41751243 richard natkiel atlas of the world war ii (1)

7/29/2019 41751243 Richard Natkiel Atlas of the World War II (1)

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Page 1: Occupying German troops march

past the Arc de Triomphe, Paris, 1940.

Page 2-3: Italian troops on the Eastern

Front, 1942.

This page: US Marines at Iwo Jima plot

the position of a Japanese machine gun

post, February 1945.

Copyright 1985 Brompton Books Corp

This edition published by Barnes & Noble, Inc.,

by arrangement with Brompton Books Corp.

2000 Barnes & Noble Books

All rights reserved. No part of this publication

may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system or transmitted in any form by any

means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying

or otherwise, without first obtaining written

permission of the copyright owner.

Printed in China

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publicatio n Data

Natkiel, Richard.

Atlas of World War II.


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Contents

Introduction 6Blitzkrieg 10The War in Northern Waters 32The Desert War and the Mediterranean 42

Soviet Ambitions Betrayed 64The Course of Global Conflict: 1939-45 78The Japanese Juggernaut 96The Italian Campaign 108Ebb Tide in the Pacific 120Retaking Burma: The Forgotten War 138Russia Finds Its Strength 148Fortress Europe Overthrown 166Index 190


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IntroductionIt has often been stated that World War II

was part of a European Civil War thatbegan in 1914 at the start of World War I.This is partly true. In Europe, at least,the two world wars were the two hideoushalves of the Anglo-German controversythat was at the heart of both conflicts.The question posed was: would Britain beable, or willing, to maintain her vastEmpire in the face of German hegemonyon the continent of Europe? The answerto that question never came. Britain, inseeking to thwart German interests onthe Continen t, eventually lost her wholeEmpire in the attempt -an empire thatbetween the wars encompassed a quarter

of the earth's surface and an equal pro-portion of its population. Put into thatcontext, both world wars were dangerousfor Britain to fight, jeopardizing the veryexistence of the Empire and inevitablyweakening the mother country to thepoint that she could not maintain herworld position at the end of the conflicts.

From Germany's point of view, thewars were not only dangerous in thatthey finally ruined virtually every townand city, devastated the countryside anddismembered the nation; they wereirrelevant. In 1890 Germany was in a

position from which, within a generation,she would economically dominate thewhole of Europe. Inevitably, with thateconomic hegemony, political hegemonywould soon follow, if not even precede. By1910 the process was well in train; had noone done anyth ing to stop her, Germanywould have ach ieved the Kaiser's dreamswithout war by the mid 1920s. The col-lapse of Imperial Germany in 1918, fol-lowed by temporary occupation, inflationand national humiliation, set Germanyback only a few years. Despite the disas-ters of World War I and its aftermath,Germany was qu ickly recovering her old

position - roughly that of 1910 - by thetime Hitler took power in 1933. By 1938German power in Europe was greaterthan ever before, and Britain had to facethe old question once again. Could shecondone German political dominance ofthe Continent?

In 1938 some Conservatives, likeChamberlain and Halifax, recognized thethreat and were tacitly willing to main-tain the Imperial status quo and condoneHitler. Other Tories, like Churchill andthe Labour and Liberal Parties, wantedto challenge Germany again. Had Hitlerbeen a bit more discreet and less hurried,

perhaps a bit less flamboyant and


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Below: Dunkirk, scene of an ignominiousretreat by Allied forces that signaled the

Fall of France.

virulently anti-Semitic, Chamberlain's

policy might have succeeded. Germanywould have extended her power inEurope and the Empire would have beenmaintained. But that was to ask the im-possible, to wish that Hitler were some-one other than Hitler. The result -humiliation of Britain's policy whenCzechoslovakia was overrun in March1939 - forced even Chamberlain's hand,and the stage was set for round two of theEuropean Civil War.

World War II in Europe was very like aGreek tragedy, wherein the elements ofdisaster are present before the play be-gins, and the tragedy is writ all the larger

because of the disaster's inevitability.The story of the war, told through themaps of Richard Natkiel in this volume,are signposts for the historian of humanfolly. In the end, Germany and Italy weredestroyed, along with much of Europe.With the devastation came the inevitablecollapse of both the impoverished BritishEmpire and centuries of Europeanhegemony in the world. A broader lookfrom the perspective of the 1980s wouldindicate a further irony. Despite Ger-many's loss of part of its Polish and Rus-sian territory and its division into twocountries, not to mention the separation

of Austria from the Reich and the semi-permanent occupation of Berlin, the Ger-man economic advance was only delayed,not permanently stopped. The FederalRepublic is clearly the strongest economyin Western Europe today and the fourthstrongest in the world. The GermanDemocratic Republic rates twelfth onthis basis. Together their economies areroughly as strong as that of the SovietUnion, and their political reunification isnow less of a dream, more of a realitytoward which Germans on both sides ofthe Iron Curtain are striving. One day,probably within the next two decades, aform of unification may take place, andwhen it does, German power on the Con-tinent will be greater than ever before.No wonder the Soviets and many West-ern Europeans view this prospect withfear and cynicism. What had the worldwars been for? For what ideals had theblood of tens of millions been spilt?

The irony of World War II becomeseven clearer when one views briefly itssecond half, the struggle between Japanand the United States for control of thePacific. The question facing AmericanPresidents from Theodore Roosevelt to

Franklin Roosevelt had been: could the


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Left: The successfu l Russian defense ofStalingrad was a m ajor setback toGerman war plans.Below: Japanese tanks pass a wrecke dBritish ambulance inBurma, 1942.

United States maintain its security andtrade routes in the Pacific in the face of anincreasingly powerful Japanese Navyand economy? For decades the questionwas begged, until the Japanese took mat-ters into their own hands at Pearl Har-bor, the Philippines, Vietnam andMalaya in 1941. The ensuing tragedy, asinevitable in the Pacific as was its coun-terpart in Europe, became obviousalmost from the outset. Millions died invain; Japan itself was devastated by fireand atomic bombs, and eventually con-ceded defeat.

From a forty-year perspective, whatwas the point of the Pacific War? Japanhas the third largest economy in theworld and by far the largest in Asia. Inrecent years the United States hasactually encouraged Japan to flex itspolitical muscles, increase its armedforces and help the United States policethe Western Pacific. It would seem thatthis conflict was as tragically futile as the

European Civil War.

The greatest disaster in the history ofmankind to date was World War II. Thisatlas is a valuable reference work forthose who feel it bears remembering.Clearly, this is the case, but the lessons ofthe war have been less clearly spelled out- to those who fought in it, who rememberit, or who suffered from it, as well as tosubsequent generations who were shapedby it and fascinated by its horrific drama.The exceptional maps of Richard Natkielof The Economist, which punctuate thisvolume, can give only the ou tlines of thetragedy; they do not seek to give, nor canthey give, the lessons to be learned.

It would seem that if anything useful isto be derived from studying World W ar II,it is this: avoid such conflicts at all costs.No nation can profit from them. This iscertainly truer today than if these wordshad been written in 1945. The advancesof science have made a future world con-flict even less appetizing to those who arestill mad enough to contemplate such a

thing.

Perhaps the balance of the 20th centuryand the early years of the 21st will bevery like the past 40 years: small con-flicts, limited wars, brinkmanship, armsraces and world tension - yes; generalwar, no. If our future takes this course,the period following World War II may beseen by historia ns of the 21st century as atime similar to the century follo wing theNapo leonic W ars - one of growing worldprosperity, wh ich has indeed been appa-rent for some nations since 1945, manycrises, but no all-out war. If that is ourfuture, as it has been our recent past, thestudy of World War II will have beenmore than useful. It will have preparedthe world psychologically to avoid worldconflict at all cost. In that event, for thesake of a relatively stable, increasinglyprosperous 'cold peace,' the 1939-45 con-flict will not have been in vain. If war isthe price for a bloodstained peace, thosewho will benefit are ourselves and futu regenerations.

S L Mayer


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The SwastikaAscendant

The German humiliation at Versail-

les was skillfully exploited byAdolf Hitler and his Nazis, who

rode to power in 1933 on a tide of nationalresentment that they had channeled totheir purpose. The territorial losses, eco-nomic hardships and affronts to Germanpride embodied in the Treaty of Versail-les virtually guaranteed the conflict thatescalated into World War II. As MarshalFoch had prophesied when the treaty wasforced upon a prostrate Germany: 'This isnot Peace. It is an Armistice for twentyyears.'

Hitler's stormy career seemed to reachits zenith when he seized control of theGerman Government in March of 1933.In fact, it was only beginning. Hitler im-

plemented a military buildup in defiance

of the Versailles Treaty, which had li-mited German arm ed forces to an army of100,000 and a small navy without armoror air force support. G roundwork was laidfor a much larger army to be built up byconscription upon a highly trained pro-fessional base organized by GeneralHans von Seeckt. The prohibited tanksand planes were developed secretly,many in the Soviet Union, and futurepilots were trained. Meanwhile, theNazis continued to scapegoat the Jewsand other minorities for the nation'sproblems; they established the first con-centration camp at Dachau in the sameyear they came to power.

Germany withdrew from the League of


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Previous page: German blitzkrieg(lightning war) tactics were expertlyexecuted by their highly trained troops.Below left: Germany's expan sio n byAugust 1939.Bottom le ft: De tail showing the re centlyannexed Rhineland and Sudetenland.Below: The Nu remberg Rally in 1934,with Adolf Hitler (center).

Nations, and by 1935 Hitler couldannounce repudiation of the Treaty ofVersailles. He told the world that theGerman Air Force had been re-created,

and that the army would be strengthenedto 300,000 through compulsory militaryservice. The Western democracies,France and Britain, failed to make anymeaningful protest, a weakness that en-couraged Hitler's ambition to restoreGermany to her 'rightful place' asEurope's most powerful nation.

Nazi Germany's first overt movebeyond her borders was into the Rhine-land, which was reoccupied in 1936. Thiscoup was achieved more through bravadothan by superior force. Hitler's generalshad counseled against it on account of therelative size of France's army, but the

reoccupation was uncontested. The next

step was to brin g all Germans liv ing out-side the Reich into the 'Greater Ger-many.' Austria was annexed in March1938, with only token protests from Bri-

tain and France. Even more ominous wasHitler's demand that Czechoslovakiaturn over its western border - the Su-detenland on ground tha t its three mil-lion German-speaking inhabitants wereoppressed. The Nazis orchestrated a de-mand for annexation among the SudetenGermans, and the Czechoslovakian Gov-ernment prepared to muster its strongarmed forces for resistance. Then BritishPrime Minister Neville Chamberlainflew to Munich to confer with Hitler.

Chamberlain rationalized that theproblem was one affecting CentralEurope alone, and expressed reluctance

to risk war on behalf of 'a far-off country

of which we know little.' France had tostand by its alliance w ith Britain, and theCzechoslovakian democracy was isolatedin a rising sea of German expansionism.

The Sudetenland, with its vital frontierdefenses, was handed over. Far fromsecuring 'peace in our time,' as NevilleCham ber l a in had p rom ised a f t e rMun ich , this concession opened the doorto Nazi occupation of all Czechoslovak iain March 1939'.

Only at this point did the Westerndemocracies grasp the true scope of Hit-ler's ambitions. Belatedly , they began torearm after years of war-weary stasis. Bynow Hitler's forces were more than equalto theirs, and the Fhrer was lookingeastward, where Poland's Danzig Corri-dor stood between him and East Prussia,

the birthplace of German militarism.


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14

The Partition ofPoland

France and Britain tried to forestall

the Nazi assault on Poland byissuing a joint guarantee to thethreatened nation. This was supposed toprovide leverage whereby the democra-cies could persuade the Poles to makeconcessions similar to those made by theCzechs. But Hitler's aggressiveness grewmore apparent throughout the springand summer of 1939. In April he revokedboth the German-Polish Non-AggressionPact and the Anglo-German NavalAgreement of 1935. Then he sent emis-saries to the Soviet Union, whereJoachim von Ribbentrop concluded bothan economic agreement and a Non-

Aggression Pact with Josef Stalin. By 1September 1939, the Germans wereready to invade Poland on two fronts intheir first demonstration of blitzkrieg -lightning war - a strategy that combinedsurprise, speed and terror. It took Ger-man forces just 18 days to conquer Po-land , which had no chance to complete itsmobi lization. The Poles had a bare dozencavalry brigades and a few light tanks tosend against nine armored divisions. Atotal of five German armies took part inthe assault, and German superiority inartillery and infantry was at least threeto one. The Polish Air Force was almostentirely destroyed on the ground by theLuftwaffe offensive supporting ArmyGroups North and South.

Abo ve righ t: The Nazi thrust into Poland,early September.

Right : Russia counterattacks , mid to lateSeptember.

Below: The part ition of Polan d as agreedby Germany and R ussia.


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Below: German troops en ter Warsaw. T hecity finally surrendered on 27 Septemberafter 56 hours of resistance a gainst airand a rtillery attack.

L 5

Thinly spread Polish troops staggered

back from their border, and Germanforces were approaching Warsaw a weeklater. The Poles made a last-ditch effortalong the Bzura River to halt the Germanadvance against their capital, but theycould not withstand the forces pittedagainst them. The Polish Governmentfled to Rumania, and on 27 SeptemberWarsaw finally capitulated.

Meanwhile, Britain and France haddeclared war on Germany 48 hours after

the invasion of Poland. Australia, New

Zealand and South Africa soon joinedthem. Since the Western Allies had failedin their diplomatic efforts to enlist Sovietsupport, they faced a united totalitarianfront of Hitler's Germany and Stalin'sRussia (which could be counted upon totake full advantage of Poland's impo-tence). Stalin had made it clear that hewanted a free hand in Eastern Europewhen he cast his lot with Germany. Be-fore the month of September was out, it

became obvious that Russia and Ger-

many had reached a secret agreement onthe partition of Poland during the sum-mer months. On 17 September Soviettroops crossed the eastern fron tier to takeVilnyas; a German-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship was announced two dayslater. On 28 September, after Warsaw'ssurrend er, Russia annexed 77,000 squaremiles of eastern Poland. The o ther 73,000square miles, bordering on Germany,were declared a Reich protectorate.


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Blitzkrieg - North

Hitler counted on Allied reluctanceto assume an active role in thewar, and he was not disappointed.

The six-month hiatus known as thePhony War lasted from September 1939until April 1940, when Germany invadedNorway and Denmark. In the interim,Britain and France made plans thatcould only fail, because they were basedon a negative concept: avoidance of thecostly direct attacks that had character-ized World War I. New Anglo-French

strategy focused on naval blockade andencirclement - indirect methods thatwere no match for the new blitzkrieg tac-tics of Nazi Germany.

Early in 1940 Hitler turned his atten-tion to Scandinavia, where he had avested interest in Swedish iron ore im-ports that reached Germany via theNorwegian port of Narv ik. Norway had asmall Nazi Party, headed by VidkunQuisling, that could be counted upon forfifth-column support. February broughtevidence that the Allies would resist aGerman incursion into Norway when the

Al tma rk, carrying British prisoners, was

boarded in Norwegian waters by a Brit-ish party . Both sides began to make plansfor a Northern confrontation.

On 9 Apri l the Germans launched theirinvasion of Norway and Denmark, basedon a bold strategy that called for navallandings at six points in Norway, sup-ported by waves of paratroops. The navalescort for the Narvik landing sufferedheavy losses, and the defenders of Oslosank the cruiser Blcher and damagedthe pocket battleship Liitzow. Even so,the Germans seized vital airfields, whichallowed them to reinforce their assaultunits and deploy their warplanes against

the Royal Navy ships along the coast.


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Denmark had already been overrun andposed no threat to German designs.

Norwegian defense forces were weak,and the Germans captured numerousarms depots at the outset, leav ing hastilymobi l ized reservis t s wi thout anyweapons. Allied planning proved whollyinadequate to German professionalismand air superiority. Kristiansand, Sta-vanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvikwere all lost to the Germans, along withthe country's capital, Oslo. Few Alliedtroops were trained for landing, andthose who did get ashore were poorly sup-plied.

In May, British, French and Polishforces attempted to recapture two impor-tant cities, but their brief success at Nar-vik was of fset by the bungled ef for t a tTrondheim to the south. Troops in thatarea had to be evacuated within twoweeks, and soon after Narvik was aban-doned to the Germans when events in

France drew off Allied troops.

Norway and Denmark would remainunder German occupation throughoutthe war , and it seemed that Hitler's Scan-dinavian triumph was complete. Howev-er, German naval losses there wouldhamper plans for the invasion of Britain,and the occupation would tie up numer-ous German troops for the dura tion. TheAllies were not much consoled by these

reflections at the time. The Northernblitzk rieg had been a heavy blow to theirmorale, and the Germans had gainedvaluable Atlantic bases for subsequentoperations.

Opposite top left: The Reich expands to thenorth and east.Opposite: German forces forge through

Denmark and make six simultaneouslandings in Norway.

A hove: A Norwegian port burns as theGermans follow through their surpriseattack.


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18

Military Balance inthe West

On the Western Front, both Allied

and German armies scarcely stir-red for six months after thedeclaration of war. The Allies had an ill-founded faith in their Maginot Line - stillincomplete - which stretched only to theBelgian border. The threat of a Germanattack through Belgium, comparable tothe S chlie ffen Plan of 1914, was to be metthrough the Dyle Plan. This strategycalled for blocking any advance betweenthe Ardennes and Calais by a swift de-ploymen t of troops into Belg ium from thevicinity of Sedan.

German General Erich von Mansteinanticipated this plan, whose weak link

was the hilly Ardennes region - widelybelieved to be impassable to an advanc-ing army. Manstein prepared for anattack on the Low Countries to draw theAllies forward, followed by a swift sur-prise breakthrough in the Ardennes thatwould aim for Calais. This would cut offany Allied troops that had moved intoBelgium to implement the Dyle Plan.

The All ies, discou nting the possibilityof a large-scale German advance throughthe Ardennes, garrisoned the MaginotLine and deployed their remaini ng forcesalong the Franco-Belgian border. Theretroops stood ready to advanc e to the RiverDyle should the Belgians need assist-

ance. Experienced French and British

units were designated for this advance,which left the sector opposite the Arden-nes as the most vulnerable part of theAllied line.

On paper, the opposing forces werealmost equally matched. The A llies had atotal of 149 divisions as against 136 Ger-man divisions, with some 3000 armoredvehicles to the Germans' 2700. But theGermans had several advantages, not theleast of which w as sup eriority in the air -some 6000 fighters and bombers to theAllies' 3300. Less tangible, but no lessimportant, was their innovative andflexible approac h to modern warfare . The

Allies still clung to outmoded ideas ofpositional warfare, and wasted theirarmor in scattered deployments amongtheir infantry divisions. The Germansmassed their armor in powerful Panzergroups that could cut a swath throug h themost determined resis tance. Wherenecessary, dive-bombing Stukas couldsupport German tanks that had outstrip-ped their artillery support in the field. Itwas a lethal combination.

In organization, too, the Allies laggedfar behind the German war machine.Their training, communications andleadership were not comparable to those

of Hitler's army , whic h was characterized

by dynam ic co-ordination of every detail.General Maurice Gamelin, Allied Com-mander in Chief, now in his late sixties,was in far from vigorous health. Con-siderable friction developed between theBritish and French commands. TheAllies also counted too much upon co-operation from the Belgians and theDutch, who were slow to commit them-selves for fear of provoking a Germanattack. German leadership, by contrast,was unified and aggressive - providedHitler did not take a direct hand in

military affairs.


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l! )

Below left: Thrust and counterthrust at

the Belgian border.Botto m left: Ge rma n so ldiers fire atattacking aircraft from the remains of ademolished bridge, Holland, 1940.Below: The forces of the Reich mass at theSieg fried Line.


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Blitzkrieg - West

The German assault on the West was

launched on 10 May 1940, whenaerial bombardments and para-troop landings rained down on the LowCountries at daylight. Dutch airfieldsand bridges were captured, and Germantroops poured into Holland and Belgium.Both countries called for help fromFrance and Britain, as the Dutch retre-ated from their borders, flooding theirlands and demolishing strategic objec-tives in an attempt to halt the invasion.Their demoralization was completed by asavage air attack on Rotterdam (14 May),after which Dutch forces surrendered.Queen Wilhelmina and her government

were evacuated to England.

The French Seventh Army had tried tointervene in Holland, but it was repulsed.In Belgium, the German capture of EbenEmael, a key fortress, and the accom-plishment of Manstein's plan to traversethe Ardennes with his Panzer divisions,gave access to the Meuse. Three bridge-heads were secured by 14 May, and theAllied line had been breached fro m Sedanto Dinant. The Panzer divisions thenmade for the sea, forcing back the BritishExpeditionary Force and two Frencharmies in Belgium. Allied forces weresplit, and their attempt to link up nearArras (21 May) was a failure. German


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Opposite below: German forces pour intothe Low Countries.

Le ft: Mo tor ized Dutch soldiers arepictured traversing a dyke.

Below: The Panzer thrust to the Meuse.

tanks had already reached the sea atNoyelles and were turning north towardthe Channel ports.

Only the unwarranted caution of Ger-man commanders prevented wholesaledestruction of Allied forces in Belgium.On 23 May orders to halt came down fromHitler and Field Marshal Gerd von Rund-stedt. The German advance did not re-sume until 26 May, and the beleagueredAllies were able to fall back aroundDunkirk.


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Dunkirk and the Fallof France

Adetermined defense at Calais, and

German failure to capitalize onthe chance of seizing the Channel

ports, enabled the Royal Navy to beginevacuating British troops from Dunkirk.Between 27 May, when Allied resistanceat Calais ended, and 4 June, 338,226 menof the British Expeditionary Force leftDunkirk along with 120,000 French sol-diers. The Germans tried to prevent therescue operation with attacks by theLuftwaffe, but the Royal Air Force dis-tinguished itself in safeguarding the ex-odus. With the loss of only 29 planes, RAFpilots accounted for 179 German aircraftin the four-day period beginning 27 May.

Royal Navy losses totaled six destroyerssunk and 19 badly damaged, plus manysmaller craft. The toll in lives and matr-iel would have been much higher hadchance not favored the Allies in the formof Germany's inexplicable pause atNoyelles.

To the south, General MaximeWeygand tried to rally remaining Frenchforces for defense of the Somme Line. TheGermans began to attack south on 5June, and the line gave way despitecourageous fighting by many French un-its. By 10 June the Germans had crossed

the Seine, and Mussolini took advantage

of the situation by declaring war onFrance. Italian troops moved in and en-countered stiff resistance, but overallFrench morale and confidence were at alow ebb. The government removed toBordeaux and rejected Prime MinisterWinston Churchill's offer of a union be-tween Britain and France. By 16 JunePremier Reynaud was resigning in favorof Marshal Henri Ptain, who announcedthe next day that France was seeking anarmistice.

The conquered nation was divided intooccupied and unoccupied zones. ThePtain Government would rule the un-

occupied zone from Vichy and collaborateclosely with the Germans, to the revul-sion of most Frenchmen. The 'FreeFrench,' led by Charles de Gaulle, ayoung army officer and politician, repudi-ated the Vichy rgime and departed forEngland, where de Gaulle announcedthat France would ultimately throw offthe German oppressors.

Above: Germany expands westwards tothe Channel coast.

Below: The Allied front line contracts asFrance andBelgium are overrun.


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Farleft: The Allies prepare to evacuate as

the Germans advance.Le ft: Fran ce divided un der Nazi an dVichy rule.

Below: Th e oc cupying forces move in toParis in June.


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Le ft: Ge rma n vac illa tio n and the spiri teddefense of Calais gave the A llies time toevacuate from Dunkirk.

Below: A Brit ish so ld ier is hi t by straf ingLuftwa ffe aircraft on theDunkirk beach.Bottom: Th e Briti sh Expe di tionary Forceand their French allies await departure.

Righ t: Th e af terma th of evac ua tion .Below right: Th e Germa n sweepsouthwards through France that resultedin th e 22 June armistice. Note Italian

incursions from the southeast.


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The Attack onBritain

Right: The stage is set for the Battle ofBritain, 1940.Below: London's dockland burns after oneof the first major bombing raids on thecapital, 7September 1940.

The Battle of Britain was fought in

the air to prevent a seaborneinvasion of the British Isles. The

German invasion plan, code-named Op-eration Sealion, took shape when Britainfailed to sue for peace, as Hitler had ex-pected, after the fall of France. On 16July 1940, German Armed Forces wereadvised that the Luftwaffe must defeatthe RAF, so that Royal Navy ships wouldbe unprotected if they tried to prevent across-Channel invasion. It was an ambi-tious project for the relatively small Ger-man Navy , but success would hinge uponair power, not sea power.

There were only some 25 divisions on

British home ground, widely scatteredand ill supplied with equipment andtransport. The RAF alone could gain thetime necessary for the army to re-equipafter Dunkirk, and hold off the Germansuntil stormy fall weather made it im-possible to launch Operation Sealion.The air arm was well led by Air ChiefMarshal Hugh Dowding, who made themost of his relatively small but skillfulforce. The RAF had the advantage of agood radar system, which the Germansunwisely neglected to destroy, and pro-fited also from the German High Com-

mand's decision to concentrate on the

cities rather than airfields.All-out Luftwaffe attacks did not begin

until 13 A ugust, which gave Britain timeto make good some of the losses incurredat Dunkirk and to train additional pilots.On 7 September London became the mainGerman target, relieving pressure onBritish airfields which had suffered inearlier bombings. RAF pilots who wereshot down unwounded could, and oftendid, return to combat on the same day,while German pilots were captured. Theshort-range Messerschmitt Bf 109 couldstay over England only briefly if it were


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Bot tom: Two Luftwaffe Dornier Do 17bombers over the R iver Thames,September 1940.

Right: Aftermath of heavy nightbombing in the Midlands city of Coventrytwo months later.

to return to its base in France, which

helped cancel out the German superiorityin numbers of planes and pilots.

The Battle of Britain raged in the skiesfor almost two months, while a Germanfleet of barges and steamers awaited thesignal to depart the Channel ports for theBritish coast. By mid September, the in-vasion date had already been put offthree times, and Hitler had to concedethat the Luftwaffe had failed in its mis-sion. Sporadic German bombing wouldcontinue until well into 1941, but Opera-tion Sealion was 'postponed' indefinitely.


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The Invasion ofYugoslavia

On 6 April 1941, the Germans

moved to extend their influence inthe Balkans by an attack onYugoslavia, whose Regent, Prince Paul,had been coerced into signing the Tripar-tite Pact on 25 March. As a result, he wasdeposed by a Serbian coalition thatplaced King Peter on the throne in a gov-ernment that would last only a matter ofdays. Hitler ordered 33 divisions intoYugoslavia, and heavy air raids struckBelgrade in a new display of blitzkrieg.At the same time, the Yugoslav Air Forcewas knocked out before it could come tothe nation's defense.

The German plan called for an incur-

sion from Bulgaria by the Twelfth Army,which would aim south toward Skopjeand Monastir to prevent Greek assist-ance to the Yugoslavs. Thence theywould move into Greece itself, for the in-vasion that had been planned since theprevious year. Two days later, GeneralPaul von Kleist would lead his First Pan-zer Group toward Nis and Belgrade,

where it would be joined by the Second

Army and other units that includedItalians, Hungarians and Germans.The plan worked smoothly, and there

was little resistance to any of the attacksmounted between 6 and 17 April, whenan armistice was agreed after King Peterleft the country. Internal dissensionamong the various Yugoslavian stateswas a help to the Germans, who lost fewerthan 200 men in the entire campaign.Another factor in their favor was the de-fenders' use of an ineffectua l cordon de-ployment that was no match for thestrength and numbers thrown againstthem. German air superiority completed

the case against Yugoslavian autonom y.

Below: Yugoslavia falls in the face of

pressure from Germany, Hungary and

Italy, April 1941.

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The Battle forGreece

Below: Italian attacks and Greekcounteroffensives, winter 1940-41.

Right: T heBrit ish evacuate the Greekmainland as Axis forces thrustsouthwards.

The overthrow of Yugoslavia's Re-

gency Government on 27 March1941 changed Hitler's scenario for

southeastern Europe. Prior to that, hehad planned to assist his Italian allies intheir ill-starred Greek campaign by per-suading Bulgaria and Yugoslavia toallow his troops free passage into Greece.Now he would have to invade both Yugo-slavia and Greece, where the Britishwere landing over 50,000 men in anattempt to enforce their 1939 guaranteeof Greek independence.

Mussolini's forces had crossed theGreek frontier into Albania on 28 Octo-ber 1940, but their fortunes had beengoing downhill since November. TheGreeks mobilized rapidly and pushed theItalians back until half of Albania wasrecovered, with British assistance, byMarch of 1941. The prospect of his ally'sdefeat, coupled with British proximity tothe oil fields of Rumania, motivated Hit-ler to send three full army corps, with astrong armor component, into Greece.The attack was launched on 6 April,simultaneously with the invasion ofYugoslavia.

Allied forces in Greece included sevenGreek divisions - none of them strong -less than two divisions from Australiaand New Zealand, and a British armoredbrigade, as well as the forces deployed inAlbania. British leaders wanted to basetheir defense on the Aliakmon Line,where topography favored them, withsufficient forces to close the MonastirGap. But the Greek Commander in Chiefheld out for a futile attempt to protectGreek Macedonia, which drew off much-needed troops to the less-defensibleMetaxas Line. The Germans seized theirchance to destroy this line in directattacks and push other troops throughthe Monastir Gap to outflank the Allied

defense lines.By 10 April the German offensive wasin high gear and rolling over the Aliak-mon Line, which had to be evacuated. Aweek later, General Archibald Wavelldeclined to send any more British rein-forcements from Egypt - a sure sign thatthe fight for Greece was being aban-doned. Some 43,000 men were evacuatedto Crete before the Germans closed thelast Peloponnesian port at Kalamata;11,000 others were left behind.

Right: German mountain infantry marchthrough the township of La mia in April

1941.


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34

Battle of the Atlantic1939-42

The memory of German submarine

success in World War I led the Brit-ish to introduce a convoy system assoon as hostilities began. The immediatethreat was less than British leaders im-agined, because submarine constructionhad not been given high priority in theGerman rearmament program, and Hit-ler was reluctant to antagonize neutralnations by unrestricted submarine war-fare. This was fortunate for the British inthe early months of the war, because theylacked sufficient escort vessels. Manyships sailed independently, and otherswere convoyed only partway on theirvoyages.

In June 1940 the U-boat threat becamemore pressing. The fa ll of France entailedthe loss of support from the French Fleeteven as British naval responsibility in-creased with Italian participation in thewar. Germany's position was streng-thened by the acquisition of bases inwestern France and Norway for theirlong-range reconnaissance support planes


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Previous pages: A surfaced German U-boat immediately prior to its sinking byUS Navy bombers southwest of Ascensionslan d, November 1943.

Opposite and below right: Earlydevelopments in the Battle o f the Atlantic.Below. USSSpencer closes on a U-boatoff the east coast of America.

and U-boats. And German submarines,

f relatively few in number, had severalechnical advantages. Their intelli-gence was superior to tha t of the Britishdue to effective code-breaking by theGerman signals service. British Asdicequipment could detect only submergedubmarines; those on the surface were

easily overlooked at night or until theyapproached with in striking distance of aconvoy. Radar was not sophisticated, andBritish patrol aircr aft were in very shortsupply.

As a result, the Battle of the Atlanticwas not one of ships alone. It involvedechnology, tactics, intelligence, air pow-

er and industrial competition. The Ger-mans made f ull use of their advantages inhe second half of 1940 (known to Ger-

man submariners as 'the happy time').U-boat 'wolf-packs' made concertedattacks on convoys to swamp theirescorts, and numerous com manders wonrenown for the speed and success of theirmissions.

35


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: ! < ;

By March 1941 this picture was chang-

ing. Many U-boats had been destroyed,and replacement construction was notkeeping pace. The British provided stron-ger escorts and made use of rapidly de-veloping radar capabilities to frustrateGerman plans. Three of the best GermanU-boat commanders were killed thatMarch, and Churchill formed the effec-tive Battle of the Atlantic Committee toco-ordinate British efforts in everysphere of the struggle. The remainder of1941 proved that a balance had beenstruck: German U-boats tripled in num-ber between March and November, butshipping losses in November were the

lowest of the war to that date. US assist-ance in both convoy duty and supplieshelped improve the British position, asdid intelligence breakthroughs.

When the United States formally en-


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37

Opposite and below right: T he Battle ofthe Atlantic continues, with Allied aircover now apparent.Below: US tro ops d isembark in Icelan d.Air co ver from Re ykjav ik dras tical lyreduced U-boat strikes in the area from1941 onwards.

tered the war at the end of 1941, the

situation changed again. The US Navywas preoccupied with the Japanesethreat in the Pacific, and the East Coastwas left vulnerable to German sub-marine operations. For the first half of1942, the US ships sailed with out escorts,showed lights at night and communi-cated without codes - afflicted by thesame peacetime mentality that hadproved so disastrous at Pearl Harbor.Sparse anti-submarine patrols along theEast Coast were easily evaded by the ex-perienced Germans. It was months beforean effective convoy system was estab-lished and extended as far south as the

Caribbean. But by late summer of 1942the US coastline was no longer a happyhunting ground, and the U-boats turnedtheir attention back to the main NorthAtlantic routes.


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:',8

Stalking theBismarck

The formidable German battleship

Bismarck was ready for action inthe spring of 1941. Armed with 15-inch guns and protected by massivearmor plate, she was an ocean raider toreckon with, accompanied on her firstforay by the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen,which had finished her trials at the sametime. On 18 May the two warships leftGdynia for Bergen, where RAF recon-naissance planes spotted them two dayslater. Their presence in Norwegian wa-ters could only mean a foray into theAtlantic, and Royal Navy vessels in andaround Britain were warned of the com-ing confrontation. Meanwhile, the Ger-

man ships put to sea in foggy weather,bound for the Denmark Strait under com-mand of Vice-Admiral Gnther Ltjens.Not until late on 23 May were they spot-ted in the Strait by the cruisers Suffolkand Norfolk.

British Vice-Admiral Lancelot Hol-land, commanding the Hoodand the newbattleship Prince of Wales, altered course

to intercept the raiders. Prince of Wales

still had workm en aboard and was by nomeans ful ly prepared to fight. Hoodwas aveteran, but she took a German shell inone of her aft magazines just as she closedwith Bismarck and blew up. Only threecrew members of 1500 survived. Bis-marck then scored several direct hits onPrince o f Wales, ending the engagement.Leaking fuel from a ruptured tank, Bis-marckleft the scene, shadowed by Princeof Wales and two cruisers. Prinz Eugenbroke away and returned to Brest, andthe Royal Navy lost contact with thedamaged German battleship. On 26 Mayshe was spotted by an RAF Catalina

north of Gibraltar.Force H, heading northeast from Gib-

raltar, included the carrier Ark Royal,which launched her Swordfish againstthe disabled Bismarck. A torpedo strike

jamm ed Bismarck's rudder and left heran easy prey to the battleships Rodneyand King George V, which arrived thatnight (26-27 May) to pour heavy-caliber

shells into the German warship. A torpe-

do from the cruiser Dorsetshire completedthe Bismarck's destruction. She sankwith all but 110 men of her crew, whichnumbered 2300.

Below: Charting the Bismarck's course todestruction, May 1941.

Right: Th e loss of Allied convo y PQ-17 inJuly 1942 proved a grie vou s blow tomorale. Almost two-thirds o f the shipsinvolved failed to reach their destination,

Archange l, and thousands of tons ofurgently needed matriel were lost.


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The Arctic Convoys

39

Hazardous duty fell to the men whoconvoyed supplies to Russia afterthe German invasio n of June

1941. The forces of nature on the arcticrun posed a threat equal to that of the

Germans. Savage storms and shifting icepacks were a constant menace. In thesummer months, the pack ice retreatednorth, and convoys could give a widerberth to enemy airfields on the Norwe-gian and Finnish coasts, but the longsummer daylight made them vulnerableto U-boats. When the ice edge movedsouth again, the U-boat threat lessenedwith the hours of daylight, but it wasmore difficult to stand clear of theairfields.

Many Allied seamen lost their lives onthe arctic run, including most of themembers of PQ-17, which sailed for Rus-

sia on 27 June 1942. Thirty-six merchant

ships were heavily escorted by Allied des-troyers, battleships, submarines, a car-rier and various smaller craft. Near BearIsland in the Barents Sea, the convoy lostits shadowing aircraft in heavy fog. At

the same time, word came that Germansurface ships Tirpitz, Scheer and Hipperhad left their southern bases.

Early on 4 July, German planes torpe-doed a merchantman and sank two shipsof the convoy. The German ships arrivedat Altenfjord, Norway, and operationscontrol in London expected an imminentsailing to intercept the convoy, whose dis-tant cover had been withdrawn per pre-vious plans. Sir Dudley Pound, First SeaLord, saw a chance for the convoy's shipsto evade the German raiders by scatter-ing; orders to this effect were issued on 4July. The long-range escort, except for

the submarines, left the convoy to rendez-

vous with the close cover, leaving PQ-17scattered and defenseless. GermanU-boats and aircraft began to pick off thehapless ships, and the surface-ship mis-sion that set sail from Altenfjord on 5

July was canceled as unnecessary latethat day.Between 5 and 8 July, almost two-

thirds of the convoy was sunk in icywaters hundreds of miles from its des-tination of Archangel. The armed trawler

Ayrsh ire succeeded in leading three mer-chantmen up into the ice, where theycamouflaged themselves with whitepaint and rode out the crisis. These threewere among the eleven merchant shipsthat finally reached Russia with desper-ately needed supplies. The other 25 wentdown with their crews and thousands oftons of matriel destined for the Soviet

war effort .


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40

The Sea RoadsSecured, 1943-45

By mid 1942 the Battle of the Atlan-

tic had shifted away from the USEast Coast to more distant areas,where German U-boats continued tomake successful raids on Allied shipping.Many oil tankers and other vessels werelost south of the Caribbean, off the Brazi-lian coast and around the Cape of GoodHope. Before the year was out, the Allieshad augmented the convoy system byspecially trained Support Groups - escortvessels that would help endangered con-voys or seek out U-boats in areas wherethey had been detected. These groupsusually included a small aircraft carrierand an escort carrier; along with surface

forces. They were free of normal escortduties and could therefore hunt theU-boats to destruction.

A cryptographic breakthrough at theend of 1942 increased Allied intel ligenceon German deployments, and changes inthe code system (June 1943) made it moredifficult for the Germans to anticipateAllied movements. Even so, late 1942and early 1943 brought great difficulties.Allied commitments were increased bythe invasion of North Africa, which drewoff North Atlantic escort forces, with


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4 1

Opposite: Continuation and (below right)conclusion of the Battle of the Atlantic.Below: A U-boat victim bu rns in mid-Atlantic . By the summer o f 1943 the worstAll ied shippin g losse s were over.

corresponding shipping losses. In March

1943, the climax of the Battle of theAtlantic, 120 Allied ships were sunk.Then the support groups returned fromNorth African wa ters, and the US indust-rial effort paid dividends in acceleratedproduction of escort carriers and otherneeded equipment. Improvements inradar and long-range scout planes, yearsin the making, came to the fore, andAllied crews began to capitalize on theirhard-won experience. In April 1943, ship-ping losses declined, and the followingmonth 41 U -boats were destroyed. On 22May the German submarines wereordered to withdraw from the North

Atlantic.After the summer of 1943, the U-boats

were never again the threat that theyhad been. The 'wolf-pack' tactic wasabandoned in 1944, and the remainingsubmarines prowled singly in an area in-creasingly focused around the BritishIsles. At the war's end, fewer than 200were still operational. Allied victory inthe Atlantic was largely a function ofsuperior co-ordination of effort, whichultimately offset the initial Germanadvantage in submarine technology.


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44

Rommel's FirstOffensive

The first German troops began land-

ing in North Africa on February1941, under command of GeneralErwin Rommel, who would earn the nick-name 'Desert Fox.' His leadership abili-ties were acknowledged by comrades andenemies alike. Rommel soon saw thatBritish forces in Africa were weak, andthat no reinforcements would be forth-coming. On 24 March German forces tookEl Agheila easily, and the 5 Light Divi-sion went on to attack the British 2Armored Division at Mersa Brega. Therethey encountered stiff resistance, but theBritish failed to counterattack and losttheir advantage.

Instead of choosing among threealternative courses of attack, Rommelmoved boldly on all three fronts : north toBenghazi, northeast to Msus and Mechiliand east to Tengeder, to threaten Britishsupply lines. Field Marshal ArchibaldWavell, in overall command of Britishforces, lacked the men to counter thismultiple attack, launched on 5 April. Hissingle armored division fell back and wasreduced to a remnant by mechanica l fail-ure. The defense at Mechili, 3 Indian Bri-gade, was soon overwhelmed, with whatremained of the 2 Armored Division. The8 Australian Division retreated from

Benghazi to Derna, thence toward Tob-ruk, which was being reinforced with the7 Australian Division.

On 14 April the German 5 Light Divi-

sion penetrated the Tobruk perimeter a

short distance, but was driven back. Ita-lian troops were now coming up to replacethe German units making ready to crossthe Egyptian frontier. The British garri-son at Tobruk was isolated in the midst ofAxis forces, and on 25 April the Germans

Previous pages: The German retreat fromEl Alamein,November 1942.Right: The Germans pres s eastwardsthrough Libya into Egypt.

Below: Ro mme l ente rs Egypt.Bottom le f t : Rommel and his of f icersinspect a ca ptured British tank.

Bottom: The Allies iso lated at Tobruk.Below right: Ro mme l directs o perations.

broke through the Halfaya Pass into

Egypt. Rommel was dissatisfied with thefailure to capture Tobruk, and anotherfull-scale attack struck the British thereon 30 April. Axis troops pushed a salientinto the western sector, but it was con-tained after four days of fighting.


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46

The German Driveon Gazala

Rommel's German units, the Deut-

sches Afrika Korps (DAK), andtheir allies suffered a setback inthe Crusader Battles with the BritishEighth Army late in 1941. Tobruk wasrelieved, and Rommel had to pull back toEl Agheila, having suffered 38,000 Axiscasualties as against 18,000 for the Brit-ish. His men were exhausted, supplieswere running out and 300 German tankshad been destroyed in the Libyan desert.

British forces pursued Rommel to ElAgheila, believing that his shattered un-its would be unable to react. However,successful air raids on Malta had restoredthe German supply line across the

Mediterranean, and Rommel's forceswere quickly rebuilt to fighting strength.On 21 January 1942 they made an unex-pected advance that pushed Eighth Army


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47

back toward Agedabia. In a matter ofdays the British faced encirclement atBenghazi and were forced to retreat tothe defensive position at Gazala. The linethere consisted of minefields runningsouth to Bir Hacheim and a series of for-tified keeps that were manned by XIIICorps brigades.

DAK forces under Cruewell swungaround Bir Hacheim on 26 May to out-flank the Gazala Line, but they were

attacked from both sides on Sidra Ridgeand stopped short with loss of a third oftheir armor. Their water and fuel wererunning out, and Rommel tried to push asupply l ine through the Brit ishminefields without success. He thenmoved all his remaining armor into 'theCauldron' to await the impending Britishcounterattack.

Cruewell's isolated forces were finallysupplied on 4 June, and Eighth Armyfailed to counterattack until 5/6 June,when it was beaten off with heavy losses.The defense at Bir Hacheim crumbledand DAK broke out of the Cauldron to

force the British back from the GazalaLine even beyond Tobruk. Axis forceshad surrounded the British garrisonthere by 18 June.

Opposite above: Rommel advanceseastwards, pushing the Eighth Armyback toward Gazala and Tobruk.

Opposite: The Allied stand on 26 May,with fortified keeps (shaded) scatteredalong the minefield (bold line).

Above left: Breakout from theCauldron.Below: An AfrikaKorps Panzer IIIadvances.


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48

TheFallofTobruk

Eighth Army was severely demoral-

ized by the German triumph atGazala, which contributed to thedistrust between infantry and tank unitsthat had surfaced during the CrusaderBattles. British leadership had failed tocapitalize on several advantages, includ-ing a numerical superiority in armor, theDAK containment in the Cauldron andthe well-prepared defense line at Gazala.

Rommel launched his drive on Tobrukfrom the southeastern sector on 20 June1942. Heavy dive-bomber attacks dis-played German air superiority to devas-tating effect, after which DAK pushedthrough the perimeter defenses. By mid-

morning German troops had reached theminefields, and the airfields were over-run soon after. At 1900 hours 21 PanzerDivision moved into Tobruk.

There was sporadic fighting within theperimeter through the night, but the Ger-mans had overcome almost all resistanceby the morning of 21 June. General Klop-per, the South African in command of thegarrison, surrendered, and the road toEgypt was open.

Right: T he perimeter defenses arebreached, and the fall of Tobruk is lessthan 12 hours away.

Below: British troops surrender to theirAxis adversaries. Rommel's victory,completed on21 June, cleared the way foran advance into Egypt.


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The Naval War in theMediterranean

49

The Royal N avy faced a difficult task

in the Mediterranean, where thewell-equipped and modern ItalianNavy enjoyed a position from which itcould strike at will. British forces weresplit between Gibraltar (Force H) andAlexandria, with Malta at the center - akey position, but highly vulnerable. Onlylight and submarine naval forces werebased on Malta, and Mediterran ean Fleetcommander Sir Andrew Cunninghamwas constantly seeking ways to enhancethe British position in the Mediterran eanthrough fl exible use of his surface ships,including a limited number of carriers.

Cunningham's forces scored several

successes against the Italian Navy inchance encou nters dur ing July 1940, andplans were laid to attack th e Italian fleetin harbor at Taranto. On the night of 11No v e m b e r , 2 1 Sw o r d f i s h t o r p e d o -bombers were launched from the carrierIllu strious: all but two returned, havingsu nk the new battleship Littorio and twomodernized battleships and inflictedheavy damage on other craft. It was amajor coup for the British, and soon fol-lowed by another successful strike atCape Matapan, Greece.

Italian naval forces moved toward

Greece in late March 1941, to interdictconvoys carrying B ritish troops to assistthe Greeks during the Axis invasion ofthe Balkans, then imminent. On 27

Marc h, RAF scouts reported three Ital iancruisers heading east, and Adm iral C un-ningham put to sea from Alexandria.Three battleships , an a ircraft carrier anddestroyer escorts comprised his force,which was to rendezvous south of Cretewith Vice-Admiral IID Pridham-Wippellcomm andin g a force of four cruisers andfour destroyers.

The principal target among the Italianforce converging south of Crete was thebattleship Vittorio Veneto, the pride ofMussolini's fleet. Air strikes were laun-

ched against her, but only one torpedofound its mark. Then the Italian cruiserPola was heavily damaged, and theheavy cruisers Zara and Flume were sent

back to help; all three were destroyed.The remain der of the Italian force fled

back to its bases, including the VittorioVeneto, which found safe harbor atTaran to to the d i sappoin tment o f Adm iral Cunning ham and his men.

Abo ve: Th e successful nigh t at tack o n theItalian f lee t in Ta ranto o n 11 No vember1940 moun ted by 21 Swordfish torpedo-bombers from HMSIllustrious.

Below: A second blow was deal t to Italiannaval might at Cape Matapan on 28

Ma rch 1941.Following pages: H MSBarham, abattleship of the Allied Me diterranean

fleet, at Gibraltar.


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52

The Malta Convoys

The British island fortress of Malta

was in serious straits by mid 1942.Its location astride Axis supply

lines made it the target of incessant airattack, and its own supply lines were in-creasingly tenuous. Convoys to Maltahad to be suspended in July due to theirheavy losses. It was clear that Maltacould not hold out against both the Luft-waffe and the Italian Regia Aeronauticawithout food or fuel, and OperationPedestal was mounted as a desperateeffort to convoy supplies from England.

Twenty warships under command ofVice-Admiral E N Syfret left the Clyde on3 August with 14 merchantmen, 32 des-

troyers and various smaller craft. Theaircraft carrier Furious accompanied thegroup with a cargo of fighter planes forMalta's RAF squadron. On 10 Septem-ber, when the convoy passed through theStrait of Gibraltar in fog, a dummy con-voy was dispatched from Port Said to-ward Malta as a diversion. Next day itreturned to port, having failed to distractAxis leaders from the main operation,which was shadowed by reconnaissanceaircraft from the morning of 11 Septem-ber. That afternoon Furious flew her

planes off to Malta and turned back, and

the Axis made its first overt move in theform of a U-boat attack on the carrier

Eagle, which was sunk.The next day brought heavy Allied los-

ses to Axis planes and submarines. Thefreighter Deucalion went down, the des-troyer Foresightwas so badly damagedthat she had to be sunk and the Indomit-able's flight deck was bombed out of op-eration. At this point Syfret turned backaccording to plan, leaving Rear AdmiralH M Burrough to escort the convoy therest of the way with four cruisers and fourdestroyers. Two of the cruisers were dis-abled in the next few hours, Cairo so bad-

ly that she had to be sunk. At dusk, two ofthe merchantmen were destroyed andone damaged. The American tanker Ohiowas hit but stayed with the convoy, as didthe damaged cruiser Kenya.

Early on the morning of 13 September,five more merchantmen and the cruiserManchesterwere lost to torpedoes, andrenewed air attacks sank Wairanamaand did additional damage to Ohio, withits irreplaceable fuel cargo. By the timelight forces from Malta met the convoy,all but five of the merchantmen had been

sunk, along with one aircraft carrier, twocruisers and a destroyer. But the fuel andother supplies that got through enabledMalta to hold on.

Above: The hazardous passage toMalta.Below: The damaged tanker HMSOhiolimps toward port with destroyer escort.

Right: General Eisenhower(lef t) onMalta with Viscount Gort, the island'sgovernor.


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gustattack

1215,12 AugustDeucalion damaged,sunk later

1600,12 August

U-boat sunk

1840,12 August

Foresight sunk,

carrier Indomitable

damaged. Maincovering force {'X')withdraws as planned

2000,12 August

Cairo, Clan Ferguson& Empire Hope sunk.

Nigeria, BrisbaneStar, Kenya & Ohiodamaged

Night, 12/13 August

Santa Eliza, Wairangi,Almeria, Lykes&

Glenorchy sunk.Manchester damaged,sunk later. Rochester

Castle damaged

0800,13 AugustWaimarama

sunk, Ohiodamaged

1125,13 AugustRochester Castle

& Ohio damaged.Dorset damaged,sunk later

1900,13 AugustMerchant ship

straggler sunk byGerman aircraft


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54

El Alamein: TheFirst Battle

Below: The German tanks advance, withItalian support.Right: The first Battle of El Alamein.Below right: General Grant tanks of theA Uied22ndArmoredBrigade advancesouth of El Alamein.

After the fall of Tobruk, Rommel

was promoted to Field Marshal, astatus that strengthened his argu-ment for advancing to Egypt at once. (Theoriginal Axis plan called for a halt whilenaval and air forces massed to invadeMalta.) Using the supplies newly cap-tured at Tobruk, Rommel crossed theEgyptian frontier and attacked the Brit-ish at Mersa Matruh (26-27 June), whereEighth Army was now under tacticalcommand of General Claude Auchinleck,Commander in Chief, Middle East. TheBritish could not contain the Germanadvance and retreated to the next de-fensible position - a line south from the

small rail station of El Alamein.Auchinleck had few reserve units with

which to prepare his position from ElAlamein, near the coast, to the QattaraDepression, an area of wilderness thatwas considered almost impassable. Hisdepleted forces took their positions alongthis line to bar the way to the Nile. Mean-while, Rommel's forces had also beenmuch reduced in recent battles to some2000 German infantry and 65 tanks -while fuel and other supplies were dwind-ling (these had consisted largely of bootycaptured at Tobruk and Mersa Matruh).

Eighth Army's artillery units were in-strumental in repelling the first Germanand Italian attacks on 2-4 July; their co-ordination was much better than it hadbeen under General N M Ritchie fromwhom Auchinleck had assumed com-mand. The British Commander in Chiefwas now in a position to essay somelimited counterattacks, whose targetswere Italian rather than German divi-sions. This choice was deliberate, as itcompelled Rommel to waste fuel in wide-spread efforts to assist his Italian cohorts.

The Sabratha unit fell to the 9 AustralianDivision on 10-11 July, and the Britishrecovered Tell el Eisa as a result.

Larger Allied efforts were mounted inthe Ruweisat Ridge area, where opposingforces grappled to an exhausted stand-still. Both sides were simply worn out,

and Auchinleck's refusal to continue theattacks known collectively as the FirstBattle of El Alamein was to cost him hiscommand.

Below: The Allied retreat along theMediterranean coast to El Alamein.


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The Battle of AlamHaifa

In August 1942 Churchill arrived in

the Middle East to make changes.General Harold Alexander replacedAuchin leck as Commander in Chief, andGeneral Bernard Montgomery tookcharge of Eighth Army. Less than threeweeks later, he would face Rommel's lastattempt to break through the position atEl Alamein.

Montgomery's defensive plan was

based loosely upon Auchinleck's: to hold

the Alam Haifa Ridge and counter a Ger-man threat in the South with 7 ArmoredDivision. Rommel used the tactic thisplan had anticipated when, on 30 August,his main attacks swung south of the Brit-ish positions with the object of turningnorth again beyond Alam Haifa to sur-round Eighth Army. The presence of 7Armored Division on the right flank

forced him to turn north earlier than he

had intended, with the result that DAKfailed to break through the Alam Haifaposition. Harassing air attacks and ashortage of fuel compounded Rommel'sdifficulties. His 15 Panzer Division triedto outflank 22 Armored Brigade on 1September, but this effort was stymied byan improved British antitank system.Axis forces pulled back to prepare a deep


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57

Below: A Vic kersgun noses o ver thebarricades.Right: The Axis attack on A lam Hal fafa ile d to achieve its objec tives .Below right: R ommel's sta ff confer as theAllie d defense turns in to coun terat tack.

defensive position between the Qattara

Depression and the sea.Rommel had to hold the new line ofdefense or be overwhelmed he lackedboth the vehicles and the fuel for a mobilebattle. By the same token he could notretreat. On 6 September, Axis forces wereback where they had started, committedto an immediate counterattack for everyfoot of disputed ground.


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58

El Alamein: TheSecond Battle

In his new command, General Mont-

gomery lived up to his reputation as acareful planner who emphasized bothtraining and morale. Eighth Army hadsuffered many changes of fortune andcommand in the North African Theater,and morale had eroded to a serious de-gree. Failures of co-operation and con-fidence had resulted in faulty operations,and Montgomery addressed himself to re-building Eighth Army into an optimumfighting unit. At the same time, he wasamassing a force superior to the Ger-mans' in every respect: troops, tanks,guns and aircraft.

The Germans were well dug in along a

line between the sea and the Qattara De-pression, and Montgomery's plan was toattack north of the Miteirya Ridge. Theinfantry of XXX Corps was to push for-ward to the Oxalic Line and open corri-dors through the minefields for passage ofthe X Corps' Sherman tanks, which werefinally proving a match for the GermanMark IV. Axis forward defenses weremanned largely by Italian troops, andRommel was hospitalized in Germany; hedid not arrive until 25 October, when thebattle was underway. General Stummecommanded in his absence.

The British infantry made a good start

toward its objectives on 24 October, but itproved impossible to move the tanks for-ward as planned. The German 21st Pan-zer Division was kept out of the mainbattle for several days by diversionaryefforts from XIII Corps, and the Germandefense suffered as a result of GeneralStumme's death from a heart attack dur-ing the first day of fighting. The Axis fuelshortage had become critical with thesinking of two tankers in Tobruk Harbor.

When Rommel returned to North Afri-ca, he launched a series of unsuccessfulcounterattacks that ended on 3 Novem-ber, when the British armor began to

break through into open ground. Hitlerat first forbade a withdrawal, but by 4November Axis losses had made it inevit-able. Rommel and his remaining forcesmade good their retreat.

A bove right: The attack plan for corridorsto be driven through Axis minefields to

provide safe passage for Allied tanks.Right: General Montgomery directsoperations at El Alamein. On his right isGeneral Sir Brian H or rocks.


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Above: Ita lia n in fantrymen in the field atElAlamein.Right: The second battle saw the EighthArmy repel Axis attacks.


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60

Operation Torch

On 8 November 1942, four days af-

ter Rommel began to retreat fromEl Alamein, American and Brit-ish forces made a series of landings inFrench North Africa. This operation,code-named Torch, was the first realAllied effort of the war. It was hoped thatthe numerous Vichy French forces inNorth Africa would not resist the land-ings, and the US had undertaken diplo-matic missions to local French leaderswith this object in view. (Anglo-Frenchrelations were still embittered by theevents of 1940.) Despite these efforts,sporadic French opposition delayed plan-ned Allied attacks on Casablanca and

Mehdia, and two destroyers were lost offAlgiers. However, the weakest point ofthe Allied plan was its failure to occupyTunisia in the first landings. Germantroops began to arrive there on 9 Novem -ber to cover Rommel's retreat and formeda defensive perimeter.

The Allied capture of Vichy leaderAdmiral Darlan at Algiers helped dimin-ish resistance from French forces; fewerthan 2000 casualties were incurred in thethree main landing areas. The largestdifficulty was pushing the considerableAllied force the 400 miles to Tunis beforethe Germans could pour in troops andaircraft from Sicily. This they did withgreat speed, on instructions from Hitlerand Commander in Chief Mediterranean

Field Marshal Kesselring. Allied forces

under General Dwight D Eisenhower,American Commander in Chief of theTorch operation, were stopped short inTunisia by early December.

Below: US troops marc h on Algiers

Maison Blanche airfie ld.Bottom: The Operat ion Torch land ings.Right: Th eAlliedpush into Tunisia .Below right: The Germans reinforc e.


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From Tripoli toTunis

Eighth Army's pursuit of Rommel's

forces was hampered by weatherand supply problems. It took Mont-gomery almost three weeks to reach Age-dabia (23 November 1942), and he had tohalt there until he was resupplied. Soonafter, the short-lived German position atEl Agheila was outflanked and the racetoward Tunisia resumed.

The port of Tripoli offered the Britishhope of alleviating their supply prob-lems, but the Germans got there first anddid as much damage as they could to portinstallations before pushing on to Tuni-sia. The British reached Tripoli on 23January 1943, and it was not until mid-

March that the port began to functioneffectively as a pipeline for British sup-plies. Meanwhile, Axis forces had con-solidated behind the Mareth Line afterinflicting 10,000 casualties on Alliedtroops from the Torch landings at theBattle of Kasserine. Rommel now facedMontgomery's Eighth Army in his lastbattle in Africa - a bitter fight that ragedfrom 6 to 27 March. Axis forces were out-flanked, and by mid-April had retreatedup the coast to form a tight perimeteron the hills around Bizerta and Tunis.

Rommel urged evacuation of Germanand Italian forces from Africa when hereturned to Germany, but his counselwas ignored. Thirteen understrength

Axis divisions sought to defend Tunisiaagainst 19 Allied divisions tha t had reco-vered from their earlier reverses to takeon an overwhelming superiority in airpower and armor. The Allies had 1200tanks to the Axis' 130, 1500 guns to theAxis' 500.

Hill 609 was hotly contested by Amer-ican forces seeking access to the so-calledMousetrap Valley leading to the coastalplain. British troops made some progressat Longstop Hill and Peter's Corner,which commanded the Medjerda Valley.Then General Alexander switched ex-

perienced units from Eighth Army to VCorps, which made possible a decisive

victory. Allied troops broke through inearly May. Tunis fell on the 7th, and fivedays later Italy's Marshal Messe andGermany's General von Arnim surren-dered with some quarter of a milliontroops. These forces would be sorely mis-sed by Hitler when the Allies launchedtheir invasion of Italy.

Above: The Eighth Army's attempt toprogress up Tunisia's east coast wasdelayed at WadiAkarit.

Right: The Allied conquest of Tunisia.Bizerta and T unis fell on 7 May.

Below: The Eighth Army's progress in thewakeofElAlamein.


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The Winter War:Finland, 1939-40

On 30 November 1939, the Soviet

Union invaded Fin land, after fail-ing to obtain territorial conces-sions demanded in early October. Fivedifferent Soviet armies crossed theRusso-Finnish frontier on four majorfronts, but the conquest of this smallneighboring nation proved much moredifficult than had been foreseen. Deepsnow and heavy forest forced Russiantanks and transports to stay on the roads,where they were easy targets for themobile, well-trained Finnish ski troops.Russian convoys were shot up and sepa-rated, and formations were isolated anddefeated in detail. The Finns never had

more than nine divisions in the field, withfew guns and almost no tanks. But theirconfidence was high, and they had theadvantage of fighting on familiar groundwith tactics suited to the terrain.

By 31 January 1940, the Russians hadmade deep penetrations in the north bydint of superior numbers, but the Man-nerheim Line, on the Karelian Isthmus,was holding on. The Seventh and Thir-teenth Soviet Armies assaulted this linefrom 1 through 13 February with forcesthat included six tank brigades and 21infantry divisions. A massive bombard-ment preceded these attacks, which

achieved a breakthrough in mid-February. The Finns were forced to sur-render, and to cede the Karelian Isthmus

and considerable territory in the north.

They would seek to make good these los-ses the follow ing year in an alliance withNazi Germany.

The Finnish fight was solitary and ulti-mately hopeless, because the British andFrench Governments feared to arouseSoviet hostility by involv ing themselves.Nevertheless, the Russo-Finnish Warhad far-reaching consequences in the in-ternational community. As a result of it,the French Government fell due to dis-sension about helping the Finns, and theLeague of Nations was thoroughly dis-credited. Hitler formed a false impressionof Soviet inefficiency that probably influ-

enced his decision to turn on his Russianally. And the Red Army was awakened todeep-seated internal problems that be-came subject to reform in the months thatfollowed.

Previous pages: The Wehrmacht advancewith difficulty along a muddy Russianroad, 1941.

Below: Th e Russian s bre ac h Finland 's

Man ne rheim Line in Febru ary.Right: Soviet so ld iers disman tle Finn ishanti-tank obstacles.


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Above: Earlier Soviet penetration in thenorth and east from November 1939 hadmet effective Finnish resistance.


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Military Balance onthe Eastern Front

The German High Command spent

almost a year planning the inva-sion of Russia, code-named Opera-tion Barbarossa. Three different planswere devised, of which the one givingpriority to the capture of Leningrad waschosen. German leaders estimated RedArmy strength along the frontier at some155 divisions (in fact, there were 170within operational distance.) The frontwas divided in half by the Pripet Mar-shes. In the north, von Leeb's ArmyGroup North was to aim itself againstLeningrad, where it faced an almostequal number of Russian divisions.However, these were deployed so far for-

ward that they were vulnerable to beingpushed back against the coast. VonBock's Army Group Centre, with twoPanzer armies, was the strongest Ger-man force in the field; facing it was thecomparatively weak Red Army WestFront. Most Soviet troops were south ofthe Pripet Marshes, positioned to defendthe agricultural and industrial wealth ofthe Ukraine. Von Rundstedt's ArmyGroup South was to thrust southeastagainst these forces.

The German plan called for swiftpenetration deep into Russia in June, todestroy the Red Army long before winte r.A massive German buildup began, butStalin and his advisors were so deter-mined not to give Hitler any excuse to

attack that they ignored all the warning

signs. In fact, the Red Arm y was still on apeacetime footing when the invasion be-gan on 22 June. Most units were widelyscattered for summer training; otherswere too close to the western frontier. Thereforms that followed upon the Russo-

Finnish War were far from complete, and

there was almost no Russian reserve todeal with deep incursions. The Germanshad good reason to be optimistic aboutthe invasion of Russia.


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Below: Soviet cavalry men on the march,

1941. Horse-mounted troops were moremobile than tanks in the severe Russianwinter conditions, and were thus moreffective than appearances suggested.

Above left: The initial German thrusts toMoscow and Kiev.Far le ft: A northern attack was lateradded to the original two-pronged assaultplan.Le ft: Hitle r fin ally identif ied Leningradas the prime target, and it was this plan ofattack that was selected.Right: The EasternFront from the Balticto the Black Sea, showing the relative

strengths and dispositions of the twoprotagonists.


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OperationBarbarossa: 1941

Below: The crew of a German Panzerattempt to free their tank from frozen mudby lighting a fire.

Right: The frontline moves progressivelyeastwards as German pressure forces

Russia to yield.

German forces achieved almost

total surprise in their 22 June in-vasion of Soviet territory, whichwas preceded by a devastating air attackthat all but wiped out the Red Air Force.Fourth Panzer Group took a series ofnorthern objectives that brought it to theLuga by 14 July. Army Group Centresealed off Russian forces at Bialystok andGorodische, taking 300,000 prisonersand 2500 tanks in a week's operations.Army Group South faced the greatest re-sistance in the Ukraine, where the Rus-sian Fifth Army counterattacked on 10

July to prevent an assault on Kiev.

This development incited Hitler to di-vert Army Group Centre from its attackon Moscow via Smolensk into theUkraine offensive. Second Army andHeinz Guderian's Second Panzer Groupwere ordered south to destroy the SovietFifth Army and surround Kiev. Guderianwas radically opposed to abandoning theMoscow offensive, but he turned south on23 August as ordered. An unsuccessfulRussian counteroffensive failed to haltthe German advance north of Gomel, andthe Soviet South-West Front suffered

heavy losses every time it gave battle.

Many divisions were trapped in pocketsand destroyed piecemeal, while at Kievalone, half a million Red soldiers werecaptured.

By mid November the Germans hadseized Rostov and the Perekop Isthmus,which commanded the Crimea. In thecenter, their victories at Smolensk andBryansk had enabled them to captureOrel, Tula and Vyazma. The BalticStates had been occupied, and the Fin-nish alliance had helped open the way toLeningrad.


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The Finnish Front

Below left: With Germa n as sistan ce , theFinns established a front line to the east oftheir 1939 border.

Below: Fin nish infantry a do pt defen siv eposi tio ns on the Man ne rheim Line asRu ss ian pressure incre ased .

The 1941 alliance with Germany

brought significant improvementsin Finland's forces. Mobilizationand training systems were revamped, asthe Finns prepared to regain the territorylost to Russia the previous year by ex-pediting the German assault in the

north. Marshal Carl von Mannerheim,

hero of the Russo-Finnish War, wouldlead first the army and then the state forthe balance of World War II.

Joint German-Finnish attacks beganon 19 June 1941, with early successesaround Lake Ladoga. The Russians were

outflanked there and began to withdraw

by water, until the Finns had pursued toa point near their former frontier (1September). On the Karelian Isthmus,another attack reached Vuosalmi on 16Augus t, but was stopped short of Lenin-grad by a second Russian retreat. At thispoint Mannerheim called a halt: havingregained the territory lost in the previousyear, he was reluctant to become moredeeply involved in the attack on Russia.

Offensives did not resume until severaldays later, when attacks north of LakeLadoga and against the Murmansk rail-way achieved their objectives. Then theRussian resistance grew increasingly

stronger, and by early December theFinns were on the defensive. The frontline stabilized along an axis east of the1939 Russo-Finnish boundary.


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The Attack onLeningrad

7,3

German Army Group North, com-

manded by General Wilhelm vonLeeb, arrived near Leningrad on 1September 1941. The Germans had de-cided not to storm the city, bu t to isolate itand starve out its defenders. Artillerybombardments began immediately, andwithin two weeks Leningrad had beencut off entirely from overland com-munication with the rest of Russia.

The city had only a month's supply offood - heavily rationed - and starvationset in by October. The following month,11,000 died of hunger. Meager suppliescontinued to come in by barge acrossLake Ladoga in the early fall, but on 9

November the Germans took Tikhvin,the point of origin, and ice on the lakemade navigation impossible. Four weekslater, the Russians opened a new 'Life-

line' road from Zaborie to Lednevo, butwinter weather and difficult terrainslowed supply trucks to a crawl.

Thousands more had succumbed tostarvation in Leningrad by early Decem-ber, when the Red Army's counteroffen-sive began to make itself felt. Tikhvinwas recaptured, and the Germans were

pushed back to the Volkhov River. TheRussians repaired the railroad andopened an ice road across the lake, whichwas now frozen solid ly enough to bear the

weight of trucks. By Christmas Day, itwas possible to increase the bread rationin Lening rad. B ut relief came too late formany: on that same day, almost 4000died of starvation.

Above: Supply ro utes to th e besie ged cityofLeningrad.

Below: Finnish members ofthe Waffen-SS in action.


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Moscow - Strike andCounterstrike

Below: Th e Germ an Army Group Sou thpush es to capture the Ukraine, bu t isforced to withd raw to the MiusRiver.Bo ttom: Mu scov ites dig defense linesaround the capital, 1941.

Righ t: T he Germa n assaul t on Mos cow.

After capturing Kiev, the Germans

redeployed their forces for theassault on Moscow. They had a su-periority of two to one in men and tanks,three to one in the air. Fourteen Panzerdivisions were involved in the attacksthat converged on Russia's capital begin-ning 30 September.

By 7 October large pockets of Soviettroops had been cut off around Vyazmaand Bryansk. They were systematicallydestroyed in the next two weeks, afterwhich heav y rains put a serious check onGerman mob ility. The Mozhaisk defenseline offere d increasing resistance, and by30 October German forces had bogged

down miles from Moscow. Many men andtanks were lost in the frustrating ad-vance through a sea of mud.

When the w eather changed, it did littleto help the German cause. The freeze thatset in hardened the roads, but Germansoldiers found it difficult to adapt to theextreme cold, which also created newproblems with their vehicles. By 27November, units of the Third Panzer


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Group finally reached the Volga Canal,19 miles from Moscow center, but theylacked the support for a frontal assault onthe city. Elements of the Second PanzerArmy had gotten as far as Kashira, butthey had to fall back for the same reason.

By 5 December the Germans realizedthat they could go no farther for the timebeing. Valuable time has been lost in thecapture of Smolensk, whose courageousdefenders had helped delay the Germanadvance on Moscow until the dreadedonset of winter. Now the capital could notbe completely encircled, and heavy bomb-ing did not offset the failure to close Mos-cow's window on the east. Fresh Soviettroops began to arrive from Siberia even

as the Germans faced temperatures thatplummeted to 40 degrees below zero.

On 8 December Hitler announced asuspension of operatio ns outside Moscow,but the Soviet High Command was notlistening. Employing the reserves it hadgathered in previous weeks, the RedArmy launched a great counteroffensivethat recalled the winter of 1812, whenNapoleon's forces came to grief on thesame ground. Avoiding German strong-points, the Soviets advanced by infiltra-tion passing over fields instead of roads,making skillful use of Cossack cavalry,ski troops and guerrilla forces. The Ger-mans were harried from flank and rear,forced from one position after another.

Tanks and planes became inoperable inthe extreme cold, and supply lines weretenuous or nonexistent.

With the recapture of Kalinin andTula, the Russians removed the immedi-ate threat to Moscow. Their offensivedrove on into late February, and Germantroops took refuge in strongly fortifieddefensive positions (called hedgehogs) inhope of holding out until fresh troopscould arrive. Hitler had ordered 'No re-treat,' and airborne supplies kept manyenclaves going through the winter. ButOperation Barbarossa had foundered inthe snowfields of Russia. The Sovietswere regaining ground from Leningradto the Crimea.


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The Red ArmyFights Back

During the fall of 1941, the Rus-

sians were able to evacuate muchof their factory equipment andmany key workers to the east, where theybegan to rebui ld the i r indus t r ia lmachine. Railroad equipment was alsoevacuated, giving the Soviets an edge inthe number of locomotives and freightcars per mile of track. The transportationbreakdown foreseen by Hitler did notmaterialize, and Russian troop reserveswere built up in Siberia to replace thegreat losses incurred on the EasternFront. At the same time, war matrielfrom the West began to reach Russia viaArchangel, Murmansk, Vladivostok and

Persia.Since Operation Barbarossa had been

designed to achieve a quick victory dur-ing the summer months, German troopshad never been equipped for winter war-fare. Soviet troops by contrast, wereroutinely equipped with clothing andvehicles appropriate to the theater of op-erations. The Soviet Supreme Command

41751243 richard natkiel atlas of the world war ii (1)

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