Online Appendix

Appendix A: Additional ResultsFigure A1: Corruption Behavior of the Firms. Results for each round.

A. Extensive Margin B. Intensive Margin

.2.3

.4.5

.6A

vera

ge fr

eque

ncy

of b

ribe

1 2 3 4 5Round

5% monitoring 25% monitoring

01

23

45

6

Ave

rage

brib

e

1 2 3 4 5Round

5% monitoring 25% monitoring

Notes: Created by authors using experimental data. Panel A refers to the percentage of individuals acting as firms who offer a bribe to a public official. Panel B includes only individuals who offer a bribe. The figures of 5% and 25% monitoring refer to the probability of getting caught.

Figure A2: Corruption Behavior by Public Officials. Results for each round.

A. Extensive Margin B. Decision to grant permit

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1

Ave

rage

acc

epta

nce

frequ

ency

of a

brib

e

1 2 3 4 5Round

5% monitoring 25% monitoring

.3.3

5.4

.45

.5.5

5

Ave

rage

freq

uenc

y

1 2 3 4 5Round

5% monitoring 25% monitoring

Notes: Created by authors using experimental data. Panel A refers to the percentage of individuals acting as public officials who accept a bribe from a firm. Panel B refers to the percentage of public officials who decide to grant a permit. The figures of 5% and 25% monitoring refer to the probability of getting caught.

Figure A3: Punishment Points by Treatment Group

-1.5

-1-.5

0.5

11.

52

2.5

33.

54

Ave

rage

pun

ishm

ent u

nits

by

treat

men

t

Leader Counter-punishment

No Corruption 5% monitoring 25% monitoring

Notes: Created by authors using experimental data. Vertical axis shows the average units used as punishment by leaders in all rounds. The figures of 5% and 25% monitoring refer to the probability of getting caught. Leader refers to a public goods game with centralized punishment, while counter-punishment refers to a public goods game with centralized punishment and counter-punishment of leaders allowed. Error bars refer to 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure A4: Earnings by Treatment Group

05

1015

2025

3035

40A

vera

ge e

arni

ngs

by tr

eatm

ent

Cooperation Leader Counter-punishment

No Corruption 5% monitoring 25% monitoring

Notes: Created by authors using experimental data. Vertical axis shows the average earnings in all rounds. The figures of 5% and 25% monitoring refer to the probability of getting caught. Cooperation refers to the standard public goods game. Leader refers to a public goods game with centralized punishment, and counter-punishment refers to a public goods game with centralized punishment and counter-punishment of leaders allowed. Error bars refer to 95 percent confidence intervals.

1

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Covariates

Covariates Corruption Treatment N Mean Standard

DeviationControl 36 0.64 0.49

Sex Low Monitoring 64 0.66 0.48  High Monitoring 64 0.67 0.47

Control 36 18.94 1.77Age Low Monitoring 64 18.8 1.85

  High Monitoring 64 18.61 1.95Control 30 21.66 13.31

Income Low Monitoring 56 21.1 16.36  High Monitoring 52 17.81 14.31

Control 30 2.25 1.05Father’s education Low Monitoring 64 2.55 1.27

  High Monitoring 64 2.27 1.14

Control 30 2.3 0.86Mother’s education Low Monitoring 64 2.34 1.16

  High Monitoring 64 2.25 1.19Notes: Created by authors using experimental data. The covariates used are the sex of each participant, age in years at the date of the experiment in years, average household monthly income in thousands of Mexican pesos, and parents' education. Education has a value of 0 for primary or less, 1 for junior high school, 2 for high school, 3 for college, 4 for master's degree, and 5 for doctoral degree. Income data are restricted to exclude 26 observations with extreme values over 100,000 Mexican pesos.

Table A2: Regression Results for Corruption

  Pr(Offer Bribe) Avg Bribe Pr(Accept Bribe) Pr(Grant Permit)  [1] [2] [3] [4]High Monitoring -0.175 0.188 -0.137 0.012

[0.067] [0.049] [0.035] [0.085]N 320 132 320 320

Notes: Each column shows a regression using robust standard errors clustered by session. Probit regressions are shown in columns 1, 3, and 4 with marginal effects at the mean of the covariates. Tobit regression is shown in column 2 with marginal effects at the mean of the covariates and restricted to individuals who offered a bribe. The coefficient is percentage of maximum bribe allowed. All regressions include the following controls: round, age and age squared, dummy of female, educational levels of father and mother (0 for primary or less, 1 for junior high school, 2 for high school, 3 for college, 4 for master's degree, and 5 for doctoral degree.)

2

Table A3: Summary of Results for Cooperation by Treatment Status

Cooperation Treatment Corruption Treatment N Mean Standard Deviation

Control 20 14.26 5.03Standard PG Low Monitoring 24 10.06 5.05

High Monitoring 24 11.71 4.75Control 12 13.58 3.48

Leader PG Low Monitoring 20 13.05 3.38High Monitoring 20 15.93 3.51Control 4 15.43 4.93

Counter-Punishment PG Low Monitoring 20 10.67 3.98High Monitoring 20 13.23 3.91

Notes: Created by authors using experimental data. Cooperation Treatment refers to the type of game played by participants, either a standard public goods game (Standard PG), a public goods game with centralized punishment and without counter-punishment (Leader PG), or a public goods game with centralized punishment and counter-punishment (Counter-Punishment PG). Corruption Treatment refers to the type of corruption game played in the first stage, either Low Monitoring, High Monitoring, or as a Control with no exposure to corruption. N is the number of participants in each scenario. Mean represents average contribution to the public good (in ECU) for all rounds of each scenario. Standard deviation represents the standard deviation of contribution to the public good for all rounds of each scenario.

3

Table A4: Regression Results for Cooperation

  [1] [2] [3] [4]Low Monitoring -2.628** -2.457** -3.543***

[0.776] [0.708] [0.532]

High Monitoring -0.862 -0.733 -2.078[1.272] [1.163] [1.733]

Leader 1.567** 1.643** -1.268[0.445] [0.434] [0.899]

Counter-punishment -1.117** -0.748* 0.297[0.375] [0.313] [0.976]

Low * Leader 3.285***[0.450]

High * Leader 4.477**[1.537]

Low * Counter-punishment -0.756

[0.691]High * Counter-punishment -1.095

[1.868]

N 820Notes: Each column shows a regression using robust standard errors clustered by session, an OLS regression of the cooperation levels for five rounds in the second stage of the experiment. Low and High Monitoring are dummy variables for groups with their respective levels of monitoring in the corruption game in the first stage. Leader and Counter-punishment represent dummy variables for the treatments in the second stage of the experiment, with Leader including centralized punishment, and Counter-punishment including centralized punishment with the option of counter-punishment of the leader. The last four variables are the interactions for the two treatments in the game. Covariates for the four models are the respective round, participants’ sex, age and age squared, and parents' level of education. Omitted variables in the regression are the control group for the corruption game and the standard public goods game in the second stage.

4

Table A5: Regression Results for Punishment

  [1] [2] [3] [4]Low Monitoring -0.196 -0.193 -0.472

[0.491] [0.479] [0.668]High Monitoring -0.275 -0.222 -0.523

[0.456] [0.459] [0.465]Counter-punishment -0.515** -0.505** -1.447***

[0.113] [0.120] [0.285]Low * Counter-punishment 1.173*

[0.521]High * Counter-punishment 1.197*

[0.540]N 96 96 96 96

Notes: Each column shows a regression using robust standard errors clustered by session, an OLS regression of the leaders’ punishment levels for four rounds in the second stage of the experiment. Low and High Monitoring are dummy variables for groups with their respective levels of monitoring in the corruption game in the first stage. Counter-punishment is a dummy variable for the treatment in the second stage of the experiment, with centralized punishment and the option of counter-punishment of the leader. The last two variables are the interactions for the two treatments in the game. Covariates for the four models are the respective round, participants’ sex, age and age squared, and parents' educational level. Omitted variables in the regression are the control group for the corruption game and centralized punishment in a public goods game for the second stage.

5

Appendix B: InstructionsInstructionsGeneral instruction for the corruption game (the experimenter read the instructions to all

participants)

Welcome, you’re going to be part of a decision-making experiment. The amount you’re going to

receive depends on the decisions you choose, so please follow carefully the next instructions. Each

one of you will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. To all participants,

besides the gains you earn by playing, you’ll receive a show-up fee of 20 pesos, just for having

assisted today.

All over the experiment you’ll gain experimental currency units (ECU), which will serve to be

converted in pesos at the end of the experiment. Therefore, the more experimental units you gain,

the more money you'll have in the end. Communication is not allowed during the experiment

between the participants, until the end of the session. If anybody has a question, please raise your

hand and one member of the staff will attend you in private. Those participants that break the rules

will be automatically disqualified. The session consist of two different stages, so you must be

careful for each session's instructions.

At the beginning of the experiment, each one of you will receive two envelopes: one contains all the

material needed to complete the experiment (yellow envelope), and the other one will be used to

deliver your decisions and to receive the final results at the end of each period (white envelope). Be

careful to keep safe both envelopes. Both envelopes have been marked with your personal ID

number that you'll use at the end of the session to claim your payoff.

Stage 1 (read out loud by the experimenter to all participants)

Each stage of the experiment will be played by rounds. The first stage will be played by couples,

formed randomly on each round, so no participant will know the identity of his partner, and no

couple will play more than once on this stage.

The stage starts by considering a situation between a firm and a public official and both represent a

couple for the game. The firm is interested on installing a new industrial factory that causes a

damage for the environment and to the public. Additionally, the public official is in charge to give

the no-pollution certificates to all new factories, therefore, he must decide to grant (or not) to this

6

new factory. Before the public official have taken his decision, the firm can offer him a bribe to

encourage him to give it the certificate.

There are two important points to remark: first, if a firm offers a bribe and the public official

accepts the bribe, the latter is not forced to grant the certificate to the firm, that is, the public official

can take the bribe and do not deliver the certificate. Second, if the public official accepts the bribe,

there is a chance that the transfer is discovered and both players would be punished.

Now you can open the yellow envelope where it's specified the role you're going to play for the rest

of this stage and read the next instructions.

7

Decisions step by step (individual sheet of instructions contained in each yellow envelope)

Step 1. The firm must decide whether to offer or not a bribe to the public official. If it decides to

offer a bribe then the firm pays 2 ECU and the game continues in step 2. If the firm decides not to

offer a bribe then the game continues in step 4.

Step 2. If the firm decides to offer a bribe, then it must choose the amount to offer, that could go

from 1 to 9 (integers) ECU. Next, the period continues at step 3.

Step 3. The public official must decide to accept or rejects the bribe from the firm.

If the public official accepts the bribe, the amount of the bribe is reduced from the firm's

account. This amount is multiplied by three and it's added to the public official's account.

Right away, a random number between 1 and 20 will be selected by the experimenter,

where:

o If the number chosen is 1 then the couple of players will be disqualified and both

lose automatically their earnings of the period,

o If the number chosen is 2, 3, ..., 20, then the game continues in step 4,

If the public official rejects the bribe then the accounts of both players remain equal

(although the firm already paid the 2 ECU for offering the bribe). The game continues in

step 4.

Step 4. The public official must decide whether to grant or not the certificate to the firm.

If the public official don't grant the certificate to the firm, then the accounts of both

players increase by 36 ECU.

If the public official grants the certificate to the firm, the firm's account increases by 56

ECU, while the public official's account increases by 30 ECU.

After step 4 the round is over. You should introduce your answer sheet into the white envelope and

pass it to the experimenters when needed. Next, the experimenters will capture the answers from all

participants, write the outcome for everyone and deliver you the profit from the round. After this, a

new round will start and you'll be matched to a new anonymous partner.

8

Payment for the corruption game

(Instructions read out loud by the experimenter after each player has read the last sheet

individually)

At the end of this stage, one round will be randomly selected for all players and everybody will be

paid according to that round's outcome. The exchange rate on this stage is 0.40 pesos by each ECU.

So, if in the selected round you gain 100 ECU you'll receive 40 pesos. You have one minute to

respond in each round.

Decision table and some examples (read and presented by the experimenter to all participants)

To collect the information on each round, the players on the firm's role must write in the selected

answer sheet if they offer (or not) a bribe, and if they offer it, specify the bribe's amount (The firm's

answer sheet is presented to all players).

For those in the public official's role, you should fill in the next table (the corresponding table is

shown). For each possible bribe you must specify whether to accept or not the bribe offered and

whether to grant or not the certificate to the firm. For each decision you choose you'll see the

corresponding profit at the end of the row.

In each round the experimenters will match the decisions for each couple of firms and public

officials and will establish the outcome of the round. In order to check that all instructions are clear

we'll see some examples: (we show an example of the firm's table and another one of the public

official).

Example 1: we suppose the firm decides to not offer a bribe; so, a public official choose to not

grant the certificate in this case. So, the final outcome is that both, the firm and the public official

get 36 ECU each, which equals 14.4 pesos.

Example 2: we assume the firm offers a bribe of 5 ECU. The public official choose to not accept a

bribe of 5 ECU, but decided to grant the certificate for the firm. In the end, the payoff for the firm is

54 ECU while that of the public official equals 30 ECU.

Example 3: we assume now that the firm decides to offer a bribe of 5 ECU. The public official

choose to accept a bribe of 5 ECU. However, the random number selected determines that the

illegal transfer is discovered and both players lose their profits.

9

Example 4 : finally, we assume the firm offers a 6 ECU bribe. The public official choose to accept

the bribe (and the transfer is not discovered). Additionally, the public official decided to not grant

the certificate to the firm, which means that the firm's payoff equals 28 ECU and the public

official's payoff is 54 ECU.

Now you can start answering the first round of the game.

10

Treatment 1: public good game (instruction read out loud to all participants)

Now we'll randomly form groups of 4 members where no one will know the identity of their

colleagues. Each group will play together for the rest of the experiment. Each member of your

group played the same game as you played before, so each group is randomly formed by firms and

public officials that decided to offer (accept) or not a bribe.

On this part of the experiment each player has an endowment of 20 ECU. You can either assign an

amount of the endowment to your private account or invest a part of it into an investment project.

Each ECU not invested in the project will be automatically saved in your private account. Each

ECU saved in your private account will be added to your round's payoff, and each ECU invested in

the project will be summed with those of your partner’s investments, multiplied by two and divided

equally among all members of your group.

Earnings by your private account (20 ECU minus your investment to the project)

+ Earnings by your investment in the project (0.5 x Sum of all investments in your group)

= Your round's total earnings

Therefore, your earnings by round correspond to the sum of the earnings by investing on the

common project plus the amount saved on your private account.

As we stated before, the identity of your partners will be anonymous and you will play together for

the rest of the experiment. You must write your investment decision to the project in the sheets

contained on the yellow envelope where is marked your group and your member number (you

should write your answer according to your group's member number). So, the steps to follow are

these:

1. You must write in the answer sheet your contribution to the project (the amount not

invested will be saved in your private account), and you should pass your decision to the

experimenters inside the white envelope.

2. After this, the experimenters will capture all participants decisions,

3. Then, your answer sheet will be given back to you with the information of your total

earnings of the round and the investments made by your group's partners.

4. Finally, the round ends and a new round will start.

Next we present to you some examples to illustrate the exercise:

11

Example 1: none of the players of your group invest on the project. So, the payoff for each one is

only 20 ECU, from the endowment.

Example 2: all partners of the group invest 20 ECU on the project. Therefore, the sum of all

investments is 80 ECU, multiplied by two and it is divided equally to all partners in the group

which means a final payoff of 40 ECU for each player.

Example 3: we assume your three partners decide to invest all their endowments in the project but

you decided not to invest on it. So, the sum of all investments equals 60 ECU, divided by four

partners gives us 30 ECU of earnings by the investment on the project for each one. Additionally,

you count with 20 ECU saved in your private account, so your total payoff of the round is 50 ECU

while your partners earn 30 ECU each.

Example 4: we assume you decide to invest 10 ECU to the project and your partners decided not to

invest at all. Then, your earnings by investing on the project are 5 ECU because the total investment

of the group is 10 ECU, which is multiplied by two and divided by four gives us 5 ECU for each

player. So, your total gain for the round is 5 ECU (by the project) plus your 10 ECU saved in your

private account equals 15 ECU, while your partners total earnings are 5 ECU by the project's profit

and their 20 ECU saved equals 25 ECU.

Each round you have at most one minute to make your investment decision and then you must pass

your answer to the experimenters. The exchange rate for this stage is 0.16 pesos for each ECU.

Now you can open your yellow envelope and start fill in your answer sheet.

12

Treatment 2: public goods game with a leader (instructions read out loud to all participants)

Now we'll randomly form groups of 4 members where no one will know the identity of their

colleagues. Each group will play together for the rest of the experiment. Each member of your

group played the same game as you played before, so each group is randomly formed by firms and

public officials that decided to offer (accept) or not a bribe.

On this part of the experiment each player has an endowment of 20 ECU. You can either assign an

amount of the endowment to your private account or invest a part of it into an investment project.

Each ECU not invested in the project will be automatically saved in your private account. Each

ECU saved in your private account will be added to your round's payoff, and each ECU invested in

the project will be summed with those of your partner’s investments, multiplied by two and divided

equally among all members of your group.

Earnings by your private account (20 ECU minus your investment to the project)

+ Earnings by your investment in the project (0.5 x Sum of all investments in your group)

= Your round's total earnings

Therefore, your earnings by round correspond to the sum of the earnings by investing on the

common project plus the amount saved on your private account.

Additionally we'll randomly pick one player for each group (the player selected as leader has

different answer sheets than the rest of the group's players). This player is allowed to reduce (or not)

the earnings of the other three partners of the group after everybody receives the information of

their earnings of investing on the project.

So, the players not selected must decide how much to invest on the project while the player selected

additionally decides how many ECU reduces the other player's earnings. The latter always must

mark how many ECU to reduce but if he do not want to reduce any unit then he must write zero on

the corresponding space. For each decision you have at most one minute and then you must pass

your answers into the white envelope.

If the player selected decides to reduce the earnings of one player he must pay a cost for doing it.

The number units to reduce for one player goes from zero to 10 at most. It is important to underline

that if the player selected pays one unit for reduce someone's earnings, the latter's earnings will be

reduced by 3 units. Plus, if the earnings of a player are negative by the reductions of the selected

player, the final round's payoff will be zero. It is important to take account of this information for

13

both, the player selected who decides the units to reduce and to the other players who will receive a

reduction multiplied by three.

The steps to follow are:

1. Choose how many units to invest on the project (and the amount that goes to the private account);

2. After the experimenters have captured all participant’s decisions, you will know your earnings of

the round and the investments made by your partners;

3. The player selected will decide how many units will reduce to the other players’ earnings.

4. Each player will know the number of units reduced by the selected player and final earnings after

reductions. After this, the round is over and a new one will start.

Next we present an example to illustrate the exercise:

Example: we assume that player one is selected to reduce the earnings of the rest of the group.

Imagine that after the investment decisions are made, each player has earned 30 ECU. Now, we

assume the player selected pays one unit cost to reduce the earnings of each player of the group.

Then, the final payoff for each player, after deductions, equals 27 ECU because player one had 30

ECU minus 3 ECU paid to reduce other players' earnings (one for each player), and the other

players had 30 ECU minus one unit selected by player one (multiplied by three) equals 27 ECU

each. If, instead, the player selected decides to reduce three units to each player, then the final

payoff for the participants is 21 ECU for the player selected (30 ECU minus 9 ECU to reduce to the

other players) and 21 ECU to the others (30 ECU minus 3*3 ECU selected by player one). Or, if the

player selected decides not to reduce the earnings of the rest of the group, so each player conserves

its 30 ECU.

Each round you have at most one minute to make your investment decision and then you must pass

your answer to the experimenters. The exchange rate for this stage is 0.16 pesos for each ECU.

Now you can open your yellow envelope and start fill in your answer sheet.

14

Treatment 3: public goods game with punishment to the leader (instructions read out loud to all

participants)

Now we'll randomly form groups of 4 members where no one will know the identity of their

colleagues. Each group will play together for the rest of the experiment. Each member of your

group played the same game as you played before, so each group is randomly formed by firms and

public officials that decided to offer (accept) or not a bribe.

On this part of the experiment each player has an endowment of 20 ECU. You can either assign an

amount of the endowment to your private account or invest a part of it into an investment project.

Each ECU not invested in the project will be automatically saved in your private account. Each

ECU saved in your private account will be added to your round's payoff, and each ECU invested in

the project will be summed with those of your partner’s investments, multiplied by two and divided

equally among all members of your group.

Earnings by your private account (20 ECU minus your investment to the project)

+ Earnings by your investment in the project (0.5 x Sum of all investments in your group)

= Your round's total earnings

Therefore, your earnings by round correspond to the sum of the earnings by investing on the

common project plus the amount saved on your private account.

Additionally we'll randomly pick one player for each group (the player selected as leader has

different answer sheets than the rest of the group's players). This player is allowed to reduce (or not)

the earnings of the other three partners of the group after everybody receives the information of

their earnings of investing on the project.

So, the players not selected must decide how much to invest on the project while the player selected

additionally decides how many ECU reduces the other player's earnings. The latter always must

mark how many ECU to reduce but if he do not want to reduce any unit then he must write zero on

the corresponding space. For each decision you have at most one minute and then you must pass

your answers into the white envelope.

If the player selected decides to reduce the earnings of one player he must pay a cost for doing it.

The number units to reduce for one player goes from zero to 10 at most. It is important to underline

that if the player selected pays one unit for reduce someone's earnings, the latter's earnings will be

reduced by 3 units. Plus, if the earnings of a player are negative by the reductions of the selected

15

player, the final round's payoff will be zero. It is important to take account of this information for

both, the player selected who decides the units to reduce and to the other players who will receive a

reduction multiplied by three.

Additionally, once each player has chosen the amount to invest to the project and knows the number

of units reduced by the player selected to his earnings, the players affected by the reductions of the

player selected would be able to respond. This means that players affected by the player selected

can now reduce the earnings of the player selected. To do this, the player must pay 3 units of his

earnings to reduce one unit of the player selected earnings. After this extra step, each player will

know his final earnings.

So, the steps to follow are:

1. Choose how many units to invest on the project (and the amount that goes to the private

account);

2. After the experimenters have captured all participant’s decisions, you will know your

earnings of the round and the investments made by your partners;

3. The player selected will decide how many units will reduce to the other players’ earnings.

4. Each player will know the number of units reduced by the selected player and final earnings

after reductions.

5. Those players affected by a reduction of the selected player on step 3 are able to reduce the

earnings of the latter. To do this, they must pay a cost of 3 ECU for one ECU of reduction

to the selected player.

6. The selected player will know the number of units reduced to his earnings and his final

payoff. The other players will know too their final payoffs. This round ends and a new

round will start.

To understand better the exercise, let’s make an example:

Example: we assume that after the common investments to the project each player earns 30 ECU.

Now, if the selected player reduces one ECU to each partner of his group, their earnings would be

27 ECU each because the selected player spends 3 units by reducing one unit per partner and each

partner loses 3 units by the reduction of the selected player. Now, if player 2 decides to reduce 2

units to the player selected earnings, while player 3 decides not to reduce the selected player

earnings and player 4 chooses to reduce 3 units to the player selected earnings. Then, the final

payoffs for the group are:

Player 1 (selected): 27 ECU - (5 ECU reduced by the other players) = 22 ECU

16

Player 2: 27 ECU - (2 ECU reduced to player 1 * 3 of the cost = 6 ECU) = 21 ECU

Player 3: 27 ECU - (0 ECU reduced to player 1) = 27 ECU

Player 4: 27 ECU - (3 ECU reduced to player 1 * 3 of the cost = 9 ECU) = 18 ECU

Each round you have at most one minute to make your investment decision and then you must pass

your answer to the experimenters. The exchange rate for this stage is 0.16 pesos for each ECU.

Now you can open your yellow envelope and start fill in your answer sheet.

17

Appendix C: Tables for Answer SheetsTable C1 Answer table, public official

ID number: __________________

Bribe Accept the bribe?

Grants the certificate?

Firm payoff

Public official payoff

1Yes No 33 39

Yes 53 33

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

2Yes No 32 42

Yes 52 36

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

3Yes No 31 45

Yes 51 39

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

4Yes No 30 48

Yes 50 42

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

5Yes No 29 51

Yes 49 45

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

6Yes No 28 54

Yes 48 48

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

7Yes No 27 57

Yes 47 51

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

8Yes No 26 60

Yes 46 54

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

9Yes No 25 63

Yes 45 57

No No 34 36Yes 54 30

If the firm does not offer a bribe

No 36 36Yes 56 30

Table C2 Answer table, firm

18

ID number: _____________________________

Your decision Public Official choices

Earnings

Your payoff

Public Official payoff

You offer a bribe {1,2, …,

9}

Accept the

bribe

The bribe is discovered - 0 0

The bribe isn't discovered

It grants you the certificate 54 - t 30 + (3 x t)It doesn't grant you the

certificate 34 - t 36 + (3 x t)

Don't accept

the bribe

- It grants you the certificate 54 30

- It doesn't grant you the certificate 34 36

You don't offer a

bribe {0}

- - It grants you the certificate 56 30

- - It doesn't grant you the certificate 36 36

t represents the bribe offered

Knowing this, do you offer a bribe? ______________________________ ECU

Write down the number of ECU you want to offer, between 0 and 9 (integer).

Does the public official accepted the bribe? _____________

Does the public official grant you the certificate? ____________

Table C3 Answer sheet, public goods game

ID number:    

Partner 1 investment:      ECU

Partner 2 investment:      ECU

Partner 3 investment:      ECU

Partner 4 investment:      ECU

Private account earnings:      

ECU

Public project earnings:      ECU

Round's total earnings:      ECU

19

Table C4 Answer sheet, public goods game with leader

ID number:         ID number:        

Partner 1 investment:      ECU Partner 1 investment:      

ECU

Partner 2 investment:      ECU Partner 2 investment:      

ECU

Partner 3 investment:      ECU Partner 3 investment:      

ECU

Partner 4 investment:      ECU Partner 4 investment:      

ECU

Private account earnings:      ECU Private account earnings:      

ECU

Public project earnings:      ECU Public project earnings:      

ECU

Preliminary earnings:      ECU Preliminary earnings:      

ECU

Earnings reduction:      ECU Partner 1 reduction:      

ECU

Round's total earnings:      ECU Partner 2 reduction:      

ECU

Partner 3 reduction:      ECU

Partner 4 reduction:      ECU

Round's total earnings:      ECU

Table C5 Answer sheet, public goods game with punishment to the leader

ID number:         ID number:        

Partner 1 investment:       ECU Partner 1 investment:       ECUPartner 2 investment:       ECU Partner 2 investment:       ECUPartner 3 investment:       ECU Partner 3 investment:       ECUPartner 4 investment:       ECU Partner 4 investment:       ECU

Private account earnings:       ECU Private account earnings:       ECUPublic project earnings:       ECU Public project earnings:       ECUPreliminary total earnings:       ECU Preliminary total earnings:       ECU

Earnings reduction:       ECU Partner 1 reduction:       ECU

20

Earnings minus reductions:       ECU Partner 2 reduction:       ECUPartner 3 reduction:       ECU

Reduction to selected player: ECU Partner 4 reduction:       ECURound’s total earnings: ECU

Earnings minus reductions:       ECU

Reductions received: ECURound’s total earnings: ECU

21