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University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament inTwenty-Three DemocraciesAuthor(s): Wilma RuleReviewed work(s):Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 477-498Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/448386 .

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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, CONTEXTUAL FACTORSAND WOMEN'S OPPORTUNITY FOR ELECTIONTO PARLIAMENT IN TWENTY-THREEDEMOCRACIESWILMA RULE

Markleeville,aliforniarT HE PURPOSE of his rticle s toascertainwhich lectoral rrange-ments, parties, and socioeconomic conditions offer the mostopportunityorwomen's election oparliament.Another bjectiveistoexplicate herelationship etween lectoral ystemsnd other ontex-tual variables s they elate owomen'sparliamentaryecruitmentnvar-ious countries.Thirdly,we seek to determinewhich countriesamongtwenty-threeemocracies n our sampleallow thegreatest o the eastpo-liticalopportunityorwomen.

PART I. ANALYSIS OF SIGNFICANT PREDICTORSThe Variables tudiedndtheHypothesizedelationshipsNumerousresearchers ave observeda positiverelationship etweenproportional epresentationPR) andwomen'sopportunityor lection oparliamentDuverger1955;Currell1974;Bogdanor1984). However,withfew xceptionsRule 1981, 1984, and Norris1985) therehas been no sys-tematic mpiricalverificationf thishypothesis, orhas therebeen an at-tempt o control or ther olitical nd socio-contextualactors.n addition,exceptforNorris 1985) therehas been no systematic tudyofthe effectof differentR, majoritarian nd plurality ystems n women's electionto parliament.Moreover, the impactof districtmagnitude M) - the numberofrepresentativeserdistrict onwomen's recruitmentonational egisla-tureshas not been investigated, lthough t would appear to be a fruitfularea for nquiry.Previousresearch n multimember istricts ndwomen'selectionto U.S. state egislatures how a positiverelationship' Clark etal. 1984; Carroll 1985; Rule 1986, and Darcy, Welch and Clark 1987).Received: April 2, 1986Revision Received: August8, 1986AcceptedforPublication:August 19, 1986NOTE: This is a revisedversionof a paper presented t theWorldCongressof the nterna-

tional Political ScienceAssociation,Paris,July15-20,1985. I wish to thank heanony-mousreviewers,he ditor nd IrvingKrauss for heir elpful omments,nd alsoRobertCiscewskiforresearchassistance.For example,of thetwenty .S. stateswith omeor all multimemberssembly nd statesenatedistrictsn 1984, the Pearsonian correlationwith thepercentages f women inboth houses was .29 significentt the 02 level (Rule 1986). All multimember istrictstates have non-partyistsystems.

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478 Western oliticalQuarterlyIn addition,recentworkon districtmagnitude ndicates hatthenumberofrepresentativeserdistrictM) has a direct ffectn the amountofturn-over nparliament,whichvariesfrom 8percent o54 percent nthirteenWestern ountriesKatz 1986,Table 4.2). The smaller heM, the smallerthe turnovernd vice versa Katz 1986: 97-101). Significantly,owturno-verhas beenpinpointed s a majorreasonforwomen's owrepresentationin theU.S. House ofRepresentativesAndersonand Thorson 1984) andBritain'sHouse ofCommons Welch1985).Thus women'sunderrepresen-tation nboth thesecountries'national egislaturesnpartmaybe/afunc-tionof he ingle-memberistrictSMD) majority/pluralitylectoralystem.The bi-variate elationshipetween istrictmagnitudentwenty-twooun-tries nd thepercent fwomen lected oparliamentn 1980-82 sdisplayedbelowin Figure 1. (WestGermany s omittedfrom hefigure ecause ofitshybrid lectoral ystem.)A linearrelationshipnFigure1 is shown longwith several outliers namelyNew Zealand, Italy,Austria, srael andThe Netherlands.

FIGUREDISTRICTMAGNITUDEND ERCINTWOMNIN PARLIAMENT,OWE HOUSEa

30 *Swed*Fin25 eNor *Den

520,

I15' Neth4 e *Switz

10N Port AustrieIree eBel It-Spe5 e *IceCa *eGrUK eJap

o .Austrs -0 5 10 15 20 120 150Numberf Representatives per DistrictaWestGermanys excluded due to its hybridSMD/Partyist-PR systen. See pp.of this article.

The first ypothesiso be tested tatisticallys thatthegreater he dis-trictmagnitude, hegreater hepercent f women in parliament.As thenumber frepresentativesnconstituenciesncreases, hepercentage fthevote needed forelection diminishes the generalformula s 100/M+ 1).


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Electoralystems 79Therefore,ntheory, omen ndother nderrepresentedoliticalminorities2have a greater hancefor lectionwhen the districtmagnitude s high. ItwashypothesizedhatM wouldbe themost mportantredictorfwomen'selectionto parliament ince thispoliticalcomponentvariesconsiderablyamongthe twenty-threeountries.An alternative ypothesiss that theparty istsystem fproportionalrepresentations the most ignificantredictorfwomen'spolitical ppor-tunity or lection o parliament.Under thissystem heparties n a statedrawup nationwide ists fcandidatesforparliament rdistrictistswhicharepresentedo thevoters. he proportionfmembers fParliament lectedfrom ach partyusually Lijphart 1986a) reflects heproportion fvotesgiven achparty ytheelectorate.Accordingly,he ist ystem mphasizespolitical party representation ather han individualrepresentationndparliamentaryandidatesrun as a team on a party late. Women are ad-ded to the ists s a meansofbroadeninghegeneral ppealof he eamticket.Otherelectoral rrangementsncludethe singletransferable ote (asin Ireland,Mair 1986: 290-91), thesinglenontransferableote as inJa-pan, Lijphart,Pintor nd Sone 1986b: 154-55)and thesinglememberdis-trict ystemas in Britain and her former olonies) tend to focuson thegeneral ppeal of ndividuals.Both the rish andJapanese systems re ac-tually orms fproportionalepresentationithmultimember istricts ndnopartyists.As intheSMD countries, otersnJapanand Ireland chooseamongcandidatesrather hanparties n theirballots. In suchnon-party-listelectoral ystems, artiesor otherrecruitmentlitesmaybe reluctanttorisknominating rendorsingwomen,eventhough here s considerableevidence in theBritish nd U.S. cases) thatwomen are as likely s mentobe elected ntheconstituenciesn which hey ontest3Welchand Stud-lar 1985; Bernstein1986, 1; Darcy and Schramm1977). There may beotherdisadvantages nd/or isincentives orwomencandidates or poten-tial women candidates n non-partyistelectoral ystems s comparedtotheir ounterpartsn list-PRcountries, uch as thenecessity findividu-ally raisingcampaignmonies (Carroll 1985: 45-55) and in the onerousaspectsof individualcampaigns.Anotherpoliticalhypothesisestedhere s thenegativeeffect fright-wingpoliticalparties n women'sparliamentaryepresentation. lthoughDuverger1955) and othersRasmussen1983;Kohn 1980;Beckwith 984)have observedthat women are morelikely o be nominatedand electedby left hanby right arties,thisrelationship as not been testedover awiderangeofcountries.The theorys thatrightwing artieshave a moretraditional iewofwomen'srole and are less ikely han eftwingnd evencenter arties o nominatewomen forparliament.Rightwing artieswereoperationalized s thosewhichgave support o thefreemarket,wereanti-communist nd were monarchist r religious dvocates.2 While the electionof blacks to at-largemultimember itycouncils in theU.S has beenminimal n thepast Engstrom nd McDonald 1986: 203-25), recentresearchWeaver1986) suggests hatthisrelationshipmay be changing.3 The inference annot be drawn,however, romwhatmaybe an atypical ampleofconsti-tuenciesto theuniverseofelections n a country.


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480 Western oliticalQuarterlyPast researchhas found a positive relationshipbetween women'sparliamentarylection,percentage fwomen n theworkforce,nd extent

of womencollege graduates Rule 1981, 1984), and a negativerelation-shiptoproportion fCatholicpopulation Rule 1984; Cook 1985). How-ever,Norris1985) foundno statisticallyignificantssociation mongthesevariablesand women'sparliamentaryecruitment hen a public opinionsurvey fnine stateswas entered ntoa multipleregressionwhichother-wise containeddata on twenty-fourountries.Consequently hefindingsare inconclusive nd limited.However,they re suggestive fthepositiverolepublic opinionmay play ntheelection fwomen toparliamentftheelectoral ystems notunfavorablesee Welch and Studlar 1986, on theBritish nd U.S. cases).Another uestion tudied nthis nalysis sthe effectfunemploymenton women's recruitmentoparliament.Researchdone onthe 1970speriodwhen significantevels ofunemploymentxistedonly in some countiesshowedtherewas a negativerelationshipRule 1981). Testinga relatedvariable,economic ffluence, ook (1985) found positive elationshipothe xtent fwomen's egislativelites. n thispresent nalysis hehypothesisis thatunemploymentas a negative ffect hereasfull mploymenton-tributes o women's national egislative pportunity.Data andMethod fAnalysisData on electoral tructures,olitical arties, ocioeconomic onditionsand thepercentofwomen in parliamentwerecollectedfortwenty-threecountries n the1980-1982period.4Duringthat imetherange npercentof womenin national egislatureswas from percent n Australia to 28inSweden,with n averageof9.2 percent.n thepreceding ecade women'srepresentationn parliament ncreasedmore than 50 percent.However,in thisten-year eriodtherewas little hangein the nations' rankorderofwomen's parliamentary epresentationtherankcorrelations .89 be-tween1970's figures nd 1980s): theNordic countries ontinue to lead,most oftheEuropean countries re in the middlerange,and Britain ndherformer oloniescontinueto lag (see Table 2 on p. 483). Coincidentwith hisgrowthn women'srecruitmentoparliamentnthe 1970-80shasbeen thedevelopmentf hewomen's movementnthese ountriesLoven-duski and Hills 1981; Bradshaw 1982; Flanz 1983; Morgan 1984).Stepwidemultiple orrelation/regressionnalysiswas used first,ode-termine the most to the least significant onoverlappingpredictorsofwomen'spolitical pportunityor lection oparliament, nd secondly orcomparative urposes odeterminewhethernychangeshave takenplaceinthepredictors ithin hepastdecade. Specifically,heresults f n earlier4 An unexpecteddevelopment ince thatperiodoccurred nthe Canadian elections f1984.Women's percentages ncreasedto 9.6 percent n the House ofCommons as a resultofupsetvictories ytheToryparty, heProgressive onservativesBagnell 1984). Con-versely,Frenchparty ist/ R electionsof 1986 show no appreciablerise in women'srepresentationnparliamentEmbassyofFrance,July1986), apparently ecause offailureofthemajor partiesto place women on the PR lists n favorablepositions.


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Electoralystems 81study singthe1970sdata (Rule 1981)willbe comparedwith his nalysisof the 1980s.

Stepwidemultiple orrelation/regressions usefulfor esting heory,nthis ase thatpolitical ystem ariables akeprecedence ver socioeconomiccomponentsnpredicting omen'sparliamentaryepresentation.he mosthighly orrelatedndependent ariable s selectedon thefirsttepto pre-dictthedependent ariable,percent fwomen nparliament, nd on sub-sequent stepsother ndependent ariablesare added whichare nothighlyintercorrelatedith ach other.The problem fmulti-collinearitystherebyeliminated ecause closely ntercorrelatedariables are removedfrom heanalysis.The reliabilityf thefindingsmaybe checkedbyrepeatedtestsintroducingewvariables ndeliminatingthers ndbyother ypes f nal-ysisusingthesame data, suchas factor nalysis Rummel 1970: 202-4),which s employed n Part III ofthisarticle.Results ftheAnalysisSeveralmultiple egressions ereundertakenwith nd without istrictmagnitude,whichhas a direct orrelation fonly 34 withpercentwomeninparliament.n all theregressionsarty-listystemR remained hemajorpredictor,withwomen n thepaid workforce econdand womencollegegraduates hird.Whendistrictmagnitudewas enteredwith he othervari-ables in thestepwise egression,twas eliminatedfrom hetable becauseit ntercorrelates73 with ist ystem R. (Later inFactor1 we see list/PRanddistrictmagnitude ogether ithnon-rightarties s a cluster fpolit-ical system ariables.)Whendistrictmagnitudewas not ncludedwith heothervariables,percent funemployed ntered heequationas a negativevariableforwomen'sparliamentaryecruitment,s didpercent ight artymembersnparliamentnda country's roportionfCatholics.The resultsare shownbelow in Table 1 alongwiththe 1972 regression.The orderofvariableshas notchangedover the1972-82period.Typeofelectoral ystems still hemajor predictor.However, nthe1982resultswe have confirmed orris' 1985) findinghattheparty ist/PR ystemsthemostfavorable orwomen'srecruitmento national egislatures.n turn,non-list/PRystems,ncluding he single-member istrict ystemof theU.S.A., Britain,Australia,Canada, New Zealand, and France, and theelectoral ystems f Ireland andJapan are least favorable.The proportions f womenworking orpay has increased n thepastdecade. In turn, hisvariable ccountsformore ofthevariance nexplain-ing increases n women's election o parliament n the 1982 period. Thepercent f women n theworkforceorrelatesnegativelywithunemploy-ment nd withpercent atholic n the1982study.Therefores unemploy-mentncreases, omen ntheworkforceecrease.Thispatternsparticularlyprevalentnthepredominantlyatholic ountriesfBelgium,reland, taly,and Spain.The amountofvarianceexplainedbypercent fwomencollege gradu-ates remained table n the1982 periodwhileunemployment iminishedin amountof varianceexplained n thepercent f womenin parliament.


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482 WesternoliticalQuarterlyTABLE 1

MOST POWERFUL PREDICTORS OF RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS:MULTIPLE TEPWISE EGRESSION982(N = 23)

Multiple Cumulative % VarianceCorrelation ofVariance ExplainedCoefficient Explained byEachIndependentariables (R) (R2) VariablePartyList/PR ystemfelections .53 28 28Percentwomen conomicallyctive .73 54 26Percentwomencollegegraduates .82 67 13Percent nemployed* .87 76 9Percent ightM.P.'s* .89 80 4PercentCatholic logged)* .91** 82 2* The zero order orrelation f thisvariable s negative.** Significantt less thanthe 01 level whencorrected ordegrees ffreedom.Sources:AlmanacfCanada Toronto:Corpus, 1984);Arthur . Banks and WilliamOver-street, ds.,Political andbookf heWorldNewYork:McGrawHill, 1981, 1982,1983);Alan S.Day andHenryW. Degenhardt,oliticalartiesf heWorldDetroit:ResearchCo., 1980);EuropaYearbookLondon:Europa, 1981)Vols. I & II; GisbertH. Flanz,Comparativeomen'sightsndPoliticalarticipationnEuropeDobb's Ferry,NY: Transnational, 983).JoniLovenduski ndJillHills,eds. ThePoliticsf he econd lectorateLondon: Routledge&KeganPaul, 1981);Walter . G. Kohn,WomennNationalegislatures:Comparativetudyn SixCountriesNewYork;Praeger, 980);StatisticalearbookParis:UNESCO, 1982); Yearbookf abourStatisticsGeneva: I.L.O., 1982),and Embassies fvarious ounties ndtheChicago, L, IsraeliandJapaneseconsulates.

TABLE 1AMOST POWERFULREDICTORS FRECRUITMENTFWOMEN ARLIAMENT EMBERS:MUL-TIPLE TEPWISE EGRESSION972*(N = 19)Multiple Cumulative % VarianceCorrelation ofVariance ExplainedCoefficient Explained byEach

Independentariables (R) (R2) VariablProportional epresentationystemfelections .48 23 23Percentwomen conomicallyctive .62 39 16Percentwomen ollegegraduates .71 50 11Greater nemploymentt .95 90 40Late women's uffraget .96t 92 2* Titleshave beenchanged lightlyo conform oTable 1.tThe zero oder correlation f thisvariable s negative.t Significantt less thanthe 01 levelwhencorrected ordegrees f freedom.Source:Rule 1981.The latterdifference aybe accounted forbythemore even distributionofunemploymentmong the23 countries n 1982. Because of thedropinvarianceexplainedbytheunemploymentariable,thecumulativeper-cent of varianceexplained R2) on thefourthtepof theregressions 76percent n 1982 as comparedwth 90 percent n 1972. This also accounts


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Electoral ystems 483forthe lower final R2 (82 percent) in the 1982 table. The fifth nd sixthstepvariables are percent rightwingM.P.s and percentof Catholics in coun-tries, both of which are negative predictors for women's parliamentaryrecruitment.In the next section we discuss the impact ofelectoral systemsin differ-ing contexts on women's legislative recruitment.

PART II. IMPACT OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ON WOMEN'SPARLIAMENTARY RECRUITMENTTable 2 presentsthe electoral systemsofthetwenty-threeWestern-styledemocracies and the percent of women in the various national legislaturesin the 1980-82 period. Glancing down the party-list/PRcolumn one seesthat women's parliamentary representationvaries from a high of 28 per-cent in Sweden to a low of 4 percent in Greece, with an average of 12.5percent. The range in non-party list electoral systems is from8.8 percentin New Zealand to 0 percent in Australia, both with single-member dis-tricts;Japan has a low percentage of women parliamentarians, less than2 percent, while Ireland had 6.8 percent in 1982. The average percentageof women M.P.s in the non-list countries is about a third (4 percent) ofthat in the list/PR countries.

TABLE 2ELECTORAL SYSTEMS OF 23 WESTERN STYLE DEMOCRACIES ANDPERCENT OF WOMEN IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURES(LowerHouses, 1982Period*)

Party ist/Proportionalepresentationystems(N - 15)

Sweden ............. ....... ........... 27.7Finland .............. ..... .......... ... 26.0Norway.................................... 23.9Denm rk ................ .... . 22.9Netherlands................................ 14.0Switzerland............................... 10.5Austria...................................... 9.8Portugal............................... 8.8Italy........................................... 8.2Belgium..................................... 7.5Israel.......................................... 7.5W Germany.............................. 7.3Spain ........................................ 5.4Iceland ................................... 5.0Greece ................................. 4.0PartyList/PR:Average = 12.5%Median = 9.3%Range = 4.0 - 27.7%

Non-PartyistSystems(N = 8)SingleMemberistrictountriesNew Zeland .......... .... .......... . 8.8Canada....................................... 4.3France ....................................... 4.1UnitedStates .............................. 4.1UnitedKingdom........................... 3.1Australia........................ .......... 0.0Single ransferableote ountryIreland ...................................... 6.8Non-Transferableote ountryJapan ............ .. .................... 1.6

Non-Party istSystemsAverage = 4.1%Median = 4.1%Range = 0 - 8.8%* Sources re listed n Table 1.


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484 Westernolitical uarterlyCases which re lowinwomen'srepresentationut ist/PR ystemsrediscussed below, followedby considerationof the effect f the hybrid

list/PR/singleember istrictystemwhich btains nWestGermany.Thenextsection ontainsdiscussion f the non-list/PR ountries' lectoral r-rangementsnd their elationshipowomen'sparliamentaryecruitment.Explication fthe rishandJapanese systemss followed yconsiderationof the impactofelectoral rrangementsn theSMD countries.Anomalous ases nParty ist/PR ystemsWhy swomen'srepresentationnGreece, celand,and Spain relativelylow comparedto otherparty ist/PRcountries n 1982? First,thepartylistsystems a favorable actor, ut theaveragedistrictmagnitude,five,inGreece, Iceland and Spain is negative. n Greece,the median size dis-trict s four the owest n Europe's list/PRcountriesGeneral lections,18thOctober,981). Generally, hefewermembersofparliamentper dis-trict, he fewerwomen areelected, ince thepercentage fthevoteneces-sary fora parliamentary eat rises as the number of seats decreases.Three-member istricts suallyrequire ome25 percent fthevote,whilefour-memberistricts equire20 percent nd so on. These smalldistrictsdiscourageminority arties romwhichwomenmight e recruited orM.P.Moreover,where hechoices reamonga smallnumber fcandidates, hestakes are higherfor hemajorparties nd it is moredifficult orwomento obtainpartynomination.However,the electoral rrangementsnGreece and Spain are insuffi-cientfor xplaining hedifferencesetween hem nd Switzerland'smuchhigherpercentage f womenM.P.s - givenaboutthesamedistrictmag-nitude. Here we see theimportance f socioeconomicfactorswhichcanmeliorate osomedegreenegative spectsofelectoral ystems orwhichmaymake an alreadydifficultituationworse.Thus, althoughGreeceandSpain aremodernizingSmela 1983; CommissionoftheEuropean Com-munities 981), there re still owpercentages fwomen n theworkforce.Moreover,theongoing nd dominantRoman Catholic and Orthodox re-ligiousculturesnthese ountries einforcehetraditional onpolitical oleof women Reilly 1985). By contrast, witzerlandhas both a Protestantand Catholic religiousheritage nd a largerpercentage f women in thepaid workforce homayform n important oliticalbase for heelectionofwomenM.P.s.Iceland, likeSwitzerland,has severalfavorable ocioeconomicfactorsoffsettingtsnegative istrict agnitudef ix.Thislow number frepresen-tatives erdistrictontributedo a smallpercentage fwomen n theparlia-ment,theAlthing.However,Iceland also has an electoralfeaturewhichproved helpful or ncreasingwomen's recruitmentn 1983. It is an ab-senceofvotethreshold orrepresentation hichallowsvery mallpartiestohave seats nparliament roportionateothevotesthey btain Agusts-son 1986; see also Lijphart1984: 156). When Iceland's established artiesdid notplacewhat women'sgroupconsidered obe an adequate numberofwomen ntheirists or he 1983election, women'spartytheWomen'sAlliance)was organizedwith list of women's namesforpresentationo


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Electoral ystems 485thevoters.Womenwere thenmobilizedto vote forwomen candidates norderto increase theirpercentages n the Althing Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1984; Biscard 1985).Iceland's1983 election esultedn a shift o the eft arties,which roughtin morewomenM.P.s, as well as a fewrepresentativesrom heWomen'sAlliance Agustsson 985).The resultwas an astonishingncrease fwomenM.P.s from to 15 percent9 womenare in the60-memberAlthing). nfine, celand's favorable lectoralfactors theparty ist/PR ystem lustheavailability f an electoral ulewhich llows smallparty epresentation- togetherwithpropitious olitical nd socioeconomic onditions nd theorganizing ctivities fwomen'sgroups overcame rather nfavorabledistrictmagnitudeof fivepersonsper district.How theWestGermanylectoralystemiscouragesWomen's arliamentaryRepresentationHalf of theseats n WestGermany's owerhouse, theBundestag,areselectedby the list/PRsystem nd the otherhalf are selected n single-memberdistrictsn thebasisof a plurality ote.Each voterhas twovotes:one for he ndividual andidate n the small SMD district nd one for heparty nthe argerPR district. n thePR elections, heproportion f seatsintheBundestag s allocated nproportiono thevotes cast for ach party(Duverger 1986: 72; Lijphart 1984: 155). The resultsunderthishybridelectoral ystem re as expected nd yetthey re quite startling:woman'schances forgetting lected n a West Germansinglememberdistrict s.thePR districtre about one tofour.Thus, for xamplein 1983, 24 per-centof women n the West GermanParliamentwere elected from ingle-member istrictsnd 76percent ythe ist-systemR. In the ist/PR land"districtswomenM.P.s were 16 percentwhereas n the SMD areas only4 percent ftheelected andidateswerewomen HandbuchT 10 [ElectionReturnsfor March 6, 1983]).The moderately ighrepresentationfwomen n theparty-list/PRis-tricts s in parta function f the arge averagenumberofrepresentativesperdistrict,which s twenty-fiveibid.). However,WestGermanyhas a5 percentvotethresholdLijphart1984: 156) forrepresentation hich npartoffsets hefavorableargedistrictmagnitude nd impactsnegativelyonwomen'selectionnthePR districts. nother egative actor orwomeninGermany'selectoral ystems the"spill-over" effect hatresultswhenvotersvotea singlemember ystem allot and a PR/listballot. Duverger(1986: 72) explains, "Politically,thiscombination ftheEnglish[single-memberdistrict]ystemnd PR exerts pressure oward two-party ys-tem as a resultof the first ote,which nfluences itizens n how to casttheir econdvote." Thus thepositive spects fthe ist/PR ystemwherebyminority arties nd womencould gain representationn theparliamentare in partnullified y combining he two electoralsystems.TheNon-Partyist Electoralystems:ow TheyAffectWomen's ecruitmentoParliamentWomencomprised .8 percent f the rishparliamentn 1980-82andhad increased30 percent o almost9 percentby 1984 (Smyth 1984). Ac-


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486 Westernolitical uarterlycording oSmyth1984) their epresentationas been rising uickly incethebeginning fthe women'smovementn the1970s. The percentage fwomenM.P.s in 1984 was only slightlyess thanobtainedin West Ger-many. Although ocioeconomic onditions remore favorablenthe attercountry,he lectoralystems a compensatingactorn reland venthoughthere reonly3-5representativeserdistrictMair 1986). Ireland's singletransferableote STV) systems a proportional epresentationystem-withouthepartyist.Votersrank ndividual andidates norderofprefer-ence and votes are allocatedaccording o a formula ywhichexcessvotesofthe first andidate chosenare transferredovoters' secondchoices andsoon (Mair 1986:290-91;Lijphart ndGrofman, 984: Part V). Althoughcandidates run as individualsrather hanmembersofa partyteam, theIrishsystem till llowsrepresentationorpersonswho receivea minorityofvotesas do all PR systems.The Irish situationbenefitswomencandi-dates, sincethey re more ikely obe recruited yparty lites thantheyare in single-member istrictmajority nd plurality ystems.Japan:Why reTherepercent omen .P.s inOneHouse nd8percentnAnother?An examination fthetwoelectoral ystems or heJapaneseDiet pro-videsthe answer. Electionsfor he owerhouse,theHouse ofRepresenta-tives, re heldaccording o a semiproportionallectoral ystemknownasthesinglenontransferableote SNTV). Electionsfor heupperhouse,theHouse ofCouncilors,are held under a straightforwardarty ist/PR ys-tem nwhichparty eamscompetewithin istrictsJapan nformation ndCulturalCenter 1985). The House ofCouncilors s the eastpowerful fthetwo and manybe overruledby the ower house by a two-thirdsote(Hargadine 1981: 303).For theHouse ofRepresentatives, oters electonlyone candidateonthe ballot and the ndividualwiththehighestnumber ofvoteswins Lij-phart,Pintor nd Sone 1986b; 154-69). Funding s raised ndividually orthemostpart nd this sa difficultyorwomen andidatesHargadine1981:306). AlthoughJapan has three,fourand five multimember istrictsnits owerhouse,they ehave ike ingle-memberistricts. heodoreMcNelly(1984) comments boutthesinglenontransferableote SNTV) system fJapan:Under differentysteme.g., ist-systemR witharge istricts)he mallerparties ouldprobablyrawmorevotes han hey o becauseunder hepresentystemhey rediscouragedrom roposingandidatesnmanyof hedistricts.n that ense heyrepartiallylocked ut" of he ystemtothe dvantage fthetwomajorparties.Thus,Japan's SNTV (singlenontransferableote) system or heHousediscourages heminorpartieswhichmakefewnominations fwomen can-didates.Since the takes rehighbetween he womajor parties, ewwomenare alsonominated ythem.Another egative actororwomen sthemalap-portionmentn House ofRepresentative istricts. n ruraldistricts otesweigh2.9 timesmore than those n someurban areas (Taagepera 1984).These rural areas are Liberal Democraticparty trongholdsHargadine


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Electoralystems 871981: 304), in whichfewwomen relikely o be nominated orparliament.In consequenceofthesevariousfactors,he totalpercent fwomen ntheHouse remainsabout 2 percent.The situation s muchmorefavorable o womenunder hepartyist/PRsystemwhichprevails n electionsfor heupper legislative hamber,theHouse ofCouncilors.The effectf he wodifferentystemsorwhich otersexpress heirpreferencest the sametime, s similar oGermany's hybridsystem:womenare about four imes as plentifuln the ist/PRHouse ofCouncilors s they re ntheHouse ofRepresentatives.lthoughheLiberalDemocraticparty asdominated othhousessince1955,smallpartieshavea greater hanceto gain seats n the House of Councilors.Consequentlymorewomen arenominated nd elected Hargadine 1981: 305;Japan In-formation nd Cultural Center1985). While greaterwomen's legislativeopportunityn theHouse ofCouncilorsmaybe due largely o theparty-list/PR system,t s quitepossiblethat he esser mportance ftheupperlegislativebody may also contribute o it.MajorityndPluralityingleMember istrictystemsnd Women's egislativeRecruitment

Onlysixcountriesmongthetwenty-three estern-styleemocracieshad themajority rpluralityystemwith inglememberdistrictsn 1982.They wereAustralia,New Zealand, Canada, theUnited Kingdom, theUnitedStates,and France which n 1986changedtotheparty ist/PR ys-tem New York imes1985: 6). Women in parliament n the SMD coun-tries totaled about 4 percent and the range was from no womenrepresentativeso 8.8 percent. xceptforNewZealand,the evelofwomen'srepresentationpproximates r is less than that n such less modernizedcountries s Greece and Spain. The primary easonfor his s theelectoralsystem ather han inhibitingocial, economic,and culturalfactors.In Australia ne seestheunfavorablempactofthesingle-memberis-trictystemwhereM = 1) intheHouse ofRepresentatives,ndthefavorableresult n themultimember istrict enatewheredistrictmagnitude s ten(five re chosen neachelection). n 1981 theHouse was 100percentmale.In 1983 an extensive ampaign byAustralia'swomenresulted n six fe-malerepresentatives,r4.8 percent fthe House (Simms 1984) comparedto twenty ercent f theseats n theAustralianSenate (Australian nfor-mation Service1983). The particularly egativefeature ftheAustralianHouse is a requirementhat andidatesbe electedbyan absolutemajorityof votes. In such cases, women are nominated nd electedonly n smallnumbers.A majority rimarylectoral ystemsometimes eferredo as thedoubleprimary) or heU.S. House ofRepresentatives perates n eightSouth-ernstates Lamis 1984). If no candidatewins a clearmajorityn the firstprimary lection,anotherprimary s held withthe two candidateswhoreceivedthehighestpluralitiesn the first rimary ompeting n the sec-ond. The final lectionsusuallyuncontested. yholding econdprimariesin these tilldominant ne-partytates, hescreening rocessbymajorityvoteeffectivelyll buteliminateswomen andidates, s wellas blacks,while


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488 Western oliticalQuarterlypreservinghe tatus uo forwhitemaleDemocratic arty andidatesibid.;GertzogPart II, 1984; Rule, 1986).

Turning now to France which also had legislativeelectionsby themajority rinciplen 1982: France had a doubleballotsystem f electionsforparliamentwhichrequireda parliamentaryandidate in each ofthesingle-memberistricts o obtaina majority ote for lection. f no candi-date won a majority n the first lection,a second was held to obtain amajority ote Fisichella1984; Beckwith 984). Given thatthe stakesarehigh- winner akes ll - fewwomenwere nominated nd electedunderelectoral rrangementsfthe FifthRepublic. Of late,however, he num-berhad beenvery lowly ncreasing less than2 percentperelectionas a result f affirmativection rules Mossuz-Lavau and Sine 1981: 119).The case of France illustratesheeffect fchangingfrom he ist/PRarrangementoa single-memberistrict/majoritarianystemnd vise versa.After heFrench lectoral ystemwas altered n 1956 to a single-membersystem,women'srepresentation as reduced from .2 percent o 1.4 per-cent Kohn 1980.) However,whenelectionswereheldin 1977for heEu-ropean Parliament, France adopted a list/PR procedure with onemultimember ationwide istrict. he resultwas thatwomenwere electedto22 percent fthe eats ntheFrenchdelegation othatParliamentCom-missionof theEuropeanCommunities1980: 10.) The fact hatthe Euro-pean Parliament s a weak legislaturewithfewenforcementowers mayaccount npartforwomen'shigh evel ofrepresentationnthisbodycom-pared to the Frenchparliament.Members of theHouse ofRepresentativesn theU.S. are elected un-der a systemwhich s theoretically exceptfor ightSouthern tatesa pluralityystem.n practice he ystemworks s a majoritarian ne,witha preponderanceftwo-partyrone-party epublicanorDemocratic reas(Patterson nd Caldeira 1984). In a two-partyistrict, otersmay usuallychoosebetween andidatesof theDemocraticand Republicanparties. na one-party istrict otershave no real choice (Lowi 1984).M.P.s inGreatBritain'sHouse ofCommons re also elected romingle-memberdistrictsya plurality rmajority ote. Like the U.S. House, theCommonshasa highpercentagef ncumbentsWelch 1985).Consequentlythere re fewopen seats and theprobabilityfgreaternumbers fwomenbeingelected s thereforeow (Welch and Studlar1986). In addition,thetotalvotesgainedby parties n all electiondistricts iffermarkedly romtheproportions fseatsobtainedbyeach party n theparliament,whichalso has a negative ffect nwomen'sparliamentaryepresentation.hesepoints re illustratedythe 1983 election Butler1984: 229). The LiberalSocial DemocraticAlliance,whichhad nominated he mostwomencandi-dates,wontwenty-fiveercent fthepopularvote and fourpercent f theseats ntheHouse ofCommons.The Conservative arty,whichnominatedfewwomencandidates, eceived 2 percent fthepopularvote and 61 per-cent of theseats. In turn, he Labour party'srepresentationn theHouseofCommons was thendisproportionatelyessbysome20 percent ibid.).New Zealand is an atypical single-member istrict ountry s faraswomen's egislative epresentation8.8 percent) sconcerned.Possible rea-


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Electoralystems 89sonsforNew Zealand's largerrepresentationfwomenmaybe, first,n-cremental uildingon previous gains; second,the electionvictory ftheLabour party.Of the twelvewomenelected,tenwere Labour nominees(1985AirNewZealandAlmanac: 91; also 589-97). This suggests hepossi-bilityhatNew Zealand's Labourparty as been more upportivefwomencandidates han has beenthecase inEngland Hills 1981: 19.) Moreover,women also appear to have a greater ole within hetrade unions (NewZealand 1984), an important ase of the Labour party.Associatedwiththe latterfactor s theextraordinarilyarge percentageofwomen in theworkforce: 5.4 percent thehighest mongthetwenty-threeemocra-cies.This provides great otential or hepoliticalmobilization fwomen.Women's considerableparliamentary nderrepresentaitonnder thesinglemember istrictystem s. their epresentationsingother lectoralarrangementsn thesamecountries re summarizedbelow in Table 3. Itshould be borne nmindthat xceptfor he WestGermanand Australiancases, the argerpercentagesweregainedin the eastpowerfulegislativebodies.

TABLE 3PERCENTWOMENM.P.s UNDERDIFFERENTLECTORALARRANGEMENTSN THE SAME COUNTRYWestGermany 4% Women M.P.s in SMD 16% in list/PR lectionsElectionsJapan 2% Women M.P.s in SNTV 8% in list/PR enateElectionsElectionsAustralia 5% WomenM.P.s in SMD 20% in 10-Member enate(absolutemajority) lections Districts lections**France 4% Women M.P.s in SMD 22% in party ist/PR uropean(absolutemajority) lections Parliament lections

Sources:Hanbuch T 10 [ElectionReturnsforMarch6, 1983] suppliedby theGermanInformationervice,NewYorkCity;E. Hargadine, Japan," inJ. Lovenduski ndJ. Hills,eds., Womennd PublicParticipationLondon: Routledge nd Kegan Paul, 1981), andJapanInformationndCultural enter, ersonal orrespondence,anuary 5, 1985;Fact heetnAustralia,1983 Electionesults,uppliedbyAustraliannformationervice;Commission ftheEuropeanCommunities,Women n theEuropeanParliament,"upplement#4,Womenf urope,russels,1980.* Except orWestGermanyndAustralia,hehigher ercentagesre foundnthe eastpowerfullegislature.** Half of thesenators or ach state re chosen n every lection.

We turn now to Part III in whichthe twenty-threeemocraciesareclusteredbywomen's politicalopportunity orelectionto parliament.PART III. WOMEN'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY BY NATIONS

The twenty-threeationswere clustered ylike characteristics elatedtowomen'srecruitmentonationalegislatures.here are threemajor types- thePoliticalOpportunityluster, heLimited oliticalOpportunitylus-ter,and theMixed Opportunity lusters A and B). See Table 5 below.


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490 Western oliticalQuarterlyTheMethodUsed to ClusterNationsThe clusteringmethodused was orthogonal actor nalysis.The com-puterroutine irstsolated hreenon-overlappingactorsxplaining totalof 79 percent f the variance refer o Table 4). These threefactorsmaybe interpreteds thethreemajorcauses Rummel1970: 24-26)ofwomen'sparliamentaryecruitment,ith heamountofvarianceexplainedbyeachfactor enoting he relative ignificancef each on the outcome.Twenty-onepercent fthevariance sunexplained. n Table 4 below we seehighlyinterrelatedariables lusteredogether. orexample,Factor , namedPo-liticalStructure omponents, s a cluster f all thepoliticalvariables usedin the earliercorrelation/regressionTable I) which ntercorrelated orewith ach other hanthecomponentsnthe otherfactors. actor oadings,for xample 91 and .81 in Factor1, are interpretedikecorrelation oeffi-cients nd also rangefrom- 1.00 through to + 1.00 (Kerlinger1964:653-54).

TABLE 4ANALYSIS OF 23 WESTERN-STYLE NATIONS' POLITICAL, AND SOCIO-ECONOMICCOMPONENTS, AND WOMEN'S RECRUITMENT TO THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE(RotatedVarimaxOrthogonal actorAnalysis)

Factor 1 Political System omponents, Nomination nd ElectionFactorPartyList/ R ........................................................... 91DistrictMagnitude, ogged ...........................................81PercentNon-RightM.P.s ..............................................72Percent fwomen n legislature.................................... .41Varianceexplained:31.8%Factor 2-SocioeconomicComponents,n Eligibility actorPercentNon-Catholic opulation, ogged.......................... .79Percent f women n workforce..................................... .74Percent fwomen n legislature.................................... .77Percent funemployed.............................................. -.63Varianceexplained:29%Factor 3-Educational Component,n Eligibility actorWomenas percent fcollegegraduates.......... .................93Percent nem loyed................................................... -.68VarianceExplained:18.4%TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED: 79.2%

CommunalitiesWom n in workforce.................................................. .81Unemployment.......................................... .87Party ist,PR ........................................... .93Womencollegegraduates.............................................91Non-RightMembers fParliament.................................64Wom n in legislature................................................... 93DistrictMagnitude, ogged ....................................... .67Non-Catholics,ogged .................... .. .64EigenvaluesFactor1 ................................................................. 2.54Factor2 ................................................................. 2.32Factor3 ...................................................... ............ 1.48


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Electoralystems 91Factor1,PoliticalStructure omponents, xplains31.8 percent fthevariance and is ofmost mportancenpredictingwomen's recruitmento

the lower houses ofparliament. ts major elements re list/proportionalrepresentation,largenumber f eatsperdistrict,nd centernd eft arties- whichpertainto thenominationnd electiontagesof women's politicalrecruitmento national egislatures.Factor2, SocioeconomicComponents, ccountsfor29 percentof thetotalvariance. Non-Catholic ountries repositivelyssociatedwithhigherproportionsfwomen n theworkforcend lowerunemployment. omen'sgreater articipationn the workforcerovides potential or hepoliticalmobilization fwomen,and it also relates o their nformal ligibility orparliament.Factor3, EducationalComponent, ccountsfor18percent fthevari-ance,and it salso significantor he ligibilitytageofwomen'sparliamen-taryrecruitment. nemployments negatively elated o thisfactor; husgreater roportionsfwomencollege graduates s associatedwithfull m-ployment.To pictorially epresenthetwenty-threeemocracies n a twodimen-sionalspace, factor cores Z scores)forFactors1 and 2 were obtained foreach country.The computer henprinted he ocationof each countrynthediagrambased on their coreson each factor.The same was done forFactors2 and 3. However,onlyFactors1 and 2 are presented n Figure1 below since therewere few differencesetweenthetwodiagrams.It shouldbe emphasizedthatthisclusteringndicateswomen's politi-cal opportunity, hich s a function fthestrengthf thecomponents nthethreefactors or ach nation s of1982. Nationscan move to the Polit-icalOpportunityluster ythepolitical ffortsfwomen and/ormen. Forexample,in 1971, Austria reduced tsdistricts rom wenty-fiveo nine.This brought he mean numberof egislators er district o twentyLij-phart1984: 165) a magnitudemostfavorable o women. Of course,theopposite s also possible,as we have seenby theelectoralchangesin theFifthRepublic of France.DISCUSSION OF NATION CLUSTERSIn Table 5 the nations re clustered ccording oproximitynthe dia-gram nFigure2, except orJapanndNew Zealand. The latter woformeda separategroup clusterB) whichwas added to the Mixed PoliticalOp-portunityluster ecauseoffavorableocioeconomic onditions orwomen'selectionto parliament.

PoliticalOpportunitylusterThe nations nthePoliticalOpportunityluster houldcomeas no sur-prise othereader.Denmark,Finland,Norway, nd Swedenhavethemostimportant avorable omponentsforwomen's nomination nd election:greaterproportions f center nd leftparties n theparliament, partylist/proportionalepresentationystem,nd largedistrictmagnitudes. in-land has thehighest veragenumberofrepresentativeserdistrictthir-


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492 Western oliticalQuarterlyFIGURE 2

23 DEMOCRACIES LUSTEREDBY LIKE POLITICAL, SOCIALANDECONOMIC ONDITIONSAND PERCENTOF WOMENN PARLIAMENT(Z SCORES F COUNTRIESNFACTORS AND )

Fl Political Components

Neth Po GeIre It Port is Nor Swedp?? I^llt^ *SwedSpo* * Gr * witz enBel AustriIce

Fr* Can Jap0a *USAustrl UK*NZ

Fl

F2

TABLE 5TWENTY-THREE DEMOCRACIES CLUSTERED BY WOMEN'S POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FORRECRUITMENT TO THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE AS OF 1982 PERIOD(Based on Figure2 FactorAnalysisDiagram)PoliticalOpportunityCluster

(N = 4)DenmarkFinlandNorwaySweden

LimitedPoliticalOpportunityCluster(N =5)AustraliaCanadaFranceUnitedKingdomUnited States

Mixed PoliticalOpportunitylusters & BClusterA (N = 12)AustriaBelgiumGreeceIcelandIsraelItaly

IrelandNetherlandsPortugalSpainSwitzerlandWestGermany

ClusterB (N = 2)JapanNew Zealand

F2Socio-eco-nomicCompo-nents


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Electoralystems 93teen),Sweden'saveragedistrictmagnitudestwelve, ollowed yDenmark,ten,and Norway, even.Withstrongwomen'smovements, large groupof women who voteforwomencandidates,and a sizable women's vote,one result n thesefour ountries as been thatpoliticalpartieshave beenaccessible Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1984: 157-58)and quitefavorabletowardwomen andidates or arliament. hese Nordiccountries lso havethe socioeconomic haracteristics hichhelp to make womeneligible npractice o be members fthenationalparliament.n thefourNordiccoun-tries here s a highpercentage fwomen ntheworkforce, large college-educatedgroupofwomen,and low unemployment.MixedPoliticalOpportunitylusters

Making up theMixed PoliticalOpportunity lustersA andB arefour-teen countrieswhichhave thepotential ornominating nd electingmorewomen to theirnationalparliaments.Of theseMixed PoliticalOpportu-nity ountries nly srael,WestGermany,and Iceland are favorableonthepolitical omponentsFactor 1) and on thesocioeconomic omponents(Factor 2); hencetheyhave thegreatest otential.Since thisanalysiswasmade, Iceland has indeed ncreased onsiderablytsproportion f womenM.P.s. Women'srepresentationn Israel'sparliaments,however,ncreas-ingslowly, incea large proportionn itsparliament s rightwingnd therightwing artiesnominatefewwomenfor heKnesset. WestGermany'sprospects orwomenM.P.s are imited ythesingle-memberistrict/partylist/PRhybrid lectoral ystemdiscussed n theprecedingpages.All theremaining ountries re favorable nlyon Factor 1, thepoliti-cal components, utareunfavorable n Factor2, thesocioeconomic on-ditions. The averagemagnitudeofelectoral onstituencies aries fromlow offour n Greece to a highofone hundredfiftyn theNetherlandswhere henation s theelectoral istrict. hat country as thehighest er-centageofwomen ntheparliamentnthenon-Nordic ountries,whereasGreece has the lowest. The remainder re somewhere n betweentheseextremes.In theMixed Opportunity ountries, everalhavehigherproportionsof eftwingnd center artymembersnparliament nd so have increasedtheirpercentages fwomenbeyondwhatmightbe expected n countrieswherefew epresentativesreelectedperdistrict. his group ncludesBel-gium,Greece, celand, reland, nd Spain. Contrariwise, ustria nd Por-tugal, naddition o srael,havegreater roportionsfconservativeM.P.s.Increasing lowly ow,theproportionfwomen ntheseparliamentshouldimprove onsiderably hould therebe a changeto greater eft nd centerpartystrength.Eleven oftheseMixed PoliticalOpportunityountries ave at least onebelow-average ligibility actor uchas a low percentage fwomen n theworkforce. aving a largepercentage fwomen n theworkforcend/orcollegegraduates,for xample, s beneficial utnot an absolutenecessityforncreasedwomen'sparliamentaryecruitment.his isbecause a smallerpool ofpotential andidates s sufficientor he imitednumberofseats nparliament.


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494 WesternoliticalQuarterlyThe remaining woMixed PoliticalOpportunityountriesCluster B)areJapan and New Zealand. Theyarebothhighon socioeconomic ondi-

tions,Factor2, butlow on thepolitical tructuralomponents,Factor 1.Previouslywe haveseenhowJapanwith semi-PRsystemndmultimem-ber districts everthelessehaves ike SMD country ith two-partyom-inant ystemnd rural-skewed istricts.n consequence, thas fewwomenM.P.s in itslowerhouse. New Zealand, on the otherhand, is a single-member istrictystemutremainsomewhat f n enigmawith tswomen'sparliamentaryelegationt eastdoublethat fother MD countries. hereare system pecificfactors perating herewhich need to be researchedfurther.Australia, anada, France, heUnitedKingdom, nd theUnitedStatesmadeup the LimitedPoliticalOpportunity luster s of1982.These coun-tries rehigher hanaverage nunemployment. ut theremainder f thesocioeconomic omponents re favorable.There are high percentages fwomen in theworkforce s well as in thecollegeeducated group.Thereare morethanenoughwomen tomake a significantool ofpotential an-didates.However, herecruitmentool s notthemajorobstacle o ncreasedlegislative ecruitmentpportunityorwomen ntheLimitedOpportunityCountries luster.The singlememberdistrictystem,with ts scarceopenseats, is.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONPart concerned hemost ignificantredictorsfwomen'sparliamen-taryrecruitmentn the 1982 period comparedto a decade earlier.Typeofelectoral ystems stillthe mostsignificantredictor. pecifically, hepartyist/proportionalepresentationystem rovides hemostpolitical p-portunityorwomen. Part II includeda discussionofthe mpactof vari-ous electoral ystemsnd contextual actorsndifferentountries.PartIIIcorroboratedheearlier indingsnd showedhowthey ellnto hree roup-ings: thepoliticalstructuralomponents,which ncludeddistrictmagni-tude;the ocioeconomicomponentsndreligious eritage,xtent fwomenin theworkforce,nd unemployment;nd thirdly,he educational com-ponent, percentof women college graduates. Finally, countrieswereclusteredy ike haracteristicsarying rom hePoliticalOpportunityoun-triesto thoseprovidingLimited PoliticalOpportunity.The data presented n thispaper make a convincing ase forthe su-periorityfparty ist/PR ystems inparticular hosewith argedistrictmagnitudes forwomen'sopportunityor lection o parliament.Eventhose countrieswith mallnumbersofrepresentativeserdistrictthree-sixmembers)generally veragehigherproportions f womenparliamen-tarians han do thesingle-memberistrict ountries.The chances are thattheparliamentarylection fwomen nthesemost unfavorable f ist-PRcountrieswill nevertheless ncrease faster n the future han the SMDcountries.This analysis lso has shown hatwomen'spolitical ctivitysvery m-portant or ncreasingwomen'srecruitmentnparliamentnvarious elec-


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Electoral ystems 495toral systems. Negative electoral systemfeatures have been overcome bywomen's political mobilization. Positive/affirmative ction by parties maypromotewomen's nomination. In addition, electoral laws may be changedto allow greaterwomen's political opportunity.Small districtsmay be com-bined into larger ones. Moreover, legislative terms may be limited to al-low forgreaterturnover and more open seats. Absent such developments,we may expect that women in most SMD states will not reach parliamen-tary paritywith men in their ifetimes,whereas the opposite is the progno-sis for women in partylist/PR and other multimember district countries.

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496 WesternoliticalQuarterly.____ . 1986. "Duverger's Law: FortyYears Later." In Grofman nd Lijphart,eds., Electoral aws and Their olitical onsequences,p. 69-84.Embassyof France. 1986. Telephone interviewwith nformationfficer, uly8.Engstrom,R. L. and M. D. McDonald. 1986. "The Effect fAt-LargeVersusDistrict lectionson Racial RepresentationnU.S. Municipalities." In Grof-manandLijphart, ds.,Electoralaws andTheir olitical onsequences,p. 203-25.Fisichella,D. 1984. "The Double BallotSystem s a Weapon AgainstAnti-SystemParties." In Grofman nd Lijphart, ds., Electoralaws andTheir olitical on-sequences,p. 181-89.Flanz, G. H. 1983. Comparative omen's ightsnd Political articipationnEurope.Dobbs Ferry,NY: Transnational.Generallections,8thOctober,981. Athens:General Secretariat orPressand In-formation.Gertzog, I. N. 1984. Congressional omen.New York: Praeger.Grofman,B., andLijphart,A., 1984. Choosingn Electoralystem,ssues ndAlterna-tives.New York: Praeger., eds., 1986. Electoral aws and TheirPoliticalConsequences,ew York:Agathon.Handbuch T 10 [ElectionReturnsforMarch 6, 1983], suppliedby the GermanInformation ervice,New York City.Hargadine, E. 1981. "Japan." In Lovenduskiand Hills, eds., Womennd Public

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Electoral ystems 497LegislativeDepartmentnd theMinistry fForeignAffairs. 984. TheNewZealandParliament. ellington.Lovenduski,J., andJ. Hills, eds. 1981. Womennd PublicParticipation.ondon:Routledgeand Kegan Paul.Lowi, T. J. 1984. "Toward a More ResponsibleThree Party System." PS 16:699-706.Mair, P. 1986. "Districting hoicesUndertheSingleTransferable ote." In Grof-manandLijphart, ds.,Electoralaws and Theirolitical onsequences.p. 289-307.McNelly,T. 1984. "LimitedVoting nthe1983General Election nJapan." Pa-per presented tthe nnualmeeting ftheAmericanPoliticalScience Associa-tion,Washington,D.C.Morgan, R. ed. 1984. Sisterhoods Global.Garden City, NJ: Anchor.Mossuz-Lavau, J. and M. Sineau. 1981. "France." In Lovenduskiand Hills,Women nd PublicParticipation,p. 112-33.New York imes. 985. "FranceAdoptingNew Plan forNationalElections,"April4: 6."New Zealand." 1984. In Morgan, ed., Sisterhoods Global,pp. 476-78.Norris,P. 1985. "Women's LegislativeParticipationnWesternEurope." WestEuropean olitics. : 90-101.Patterson, . C. and Caldeira, G. A. 1984. "The Etiologyof PartisanCompeti-tion." Americanolitical cience eview 8: 691-707.Rasmussen,J. 1983. "The ElectoralCostsofBeinga Woman in the 1979 BritishGeneral Election." Comparativeolitics. 5: 461-75.Reilly,M. E. 1985. "The PoliticalMobilization ofSpanishWomen ComparedtoOtherWomenofWesternEurope." Paperpreparedforpresentationt theannual meeting fthe AmericanPolitical ScienceAssociation,New Orleans.Rule,W. 1981. "WhyWomenDon't Run: The Critical actors nWomen's Legis-lativeRecruitment,"WesternoliticalQuarterly4: 60-77., 1984. "How To Increase FeministRepresentationn Parliament." Pa-per presented t the Second International ongresson Women, Groningen,

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498 WesternoliticalQuarterlyTaagepera, R. 1984. "The Effect istrictMagnitudeand Properties f Two-SeatDistricts." n Lijphart ndGrofman, ds. Choosingn Electoralystem,ssues ndAlternatives,p. 91-101.Weaver,L. 1986,"Women and theElectoralSystems."Briefing otesfor ound-table at theAmericanPolitical cience Associationmeeting,Washington, .C.Welch,S. 1985. "WhyWomen Aren'tElectedto Office: ome British nd Ameri-canComparisons." Paper presentedt theWorldCongressofthe nternationalPolitical Science Association,Paris., and DonleyT. Studlar. 1986. "BritishPublic Opinion Toward Womenin Politics:A ComparativePerspective."Westernolitical uarterly9: 138-54.

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