41855132

Indian Political Science Association

THE PARTITION OF INDIA IN PERSPECTIVEAuthor(s): N. G. RajurkarSource: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 2 (APRIL-JUNE 1982), pp. 34-53Published by: Indian Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855132 .

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I. J. P. S. Vol. XLI1I No. 2

3

THE PARTITION OF INDIA IN PERSPECTIVE

-N. G. Rajurkar

Like Charles' head, the controversy in regard to the exact cause or causes that ted to India's partition, raises its head again and again. While some hold the British policy of 'divide and rule* in India primarily responsible for its ultimate division into two parts, others take the view that it was the so-called Congress Policy of 'Muslim appeasement' in India that finally led to India's vivisection. A few others put forward the argument that the tragedy of partition could have been averted if the Congress had been a little more responsive to the demands of the Mus- lim League. Then there are still others who vehemently declare that some major mistakes on the part of the Congress leaders as also some tactical errors on their part, ultimately led to a situation wherein partition of the country became inevitable. There are also quite a féw, who hold the opinion that the change in the attitude of one person vis-a-vis political objec- tives led to India's division- the person being Mohammed Ali Jinnah. These persons feel that the riddle of India's partition could be solved if we could decipher the reasons - tempermental, political or otherwise, that converted Jinnah the Nationalist, into Jinnah the Communalist. Then there are those (among muslims), who continue to hold the view that India's partition was in- herent in the situation and as much inevitable, since Muslims constitute a nation by themselves.

The views that the British policy of 'divide and rule' contributed in a considerable measure to India's partition, as also the one that the so-called Congress Policy of 'Muslim appeasement' was responsible for it, were so frequently put forward and by so many that they have become matters of common knowledge and as such need no elaborate mention. It is sufficient to state that most of the political parties1 considered Britain the villain of the piece to a greater or lesser extent, where as the Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu orgnis- ations pointed an accusing finger at the Congress for what they considered at its 'Muslim appeasément policy'. Thus, according to the leaders of these parties and organisations the.



partition of india 3§

tragedy of partition could have been avoided but for this suicidal policy of the Congress.

Paradoxically and ironically enough, some of those who have written books on the political aspect of the pre- Independence period in India, hold a view diametrically opposite to the one held by the Hindu-oriented political parties. As stated earlier, they feel that the Congress leaders went wrong ( specially in

1937), in not giving to the Muslim League what was its legitimate due, thereby hurting Jinnah's feelings. Kanji Dwarkadas, Frank Moraes and J. H. Sahani are among those writers who subscribe to this view. It would be revealing to the people with Hindu Mahasabha leanings (who accused the Congress of pro-Muslim policies) to know what Jinnah had stated while referring to the Congress leaders. During his talks with Lord Mountbatten (23rd April, 1 947, New Delhi), Jinnah said: "Frankly, your Excellency, the Hindus are impossible. They always want seventeen annas for the rupee.3" They would be equally surprised by George Abell's (Private Secretary to the Viceroy) comment

on what Jinnah said: "I have a feeling this is true. By and

large the Hindu's case is probably better than the Muslims', but they always spoil it by over-bidding.3"

Before I deal with other matters germane to the contro-

versy relating to India's partition, I would like to draw the

attention to a very important geographical or demographic

factor, which more often than goes un - noticed and but for it the question of partitioning the country would not have arisen. Though the country had Muslim minorities iñ different

parts, there were certain provinces in the North - East and

North - West of India which had Muslims in a majority. If this

had not been the case, neither Jinnah nor anyone else would

have been in a position to put forward a plea for the division of the country.

I suppose that it would be appropriate at this stage, to

trace those factors, which in later years led to the demand

for India's partition. That, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the great

19th century leader of the Indian Muslims, was the first person

to put forward the 'two nation theory' is too well known a

fact to need any proof or evidence. Like Mohammed Ali Jinnah

in later years, Syed also emerged on the political scene of

India as a leader speaking on behalf of the people of India



36 tHË INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

as a whole, and again, tike Jinnah, it was in later years that he began talking in a different language, metaphorically speaking. A speech that he delivered in 1883 was brimming to the full with nationalistic sentiments, as the passage quoted below would show. Sir Syed said: "Just as the high caste Hindus came and settled in this land once, forgot where their earlier home was and considered India to be their own country, the Musl- ims did exactly the same thing .... they also left there climes hundfeds of years ago and they also regard this land of India as their own . . . Both my Hindu brethern and my Muslim co- religionists breathe the same air, drink the water of the sacred Ganga and Jamuna, eat the products of the earth which God has

given to this country, live and die together ... I say with conviction that if we were to disregard for a moment our conception of Godhead then in all matters of everyday Hinuds and Muslims really belong to one nation, and the progress of the nation is possible only if we have a union of hearts, mutual sympathy and love.4"

If we ignore the factual inaccuracy in Sir Syed's speech about the Muslims having 'left their climes' (the over-whelming majority of them were converts from Hinduism), there is every- thing in that speech to reveal him as a nationalist to the very core. However, the very same Sir Syed, asked his co- religionists to keep away from the Indian National Congress, when that organisation was founded in 1885. In a speech that Sir Syed delivered at Lucknow on December 28th, 1887, the reasons for his advice to his co-religionists were clearly spelt out. He thought that the Congress could not represent the Hindus as well as the Muslims, as they were two different na- tions, though they might have many things in common. More over, he also stressed the fact that Muslirtfs would suffer at the hands of the Hindu majority if representative institutions were introduced in India, as advocated by the Congress. Finally, he asked his co-religionists to realize that it was in their best interests to depend on the British for their advancement.5 It is not necessary for the purposes of this article to go deeply into the causes that resulted in a basic change in Sir Syed's stand on political matters. It would be sufficient to state that he wanted the help of the British government in India to pro- mote western education among his co-religionists - a help which he knew would not be forthcoming if Muslims threw their weight with the Congress (which had lost Government favour after its



PARTITION OF INDIA 37

first two sessions) and his fear (perhaps instilled or nourished in his mind, by Theodre Beck-the first Principal of the M.A.O. College), in regard to the perpetual domination of the Muslims by the Hindus through representative institutions, because of their superior numerical strenth. Controversy apart, in regard to the precise reasons that brought about a change in Sir Syed's political stance, what is important to remember is that he vehemently advocated the two - nation theory and was thus 'the father of all that was to happen, ultimately, in Mohammed Ali Jinnah's mind.'6

Eight years after Sir Syed's passing away, that is, in 1 906, the All India Muslim League came into existence, its founder being Sultan Mohammed Shah Aga Khan. Some of the leaders of the Congress associated themselves with the League while still working in the Congress. At this distance of time and in retrospect it sounds very surprising that Mohammed Ali Jinnah was not even remotely connected with the League during the first few years of its life - in fact he was opposed to it as the League had demanded separate electorates for the Muslims, which according to Jinnah amounted to dividing the nation against itself. The future founder of Pakistan started associating himself with the League only from 1913 onwards - though he continued to work in the Congress. It was in that year that 'the attainment of the system of self- Government suitable to India", become yet another objective of the League, resulting in a

greater ideological affinity between the League and the Congress. Three years later, when both the parties held their respective sessions at Lucknow at the same time (December, 1916), a scheme of constitutional reforms was jointly adopted by the Congress and the League, which came to be known as the

Congress- League scheme.7

It was at this session that the Congress accepted the principle of separate electorates for the Muslims. Many have taken the view that one of the factors that contributed in a

great measure to the partition of India was that of separate electorates for the Muslims and that the Congress commited a

major mistake in lending its support to it at its Lucknow session of 1916. A careful examination of facts would show that there is not much substance in this charge levelled against the Congress.

It was on October 1, 1906, that a deputation of Muslims, led by Sultan Mohammed Shah Aga Khan, had met the then Viceroy of India-Lord Minto, at Simla. During that meeting the members of the depuation had pleaded for the grant of separate electorates for the Musliems and the Viceroy in his turn was quite



30 THE^ INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

happy to promise them what they desired. In fact, the British in India, consistent with their policy of 'divide and rule', secretly encouraged all such demands. This was how the separate electorates for Muslims became a part of the Indian Councils Act of 1909.

While passing a judgements over the Congress decision to accept separate electorates for the Muslims in 1916, we should not lose sight of the important fact that the separate electorates had already become a part of the Act of 1909 and that any attempt on the part of the Congress leaders to oppose them at that juncture would have alienated the Muslims further from the Congress; the British in their turn would then have exploited the situation by telling the Muslims that the Hindu - dominated Congress was opposing a concession given to them by the British on

their own request and on by grounds which the British considered

legitimate. Thus, the Congress leaders found themselves in a most un-enviable position, wherein they had to lend their support to separate electorates for the Muslims inspite of their awareness in regard to the dangers associated with it. Though, in retrospect, this decision of the Congress leaders appears as an improper one, I wonder as to whether things would have shaped any better if the Congress had opposed at that stage what was already a fait accompli.

The non - cooperation movement started by Gandhiji on the

Khilafat issue in 1920, served the purpose of bringing the Hindus

and the Muslims very close to each other, but only for a very short

time. The Hindu-Muslim unity was at its peak during this move-

ment-something that gave a fright to the British rulers of India, who had consistently formulated their policies in such a fashion as to keep the two communities apart. However, this unity proved to be an ephemeral one and the suspension of the movement by Gandhiji was followed by the Moplah massacre in Kerala and Communal riots

in other parts of the country. The reasons for this anti-climax were

many. The constant appeal to the religious sentiments of the Muslims by the leaders of the Khilafat Committee made them gradually more communal. Then there was the abolition of the Caliphate itself by the {Government headed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1924 - something that frustrated the Indian Muslims greatly and rendered them more communal still. I am saying more communal still, as the

separate electorates had already resulted in rousing communal sentiments among the Muslims and things had become worse because of the speeches of the Khilafat leaders. Thus, the efforts of the Mahatma to unite the Hindus and the Muslims through the Khilafat movement proved counter-productive.




Incidentally, it may be noted that the Khiiafat movement launched by Gandhiji is cited by many as an example of his policy of 'Muslim appeasement'. It is easy enough to come to that conclusion, but what is important to remember is, as already stated in the pre- vious paragraph, it was intended to be a counter strategy to that of the British (it does not however mean that Gandhiji's interest in the

Khiiafat issue was not genuine) and if it did not serve the

intended purpose, all that could be said against Gandhiji is that his calculations went wrong, Many people who think that

Tilak, un-like Gandhi, did not follow a policy of 'Muslim

appeasement' and greatly admire him on that count, are not

aware of the fact that the manifesto of the Congress Democ-

ratic Party (organized by Tilak to contest elections to legislative councils which were to be set up as per the Act of 1919)

incorporated the following sentence. "This Party supports the

claim of the Mahammedans for the solution of the Khiiafat

question according to Mohammedan dogmas and beliefs in the

tenets of the Koran.8 It is not too unreasonable to believe on the basis of the above quoted sentence that had Tilak been

alive, he would have lent his support to the Khiiafat movement

started by Gandhiji. Thus what Gandhiji did vis-a-vis the

Khiiafat issue should not be summarily dismissed as 'Muslim-

appeasement', pure and simple, and as Tilak, who was known for

his political realism, also held similar views.

It was during the non-cooperation movement that Jinnah left the Congress. Neither was he enamoured of Gandhiji as a person, nor could he approve of the techniques that were adopted by the

Congress, such as those of civil disobedience, non-cooperation, etc., because of Gandhiji's leadership. Jinnah, who was till then a

nationalist to the very core and who was described by no less a person than Sarojini Naidu as the 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity',

changed gradually since Gandhiji became the un-challenged leader of the freedom movement. He left the Congress to join the

League and after a few years started talking day in and day out about the 'two-nation theory', and finally emerged as the founder of a separate state for Muslims-Pakistani According to M.C. Chagla, the reasons for a change in Jinnah went much deeper than his disapproval of Gandhian political techniques or his personal allergy for the Mahatma. This is what he has to say about it in his autobiographical narrative, 'Roses in December', "Why did Jinnah



40 THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

change?" asks Chagla and comes out with his own explanation

himself, "There could be many possible explanations for this. Jinnah's besetting fault was his obsessive egoism. He had to be a leader, and the prime mover in whatever cause he worked. With the emergence of Gandhiji in Indian Politics, Jinnah felt that his importance would gradually diminish. Jinnah was the

complete anti-thesis of Gandhiji. While Gandhiji believed in

religion in abstract moral values, in non-violence, Jinnah only

believed in practioal politics. He could not possibly give up his faultlessly tailored suits and his high collars for the simple Khadi which Gandhiji wanted ....

"After he was dropped from the Third Round Table Conference Jinnah became convinced that if he had to have a

place, he would have to stand on communal platform. Jinnah's transformation really began when it seemed to him that he was

beginning to be considered as a man of little consequence so much so that he could not find a place in the Third Round Table Conference. Once he adopted the communal platform he drifted rapidly and came to a stop only when he reached the

pinnacle to become the leader of the communal party that the Muslim League ultimately became.''9

To attribute India's partition merely to the peculiarities of Jinnah's temperment would be over-simplifying facts. And it must be readily accepted that even M. C. Chagla does not try to explain India's vivisection in August, 1947, merely in terms of Jinnah's temperment and mental make-up. He is objective enough to criticise some of the decisions of the Congress which he considered wrong and which according to him should be taken into account while considering the question of India's

partition. It is not, however, necessary at this stage of discus- sion to consider Chagla's comments in regard to the tactical mistakes commited by the Congress. What is important to , remember is that Jinnah's nature and the peculiarities of his

temperment should not be lost sight of, not only while exploring the causes for his leaving the Congress, but also while analys- ing his subsequent actions and how he would possibly have reacted in a given hypothetical situation.

After leaving the Congress, Jinnah threw his lot with the League and became its President in 1924. About three years



PARTITION OF INDIA 4i

later, in March 1927, to be very precise, Jinnah pursuaded a number of Muslim leaders to agree to the giving up of

separate electorates, provided four conditions, as put forward by him, on behalf of the Muslims, were fulfilled. These conditions which came to be known as "Delhi Muslim proposals", were evidently considered reasonable by the Congress Working Committee, which accepted them on the whole, without delaying matters, The conditions were (1) Sind should be constituted into a separate province; (2) reforms should be introduced in the North-western Province and Baluchistan; (3) in

the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of the Muslim

representation should be in accordance with their population; and (4) in the Central Legislature the Muslim representation should not be less than one-third of the total.18 The decision

of the Congress Working Committee vis-a-vis the acceptance of

"Delhi Muslim Proposals" was endorsed by the All India

Congress Committee with some minor modifications and it was

accepted by the Congress when its session was held at Madras

in December, 1927. However, the All Parties Conference, con-

vened in early 1928, appointed a Committee to determine the

principles of Swaraj constitution for India. This Committee did not give its consent to these proposals, but made recommenda-

tions on differenr lines to solve the communal problem, through its report, which came to be known as the "Nehru Report." The Report was accepted at the convention of the All Parties

Conference, which was held at Culcutta in December, 1928.

The All Parties Convention was followed by an All Parties

Muslim Conference (engineered and encouraged by the British, who

were not happy at Jinnah.s readiness to give up seperate electo-

rates on certain conditions) in Delhi with Aga Khan as its President.

The Conference formulated a 13 point programme-covering a vide

range of Muslim demands. Jinnah realized immediately that the All

Parties Muslim Conference's 13 Point Programm endangered his

position as the principal protector of the Muslim interests and in utter

desperation decided to go one better then the Conference in cemm-

unalism, and called a meeting of the League. The League

passed a 14- Point Programme, which was an amalgamation of the demands of the League and those of the Muslim Conference.

Jinnah's efforts to outbid the Muslim Conference did not meet with




much success. As such' in a disappoined and frustrateed mood he decided in December, 1931 to bid good bye to India and settel in England. Jinnah spent three years in England, practising at the Privy Council, but was pursuaded by Liaquat Ali Khan (future first Prime Minister of Pakistan) to return to India. The Jinnah that returned to India in 1934 was a new Jinnah. determined to''embark on a career radically different from that he had followed in his earlier life"12

The Jinnah that emerged on the political scene of India in 1934, was Jinnah the master tactician. Rajendra Prasad, the then

President of the Congress, initiated talks with Jinnah at the inst- ance of M. A. Ansari, to arrive at some settlement with the Muslim

League Chief over the communal question. The talks failed. In the words of Rajendra Prasad they failed because; "His (Jinnah's) attitude had undergone a change, He wants the Muslim League to be accepted as the only representative of the Indian Muslims while he classified the Congress as a representative of the Hindus"13. The comment of D. P. Misra on the failure of talks serves as a key to the understanding of Jinnah's political tactice from that year onwards, till the year in which the country was partitioned. Misra says:

" The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the failure of these negotiations is that Jinnah wanted to talk but not to settle. Invitations to him to talk by Congress leaders added to his prestige and therefoer every invitation was welcome to him... he had decided even before the talks had started not to settle.14''

According to many16 noteworthy writers, the year in which the seeds of partition were really sown was the year 1937. It was in that year that popular ministries assumed office in the different provinces of British India, as per the Act of 1935. Most of these writers put forward the view that the Congress leaders infuriated Jinnah by the manner in which they handled the question of ministry formation in U. P. and Bombay. These writers take the view that had this question been tackled with tact and wisdom by the Congress leaders, Jinnah would not have become a bitter person, and in consequence the partition of India would not have taken place. They feel that Congrees-league coalition governments should have been formed in these provinces to avoid future complications and to win over Jinnah, but the Congress failed to do what was politically expedient and desirable.




According to Kanji Dwarkadas (one of those writers who are highly critical of what the Congress leaders did in 1937), Jinnah was infuriated by two happenings in 1937, these were -

1) the refusal of Nehru to include two Muslim League representatives in the U. P. ministry; and 2) the Chief Minister designate of Bombay - B. G. Kher, being taken to task by the Congress High Command, particularly by Sardar Patel, for having requested Jinnah to suggest the names of two Muslim Leaguers, who could be included in the Bombay Ministry. These two actions, according to Kanji Dwarkadas, were indicative of 'the arrogance and lack of foresight' of the Congress leaders. They repeated such mistakes in future also and in consequence the country had to be partitioned.16

Yet another important criticism against Congress leaders vis-a-vis what happened in U. P. in 1937 is that they insisted on the elected Muslim League members signing the Congress pledge, as a pre-condition to the formation of a coalition government.17

The validity of the criticism levelled against the Congress leaders should firstly be examined in the context of the results of the elections that took place in February, 1937. Of the 1,585 seats (in the eleven provinces of British India), the Congress won 711 seats. As for separate Muslim constituencies, the Congress contested only 58 seats out of 482 and won 26. In five of the eleven provinces, the Congress secured an absolute majority and was the largest party in three others.18 On the whole, the Congress did very well at the polls, though it fared badly in so far as the seats that were reserved for the Muslims were concerned.

The Muslim League record in terms of seats obtained in various provincial assemblies was far from impressive. It could secure only 51 of the total of 482 seats, reserved for the Muslims in provincial assemblies. In terms of votes, the Muslim League could secure

just 4.8 percent of the total ^Muslim votes. Moreover, the Muslim League did not succeed in obtaining a majority of seats in any of the four Muslim majority provinces. The election results made it quite clear that in British India as a whole, the Muslim League had little

support, though it'had done rather well in U.P. and Bombay, where it secured 27 out of 64 and 20 out of 29 reserved Muslim seats res-

pectively. However, in terms of the totality of results, the Congress leaders could not be blamed for taking the view that they need not bend backwards in order to get the cooperation of the League, even in U.P. and Bombay. Now let us examine the criticism vis-vis the refusal of Nehru to include two Muslim League members in the U. P.

ministry. It is surprising to note that the U.P. ministry was to consist of only seven members, out of which the League wanted a share of two.



44 tHE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

According to Maulana Azad, the leaders of the Muslim League in U.P. - Chaudhari Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan, expected 'some share' in the new Government. However, states Maulana, "the local position was such that neither of them could enter the Government alone. Either both would have to be taken or neither."19 He held out hopes to them that both would be taken but Nehru took a stand to the effect that only one could be included in the Ministry and it was for the Muslim League to decide as to who should be included. According to Maulana this was a very un-wise move on the part of Nehru of which, "Mr. Jinnah took full advantage. ..and started an offensive which led to Pakistan."30

From what has been stated above, it should become clear that the demand for two seats in the Ministry was not based on considerations of fair representation, but on those of some internal problems which the League was facing. This in turn would mean that but for this difficulty the Muslim League would not have had any objection to only one of the members being included in the Ministry. If that be so, why should the Congress or Nehru for that matter be blamed for the League's inability to choose one of the two for the representation in the Ministry.

It may also be remembered in this connection that out of the six members of the Congress Ministry which eventually came to to power, two were Muslims. This was by any standards a fair representation in the Ministry to the Muslim community, unless one accepted the extraordinary claim of Jinnah that only the members of the Muslim League could be the true representatives of the Muslim community.

The most appropriate way of looking at the happenings in U. P. and Bombay, is the one of looking at them in the context of the overall League strategy and tactics and not in isolation. Shocked by the election reverses, Jinnah became acutely aware of the fact that the only way of strengthening the Muslim League was the one of rousing the religious passions of the Muslims. It is safe to infer on the basis of the permanently negative attitude31 that Jinnah adopted, specially since his return from England, that even if coalition ministries had been formed in U. P. and Bombay, they would not have survived for long, as Jinnah's men would have come out of their respective ministries by precipitating some crisis, with the avo- wed inteniton of bringing further notoriety to the Congress as an organisation opposed to Muslim interests. It is instructive to remember in this connection that even the Congress resolution of October 1937, which reiterated its attitude towards Minorities and funda- mental rights, left Jinnah completely cold and un-moved.




To sum up in the words of D.P. Mishra. "The Muslim League having been utterly rejected in the elections except in Bombay and U.P. and Jinnah having no base for his operations, found that he and his Muslim League would be left high and dry in the provincial ministries about to be formed all over India under the new Government of India Act. He had expected that the Congress would not be able to sweep the polls and in the Hindu majority provinces it would need the League's co-operation to capture power. In short, he had tried to capture as many Muslim seats as possible in these provinces with a view to playing the same decisive role in them as he had been playing in the central assembly since 1923. Although his calculations had miscarried, yet he tried to bargain for position in U.P. and Bombay by putting forward the idea of a "united front". When the Congress did not fall into his trap he got furious and he and his friends, started propagating that the Congress spurned his cooperation because the election results had intoxicated its leaders. If Jawaharlal in U. P. and Sardar in Bombay had allowed Jinnah's men to enter the ministries formed in these provinces, the Congress high command would have had a fore-taste of the ugly situation that arose in 1946-47 in the interim government formed by Jawaharlal."83

From 1937 onwards, till the Congress Ministries resigned from office in 1939, Jinnah was solely occupied with the work of levelling bogus charges against the Congress Ministries regarding the ill- treatment of the Muslims and injustices done to them, as also with

rousing their religious sentiments in different ways. The Congress by that time had commited itself (through various resolutions) to the

protection of the rights of Muslims vis-a-vis political, religious, social and cultural matters and had even swallowed the bitter pill of Mac Donald Award. Further, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the then Presi- dent of the Congress had agreed in his negotiations with Jinnah to reserve seats for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal. All that was left for Jinnah after that was to adopt purely negative tactics of criticising the Congress all the time and yet not spelling out the details in regard to then ature of his demands. Sincc he had nothing really to specify in terms of demands, he insisted on the

League being recognized as the only representative of the Muslims, as a pre-condition to any negotiations with the Congress. The Con- gress very rightly and understandably refused to accept this pre-condition and the stalemate continued.

The Second World War that began in Europe in September, 1939, profoundly influenced the political situation in India. The British Government declared India to be a belligerent country without consulting either the Central Assembly or for that matter the Provin- cial Governments. As a consequence to this, a long statement was




issued by the Congress Working Committee, through which the Bri- tish Government was asked to explain their war aims, more particularly vis-a-vis, British imperialism. Did the British "Recognize the independence of India and her right to frame her own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly ? What immediate steps would be taken to introduce popular control of the Central Government ? Later in order to meet every possible objection of any minority group, the idea behind the Constituent Assembly was further amplified. It was stated that the minority claims would be settled in this Assembly with the consent of the minority concerned, and not by a majority vote. If such agreement was not possible in regard to any issue, then this was to be referred toan important tribunal for final decision. This was an unsafe proposal from a democratic point of view but the Congress was prepared to go almost any length in order to allay the suspicions of minorities."83

The response of the the British Government to the statement of the Congress Working Committee left no doubt about the fact that they were neither prepared to spell out their war aims nor were they ready to hand over the control of the Government to the representatives of the people. As such, the Congress Ministries, resigned, as they were not agreeable to lend their co-operation on theseterms in the prosecution of the war.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the Congress statement was exceedingly fair to the minorities, and Jinnah could not have

possibly asked for a better assurance, but then, by that time, Jinnah's mind was moving in another direcrion.

Some eminent men hold the view that the Congress made a big tactical mistake in asking its Ministries to resign at the commencement of the Second World War. They argue that this ill- advised step gave the opportunity to the League to strengthen its position greatly, and in this they were helped and encouraged by the British. It is certainly true that the League increased its strength immeasureably during the war period, when the top Congress leaders were behind prison bars and when the younger leaders of the Congress were busy in leading and guiding the underground movement, which came to be known as the quit India Movement. However, it is not easy to see as tP how the Congress Ministries would have found it possible to remain in office and extend their hand of co-operation to the British in their war efforts, when the latter had not agreed to any of the Congress demands.

The resolution demanding a separate state for the Muslims, that is, Pakistan, was passed at the historic Lahore session of the




Muslim League, in 1940. However, the idea of India's partition took birth in 1930, through Sir Mohammed Iqbal's Presidential address at the session of the Muslim League. Iqbal put forward the view that the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan should constitute a single state.34 It may be that what Iqbal had in his mind was not a separate sovereign state for the Muslims but a single unit of North-West areas, constituting an integral part of an All-India federation.25 A direct suggestion in regard to the partition of the country, however, came in January 1933, through a leaflet circulated privately by a few young Indians (Muslims) in England entitled, 'Now or Never'. The authors declared that India was not the name of one single country nor was it the home of one single nation. It was, in fact, the name given to a state created for the first time in history by the British .."our national customs and calen- ders, even our diet and dress are different... (we) demand the reco- gnition of a separate national status."36

At the Madras Session of the Muslim League in 1941, Jinnah reiterated the idea of a separate state for the Muslims, incorporated in the Lahore resolution. He stated very categorically that the Muslim League would not rest till the goal of a completely independent state . for Indian Muslims was reached. That State, according to Jinnah, was to be in the North-West and Eastern Zones of India.37

It is interesting to remember as to what Jinnah the protector of the interests of the Indian Muslims had to say about the Muslims that would be left behind behind in India after partition. To quote M.C. Chagla : "It is absurd to think of a home for the Muslims, when as many as 60 million Muslims were left behind in India. I remember once asking Jinnah : You are fighting for Pakistan mainly in the interest of the Muslim majoity states, But what happens to the Muslims in the States particulary like Uttar Pradesh where they are in a small minority? I will never forget the answer he gave me. He looked at me for a while and said: 'They will look after themselves. I am not interested in their fate.'28

While Jinnah aimed at Pakistan, he was hardly sure of getting it in view of the very strong Congress opposition to it. As such, he was mentally prepared to settle for something less than Pakistan, inspite of the fact the League had consolidated its position immensely during the the war period (because of British Patronage, encourage- ment and active help, as also because of the absence of the Congress leaders from the political scene) and notwithstanding the good per- formance of League during the 1945 General Elections. The League, it may be remembered, succeeded in capturing almost all the Muslim seats in the Central as well as Provincial Legislatures with the excep- tion of the North-West Frontier Province. It was also able to from Ministries in Bengal and Sind-though its majority in the latter was precarious.




Jinnah, the shrewd and clever tactician, gave his support to the Wavell plan at Simla in May, 1946, but surprised everybody by changing his mind the very next day. Referring to theis incident, Durga Das says : "I asked him (Jinnah) why he had spurned the Wavell plan when he had won his point of parity for the League with the Congress, His reply stunned me for a moment. 'Am I a fool to accept this when I am offered Pakistan on a platter.®9 In this connection, Durga Das also states that Jinnah, who was about to make an announcement indicating his acceptance of the Wavell Plan, changed his mind because of the message that he received from some British Civil servants and those in England who were hostile to the Indian aspirations.30 It may be remembered in this connection that Winston Churchill was Britain's Prime Minister at that time. Jinnah's rejection of the Wavell pin points the fact that the British also were responsible from time to time in preventing a settlement among the Indian political parties.

Jinnah's determination in the subsequnt months to have Paki- stan at any cost is attributed by many, including Maulana Azad, to what Nehru had stated at a Press Conference in Bombay on July 10, 1946. Azad in his book India wins Freedom, refers to that Press Conference as "one of those unfortunate event which changed the course of history."31 Nehru who was pleading for a sovereign constituent Assembly to decide India's future since a decade earlier asserted emphatically at the Press Conference that the "Constituent Assembly would never accept any dictation or any other directive from the British Government."33 This assertion, as D.P. Mishra rightly points out, "had nothing to do with the Muslim League, which was to be a part of this body and could easily have joined its voice in support of what Nehru was saying."33 The sovereign status of the Constituent Assembly was subject to two limitation» as per the Cabinet Mission, they being tha problem of minorities and a treaty between England and India and Nehru clearly accepted that position at the Press Conference. In so far as Nehru's observations on grouping of provinces in sections were concerned, "he was only giving uttera nee to what the Congress Working Committee had itself decided by its resolution of 25th June that it would stick to its own interpretation of paras 15 and 19 of the Cabinet Mission's statement."34 It is as such not easy to comprehend as to what the Maulana had in his mind when he criticised Nehru's Press statement of July 10, 1946.

The traumatic experiences of Nehru and Patel in the Interim Government (1946) gradually made them painfully aware of the fact that the partition of India was possibly the only way out of the situation, that was created by Jinnah and his followers. Without going into the details in regard to the difficulties and annoyances that the Congress leaders had to put up with (in the Interim Government)




cause of a "mental alliance between the League and senior British officials"35 as Nehru put it, and without expatiating upon the communal frenzy let loose by Jinnah in the country, the political trend in the country made the Congress leaders wonder as to whether there was any point in sticking to the idea of keeping the political integrity of the country in tact. Referring to the period when he functioned as the Vice-President of the Interim Government, Nehru stated (in the context of how be had colleagues started thinking in term s of

partition), "I think the real facts were the situation itself and the bitterness and conflicts that were growing in the communal field and the feeling that even if some arrangement could be arrived at to prevent partition, those contlicts and inner disruptions would continue and might come in the way of any marked progress of the economy of the country later... this overwhelming sensation that any kind of union, if it came about, would first of all not put an end to these inner pulls, secondly, it would leave the Federal Government so weak-with the transfer of power to its various constituent units- the central Federation would be so weak that it would not be able to act properly or adopt any effective measures. These were the real reasons which ultimately induced us to agree (to partition)."35

In terms of partition, the last straw that broke the camel's back as the expression goes, was the historic statement of clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, on February 20, 1947, in the House of Commons. To prevent the partition of the country thereafter was almost an impossibility. In that statement, Attlee

gave expression to the firm decision of the British Government to transfer power into Indian hands not later than June, 1948, irres-

pective of the fact as to whether any agreement was reached among the political parties of India or not. In the absence of any settlement by that time, stated Attlee, the British Government would "have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over, on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India, or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people".37

The political condition in India during that period had become highly explosive. The only alternatives after Attlee's statement were Pakistan or chaos. Lord Ismay, who had accompanied Lord Mountbatten to India, likened the political situation in India at that time to that of *'a ship in mid-ocean with a fire on the deck and ammunition in the hold".38 Whatever little hope or desire the Congress leaders had of avoiding partition became almost extinct after Attlee's announcement. In the words of H.V. Hudson, "the creation of Pakistan (was) implicitly written in the statement of




20th February. In the context of Indian Politics it (was) thus an open license for Pakistan in some form or other".39 According toCompbell- Johnson, Patel was thè first amongst the Congress leaders to realize that Attlee's statement of 20th February, implied the partition of the country.40

The resolution that was passed by the Congress Working Committee on 2nd March, 1947, demanding the partition of the Punjab into Muslim-majority and Hindu-majority zones was clearly indicative of the fact that the Congress High Commandwere getting prepared for the partition of the country. In his letter to Gandhiji, Nehru, spelled out the details in regard to the factors that prompted the Congress Working Committee to pass the resolution demanding the partition of the Punjab and stated : Indeed, this is the only answer to partition as demanded by Jinnah."41 Patel too wrote a letter to Gandhiji, through which he assured the Mahatma that the resolution, "was adopted after the deepest deliberation."4' Incide- ntally, I may state for the information of such of those who hold the view that Nehru agreed to partition because of Lady Mount- batten's influence on him, that the Punjab resolution signalling the preparedness of the Congress leaders to accept partition was passed twenty days before lady Mountbatten arrived in India along with her husband.43

The popular belief that Gandhiji opposed the idea of India's partition till the very and is hot supported by facts. He had Opposed it during the meeting of the Congress working Committee, but when the All-India Congress Committee met at Bombay on 14th June, 1947, Gandhiji told the members that, ''they would be ill-advised to throw out or amend the Working Committee's resolution on partition."44 The fact that even Gandhiji had to reconcile himself to the idea of the partition of the country, inspite of his acute opposition to it earlier, indicates as to how severe was the compulsion of events and how dire the overall situation.

In conclusion, I may state that the partition of India was a result of a highly complex political situation that had developed in India and as such cannot and should not be attributed to the operation of one single factor or, for that matter, to a particular policy or décision of any party or even to the utterances and pronouncements of individuals or any individual. As I had stated carwe the question of India's partition would just not have risen but for the geographical or demographic factor of the existence of Muslim majority provinces in the Northern part of British India. Similarly, it has to be borne in mind that religion has always been a very strong binding factor amongst the Muslims and has created in them a feeling of identity as a social group - a feeling that Jinnah exploited to the utmost after 1937. In all fairness to the Congress




leaders, it should be pointed out that they did their best to remove from the minds of the Indian Muslims those legitimate fears and apprehensions that are natural and understandable in the members of any minority group. In fact, sometimes, while meeting Muslim demands, they went a little farther than was strictly necessary in terms of justice and fairplay, primarily because the British were making a constant endeavour to create dissensions amongst the Hindus and the Muslims (in order to perpetuate their rule), and that had to be effectively check-mated. A change in Jinnah's attitude vis-a-vis Indian politics, for reasons psychological, political or otherwise, played a very important role in bringing about the partition of the country, as he was in a class by himself in statecraft, and if and when he was in a mood for settlement (which was on very few occasions) the British were always there to prevent it. Jinnah, by his permanently negative attitude (particularly after his return from England in 1 934,) not only exasperated the Congress leaders, but also succeeded in creating an essentially false impre- ssion that they were antagonizing the Muslims by their unfair attitude towards them. While the agonizing experiences of the

Congress leaders in the Interim Government created in them the overwhelming feeling that they better accept partition and have an

independent India with a strong centre, Attlee's statement of

February 20, 1947, killed whatever little hope there was of avoiding the partition of the country. I shall end my article by reproducing the

concluding part of the reply given by Nehru to a question that was put to him in a Press Conference, vis-a-vis Azad's criticism of his (Nehru's) statement of July 10, 1946, because in a way it sums up what I have tried to convey through this article. " I would say this", said Nehru, "that Maulana Sahib thinks too much in individual terms, sometimes, and not in terms of historic forces at work. Individuals make a difference and have made a difference but sometimes individuals are only symbols of forces at work."45



52 THE INDIAN JOURNAL ÓF POLITICAL SČIÉNČÉ

NOTÉS & REFERENCES

1. There is ample proof to show that the British in India not only embarked upon a policy of 'divide and rule' but also prevented many a political settlement by subtle secret manoeuvres.

2. Alan Compbell - Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, Robert Hale Limited, London, 1951, P. 70.

3. Ibid., Loc. cit.

4. Quoted by Dr. V. P. Varma in his book Modern Indian Political Thought, Second Edition, Agra, 1964, P. 413.

5. S. Abid Hussain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims , Bombay, 1965, P. 155.

6. Hector Bolitho, Jinnah, London, 1954, P. 381.

7. Sarojini Naidu, who was present at the historic Lucknow session of the Congress, made a pun on the word Lucknow, to give expression to her joy at the agreement between the Congress and the League. "We are", said Sarojini Naidu, "at Lucknow"/

8. Quoted by J. P. Suda in his book Main Currents of Social and Political Thought of Modern India, Vol. I, Meerut, 1963, P. 431.

9. M. C. Chagla, Roses in December , Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1974, P.79.

10. Based on an account given by D. P. Mishra in his book Living an Era , Vol. I, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1975, P. 124.

11. Pandit Motilal Nehru was the Chairman of this Committee.

12. Khalid B. Sayeed, as quoted by D. P. Mishra in his book Living an £ra. Vol. I( PP.247 -48.

13. Ibid., PP. 248-49.

14. Ibid., PP. 249.

15. Beni Prasad, Durga Das, Frank Maraes, Kanji Dwarkadas J. H. Sahani and many others subscribe to this view.

16. Kanji Dwarakadas, India's Fight for freedom, 1913-1937, Bombay, 1966, PP466- 467.

17. M. C. Chagla, Roses in December, P.82.

18. The Congress success was in fact more impressive than what the figures indicate, because only 657 out of 1585 were 'General' or open seats.

19. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Bombay, 1959, PP 160-61.

20. Ibid., P. 161.

21. In one of his talks with Lord Mountbaten, Nehuru attributed the tremendous success of Jinnah in later years to his capacity to take a 'permanently negative attitude'. Jinnah, according to Nehru, did that with a singlenss of purpose ever since 1935. Allen compbell - Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, P. 44.




22. D. P. Mishra, Living an Era , Vol. I, P.250.

23. Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography. London, 1953, P. 608.

24. As for Iqbal's advocacy of a separate state for the Muslims, this is what Nehru has to say in his Discovery of India- He writes: ' Edward Thomson has written that, in the course of a conversation, Iqbal told him that he had advocated Pakistan because of his position as the President of the Muslim League Session, but he felt sure that it would be injurious to India as a whole and to Muslims specially. Probably, he had changed his mind, or he had not given much thought to the question previously, as it had assumed no importance then. His whole outlook ? life does not fit in with subsequent developments of Pakistan or divison of India". Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India, Signet Press. Calcutta, Fourth Printing, September. 1948, P.293.

25. Presidential Address, All India Muslim League, Allahabad Session, December 1930, Delhi, 1945, Edition, P.12.

26, R. Coupland, The Indian Problem (1836 - 1942), Printed in Great Britain, P. 199.

27. F. Akhtar, The March of a Nation ; A Collection of the most important speeches of Qaid-i-Azam, M. A. Jinnah, P.101.

28. M. C. Chagla, Roses in December, P.81.

29. Durga Das, India From Curzon to Nehru and After, London, 1969, P.216.

30. Ibid., Loc. cit.

31 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Bombay, 1959, P. 181.

32. D. P. Mishra, Living an Era, Vol. II, P.513. 33. Ibid., Loc. cit.

34. Ibid,, PP 513-14.

35. Ibid., P.535.

36. Dorothy Norman, Nehru, The First Sixty Years , Vol. II, Asia Publishing House, 1965, P. 240.

37. Allen Campbell - Johnson. Mission with Mountbatten, P.22. 38. Ibid., P.354.

39. H.V.Hudson, The Great Divide, London, 1969, PP.200 & 203.

40. Allen Compbell - Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten , P.1 1 7.

41. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi - The Last Phase, Vol. II, Ahmedabad, 1958, P.34¿;

42. Ibid., P.35.

43. The Mountbattens arrived in India on 22nd March, 1947„

44. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi - The Last Phase, Vol. II, P.251.

45. Dorothy Norman, Nfehru. The First S ¡xty Years , Vol. II P.241.



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