3178065] longino, helen e.; keller, evelyn fox; fausto-sterling, anne; ha -- science, objectivity,...

7/27/2019 3178065] Longino, Helen E.; Keller, Evelyn Fox; Fausto-Sterling, Anne; Ha -- Science, Objectivity, And Feminist Val

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Science, Objectivity, and Feminist ValuesReflections on Gender and Science by Evelyn Fox Keller; Myths of Gender: BiologicalTheories about Women and Men by Anne Fausto-Sterling; The Science Question in Feminismby Sandra HardingReview by: Helen E. Longino

Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 561-574Published by: Feminist Studies, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178065 .

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REVIEW ESSAYSCIENCE, OBJECTIVITY, AND FEMINIST VALUES

HELENE. LONGINO

Reflections n Genderand Science.By Evelyn Fox Keller.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1985.Mythsof Gender:BiologicalTheories bout Womenand Men. ByAnne Fausto-Sterling. ew York:BasicBooks, 1986.TheScienceQuestionnFeminism. ySandraHarding. thaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress, 1986.

The feminist demonstrationof masculinepartialityand bias inwell-establishedfields of inquiry has shaken our faith in con-ventionalknowledge.How deeply must our skepticismreach?Isrationalitytselfonly an instrumentof male domination?s objec-tivitya masculine illusion? f we answer hereaffirmatively,whatis left as groundforourown feminist claims?Thesequestionsat-tain their most threateningdimensions when we bringfeministanalytictools to bear on the naturalsciences.Thephysical,chemical,andlife sciencesposea complexsubjectfor feminist inquiry. They are, as professions,bastions of maleprivilege.Throughvariousscience-basedechnologies, heyarein-creasingly involved in the transformationof productive andreproductiveprocesses.Most twentieth-centuryWesterners indin these sciencesa source forunderstanding atureandourselvesas partof andin relation o nature.Theyhavebecome modelsforany kind of knowledgeand most kindsof inquiry.And a certainvision of these sciences lies at the cool heartof modem Westernculture'sself-image.In each of these aspects, the sciences haveFeministStudies 14, no. 3 (Fall 1988). ? 1988 by Helen E. Longino561

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562 Helen E. Longino

been constructedn hostilityto women and to what is named asfemale. Paradoxically,however, they have been a source ofresistanceto benightedprejudiceeven while helping to inventnew modesandbasesof inferiority.Theyhave been a locusof in-tellectualfulfillment,emancipation,andjoy, formen and for thefew women admitted. And their applications can save andameliorateas well as destroylives.Each of the books reviewed here is addressedprimarily o oneaspectof the complexface of science. Inevitably,of course,theauthors'concernsspill over to the others. Evelyn Fox Keller,aphysicistturned mathematicalbiologist,has formany yearsbeenfascinatedby the effects of gender and of psychodynamicpro-cesses on the sciences. Reflectionson Genderand Science is the in-tegratedand expanded presentationof reflectionsthat have ap-peared in scientific and feministjournalssince the mid-1970s.DevelopmentalbiologistAnne Fausto-Sterlings well known fordevastatingcritiquesof specific forms of scientific sexism. She,too, has thoughtabout the issues of good science, bad science,feminist science, and objectivityin the struggleto replace the"mythsof gender,"which providethe title for her book. SandraHardings one of the bestknown of the feministphilosophersad-dressing"the ciencequestion"ndhas written lluminating ssayson theoretical ssues in the social sciences. Her concern in TheScience Questionin Feminismis as much with how feminists havetalkedabout science as it is with the task of envisioninga newscience.Eachbook raisesandanswersdifferentlyquestionsaboutthe natureof knowledgeand of objectivityandaboutthe relationof the sciencesto theirsupporting ulture.My essaywill focusonthese common concerns.In Reflectionson Genderand Science,Keller is most concerned tosubvertthe hegemonyof certainprincipalorganizingdeasin themodern natural sciences. The identificationof knowledge anddominationhas facilitated he developmentand establishmentofscientific theories informed by one among several possiblephilosophiesof nature.Kellerarguesthat alternative cientificvi-sionshave neverthelessbeena constant, f minority,presence,andshe aims to undo theequationof knowledgeandpowerthatkeepsthose visions subordinated.Because hatequation s, according oKeller, forged in masculine developmental processes, undoing itsimultaneously reveals the basis of the exclusion of women from



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Helen E. Longino 563

the sciences. Keller'sargumentproceeds throughstudies of themetaphoric tructureof the formativedebatesaboutearlymodemscience, throughpsychodynamic nvestigationsof the emotionalcontentof key cognitiveconcepts,and,finally,through hreecasestudiesin contemporary cience.As other scholars,like BrianEaslea and CarolynMerchant'have shown, sexualandgenderimagerywas (atleastin England)central o the ideologicalormationof earlymodemscience.Kellernotes thatFrancisBacon,who first madeexplicitthe connectionsbetween knowledgeand power and who describedexperimenta-tionin languageappropriateo rapeandseduction,alsoarticulatedthe need for a receptiveattitude owardnature,one thatinvolveslisteningto andrespectingnaturerather han (perhapsas well as)imposingone'swill on it. Theseattitudeshavenot beenintegratedin Westernscience but have resulted n at least two traditionsofinquiryin the sciences-one dominantand anotherseeminglyinneed of constantreinvention.A centralgoalof Keller'ss to under-standwhy the traditionassociatedwith control,with mechanisticand reductive explanations,has thrived, but explanationsem-phasizing nteraction,holism, and the integrityof organismsarecontinuallycast aside. To this end, she draws on the work of ob-ject relationstheoristsand psychoanalytically rientedfeminists,arguingthat objectivity,a key characteristic f scientificknowl-edge, has been misunderstood. Keller traces that misunder-standing o the sexualization f scientificknowledgedescribed nthe firstpartof the book:"'Theask of explaining he associationsbetween masculine and scientific thus becomes ... the task ofunderstandingthe emotional substructure that links our ex-perienceof genderwith our cognitiveexperience"p. 80).Taking he capacity orobjectivityasthecapacity ordelineatingself from non-self,Kellerarguesthat the psychologicaldevelop-mentofboysaccentuates heprocessesof self-otherdifferentiationand distortsthe achievement of the true autonomy requiredforobjectivity.Boththe dynamicprocessesof developmentthat re-quire separationfrom the mother and cultural definitions ofmasculinityas independencereinforcean associationof the malewith separateness,pushinghim to rigidand exaggerated epara-tion. Maintenanceof this form of individuation s achieved bydominationof the other.Althoughothertheoristshave used theseideas in explanationof male dominationof women, Keller sees



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here the forgingof the link betweenmasculinity,objectivity,andthe domination of nature. Once the making of this link isunderstood, t becomespossibleto unmakeit, and Kellerdevotesthe restof the second sectionto developingaccountsof autonomyandof objectivityhatfreetheseconceptsfromtheirculturallym-posed connectionswith domination.In the thirdsection,we see how these reflectionsmighthave abearingon actual science andnotjust on ourideasof science.Anessay on theoreticalphysicstraceslong-standing roblems n theinterpretationf quantummechanics o aninability o letgoof theconceptionsof natureand of the knowledgeof natureunderlyingclassicalphysics. An essay on models of slime mold aggregationshows the ideological power of "mastermolecule"theories ofbiological processes, as against models of environmentallystimulated elf-organization.n essayon the workof BarbaraMc-Clintockdemonstrateshow adherenceto a nonstandard oncep-tion of nature leadsto the formulationof differentquestionsandthe discovery of different answers. McClintock'snsistence onthinking about genetic processes in the context of the entireorganismed her to transposition"jumpingenes") ecadesbeforemolecularbiologistswith their insistenceon the immutabilityofinformationcodedin DNA-could conceive of it.

Throughouthese essays,Keller s concernedwith showingtheeffectsof an ideologyof dominationon thepracticeandcontentofscienceandwitharticulatingn alternative hilosophyof natureone in which erosreappears,n which nature'sorder s perceivedas inherent and self-generatedrather than construable as lawgoverned.She endorsesa vision of nature and of societythat re-jects the sexual polaritiespermeatingmodern conceptions ofscienceand natureand that wouldmake nature's tudyas invitingto women as it is to men.AfterencounteringKeller'soriginaland provocative deas, noone canthinkin the sameway about the sciencesagain.Whetherone agreesordisagreeswith detailsor with themajorclaimsof herstudy, Keller has introduced questions that will preoccupyscholars and,one hopes, scientists) orsometime to come.Letmetryto outlinesomeof my questions/reservations. ne set hasto dowith history.How do we explainthe transformationn attitudestoward nature that took place during the sixteenth and seven-teenth centuries? The sexualized language of the debates between



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mechanicistsand hermeticists does not explain what historicalconditionsmakedominationnecessary(orappealing) t that time.CarolynMerchant's nalysisof the environmentaldestructionofEurope s crucial o this explanationbutnotsufficient.2Thesexualimageryused to describeand legitimatedominationmust surelyhave a basisin the actualsexualpoliticsof the period,butfeminist(orany other)historianshave yet to give us an understanding fthis.A secondarea of quandaryhas to do with Keller's luralistic i-

sion of both science's past and its possible future. Given themultiplicityof stylesandapproachesn actualsciences,why doesthe ideologicalprescriptioncontainedin the rhetoricof domina-tion continueto exercisea controllingnfluence n the selectionofthe scientificcommunity?Keller's nswermust lie in an appeal othe self-perpetuatingharacterof genderrelationsas analyzedbyfeminist objectrelationstheory. But this answer must confrontseveralproblems.First,humans,even modernEuropeans, xhibitgreater variety in gender-relatedmatters than object relationstheory seems to allow for. Feministobjectrelationstheorycon-flateswhat SandraHardingusefully distinguishes-symbolicandinstitutionalgenderwith individualgender.It treatsthe questionof how individualsbecome genderedas equivalentto questionsabout the sexual divisionof labor(socialor institutionalgender)and about bivalentsymbolic systemsassociatedwith gendercon-cepts (cultural r symbolicgender).Societiescan,however,main-tainboth social andculturalgendersystemseven thoughmanyoftheir individualmembersdo not conform to genderstereotypes.And if objectrelations heoryis usedto explain he predominanceof one tradition,to what can the actual variety in explanatorytraditionsKeller observes be attributed?s there an explanationavailable within object relationstheory or must we postulatesupervening actors?Second,the scopeof the theoryis problema-tic. Does it aspire o accountforgenderdifferencegenerallyoron-ly forgender n Westernmiddle-class ocieties?Hardingnotesthatin some (African) ocieties the attributesand values associatedwith females in Euro-American re claimed by and for males.Other scholars have made similar claims about other non-European cultures. What childrearing practices prevailing in thosecultures provide the context in which the individual persondevelops, and do they vary in the way consistency would require?



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Third,can a phenomenonas diffuse as the patternof explanationin modem sciencesbe explainedby appeal o individualpersonali-ty, or how do features of personalitybecome ideologicallyen-trenched? suspectthat there are economicandpoliticalreasonsfor the convergenceas well as psychologicalones and that a com-plex interactionof extrapsychicand intrapsychicprocessesis atwork.3My last concerns have to do with the discussionof objectivity.The positive accountof objectivity n the chapteron "Dynamic

Objectivity"uggeststhat dynamic objectivity-which "grantsotheworld aroundus its independentntegrity,butdoesso in awaythat remains cognizant of ... our connectivity with that world"(p.117)-will providemore adequate,reliable,representations fnature han are available hroughstaticobjectivity.Because n herepilogueKellerseemsto be arguing ordiversityrather han whatshe takesto be a more accurateway of conceivingnature,I'mnotsure I understandher properly.Nevertheless,the first claim Icitedinvites indeed,demands the question;How do we know?Traditionally,objectivityin science has been attributedto thejustificatoryprocessesof scientific nquiry,the tests to which wesubjectideas before acceptingthem. Keller's orts of objectivityseemto be attitudeswhich generate he ideasthatgetsubjected otests.What we need is a way to connectthese two conceptionsofobjectivity.AnneFausto-Sterlinglso addresses he connectionbetweenthesex compositionof the scientificwork force and the content ofscience. Her concernin Mythsof Gender: iologicalTheories boutWomenandMen is not with a mode of knowledgethat definesitself as excluding women but with the specific content ofbiological deas aboutwomen, gender,and men. As its title sug-gests, the aim of the book is to overturnbiologicaldeterministunderstandings f behavioraland cognitivesex differencesthatsupportdifferential reatmentof women and men.Fivechapters akeon allegedsex differences n performance nstandardizedestsof various ntellectualabilities, he developmentof genderidentityand genderrole behavior,premenstrual yn-drome andmenopause,allegedmaleaggressivity, ndthe rolesoffemalesand males in human evolution.In each of these, Fausto-Sterlingpresents, n concisebut sufficientdetail,the basicbiologyunderlyingand involved in the more controversial laims about



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sex differencesand sex-linkedcharacteristics.This betterenablesthe readerto understand he scientificaspectsof these debates.Fausto-Sterling'seachingexperience s in evidence here.Althoughher book is clearlypitchedto a "lay"udience,herexplanations reaccessiblewithout a trace of condescension.Most of the workFausto-Sterlingiscussesis recent. It is a measure of the labilityand inventivecapacityof the fields that there is yet newer workwhich she doesnot cover. Thisincludesworkurginga connectionbetween fetaltestosterone evels, greaterbrainhemisphereasym-metry,and a varietyof behavioralexpressionsranging rom left-handedness to allergy proneness to high mathematicalability.These notions, propounded by the late neurologist NormanGeschwindandcognitiveabilitiesresearcherCamillaBenbow,areripe for a feminist treatment.Fausto-Sterlings not content merely to indicate the scientificflaws in the work she discusses. Like other feminist scientiststhinkingabout these issues, she wants to push research n a dif-ferentdirection awayfrommodelsthatstresscontrolandtowardthose that stresscomplexityand interaction.She alsoarguesthat,forthe fields of researchwith which she is concerned, his is anin-herently politicalmove. It is not, in certaincases, possible "todistinguishunequivocablybetween science well done andsciencethat is feminist" p. 212). Fausto-Sterlingupportsthis claim bydiscussingthe work of anotherbiologist,RandiKoeske.Koeske,who is developing new theoretical models for menopauseresearch,criticizescurrentbiomedicaland behavioralmodels fortheirfailure o takeaccountof bothkey aspectsof and the varietyin women'sexperience.In addition, hese modelsignorethe com-plex interactionsbetween physiologicaland psychologicalstates.Koeske urges a much more subtle and diverse program ofresearch,one which begins by takingas primarydatawomen'sown accountsof theirexperiencesand which acknowledgesandattempts to connect the many levels at which the eventsassociated with menopause occur. Fausto-Sterlings not sug-gestingthat feminismoffersa unique window on nature,nor isshe urging hat interactionism nd respectfor complexityreplaceall unicausalresearchprograms.Shedoes seem to be sayingthatthere are certainareasof biologicalresearch-those havingto dowith women, femalebiologicalprocesses,and gender-in whichpolitics necessarily affects science. Patriarchalculture has in-



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evitablyproducedsciencesthatdehumanizeand/ormisrepresentwomen;a moreadequate cientificapproachhasrequiredmodernfeminism for its emergenceand will continue to depend on afeministcontextforits development."Ifwe don'trecognize he ap-proachesdevelopedby scientistssuch as Koeskeas one aspectofbroadpoliticalchange,then a realdangerexiststhat"goodcience"will not prevail .... Quality research alone is not enough. Goodscience . . . can prevail only when the social and political at-mosphereoffersit spaceto growand develop" p.213).As I interpret Fausto-Sterling, she is saying, first, thatmethodologicallylawlessresearchcan be pursuedwithin an in-adequatemodel. The explanatoryrameworksof a researchpro-gram requirescrutinyover and abovethe scrutinywe devote tothe use of appropriateontrols n experimentsand the qualityofthe statisticalanalysis of our results. Secondly, even beautifulresearchpursuedwithin an adequateexplanatoryrameworks indangerof makingno impactatall on the overallpictureof womenand gender presented by the biologicalsciences. If individualresearchprograms emain solatedfromeachother,and from themovementfor social changethat could supportthem, they cansink into the seas of BiologicalAbstracts or Chemical Abstracts4without a trace.I appreciatedFausto-Sterling'snsistence on narrowing thediscussionof the relationsbetweenscience andpolitics, objectivi-ty andvalues,to specificresearchquestions,her senseof the com-plexityof these relations,andher groundingof thatdiscussion n

particular nstances of work. Of course, far from settling theissues,these virtues raisefurtherquestions.For nstance,by whatcriteriado "feministnsights concerningthe subjective/objectiveseparation,the validation of a woman's individualhealth ex-periences,the highlightingof the fear and dislikeof women fre-quentlyfound in the medicalliterature,and the complexityandsocialcontextsof women's ives" p.213)constitutegoodscience?Once we acknowledgethe relevanceof value-basedconsidera-tionsin thedevelopmentof scientific heory,how dowe weightherole of empiricalconsiderations?Koeske'smodel may indeed beworth emulating,but the methodological ssues need furtherdevelopment f her work is to serve as morethan inspiration.Justthis sortof methodologicaldiscussion is promised earlyinThe Science Question in Feminism when Sandra Harding writes



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that "thisbook examines importanttrends in the feminist cri-tiques of science with the aim of identifyingtensions and con-flicts between them, inadequate concepts informing theiranalyses, unrecognizedobstacles to and gaps in their researchprograms,and extensionsthat might transformthem into evenmore powerfultools ..." (p. 10).Harding's mbitiousvolume documentsthe transition n femi-nists'discussionsof sciencefrom"thewomanquestion"- orexam-ple, the nature-nurture ebates-to the sciencequestion-can thesciences accommodate women's experiences and aspirations?How must they be transformedf they areadequately o includewomen as participantsand subjects?Perhapsbecause of its am-bitious scope, Harding'sbook is more uneven than the firsttwodiscussed.Herdiscussionsof feministsocialtheoryareinsightful,as is, for the mostpart,herreviewof literature n the social struc-ture of science. The grasp displayed in this book of both thenaturalsciences and the philosophyof science is more tenuous.Harding dentifiesfive projectsrelatedto the sciences currentlypursuedin contemporaryeministscholarship: 1)studiesof thesocial structureof the sciences, (2)studiesof the uses and abusesof the sciences, (3)criticismof androcentrism nd masculinebiasin particular esearchprograms, 4)textualcriticism for example,explorationof the metaphoricstructureof scientifictheoriesandmanifestos),and (5) epistemologicalexplorations.Althoughcon-tainingexcursions nto Africanphilosophyand historiography fSixteenth-and Seventeenth-centurycience,the book is primarilya discussionof these projects.While findingmuch to praise inthem, Hardingclaimsthatthey have all, ultimately,been limitedby inadequateconceptionsof genderand by inadequateunder-standingsof science.I agreewith this assessmentand found Harding's iscussionofthe tripleaspectsof the gendersystem illuminating.Her treatmentof science is less successful. She assertsthat the two majorerrorsof twentieth-century pproaches o science aretreating cience asa set of sentencesand thinkingabout science as a uniquemeth-odology.Instead,we shouldthinkabout science as "a ully socialactivity."Hardingdoes not, however,developthe implicationsofthis approach or our understanding f scientificknowledgebutconcentrates on showing how failure to appreciatethe socialcharacterof science derailsvarious feministprojects.



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AlthoughTheScienceQuestionn Feminismouches on a richvarietyof topics,the main threadof discussionpursuesthe lastofthe identified feminist projects, "epistemological inquiry."Epistemologys the study of philosophicalproblems n our con-cepts of knowledgeand truth,amongthem the questionof whatconstitutesadequate ustification orassertions hat a givenclaimis true. Hardingdistinguishes hree feministepistemologicalpro-grams-feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, andfeminist"postmodernism."hestates,at the closeof herbook,thatthe projects dentifiedwith all threeof these programsmust con-tinue, but she is concerned with describing he tensions withinand amongthem, which have impededtheirprogress.Harding'scontributionso the questionsI haveraisedforKellerand Fausto-Sterlingareto be expected n these sections,so I shallconcentratemy discussionon them.Feministempiricism s describedas the view that "sexismandandrocentrism re socialbiasescorrectableby stricteradherenceto the existingmethodologicalnormsof inquiry"p.24). Feministempiricisms, thus,notphilosophical mpiricismbutallegiance oone or anothercontemporary cience. Hardingarguesthat femi-nist empiricismundermines tselfby makingthe additional laimthat"women orfeminists,whethermen orwomen)as a grouparemore likely to produceunbiasedand objectiveresultsthan aremen (ornonfeminists)as a group"p. 25). ButHarding'seministempiricist ouldreplyas follows."To ayof anygroup,X, thatit islikely to produceunbiasedresults is to make a statisticalclaimaboutthe correlationof two properties-membership n groupXandproducingunbiasedresults.It is an empiricalassertion hatisitselfsubject o testby theappropriatemethodologies."oproducethe inconsistencyHarding eems to detect,the claimwould haveto be presentedas a conceptual ruthaboutthe natureof woman-hood- thatit is of the essenceof womanhood(or eminism) opro-ducemoreobjectiveorunbiasedresults.Whatfeministempiricisthas made this claim?As NorettaKoertgeobserves,a consistentempiricismwould welcome the new hypothesesthat can be ex-pectedto be putforward ortestingthrough he emergenceof thegay,women's,andThirdWorld iberationmovements.5Whattheempiricist or,in Koertge'sase, the Popperian) oesn'tgive up isthe rightto subjectsaidhypothesesto rigorous ests.Fausto-Sterling,n the chapterscited earlier,comes closest to



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makingthe claims attributedo feministempiricism,but even shedoesn'tclaim that women or feministsare morelikelyto produceunbiasedresults,nor is she content with existing methodologies.She does saythat new ideas abouta specificsubjecthaveemergedin the context of a politicaland culturalmovement that takeswomen's lives seriously.Once those ideashave been transformedintospecifichypotheses,Fausto-Sterling,ould,I'msure,demandthatthey be rigorously ested.The continuing eministcontext isnecessaryto keepthe ideasalive,to connectisolatedresearchpro-gramswith one anotherso that they can coalesce in a broaderunified vision. Whatboth the idealizingempiricistand Hardingoverlook s our actualworldin whichso muchresearchs done,somuch is published, that perfectly good-even brilliant-work(especially f done by women or membersof othermarginalizedgroups)can die of neglect.Harding's eminist empiricistis a straw woman-designed togive way to feministstandpointheory,the view thatinquiry roma feminist (or women's)perspectivewill providemore adequateunderstandings f nature and social life. Here, there are real in-dividuals-Jane Flax, HilaryRose, Dorothy Smith,Nancy Hart-sock (I would add AlisonJaggar o Harding'sist)-who identifythemselves as standpointtheorists.The chapter"FromFeministEmpiricism o FeministStandpointEpistemologies"s one of thebest in the book. Harding'sdiscussion,however, fails to addresstwo central issues. If standpoint theories are to constituteepistemologies i.e., theoriesof justificationor of the groundsformakingtruthclaims),then such notionsas "lessdistorted" r "ob-jectivity increasing" emandanalysis.Second,standpoint heorywas developedby socialscientists o addressspecificproblems nthe various social sciences. AlthoughHardingdid argue in anearlierchapter hatwe oughtnot takephysicsas the paradigmofinquiry, there is no argument(althoughone is promised)thatsocialsciences areor shouldbe the paradigmof inquiry.Such anargumentwould be necessary o take the discussionof standpointtheory in The Science Question in Feminism as relevant to themethodologicalssues in physical,chemical,and life sciences.Standpoint heories themselves are supplanted n TheScienceQuestionn Feminismby "feministpostmodernism."Hardingwilllater say that we need both approaches but seems to be convincedby the observation, made by a number of feminists, that neither



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women nor feminists constitute a homogeneous group fromwhich a singleworld view orperspectivecanbe constructed.Thepostmodernismshe endorses seems, however, incomplete. Asepistemology,orexample, hepostmodernismhe findsin DonnaHaraway'scomplex essay, "AManifestofor Cyborgs,"6justifiesknowledge claims only insofar as they arise from enthusiasticviolationof the foundingtaboosof Westernhumanism"p. 193).Any violation?Does it matterif violationsresultin incompatibleknowledgeclaims?Harding aultsthis approach orfailingto giveus knowledgethat is adequateas a basis for politicalaction,butsimilarquestionsarisefor the thesis expressed n her conclusionthat "ithas been and should be moral and politicalbeliefs thatdirect the developmentof both the intellectualand social struc-turesof science" p.250).This does not assistus, for example,inchoosingbetween ElaineMorgan'sDescentof Woman nd NancyTanner'sOnBecomingHuman.7Both of these books develop ac-counts of human origins that are shaped by feminist commit-ments,but Morgan's ynecentric toryflies in the face of contem-porarypaleontologicaland biologicaltheory and methodology,andTanner's ookexploits hem.Harding'shesisalsodoesnot ad-dress the difficulttask of evaluatingmoral andpoliticaldivisionsamongthose committedto the struggleagainstmasculinismandcorporatedomination.If the bookfailsto articulatea new and coherentaccountof thesciences, it does review a fairamountof literature. ts value as areview is, however, diminishedby some carelessscholarship orpoorediting)andidiosyncraticudgments.Someerrorsaretrivial,such as the overestimatedncidenceof hermaphroditismp. 127),the description of the professional scientific work force aslaboratory echniciansand equipmentmakers (p. 72), the mis-leadingsuggestion hat evolutionarybiologyis primarilydevotedto studyinghuman evolution (p. 46), and occasionalmisattribu-tions and miscitations.A more seriouslapse is Harding's irtualdismissalof EvelynFoxKeller'sworkas "abrief accountof the im-plicationsof object relationstheory for science."Keller's ong-standingengagementwith these issues has had such a strong n-fluenceon feministsthinkingaboutthe sciencesthat this descrip-tion is quiteperplexing.Finally,Harding's riticismsof the philosophyof science (pre-sented for the most part as the productof an anonymousand



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homogeneousfraternity) re directedat outdatedviews and over-look current hinking n thisfield.Harding hidesphilosophersorthinkingof science as a unique methodologyor set of sentences.Even in positivism's heyday, it was scientific theories-notscience-that were treatedas sets of sentences. Mostphilosophersof science think of scientificreasoningas on a continuumwithpractical, everyday reasoning and not as the expression of auniquemethodology.Theonly establishedphilosopherof scienceHardingdoes take on individuallyis Mary Hesse, the Britishhistorian and philosopher of science. Harding'streatment ofHesse'srecent work seems oddlyincomplete, or much of it, con-traryto what Hardingsuggests,is a philosophicalexplorationofthe interactionsbetween science,metaphysics,and sociallife.8Because so much of the argumentof TheScienceQuestionnFeminisms structuredas a discussionof the problemsandinade-quacies in the existing literature,it is disappointingthat theliterature s so unreliablyreported.The main problemwith thisbook, however, is the attemptto subsume the naturalsciencesunder the social sciences without sufficientlyattendingto thegoals,content,andmethodologiesof natural cienceinquiry.Har-ding consequentlyrepresentsboth feministsand philosophersashavingthought n onlythe shallowest ermsabout he questionsofobjectivity,values, realism,and truththat are raisedby the cri-tiques of science.This reductionist reatmentof her sourcespre-vents herfromgoing beyondthe obviousclaimthat the "problem-atics"of science are androcentricand from developing sophisti-catedand powerfulanswersto the questionsshe raises.Reflectingon all three books leadsme to realizethatwe, femi-nist scholarswriting n andaboutthe sciences,havenotsufficient-ly distinguisheda critique of the sciences from a critique ofpositivistphilosophyof science. A discussion of alternativewaysof doing science or of thinkingabout nature is not enough todislodgeentrenchedphilosophicalviews aboutknowledge.Andacritiqueof thoseviews will not show us how science canbe donedifferentlyor why it shouldbe. In orderto answer the questionsaboutrationality ndobjectivity hattroubleus as we remaketheworld, we must distinguish he sciences from theirphilosophies.This is not to say that the two are not related. Feministphilos-ophershave much to learnaboutthe natureof sciencefromstudy-ing the practiceof feminist scientists as well as from tryingto



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understandhe more abstractphilosophicalandsociologicalques-tions.Andfeminist scientistsareeagerfor the new ideas andcon-ceptual space that philosopherscan make available.Scientificknowledge-although not the productof some uniquely truth-producingmethod is neverthelessa specificform of knowledge.It is pursuedfor particularreasons,to achieve particularends.Furthermore,he aimsof individualsengaged n scientific nquiryarenot, or not necessarily, denticalwith those of the societythatsupportssuch inquiry.We must attendto what these aimsareorcouldbe to morefullyunderstandboth the limitsandthepossibili-ties of science.

NOTESI wish to thank Ruth Doell and ElisabethLloydfor theirhelpfulcomments on earlierdraftsof this essay.1. Brian Easlea, Witch-Hunting,Magic, and The New Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands,N.J.: HumanitiesPress, 1980);and CarolynMerchant,TheDeathof Nature:Women,Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980).2. Merchant,42-68.3. RogerGottliebmakes some similarpoints aboutfeministobjectrelations theorists'explanationsof male domination in "Motheringand the Reproductionof Power,"SocialistReview,no. 77 (September-October984):93-119.4. BiologicalAbstracts ists about 15,000 articles in biology per month, and ChemicalAbstractsndicatesa similar, f not even higher, publicationrate in chemistry.5. Noretta Koertge,"Methodology, deology, and Feminist Critiquesof Science," nPSA, 1980, vol. 2, ed. Peter D. Asquith and Ronald Giere (East Lansing, Mich.:Philosophyof ScienceAssociation,1981),346-59.6. Donna Haraway,"AManifestofor Cyborgs," ocialistReview,no. 80 (March-April1985):65-107.Hardingalso cites conversationswith JaneFlaxas havingcontributed oher acceptanceof a postmodernist tance.7. ElaineMorgan,TheDescentof WomanNew York:Stein &Day, 1972);and NancyTanner,OnBecomingHuman Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1981).8. See the essays in Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy ofScience Bloomington:ndianaUniversityPress, 1980).

3178065] longino, helen e.; keller, evelyn fox; fausto-sterling, anne; ha -- science, objectivity,...

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