make a wide pattern and aim for a 5 mile final.
• If marginal weather, choose an airport with good landing aids (ILS/VASI/PAPI).
• Select gear down earlier than normal to be able to establish the approach speed in good
time.
• On final approach pay attention to the vertical speed indication. The pitch attitude is higher
than usual (4º nose up). When changing from instrument to visual references, the pitch
attitude must be maintained. A slight reduction in pitch will create a high sink rate, which
may easily go undetected and there is a great possibility, especially in gusty conditions,
that on final the aircraft can come too close to the ground or the approach lights.
• Anticipate a more than normal floating tendency due to increased ground effect. Avoid any
tendency to float. Fly the aircraft to a positive touchdown at the intended landing point.
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5.19 EMERGENCY DESCENT
5.19.1 General
A rapid depressurisation is recognised by a rapid loss of cabin pressure at a continued high rate,
as evidenced by the cabin rate of climb indicator and cabin altitude increase. A rapid
depressurisation may be followed by an emergency descent that must be conducted in accordance
with standard operating procedures.
Emergency descents can be required for several reasons including decompression, severe icing
and engine failure/s.
Detailed below is the procedure to be followed for decompression. It is not practical to provide a
checklist for all other possible cases requiring an Emergency Descent and the actions for the
decompression case should be followed as appropriate.
The certification of the SAAB 340 requires that the aircraft can descend to FL140 or lower within 4
minutes (CAR 20.4).
5.19.2 Emergency Descent Procedure
1. Identify and confirm the failure.
2. Conduct Rapid Depressurisation Memory Items:
OXYGEN MASKS AND REGULATORS ....................................................... ON & 100%
• Autopilot ON
- Both pilots don oxygen masks
• Autopilot OFF
- PF must continue to fly the aircraft – PNF dons oxygen mask
- PF dons oxygen mask
NOTE
Hand over required.
COMMUNICATIONS.....................................................................................ESTABLISH
TRANSPONDER...................................................................................................... 7700
SEAT BELT SIGN........................................................................................................ON
3. Assessment of Structural Integrity
• Yes or No
4. Decision to conduct Emergency Descent – Captain
• Yes or No
- Yes – High or Low speed descent
- No – (FL 140 and below) Normal descent to 10,000 ft
5. The Captain shall advise other flight crew member on the flight deck by calling
“Emergency Descent - High/Low Speed” as appropriate
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6. Actions - PF
• Power Levers – flight idle
• Disconnect autopilot
• High speed
- Initial attitude 10º nose down (average 6º nose down)
- Speed Max Mmo/Vmo
• Low speed
- Speed - 200 kts
- Configuration – Gear down
• Turn 45º off track for 1 minute then parallel track
• Re-engage autopilot – HDG/IAS or VS – Monitor Flight Path
NOTE
If the aircraft is equipped with an electronic speed bug consider
descending in IAS mode. As VMO increases the Captain should
increase IAS using the speed bug.
7. Actions – PNF
• CL’s – Max
• The PNF shall alert the cabin by making an announcement on the PA
“This is the Captain, Emergency Descent”
• Set APA - 10,000 ft
• PAN call
• Monitor flight path
8. When stabilised at the level off altitude, the PNF must make the following announcement
using the PA.
“This is the Captain. A safe altitude has been reached”
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9. PF calls “Emergency Checklist Rapid Depressurisation – Emergency Descent”
NOTE
As a safe guard against descending onto traffic below, the PF
should immediately turn the aircraft 45 deg off track for one minute
and then resume original heading to parallel track. This turn shall
be limited to 30º angle of bank.
After stabilising the aircraft in Emergency Descent consider re-
engaging the autopilot in HDG/IAS or Vs MODE. Initial descent
rates will be in the order of 6,000 fpm however, as speed
increases descent rates need to be reduced. In order to maximise
the descent profile airspeed must remain close to Mmo/Vmo.
Speed must never exceed Max Mmo/Vmo.
Until the autopilot is re-engaged the PNF should control the HDG
Bug and APA settings. All timing shall be conducted by the PNF.
Where appropriate, checklist E7 should be conducted after the
autopilot has been re engaged. Reading of the checklist must not
interfere with flight path monitoring.
5.19.3 Post Emergency Descent Considerations
The flight crew must then:
1. Assess the status of the cabin from information provided by the Flight Attendant.
2. Assess supplemental oxygen requirements.
3. Assess the altitude and fuel requirements.
4. Reassess the suitability of the planned destination or the need for an alternate.
5. Advise ATC of the nature of the emergency and intentions.
6. Advise the Flight Attendant of the nature of the emergency and intentions.
7. Use long range cruise if appropriate.
8. Address passengers with an informed PA.
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5.19.4 Emergency Descent Profile
Capta
in
“EMERGENCY D
ESCENT,
HIG
H SPEED o
r LOW SPEED”
PF
“MEMORY ITEMS,
RAPID D
EPRESSURISATIO
N”
PN
F
“THIS IS THE C
APTAIN
,
A SAFE ALTITUDE H
AS
BEEN R
EACHED”
PF
“EMERGENCY
CHECKLIST, RAPID
DEPRESSURISATIO
N –
EMERGENCY D
ESCENT”
PN
F
Set
AP
A t
o A
100
PA
N c
all
Monitor
flig
ht
path
PF
R
e e
ngage a
uto
pilo
t –
HD
G/I
AS
or
VS
M
onitor
flig
ht
path
PF
Po
wer
Le
ve
rs
FI
AP
D
isconnect
HIG
H S
PE
ED
In
itia
l 10
nose d
ow
n
(avera
ge 6
)
Speed M
mo/V
mo
or
LO
W S
PE
ED
S
pee
d
200 k
ts
Gear
D
ow
n
Turn
45
off
tra
ck
for
one m
inute
After
one m
inute
,
turn
to p
ara
llel tr
ack
PN
F P
A
“THIS IS THE C
APTAIN
,
EMERGENCY D
ESCENT”
PN
F
CL
M
ax
Cru
ise Level
A100
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5.20 DOUBLE ENGINE FLAMEOUT
The chances of having a double engine flameout are highly remote. Possible causes may result
from fuel starvation, ice, ash, or mechanical failure.
A primary effect will be that one or both propellers will windmill. The drag will cause the IAS to
decay rapidly especially if the AP is engaged. It is important crews identify and act immediately
upon recognition of a double engine flameout. The autopilot must be disconnected without delay
and a 5º nose down attitude adopted. This will prevent a rapid decay in airspeed. The nose down
attitude should be maintained until the CL’s are moved into fuel shut off position and the propellers
are feathered. After the propellers have feathered a 5º nose up attitude will aid in maintaining 130
KIAS.
As a secondary effect, both generators will go off line approximately 10-15 seconds after the
engines have failed. This will result in a total EFIS failure. The PF should concentrate on
maintaining attitude and airspeed. Maintaining control of the aircraft must be the first priority.
As the Captain is familiar with the start sequence he should consider becoming the PNF. This will
allow him to conduct checklist and subsequent start procedures.
Memory Items shall be conducted in accordance with Company SOP’s. If an engine is re-started,
prior to consulting Emergency Checklist, the PNF should set MCP and consider re-engaging the
the AP in HDG/NAV. – IAS/VS modes.
Communications with ATC, Flight Attendant and passengers should be considered only after an
engine has been started and control of the aircraft is assured.
5.21 TAWS/GPWS WARNING IN FLIGHT
When a TAWS/GPWS warning occurs in IMC or at night, pilots must immediately and without
hesitation:
1. Disconnect AP, maintain wings level and simultaneously pitch up at a rotation rate of 2 to 3
degrees per second to the best angle of climb attitude (approx. 12 deg).
2. Apply MCP and execute a pull up action.
3. Continue maximum climb straight ahead until all visual and aural warnings cease.
4. Monitor radio altimeter for trend toward terrain contact and adjust pitch attitude accordingly
upward as necessary.
5. Advise ATC as required.
When a TAWS/GPWS warning occurs in VMC by day, the pilots should immediately assess the
warning and take whatever corrective action is required to ensure the safe flight of the aircraft. In
doing so the PF will acknowledge the warning and state the corrective action to be taken.
After a TAWS/GPWS warning at night or in IMC, an incident report must be submitted.
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TCAS
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5.22 TCAS
5.22.1 General
The ATSB requires that Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) Resolution Advisory
Alerts be treated as immediately notifiable occurrences. As such an SMS must be submitted.
5.22.2 Traffic Advisory (TA) Actions
Immediately upon a TA annunciation, crew members must attempt to establish visual contact with
the intruder. The PF must not manoeuvre solely on the basis of a TA, although subsequent visual
acquisition of the intruder may make it necessary to perform some avoidance action.
5.22.3 Resolution Advisory (RA) Actions
A resolution advisory, with its associated TCAS voice annunciation, is a prediction that another
aircraft (that is providing altitude data) will enter the collision airspace. When TCAS predicts an
RA, TCAS vertical guidance is displayed.
The pilot flying must immediately disengage the autopilot and respond to the RA commands
unless the Captain considers that doing so would jeopardise the safe operation of the flight. TCAS
assumes a 5 second response time to an RA. Reaction time to any ‘increase’ or ‘reversal’ RA is
2.5 seconds.
PF PNF
Disconnects the autopilot.
Applies pitch and power as required to comply with the RA.
Calls ATC, “(callsign) ....TCAS RA”.
Monitors the aircraft’s flight path.
Attempts to visually acquire the traffic.
Once TCAS “Clear of conflict” is annunciated, return to the previously assigned level.
Calls ATC, “(callsign) ....clear of conflict, returning to (assigned level)”.
Once at previously assigned level, call ATC: “(callsign) ....clear of conflict, (assigned level) resumed”.
If an RA contradicts an ATC clearance or instruction, comply with the RA
Calls ATC, “(callsign) ...unable, TCAS RA”.
To comply with RA, avoid flying
vertical speeds in the red banded
areas and do fly vertical speeds in the
green band areas shown.
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Climbing or descending at a greater rate than the displayed TCAS RA command should be
avoided as it tends to increase the possibility of interference with other traffic and exaggerates ATC
clearance deviation. At the annunciation of “Clear of conflict”, the pilot flying (manipulating pilot)
should promptly return the aircraft to the assigned altitude or resume the ATC clearance (for
example, climb or descent). ATC must be advised accordingly.
Crew should consider broadcast of standard TCAS radio phraseology on Area or CTAF frequency,
as appropriate, to increase awareness of other traffic in the area.
During an RA manoeuvre, the PF must ensure that the desired airspeed is maintained.
If a TCAS ‘Climb’ or ‘Increase Climb’ RA occurs when configured for a landing, carry out the TCAS
action in conjunction with the go-around procedure. If a Stall Warning (or stick shaker) occurs
during a TCAS manoeuvre, immediately abandon it and execute the Stall Recovery. If a
TAWS/GPWS warning occurs immediately abandon the RA manoeuvre and execute the TAWS/
GPWS Recovery Procedure.
It is possible that the RA will require manoeuvres that the aircraft cannot perform. In this case the
following limits will apply:
Power If required apply up to MCP
Pitch AEO, respond to the RA with the following limitations:
- Max pitch: ± 15o deg pitch
- Min speed: V2 or VENROUTE +10 in icing
OEI, operations are in TA mode only. If an avoidance manoeuvre is performed, use
the following limitations:
- Max pitch: + 6.5o and - 15o deg pitch
- Min speed: V2 or VENROUTE +10 in icing
If the target is visually acquired manoeuvre as required to avoid a collision.
WARNING
Never manoeuvre opposite to a TCAS RA.
CAUTION
TCAS RA responses do not require violent manoeuvring to
resolve a conflict.
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5.23 OVERWEIGHT LANDING
Normally, the maximum certified landing weight should not be exceeded. Overweight landings may
be performed in any abnormal or emergency situations. Situations such as serious illness of crew
or passengers, which would require immediate medical attention, would also justify an overweight
landing. Deviations from prescribed procedures to the extent required are permissible in the
interest of safety.
In preparation for an overweight landing due consideration must be given to the following:
1. System Malfunctions, which might effect the landing include:
• hydraulic failure,
• landing gear or tyre failure,
• flight controls failure, and/or
• one engine out condition.
2. Performance Requirements:
• landing field length,
• approach and landing climb gradients,
• flap speed, and/or
• go-around capability, if applicable.
3. Meteorological Conditions:
• ceiling and visibility,
• crosswind and/or tailwind component,
• contamination of runways, and/or
• windshear conditions.
The normal sink rate at touchdown averages 120 ft/min. The airplane is certified with a sink rate of
360 ft/min at the structural limited TOW and with 600 ft/min at maximum landing weight. Therefore,
structural problems will not arise, provided sink rates at touchdown do not exceed 360 ft/min.
Each overweight landing must be noted in the Daily Flight Log and reported to Engineering prior to
the next take-off. After an overweight landing an incident report must be submitted.
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5.24 OVERSPEED WARNING
The overspeed warning is regarded as an abnormal occurrence. It is expect the PF shall monitor
airspeed, ensuring speed remains below Vmo. Descent speeds should not normally exceed Vmo –
10 KIAS.
When the indicated air speed on the Captain’s side exceeds VMO by 1.5 kts a continuous horn will
sound. The airspeed indicator on the First Officer’s side has a back-up system should the primary
system fail.
The sounding of this warning should not go unacknowledged. When the horn sounds, the PNF
calls “Overspeed warning”. The PF acknowledges by calling “Checked” and takes appropriate
corrective action.
5.25 UNRELIABLE AIR DATA
A loss of, or unreliable air data may occur due to an obstruction of one or more pitot/static sources,
a failure of the Air Data Computer, or the failure of an individual instrument. Depending on the
reason for the loss of air data, the failure may present some or all of the following symptoms to the
crew:
• Left ASI Red Flag
• Left Altimeter Red Flag
• Left VSI Red Flag
• Left/Right/Standby Airspeed Indicator increasing with an increase in altitude
• Left/Right/Standby Airspeed Indicator decreasing with a decrease in altitude
• Nil Movement on Left/Right and/or Standby Airspeed Indicator
• Nil Movement on Left/Right and/or Standby Altimeter
• Nil Movement on Left/Right Vertical Speed Indicator
• Significant discrepancies between different altimeters and airspeed indicators
• Loss of TAS display and Wind Vector on EHSI replaced with red flags
• Erroneous APA alerts
• Erroneous Flight Director commands in the pitch axis
• Erroneous Overspeed Warnings
• Rudder Limiter Master Caution
• FMS message “ADC Fail”
The QRH offers three checklists to manage Air Data faults. Careful consideration of the cause of
the symptoms is required to ensure the correct checklist is selected. At any time speed and/or
altitude information is in doubt, apply UNRELIABLE SPEED AND/OR ALTITUDE INDICATIONS
procedure. In the case of a situation with unreliable airspeed, it is essential to revert to basic flying
using power and pitch attitude. When disconnecting the autopilot, be prepared for transient stick
forces. Deselect the Flight Director to avoid erroneous commands possibly aggravating the
situation. Stabilize the flight path by flying on power and attitude. If necessary, adjust power. In the
event of a loss of data on take-off, level off at or above the MSA.
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Chapter 5 Page 46
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5.26 FLIGHT IN TURBULENCE
5.26.1 General
Flight through areas of known severe turbulence should be avoided. However, should the aircraft
enter severe turbulence then the following is recommended.
5.26.2 Notification to the Flight Attendant
The crew should advise the Flight Attendant, if time permits, by the interphone that they are about
to experience moderate to severe turbulence. If time does not permit, then by the PA, “Flight
Attendant, take your seat”. The Flight Attendant will respond by taking the nearest seat, strap
themselves in and wait till the all clear comes from the flight deck.
5.26.3 Altitude
Large altitude variations are likely to occur in severe turbulence. Do not oppose these by sudden
large control inputs but by slight elevator movements. If in controlled airspace, advise ATC of the
difficulty in maintaining levels.
DO NOT CHASE ALTITUDE: FLY ATTITUDE
5.26.4 Speed
Prepare in advance, if possible, by adjusting power and trim to maintain VRA speed. When flying
into turbulent conditions, do not reduce speed rapidly. It is better to fly too fast than too slow in an
unstable state of power and trim.
When flying in moderate or severe turbulence, large fluctuations of indicated airspeed are likely to
occur. Aim for the VRA speed.
Do not over control in an effort to maintain a selected speed, as this is more likely to lead to loss of
control than the speed fluctuations themselves and greater loads will be imposed on the aircraft.
DO NOT CHASE AIRSPEED
The alpha vanes are sensitive to fast variations in load factor (caused by turbulence). When
climbing in moderate or severe turbulence minimum AEO climb speeds should be increased by 10
kts and 15 kts respectively. In these conditions the autopilot may not react quickly enough to track
the desired speed, include when in CLIMB/IAS mode. If this is the case the AP should be
disconnected and the aircraft’s attitude adjusted to achieve the required performance.
5.26.5 Attitude and Trim
Keep the aircraft level and fly primarily on the EADI. The altimeter, airspeed indicator and vertical
speed indicator can be misleading. If the power and trim are set for level flight to maintain VRA and
left alone, the airspeed will remain within safe aerodynamic limits provided the attitude is
maintained reasonably constant.
FLY ATTITUDE ON THE EADI AND DO NOT CHANGE THE
ELEVATOR TRIM WHILE IN TURBULENCE
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5.26.6 Power Settings
Set power for VRA and do not change it unless fine corrections become necessary to oppose larger
and persistent variations in speed/altitude. Large variations of power will change both pitch and
trim.
5.26.7 Autopilot
The autopilot will not be fooled by false attitude cues or unreadability of instruments in severe
turbulence and it will be able to make corrective control inputs when such inputs become
necessary. It is therefore recommended to keep the autopilot engaged. Monitor the autopilot
carefully and be alert for an inadvertent disconnect. Do not use IAS or ALT modes. HDG and VS
modes are recommended. Do not assist or resist control motions when the autopilot is engaged.
USE AUTOPILOT TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. BE PREPARED FOR AN
INADVERTENT AP DISCONNECT IN SEVERE TURBULENCE
5.26.8 Shoulder Harness and Seat Belts
Shoulder harness must be worn in severe turbulence and if necessary the inertia reel locked. The
Fasten Seat Belt sign must be ON.
5.26.9 Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML)
An AML must be raised following flight through severe turbulence and requires engineering
inspection.
NOTE
The L/R Engine Oil Pressure Warning Lights and Master Warning
will come on during flight with negative G load in turbulent air.
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Wake Turbulence
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5.27 WAKE TURBULENCE
5.27.1 General
Wake Turbulence separation standards shall be, at a minimum, in accordance with the
requirements published in the Jeppesen Airway Manual. Wake Turbulence Pilot Waivers are not to
be sought or accepted under any circumstances.
Flight crew must use sound judgement when operating in proximity to heavier aircraft, especially in
light wind conditions. Whilst not limited to, previous experiences have shown increased risks
departing behind the Airbus A320 as they sit in the higher end of the medium wake turbulence
category.
The strength of wake turbulence is dependent on the weight, wing design, aircraft configuration
and aircraft attitude of the leading aircraft. The strongest wakes are generated behind aircraft that
are heavy, clean and slow (high angle of attack).
Wake turbulence from an aircraft begins from the point of rotation on take-off and ends once the
nose wheel touches the ground during the landing.
Wake Turbulence can persist for:
• Approximately 60 seconds, with wind speeds between 5 and 10 knots;
• Up to 120 seconds, when the wind speed is less than 5 knots.
The following factors increase the probability of a vortex encounter:
• Heavy, slow, and clean leading aircraft,
• Leading aircraft performing a go around,
• Parallel or crossing runways,
• Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), because of the reduction in separation between
aircraft during visual approaches,
• Light crosswind (1 to 5 knots) or tailwind,
• Stable atmosphere, temperature inversion (at sunrise for example),
• Flat surrounding terrain,
• During the final descent, a tailwind can bring wake vortices back to the glide path,
• Windshear, a vortex can be trapped and maintained between two air masses that move in
different directions and/or velocities.
5.27.2 Takeoff
Whilst separation standards exist between medium and heavy aircraft it may be prudent,
depending on atmospheric conditions, to provide some mitigation / separation when departing
behind heavier medium category aircraft. Separation standards for departure dictate that the
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following aircraft does not become airborne until the specified time interval has elapsed since the
leading aircraft became airborne. For a departure out of a Controlled Aerodrome, crew may
request the order of departure from ATC to assist in advising if any separation is required.
Flight crew must advise ATC (tower) of any additional wake turbulence separation required
in addition to that published in the Jeppesen Airway Manual as soon as possible (ideally
prior to calling READY).
Flight crew must not enter a runway (or accept a clearance to enter a runway) if they have
not previously advised ATC of a separation requirement additional to that published.
To further assist with avoiding wake turbulence on takeoff, use Rated Power (refer FCOM
Chapter 6.5.3) and an intersection that will result in a rotation point occurring before the point of rotation of the preceding aircraft. If possible stay upwind of the preceding aircraft.
5.27.3 Approach
Wake turbulence behind the leading aircraft will initially descend at a rate of 300-500 feet/min. The
wake then stops descending at about 500-900 feet below the flight path of the lead aircraft. In still
air these vortices move outwards at a rate of approximately 5kts.
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There are many situations crew have to anticipate the possible occurrence of wake turbulence.
The following are examples of previous wake turbulence incidents.
Landing behind a large aircraft on the same runway.
Landing behind a large aircraft on a parallel runway
Where the LDA markedly exceeds the LDR crew may elect to fly visual approaches above the
profile/glide slope of the preceding aircraft if they perceive the threat of wake turbulence.
NOTE
The DFDR Event button must be pressed following a reportable
wake turbulence event and the subsequent SMS report should be
annotated as such where applicable.
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Chapter 5 Page 51
5.28 STALL RECOVERY
5.28.1 General
In a clean, ice-free stall, a small roll off, if any, can be expected. The roll off increases with
increased flap angle but normally will not exceed 20º with flap 35°.
In a stall with an iced-up aircraft the stall may in some cases occur before stick shaker/pusher
activation and a more pronounced roll off might occur. In an extreme case, a roll off of more than
90º and excessive nose drop can occur. If such an event is experienced it is important to be familiar
with the EADI presentation and roll back towards wings level in the shortest direction without
unnecessary overspeeding the aircraft and return to safe attitude.
WARNING
When conducting critical manoeuvres in moderate to severe
turbulence at or close to optimum speeds a momentary (one
second or less) transient stall warning might be generated.
Especially noticeable during climb with ICE SPD activated.
The transient stall warning is triggered by sudden large
movement of the alpha vane caused by the turbulence and is
not caused by actual aircraft alpha being at stall warning
level. These momentary (one second or less) warnings may
provide conflicting information during critical manoeuvres
such as TCAS / TAWS / Wind Shear Escape.
5.28.2 Stall Identification
Stall onset is recognised by:
• light (natural) buffeting of controls,
• stick shaker/pusher,
• push 1 – 2 lights,
• AP disconnect, and
• Roll/Pitch change.
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WARNING
Moderate to severe airframe icing changes the stall
identification, speed and handling characteristics
considerably. In severe cases, the first indication of a stall
may be the natural buffeting without any indication from the
stick shaker/pusher.
Provided recovery is started firmly at the first indication of stall onset, response to control inputs is
immediate and positive.
5.28.3 Recovery from Stall Warning or Stall
The recommended procedure when recovering from a stall warning (stick shaker or natural
buffeting) or stall in an clean or iced-up aircraft is to lower the nose approximately 5 degrees or as
commanded by the stick pusher (if not restricted by proximity to ground), simultaneously apply Max
power and if required roll the wings level (ref 5.29.2).
On Stall Identification
CALL .........................PF or PNF - “STALL”.
PF - “MAX POWER” and advance the power levers to approx. 80% tq
AP/YD ........................DISCONNECT
PITCH ........................ Immediately decrease approximately by 5 degrees or as commanded by the
stick pusher, do not fight the pusher. Avoid unnecessary dive.
POWER .....................PNF - Set MCP
The above items should be completed simultaneously.
SPEED.......................Accelerate to the higher of VENROUTE (VENROUTE +10 in icing) or 30 knots
above the encountered stall / warning speed. VENROUTE at max weight is
136 kts (146 kts in icing). After initial recovery, do not pull up with too high a
rate. Consider the possibility of a secondary stall.
ALTITUDE..................When positive climb rate is indicated, recover lost altitude. If flaps are down,
leave them where they are until after initial recovery. In recovering from a
low level stall, or stall with gear or flap extended, apply standard go around
procedures once a minimum VREF + 10 (VREF + 20 in icing) or stall/warning
speed + 30kts is attained. Consider the possibility of a secondary stall.
CAUTION
For an ice induced stall do not hesitate to trade altitude for speed, avoid unnecessary dive. After initial recovery, do not pull up with too high a rate. Consider the possibility of a secondary stall.
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Chapter 5 Page 53
5.29 UNUSUAL ATTITUDE/UPSET RECOVERY
5.29.1 General
An aircraft upset exists anytime an aircraft is diverging from what the pilots are intending it to do.
The primary objective in managing upsets is to intervene as soon as an undesired aircraft state
starts to occur.
An upset is characterized by unintentional divergences from parameters normally experienced
during operations and may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences as well as inappropriate
airspeeds for the conditions. Deviations may become larger or more critical until action is taken to
stop the divergence.
In all cases the pilot response to an upset must be appropriate to arrest and recover the condition.
Full-scale control deflections may be necessary. However, initiating recovery with arbitrary full-
scale control deflections could aggravate the situation. An excessive or inappropriate control input
that overshoots the desired response can startle the pilot and cause one upset to lead to another.
Pilots must be or become situationally aware before they are able to take appropriate actions.
Troubleshooting the cause of the upset is secondary to initiating the recovery actions. A pilot must
recognize and confirm the situation before a recovery can be initiated. Regaining and then
maintaining control of the airplane is paramount.
There is NO situation that will require rapid full-scale control deflections from one side to the other.
CAUTION
Excessive use of pitch trim or rudder may aggravate the
upset situation or may result in high structural loads.
5.29.2 Recovery Procedure from Excessive Roll
Recovery from Excessive Roll
AP/YD ........................DISCONNECT
ROLL.......................... Use the “blue sky” on the EADI to establish roll direction. Roll the shortest
way towards the “blue sky” to recover.
POWER...................... Reduce if large pitch down, do not over speed.
Increase if large pitch up, avoid stall.
PITCH ........................ Nose low - Pull to stop the dive. Pitch may be increased when roll <30°
Nose high - Lower to the horizon. Avoid unnecessary dive.
If excessive roll has resulted from a stall, continue as for recovery from stall procedure.
Should control be lost, resulting in a dive the following may aid recovery;
• Monitor EADI for correct up/down indications.
• Reduce power and advance CL to MAX.
• Maintain wings level and make a smooth pullup.
• Use pitch trim with great care.
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Windshear
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5.30 WINDSHEAR
5.30.1 General
Pilots must remain alert to the possibility of windshear and be prepared to make relatively harsh
control movements and power changes to offset its effects. If windshear is encountered
“Windshear” shall be called by either pilot.
Crew interaction plays a vital part in windshear recovery. The PNF should be calling instrument
trends (particularly VSI and airspeed). Do not assume the aircraft is out of windshear until constant
instrument trends have been observed.
Immediately after take-off, the pilots choices of action will be limited, since he will normally have full
power applied and be at the recommended climb speed for the configuration. If the presence of
windshear is indicated by rapidly fluctuating airspeed and or rate of climb/descent, ensure that
rated power is applied and aim to achieve maximum lift and maximum distance from the ground.
Similarly, if the shear is encountered during the approach, positive application of the power and
flying controls should be used to keep the speed and rate of descent within normal limits.
If there is any doubt, the approach should be abandoned and action taken as in the after take-off
case. Whenever windshear is encountered, its existence should be reported to ATC in terms such
as changes in IAS, sink or actual wind changes (not as overshoot or undershoot shear) as soon as
possible.
5.30.2 Avoidance
The flight crew should search for any clues to the presence of windshear along the intended flight
path. Stay clear of thunderstorm cells, heavy precipitation and areas of known windshear. If severe
windshear is indicated, delay take-off or do not commence approach. As a general rule do not land
or take-off if a thunderstorm is within 5 nm (9 km) of the airport and is forecast to track closer.
The presence of windshear may be indicated by:
1. thunderstorm activity,
2. virga (rain that evaporates before reaching the ground),
3. pilot reports, and/or
4. Low Level Windshear Alerting System (LLWAS) warnings.
5.30.3 Definitions
Windshear
Windshear is defined as a change in wind speed and/or wind direction over a short distance along
the flight path. Severe windshear is that which produces:
• airspeed changes greater than 15 kts or,
• vertical speed changes greater than 500 ft per minute or,
• pitch attitude variations or + 5o or greater or,
• glide slope displacement of +1 dot or,
• unusual power lever positions for a significant period of time.
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Windshear can be described by its effects on the aircraft, as follows:
Overshoot Shear
A windshear occurrence that produces an INITIAL effect of overshooting the desired flight path
and/or increasing indicated airspeed (either an decreasing tailwind, increasing headwind or an up
draught can cause an overshoot shear).
Undershoot Shear
A windshear occurrence that produces an INITIAL effect of undershooting the desired flight path
and/or decreasing indicated airspeed (an undershoot shear can be caused by either an increasing
tailwind, decreasing headwind or a down draught).
Crosswind Shear
A change in a crosswind component over a short distance. Intense vertical wind activity
(updraughts and downdraughts) could be variable with horizontal distance, vertical distance or
both.
WARNING
Meteorological conditions that produce severe low level
windshear are a serious threat to take-off and landing safely.
Known or expected windshear conditions should be avoided
and consideration given to delaying the take-off or landing.
5.30.4 Take-off
If possible light or moderate undershoot (tailwind) shear is expected for take-off, the following
precautions should be considered:
• If practicable, use the longest runway available or choose the take-off direction that
provides a headwind increasing with altitude.
• Where practicable, use a lower (lesser) flap setting for take-off to gain improved
performance.
• Use Rated Power.
• Use normal rotation speeds.
• Maintain V2 + 25 kts.
• If obstacle clearance is not a problem, some initial climb rate may be sacrificed to obtain
better speed margins for encountering unexpected undershoot shear.
• Maintain a continuous full panel scan during climb out when close to the ground for earliest
possible detection of windshear.
If severe undershoot shear and/or intense down draught is experienced during take-off apply
Windshear Escape procedures.
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5.30.5 Landing
A landing should NOT be attempted when severe windshear is reported on the landing flight path.
If possible light or moderate windshear conditions are expected on final approach, the following
precautions should be considered:
• Consider the use of a runway that minimises windshear exposure and optimises landing
performance.
• Use an approach speed additive, not above the maximum increment (20 kts).
• Do not make large power reductions until approaching the flare point.
If severe undershoot shear and/or intense down draughts is experienced during the approach,
apply Windshear Escape Procedures.
5.30.6 Wind Shear Escape
A Wind Shear Escape manoeuvre is considered to constitute an emergency operation. Flight crew
adherence to the procedure will take precedence over ATC clearances, instructions and/or
published procedures.
The following manoeuvre should be carried out when severe wind shear is recognised by the flight
crew.
• PF or PNF call “Wind Shear”
• PF call “Wind Shear Escape" advance PL to 80%Tq and simultaneously pitch the aircraft
up to the go-around attitude if on approach, or to a higher than normal lift-off attitude on
departure, to check the rate of descent. Accept airspeed loss to that approaching stall
warning/stick shaker speeds, as applicable, or until a rate of climb is commenced. In doing
so, DO NOT STALL. Proper attitude and speed control is mandatory to minimise any
descent rate. Climb straight ahead.
• PNF apply rated power (or maximum available power, if conditions dictate) and transmit
"REX….Wind Shear Escape"
WARNING
Delay the retraction of Flaps/Gear if the possibility of ground
contact during the escape is a factor. Do not retrim the
aircraft until stabilised conditions have again been
established.
When ground contact is no longer a possibility
• PF call "Going Around"
• PF & PNF apply normal go around procedures ensure compliance with structural speed
limitations
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Phraseologies
Whilst the above guidelines may assist in the handling of unexpected severe windshear on take-off
or approach to land, the first priority should always be, as with thunderstorms, avoidance.
WARNING
Deliberate penetration of a known severe wind shear area
must not be attempted, as a severe windshear may exceed
the performance capabilities of the aircraft.
After response to a Wind Shear Escape
Manoeuvre is completed and a return to the
ATC clearance or instruction and/or
procedure is initiated.
PNF - “Rex .... Clear of Wind Shear,
returning to ... (ATC clearance or
instruction and/or procedure)”
After response to a Wind Shear Escape
Manoeuvre is completed and ATC clearance
or instruction and/or procedure has been
resumed.
PNF - “Rex .... Clear of Wind Shear, ...
(ATC clearance or instruction and/or
procedure) resumed”
After an ATC clearance or instruction
contradictory to the Wind Shear Escape
Manoeuvre is received, the flight crew will
follow the Wind Shear Escape Manoeuvre
and inform ATC as soon as safely
practicable when permitted by the flight crew
workload.
PNF - “Rex ... Unable to comply,
windshear escape”
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5.31 PILOT INCAPACITATION
Incapacitation of a pilot may be obvious or subtle. Pilots should be alert to the possibility of subtle
incapacitation particularly in the critical stages of flight; during take-off, landing and ground
manoeuvring close to obstacles.
During these periods the PNF should ensure that he is in position to immediately take control if
necessary.
Subtle incapacitation should be suspected during critical flight conditions, if an appropriate
response is not received to any required call or cautionary prompt. If a second call results in no
response, the PNF should assume control of the aircraft immediately and call “Taking over”.
If a pilot is incapacitated at any time, assistance should be sought from FA, or suitable passengers,
as soon as a safe flight path is attained. The incapacitated pilot should be restrained from
interference with flight controls or removed from the cockpit for treatment if necessary.
ATS and Company should be advised and priority requested for approach. The assistance of any
suitably qualified Company pilots travelling as passengers may be utilised if available. For
continued single pilot operation, maximum use should be made of the auto-pilot if fitted, with the
remaining pilot operating from his normal seat until after landing.
If incapacitation of a crew member occurs, proceed as follows:
1. Ensure a safe flight condition
• Take over and maintain control of the aircraft
• Check the position of essential controls and switches.
• Maximise autopilot usage.
2. Advise ATC
• Make a PAN call.
• Request an ambulance and advise any holding time required to complete cockpit
activities.
3. Attend to incapacitated crew member
If possible remove the crew member from the cockpit. If this is not possible restrain the
incapacitated crew member as follows, enlisting the aid of the Flight Attendant and/or a
suitable passenger, if necessary:
• slide the seat fully back,
• recline the seat back,
• tighten the seat belt,
• lock the shoulder harness,
• administer 100% oxygen, and
• check manifest for suitably qualified persons.
4. Prepare for Approach and Landing
• Complete Emergency/Abnormal/ECCL or normal checklists and procedures.
• If suitably qualified crew are on board consider asking for assistance.
• If the Captain is incapacitated, the First Officer must carry out the landing from the
right hand seat and no attempt must be made to taxi the aircraft.
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5.32 MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL) &
CONFIGURATION DEVIATION LIST (CDL)
5.32.1 General
The aircraft and all its equipment must be serviceable unless an exception is approved in the MEL/
CDL. The MEL/CDL is stowed on the flight deck of the aircraft and a copy is also available for
reference in crew libraries. Some MEL items have performance or flight planning penalties and
these have been summarised in the performance section of this manual. Unless stated otherwise,
it is not necessary to refer to the AFM or AOM as long as these penalties are observed. If any
further information is required, the company Performance Engineer or Flight Operations should be
contacted.
5.32.2 Flights operating under an MEL
The following Non Standard Configurations have been included in the performance section and
MUST be referred to prior to flight:
• Flight with the landing gear extended,
• Anti-Skid System inoperative,
• Nose Wheel Steering Inoperative,
• Autocoarsen system inoperative, and
• Take-off with CTOT inoperative.
5.33 ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE TAXIING
This procedure is considered an abnormal procedure and therefore should only be carried out if
operationally required. An SMS report must be submitted.
5.34 JUMP SEAT PASSENGERS
Refer to Chapter 12 of the Regional Express Policy and Procedures Manual.
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5.35 POWER INTERRUPTIONS/FLUCTUATIONS
5.35.1 Power Fluctuations Due to Icing
A Power fluctuation during or shortly after leaving icing conditions is a momentary (1 to 4 second)
uncommanded self-recovering fluctuation caused by ice or slush ingestion accompanied by auto
ignition light and possible aircraft yaw.
Pilot reports show that power fluctuations although infrequent will occur primarily at altitudes
greater than 10,000 ft while operating at temperatures between ISA and ISA + 20 in icing
conditions, or shortly after leaving such conditions.
The captain of an aircraft that has had such a power interruption must:
• Immediately press and hold for 5 seconds the “event” button on the flight data recorder.
• Before landing record a complete set of trend data in the flight log irrespective of altitude
(even if the daily trend has been taken on an earlier flight).
• In addition a “Power Interruption Report” must be completed.
• This form and trend data is to be handed to engineering as soon as possible.
If following a Power Interruption the DDT is less than 30 degrees C the aircraft may depart. If the
DDT is 30 degrees C or more, an AML must be raised and an inspection of the engine intake and
exhaust is required. If the inspections of the engine intake and exhaust do not indicate signs of
damage or blockage, the AML may be deferred as an NAD following consultation with Engineering.
Regardless of the in-flight environment (icing, altitude etc.) a trend should be completed following
any power interruption as well as the sector subsequent to the event.
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5.35.2 SAAB 340 Power Interruption Report Form
RO.221 (15.08.18)
REGIONAL EXPRESS
SAAB 340 POWER INTERRUPTION REPORT
General
Date: Time: Aircraft
VH-
Flight No. Side Affected
LH RH
Duration of flight prior to power interruption: Point of Departure Point of Arrival
Aircraft position in flight (climb, cruise, descent):
Airspeed Captain First Officer
Environment
OAT: Altitude: Day Night
Clouds: Yes No If yes, time between entering cloud and power interruption?
Type of cloud (rain, ice, snow):
Time between leaving cloud and power interruption?
(if applicable)
Describe the icing situation and where on the aircraft ice was visible:
Aircraft configuration at time of Power Interruption
TRQ:
ITT: NP: NG Fuel Flow CTOT on/off Autocoarsen on/off
When was the power last changed/adjusted, how much?
Propeller de-ice activated? Yes No .......minutes
Engine anti-ice activated? Yes No
Time from activated till entered icing?
Anti-ice system fault warning? Yes No Time from warning till power interruption?
Event Description
Report all indications/warnings, such as engine parameter fluctuations, aircraft yaw, engine noise and/or other observations made
Noise Flames Multiple power interruptions Ign Light Yes No Time sec
��T after Power Interruption _______OC. (Variance between Expected/Placarded �T & Actual �T is the ��T).
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Note: Complete a Trend after any Power Interruption. This step is extremely important and it is preferred that a trend is completed even if the normal conditions for taking a trend do not exist. ��T after Power Interruption less than 30°. Continue normal operations. A trend is required on the next sector.
��T after Power Interruption between 30° & 40°C. Carry out a visual inspection of the inlet and exhaust for any sign of damage and/or FOD. A trend is also required on the next sector. Raise an AML and defer as an NAD if damage or FOD are not evident.
��T after Power Interruption > 40°C. Advise Engineering. Raise an AML.
AML Number (if applicable):
Email this form to: [email protected] or if unable to email fax to (02) 6926 7780
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5.35.3 Uncommanded Engine Operation
Actioning of the Uncommanded Engine Operation checklist does not imply that an engine is
actually operating abnormally. It is simply the name of a checklist and a procedure to be followed to
enable initial management of any abnormal indication (actual or otherwise).
The Uncommanded Engine Operation procedures and checklist should be initially considered if
any engine or instrument indications (not limited to torque) are observed (heard, felt or seen) to be
non normal.
Uncommanded engine operation may be caused by sensor failure, electrical control failure or
mechanical failure. The failure may create actual power variations. The failure may also be
indicated on the cockpit indicators only, without any actual power variation(s).
In the case of torque, due to resonance in the engine, it is possible to have torque fluctuations of up
to 3%. The Uncommanded Engine Operation procedures and checklist should only be actioned if
such fluctuations remain after making adjustments to the Power Lever (Ng) or Condition Lever
(Np). The prop sync should be turned off prior to adjusting Np. Larger or uncontrollable fluctuations
are to be considered as erratic engine operation and the Uncommanded Engine Operation
procedure is to be commenced immediately.
Locking out the Torque Motor will not correct the erratic cockpit indications; however it will prevent
uncommanded operation of the Torque Motor.
This situation must be carefully assessed and a decision made if actual power variations exist or if
there is an Instrument Fluctuation only. Actual power variations are a combination of fluctuations of
Tq, ITT, Ng, Np and Fuel Flow and would likely be accompanied with aircraft yaw /roll and changes
in engine noise. Crews should consider the performance of the aircraft prior to shutting down the
engine if actual power variations exist.
NOTE
A single Fuel Flow gauge indicating zero (or fluctuating without
any other associated indications) does not require the use of the
uncommanded engine operation procedure.
5.36 OPERATIONS IN ASH OR DUST
5.36.1 Operations in Volcanic Ash
Flight in volcanic ash or dust is prohibited.
Aircraft weather radar cannot detect volcanic ash or dust. Recognition of the cloud can be difficult
in daylight and extremely difficult at night or in cloud. If volcanic ash is inadvertently entered the
following can be expected (depending on the amount of ash):
• Smoke or dust on the flight deck, and the passenger cabin.
• An odour similar to that from electric arcing or smoke.
• Engine malfunctions such as increase in ITT, torque fluctuations or flameout.
• Unexpected changes in airspeed due to blockage of pitot systems.
If areas of volcanic ash or dust are inadvertently entered, Emergency Checklist - FLIGHT IN
VOLCANIC ASH must be followed. Indication of penetrating areas with concentration of volcanic
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ash are, but not limited to, entering visible volcanic ash clouds, change in engine indications,
change is airspeed.
Notify Engineering if volcanic ash or dust has inadvertently been encountered.
5.36.2 Operations in Organic Ash or Dust
Operations in organic ash (smoke) or dust are permitted.
Crew are reminded to be vigilant when operating in such conditions especially during approach
and departure operations due to reduced visibility.
Positive traffic management procedures are required as fire bombing and fire management aircraft
operations are normally coincidental with organic ash conditions associated with bush fires.
Aircraft must, as far as practicable, avoid operations over active fires or directly through smoke
plumes when operating below 10,000'.
If the visibility is below 5000m in smoke or dust during approach or departure the Pilot in Command
is to be assigned Pilot Flying.
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5.37 EMERGENCY COVER CHECKLIST
SAAB 340B & WT Eme rgency Cove r Check l i s t
NOTE
If the Flight Deck Door remains closed during an Emergency
landing, damage to the structural integrity of the aircraft may
impede access from the cockpit. If a NORMAL landing is NOT
expected the Flight Deck Door may be open for landing.
FUEL BALANCE
FUEL CONNECT VALVE OPERATION
CONN VALVE switch ................................................... OPEN
Check CONN VALVE OPEN light to come on.
WHEN FUEL BALANCE NO LONGER REQUIRED
FUEL CROSSFEED OPERATION
STBY PUMP (Failed side) ............................................ OVRD
X-FEED SWITCH................................................................ ON
Check the XFEED light and operating engine side STBY PRESS light comes on. If fire handle has been pulled the failed engine side STBY PRESS light may not come on.
X-FEED SWITCH .............................................................. OFF
STBY PUMP (Failed side) ............................................ AUTO
WHEN FUEL CROSSFEED NO LONGER REQUIRED
CONN VALVE switch ............................................... CLOSED
Emergency Cover Checklist
ENGINE SECURITY CHECKLIST
PROP SYNC ..................................................................... OFF
GEN SWITCH ................................................................... OFF
BUS TIE CONN LIGHT ........................................ CHECK ON
PROP DE-ICE switch ...................................................... OFF
ENGINE ANTI-ICE switch ............................................... OFF
AIR CONDITION XVALVE switch .............. CHECK CLOSED
BLD and HP VALVE switches ................................ CLOSED
TCAS ........................................................................TA ONLY
ENGINE FAILURE ENGINE FIRE Land at nearest Land as soon as suitable airport possible
DESCENT & APPROACH CHECKLIST
SEAT BELT SIGN .................................................. ON PF
EXTERNAL LIGHTS ............................................ SET PF
FLIGHT ATTENDANT ................................. NOTIFIED PF
ALTIMETERS ...................... SET/CROSS CHECKED PF
CABIN PRESSURISATION ........... SET & CHECKED PF
APPROACH BRIEF ................................ COMPLETE PF
CTOT ................................................................... SET PF
SPEEDS (Refer Speed Table below) .............. BUGGED PF
LOW PRESSURE BLD VALVE ................... CLOSED PF
CABIN .......................................................... SECURE PF
AUTOCOARSEN ................................................... ON PF
X-FEED/CONN VALVE (Consider) ....... OFF/CLOSED PF
ICE SPD ......................................................... ON/OFF PF
CAUTION: If the propeller has not feathered ensure the AUTOCOARSEN switch is OFF, and set PROPELLER PUMP switch to MAN FEATHER. Hold the switch until the propeller is in the full-feathered position. NOTE: Following an engine failure it is required to disconnect the AP and re-trim the a/c before re-engagement of the AP.
SAAB 340B & WT
NOTE
For OEI Go-Around/Missed Approach only perform checklists in white.
NOTE
If TEMP rises above 540°C or if there is evidence of combustion after shutdown, MOTOR engine until TEMP decreases below 175°C.
FINAL CHECKLIST
CAUTION: Both LP BLD Valves and HP BLD VALVES must be closed for an OEI Go-around.
FLIGHT DECK DOOR ....................... OPEN/CLOSED PNF
GEAR ............................................ DOWN 3 GREENS CR
CONDITION LEVER ........................................... MAX PF
HYD PRESS & QTY ................................... CHECKED PNF
FLAPS (Max 20) ............................................. .... SET PF
LANDING CLEARANCE....... RECEIVED/NOT REQD CR
YAW DAMPER .................................................... OFF PF
One minute prior to impact, if required - “This is the Captain. Brace. Brace.”
Landing Flap
ICE ACC
ICE INCR
Mi Mi / Wi LDF
20 No — +10 1.15
Yes +10 — 1.15 Highest of Mi or Wi
END OF PROCEDURE
RO.225 (24.01.17)
Memory Items
Critical Item - requires confirmation from PF
AFTER SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST
GEAR ..................................................................... UP PF
FLAP ................................................................. ZERO PF
TAKE-OFF INHIBIT ............................................. OUT PF
MCP (LP/HP BLD VLV consider. See table over) ..... SET PF
AUTOCOARSEN .................................................. OFF PF
X-FEED/CONN VALVE (Consider) ................ ON/OFF PF
AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES ........................... ADVISED PF
ENGINE RESTART …………………..................YES/NO PF
NOTE In case of engine flameout; If no malfunction or no abnormal operation was
observed before the flameout, the engine may be restarted.
COMMUNICATION (FA,Pax,Company)......COMPLETE PF
ENGINE FAILURE/SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST
POWER LEVER .................................. REDUCE to 20-30%
CONDITION LEVER ........................................... FUEL OFF
ENGINE FIRE CHECKLIST
POWER LEVER .................................. REDUCE to 20-30%
CONDITION LEVER ........................................... FUEL OFF
FIRE HANDLE ............................................................ PULL
FIRE EXT. SWITCH ....................................................... ON
FIRE INDICATION .............................. (after 30 seconds) CHECK
RES. EXT. SWITCH .............................. (if fire still indicating) ON
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SAAB 340A Eme rgency Cove r Check l i s t
NOTE
If the Flight Deck Door remains closed during an Emergency
landing, damage to the structural integrity of the aircraft may
impede access from the cockpit. If a NORMAL landing is NOT
expected the Flight Deck Door may be open for landing.
FUEL BALANCE
FUEL CONNECT VALVE OPERATION
CONN VALVE switch ................................................... OPEN
Check CONN VALVE OPEN light to come on.
WHEN FUEL BALANCE NO LONGER REQUIRED
FUEL CROSSFEED OPERATION
STBY PUMP (Failed side) ............................................ OVRD
X-FEED SWITCH................................................................ ON
Check the XFEED light and operating engine side STBY PRESS light comes on. If fire handle has been pulled the failed engine side STBY PRESS light may not come on.
X-FEED SWITCH .............................................................. OFF
STBY PUMP (Failed side) ............................................ AUTO
WHEN FUEL CROSSFEED NO LONGER REQUIRED
CONN VALVE switch ............................................... CLOSED
Emergency Cover Checklist
ENGINE SECURITY CHECKLIST
PROP SYNC ..................................................................... OFF
GEN SWITCH ................................................................... OFF
BUS TIE CONN LIGHT ........................................ CHECK ON
PROP DE-ICE switch ...................................................... OFF
ENGINE ANTI-ICE switch ............................................... OFF
AIR CONDITION XVALVE switch .............. CHECK CLOSED
BLD and HP VALVE switches ................................ CLOSED
TCAS ........................................................................TA ONLY
ENGINE FAILURE ENGINE FIRE Land at nearest Land as soon as suitable airport possible
DESCENT & APPROACH CHECKLIST
SEAT BELT SIGN .................................................. ON PF
EXTERNAL LIGHTS ............................................ SET PF
FLIGHT ATTENDANT ................................. NOTIFIED PF
ALTIMETERS ...................... SET/CROSS CHECKED PF
CABIN PRESSURISATION ........... SET & CHECKED PF
APPROACH BRIEF ................................ COMPLETE PF
CTOT ................................................................... SET PF
SPEEDS (Refer Speed Table below) .............. BUGGED PF
LOW PRESSURE BLD VALVE ................... CLOSED PF
CABIN .......................................................... SECURE PF
X-FEED/CONN VALVE (Consider) ....... OFF/CLOSED PF
ICE SPD ......................................................... ON/OFF PF
CAUTION: If the propeller has not feathered ensure the AUTOCOARSEN switch is OFF, and set PROPELLER PUMP switch to MAN FEATHER. Hold the switch until the propeller is in the full-feathered position. NOTE: Following an engine failure it is required to disconnect the AP and re-trim the a/c before reengagement of the AP.
SAAB 340A
NOTE
For OEI Go-Around/Missed Approach only perform checklists in white.
NOTE
If TEMP rises above 540°C or if there is evidence of combustion after shutdown, MOTOR engine until TEMP decreases below 175°C.
FINAL CHECKLIST
CAUTION: Both LP BLD VALVES and HP BLD VALVES must be closed for an OEI Go-around.
FLIGHT DECK DOOR ....................... OPEN/CLOSED PNF
GEAR ............................................ DOWN 3 GREENS CR
CONDITION LEVER ........................................... MAX PF
HYD PRESS & QTY ................................... CHECKED PNF
FLAPS (Max 20) ............................................. .... SET PF
LANDING CLEARANCE....... RECEIVED/NOT REQD CR
YAW DAMPER .................................................... OFF PF
One minute prior to impact, if required - “This is the Captain. Brace. Brace.”
Landing Flap
ICE ACC
ICE INCR
Mi Mi / Wi LDF
20 No — +10 1.15
Yes +10 — 1.15 Highest of Mi or Wi
END OF PROCEDURE
RO.225 (24.01.17)
Memory Items
Critical Item - requires confirmation from PF
AFTER SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST
GEAR ..................................................................... UP PF
FLAP ................................................................. ZERO PF
TAKE-OFF INHIBIT ............................................. OUT PF
MCP (LP/HP BLD VLV consider. See table over) ..... SET PF
AUTOCOARSEN .................................................. OFF PF
X-FEED/CONN VALVE (Consider) ................ ON/OFF PF
AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES ........................... ADVISED PF
ENGINE RESTART ........................................YES/NO PF
NOTE In case of engine flameout; If no malfunction or no abnormal operation was
observed before the flameout, the engine may be restarted.
COMMUNICATION (FA,Pax,Company)......COMPLETE PF
ENGINE FAILURE/SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST
POWER LEVER .................................. REDUCE to 20-30%
CONDITION LEVER ........................................... FUEL OFF
ENGINE FIRE CHECKLIST
POWER LEVER .................................. REDUCE to 20-30%
CONDITION LEVER ........................................... FUEL OFF
FIRE HANDLE ............................................................ PULL
FIRE EXT. SWITCH ....................................................... ON
FIRE INDICATION .............................. (after 30 seconds) CHECK
RES. EXT. SWITCH .............................. (if fire still indicating) ON
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5.38 MEMORY ITEMS
5.38.1 Starting
NO LIGHT UP,
START SEQUENCE INTERRUPTED,
HUNG START, or
HOT START
1. QQQQ CONDITION LEVER ....................................................................................... FUEL OFF
2. QQQQ IGNITION SWITCH................................................................................................... OFF
3. QQQQ MOTOR ENGINE TO ITT BELOW 175°C OR FOR A MINIMUM 10 SECONDS.
5.38.2 Engine Failure After V11. QQQQ POWER.......................................................................................REDUCE TO 20%-30%
2. QQQQ CONDITION LEVER ....................................................................................... FUEL OFF
CAUTION
If the propeller has not feathered ensure AUTOCOARSEN
switch is OFF and set PROPELLER PUMP switch to MAN
FEATHER. Hold the switch until the propeller is in the full-
feathered position.
5.38.3 Engine Fire
1. QQQQ POWER LEVER..........................................................................REDUCE TO 20%-30%
2. QQQQ CONDITION LEVER ....................................................................................... FUEL OFF
3. QQQQ FIRE HANDLE ........................................................................................................ PULL
4. QQQQ FIRE EXTG SWITCH..................................................................................................ON
If fire indication still on after 30 seconds – discharge FIRE EXTG opposite side.
CAUTION
If the propeller has not feathered ensure AUTOCOARSEN
switch is OFF and set PROPELLER PUMP switch to MAN
FEATHER. Hold the switch until the propeller is in the full-
feathered position.
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SAAB Flight CrewOperating Manual
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5.38.4 Uncommanded Engine Operation In Flight
1. QQQQ POWER LEVER ......................................................................... REDUCE TO 20%-30%
• If TRQ indication is lost or unreliable set PL half an inch (12mm approx.) above
flight idle.
2. QQQQ CONDITION LEVER................................................................................T/M THEN SET
CAUTION
Keeping Condition Lever in T/M position will cause a small
amount of fuel to be vented overboard. Make sure that the
Condition Lever is positively returned into Min-Max range and
does not remain above Max gate.
3. QQQQ AUTOCOARSEN.......................................................................................................OFF
NOTE
Advancing both Condition Levers to max prior to locking out the T/
M and resetting RPM aids in propeller synchronization.
5.38.5 Uncommanded Engine Operation On The Ground
1. QQQQ SHUT DOWN THE ENGINE.
5.38.6 Engine Shut Down
1. QQQQ POWER LEVER ......................................................................... REDUCE TO 20%-30%
2. QQQQ CONDITION LEVER........................................................................................FUEL OFF
NOTE
If TEMP rises above 540oC or if there is evidence of combustion
after shut down, MOTOR engine until TEMP decreases below
175oC.
CAUTION
If the propeller has not feathered, ensure AUTOCOARSEN
switch is OFF and set PROPELLER PUMP switch to MAN
FEATHER. Hold the switch until the propeller is in the full-
feathered position.
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Chapter 5 Page 70
Approved by the General Manager Flight Operations
RO.340.0301 v3.2 – Effective 14 OCT 2021
5.38.7 Compressor Stall
1. QQQQ CTOT ........................................................................................................................ OFF
2. QQQQ POWER LEVER..........................................................................REDUCE TO 20%-30%
5.38.8 Air Conditioning Smoke
1. QQQQ OXYGEN MASKS AND REGULATORS .................................................. ON AND 100%
2. QQQQ SMOKE GOGGLES ....................................................................................................ON
3. QQQQ COMMUNICATIONS.....................................................................................ESTABLISH
5.38.9 Avionics or Electrical Smoke or Fire
1. QQQQ OXYGEN MASKS AND REGULATORS .................................................. ON AND 100%
2. QQQQ SMOKE GOGGLES ....................................................................................................ON
3. QQQQ COMMUNICATIONS.....................................................................................ESTABLISH
5.38.10 Rapid Depressurisation
1. QQQQ OXYGEN MASKS AND REGULATORS ....................................................... ON & 100%
2. QQQQ COMMUNICATION .......................................................................................ESTABLISH
3. QQQQ TRANSPONDER ..................................................................................................... 7700
4. QQQQ SEAT BELT SIGN........................................................................................................ON
5. QQQQ EMERGENCY DESCENT..................................................................................INITIATE
5.38.11 Tail Pipe Hot
1. QQQQ POWER LEVER (AFFECTED SIDE) ..........................................REDUCE TO 20%-30%
5.38.12 Cargo Compartment Smoke
1. QQQQ CARGO FIRE EXTG SWITCH (SINGLE EXTG) ........................................................ON
1. QQQQ CARGO FIRE EXTG SWITCH 1 (DUAL EXTG) .........................................................ON
CAUTION
For dual cargo extinguisher installations select only EXTG 1
initially. Refer to the QRH for direction on use of EXTG 2.
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SAAB Flight CrewOperating Manual
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Chapter 5 Page 71
5.38.13 Hydraulic Light On
1. QQQQ HYDR PUMP SWITCH..............................................................................................OFF
2. QQQQ CHECK HYDR INDICATORS – EMERG AND MAIN PRESSURES ARE BOTH LOW
CAUTION
Leave flaps in actual position.
3. QQQQ SPEED BELOW 200 KIAS
4. QQQQ LANDING GEAR HANDLE................................................................................... DOWN
5. QQQQ EMERG LDG HANDLE .......................................................................................... PULL
5.38.14 Hydraulic Fluid Loss
1. QQQQ HYDR PUMP SWITCH..............................................................................................OFF
5.38.15 Elevator System Jammed
1. QQQQ AUTOPILOT ............................................................................................... DISENGAGE
• Be prepared for trim transients.
2. QQQQ INTERCONNECT UNIT............................................................................ OVERPOWER
• Both pilots shall act on the controls. The pilot on the side not failed can, by
overpowering the interconnect unit, control the aircraft.
3. QQQQ PITCH DISCONNECT HANDLE .............................................................................PULL
• The pilot on the side not failed can control the aircraft.
5.38.16 Aileron System Jammed
1. QQQQ AUTOPILOT ............................................................................................... DISENGAGE
2. QQQQ INTERCONNECT UNIT............................................................................ OVERPOWER
• Both pilots shall act on the controls. The pilot on the side not failed can, by
overpowering the interconnect unit, control the aircraft.
3. QQQQ ROLL DISCONNECT HANDLE............................................................................... PULL
• The pilot on the side not failed can control the aircraft
5.38.17 Flap Fault
1. QQQQ FLAPS SPLIT
• The split may be reduced by reselecting previous flap setting.
v3.2 – Effective 14 OCT 2021
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Chapter 5 Page 72
Approved by the General Manager Flight Operations
RO.340.0301 v3.2 – Effective 14 OCT 2021
5.38.18 Emergency Evacuation
Captain’s Duty
1. QQQQ PARK BRAKE ........................................................................................................... SET
2. QQQQ CONDITION LEVERS..................................................................................... FUEL OFF
3. QQQQ EVACUATION ..................................................................................................... ORDER
• Flight Attendant will automatically initiate an evacuation on water.
4. QQQQ TOWER/COMPANY............................................................................................ ADVISE
5. QQQQ BATTERY SWITCHES................................................................................... BOTH OFF
CAUTION
Do not order an evacuation until both NG’s are below 20%.
First Officer’s Duty
At the Direction “EVACUATION DRILLS” from the Captain:
1. QQQQ EMERGENCY PANEL SWITCHES (3) .......................................................................ON
2. QQQQ FIRE HANDLES (BOTH)......................................................................................... PULL
3. QQQQ FIRE EXTG. SWITCHES (BOTH).............................................................................. ON
5.38.19 Both Engines Flame Out
1. QQQQ POWER LEVERS (BOTH) ..........................................................................FLIGHT IDLE
2. QQQQ CONDITION LEVERS (BOTH) .......................................................................FUEL OFF
3. QQQQ AIRSPEED........................................................................................................ 130 KIAS
4. QQQQ BATTERY SWITCHES (BOTH)..............................................................................OVRD
5. QQQQ FUEL STBY PUMP SWITCHES (BOTH) ...............................................................OVRD
6. QQQQ AUTOCOARSEN ...................................................................................................... OFF
7. QQQQ LEFT CONDITION LEVER ...................................................................................START
8. QQQQ START SWITCH...................................................................................................... LEFT
If Engine Restarts
9. QQQQ LEFT CONDITION LEVER ...................................................................................... MAX
10. QQQQ LEFT POWER LEVER.................................................................................... ADVANCE
11. QQQQ LEFT GEN SWITCH ........................................................................... RESET THEN ON
• Maximum two reset attempts.
If Engine Does Not Restart
12. QQQQ LEFT CONDITION LEVER ............................................................................. FUEL OFF
• Attempt to start right engine commencing at Item 7.
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SAAB Flight CrewOperating Manual
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5.38.20 Loss of Both Generators
1. QQQQ BUS TIE SWITCH ..................................................................................................SPLIT
2. QQQQ BOTH GEN SWITCHES......................................................................RESET THEN ON
• Maximum two reset attempts for each generator.
5.38.21 Unreliable Speed and/or Altitude Indications
1. QQQQ AUTOPILOT ............................................................................................. DISCONNECT
2. QQQQ FLIGHT PATH.................................................................................................STABILISE
3. QQQQ POWER SETTING .................................................. Initially maintain Power and Attitude
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