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The Agrarian Myth, the 'New' Populism and the 'New' RightAuthor(s): Tom BrassSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Jan. 25-31, 1997), pp. PE27-PE42Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4405017Accessed: 30/04/2010 11:53

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T h e Agrarian M y t h , t h e ' N e w ' Populisma n d t h e ' N e w ' R i g h t

Tom BrassIt is argued here that the 'new' populism and the 'new' right, both of which emerged after the 1960s and

consolidated during the 1990s, are structured discursively by the agrarian myth, and with it the reaffirmationof peasant essentialism. Whereas the earlier variants of the 'new' populism associatad with the views of Marcuseand Fanon, expressed fears about alienation involving the estrangement from an 'authentic' peasant selfhood,in the third-worldist discourse which the more recent and postmodern variants of the 'new' populism share with'new' right, this innate 'peasant-ness' is represented ideologically as the recuperation of a cultural 'otherness7'difference' that can now be celebrated. Alienation thus metamorphoses into its 'other', 'peasant-ness'-as-empowerment.NOTING the way in which the agrarianmyth has emerged andre-emergedover thepastcentury nideology sharedby populismand hepoliticalright, he focus of this articleis on theconceptof aninnate'peasant-ness'which informs the cultural identity of'othemess'/'difference' hat ies atthecentreof recent nd urrent ariants f thisdiscourse.Notwithstandinghe variety ncontextually-specific discursive forms (Nohonshugi,'Merrie England', volksgemeinschaft,narodnism), oth thepopulismof the 1890sand hepopulism/nationalism/fascism hichemerged nEurope,AmericaandAsiaduringthe 1920s and1930s (= the 'old' right)wereall informedby the agrarianmyth.'The latterre-emerged owards the end ofthe 1960s, in whatmightbe termed he 'new'populism of Fanon,Marcuse andFoucault.It s arguedhere hat hepeasant ssentialismstructuring the agrarian myth has beenconsolidatedduring he 1990s in adiscourseabout hecultural otherness'/'difference' fthe so-called thirdworld. In a developmentwhich ought to generatemore concernandattention hat it does, this discourse is onewhich the more recent and postmodernvariants f the 'new' populism ecofeminism,new social movements, 'the subaltern','everyday-forms-of-resi stance', '6post-colonialism', 'post-Marxism' and 'post-capitalism') share not just with the 'new'right but also in many instances with itscounterpart rom the 1920s and 1930s.2

The more recent versions of the 'new'populistagrarianmyth are characterised ytwo important ransformations: n the onehandrevolutionary gency passes from theproletariato the peasantry,and then ceasesevenforthe atter;andontheother, peasant-ness'-as-alienationmetamorphoses nto its'other', 'peasant-ness' as-empowerment.Accordingly, the discourse-against ofMarcuse andFanon is characterisedby thedominationof non-materialistconcepts of'alienation' which, unlike the specificallymaterialist concept of alienation thatstructuresMarxism,arealso sharedby those

on the 'new' political right. Whereas theprefiguringdiscourseof both the 'old' rightand 'new' populists such as Fanon andMarcuse dentifies he 'estrangement' f thepeasantry ycapitalismas aproblem, o thatof the its more recent postmodern/post-coloniallpost-capitalism/'new' ight inheri-tors declare this estrangement o be at anend, aproblem hathas n effectbeen solved.Sorelianmythas a mobilising discoursehasin process become a reality.Two points should be made clear at theoutset about the conceptualisation ofpopulism adheredto in this presentation.First,populisms theorised ereasessentiallya mobilising deology, operatingat the levelof consciousness whereit serves to deflectdiscourse from class to non-class identity;the importanceof this aspectof populism sevident fromthe manytexts which label itas rht oric, or a class consciousness dis-placingdiscourse-about.3 ndsecond,unlikeother texts which categorise variants ofpopulismas compatiblewith the politics ofeithertheleft or theright, populism s asso-ciated hereonly withthe political right.4 nshort,'new' populism s not anautonomoustheory/practice that occasionally (andaccidentally) overlaps with the largelyunconnected theory/practiceof the right;much ratherit is the right, mobilising ormobilised politically.5

INot Asking the (Agrarian) Question

Generallyspeaking, populism is an 'a-political'/'third-way'deology hathasalonghistory,and whichprojects tself in termsofa discourse-against hat is simultaneouslyanti-capitalist ndanti-socialist. n a varietyof gui es andforms,populismhasemergedandre-emergedperiodicallyasa reactionby(mainly, but notonly) peasantsand farmersto industrialisation, rbanisation nd(again,mainlybut notonly) capitalistcrisis: first nthe 1890s, subsequentlyduringthe 1930s,yet againduringthe 1960s and now in the

1990s.6A potent orm of ruralismwith rootsin romanticandconservative notions of anorganic ociety, agrarian opulism s'Ihmanyways the mirrormage of its 'other',Marxism(see Table). Historically, populism hasproclaimedhenecessityof an'abovepolitics'mobilisation on the basis of the agrarianmyth, anessentialist deologywhich n mostcontexts is defended with reference to themutually reinforcing aspects of 'peasant-ness', national dentityandculture.7Amongother things, this discourse has entailed acritiqueofindustrialisation, rbanisationndmodernitybasedonnostalgia oravanishingway-of-life, linkedin turnto perceptionsofan idyllic/harmonious/folkloric villageexistence as an unchanging/unchangeable'natural' ommunityandthustherepositoryof a similarlyimmutable nationalidentity.Linked to the latter was the view of thecountrysidegenerallyasthelocus of myths/legends, spiritual/sacred attributes, non-commercial values, and traditionalvirtue.Since it downgrades/deiiies he existenceof class and accordingly essentialises thepeasantry,populism regards smallholdingproprietors as socio-economically un-differentiatedandthus casts themall in therole of 'victims', uniformly oppressed bylarge-scale institutions/monopolies ocatedin the urban sector (the state, big businessand 'foreign' capital). As many Marxistshave pointed out, the political anxiety thatstructureshediscourse-against f populismis anunderlying ear of socialismrather hancapitalism. For this reason, the populistdiscourse-against s directednot so much atcapitalism per se as at its large-scalemonopoly/('foreign') variant which givesrise to the very conditions that lead in turnto socialism.Like Marxism,populism also combines apessimismabout hepresentwithanoptimismabout he future.UnlikeMarxism,however,populism fails to distinguish between aprogressive/modernanti-capitalism whichseeks to transcendbourgeois society, and aromantic anti- (or post-) modern form the

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rootsof whichare ocated nagrarian ostalgiaandreactionary isions of an innate nature'.Accordingly, hepessimismwhichstructuresthe discourse-against f populism ngeneralandagrarian opulism nparticulargeneratesanoptimismwhichis not forwards-lookingbutmuchrather ackwards-looking,nd huscorrespondso anattempto reinvent raditionin a way thathas been (andcontinues to be)supportiveof conservative, nationalist andeven fascist ideology.

MARGINALITYAS ALIENATIONThe concept of alienation discharges acrucial role in the discourse of populismwhere,unlike Marxism or which alienationis a specifically materialist phenomenonlinkedto the reproduction f labour-power,it refers generally to a process of culturalmarginality/estrangement nd in particularto the impactof the latter on the peasantry(and through his on national dentity).'The

theoretical and political difficulty withalienation-as-estrangement-from-selfhoodand concepts of marginality to which itgives rise is that de-objectificationand re-subjectification an beeithera materialist ran idealist project.9Accordingly, the verynotionof becoming/being-other-than-oneselfis premissed on the existence of an innate'selfhood' hatisa-historical ndunchanging,a 'natural' dentity fromwhich the self hasbeen estrangedand hence transformed ntosomething 'alien' (= 'other').'0Moreover,this.definition f 'selfhood'canextendfromthe ndividual hroughhegroup othenation:theresult s anall-encompassingconceptof'estrangement' that includes not just thealienation of labour and its reification ascommoditybutalso Rousseauesque/Words-worthianversions of conservative nationa-lism, varieties of 'marginal' 'abnormal'identity declared rationally/socially other'by Enlightenment discourse, and an'authentic' national/ethnic/peasantdentitydeclared culturally/spiritually 'other' bycolonialism.The potentially conservative politicallinkages between marginality/alienation/estrangement on the one hand andRousseauesque/Wordsworthian ersions ofnationalismon the other are not difficult todiscern.According to Rousseau, the originof inequality ies in a debasementof humangoodness, an instinctual behaviour fromwhich humanity had become estranged/alienatedand which forhim was tobe foundin its 'natural' orm in 'Nature' itself. Theobject, therefore was to return to this'natural','primitive' state which had beenlost, and withit aninnately democratic ormof existence based on subsistence." Boththisbelief nand he necessity of recuperatingthe 'natural'goodness of humanitywas notmerely shared by the romantic poet

Wordsworth,but formed the basis for hisconservative theory of nationalism."2Like Rousseau, Wordsworthmaintainedthat hulmanitywas essentially 'good', butthat this 'purestate' hadnow been lost dueto theimpositionof an 'artificial' = 'alien'/alienating/alienated) existence based onhierarchy. To recover this lost state of'goodness', therefore, t was necessary o re-establish the context in which it thrived,when humanitywas closer to Nature.Sincethe latter was also a context in which anequallypure ormof 'generalwill' (=absenceof hierarchy)was exercised, this state ofNature or Wordsworthalso constitutes hebasis for the presenceof an authenticandbenign national dentity.A consequenceofrecuperating his 'natural' state, therefore,whena 'naturally ood' humanity xerciseda political will thatwas equally 'pure'and(hence) benign,wouldbe tobring ntobeinga 'natural', 'virtuous' and thus 'authentic'nationalspirit/identity.

The mportance f thisspecificallybenignsource/formof nationalism for conserva-tive theory s that t invites popularconsentand thus confers legitimacy on action(s)exercised in its name.'3 The same pointabout the tradition-invoking ideologicalrole of ethnic and/or peasant marginality/alienation/estrangement an be made withregard o the mobilisingdiscoursenotonlyof the 'new' populismbut also of the 'new'right.

FROM ALIENATEDTO EMPOWERED'OTHERNESS'

Although the subject of much debate, he'new' populism which re-emerged duringthe 1960s andhas become entrenched uringthe 1990s encompasses - like its 1890s/1920s/1930s counterpart- a number ofrecognisable characteristics. Generallyspeaking, herefore, texpresses antagonismtowards helarge-scale,andmoreespeciallytowardspolitics, class, capitalism, ocialismand the state; by contrast, it endorses theinnate 'peasant-ness'of the agrarianmyth,the small-scale, and especially the idea ofnon-class-specific common interests ('themasses', 'the people') operatingon the basisof grassroots/local nitiatives. 4Antagonisticto Eurocentricmetanarratives remissedonEnlightenment rationalityand to Marxisttheory/practice n particular, he romanticanti-capitalism of the 'new' populisminfluenced by postmodem theory endorsesinstead a processof 'resistance'/'empower-ment' based on non-class identities thatcelebrate 'diversity', 'difference' and'choice'.'5Such a project could be said to structuremuchrecent ocial theoryabout heso-calledthird world.'6 Accordingly, the 'new'populism is evident in the concept of analienated/marginal othemess' that nformsthetheoryof Marcuse,Fanonand Foucault.It is also present, albeit with a radically

TABLEMARXISM POPULISM(Agrarian uestion) (AgrarianMyth)(Historical ubject)Proletariat Peasantry(Political dentity)Class EthnicityEconomic CulturalInternationalism Nationalism(PoliticalAction)Revolution ResistanceStruggle Accommodation(SystemicEffect)Socialism/Communism Pre-Capitalism/Capitalism(EconomicDiscourse)Conflict HarmonyChange StasisProgress TraditionPoliticalEconomy NatureProduction ConsumptionManufacture HandicraftsLarge-scale Small-scaleSurplus SubsistenceCollective IndividualPlanning Market(Politico-Ideologicaliscourse)Rationality InstinctScience ReligionHistory MythPolitics A-PoliticalState VillageCommunityUrban RuralIndustry AgricultureInternational National

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different meaning, in the tribal/peasant/gender/ethnic/national 'communities'implied n or disclosedby themany variantsof postmodern theory: the discourse ofecofeminism,new social movements, 'thesubaltern', everyday-forms-of-resistance','post-colonialism', 'post-marxism' and'post-capitalism'. Most of the lattercontextualise empowerment within thedomain of 'popular culture', a procedurewhich challengesthe notion of passivity byrecognisinghevoice andactionofoppressedhistoricalategories = 'thosebelow') usuallyperceived as mute and/or dominated.Recuperating Rousseauesque notion of a'generalwill' in a state of Nature, 'popularculture'becomes identifiedwith the voice-from-below and anything/everythingassociatedwith it can now be celebratedbypostmodernnew' populismas the embodi-ment of an authentically democraticexpression.'7One telelogical effect of postmodernnominalism, whereby the meaning oflanguagehas no purchaseon any existenceoutside of itself, is the naturalisation of'culture',a conceptwhichconsequentlynotonly no longer needs to be problematisedpolitically but also (and thereby) becomesa substitute for economic development.'8Implicitly oncedingtheargumentsmadebythose on thepoliticalright,that there s nowno ongeracoherentalternative ocapitalism,that the latter is consequently here to stay,and that further opposition to capital isaccordingly pointless, much postmodern'new'populistdiscoursenow seeks topresentthe status quo in the best possible light.'9 Inorder to put the best face on the existingsituation, therefore, it is necessary forpostmodern new' populists to redefine it:cultural dentity becomes a substitute foreconomic identity, as a result of which a'from below' empowermentcan be said tohavealreadybeen accomplished.Insofarasall 'those below' categories (lumpen-proletarians,ribals,peasants,womenofany/every ethnic/national dentity) previouslyalienated/marginalised/estranged havesucceeded n realising 'selfhood' within thedomain of 'popular culture', no furtherstruggleis necessary.

Inthediscourseof anti-/post-colonialism,alienation is linked conceptually to theexperience of blackness, the definition ofwhichwhenconstructed y (colonial)whitesis not - cannot be - represented as an'authentic' xperience.ForFanon, herefore,alienationcorresponds o the experience ofestrangementwhereby the colonised is an'alien' nhis/herownnational nvironment.20By regainingnationalautonomy in the actof violentlydisplacing/expelling he 'alien'coloniser,the post-colonial subjectrealisesaliberatingselfhood:heactofdecolonisationeffectedby a national iberationmovement

entailsamongotherthings therecuperationby the self of therespectwhich precededandwas negated by the basic 'otherness' ofalienation.2'Much the same applies to the categoriesof marginalised/estranged/' alienated'subjectivity ecuperatedy post-modernism.Like Fanon andMarcuse,Foucaultnotonlydemonises he EurocentricmetanarrativesfEnlightenmentdiscourse but also romanti-cises marginality simply because of its'otherness'. To the varieties of 'selfhood'established by Enlightenment discourse(reason/rationality/science/knowledge ='thenormal', thesocial'), tsrelatedpractices(gaze/speech= rule/power)andsanctifyinginstitutionaleffects (sanity/legality/hetero-sexuality/life), therefore,Foucaultcounter-poses de-centred 'other' forms of marginal'selfhood' (madness/criminality/homo-sexuality/death) which find their expres-sion not merely in a multiplicityof 'other-nesses'/' marginality' but 'othernesses'/'marginality'which are also taboo (= 'ab-normal').22 he latter are thusalienatedbyvirtueof being discursively stigmatisedas'a-social' (= socially marginal) and ac-cordinglypolitically/institutionallyxcludedfrom the realm of scientifically sanctioned(= 'rational') ormsof social existence(= the'normal').Because he blames Enlightenmentrationalism for inventing 'normality' andthus dbnormality', Foucault attacks theformer n thenameof the atter.The nventionof an 'abnormality' imultaneously icensesthecreation f 'marginality' nd alienation',since the 'non-normal' is not merelyconsignedtothe marginsof 'the social' (andbecomes thereby the 'a-social') but stig-matisedas the 'other' that requiressocialregulation.In this processof camivalesqueinversion, herefore,notonlyisthe 'normal'/'abnormal' distinctiondissolved (itself anuncontentious procedure) but - morecontroversially marxism s itself inculpa-ted as partof 'scientistic' and tainted En-lightenmentdiscourse that constructed heopposition between 'normality' and'abnormality'n the firstplace.23Moreover,since it is considered by Enlightenmentdiscourseas 'irrational' nd thus its 'other',traditional folkloric memory - the em-bodiment of a 'from-below' discourse andthe ce.ntral mplacementof popularculture- is forFoucaultpartof this samecategoryof 'otherness',and thereforebelongs in thepantheonof stigmatised-to-be-recuperatedvoices.24In contrast to Marxism, which allocatessociety-transforming evolutionaryagencyto the working class, this same role in the'new' populism of Fanon, Marcuse andFoucault s dischargednotby theproletariatbut rather by marginal socio-economicelements that are similarly alienated from

capitalism. For both Fanon and Marcuse,capitalism has succeeded in buying off itsworkers.The latter are thereforedismissedas privileged, and hence no longer revolu-tionary.AccordingtoFanon, tisthecolonies'where a realstruggleforfreedomhastakenplace', the inferenCebeing that class strug-gles in the metropolitan apitalistcountrieshave eitherbeen non-existent or 'unreal'.'Noting that support for political partiesisurban,and composed not just of teachers,artisansandshopkeepersbut also workers,allof whom 'havebegun to profit... romthecolonial set-up', Fanon concludes thatworkers in particularwant no more thanwage increases and are thus preparedtocompromise with colonialism.26This view about the privileged andhencenon-revolutionary nature of the urbanindustrial roletariatnmetropolitanapitalistcontexts is in animportant ense confirmedby Marcuse.27 or the latter,as for Fanon,the western industrialproletariathas be-n'co-opted by capitalism to the degree that itis nolongercapable andperhapsno longereven willing- of realising ts historical askof self-emancipation by overthrowing thesystem in a revolutionary ct.28 hisprocessof working class incorporation ('introiec! iE.-'*of the subjectby its master') s ifr Mmrcusea 'repressive tolerance' determined n partbythecapacityofcapital ogencrate rtificial(= 'alienating')needs;theresultinig .orkingclass consumerism s linked by Marcuse nturnto the technificationof domination(aprocedurenot dissimilar to Foucault's dis-course/techniques/practice of power).29Indeed, insofar as the alienationthatstemsfromthe culturalalienationof the worker =spiritualdisenchantmentwith the existing)isnoteradicable, t nowbecomesapermanentobstacle to emancipation.Like Foucault's'power', therefore, Marcuse's 'alienation'appears o be innate and systemically non-transcendable.20Intermsof socialcomposition, heelementof 'marginality' covers a heterogeneousensemble of 'othernesses', extendingfromthe alienated deskilled (students, intel-lectuals) in metropolitan apitalistcontexts,throughvariantsof the 'abnormal'/a-social'(criminals, prisoners, homosexuals, theinsane) in bothmetropolitan ndperipheralcapitalism, to the peasantryand lumpen-proletariat in the so-called third world.Although Fanon accepts that peasantsanda lumpen-proletariat omposed of landlesspeasantsarereactionary, nti-modern,anti-urban n outlook,andcounter-revolutionaryin termsof action,for him therevolutionarypotentialof these alienatedelements stemsfrom the fact of theirmarginality.3'Unlikethe urbanproletariat,neither the peasantrynor the lumpen-proletariat have been'corrupted'by colonialism;moreover,eachretains its spontaneous revolutionary


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tendencies that derive from its as-yetundiscarded background (= 'peasanttradition').32 he 'marginality'of Marcuseis a similarly all-embracing categorycomposed of 'the underprivileged'. Ac-cepting that the latter cuts across classboundaries,he neverthelessidentifies it asrevolutionary imply by virtue of it being'the mass basis of the national liberationstruggleagainstneo-colonialism n the thirdworld'3In ermsof agency, he alienated/estranged/marginalsperceivedbymuch new'populistdiscourse to be the 'natural' locus of anequally 'natural' nnate/spontaneous resi-stance' to capitalism. Hence, the peasantryis for Fanon 'the only spontaneouslyrevolutionaryorce', while for Marcuse t isincluded among the 'underprivileged'sections in the third world that are therepositoryof a radical 'pre-revolutionary'political consciousness.-' As with Fanon,therefore, herecognitionby Marcuseof thenon- or indeed the counter-revolutionarypotential fdeclasse petitbourgeoiselementsor lumpen-proletariat oes not preventhimfrom claiming that- simply on accountofan'oppressed' tatus suchelementspossessan nnate nterest nchallenging hecapitalistsystem.33Again like Fanon, the potentiallyrevolutionary haracterof this oppositionaldisposition is attributedby Marcuseto thefact hat he umpen-proletariatsimperfectlyincorporatedntocapitalism.Moreover,bothattribute an elemental/(non-rational)character to the agency of the alienated/marginal n the thirdworld. ForFanontheviolenceof the masses (= peasants+lumpen-proletariat) is 'innate', almost 'natural',thereby eproducinghestereotype f 'native'= 'savage', while Marcuse similarlynotesthe 'instinctual' natureof revolt.2, At thecentre of the 'new' populist discourse ofFanonandMarcuse, herefore, s to be founda concept of pristine 'peasant-ness' notdissimilarto that which informsthe earlierversionsof the agrarianmythassociatedwiththe ideology of Nohonshugi, 'MerrieEngland' and volksgemeinschaft.Muchthesame is trueof the 'frombelow'mobilisation which structures the 'new'populistpostmodern rameworkof Foucaultandothers, orwhom the concept of agencyamounts to a politically non-specific formof individualresistance, 'a certaindecisivewill not to be governed'.1' And just asFoucault attemptsto locate an 'authentic'system of values as essentially religious,non-materialist ndpre-capitalist n origin,so he identifies anequally 'authentic'formof resistance ot nMarxbutratherin eligiousdissentduring hepre-capitalist ra.Inmanyrespects, heprecursor f Foucaultandotherswho adhere to a postmodern concept ofagency is Sorel, for whom the cleansingviolence of the revolutionaryact was more

importanthan ts socio-economiccause andpoliticaloutcome.3" ikeFoucault,Sorel notonly questionedthe possibility/desirabilityof progress but linked mobilisation to aBergsonian intuitiveness based on myth.39The importanceof myth for Sorel is itsspecifically anti-intellectual uality:since itisbasednot on analysis = 'facts'/'thinking')butoninstinct = 'intuition'/'feeling'),myth- like religion - is unamenable o rationalcritiqueandhencerefutation.40 significantresultof thisde-objectification fknowledgeisthataction inked oitbecomescontextuallyde-linked, orrespondingly oluntaristic ndthus spontaneous'/'elemental'ncharacter.4'To the extent that the 'new' populismgenerallyarguesfor the mobilisationof all/every category of 'marginal' supposedlyalienated from capitalism, therefore, itendorses the realisation of Sorelian myth.Thediificultywith this is that,as in the caseof 1920s/1930spopulism, uch mobilisationis supportive otof the political eft butmuchratherof the political right.NEW 'RIGHT'OR 'NEW' RIGHT?

Inculpatingiberalism orgivingrisetoanegalitarianism hatprefigures ocialism andculminates in communism (= 'totalitaria-nism'),the'new'right-likeits 'old'counter-part identifiesasthetargetof itsdiscourse-againstthe combinedand interrelatedpro-cesses of large-scale urbanisation, ndus-trialisation, apitalism, ocialism,modernity,and echnology.42 mong tsmore ignificantpre-figuring nd/ororganic ntellectualsareAlain de Benoist, Marco Tarchi, JulienFreund, Gianfranco Miglio, HenningEichberg,FriedrichHayek,MiltonFriedman,Roger Scruton and John Gray.43 Alsoimpoi ant n thisregards thepolitical heoryofJuliusEvola(1898-1974)andCarlSchmitt(1888-1985),eachof whomnotonly rejectedrationalism stheprogenitorof nhumanisticliberalism/(socialism/communism) ut alsoconstitutes linkbetween he 'old' and new'right.'" entral o muchcontemporary ebateaboutpolitical heory,bothonandwithin he'new' right, s the extent to which the latternow exercises a politicallyunchallengeablehegemony (= transcendence f the left/rightpolarity),a result both of distancing itselffrom its past (= decline of the 'old' right)and of the demise of the 'old' left.Perhapsthe most frequentlyrepeatedofcontemporarymyths propagatedmostlybythose on the 'new' right itself - is that theleft/right oliticaldividehasceased opossessanymeaning, incethe 'new'righthasbrokenwith its undemocraticpast and now sharesmanyof thepositionsendorsedby the 'new'left 'iile the 'old' left remains mired inirrelevancy, and increasingly endorseswhatarewidely regarded s anti-democraticpositions.'5 otonly is the Europeanight

nowopposed o thestate, o the'Americanisa-tion' of the globe, to Christianity,and eventospecificformsofcapitalism, herefore, ut(so theargument oes) itspro-third-worldism,its espousalof feminism and sexualchoice,environmentalism, the right to cultural'difference', togetherwith its advocacy ofeconomic and political decentralisation(= 'small-is-beautiful') and local self-determination, ll constituteevidence of itsprogressivepolitics, its pluralism, ts non-authoritarianharacter ndhence heveracityof its self-proclaimed democratic cre-dentials.46It is, its supporters/apologistsclaim, notthe politicalrightof old but muchratheran authenticallynew right.47By contrast,the continuedadherencebythose on the left to Eurocentricuniversals(class, science, progress,development,etc)andtheir nternationalism,heiradvocacyofanenvironmentally nsustainablearge-scaleindustrialisation nddefence of the stateisagainwidely seenbythose onthe 'new'rightnot only as outmodedandcorrespondinglyunprogressive,but also (and therefore)asanti-democratic ndultimately ncompatiblewith a variety of sought-afterde-alienated'selfhoods'. The sub-textof this argumentis unmistakable: since the 'new' rightpossesses fresh ideas thatbothengage withandoffer solutionstosocio-economic ssueswhich neither he 'old' left nor he 'old'righthave been able to address or to solve, itsviews should be taken seriously andhenceforth ncorporated nto the domain of'acceptable'politicaldiscourse.48 inked othis are claims about the fragmentednatureof right-wingdiscourse itself, the sub-texthere being that a consequenceof this non-monolithicpolitics s acorrespondingly on-threateningdisposition.

IINotwithstandingclaims to the contrary,therearegoodreasons orsupposingnot ustthat the 'new' populism is in a numberofimportant respects indistinguishablefromthe 'new'rightbut also thatacrucialelementin this sharedepistemology is the commonendorsementof the agrarianmyth.49First,some on the 'new' rightin some instances

define themselves as part of the 'new'populism.5"A second point of overlap ischronology. Like that of the 'new' right,muchof the 'newpopulist hinking mergedduringthe 1960s generally, and in relationto the events of 1968 in particular.5Thecombination of an anti-American/anti-capitalist/anti-progress/technophobicdis-course-against ndanenvironmentalist/third-worldistdiscourse-for hatcharacterisedheevents of 1968 and the emergenceof newsocial movements linked to these issuesinfluencedthepoliticalthinkingof those onthe 'new' right as much as those who were

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linked to the 'new' populism. Third, andmore importantly,both emphasise culturalnoteconomic struggle,whereby 'selfhood'is realised within the domain of 'popularculture'.DE TE FABULA NARRATUR

Intermsof practice,both the fact andtheextentof theoverlapbetweenthe 'new' rightand contemporaryvariants of populism isnot difficult to discern. For both the 'new'rightand he 'new' populism,struggle s notso much economic or political as cultural.Central o this processof imbrication s theappropriation y the former from the latterof Gramsciantheory/practice of culturalhegemony; ikecontemporary opulism, he'new' right now allocates primacy toconducting ts struggle within the domainnotof politicsbutof culture.52 achendorsesexisting forms of 'from-below' discoursesimplybecause tis 'from-below',apositionwhich avoids problematisinghow and whycurrentdeology circulatesamongthegrassroots and who or what is responsiblefor itsreproduction.The importantdifference isthat, whereas populism has attempted todepoliticise ts analysisof culturalstruggle,the 'new' righthasby contrastrepoliticisedthis process. While the high/low culturaldivide remains intact, therefore, low(= 'popular') ulture snow celebrated atherthandenigrated.For the 'new' right,as forthe 'new' populism, he sole criterion ortheacceptability of any/every view is that itcurrentlycirculates among -(and by impli-cationenjoys hesupport f) thegrassroots.53

A similarity of emphasis on culturalpracticenotwithstanding, t might still beobjected that hardly any similarity existsbetween the 'new' populism and the 'new'right n termsof thepoliticalcontent of suchstruggle.The evidence, however, suggeststhe opposite is true. In certain importantrespects, therefore, little separates thediscourse-for/discourse-againstf the 'new'populismandthat of the 'new' right, parti-cularly with regardto on the one hand acommon anti-Americanismand a shareddistrust oncerninghepossibility/desirabilityof socio-economicprogress,andon theotheranespousalof 'difference'generallyand inparticulars thisencompassesmultiple ormsof 'otherness' n the so-called third world.To begin with, the discourse-againstofboth the 'new' populismand the 'new' rightis characterised by a nationalistic anti-Americanism. nawaythatwassubsequentlytobeappropriatedlmostwholesalebythoseon the 'new' right, therefore, the anti-capitalismof Marcuse s expressed n termsof antagonism towards generating andreplicating a specifically north Americanpatternof consumption.54n terms of dis-course, it is but a small step from a critique

of capitalism-as-American-consumerismoa critique of the latter as a threat to thecultural specificity of the 'other'. Thisnationalist sub-text emerges clearly in theanti-Americanismof the 'new' Europeanright." Far from being evidence of apolitically progressive transformation, heanti-Americanismof the European 'new'right n generalandof deBenoist n particularis actually in keeping with that of thetraditional ight on this issue.-1Not only isthis anti-Americanismgrounded in an at-tempt to protect what is presented as aninnatecultural dentity which requires heprevention of a universalising 'American'(= capitalist) influence from underminingnon-American ultures but t is also rootedin the economic competition betweennationally-specific capitals.Another characteristicwhich the 'new'populism shares not just with the European'new'rightbut also with ts 'old' counterpartis a pessimistic view about historical pro-gress, and thus about the possibility, theeffectiveness and even the desirability ofsocial change. Like the 'new' right, theanalyticalapproachof the 'new' populismtosocio-economic ransformationssociatedwithEnlightenmentnotions of 'progress' sat best equivocal. Fanon not only rejects'westernvalues' as Eurocentricbut appearsto associate economic developmentwith aspecifically European experience, theimplicationbeing that t hasnothing o offerthose in the so-calledthirdworld." Becauselarge-scale ndustrialisation nderminesnotjust traditional ulture,religionand nationalidentity,butalso(and hereby)humannatureandNature tself, mostpostmodernvariantsof the 'new' populism like the 'new' right- aresimilarly echnophobicand/oropposedto progress."5Thisquestioningof progress = the denialof modernity) s itself linkedhistoricallytotherejectionbyconservative ntellectualsofa linearconceptionof time, and its replace-ment by cyclical notions of time based onthe annualcycle of birth/death n nature.59In contrast to the political left, for whichprogress involves a unilinear process oftechnical/mechanical/relational change,therefore, for those on the political rightNature/time (= particularisticknowledge/wisdom/culture) s suspended n an 'eternalpresent' which sdivinely and/or naturally'ordained and ordered, and its hierarchy/'difference' (= heterogeneity, diversity) istherefore sacred and/or 'natural'.' For deBenoist andEvola, therefore,here s notimebut the present, into which both past andfuture are incorporated: ll the centralandinterrelated elements of social existence(= farming/tradition/culture/ethnicity) c-cordingly exist outside time/(history), un-changing and unchangeable n an 'eternalpresent'1

A WORLD F DIFFERENCECertainly the most significant epi-stemological - and perhaps the mostimportant political - component in thetheoreticalframeworksharedby the 'new'populism and the 'new' right s theconcept'difference'/'otherness' on which culturalempowerment s based.Incontrastwiththe

political left, for which empoweringuniversalsoverridedisempoweringalterity(= 'otherness'/'difference'), this anti-universalisticespousal of the irreducibilityof cultural 'othemess' is a characteristic f'new' populism in general, and of itspostmodernvariants n particular.Not onlydoes Fanon himself refer to the colonised'original inhabitants'of 'native society' as'theothers',therefore,but t is precisely thisemphasisonandendorsement f 'otherness'that exponents of postcolonial theory finduseful in his approach.62imilarly, n muchof the 'new' populist discourse cultural'difference' is presentedasbeingatthe rootof underdevelopment n the so-called thirdworld: not merely is industrialisatiois er-ceived as an inappropriate western im-position, but its absence (= underdevelop-ment) is itself vindicated/celebrated s theaccomplishmentof a form of culturalem-powerment specific to the third world'other'.63Along with many on the 'new' right, deBenoist arguesfor 'the rightto difference',a principle which is to operate across allareasof human ctivityandexistence: ulture,religion, sexuality, ethnicity, politics andeconomics." The significanceof thisis that,unlike the left, for which a specificallyinternationaldentity/experiencel(conscious-ness) of class undermines national/ethnic/cultural articularism,orthe'new' populismand the 'new' rightbycontrast t is preciselythisnational/cultural/(ethnic)dentitywhichoverrides/displaces what is perceived bythemas an 'alien'/unfeasible/(undesirable)internationalism.63The focus of this 'difference', t is claimedboth by those on the political rightandbytheirdefenders, s no longerracebutculture,and distinctive ethnic/national identities/practicesarenow perceivednot as raciallysuperior/inferiorbut merely as culturally'other'.'6Such a position is not only com-patible with but actually supportiveof theinvocationand/orexercise by the 'other'ofan analogous form of particularism:theacceptabilityof the latterpracticeto thoseon the political right derives from the factthat t adheres o the samedefining principleof 'otherness',andis thus to be encouragedso long as it does not undermineorthreatenthe distinctiveness of those - like a rulingaristocracy whose culture s built on (andindeedsymbolises)economicpower.It s forthis reason hat historically ndcurrently

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- those on the political right oppose the'sameness' impliedin the advocacy by thepolitical left of universals.A number f problems onfront hose suchasTaguieff who claim to identifya politicalbreak n theviewsof de Benoist andtherightgenerally, l;etween an explicitly racist/nationalist/anti-communist osition of the1960s and a seemingly more enlightenedphase during the 1970s when biologisticdeterminism lhas been replaced with anadvocacy of cultural 'otherness'. To beginwith, in a general sense biologistic deter-minism is not the ideological sine qua nonof the 'old' Europeanright.67Not the leastof the many difficulties facing those whodenythecontinuingcomplicitywith fascismof non-biologistic views about 'racialotherness' (as does Taguieff in the case ofdeBenoist), s afailure o consider he extentto which views unconnected with race arealsoa product f fascism,and husnotmerelycompatiblewithbutactuallysymptomatic fa politico-ideological project of right-wingreaction. Only by focusing on the singleissue of race, andmaintaining falsely as itturns out) that the 'new' right has purgeditself of discredited notions of 'othemess',is it possible for those such as Taguieff toclaim thatbecause a particular oliticsis nolonger taintedwith racism t is ipsofacto nolonger fascist and thus acceptable.More importantly, he 1960s and 1970swere decades when throughoutEuropeandNorth Americathose belongingto the 'old'right were re-inventing the definition ofinnateness central to their political beliefsand n theprocess themselves." And as withmanyotherof itscomponents, hisparticularelement of 'new' right ideology has a longgenealogy in thediscourse of the traditionalright.Thus,it is clearthatforsomeof thoseon the political right during the 1930s theundesirability f the historical rend owardsmass society was the eradicationnotjust ofcultural'othemess' itself but- andperhapsmoresignificantly the capacity o reproducethis: namely, the materialbase which givesrise to this specifica diferentia in the firstplace.69Behind the defence by the political rightof a specifically cultural 'difference',therefore, s to be found a more importantsubtext: hedefence of the rightto retain.theeconomic power on which this culturaldifference s based,and ndeed, which makesit possible to be 'different'.70 n short, it isa defence notso muchof cultural otherness'as of theeconomic basis of class power: theownershipof or control over the means ofproduction which enables the owning/controlling ubject ocommandbothculturalresources art,music, architecture) nd- bywithdrawing rom productivelabour- thetime to indulge in them.7'Accordingly, theadvocacy of the desirability of cultural

'otherness'by those who continue o regardthemselvesas politicallyprogressive gnoresthe factthat t is to the advantageof aglobalcapitalismwhichreproduces neconomicallyuniformclass position to endorse preciselythis kind of specifica diferentia by em-phasisingculturalheterogeneityas the basisof national/ethnic difference', in order todisguisenotmerely hiselementof relational'sameness' worldwidebutalso - and moreimportantly to prevent oliticalmobilisationon the basis of this economic uniformity.72

A (THIRD) WORLD OF (EMPOWERING)'DIFFERENCE'

Both the existence of and the reasons forthe third-worldist views of the 'new'populismand the 'new' rightderivein eachcase from herejectionof whatareperceivedas culturally-erodinguniversals (such aseconomic development/progress and itsconcomitant process of large-scale urbanindustrialisation), and a correspondingendorsement of what is perceived as a'natural' culturally-based form of pre-capitalist existence (= the 'golden age' ofagrarianmyth) which entails the reproduc-tion of those traditional nstitutional ormsand a peasanteconomy threatenedby theseuniversals. nshort, heunderdeveloped/less-developedcountries ngeneraland heirruralpopulation in particular epitomise the'otherness'/'difference'which is central tothe'new'-right/'new'-populistthird-worldistdiscourse-for.Likv-hediscourse-forof he'old'populismand he 'old' right,mostvariants f the 'new'populismsubscribe o theagrarianmythandthus undertake a backwards looking re-cuperationof (and in the process idealise)non-/pre-capitalist uralsociety in the so-called thirdworld.Althoughhe acceptsthatcolonialism 'tribalises' its opponents (withtheobjectof dividingandconquering), hatit 'encourages chieftaincies' (becausetraditional institutions,are complicit withcolonialrule),and urther hat townworkersand ntellectuals'whosupport oliticalpartieshave no respect for and indeed struggleagainst raditionalnstitutions = 'customarychiefs'), therefore,Fanonnevertheless nsiststhat nthecourseof theanti-colonial truggletheauthority f chiefsshouldbesupported.73The reasons for this are two-fold: becausethe authorityof tribalchiefs is recognised(= legitimated) by the peasantry,and alsobecau-eit is a sourceof anauthenticallypre-colonial national identity. Marcuse alsocomes close to idealising non-capitalistsociety in terms of alreadyexisting 'naturalneeds' which do not involve having to godown the capitalist path.74Muchthe same is trueof the morerecentvariants of the 'new' populism influencedby postmodern theory. Like the Rous-

seauesque/Wordsworthian ombination ofa 'natural' state of human 'goodness'exercisedas a 'generalwill' inNature tself,the subaltern studies/post-colonial frame-work seeks to recuperate similarlypristinepre-colonial ubjectwho-oncethe distorting/occluding encrustations of an 'alien'colonialism havebeen erased is, it seems,'naturally' oodand herefore yimplicationalso possesses a politics that amounts o anequally 'authentic'exercise of the 'generalwill'. This attempt o identify the presenceat the grass roots in manyrural hirdworldcontexts of what is presented as andalternative,anti-capitalist nd anti-socialist,and hence new and politically progressivediscourse, is less than persuasive, for tworeasons in particular.First, the very flimsyevidence on which the case for this'alternative' discourse rests. And second,because important omponentsof what areidentified as an 'alternative'discourse arein fact nothing other than variantsof the'new' populism.A similarly idealised notion of pre-capitalist society informs the work ofFoucault.His argumentboththatprior othe16th century those who were mad weretolerated ndnot ncarcerated,nd hatbeforethe modern 'invention' of sexuality whatmodernity subsequently reclassified as'unnatural' was accepted as 'natural',suggests that Foucault does indeed adhereto a Rousseauesque vision of primitivegoodness.75 Moreover, not only is pre-Christianantiquity or Foucaulta source ofa new politics, butit also represents returnto apre-/anti-Enlightenmentystemof valuescorresponding to what he refers to as a'politicalspirituality'.' Inasimilarvein, thebackwards-lookingnew' populismof thoseassociated with the 'everyday-forms-of-resistance' ramework,he Subaltern tudiesprojectand he newsocialmovements heoryas well as texts by those such as Latouche,Shiva, Mies and Omvedt reproduce theromanticisation f pre-capitalist ocietythatstructures he agrarianmyth. All maintainthat economic growth per se is aninappropriateand hence a disempowering'western' imposition on less developedcountries: in order to protect/enhance heposition of - and thus empower - a varietyof thirdworld 'others' (women, tribalsandpeasants), therefore, such texts advocateinstead a reversion to a subsistenceagriculture.77Attemptsby 'new' populist discoursetopresentan idealised notion of pre-capitalistsociety as an empowering, new and alter-native form of non-capitalist/non-socialistsocial existence invariably overlooks itshistoricalgenealogy. As thethird-worldismof the 'new' right suggests - this kind of'alternative' s not only not new, nor simplycompatiblewith a reactionary = tradition-


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v..oking) form of anti-capitalism 'goldenage' of the agrarian myth, but actuallysupportive of the latter. Unsurprisingly,therefore, he 'new' rightevinces a similarapproval of a traditional third-worldist'otherness'/'difference' hat is the basis ofa distinctivenational dentityand - for thisreason alone - is perceived by it as em-powering.Like 19th century romanticismand 20thcentury fascism, the European'new' rightinvokesas ts 'goldenage' an dealisedvisionof an ancient Indo-European/'Aryan'civilisation,when subsistence-oriented ndeconomically elf-sufficient ribal ultivatorslived 'naturally' n harmonywith Nature.78In the case of Evola, this third-worldistdiscourse is linked to his Orientalistengagementwiththeeastern ultural other'.Turningawayfrom the 'decadent' materia-lismof'thewest',the'new' rightromanticiseswhat it takes to be an organic and thusculturallypure 'otherness' of the east thatis the source of its own primordialIndo-Europeanpast.This redemptivemyth of a'golden age', whichstructures he ideologyof Nohonshugi, 'Merrie England' andvolksgemeinschaft, s also present in thesymbols, rites, and religious customs/ceremonies of most pre-capitalist socialformations,where tinvolves the deologicalattempt o replacethe mortalityof profanetime (= history) with the immortalityofsacred time (= the eternal present in theGardenof Eden).79 n the discourse of the'new' right, therefore, underdeveloped(= 'primitive'/peasant)ocieties representalost innocence, a desirable purity and anharmonious existence (= 'primitivegoodness') that t perceives as empoweringand huswishes torecuperate.Forthose suchas de Benoist,such a process of recoveringa lost past entails an alliance between theEuropean new' right and the mainly ruralpopulationsof the third world (where this'primitive goodness' still survives in theform of peasant economy) against theundesirable universalising/de-naturingprocesses emanatingfrom the US.80Also supportive of this third-worldistdiscourse-for s thereligious pluralism f theEuropean new' right, which derives fromthe perceptionof Christianityas partof theJudeao-Christianother'; as in the case ofFoucault, therefore, Christian beliefs aredeprivilegedanddisplaced n thediscourse-for the European'new' right by an earlier- andwhat for it is thus a more 'authentic'form of religious belief - paganism.8'Notonly is this consistent with 'new'-populist/'new'-rightviews regarding he ruralgrassroots practice of an empowering form of'popularculture', but the endorsement ofany/all religious belief also constitutes anegation of Enlightenmentrationality.Justas the 'new' right subscribesto a form of

ancient religious faith that predates auniversalising Christianity, herefore, so itaccepts hat hesamecanbe trueof 'different'pre-C,.ristianmythicalbelief systems whichare culturally specific to the third world'other'.Neither s thereany mysteryabout hefactthat the ecological beliefs now espoused bythe 'new' rightand he 'new' populismalikesimilarlyuphold heirthird-worldist iews.,2To begin with, ecological theory and itspractice, environmentalpreservation,con-stitutesapotentdiscourse-for bout he samekind of Nature-based 'naturalness' thatstructures the gender/peasant/nationalidentity that is at the root of third world'otherness'/'difference'. Environmentalistdiscourse s also supportive f (and icensedby) the powerfullycombinedanti-state/anti-industrial/anti-modern/anti-progress/techno-phobicdiscourse-against haredby he 'new'populismand the 'new' right. Accordingly,'new'-populist/'new'-right discoursemaintainshat nsofarasidentity/'difference'is detKmined by space/place, change thatundermines ecology also threatens thetraditional institutions/organisations/'community'of the thirdworld'other'X Forthis reason, herefore, nvironmentalism-as-preservation-of-Natureonfirms the 'new'-populist/'new'-right view that economicgrowthis not a desirableobjective for thirdworld countries."Notonlyis this third-worldismompatiblewiththepluralistic ndorsement f religious/ethnic/nationalheterogeneityon the partofthe 'new' rightand the 'new' populismbutthe discourse-forof both the latterhas con-verted he element of a politicallyunaccept-able (= economically disempowering)cultural ubordination ndeconomicexploi-tationassociatedwithalienationntoaneutralform of 'otherness'.The distinctivenessofthe so-calledthirdworld other'has, nshort,been reconstructed s anempowering ormof cu'tural 'difference'. Economic 'dif-ference' as a formof 'otherness'/'not-us' sdisplaced by cultural 'difference' as thedefinition of identity, the consequence ofwhich is that economic 'difference' is nolongerperceivedasalienating rexploitativebutmerelyorganisationally other';notonlydoes economic 'difference'no longer haveto be explained or changed, but it isepistemologically reduced to and in effectbecomes part of 'cultural' difference,henceforth to be celebrated as such. The'new'-populist/'new'-right discourse isaccordingly a relativistic analyticalframework n which it is possible to assertthat the rich and powerful are simplyculturally 'different' from the poor andpowerless,andthe economic 'difference'ofthe latter s not merely partof their culturebut much rather a form of empowerment.Both the fact of economic 'difference' and

its cause are thereby banished from thisdiscourse.CONCLUSION

Like the 'new' right (andindeed the 'old'right), the 'new' populism subscribes to anumberof essentialist dentitiessaid both topredate and be alienated/marginalised/estrangedby the discourse of rationalism.Each endorses the continued existence ofmany'traditional' nstitutional orms inkedto asupposedability omeetbasicgrassrootsneeds.Mostsignificantly, he'new' populismand the 'new' rightalso sharea belief in theundesirabilityof change that substantiallytransforms xisting (= 'traditional') ropertyrelations. The resulting displacement ofworking class revolutionaryagency effec-tively precludes the possibility of systemictransformation/emancipationssociatedwiththeagrarian uestionof Marxism.Like thoseon the political right, therefore, exponentsof the 'new' populism mplythatcapitalismcannot be transcended.At the centre of this shared discourse isthe agrarianmyth. The 'new' populism ofFanonand Marcuse, however, expresses afear about the way in which the peasantryexpriences alienation, as a result of whichit is deprivedof an 'authentic'selfhoodandreconstituted as other-than-peasants. Bycontrast,hepostmodern ariants f the'new'populism announce that the recuperationsignalled as desirableby the agrarianmythhas in factbeen realised.The sameessentialidentity of 'peasant-ness' is now projectedinapositivediscursivemode,andcelebratedas having survived due to its culturallyindissoluble 'natural' haracter.Declaredbypostmodem 'new' populistsno longerto beunderthreatof lienation, his nnate peasant-ness' is (re-) presentedas an empoweredform of cultural 'otherness'/'difference'firmly rooted in 'Nature'.This overlapping discourse about theagrarianmyth sitselfstructuredyasimilarlyshared third-worldism.Instead of a racialhierarchy n which the ruralpopulationsofthe so-called third world are dismissed asinferior, they aremerely recategorised n adiscoursewhichthe 'new' rightshareswiththe 'new' populismas 'other'/'different'. nkeeping with its espousal of inter-nationalpluralismandan acceptanceof polytheism,therefore, this replacement by the 'new'rightof racial hierarchywith a concept ofcultural 'difference' is not merely notanomalousbut in keeping with the specificform taken by third-worldism n the dis-course of the political right generally, notleast because for it Orientalismis a re-affirmationof that mysterious 'othemess'(= the unknown,the unknowable)which isin fact historically central to conservativephilosophy.


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The politically disempowering effect ofthisdiscoursegenerally,and nparticularheconceptualshift to a culturallyempoweredpeasant essentialism, is unmistakeable.Hence theconceptof 'difference'/'otherness'fuses with and s supportiveof a reactionary'new'-populist/'new'-righthird-worldismncontrast otheagrarian uestionof Marxism,whichfocuses on the way peasanteconomychanges,theagrarianmythof populismandthepoliticalrightseeks to recuperate easantessentialism by shifting the focus onto theway in which peasant culture (= the root of.'othemess'/'difference') remainsthe same.Preciselybecause it operates argely withinthe domainof 'the cultural', the discourse-for/discourse-against of both the 'new'populismandthe 'new' rightrecognisesandsimultaneously negates the threat thatemanatesrom marginality' nd 'alienation':byre-defining helatteras 'difference',eachceases to be a problem.

NotesI This article is a much shortenedversion ofBrass (forthcoming). Here most of thequotationshave been omitted,as has a sectionexamining the agrarianmyth in the 'popularculture'both of populism/nationalismn thelatterhalf of the 19thcenturyandof populism/nationalisn/fascism during the 1920s and1930s. The terms Nohonshugi, 'MerrieEngland', volksgemeinschaft, nd narodnismrefer to the contextually-specific orms takenbytheagrarianmythover thisperiod n Japan,England,Germanyand Russia. In the longerversion t s argued hat hepeasant ssentialismstructuringthe agrarian myth in all thesecontexts licenses what is a politically

conservative nationalist discourse thecontinuities of which extend from the 'old'populismandtheold'righttothethird-worldist'new' populismandthe 'new' right.Onlytheconnectionbetweenthe last two is consideredbelow.2 Giventhereceivedwisdomthatpostmodernismand right-wingtheory/politicsare notmerelyunconnectedbut antinomic, pointing to theexistence of a connection - let alone anepistemological affinity - is a controversialundertaking.Although t is obviouslythe casethatcurrent xponents of postmodernismarenot fascistically inclined, the same cannot besaid abouta numberof importantprecursors:for the fascist sympathies/complicity ofHeidegger,Blanchot,de Man andMcLuhan,see Farias(1989), Ferryand Renaut(1990),Kermode (1991: 102-18), Lehman (1991),Marchand (1989), Mehlman (1983),Hamacher,Hertzand Keenan (1989), Norris(1990: 222ff), Ott (1993), and Sluga (1993).The following kind of 'new' populist/postmodern rgument e g, Chakravarty 995]is typicalof muchrecentwritingabout he riseof nationalism and its political implicationsforso-called hirdworldcontexts.Since fascismis a Europeanphenomenonand an historicalone at that, and as it emanates conceptuallyfromEurocentricdiscoursegenerallyand thatof liberalism in particular, or these reasonsalone, he 'new' populists/postmodems laim,

it is impossibleto speak of its actual/potentialpresencen non-Europeanontexts.Nationalistdiscourseinked o traditions ndculturalormswhich areauthentically ndigenous o the thirdworld, t is further laimed, arenot merely notinherently or potentially reactionary butactually a bulwarkagainst the rise/spread nsuch contexts of fascism. The prevailingdiscursive dominance of an emancipatorypostmodemism(advocatingdiversity/plurality,upholdingthe rights of 'the marginal', andopposed to power in generaland that of thestate nparticular),ogetherwith the vigilanceof scholars influenced by this, it is inferred,is itself a guarantee against the politicallegitimisationof fascist ideology. Amongthemany objectionsto this kindof complacencyisthefactthat,while t s truethatwithiberalismcomes capitalism, ndwithcapitalism ascism,it is nevertheless ncorrect o conclude fromthis that hankering after a traditional/indigenous/(non-socialist) alternative tocapitalismprecludes ascism.Much rather heopposite,sinceit is preciselyonthis same kindof mythic/folkloric/('blood-and-soil') nost-algia that fascismdraws n order o constructits own discourse-for.Another text [Vanaik1994]that s notpostmodernbut neverthelesssimilarlydismissive of the fascist label is amore serious approach o the issue, and analtogethermore interesting heoreticalpiece,notwithstanding ts somewhat contradictoryconclusion that a non-fascistic 'Hindutva[constitutes] a reactionary rightwing anddangerouslyauthoritarianorm of populism'.In the view of this writer he latterdefinitionis in factperfectlycompatiblewith (not to sayan "xcellent descriptionof) fascism.3 On this point see, for example, Kazin(1995:1, 2, 3, 248, 266), who defines populismas'a flexible mode of persuasion',and Dolbeareand Dolbeare (1976: 115, 119, 121).4 Texts which implicitly/explicitly attributeapolitically dual identityto populism includeDolbeareand Dolbeare 1976:Ch7), Canovan(1981), Phillips (1982: 33), Lasch (1991),Kazin (1995) and Harrison (1995: 9ff).Revisionist critics [such as Goodwyn 1976,1978, 1986, 1991; Lasch 1991] currentlyattempting to rehabilitatepopulism as theauthentic rassrootsversionofNorthAmericandemocracy, discount the earlier critique ofpopulismby Hofstadter 1962) becauseof the'end of ideology' context in which the latterwas made. Hofstadter's argumentwas thatpopulismwouldn't work because no kind ofutopia was possible, and that therefore oneshould stick with existing (bourgeois)democracy. Unsurprisingly, revisionismopposes Hofstadter'sclaim that populism isconservativebecause his s incompatiblewiththe -evisionists' own view that t correspondsto anon-bourgeois/non-socialistormof grassroots democracy.Marxists, by contrast,arecritical of both the revisionist attempt torehabilitate populism and of Hofstadter'steleology. Althoughsharingwith Hofstadterthe critique of populism as conservative,therefore,a Marxistargumentpartscompanywith his over the absolute impossibility ofutopia: unlike Hofstadter, therefore, forMarxisma socialist outcome s bothdesirableand feasible. For the theoretical impact onHofstadterof the end-of-ideologydebate,seeMorton (1972: 109ff).

5 A frequentmistake made by thoseoccupyingmany different positions on the politicalspectrum is that populism constitutes aleftwards movement by the political right(which s what hoseassociatedwith hejoumalTelos seem to think); namely, the right isbecoming politically more progressive.It isargued here that the opposite is the case: it isnot the right that has shifted leftwards butmuchrather he eft thathasshiftedrightwards,in the process becoming less progressivepolitically.It s important onoteinthis regardthat he merepresence n new social movementsof activists from the political left cannot ofitself be taken as evidence for the advocacyof socialist policies. Muchratherhecontrary,since there s lots of evidence (fromIndiaandelsewhere) to suggest that what happens inthese circumstances is that, rather thanadvocatinga specificallysocialistprogramme,those on the left {or perhapsmore accurately'left') simply lock onto existing policy/programmes.notherwords,what s frequentlyaccepted at face value as socialism is notactuallysocialist but much rathera varietyofpopulism, ts emanation rom eft-wingcirclesnotwithstanding [about which see Brass1995b].6 There-emergenceof populistdiscourse nthelate 1960s is of course an exception to theconnectionbetween hepopulismandcapitalistcrisis.7 Although the focus here is on the culturaldiscourseof populism,it must be emphasisedthat heagrarianmyth s also structured yandindeed dependenton economic and politicalarguments.Historically, herefore,heagrarianmyth has also had an importanteconomiccomponent,wherebyagriculture aspresentedas the basis of social organisationandpeasantfarmingas the source of nationalfood self-sufficiency.This discourseabout hecentralityto thenationaleconomy of the peasant amilyfarm ontinueso be mportant,nd ts nfluencecan be traced from an intellectualprecursorlike A V Chayanov (1966), via neo-classicaleconomists [Lipton1977, Richards1985] forwhomrural overty n the so-called hirdworldis an effect of adverse ermsof trade = 'urbanbias')forpeasantproduce,o recentandcurrentpopulist leaders/politicians n India such asCharanSingh, M S Tikait, M D Nanjunda-swamy and SharadJoshi [about whom seeByres 1988 and the contributions o Brass1995c]. The same is true of the politicalcomponent of populist discourse, whichinvolved claims aboutthe peasantryboth asupholdersof theexisting hierarchy and thusas a bulwarkagainst the spreadof socialistideas and the guarantors f political stability- and also as the source of militarypersonneland thus the defence of the nation.8 It is important o note that for Marxismtheconcept 'alienation' has always beentheoretically problematic,not least becausethe political righthas always laid claim to it[Bell 1962; Feuer 1963]. Maintainingthat'[s]ince the 1930s Marx'sEarlyWorks havebeen a war-horse for petty-bourgeoisintellectualsn their truggleagainstMarxism',Althusser(1969: 1Off)dismisses the conceptalienationasapre-Marxist estigeof Hegelianidealism, an existentialist anomalycharacteristic of the period before theepistemological break of 1844 thatsignalled


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the emergence of the 'mature' Marx. Muchthesame point s madeby Mattick 1978: 160-62).9 In much contemporary social theory thisprocessofde-objectification/de-privilegingfattempts o constructanexistence beyond theself amountsat timesto solipsism. One effectis to fragment eality,which is reduced o theepistemological status of an epiphenomenonof the 'self'. A de-objectified 'reality' thatdoes not- indeedcannot extendbeyondtheperception f the individualbecomes therebywhatever ny/every ubjectclaims it to be. Notonly is this 'reality' now reducible to theindividual, ut t is alsodeemedtobe the basisof a subjectively-based process of self-empowerment,simply by virtue of 'being-mine/being-yours'.There is accordingly nolonger an 'out there' to be perceived, onlycompeting erceptions f an'outthere'. nsteadof objectivity, therefore,there are now onlycontesting subjectivities, each of whichadvances rival claims to truth,and betweenwhich one is no longer able to judge. Aconsequence of an 'out-there' objective'reality' being non-existent is it cannot bechanged,a position that is so convenient forownersof real estate. Inaddition o valorisingthe view of the indigenous subjectin relationto that of the coloniser, therefore,such de-objectification/de-privileging also conferspolitical acceptability on landlords' orcapitalists'view of existence, now deemedtobe as 'valid' as that of a tenant or worker.10 Theconcept'alienation'asestrangement-from-an-essentialist-peasantness s central to theChayanovian xegesis of Netting 1993:328ff),forwhomcapitalistdevelopment s perceivedas a process of (mainly cultural)dislocationthatnotonly 'threatenedhestabilityof peasantequilibrium' but also preventedthe middlepeasantfromrealisingwhat is posited as the'authentic selfhood' of petty commodityproduction.11 In seeking to explain this loss, Rousseauinvokes theelementof 'chance', whichgivesrise to the development that dissipates'primitivegoodness'nthecourseofgeneratinginequality [Broome 1963: Ch III]. Hedistinguishesbetween what he categorisesasa benign'self-interest'(amourde soi), whichis compatible with a 'natural' state of'goodness', and 'selfish interest' (amour-propre), whichis not. Accordingto Rousseauthe ormers a harmlesskindofself-centredness(=egocentricity-relative-to-the-self), hereasthe latter by contrast is an altogether lessbenign gocentricityhat sexercised n relationto others, and thus at the root of competitivebehaviourand the conflict it generates.Thedistinction is untenable, however, since theallegedly benign form of self-interestednationalism (= 'pro-self) is in the end nodifferent from less benign selfish variant(= 'anti-other'):heonly difference s thattheformer s implicitlyexclusionarywhereasthelatter is explicitly so, a point confirmed forexamplebythe'transformed' tterances f theKlu Klux Klan (see note 68).12 On this point see Brinton (1926: 58), whoobserves that 'in 1809 Wordsworth hadsketched as completely as Mazzini ever dida theoryof nationalism hat was to becomethe political faith of the century'.13 Both historicallyandcontemporaneously,he

advantageof such a discourse for the better-off peasantry s that t enables themto operatepolitically and ideologically on two fronts:againstpoorpeasants ndagriculturalabourersas well aslandlords nd/or nternationalapital.The success of this hinges in turn on thedisplacement of class categories, wherebyagrarian ubjectswho are definedin terms ofownershipof or separation romgiven meansof productionareredefined n populisttermssimply as 'peasants'/'cultivators'/'farmers',or petty commodity producers in contextswhere there s actuallygreat variation n bothrelations and the scale of production.Such adiscursive fusion permits agrariancapitalistproducers to claim not only that all ruralinhabitantsexperience a uniform level ofsuffering n the face of urbanand/or foreign'exploitationbut also thateconomic growth slocated nandconfined argely o towns/cities/industryand/orothernations.By suppressingreference to socio-economic differentiationarising from the process of capitalistdevelopment, therefore, rich peasants canchallenge andlordsand/or mperialism n thenameofthe peasantry s awhole, whichpermitsthem not merely to reinforce and reproducein discourse sharedwith poor peasantsandagricultural abour the mythic yet politico-ideologicallypotent mageof an homogeneouspeasantrybutalso to claimthat hey representthereby the voice of 'the people' (= thepeasantry),and thus the nation itself. Twoimportant consequences follow from thisnationalist discourse, each of which issupportive f the populistcamouflageadoptedby richpeasants. First,thatempowerment seffected at the expense of a foreign and notan ndigenouscapitalist lass;andsecond,that'popular culture' becomes identified un-problematicallywith the 'voice frombelow',andactionbasedonthis saccordinglydeemedto constitute an authentic expression of aRousseauesquedemocraticwill.14 Examplesofthequasi-mysticalbeliefby'new'populist texts in the efficacy of any/alldiscourse/action-from-belowncludeCanovan(1981: 257), Sinha, GreenbergandGururani(forthcoming), Scott (1990) and - mostimportantly- many of the contributors oGuha(1982-89).The subaltern tudiesprojectassociatedwith theworkof the latter s by nomeansconfined othe historiography f India,and nowextendsto AfricaandLatin America(Latin American Subaltern Studies Group1993; Prakash 1994; Mallon 1994; Cooper1994].15 The libera/neo-liberal/(anti-Marxist) enea-logy of 'choice' in 'new' populistdiscourseis unmistakeable.For an existentialist likeSartre (who endorsed Fanon's argument),therefore, it was possible to choose arevolutionary agent. Because the urbanindustrial proletariat,both in metropolitancapitalistand colonialcontexts,can no longerbe considered a revolutionary subjectcommitted to self-emancipation and theemancipation fthe 'other', tbeconmesossiblesimply to select (= choose) a replacement.Accordingly, for Fanon and Marcuse, thelunten-proletariat nd hepeasantryrechosenas revolutionary agents, interested in andcapable of accomplishing the revolutionarytasks whichthe urbanworking lass is nolonger willing or able to carry out.

Unsurprisingly, n view both of its rejectionof any/all forms of government and/orregulation and its emphasis on individualchoice-making,Foucaultwasalso sympatheticto liberalismgenerallyand othatof von MisesandHayek nparticular. orthe attractivenessto Foucault of liberalism,not least because tlicensed choice in the domain of sexuality asmuch as in otherareas,see Miller (1993: 310-II, 327). The latterconcludes that'[a]s muchas any figure of his generation, [Foucault]helped inspire a resurgentneo-liberalism nFrance in the 1980s' [Miller 1993: 315].16 This social theory, heavily influenced bypostmodemism, asas tsneo-liberal conomiccounterpartthe similarly designated 'newpolitical economy', theequally class-specificpolitialobjectof which s to theoreticallyj stify- and thus contribute to the ideologicallegitimationof - the economic redistributionof resources rom thepoorto therich[Bagchi1993; Leys 1996; Vieux and Petras 1996].17 The currentdangers in endorsing what is ineffect a de-politicised 'popularculture' areclear from the following examples. Right-wing Christiangroups in North America aremobilising politicallyon the basis of popularculture, heobject being to achieve 'crossoverinto the mainstreammarket' in videos, popmusic, television, films andbooks, all formsborrowed rom their secularcounterparts utgiven an explicitly non-secularandpoliticallyreactionary ontent. Much thesame is trueofa de-politicised notion of 'empowerment',aconceptwhich similarlycan be applied o anyandeverykindof activity.Itbecomespossible,therefore,for Rodriguez (1994) to celebratereligious faithin OurLadyof Guadaloupe,atraditional con of conservativeCatholicismin Mexico, as evidence of gender empower-ment.Similarly, n thecase of Italythe 'post-fascist' Gianfranco Fini was invited by thePDS (the ex-Communist Party)to its annualconference nJuly 1995,wherehewas receivedwith rapture ndapplause:both the invitationand the receptionwere justified by the PDSleadership in terms of the fact that Ginirepresentsa grass roots movement.This toois a familiarargument, oved by andsympto-matic of the postmodem 'new' populism.Because a view comes 'from below' or hasgrass roots support, therefore, this it isclaimedis enoughto make tacceptable.Sucha position,which postmodemismshareswiththe 'old' populismand the 'new' right,failsto ask what the politics of these grass rootsviews are.On this 'logic', it would be possibleto endorse notonly fascism butalso genocideand racism.

18 Notonly doesthecolonial/postcolonialdualitysignals its nationalistepistemologicalunder-pinnings, but it is clear from texts by itsexponents [Bhabha 1991;Prakash1995]thatpostcolonialism addresses mainly - and inmost cases only - questionsof ideology; thatis, of the way in which the colonised other'is (mis-) represented n the discourse of thecoloniser. Because it depicts the colonised'other' as passive (= victim), postcolonialtheoryeschews thedomainof 'the economic'(= 'sociology of underdevelopment' depen-dency') as this encompassesthe specificallyeconomicdimensionofthe coloniser/colonisedrelationship.oraparticularlyeffectivecritiqueof postcolonialism,hichpoints ut he way


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in which it has been inflated in temporal/spatial terms, see Ahmad (1995).9 Like all the postmodernvariantsof the 'new'populism, hose which maintain hat societiesare now 'post-capitalist' and can only beunderstood n termsof a 'post-Marxist' heoryadhere o ananalytical ramework romwhichclass, class formationandclass strugglehaveall beenbanished,and n which ethnic/'tribal'/national identities are regarded as innate.Proponentsof 'post-capitalism' [Dahrendorf1959:241ff;Bell 1971;Drucker1993]maintainthat,as productionhasbow beendisplacedbyknowledge as a source of value in the globaleconomy, the resulting knowledge-intensivesociety sno ongerpremissed n theoppositionbetween capital andlabour.The anti-Marxistnature f this particular gendawasaccuratelydelineated ome 30 years ago by Macpherson(1972: 18), who observed hat: there s agooddeal of loose writingthese days [1964] aboutsomethingcalled "post-capitalism". he samepublicists and theorists who use this termareapt to talkalso aboutpost-Marxism.The ideain both cases is the same: to suggest that thethingnow hyphenatedhasin factdisappearedand has been replaced by something reallyquite different.If one cannot deny, in eithercase, that something superficially similar tothe old thing is still around,one can perhapsexorcise its spirit by calling it "post-".Thus,as capitalism, old-style, has becomeincreasinglydifficult to justify intermsof anyacceptable social ethic, it becomes highlyadvantageous o find thatit has given way tosomething else. And as Marxism, old-style,continuesto give trouble, t can perhapsmoreeasily be dealt withby announcing ts demiseand replacement.'20 On this point, see Fanon (1968).21 A parallel could be made here with thepostmodern heoryof Prakash 1992: 18), forwhom underneath the externally-imposedcolonial encrustation here ies an 'authentic'Indian-ness,a pristine dentity of 'self-hood'which colonialism neither affected nordisturbed.Marcuse(1970:104-05)alsoimpliesthatthe negationof the establishedorderwilltake place on the basis of an appeal toRousseauesque/Burkean 'natural rights'(= ancient principle).22 UnlikeFoucault, or Marcuse 1970: 81) thereis such a thing as rationalauthority,but likeFoucault he endorses 'a new dimension ofprotest,which consists in the unityof moral-sexualandpolitical rebellion' [Marcuse1970:921. In the light of his sadomasochism,histhanatological disposition and his somaticreductionism on which see Miller 1993], thedetaileddescription by Foucault(1977: 1-6)of all thedistressingminutiaeof the executionin 1757 of the regicide Damiens appearsworryingly to be more a celebration than acritiqueof this event. For Foucault, t seems,death s not ust the ultimatebutperhaps venthe only form of empowerment - a veryreligioussentiment ndeed.Alternatively, hefact that his descriptioncan be read either ascritiqueor as celebration s perhapsno morethan a measure of the extent of Foucault'spostmodernaporia.23 Fortheequationby FoucaultofEnlightenmentrationalismas the 'other'of freedom,and hisdismissal of Marxism as a variant of En-lightenment scientism', see Foucault (1991:118) and Rabinow (1984: 52-53). The

specifically anti-Marxist epistemology ofFoucault was recognised by Sartre in 1966(Eribon1992: 164);moregenerally,Foucault'svehement anti-communismis well known,and a matterof extensive record [see Eribon1992: 136]. In the case of Marcuse, herecanbe no doubt about his Marxist commitment.The case of Fanon is more problematic:althoughcharacterised y Caute 1970: 52) asa socialist, it is evident from what Fanon(1963: 78) himself writes thathe was as muchanti-socialist as anti-capitalist.24 On the displacement of rationalism by the'from-below'discourseoftraditional olkloricmemory,Foucault sunambiguous:Unreasonwould be the long memory of peoples', heobserves, 'theirgreatest fidelity to the past'[cited in Eribon 1992: 118]. Unsurprisingly,much the same kind of reification of spon-taneity/elementalismas a 'natural' andthusnon-transformable)spectof human xistencehas ong beenthe stock-in-trade fthe politicalright.LikeFoucault, herefore,OrtegayGasset(1961) invokes the authorityof Nietzsche forhis view that rationalism s necessarily andalways displaced by an innate irrationalism.25 Fanon (1963: 37).

26 On these points, see Fanon (1963: 47). 'Itcannot be too strongly stressed',he observes(1963: 88), 'that n the colonial territories heproletariat s the nucleus of the colonisedpopulationwhich has been mostpamperedbythecolonialregime.Theembryonicproletariatof :`e towns is in a comparativelyprivilegedposition. [It] has everything to lose...'According to Fanon (1963: 48), the result isthe emergence of an urban proletariat hemembers of which 'fight under an abstractwatchword:"Governmentby the workers",and...; orgetthatin theircountry t shouldbenationalist watchwordswhich are the first inthe field' (original emphasis).27 Marcuse'sdenialsnotwithstanding1976: 71),thathe nolongerperceived he rubanndustrialworking class in metropolitan capitalistcontexts as a revolutionary gent s clear frommany of his texts [see Marcuse 1969: 14-15;1970: 99-100].28 On this point, see Marcuse (1976: 66).Ironically, his kindofthinkingalso lies behindthe postmoderncelebrationof what used tobe regardedas alienation:not only is socialfragmentation = alienation) nvertedand re-presented by postmodernism as the em-powerment of identity politics, but thegenerationby capitalismof artificial = alien)demandsamountingto consumerism-as-the-nepation-of-selfhoods similarlyreborn n its'other'postmodern orm of consumerism-as-the-realisation-of-selfhood = 'shop-till-you-drop').29 On the significance for accumulationof thiscapacity to generate seemingly endlessdemand,and its connection with the politicalintegration f theproletariatntometropolitancapitalism, see Marcuse(1976: 66-67). Forthis reason, moreover,social transformationmustbeprecededbyachange nthe definitionof needs [Marcuse 1969; 4, 18-19; 1970:80].30 Since for Foucaultpower is everpresent, orthis reasonalone therecan be no process ofemancipation. For different reasons, theconcept 'repressivetolerance' is faced withsimilar problems. Hence, the pessimism ofMarcuse 1970: 100-101; 1976:66) abouttheimplications for working class emancipation

of this process of incorporation temmedinpartfrom the conjuncturalperception alsoshared by the end-of-ideology theory- thatcapitalism had in the short-termsolved theproblem of crisis (_ overproduction).Consequently,for those on both the politicalright and left, the urban proletariat inmetropolitan apitalistcountrieswasregardedas no longer having a reason to oppose thecapitalist system. The responses from bothends of the political spectrum,however,wasdifferent: hoseon thepolitical ightproclaimedthe end-of-ideology (= a foreclosureon classand class struggle), while some of those onthe eft searched oranalternativeevolutionarysubject.31 Forhis views onthe peasantry nd he umpen-proletariat, ee Fanon (1963: 90-91, 93, 95-96, 103-5, 109). It must be emphasisedthatthis kind of anti-colonialdiscourseassociatedwiththe 'new' populism, nvolvingthesearchfor analternative evolutionary ubject hat sneither urban, working class nor tainted bycapitalism, is not in fact new. Many of thecentral ideological components which re-emerged as Fanonist, Marcusian andFoucauldianvariantsof populism during the1960shavealong lineage ncolonialcontexts:in the case of India, for example, they wereprefigured n the views expressed notjust byMahatmaGandhi but also by Dev (1946) inthe late 1930sandby Ranga 1946) andLohia(1963) during he early 1940s.AlthoughDevand Lohiawereregarded nitiallyas socialistsofsome sort, hediscourseofeach wasbasicallypopulistand nationalist.Hence, the exploiteris depicted by them as external, the Indianpeasant is equated with 'nature' (= 'pure'/untainted-by-the-city) and is accordinglyregarded as an uncorrupted and thus arevolutionary ubject. By contrast, he urbanworker is 'tainted-by-the-city',corruptedbycolonialism,and husnolongerarevolutionarysubject.The urbanproletariatn metropolitancapitalism s in theirperception oubly ainted:simplybyvirtueof itscombinedurban/colonial'otherness', therefore, it can no longer beconsidered revolutionary.The latter mantlehaspassed nstead o'colonial oilers' ngeneralandpeasants n particular,who in the view ofpopulistssuch as Lohia would challengeanddestroy capitalism.It is perhapsnot withoutsignificance that Ranga resigned from theCongress Partyin the early 1950s, accusingitof being against armers, ndwenton to formfirst his own peasants'party, he KrishakLokDal, and then in 1959 the conservativeSwatantraParty,of which he remained eaderuntil the early 1970s [Erdman1967].32 Hence,theview (Fanon1963:103)that: ...therebellion,whichbegan n thecountrydistricts,will filter into the towns through hatfractionof thepeasantpopulationwhich is blockedonthe outer fringe of the urbancentres, thatfractionwhich hasnotyetsucceeded nfindinga bone to gnaw in the colonial system. Themen whom the growing populationof thecountry districts and colonial expropriationhave broughtto desert their fanily holdingscircle tirelessly aroundthe differenttowns,hoping that one day or another hey will beallowed inside. It is within this mass ofhumanity, his people of the shanty owns,atthe core of the lumpen-proletariathat therebellionwill find ts urban pearhead. orthelumpen-proletariat,hathordeof starvingmen


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uprooted romtheirtribe and fromtheirclan,constitutesone of the most spontaneousandthe most radicallyrevolutionary orces of acolonised people.' Not only does thisromanticisationf theurban umpen-proletariatas potentially evolutionaryontinue opervadeanalysesof the contemporaryurban nformalsector economy in the so-called third world[e g, Scott 1994], but- like the 'peasant-ness'of the agrarian myth as perceived bypostmodern 'new' populism - this kind ofalienated/marginalxistence s alsorepresentedas a locus wherethe poorly-remuneratedndhighly exploited self-employed realise'empowerment'eg, Scott 1985a:191ff;Nunez1993; Sherman 1992: 73-74, 179; Latouche1993: 127ff].33 Marcuse (1970: 85): 'These masses', hecontinues, can perhapsnowbe considered henew proletariatand as such they are today arealdangerfortheworldsystemof capitalisin'.For similar claims, see also Marcuse(1970:93, 94-95, 100-101; 1976; 72), where herecognises not ust thatsuch opposition mightbe mobilised as easily by the political rightasbythe eft butalsothata successfuloverthrowof the capitalistsystem can only be achievedby the combinedopposition in metropolitanand thirdworld contexts.34 On these points, see Fanon (1963: 99) andMarcuse (1969: 56-57). About the revolu-tionary oleof apeasantrygnoredordisdainedby political parties,Fanon(1963: 48) notes:'it is clear that in the colonial countries thepeasants lonearerevolutionary,ortheyhavenothingto lose and everythingto gain. Thestarvingpeasant,outsidethe class system, isthe firstamongtheexploitedto discover thatonly violence pays'.35 For the denial of the lumpen-proletariats a-revolutionary orce, see Marcuse(1969: 51;1970:73). Accepting hat t may '[regress]tobourgeois or, even worse, aristocratic deo-logies', Marcuse (1969: 52) neverthelesspersists n identifyingthe lumpen-proletariatasthebearerof ane'v, spontaneous olidarity'.There s muchhistorical vidence to the effectthat not only is the lumpen-proletariatnotrevolutionary ut hat t s muchrathercounter-revolutionary. nthe case of Johannesburgntheearly20thcentury vanOnselen 1977],forexample, hecriminalactivity (= 'resistance')of urbangangs whose memberswere a de-peasantised lumpen-proletariat resistingproletarianisationnd eekinginsteadaprocessofre-peasantisation, asdirectedagainstblackmigrantworkers(from whom they stole andby whomnhey were feared).36 On thesepoints,see Fanon( 1953: 56-57) andMarcuse(1969: 9).

37 For heepistemologyof this 'resistance'basedon what Foucault similarly categorises as apolitically non-specific process of individual'critique', ee Miller 1993: 301-305). In whathe accepts is 'a celebration of the petitebourgeoisie', Scott (1985a: 185, 186) placesthe agency of the latterat the centre of hisubiquitous 'everyday-forms-of-resistance'theory and similarly invokes 'a libertarianreason' orbelievingthat thepettybourgeoisierepresentsa precious zone of autonomyandfreedom in state systems increasinglydominatedby hugebureaucraticnstitutions'.The extent of theoretical/political onfusionis evident from the fact that for Scott (I 985a:196-97)hepetty ourgeoisie= hepeasantry)

are the 'natural'bearersof socialism, a viewwhich he derives in turn from the mistakenbelief that thepopularownershipofthemeansof production' is the same as commonownership. Unsurprisingly, therefore,socialismis forScott simplytheresultof non-class-specific 'from-below' grass rootsmobilisation by 'the popular',a view whichignores the fact that peasant smallholdingentails (individual/private) roperty elationswhich are incompatible with commonownershipof the means of production.38 The same is true of Bataille (1985; 1991;1994),anotherpostmodernprecursorwho notonly lamentedthe loss of myth entailed inprogress/modernitybut also celebrated thecleansing effect of 'primitive'violence as a'natural' e-affirmationf myth n pre-capitalistsoe;al formations akin to the elemental/destructive force of 'Nature' itself.39 For his critiqueof progress, ee Sorel (1969).For the link between Sorel's theory and theFrench political right,see Wilde (1985). Thedescription fSorel Wilde1985:16)as 'neitherapoliticalorsocial theoristbutmerelyacritic...his views regarding he distribution f politicalandeconomic powerare imited o abhorrenceof the statusquo... he remainsfirmly on thesideof intuitionwhendealingwith hepotentialforces for liberation romthe strangleholdofdemocratic society' might apply just asaccuratelyomany new'populistlpostmoderntexts.40 For the importanceof myth, see Sorel ( 1916:22ff); for the centralityof the invocation ofmythical/traditional/religious/sacredhemes otheprocessof fascistmobilisation, ee Mosse(1978).41 Not only does this 'spontaneous'/'elemental'characterisation pply also to the way post-modernism and 'resistance' theory interpretagencybut,the claimsto accuratelyrepresentan authentically frombelow' discourseaboutmo3ilisationnotwithstanding, oth heformershare what is actually a patronisingattitudetowards those below' (= talking-down-to-the'other'), a positionthat is notjust politicallydisempowering utalsowrong.Much hesamepoint about talking-down-to-the-'other'hasbeen madeby Larsen(1993: 282, 285), whoobserves: 'Those super-exploited andoppressedat the periphery...become peggedwith a sortof sub-politicalconsciousness, asif they couldn't or needn't see beyond thesheerfact of survival... postmodernism] estsonan ntellectualdistrust f themasses,a viewof the mass as beyondthe reachof reasonandhence to be guided by myth. The LatinAmericanmasseshave a long historyof beingstigmatised n this way by both imperialandcreole elites... [I]ntheera of "postmodernity"we arebeing urged. n exchange for a cult ofalterity, to relinquishthis conception of themasses as the rationalagents of social andhistoricalchange,as the bearersof progress.Given the increasing prevalence of sucharistocratism,however it may devise radicalcre-4entialsor itself, it becomespossible... tobe seducedbythe falseNietzscheanregard orthe massesas capableonlyof anunconscious,'instinctual political agency'. Significantly,this observation about 'instinctualpoliticalagency' applieswith particular orce notjustto Foucaultor indeedto Marcusebut also tothe Sorelian onceptof mythand ts mobilisingrole.

42 Textsabout/by he 'new' rightgenerallyncludePhillips 1982:46ff), Levitas 1986b),GottfriedandFleming 1988), Gamble 1988), Habermas(1989), Gunn (1989), Sunic(1990), Cheles eta] (1991), Hoeveler (1991), Ford (1992),Eatwell and O'Sullivan (1992), Basu et al(1993), Gray 1993), Diggins (1994), Gingrich(1995), Sarkar ndButalia(1995), Mazumdar(1995) and Eatwell (1995).43 For the theoretical importanceand politicalinfluence of de Benoist, see Sheehan (1980;1981),O'Sullivan(1992: 174ff),Sunic(1990),Taguieff(1994);forTarchi,seeSacchi(1994);for Freund, ee Sunic (1990: 158) and Ulmen(1995); for Miglio, see Campi (1994) andGottfried 1994); forEichberg, ee Bodemann(1986) and Biehl (1995); for Hayek andFriedman, ee Gamble(1988) and Shackletonand Locksley (1981: 53ff, 87ff); for Scrutonand Gray, see Gamble (1988: 161-62) andO'Sullivan (1992: 175ff). In terms of thepractice linked to this theory, the NorthAmerican right has exercised influence notonly through periodicals such as The PublicInterest,Commentary,ndTheNewCriterion,but also via foundations/institutes HeritageFoundation, American Enterprise Institute);de Benoistwas instrumental n thefoundationofthe umbrellagrouportheEuropean oliticalright, Groupementde Recherche et d'Et'zc"pour la Civilisation Europeenne (GRECE)while Scruton and others)exercisedagenda-setting influence on Thatcheritediscourse inBritainvia rightwing think-tanks' or; w, ii.;:see Cockett 1995].44 For the influence on the 'new' righlof Evolaand Schmitt, together with their generaltheoretical/political mportance, ck Sheehan(1981), Sunic( 990:43ff), Bendersky 196AWard(1992: Ch 8), Sacchi (1994: 72ff) andEatwell (1995: 202ff).45 For an example of this kind of argument, eeamong

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