42p.other security breaches mentioned were internal fights, muggings, drug dealing, physical...

ED 408 502

AUTHORTITLE

INSTITUTIONREPORT NOPUB DATENOTEAVAILABLE FROM

PUB TYPEJOURNAL CITEDRS PRICEDESCRIPTORS

IDENTIFIERS

ABSTRACT

DOCUMENT RESUME

CE 074 330

Coe, BeatriceSecurity Is Not an Option--Learning in a Safe Environment.FEDA Paper.Further Education Development Agency, London (England).ISSN-1361-997797

42p.

Further Education Development Agency, Publications Dept.,Mendip Centre, Blagdon, Bristol BS18 6RG, England, UnitedKingdom (6.50 British pounds).Reports Evaluative (142)FE Matters; vi n19 1997MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage.Adult Education; Alarm Systems; *Campuses; Crime; *CrimePrevention; Foreign Countries; Police School Relationship;Postsecondary Education; *School Security; School Vandalism;Security Personnel; Stealing; *Technical Institutes;Violence; Vocational Education*Great Britain

A study examined what further education colleges in Britainwere doing about security and what they planned for the future. A literaturesearch found that a PEST (Political/legal, Economic, Sociocultural, andTechnological) analysis was one way to examine the differential impact ofexternal influences. A PEST analysis offered a strategy for security thatconsidered college environment, strategic capability, organizational culture,and stakeholders' expectations. The research was undertaken to help BarkingCollege in greater London plan an organizational strategy on security.Questionnaires were sent to 225 colleges in southeast England, GreaterLondon, and Essex; the response was 50 percent. Focus was on clientrequirements, organizational requirements, and security measures. Less formal"opportunistic interview" sessions were used to discover staff concerns. All109 colleges taking part said they had experienced theft. Other securitybreaches mentioned were internal fights, muggings, drug dealing, physicalattacks, vandalism, arson, aggression, and a bomb scare. One-third ofcolleges had had staff physically attacked; one-half had had studentsattacked. Most medium-to-large colleges employed specialist security staff.Two of five colleges had some form of restricted access. Implications offindings were organized into three categories: those pertaining to premises,procedures, and training. (Appendixes contain 14 references, instruments, anda map of location of colleges responding to questionnaire.) (YLB)

********************************************************************************* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *

* from the original document. *

********************************************************************************

0_ 4;1...

.a

Further EducationDevelopment Agency

Security is not an optionlearning in a safe environmentBeatrice Coe

FE MATTERS3

About the author

Beatrice Coe, Head of Client Services,Barking College

Beatrice Coe began her teaching career incomprehensive schools. She moved into furthereducation in 1980. Her management experienceincludes being deputy head of department in anFE college and assistant director of a businessand services faculty. In January 1995 she becamehead of client services at Barking College. Thisrole involves working closely with the sitemanager and director of faculty responsible forestates, and responding to breaches of securitywhich involve students. The research aroundwhich this paper is based was carried out forher MBA thesis.

Published by the Further EducationDevelopment AgencyCoombe Lodge, Blagdon, Bristol BS18 6RGTelephone 01761 462503Fax 01761 463140 (Publications Department)

Registered charity no: 1044145

Editor: Angela DewsburyDesigner: Mike PopePrinted by Blackmore Limited, Shaftesbury,DorsetCover illustration: courtesy of the School ofPhotography, Barking College

ISSN: 1361-9977

© 1997 FEDA

All rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic, electrical, chemical, optical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without priorpermission of the copyright owner.

2 FE MATTERS FEDA paper

Acknowledgements

FEDA wishes to thank the staff at BarkingCollege for their co-operation with this research,and all those who have assisted Beattie Coewith the project. We are also grateful forpermission from the college principal, TedParker, to include in this paper informationspecific to the situation at Barking College.

5

ContentsSecurity becomes a top priority 5

Key findings

1. Security key issues 7

External influences

Approach for FE

Key points when developing a strategyon security

2. Achieving security in an FE college:aims of this research 13

Approach taken by Barking College

Investigating a new approach

Collecting the data

Evaluating key methods

3. Security in FE emerging picture 17

What the principals say

Situation at Barking College

4. Action plan for FE 25

Key recommendations

Messages for colleges

References 30

Appendices

1. Plan of Barking College site 31

2. Principal's bulletin regarding security(January 1996) 32

3. Student satisfaction questionnaire 33

4. Questionnaire to principals 34

5. Questionnaire to students 37

6. Map of geographical location of collegesresponding to questionnaire 38

FE MATTERS FEDA paper 3

Security becomes atop priorityRecent tragedies such as the murder of innocentchildren and a teacher in Dunblane, the killingof a headteacher outside a London compre-hensive school, and a machete attack onchildren in a nursery school in Wolverhamptonhave made security in UK educational institu-tions a key issue at a national level. At a locallevel, many further education colleges haveexperienced violence on campus causingincreasing concern for students, staff, gov-ernors, college principals and the community.

The current situation has given security a highprofile within the education sector. Allowingfreedom of access to legitimate users while alsoensuring that the institution's environment is asafe one is a critical balance to be achieved.However, with thefts and assaults becomingmore commonplace inside the walls of educa-tion establishments, it is paramount that actiontakes place now to make learning environmentssafe as well as welcoming places for youngpeople to be.

This paper reveals what further education col-leges are doing about security at present andwhat is being planned for the future, via a ques-tionnaire to college principals. It also takes acloser look at the types of incidents experiencedand the views of students to establish whetherthey think it is possible to combine a wel-coming, open-access environment with a secureplace in which to work and study. Thesefindings are used to offer recommendations formanagers in FE.

The research was carried out to help a particularinstitution, Barking College, to plan anorganisational strategy on security. However,what soon became evident was that the samesecurity issues are prevalent in colleges of alltypes in all parts of the country, so the findingsof this research are applicable to all within FE.The high response rate to the questionnaires,nearly 50 per cent, particularly considering theamount of paper work already facingprincipals, indicates the high interest in securitywithin FE.

6

The recommendations for changes in the waysecurity issues are handled at Barking Collegeoffer key messages to the sector as a whole.

Because research on security in furthereducation is minimal, this paper will in partrefer to the situation in education in general.However, the research undertaken will relatespecifically to FE establishments.

Key findings

All 109 colleges taking part, except three whichgave no response to this question, said they hadexperienced theft. The other types of securitybreaches mentioned were internal fights,muggings, drug dealing, physical attacks,vandalism, arson, aggression and a bomb scare.

Alarmingly, one-third of these colleges havehad staff physically attacked and half have hadstudents attacked. A large proportion of theseattacks were carried out by people who had noreason to be on the premises.

This survey of colleges in the south east alsorevealed that most medium-to-large colleges,with predominantly full-time students, employspecialist security staff. Two out of five collegeshave some form of restricted access, the mostpopular method being a swipe card system. Ahigh proportion of those without restrictedaccess are considering it for the future, andsome have budgeted for imminent installation.The most popular method of security is anelectronic system alongside a secondary systemsuch as closed circuit television (CCTV).

The implications of the findings of this researchcan be organised into three categories: thosepertaining to premises, procedures and train-ing. Some recommendations have a costattached, but a considerable number can beachieved for free, or only at a minimal cost.

The key recommendations for Barking collegefollowing this research include:

reorganising the premises staff

producing a feasibility report onrestricting access

FE MATTERS FEDA paper5

providing:

a staffed car park barrier

security lighting

swipe card entry system intwo stages

professional security guardstrained by college staff

a dedicated radio system

panic alarms

refining and upgrading CCTV cameras

ensuring security procedures areimplemented

establishing a security action team tomonitor procedures

implementing training procedures andensuring shared ownership with students.

The main indicators of success of any of theseprocedures are a reduction of incidents of injuryor losses through criminal activities and theincreased satisfaction of students and staff.However, it is important to be aware thatimproved monitoring and recording systemsmay mean that the number of recordedincidents initially increases until all measuresare in place.

There will always be a conflict between libertyand security. It is the responsibility of furthereducation staff to ensure that any measurestaken are not counterbalanced by creating anenvironment of fear, excessive concern orhostility. The harshness of security can bemasked with the right attitude from staff.


1. Security key issuesSecurity is a nebulous and emotive concept. Forone person it may be a busy metropolis withpeople all around providing safety in numbers.For another it may be the isolation of a desertedlandscape with no-one to pose a danger to yourwell-being. Each of these concepts also conjuresup images of other dangers which may takeaway the feeling of security.

A literature search under the heading 'securityin education' brought up research projectswhich, almost without exception, were to dowith 'job security'. This reveals the intriguinginsight that only in the light of recent events ineducation establishments in Dunblane, Londonand Wolverhampton have educationists becomeaware that there but for the grace of a madmango each of our institutions.

Other literature searches on such key words as'premises', 'security', 'safety', 'incidents inschools/colleges' produced more informationon security of the computer mainframe and con-tingency plans for computer crashes than onsecurity measures to protect staff.

The concise Oxford Dictionary offers a numberof definitions of security ranging from 'docu-ments as evidence of a loan, bond etc' to 'thingthat guards or guarantees', giving further proofas to the confusion associated with the term.Since security in an education institution hasmuch to do with the environment, this researchuses the definition given by Fischer and Green:

security implies a stable, relatively predictableenvironment in which an individual or groupmay pursue its ends without disruption orharm and without fear of disturbance or injury.(1992; page 3)

Johnson and Scholes (1993) point out thedangers of dealing with environmentalinfluences in a piecemeal way, partly because ofbeing unable to predict what might happen inthe future. Who, for example, could havepredicted the recent incidents in schools whichhave resulted in the deaths of many childrenand a headteacher?

Johnson and Scholes suggest that:

managers sensibly address themselves toconsidering the environment of the future, notjust of the past. They may do this by intuitivemeans, or may employ more structured ways ofmaking sense of the future, such as scenarioplanning. This involves identifying possiblefuture changes significant to the organisationand building logically consistent alternativeviews of the future based on these.

External influences

A PEST analysis (see Johnson and Scholes) isone way to examine the 'differential impact' ofexternal influences, that is those which are:

Political/legal

Economic

Socio-cultural

Technological

Political/legal influencesThe machete attack on infant school children inWolverhampton on 8 July 1996 led to pressurefrom unions and parents for the Government touse lottery money to make schools safer.However, the Department of National Heritagesaid that national lottery money was not in-tended to replace mainline government funding.Following the fatal attack on Philip Lawrence,the headteacher killed outside a London schoolon 8 December 1995, the Government haspromised new money for schools from April1997 (Times Educational Supplement, 19 July 1996,page 6). A Government working party was alsoestablished following this attack. This has sincerecommended that the Government:

make guidance available to schools,police and other agencies on powersavailable to the police and criminaljustice system to deal with trouble-makers in and around schools

review whether there is a need forfurther strengthening of the law

8FE MATTERS FEDA paper

7

publish guidance on improving thesecurity of schools and designing moreprotection into new buildings

make substantial new money available

support governors to help them to fulfiltheir security responsibilities

offer teachers, support staff and gov-ernors appropriate training.

The governing body has ultimate responsibilityand yet does not have the operational control toensure the safety of those at the college. If thiswere a problem, it would be up to the chiefexecutive to draw governors' attention to thisissue. With the existing financial struggles ofeducation institutions, any legislation imposedwould need to be backed by government funds.

Economic influences

A growing tendency to resort to litigationmeans that cases similar to those taken outagainst hospitals could soon be issued againstcolleges. For example, a student who did notfeel reasonable care had been taken to ensure hisor her safety might sue the college for neglect.

The ever-increasing cost of theft is anothermajor economic influence. During 1991, schoolvandalism and theft in England and Wales wasreported to have cost more than £150 million(Times Education Supplement, 14 February 1992).This excludes administration costs, overtimepayments, call-out charges, replacing stolen anddamaged equipment and insurance premiums,not forgetting the human cost of disrupted andcancelled classes, lowering of morale and othernon-financial costs. Again, no figures are avail-able for colleges. Most insurance companies willnot insure for walk-in thefts. They also imposeheavy excess costs. Post-incorporation, it is theFE colleges who must bear these costs.

Shrinkage (theft by employees) is a delicate andunpleasant concept to deal with. It is alsodifficult to prove and takes time to be identified,since an employer would rather not believe thata trusted employee is a thief. A determinedmember of staff in a position of trust can inflicta great deal of damage before being discovered.


Socio-culturalA recent article in the Times EducationalSupplement (17 May 1996) suggested that knives,bats and chains are carried by almost one-thirdof 14-15-year-old boys and that almost one infifty is armed with a gun. While this survey wasof more than 11,000 pupils in a total of 64secondary schools, the statistics are relevanthere since a number of these young people willnow be in FE colleges. None of the sevendistricts sampled Cornwall, Cumbria,Devon, Essex, Northern West Lancashire, WestMidlands and Teesside correspond to knowntrouble spots. This makes the potential forviolence and threat to safety implied by theseresults even more alarming.

As part of this research, 40 students (24 boysand 16 girls) were asked if they thought schoolwas a safer place to be than college. Exactly 80per cent said yes, with less than eight per centsaying they thought college was safer, and justover 12 per cent saying they thought they wereequal in level of safety. If a third of 16-year-oldboys carry weapons at school to feel safe andthey generally feel college is a less safe environ-ment, what does this say about the number ofstudents in FE who may carry a weapon?

Technological influences

Improved communication links amongteachers, card entry systems, limited points ofaccess and CCTV are all means to use tech-nology to increase security measures. The levelat which colleges are investing or plan to investin such measures is a focal point of thisresearch. It also aims to reveal what studentsfeel about the use of such security measures, forexample, how much they see them as aninvasion of privacy.

Approach for FE

In the light of recent events it is not enough tosit and hope that it is only minor theft which iscarried out when intruders gain access to FEcolleges. The number of hours an FE collegemust remain open makes it more vulnerable to

9

the dangers of open access thanschools. Unfortunately, FE col-leges are having to face up tothe reality that no institution isimmune from threats to thesecurity of its environment.'That kind of thing won'thappen here' is not an attitudethat anyone can afford to take:in the current environmentcomplacency can allow catas-trophe to strike. Table 1 givesjust two examples of incidentsreported by one member ofstaff in an FE college.

Environment

LOrganisational

culture

STRATEGIC

ANALYSIS

Strategic

capability

Stakeholders'

expectations

FIGURE 1: ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Public opinion is forcing the government toconsider the issue of security within educationestablishments. As other colleges begin torespond to this issue and invest in tightersecurity measures, those who are trying tomaintain an open access policy will become softtargets. Security is not an issue to ignore.However, it is also crucial that colleges don'thave a knee-jerk reaction to all types ofimaginary problems. Instead, they shouldidentify actual problems and suggest possiblesolutions which work for their institution.

Fischer and Green (1992) note that securitymirrors society and suggests that throughouthistory security emerges as:

a response to, and a reflection of, a changingsociety, mirroring not only its social structurebut also its economic conditions, its perceptionof law and crime, and its morality. Thussecurity remains a field of both tradition anddramatic change.

One conceptual framework that can be used toidentify the influences which will affect thechoice of strategy is that offered by Johnson andScholes (1993). It recognises the complexity andvariety of changes taking place in the externalenvironment and society which have an impacton the organisation, and so outlines theopportunities and threats which must beconsidered in a strategic plan (see Figure 1).

Incident

A young man had been continually entering one of the sites of our FE college and harassing the female students. He

was ejected on several occasions but it became more serious when a group of girls came to me in tears saying that this

man was in a classroom and had a knife. I looked in the classroom and saw that he was trying to get out of the window,

which I had asked the caretakers to lock as this was his normal escape route whenever he saw me. I asked the

secretary to call the police and then entered the room and removed all students. I stood in front of the door, not

allowing him to escape, until the police arrived. After the event I realised how serious this incident could have become

for the students and myself.

Incident 2

When passing the college refectory I found a large group of young men kicking and punching one of our students. With

the help of some students, f managed to free the victim and have him ushered into the refectory kitchen where he had

to be locked in for his own safety. I was left with approximately zo youths, all dressed the same like a small army, who

had obviously come to settle a grievance. I had difficulty finding a telephone or to get anyone to call the police as many

people had locked their offices and were out for a Christmas lunch. The police eventually arrived but for a considerable

length of time many people were in danger.

TABLE 1: EXAMPLES OF INCIDENTS OF SECURITY BREACHES IN AN FE COLLEGE


College environmentMost FE colleges will tend to be influenced bythree environments: the immediate vicinity, thelarger environment covering the surroundingarea, and society in general.

When planning a strategy on security, each ofthese environments must be considered.

After identifying the environmental influenceson a college it is important to analyse the organ-isation's strategic position in relation to othergeographically close institutions competing forthe same customers.

Students need to feel safe in the collegeenvironment. They may also wish to be visitedon campus by family, friends and so on. If acollege has total open access and a neigh-bouring college does not, it may become thevictim of increased theft or assaults. If studentsfeel that one college offers more security thananother they may go elsewhere.

The competitive climate in FE brought about byfunding methodologies units of resource,convergence, productivity improvements,results, retention, recruitment and so onmeans that managers of other local colleges areoften reluctant to collaborate. How much infor-mation they are willing to share regarding thesensitive issue of the security of their customers,staff and buildings is uncertain. This researchincluded a survey of other colleges in the regionof Barking College to find out how other insti-tutions were dealing with the issue of security.

While recent events have raised awareness ofthe issue of violence in schools, with moneypledged by the Government to tackle thisproblem, there has been no correspondingattention given to colleges. Because an FEcollege has students and staff arriving atvarious times of day and visitors and membersof the public needing regular access to facilities,it is far more difficult to secure than a school.The FE sector deserves at least equal attention tothe issue of security as that given to schools.

so FE MATTERS FEDA paper

Strategic capabilityA resource analysis should also be part of theprocess of developing a strategy on security.This should be approached from the point ofview of the organisation's strategic capability, toconcentrate on value activities and the linkagesbetween activities rather than simply resourcesper se. Johnson and Scholes discuss ways inwhich it can contribute to the understanding ofstrategic capability.

Most colleges have evolved during the pastthree years making radical changes in manyareas, but 'resource heritage' has meant theyhave stuck with existing systems; althoughsome Management Information Systems (MIS)have gone through enforced metamorphosis tomeet information requirements of the FurtherEducation Funding Council (FEFC). There is adanger that weak communication systemsinherited within large organisations may lead tospeculation and exaggeration regarding eventswhich have taken place on its premises.

In terms of security, which has traditionallyreceived very little in the way of resources, aconventional audit would not suffice. Collegesmust now consider the link that resourcesutilised for security have in all areas of collegelife: marketing, attendance, outcomes, clientsatisfaction, general atmosphere. Two years agoa murder took place on the threshold of a collegeeight miles away from Barking College. Anycollege experiencing one such event is lucky tosurvive; if any college experienced a spate ofgang intrusions or injuries to students, the com-munity would quickly acknowledge that collegeas a dangerous place to send young people,which would inevitably affect recruitment.

Organisational cultureThere are many cultures within a college. Thispaper will focus on the concept of culture as itaffects or contributes to the issue of security.

Williams, Dobson and Walters refer to culture as:

commonly held beliefs, attitudes and values.(1993)

11

They emphasise a distinction between thisdefinition and one which may imply sharedbeliefs, attitudes and values. They highlight thatin a given situation people will think andbehave similarly, adopting similar styles, ritualsand ways of behaving, even though they havereceived no formal instruction and may comefrom a variety of backgrounds and cultures.They suggest that this common behaviour isderived from sharing their history, experienceand environment.

Culture within an organisation is said to be self-perpetuating. Williams, Dobson and Walters state:

Beliefs and attitudes within an organisation aredrawn initially from its external environment.The beliefs of individuals within theorganisation determine their behaviour, whichacts as a role model for others. When coupledwith power, as in the case of senior executives,beliefs influence the internal environment of theorganisation in a more formal way. This may bethrough the development of strategy, orthrough the design and implementation of thestructures and systems of the organisation. Ifeffective these reinforce existing beliefs andinfluence the beliefs of new members joining theorganisation. In other words, beliefs influencethe internal environment which in turninfluences beliefs. If there is no new input fromthe external environment, this will result overtime in stability. (1993; p70)

This final sentence is particularly pertinent whenconsidering the plight of the Dunblane primaryschool, since the tragedy there on 13 March 1996.

A college or school will wish to encourage a cul-ture of mutual respect for each others' well-being among students and staff, but if an exter-nal force a person with a gun/knife/drugsinfiltrates this stability then all normality couldbe considered suspended. Unless contingencyplans are in operation serious consequencescould result.

Egan, however, defines culture as:

the shared beliefs, values and norms of acompany in so far as these drive shared patternsof behaviour. (1994; p7)

He suggests that culture has a 'thinking side',that is shared beliefs, values and norms, and a'doing side', that is the patterns of behaviour.

When dealing with a sensitive issue such assecurity it is unrealistic to suggest that allinvolved staff and students have a sharedbelief. With regard to a person's safety it is verylikely true that there is a shared culture inwishing to work in a safe environment.However, the methods of imposing any restric-tions or rules to guarantee a safe environmentmay not result in shared beliefs. Individuals orgroups involved would be influenced by theirown culture, and the cultural context of theorganisation reflects the beliefs of those insideand outside the organisation.

Stakeholders' expectationsStakeholders are groups or individuals withexpectations or interests in an organisation,including students, staff, local employers, andthe Government.

Priorities change as a result of the actions ofvarious pressure groups and of events. Forexample, what happens in any college has animpact on the local community and visitors tothe college. If a college has weak securitysystems which attract crime to the area, then thecollege has a responsibility to the localcommunity to put suitable controlling systemsin place. However, colleges cannot afford towait until a crisis occurs or externalstakeholders insist that something is done.Clients will vote with their feet and go to acollege that seeks to ensure their safety, so it isin the interest of all colleges to be proactiveregarding security.

Different cultures will have differing levels oftolerance towards uncertainty. Johnson andScholes give two extreme stereotypes:

a culture where uncertainty is managed byattempting to reduce it; when organisations areseen as having control and being proactive; andwhere the hierarchy, the individual and thework tasks are stressed. Here strategies arelikely to be planned. United States culturecomes close to this stereotype.

12

FE MATTERS FEDA paper ii

In contrast, the adaptive model of strategicmanagement is more likely to be found in cul-tures where uncertainty is accepted as given;where the organisation has less control and isreactive; and where the orientation is towardsthe group and social concerns. Japanese cultureis close to this stereotype. (1993; p159)

It could be argued that each is a valuableresponse to different issues at different times.

Although the expectations of each stakeholdermay be different, the common theme will nodoubt be a friendly environment with openaccess which has cost-effective measures toensure the security of all stakeholders.

In particular, this research project will seek toestablish what staff want and what they areprepared to do to support security measures.

Key points when developing astrategy on security

External influences on a college shouldbe analysed before any strategy onsecurity is developed. These includepolitical, economic, socio-cultural andtechnological influences. Looking at theenvironment of the future is as impor-tant as considering what has happenedin the past. Any future changes whichwill impact on the organisation shouldbe identified and accommodated in theresulting strategy.

Recent events, have increased gov-ernment input on security in education:guidance on dealing with trouble-makers and on designing more pro-tection into new buildings is expectedshortly. While the focus is on security inschools, this guidance could also havesomething to offer to the FE sector, ifadapted accordingly.

The number of weapons in schools isstartlingly high. Given that studentsconsider FE colleges even less safe thanschools, this has alarming implicationsfor the situation in further education.


When planning the introduction of newsecurity measures, colleges need to lookat the latest technological developmentsin this equipment. Before choices aremade, they should consider the impactof specific measures on students' per-ceptions of the college environment.

Auditing actual problems and identi-fying solutions that work for that spe-cific college is vital: a knee-jerk responseto all types of imaginary problems couldbe counter-productive.

Colleges should consider the environ-ment of the immediate vicinity, of thesurrounding community and of societyin general.

They should carry out an audit of theirresource stock in terms of how theequipment is used for specificorganisational activities. They shouldconsider how resources used for securitywill impact on different aspects ofcollege life.

The culture of an organisation can havea considerable influence on how securitymeasures are perceived. Colleges shouldseek to ensure that their organisation'sculture is one where security measuresare not viewed in a hostile way. Theright attitudes from staff can help toreduce negative perceptions of thesecurity measures adopted.

Colleges should consider the expecta-tions of all its stakeholders: if thecollege's approach to security doesn'tmeet their needs, then clients will votewith their feet and transfer to a collegewhich does.

13

2. Achieving security inan FE college: aims ofthis researchBarking College, the institution used as thefocus of this research, is a medium-sized furthereducation establishment in East London. It has9,000 students and 290 staff on one site, which isapproximately a quarter of a mile in length fromfront to back and houses 15 main buildings (seeAppendix 1). The main block alone has fiveentrances, making restricted access difficult.Proposals are in place for a new buildingincorporating security features to replace someof the smaller buildings and to improvefacilities in existing buildings. Within a ten mileradius of Barking College there are three otherFE colleges competing for the same customers.

Approach taken by Barking College

Managers of Barking College pride themselveson maintaining an open, welcoming atmos-phere which avoids barriers to the general pub-lic and potential customers making impromptuvisits. However, this approach means thatintruders also have access, and there have beentimes when they have come on to the premises.So far none of these incidents have led to anyserious harm. However, this is no reason to becomplacent. The college realised that it was timeto put into place procedures which provideeffective, not obstructive, measures for ensuringthe security of all personnel and property.

Historically, any security issues at BarkingCollege have been dealt with by the Securityand Premises Manager; his original title wasPremises Manager, when security issues formeda relatively minor part of his role. A growingnumber of incidents (mainly of theft) high-lighted the need for more formalised securityprocedures and training. A number of incidentsof gangs coming on to the premises to settleexternal arguments with certain students ledthe principal to issue a bulletin to all staff onsecurity (see Appendix 2). The principalreluctantly decided that more stringent securitymeasures were needed.

Investigating a new approach

After incorporation in 1993, when seniormanagers became responsible for all areas ofcollege organisation, certain areas hithertoconsidered of low importance were catapultedto a prime position on the agenda. Security wasone of these.

While it was clear that the college might not beable to maintain the open access it had enjoyed,it was considered equally important not to loseall aspects of accessibility. This research wouldinvestigate actions taken in other colleges tomake use of the experiences of and solutionsadopted by others.

Planning the research

Good research should include:

descriptive research giving a snap-shot of present status

explanatory research asking why 'X'happens

generalisation research if techniqueswork with 'X', will they work with 'Y'?

basic and theoretical research todiscover any underlying principles.

Since security is an obscure and complex topic avariety of investigative methods would be used.Two different questionnaires would be sent out,one to principals and security staff of colleges,the other to students. Interviews would becarried out to ascertain perceptions of safetywithin the college.

Historical research was almost non-existent;research on security relates to schools, and notthe FE sector. The only literature that could beused was recent articles in journals or thenational press, and these were often connectedwith the Dunblane or London killings or theattack in Wolverhampton.

The research would be limited to colleges in areasonably-sized geographic area; too wide anarea could lead to results skewed by environ-mental issues pertinent to specific regions. The

14FE MATTERS FEDA paper 13

sample surveyed was a varied target populationbut small enough to restrict the research toacceptable perimeters. No attempt was made toreflect socio-economic, urban or size differencesof colleges as a deciding factor of inclusion. Theresearch would deal with facts (quantitativeapproach) when establishing the status quo andmeasuring the level of importance each collegeattaches to security. It would also take accountof the psychological aspect regarding perceivedversus actual danger (the qualitative angle).

Questionnaires were sent to 225 colleges in thesouth east of England, Greater London andEssex to achieve geographical and sociologicalvariety. The response to this research (almost 50per cent replied within the time limit) suggeststhere is sufficient interest to warrant a nation-wide survey, perhaps analysing the results geo-graphically as well as socio-economically.

Collecting the data

The three parts to the research were:

primary research:

looking at other colleges

looking at Barking College

a questionnaire to principals in thesouth east to research opinion andgauge action taken or planned

secondary research:

reading on security issues

researching statistics on assaultsand thefts experienced in colleges

empirical evidence:

discussions with the principal

discussions with the site manager

documented evidence of incidentswithin the college

watching student behaviour

listening to staff concerns.

hi FE MATTERS FEDA paper

The three main areas on which the researchwould focus related to client requirements,organisational requirements and security mea-sures (see Figure 2). Data would be collected on:

areas of concern and priority in furthereducation colleges regarding security

projected future expenditur

breaches of security experienced

students' views on their personal safety,perceived and actual, and on whetherthey regard specific security measures asan intrusion into their college life

the staff perspective.

The questionnaire would be used to collect thefirst three sets of data to give a snapshot imageof current and projected trends and budgets,

CUENT REQUIREMENTS

access and freedom

personal safety

good facilities

SECURITY MEASURES

ORGANISATIONAL

REQUIREMENTS

cost

security of personnel

security of property

security of equipment

control of unauthorised access

FIGURE 2: FRAMEWORK FOR DATA COLLECTION

15

and of experiences in other colleges. Thestudents' perspective would be gained via aquestionnaire and through interviews of smallfocus groups of Barking College students. Asecurity question would also be included on thestudent satisfaction survey (issued annually) togain a wider poll of student opinion (seeAppendix 3).

Questionnaires were considered inappropriatefor ascertaining staff perspectives, so less formal'opportunistic interview' sessions were used todiscover staff concerns. Where appropriate, thesubject was brought up subtly within aworking context.

The timetable for collecting data on these threeaspects is given in Table 2.

Evaluating key methods

Policy research

Analysing a social problem to offer policy-makers ways to deal with it involves research-ing a course of action not yet put into practice.An indicator of the value of such research is itseffect on social progress. However, it takes timebefore the true effects are known. This researchfocuses on measuring the level of importancecolleges attach to security and on investigatingpossible solutions for their security issues.Future work could include looking at securityfrom an economical, political, educational andcountry-wide geographic viewpoint.

QuestionnairesSurvey results must be approached with theunderstanding that while they can reveal whatis going on, where and when, they cannotanswer why or reveal any causal relationships.

Activity Date

CLIENTREQUIREMENTS

Approach student union regarding security

Send out brief questionnaire to 5o students

(at random in the refectory)

Hold focus groups (one with four students per group, and one with

six students)

Include a question on security on the student satisfaction questionnaire

Interview 40 students about their feelings of security and on

carrying weapons

February 1996

March 1996

March 1996

May 1996

May 1996

SECURITY

MEASURES

Have discussions with the principal and the security manager to

establish guidelines for the questionnaire

Pilot the questionnaire on the principal and security manager

Post the questionnaires to 225 principals in South East England

(with SAEs) with closing date as 24 May 1996

December 1995

February 1996

April 1996

ORGANISATIONALREQUIREMENTS

Meet with the principal and two senior managers

Contact security/access control company

Contact six security firms

Have presentations and tenders by five security firms

October 1995

May 1996

June 1996

June 1996

June-July 1996

TABLE 2: TIMETABLE FOR RESEARCH


Although suitable for collecting facts andfigures a questionnaire does not give anopportunity to gain opinion on, what is in thiscase, an emotive subject.

A guide offered by Anderson (1993) was used toconstruct the questionnaire to principals. Hesuggested the following approach:

determine the research questions

specify sub-questions

draft the items

sequence the items

design the questionnaire

pilot-test the questionnaire.

Specifying the sub-questions and piloting thequestionnaire would be the most difficult partof the process. The sub-questions had to bestructured to give a choice of options whichwould then determine which question wasanswered next. Ambiguity and leadingquestions had to be avoided.

One of the difficulties in testing the question-naire was gaining access to principals alreadybusy with paper work and similar requests. So,instead, it was shown to the principal and thesecurity manager at Barking College; their rec-ommendations led to minor alterations. Theresulting questionnaire is given in Appendix 4.The questionnaire for students was less struc-tured see Appendix 5. It was tested on stu-dents in the student union office and no alter-ations were suggested.

Since no suitable computer software was avail-able, the data was analysed manually, whichwas time-consuming. An optical mark readersystem would have made analysis far easier.

Response rates to postal questionnaires arenotoriously low but it was considered the onlymethod of reaching so many principals in ashort time span. Scott (1961) points out thatnon-respondents could distort results and thatevery effort must be made to ensure returns.However, due to cost and time available it wasdecided not to send out a reminder copy.

16 F E MATTERS FEDA paper

Focus groupsFocus groups can be used to pre-empt questionswhich should be included in a questionnaire orto probe more deeply than a questionnaireallows. Their main advantage over the standardinterview is the further dimension offered bythe synergy of a group response.

In this research, the focus group would be usedto test how safe or insecure the students feltwithin the college and whether they thoughtthat new security measures under consideration(those which would directly affect the studentgroup) would restrict or enhance their collegelife. Each group should have a balancedcomposition in terms of opinion, age andgender; Anderson suggests between six and 12members. When preparing questions for a focusgroup it is important to avoid asking 'why' aperson feels a certain way about an issue it is'what' they feel that is important. One of thedifficulties was keeping the group 'focus' on theinternal issue rather than it extending to eventswhich had recently taken place outside.

The differing dynamics of one group to anotherand the means of data collection make analysisextremely difficult. However, this would notpose too much of a problem in this researchsince the focus group was not the main sourceof data collection but was included to giveadditional scope to students wishing to expressan opinion.

Dismissing ethnographic researchStaging an incident involving a breach ofsecurity to ascertain reaction and timescales wasanother method considered. Because of diffi-culties in deciding who should be forewarned,out of the principal, security manager, staff andstudents, and whether this would be a validway to 'test' established security personnel, thismethod was not pursued. It could, however, beincorporated into future investigations.

17

3. Security in FEemerging picture

What the principals say

The questionnaire sent to 225 college principalsin the south east covered security issues relatingto: staffing; costs; duties; future developments;budgets; priorities and details of incidents (seeAppendix 4). A total of 109 full responses werereceived within the time limit. Results forquestions with multiple answers are given innumbers, the rest are given as percentages.

The findings reveal that security is consideredan important issue in FE colleges today. Onlyfour of the colleges taking part in the surveysaid it was a low priority; while two of thesehave large intakes, one is mainly for part-timestudents and the other is a specialist agricul-tural college. More than half said security was ahigh priority in their college, and the remaining40 per cent consider it a moderate priority.

The largest college replying had 12,000 full-timeand 12,000 part-time students. The smallest had300 full-time students and no part-time. A totalof 20 colleges had no full-time students at all.Four of the principals gave no details on size ofcollege. The remaining 78 per cent ofrespondents ranged from colleges with just 40full-time students to the largest intake of 15,000full-time students. Between them they wereresponsible for 233,207 students. The part-timeintakes ranged from 10 at one college to 19,800as the highest intake, with a total of 443,052students between them; 12 per cent ofrespondents had no part-time students.

The amount spent on security differsimmensely at these extremes of college size, butthe type of incidents are almost identical,including unauthorised people on site, theftsand physical attacks on staff and students. Itwould have been useful to ask for the number ofincidents experienced in each college.

Nearly 45 per cent of the colleges employ spe-cialist security staff (see Table 3). The per-centages show the proportion of colleges withinthat intake range which employ security staff.

When comparing the size of college againstresponses, to determine any correlationbetween the two, a more significant findingemerges: colleges with specialist staff have fourtimes the number of full-time students thanthose not employing such staff. This could implythat the larger the intake of full-time students,the more likely they are to have securityproblems. However, the response to types ofincidents experienced suggest that colleges ofall sizes experience breaches of security. Takingthe total number of students involved, what itdoes mean is that 80 per cent of full-timers arestudying in colleges with security staff. Thisraises issues about the training of these staff andwho should employ them: college or agency. Italso means that part-time students have a fifty-fifty chance of attending a college with securitystaff. This could imply that colleges with morefull-time students experience problems in suffi-cient numbers or of such severity that they aremore likely to require specialist security help.

College size by

student intake

Employing

security staff

Not employing

security staff

10,000 plus 6 (i00%) N/A

4,001-9,999 9 (i00%) N/A

F 2,000-4,000 12 (71%) 5 (29%)

U 1,000-1,999i

less than L000L

14 (48%)

4 (17%)

15 (52%)

19 (83%)

no full-time 2 (10%) 19 (90 %)

T no student figures 1 3I

M Total colleges 48 61

E Total students 189,425 43,782

15,000-19,800 N/A 4 (loo°/0)

10,000-14,999 5 (45%) 6 (55°/0)

5,000 -9,999 15 (71%) 6 (29%)

P2,000-4,999 14 (50%) 14 (50%)

A 1,000-1,999 3 (37%) 5 (63%)

R less than i,000 4 (22%) 14 (78%)T

no part-time 6 (43%) 8 (57%)

T no figures given 1 4I

M Total colleges 48 61

E Total students 210,189 232,863

TABLE 3: COLLEGES EMPLOYING SECURITY STAFF


Incidents of security breaches in FE

The findings on incidents of breaches of securityconfirm that FE colleges need to make security ahigh priority. All but three colleges taking partsaid they had experienced some type of securitybreach (see Figure 3). These incidents includedvehicle theft (11), walk-in theft (9), muggings(4), robbery (1) and many unspecified thefts(81). Nearly half of these colleges hadexperienced break-ins and burglary (49 colleges).A total of 47 had had unauthorised persons onsite and 46 had experienced vandalism, six ofthese incidents being vehicle damage, one a caseof arson, and one a bomb scare.

Even more alarming was the extent of physicalattacks taking place on college sites: 20 collegesreported incidents of violent behaviour. Theseincluded physical attacks (8), verbal aggression(6), internal fights (5) and attacks on clericalstaff (1). Five reported incidents of drug dealing.

It came as a shock to discover that nearly one-third of the 109 colleges taking part have hadstaff attacked. These included being attackedwhile disturbing intruders, dealing with iratestudents or refusing entry, dealing with specialneeds students or irate parents, and beingmugged. Figure 4 gives the details. Of the 32colleges who have had staff attacked, nearly 40per cent had no security system. No type of

Key

Theft

Break-in

Trespassing

Vandalism

Physical attacks

Drug dealing

FIGURE 3: TYPES OF SECURITY BREACHES

EXPERIENCED BY FE COLLEGES

college appears to be immune to such attacks:included on the list of those experiencingattacks on staff were the largest college takingpart and the smallest, with all sizes represented,and the majority of these had

both full-time andpart-time students.

Another worrying sta-tistic is that half of thecolleges have had stu-dents attacked on col-lege premises (Figure5 gives the details).Almost half of thesewere internal studentfeuds (25 incidents),with a further sixbeing internal racialfeuds, and two beingincidents relating togender interaction.The other types ofattack were:

Key

Disturbing intruders

Dealing with irate students

111 Refusing entry

Muggings

Dealing with special needs students

External duties

EiDealing with irate parents

,:-::

Other

FIGURE 4: INCIDENTS OF ATTACKS ON COLLEGE STAFF


19

unauthorised persons on site (14)

muggings (4)

ex-students returning to site (2)

racial intruders (1).

Nearly two-thirds of these attacks are internal,so would not have been prevented by limited orelectronic access security systems. In theseincidents, proper security guards might havebeen a deterrent. The remaining 39 per cent ofattacks were by outsiders, so may have beenavoided if methods of limiting access to non-students had been used. One member of staffwith responsibility for client services reported anumber of complaints from students aboutbullying: each time it is the fear of 'outside help'coming in that frightened them the most.

While there is no indication of the seriousness ofeach reported incident, it is still disturbing todiscover that a quarter of these attacks were byunauthorised persons on site.

Colleges do not seem to be paying that muchattention to the issue of internal attacks. Whenasked what additional security measures theyexpect to be using in five years' time out ofguards, swipe cards and other electronic

11%

7%

2%

46%

26%

Key

111 Student feuds

Trespassing

Racial feuds

IN Muggings

Ex-students on site

Racial intruders

Gender interaction

FIGURE 5: INCIDENTS OF ATTACKS ON STUDENTS ON

COLLEGE PREMISES

SECURITYMEASURE/COMBINATION

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 AoOF MEASURES

I I I I I I I I

RESPONSES ( %)

Guards

Guards and swipe cards

Guards and other

electronic system

Swipe cards

Swipe cards and other

electronic system

Other electronic systems only

All three

Other

FIGURE 6: ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES COLLEGES EXPECT TO HAVE ADOPTED IN FIVE YEARS' TIME


Method Operational responsibility Cost Effective

Yes No Partly

Swipe card: Site service manager

Head of school

Hall manager/assistant bursar

College superintendent

NS

20,000

NS

2,000 perlocation

Building services NS

+ ID cards Commissionaire NS (part of 120Ksecurity budget)

Programme manager 3,000

for certain areas College security officer NS

only for student accommodation Caretaker/estates supervisor 2,000PRUX card Director of property and facilities 6,000

Premises officer 15,000 New system

only library and open access areas Library staff in-houseLocation manager 6,000

card-operated plus entranceturnstiles

Deputy principal and MIS manager NS

Premises manager 2,50o

Facilities manager 40,000

for staff Building premises manager 3,000

Swipe card, turnstiles and ID cards Security manager NS

Safety and security manager 75,00o+

Intercom system Facilities manager/house manager L000

Security staff Site manager NS

External barriers Staff 1,000

Intruder sensor alarm Hall manager/assistant bursar NS

Zone alarm Senior maintenance officer NS

ID card Head of estate services 80,000

Access control Security staff and facility/housemanager

Facilities manager 20,000

for students only

Security manager

Building premises manager

NS

Student services NS

Estate manager 1,000

Coded locks Senior warden

Head of security4,00oloo each

Staff 1,00o each

Staff 180 /lock

Key locks Centre manager NS

Key control Caretaker

Administration manager

Varied

loo pa runningcost

Electronic lock Receptionist/hair and beauty 300

Facilities/house managers 200

Estate manager 3,000

Key pad All staff N/K

plus phased alarms Caretaking staff 12/160o

Office manager 120 each

Administration manager NS

in selected rooms Vice principal 1,000

TABLE 4: METHODS OF RESTRICTING ACCESS TO SOME AREAS


21

systems, just four per cent named guards onlyas an additional measure, with 23 per centnaming them as a combined measure alongsideeither one or both of the other options. Theelectronic system figured most highly in theresults (named in 82% of cases). Swipe cardswere named either as a single or combinedoption by 48 of these respondents (see Figure 6).

Staff responsible for securityThe number of staff employed at the 48 collegeswith specialist people varied from one to 45, ata cost of between £10-£900K. Other duties givento these staff included helping with visitor care,removals, ID card maintenance and reception,acting as escorts, commissionaires, car parkingassistants, traffic control and fire officers.

Nearly all of the participating colleges involvecaretakers in security measures. Around halfinvolve senior staff and less than 10 per centhave other staff involved. Only four per cent ofthose colleges expecting to spend on securitywithin the next two years, anticipated buying inextra staff.

Types of system used

Two out of five colleges have methods ofrestricting access to some areas. Swipe cardswere used by 14 colleges, and nine others usedswipe cards with another system. Second inpopularity and effectiveness was some form ofelectronic lock or key control, which was usedby 15 colleges. Seven colleges used some type ofID card and access control system. Less thannine per cent used alarms or security guards forthis purpose. However, colleges could be usingalarms for purposes other than just restrictingaccess, which was what this question asked.

Those who did restrict access in some way wereasked who had operational responsibility forthe system, how much it cost and whether theyfind it effective (see Table 4). Since colleges oftenuse different titles for similar jobs, it is some-times difficult to link like with like. However,most have a member of staff known as site-keeper, commissionaire, college securityofficer /manager, premises manager or estatesmanager. Some give operational responsibilityfor the system to caretaking staff, and in acouple of cases the deputy or vice principalcarried out this function. In one college thelibrary staff was responsible for a library-only

System Respondents

(in numbers)

Swipe card 8

Security cameras 8

Reduced number of entry points

Supervised access points and

turnstiles

Electronic locks, key pads and

key access

Other reduced access method

3

4

5

2

No method given 4

Swipe card and security camera 2

Swipe card and other system 7

Security cameras and other system 6

Reduced entry points

access points, electric

locks

(14)

FIGURE 7: ALTERNATIVE OR ADDITIONAL METHODS OF SECURITY CONSIDERED


access area, and in another the MIS managerhad responsibility. The cost of restricting accessranges from £200 for locks to £75,000 plus for aswipe card, turnstile and ID system. All but twosaid that the system was either completelyeffective or partially effective. The 67 collegeswho said they had no method of restrictingaccess to some areas were then asked if they hadconsidered such a system: 64 per cent said yesand 31 per cent said no (three gave noresponse). Interestingly, more than 60 per centof the colleges not considering a system hadpart-time students only.

Nearly half of all respondents said they are con-sidering additional or alternative methods ofsecurity. The single most popular additionalsystem considered was a means to reduce accesspoints (14 respondents). Security cameras andswipe cards were the next preferred options,each specified by eight respondents. Othersconsidered a combination of systems Figure7 gives the details.

COS LS

Security emerged as a key funding issue forcolleges taking part in this research: two-thirdssaid they envisaged major expenditure onsecurity within the next two years.

Most of these 72 respondents (75 per cent) saidthat they expected the expenditure to be on anelectronic system either on its own (20respondents) or with another system, the mostfavoured, for one-third of these respondents,being a mechanical one. Six principals said theywere expecting to spend on a camera system onits own and 16 were considering using cameraswith another system. Figure 8 shows the results.

Alarmingly, less than 40 per cent of thosecolleges envisaging expenditure had allocated abudget for it. This ranged from £2K to £150Kwith an overall total between them of £801K,giving an average of £40K per college.

TYPE OF SYSTEM RESPONDENTS (NUMBERS)

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 i6 18 20

Additional staff

Electronic

Mechanical

Camera

Other

Staff and electronic

Staff and mechanical

Staff and camera

Staff and other

Electronic and

mechanical

Electronic and camera

Electronic and other

Mechanical and other

Electronic, mechanical

and other

Electronic, mechanical

and camera

FIGURE 8: TYPES OF SECURITY SYSTEMS COLLEGES EXPECT TO BUY IN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS


23

Situation at Barking College

Security: current and plannedBarking College's response to the questionnairereveals that it considers security a high priority.

In line with most other colleges responding, itinvolves site keepers in security measures andhas senior staff on duty at set hours during theday. It employs one part-time security staff onan evening/night-time basis. This guard has noother duties and costs approximately £30,000per year through an agency.

Apart from key locks on some doors and keypad entry restriction for the finance area andstaff rooms, there is no restricted access.Methods of restricting access have beenconsidered, which is the same response as thatgiven by 64 per cent of those colleges which donot have these systems at present.

Alternative methods considered are moreCCTVs and the use of security guards. Thecollege envisages future expenditure within thenext two years on additional staffing, electroniccontrols and mechanical controls; again thisresponse is in line with the majority of othercolleges in the survey. Barking College hasallocated a budget of £80,000 for this, which isdouble the average expenditure budgeted forby the responding colleges.

As with the other colleges in the survey, Barkinghas experienced a variety of types of theft:vehicle theft; walk-in theft and break-in theft. Ithas also experienced:

trespassing (along with 47 otherresponding colleges)

violence (along with 20 other respond-ing colleges)

drug dealing (along with five otherresponding colleges)

drunks on site.

There have been no reported attacks on staff,which makes it one of the fortunate two out ofthree colleges in the survey which can say this.

However, there have been attacks on studentsdue to internal feuds and unauthorised personscoming on site to settle grievances or causedisturbances, which puts it alongside half of thecolleges responding to the questionnaire.

Student perspective

The survey carried out among students atBarking College revealed that all felt at ease inthe college. This involved more than 100students: 50 completed the questionnaire (seeAppendix 5); 40 were interviewed, and therewere two focus groups.

Their opinion on swipe card systems wasdivided: half said they would not be happy touse swipe cards. Interestingly, all but one saidthey would welcome use of close circuit TV.

Only one student said yes to 'have you ever feltthreatened in college'. None of thoseinterviewed had ever been the victim of an actof violence or theft in the college.

Students were asked to suggest ways forensuring a safer environment. Their responsesincluded to be stricter on discipline, tointroduce CCTV and to limit access to outsiders.

Finally, they were asked to give a word whichdescribes the college atmosphere. Theirresponses included: tense; comfortable; calm;relaxed; dull, boring; sweet; friendly; nice; jolly;good. This would indicate that Barking Collegehas managed to retain a welcoming atmospherefor the majority of those interviewed.

This is not, however, the whole story. Therehave been incidents where bullying or feudinghas taken place. The victims of these incidentssaid that their greatest fear is how easy it wouldbe for a whole army of the perpetrator's friendsto descend on the college, which has happenedin the past. One or two students have left thecollege rather than risk being attacked. This isevidence that lack of attention to security canaffect recruitment and retention of students,which in turn can have an impact on funding.


Staff perspective

Impromptu interviews of a variety of staffrevealed an atmosphere of confusion: staff donot always know what to do if they see anincident, and mentioned that incidents do notget 'followed up'. This indicated a lack ofcommunication rather than a lack of action.Some staff feel vulnerable in certain places inthe college more from potential intrudersthan from the students.

Staff seemed far more worried about securitythan the students. A member of staff withresponsibility for security said:

Nothing will be done until one of us is stabbed.

He was particularly talking about large groupsof non-students gathering in the car park orrefectory for non-specific reasons who can takeon a very threatening demeanour when askedto leave the premises.


25

3. Action plan for FESecurity is not optional! Section 2(3) of theHealth and Safety at Work Act (HMSO, 1974)requires that employees have a written healthand safety policy statement; this includes deal-ing with foreseeable risks of violence to staff.

This research gives a timely and much awaitednational overview of what colleges are doingabout security. The responses suggest a possiblegeographical link with security concerns andthis could be of interest for further study. Themajority of responses came from the GreaterLondon area 59 responses from 119 contacted(approximately half); 13 responses from 21approached came from Essex; in East Sussex 14responded out of the 18 approached; from Kentseven responded from 23 approached, and fromSurrey 10 responded from 23 approached;Appendix 6 gives the full details.

The overall picture emerging is that theft andvandalism of one type or another is experiencedby all colleges. One-third of these colleges havehad staff attacked and half have had studentsattacked. More than one-third of the attacks onstudents are connected with unauthorisedpersons on site, and the rest are internal attacks.A significant proportion of colleges haveproblems with violence.

As a result of this research, Barking College isfaced with a dilemma which confronts many FEestablishments. It is understandably reluctant torespond in a knee-jerk way to the question ofaccess, and risk damaging its reputation as awarm, friendly college. Unfortunately, in thelight of recent reported events where deaths ofchildren and staff have occurred, no educationestablishment can afford complacency. Also,with the results of this survey revealing thatattacks on site from intruders are a widespreadoccurrence in colleges, this is not an issue thatthe FE sector can hope will go away. FE collegesmust strive to protect personnel and propertyand offer their students a safe environment inwhich to work. Security must also be consid-ered in the context of what the community andneighbouring colleges are doing: as soon as theyinitiate tighter security measures the collegewhich does nothing becomes an easy target.

There is also the question of repeatvictimisation. The chances of repeat crimeincreases three-fold. If an easy opportunity wassuccessful, the chances are it will happen again.

Full-time students in urban colleges appear togive rise to most security problems. However,this does not mean that all other types ofcolleges are immune: all should take action ofsome sort. Whatever measures are taken, nocollege or public building will be able toannihilate crime; what colleges must do isidentify those people acting against their secureenvironment and decide how they can reducetheir influence.

Visits, carried out as part of this research, to anumber of colleges with varying degrees ofsecurity measures in place have shown that justthrowing money at the problem is not theanswer. If a college has no procedures in placeto support its security measures, then it couldbe wasting thousands of pounds. For example,CCTV cameras in place with no procedures formonitoring are just a minor deterrent; to betruly effective they must be used to identify andtrack down offenders.

Key recommendations

The following recommendations are proposedfor Barking College, but can be applied to FEcolleges in general. Details of time-scale andcost are given, except in cases which requiremajor financial investment by the college so willmean implementation in the longer-term.

The recommendations fall into three categories,those relating to:

premises reorganisation

procedures

training.

Premises reorganisation

Implement a proposal for the reorgani-sation of premises staff to identify clearresponsibilities for security of the site,within a structured team approach.

26FE MATTERS FEDA Paper 25

Barking College has 15 buildings spreadover a considerable area so needs a numberof such staff working under the supervisionof a team leader. Two daytime shifts each ledby a shift leader with responsibility for allday-to-day site management safety,security, cleaning and porterage areproposed. Each of the three site zones willhave a supervisor responsible for an area ofthe college, but working to the shift leader.At present, the college contracts out night-time, weekend and 'out of term-time'security, but with the planned installationof swipe card access controls is looking touse two daytime security guards from anexternal guarding company, one based inthe site security office viewing CCTVmonitors, and one on patrol.

time-scale immediateadditional cost as outlined below

Carry out a feasibility report to identifyand secure as many potential exits assafely possible. An intruder will requirea fast means of escape controlledvantage points will hinder this.

time-scale 3 monthscost neutral

Install tighter security systems includinga barrier for the car park.

time-scale 6 monthscost £10,000

Give porters lodge a telephone link andcontrol of the car barrier.

time-scale 6 monthscost minimal

Issue car stickers so that student andstaff cars can be identified.

time-scale immediatecost minimal

Install security lighting on the site,particularly in the car parking areas.


26 FE MATTERS IlLEIT)Apaper"'

O Install a swipe card entry system:

in the short term to the library andIT rooms


in the long term to the whole sitewith a limited number of accesspoints, built in to a complete siteredesign including a new buildingto be the main reception andteaching area.

time-scale future planning cyclecost £34,500 for a perimeter access terminal;£5m for new building

Tender a contract for security guardswith clearly defined duties.

time-scale immediatecost £32,750/year

Refine and upgrade CCTV cameras,including ensuring they are monitoredby site security officers.

The existing system was installed to meetinsurer requirements, to monitor theperimeter fencing and rear of one of theblocks at night and during weekends. Thereis now a need for cameras which can pan,tilt and zoom-in to identify faces andvehicle registration numbers, and to havethe system monitored during the day bysecurity guards. Dome cameras wererecommended since they are capable ofcovering the same area that would requirefour of the existing cameras. The existingexternal colour cameras would be relocatedinside the building and replaced by blackand white equipment outside to achievebetter night-time definition.


Ask premises staff to identify areas atrisk open access does not mean accessto all areas all of the time.

time-scale immediatecost neutral

27

Invest in a dedicated radio system atpresent the borough system is usedwhich causes problems with use ofairwaves being shared by other usersand occasionally being closed down.

time-scale 3 monthscost £4,500 for base station plus £620 pafor licence

Install panic alarms in key areas, such asthe refectory, library, reception.

time-scale immediatecost £4,000

Build an atrium adjoining block toprovide a covered area for students tosit this removes the need for acommon room and allows access pointsto be reduced.


Procedures

Compile security procedures formanagers, security guards, staff and sitekeepers, to be agreed by the seniormanagement team and implemented.(Table 5 outlines specific proceduresproposed for Barking College.)


Ensure that the security and premisesmanager implements specific proceduresto avoid internal theft by staff. Theseshould include procedures to deal with:

staff entering or leaving premisesoutside normal working times

removal from site ofequipment/tools

handling of keys outside normalworking hours

follow-up procedures ormonitoring time/place/duty rotaat times of thefts

Investigate using surveillance cameraswith electronic beam for the storerooms.


Establish a security action team report-ing to the senior management team whereinterested parties, including students,may review progress of security actions.


Implement a victim support scheme viathe college counsellor.


Communicate procedures to all staff.


Monitor procedures regularly throughthe security action team and ensure thatstudent and staff needs are regularlyanalysed and accounted for.


Keep staff informed of incidents to avoidhearsay distorting actual events.

Training

Ensure that all new staff are informed ofsecurity procedures during induction.

Ensure shared ownership of securitymeasures by training students in socialresponsibilities to other students and staff.

Use own staff to train security guards sothat they are aware of student needs andensure a balance of liberty and security.

Implement staff training at all levels onpolicy and procedures during facultyreview days and make it compulsory.

time-scale for all training 3 monthscost neutral


DUTY MANAGERS

(all day cover including evenings)

GUARDS

To be contactable by site guards

Act as first point of contact for all incidents

Give priority to any call regarding security

Take responsibility for all incidents

Deal with first step of disciplinary procedure

including suspension

Must not leave the site

Ensure reception knows where they can be found

Keep a log book

Produce documentary evidence for distribution to

relevant staff including the principal

Issues warranting suspension:

0 fighting

stealing

vandalism

drug dealing

taking drugs

O 1. any other serious issues which contravene the

code of conduct

Patrol whole college with particular attention to hot

spots: refectory, car parks, reception, toilets

Ensure students conform to code of conduct:

Serious issues which require that the perpetrator be

taken to the duty manager immediately:

identify, intervene and report drug taking,

bullying, fighting, theft and trespassing

intervene if any act of vandalism is seen

Non-serious issues which require reporting the

student names to the duty manager (these could

become serious if they continue after warnings):

carry out random ID checks

stop people smoking

prevent loitering

deal with illegal parking

inspect, record and identify problems/faults with

fire-fighting equipment

ensure all fire exits and escape points are kept clear

control the playing of loud music in the car park

0 act as escorts when visitors are on site

SITE KEEPERS STAFF

Ensure all premises are locked up when not in use

Ensure all classrooms are locked when not in use

Ensure no item of equipment leaves college premises

without written consent by the director of faculty

Patrol buildings and car parks to identify, intervene

and prevent:

0 smoking in buildings

thefts

fights

. illegal parking

trespass

all fire equipment in good working order

all fire exits and means of escape are kept clear

Assist in identifying and removing any suspended or

expelled students and report to the senior site keeper

Ensure the general safety and security of personnel

and property on the college premises

Report acts of fighting, theft, vandalism, drug taking,

and any acts of bad behaviour contrary to the

student code of conduct

Ensure all rooms are locked and windows closed

after use and keys returned to agreed location

Intervene when observing acts of violence, theft,

vandalism, including minor offences such as smoking

in buildings, dropping litter

Report any serious offences to the duty manager

TABLE 5: SECURITY PROCEDURES PROPOSED FOR PERSONNEL AT BARKING COLLEGE


29

Messages for colleges

No security solution can be watertight, no mat-ter how sophisticated and extensive the packageof measures introduced. What colleges shouldaim for is to identify the risks and use thisinformation to reduce the influence of peoplewho act against their secure environment.

The measures suggested aim to maintain thefriendly atmosphere of the college whilereducing the opportunity for crime and thenumber of intruders who gain access to thepremises. These measures should be commun-icated to staff and students in a positive way,driven by a pastoral not a policing approach.

All colleges should make it a priority tointroduce measures which will make it far moredifficult for anybody wishing to commit a crimeon the premises, rather than waiting until theyare in the position of having to react to anincident after the event.

Colleges should put pressure on thegovernment and policymakers to urge thatequal attention be given to security in furthereducation as is being given to schools. Collegesowe it to their students and staff to ensure a safeworking environment.

30


ReferencesAnderson, G (1990) Fundamentals ofeducational research. Falmer Press

Egan, G (1994) Re-engineering the companyculture Parts 1 and 2. Egan Hall

French, Bell and Zawacki (1994) Organizationdevelopment and transformation. Richard DIrwin Inc.

Gorringe, R and Toogood, P (1994) Changingthe culture of a college. Coombe Lodge ReportVol 24 No 3 FEDA

Green, G and R Fischer (1992) Introduction tosecurity. Butterworth Heinemann

Handy, C (1985) Understanding organisations.Penguin

HMSO (1974) Health and Safety at Work Act.Public General Acts c.37. HMSO

Johnson and Scholes (1993) Exploringcorporate strategy text and cases. PrenticeHall

Reeves, F (1993) Community need and furthereducation. Education Now Books

Robertson, D (1993) Violence in yourworkplace how to cope. Souvenir Press

Scott, C (1961) Research on mail surveys.Journal of the Royal Statistical SocietySeries A

Smithers, A and Robinson, P (1993) Changingcolleges further education in the marketplace. Council for Industry and HE

Warner, D and Kelly, G (1994) Managingeducational property. Society for Research intoHigher Education and Open University Press

Williams, Dobson and Walters (1993)Changing culture new organisationalapproaches. Institute of PersonnelManagement


31

Appendix 1: Plan of Barking College site

Studentcar park

Staff car park

Student &visitorscar park

A2:

Staffcar park

4Staffcar park

Creche

Reception, collegeservices & admissions

Dagenham Road

32igEDA paper: 31

Appendix 2: Principal's bulletin regarding security(January 1996)

SECURITY

Traditionally, Barking College has enjoyed a reputation as an open and friendlycollege. Students have valued the friendly atmosphere and the results ofstudent questionnaires have continually reflected this theme. However, inrecent months we have had a spate of ugly incidents that have threatened thisenvironment and damaged our reputation. I am grateful to several key staff fortheir actions in preventing such incidents from worsening.

Last year's consultation exercise on security issues produced a limitedresponse with staff reluctantly prepared to endorse techniques such as closedcircuit television (CCTV), but uneasy about losing the college's open, accessibleethos. Since September 1995 we have had a recurrence of student and intruderproblems. Widespread non-compliance with the non-smoking policy in thestudent refectory with evidence of cannabis smoking resulted in actionspearheaded by Beattie Coe, Head of Client Services, to stamp out theseproblems in collaboration with refectory staff, premises staff and undercoverpolice. This campaign has been overwhelmingly successful and I would like tothank all involved, especially Beattie. Unfortunately we have not yet achievedimproved student behaviour outside of the college and I am now in theprocess of organising a meeting at the college with local residents, thepolice and, hopefully, local councillors and the Students' Union to devise aworkable strategy.

Our CCTV was recently installed on a specification to protect property in the car

parks and computer rooms. We put an additional camera in the rear of thestudent refectory but now need to upgrade our coverage in public areas suchas A block, B block and D block foyers as well as the front of the refectory.

However, I am reluctantly being driven to the conclusion that we need swipe

card access to the site. This will be expensive but can be combined with someimprovements such as electronic student registration and computerised roomtimetabling. The above would need to be considered alongside thedevelopment of site accommodation.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE


33

Appendix 3: Student satisfaction questionnaire(relevant sections)

6. What changes would you like to see to improve the % Yesatmosphere?

% No

a) piped music 31 69

b) college radio station more often 51 49

c) juke box more music selection 65 35

d) lower ceiling in the main eating area 28 72

e) more areas for posters and information points 59 41

f) brighter paintwork etc 70 30

g) plants 58 42

h) low dividing partitions 41 59

i) MTV or other satellite TV screen 83 17

7. What security systems would you like to see operating? % Yes % No

a) close circuit TV

b) more visible security personnel within the refectory

c) compulsory ID badges worn by staff and studentsalike so that intruders can be identified

74

59

60

..i Evening students only % Yes

Are you satisfied with the arrangements at present for 56evening students?

BEST COPY AVAILABLE 34FE MATTERS RDA paper

26

41

40

No

40

33

Appendix 4: Questionnaire to principalsMay I thank you in advance for taking time to complete this questionnaire and assure you that allinformation received will be handled in strictest confidence.

The purpose of this questionnaire is to identify areas of concern and priority in further education collegeswith regard to SECURITY.

I will be using statistics gained from this to assist in research for an MBA project to be completed thisyear. When using the word security I am including personal safety of staff and students as well assecurity of property.

Name: Designation.

College:

1. Please indicate the approximate size of your college ft students

pt students

2. Do you employ specialist security staff? Yes

nIf Yes please indicate

No

how many people

approximate staff costs

do they have other duties

(please indicate type of duties)

3. Who carries out security duties: (please tick if appropriate)

senior staff

middle managers

caretakers

others (please state)

4. Do you have any methods of restricting access to some areas eg swipe card system etc.

F-1 Yes

No

If Yes please go to question 5.

If No please go to question 6.

PTO

FE MATTERS FE DA paper

5. What is the method used?

Who has operational responsibility?

Approximately how much did it cost?

Do you find it effective? Yes

6. Have you considered such a method?(only answer if answer to question 4 is No.)

7. Have you considered alternative methods?

Partially

Yes

Yes

No

No

El No

If yes, what methods?

8. What priority do you place on security at present?

High Moderate Low

9. Do you envisage any major expenditure being allocated within the next two years on security?

Yes No

10. If Yes please indicate how much this is likely to cost and what form it will take.

Additional staffing

Electronic

Mechanical

Other (please elaborate)

11. Has a budget been allocated? Yes No

If so, approximately how much?

12. What types of breaches of security have you experienced if you could itemise perhaps the fourmost common or serious:

1.

2.

3.

4.

PTO


13. Have any of your staff been physically attacked on college premises?

Yes No

If Yes could you briefly describe who was attacked and what were the circumstances:

14. Have any of your students been physically attacked on college premises?

Yes No If Yes could you briefly describe the circumstances:

15. In five years time what additional measures do you expect to be used in your college?

Guards

Swipe cards

Other electronic systems

Many thanks for completing this questionnaire. Would you please return it in the enclosed reply paidenvelope before 24th May 1996.to:Beattie CoeHead of Client ServicesBarking CollegeDagenham RoadRomfordEssex RM7 OXU

Once again many thanks for your co-operation.


17

Appendix 5: Questionnaire to students

SURVEY ON PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AT BARKING COLLEGE

This survey is being carried out in order to assess perceptions on personal safety atBarking College.

1. Do you feel at ease in the college?

2. Would you be happy to use swipe cards and have limited access to some areas?

3. Do you welcome the use of close circuit TV?

4. Do you object to the use of close circuit TV?

5. Have you ever felt threatened in college?

6. Have you ever experienced a theft in college?

7. Have you ever been the victim of an act of violence in college?

8. On a scale of 1-10 (1 being unsafe and 10 being very safe) how would you ratethis college?

9. What steps would you take to make this a safer environment?

10. Give me a word which describes the atmosphere here.

Many thanks for your help with my research.

Beattie CoeHead of Client Services


Appendix 6: Map of geographical location of collegesresponding to questionnaire

Hillingdon

Harrow

Ealing

Hounslow

Banbury

WitneyOxford

Barnet

Brent

Richmond uponThames

I I I I I I I II I

Oxfordsh ireTharne

AbingdonHenley onThames

KingstonuponThames

2

3

Enfield

Haringey

Islingtonamden

City

Wandsworth

Maidenhead

Berkshire ReadingSlough

Newbury Bracknell

Basingstoke

Lambeth

WalthamForest

HackneyNewham

ower Hamlets

Southwark

Merton

Sutton

Egham

Epsom

Lewisham

Redbridge

Barking &Dagenham

Greenwich

Croydon

WokingGuildford Redhill

Farnborough SurreyFarnham Reigate

GodalmingAndover Alton

HampshireWinchester Petersfield

EastleighSouthampton

BrockenhurstGos

Havant

Fare hamort

Portsmouth

CrawleyHorsham

Pulborough HaywardsHeath

West Sussex

Chichester Worthing

Isle of Wight


Bromley

DartfordChatham

KentTon bridge

Bexley

East SussexHastingsLewes Bexhill

Hove EastbourneBrighton

Havering

i City of Westminster2 Kensington & Chelsea3 Hammersmith & Fulham

Greater Londoncolleges responding

Broadstairs

Canterbury

Folkestone

South Eastern regioncolleges responding

MiltonKeynes

Wisbech

Peterborough

Bedford

CambridgeshireHuntingdon

Milton

Cambridge

edfordshire

Dunstable

BuckinghamshireAylesbury

I

Luton Stevenage

HertfordshireSt Albans

WatfordAmersham

Ware

Harlow

Loughton

King's Lynn

North Walsham

Norfolk Norwich

Bury StEdmunds Suffolk

Ipswich

BraintreeColchester

Essex

Chelmsford.

40

BasildonSouthend-on-Sea

Grays

FE MATTERS FEDA paper

GreatYarmouth

Lowestoft

Eastern regioncolleges responding

39

FEDA publication series

Developing FE: Volume

1. Student tracking2. Caseloading3. Assessing the impact: provision for

learners with learning difficultiesand disabilities

4. Adults and GNVQs5. On course for next steps: careers

education and guidance for studentsin FE

6. Marketing planning7. Managing change in FE8. The effective college library9. Appraisal in FE where are we

now?10. Clarity is power: learning outcomes

and course design

FE Matters: Volume

1. Environmental education in FE:part 1

2. Environmental education in FE:part 2

3. Towards self-assessing colleges4. Colleges working with industry5. Evidence for action: papers prepared

for FEFC's Learning andTechnology Committee

6. Student retention: case studies ofstrategies that work

7. Getting the credit: OCNaccreditation and learners withlearning difficulties and disabilities

8. Moving on from Key Stage 4: thechallenges for FE

9. Monitoring student attendance10. Educational Psychologists in FE11. Assuring coherence in individual

learning programmes12. Adult learners: pathways to

progression13. A real job with prospects: supported

employment opportunities for adultswith disabilities or learningdifficulties

14. Transforming teaching: selecting andevaluating teaching strategies


15. Information and learningtechnology: a developmenthandbook

16. Delivering modern apprenticeships17. Planning a merger of FE colleges18. Tackling drugs together: addressing

the issues in the FE sector19. Security is not an option learning

in a safe environment20. Give us the credit: achieving a

comprehensive FE framework

FEDA bulletins: Volume

1. Developing college strategies forHuman Resource Development

2. Enhancing GCE A-level programmes3. Impact of voucher schemes on the FE

curriculum4. Quality assurance in colleges5. Maintaining quality during

curriculum change6. Action planning and recording

achievement7. Implementing modular A levels8. Comparing content in selected GCE A

levels and Advanced GNVQs9. Engineering the future10. Charters in FE: Making them work11. Access to accreditation12 Back to the future: modern

apprenticeship schemes13. Competing for business: colleges and

the Competitiveness Fund14. Developing an information strategy

for a college15. Strategic approaches to processes,

cultures and structures

41

r

FEDA paper

Price: £6.50

42

ERIC I

(9/92)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONOffice of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI)

Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC)

NOTICE

REPRODUCTION BASIS

O

This document is covered by a signed "Reproduction Release(Blanket)" form (on file within the ERIC system), encompassing allor classes of documents from its source organization and, therefore,does not require a "Specific Document" Release form.

This document is Federally-funded, or carries its own permission toreproduce, or is otherwise in the public domain and, therefore, maybe reproduced by ERIC without a signed Reproduction Releaseform (either "Specific Document" or "Blanket").

42p.other security breaches mentioned were internal fights, muggings, drug dealing, physical...

Documents