3. The Level-of-Analysis Problem inInternational Relations

J. David Singer is Professor of Political Science at the University ofMichigan. A pioneer in the effort to render the study of international politicsmore scientific, his many important works include authorship of Deterrence,Arms Control, and Disarmament (1962) and editorship of Human Behavior andInternational Politics (1965) and Quantitative International Politics (1968). Ascan be seen in Selections 7, 29, 35, and 45 as well as here, Professor Singer'scontribution has been multifaceted and includes works that focus on theoreticalproblems, that present unique empirical data, that analyze crucial policy dilemmas,and that examine the methodological challenges confronting researchers. Inaddition, and perhaps no less important, Professor Singer's research has not curbedhis involvement in political affairs. His commitment to the peace movement is asthoroughgoing as is his detachment in his scholarly and scientific inquiries, thusdemonstrating that forfeiture of effective citizenship need not be the price ofscientific research into international politics. In this essay Professor Singer arguespersuasively that while the field consists of both international politics and foreignpolicy, the two are not the same and the differences between them are in certainrespects unbridgeable. Indeed, the distinction that is drawn here between thetwo aspects of the field seems so basic that it has been introduced into both thetitle and the organization of this volume. [Reprinted from Klaus Knorr andSidney Verba (eds.), The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92, by permission of the author andPrinceton University Press.]

In any area of scholarly inquiry, there arealways several ways in which the phenomena understudy may be sorted and arranged for purposes ofsystemic analysis. Whether in the physical or socialsciences, the observer may choose to focus upon theparts or upon the whole, upon the componentsor upon the systemT YfiTmay, for example, choosebetween the flowers or the garden, the rocks or thequarry, the trees or the forest, the houses or theneighborhood, the cars or the traffic jam, the de-linquents or the gang, the legislators or the legis-

20

lative, and so on.J Whether he selects the micro- ormacro-level of analysis is ostensibly a mere matter ofmethodological or conceptual convenience. Yet thechoice often turns out to be quite difficult, and maywell become a central issue within the disciplineconcerned. The complexity and significance of theselevel-of-analysis decisions are readily suggested by

1 As Kurt Lewin observed in his classic contribution tothe social sciences: "The first prerequisite of a successfulobservation in any science is a definite understanding aboutwhat size of unit one is going to observe at a given time."Field Theory in Social Science, New York, 1951, p. 157.

[3] The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations 21

the long-standing controversies between socialpsychology and sociology, personality-oriented andculture-oriented anthropology, or micro- and macro-economics, to mention but a few. In the vernacularof general systems theory, the observer is alwaysconfronted with a system, its sub-systems, and theirrespective environments, and while he may chooseas his system any cluster of phenomena from themost minute organism to the universe itself, suchchoice cannot be merely a function of whim or caprice,habit or familiarity.2 The responsible scholar mustbe p~repared to evaluate the relative utility—con-ceptual and methodological—of the various alterna-tives open to him, and to appraise the manifoldimplications of the level of analysis finally selected.So it is with international relations.

But whereas the pros and cons of the variouspossible levels of analysis have beea^'debated ex-haustively in many of the social sciences, the issuehas scarcely been raised among students of ouremerging discipline.3 Such tranquillity may be seenby some as a reassuring indication that the issue isnot germane to our field, and by others as evidencethat it has already been resolved, but this writerperceives the quietude with a measure of concern.He is quite persuaded of its relevance and certainthat it has yet to be resolved. Rather, it is contendedthat the issue has been ignored by scholars stillsteeped in the intuitive and artistic tradition of thehumanities or enmeshed in the web of "practical"policy. We have, in our texts and elsewhere, roamedup and down the ladder of organizational complexitywith remarkable abandon, focusing upon the totalsystem, international organizations, regions, coali-tions, extra-national associations, nations, domesticpressure groups, social classes, elites, and individualsas the needs of the moment required. And though

2 For a useful introductory statement on the defini-tional and taxonomic problems in a general systems ap-proach, see the papers by Ludwig von Bertalanffy,'' GeneralSystem Theory," and Kenneth Boulding, "General SystemTheory: The Skeleton of Science," in Society for theAdvancement of General Systems Theory, GeneralSystems, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956, I, part I.

3 An important pioneering attempt to deal with some ofthe implications of one's level of analysis, however, isKenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, New York,1959. But Waltz restricts himself to a consideration of theseimplications as they impinge on the question of the causesofwar. Seealsothis writer's review of Waltz, "InternationalConflict: Three Levels of Analysis," World Politics, XII(April 1960), pp. 453-61.

most of us have tended to settle upon the nation as ourmost comfortable resting place, we have retainedour propensity for vertical drift, failing to appreciatethe value of a stable point of focus.4 Whether thislack of concern is a function of the relative infancyof the discipline or the nature of the intellectualtraditions from whence it springs, it neverthelessremains a significant variable in the general sluggish-ness which characterizes the development of theoryin the study of relations among nations. It is thepurpose of this paper to raise the issue, articulate thealternatives, and examine the theoretical implicationsand consequences of two of the more widely employedlevels of analysis: the international system and thenational sub-systems.

I. The Requirements of anAnalytical Model

Prior to an examination of the theoretical implicationsof the level of analysis or orientation employed in ourmodel, it might be worthwhile to discuss the uses towhich any such model might be put, and the require-ments which such uses might expect of it.

Obviously, we would demand that it offer ahighly accurate description pf_the; phenomena under"consideration. Therefore the scheme must present •as complete an^l_3JSdj)sjtQrjt£d__ji_gicto^__c)f these I ,/phenomena as is possible; it must correlate with I \ >^objective reality and coincidejvj,th,-pur empirical I

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referents to the highest possible degree. Yet we know \that such accurate representation of a complex andwide-ranging body of phenomena is extremely diffi-cult. Perhaps a useful illustration may be borrowedfrom cartography; the oblate spheroid which theplanet earth most closely represents is not trans-ferable to the two-dimensional surface of a mapwithout some distortion. Thus, the Mercator projec-tion exaggerates distance and distorts direction at anincreasing rate as we move north or south from theequator, while the polar gnomonic projection suffersfrom these same debilities as we move toward theequator. Neither offers therefore a wholly accuratepresentation, yet each is true enough to reality to bequite useful for certain specific purposes. The same

4 Even during the debate between "realism" and"idealism" the analytical implications of the various levelsof analysis received only the scantiest attention; rather theemphasis seems to have been at the two extremes of prag-matic policy and speculative metaphysics.

I

A^, -»<", fu-.VI

22 Identifying the Boundaries and Contents of the Field

sort oftolerance_js^nec£ssaryiiievaluating any'analytical model for tKe stud*y of international Tela-tions; if we must sacrifice total representationalaccuracy, the problem is to~d^ci^'wheredistdrtionis~least dysfunctional and where such accuracy isabsolutely essential.

These decisions are, in turn, a function of thesecond requirement of any such model—a capacitytoexplain the relationships among the phenomenaunder investigation. Here our concern is not so muchwith accuracy of description as with validity ofexplanation. Our model must have such analyticalcapabilities as to treat the causal relationships in afashion which is not only valid and thorough, butparsimonious; this latter requirement is often over-looked, yet its implications for research strategy arenot inconsequential.5 It should be asserted here thatthe primary purpose of theory is to explain, andwhen descriptive and explanatory requirements arein confiJctTtSe'Tat'teT ought tobe^iwn^pFiority, evenaf'the cost of some representational inaccuracy.

Finally, we may legitimately demand that anyanalytical model offer the promise of reliableprediction. In mentioning this requirement last, thereis no implication that it is the most demanding ordifficult of the three. Despite the popular belief tothe contrary, prediction demands less of one's modelthan does explanation or even description. Forexample, any informed layman can predict thatpressure on the accelerator of a slowly moving carwill increase its speed; that more or less of the moonwill be visible tonight than last night; or that thenormal human will flinch when confronted with animpending blow. These predictions do not require a

5 For example, one critic of the decision-making modelformulated by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and BurtonSapin, in Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study ofInternational Politics (Princeton, N.J., 1954), points outthat no single researcher could deal with all the variables inthat model and expect to complete more than a very fewcomparative studies in his lifetime. See Herbert McClosky,"Concerning Strategies for a Science of InternationalPolitics," World Politics, VIII (January 1956), pp. 281-95.In defense, however, one might call attention to the relativeease with which many of Snyder's categories could becollapsed into more inclusive ones, as was apparently donein the subsequent case study (see note 11 below). Perhaps amore telling criticism of the monograph is McClosky'scomment that "Until a greater measure of theory is intro-duced into the proposal and the relations among variablesare specified more concretely, it is likely to remain littlemore than a setting-out of categories and, like any taxonomy,fairly limited in its utility" (p. 291).

particularly elegant or sophisticated model of theuniverse, but their explanation demands far more thanmost of us carry around in our minds. Likewise, wecan predict with impressive reliability that any nationwill respond to military attack in kind, but a descrip-tion and understanding of the processes and factorsleading to such a response are considerably moreelusive, despite the gross simplicity of the actsthemselves.

Having articulated rather briefly the require-ments of an adequate analytical model, we might turnnow to a consideration of the ways in which one'schoice of analytical focus impinges upon such amodel and affects its descriptive, explanatory, andpredictive adequacy.

II. The International System asLevel of Analysis

Beginning with the systemic level of analysis, wefind in the total international system a partiallyfamiliar and highly promising point of focus. Firstof all, it is the most comprehensive of the levelsavailable, ^rjcompassiing the totality of interactionswhich take place v^itJiujIERFsy^tern and its environ-ment. By focusing on the system, we are enabled tostudy the patterns of interaction which the systemreveals, anoto generalize about such phenomena asthe creation and dissojutionpf coalitions, the f^equen-•cy ana^duration of sp^hc^gowerconfigurations,modifications in its stability, its responsiveness tochanges in formal political institutions^~aTld thenorms and folklore which it manifests as a societalsystem. In other words, the systemic level of analysis,and only this level, permits us to examine inter-national relations in the whole, with a comprehensive-ness that is of necessity lost when our focus is shiftedto a lower, and more partial, level. For descriptivepurposes, then, it offers both advantages anddisadvantages; the former flow from its comprehen-siveness, and the latter from the necessary dearth_of

"cjetajl. ~ ~As to explanatory capability, the system-ori-

ented model poses some genuine difficulties. In thefirst place, it tends to lead the observer into a positionwhich exaggerates theimpacl of the system upon thenational actors and, conversely, di§£oun|s_the impactof the actorson the system. This is, of course, by nomeans inevitable; one could conceivably look upon

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[3] The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations'<£.*,

23

the system as a rather passive environment in whichdynamic states act out their relationships rather thanas a socio-political entity with a dynamic of its own.But there is a natural tendency to endow that uponwhich we focus our attention with somewhat greaterpotential than it might normally be expected to have.Thus, we tend to move, in a system-oriented model,away from notions implying much national autonomyand independence of choice and toward a moredeterministic orientation.

Secondly, this particular level of analysis almostinevitably requires that we postulate a high degree ofunifqrmityjln theToreign policy operational coctes ofour national actors. By definition, we allow littleroom tor divergence in the behavior of our partswhen we focus upon the whole. It is no coincidencethat our most prominent theoretician—and one ofthe very few text writers focusing upon the inter-national system—should "assume that [all] statesmenthink and act in terms of interest defined as power."6

If this single-minded behavior be interpreted literallyand narrowly, we have a simplistic image comparableto economic man or sexual man, and if it be definedbroadly, we are no better off than the psychologistwhose human model pursues "self-realization" or"maximization of gain"; all such gross models sufferfrom the same fatal weakness as the utilitarian's"pleasure-pain" principle. Just as individuals differwidely in what they deem to be pleasure and pain,or gain and loss, nations may differ widelyin wlfftthey consider to be the natign^Tlnte'res^and~we endup having to break down and refine the larger cate-gory. Moreover, Professor Morgenthau finds himselfcompelled to go still further and disavow the relevanceof both motives and ideological preferences innational behavior, and these represent two of themore useful dimensions in differentiating among theseveral nations in our international system. Byeschewing any empirical concern with the domesticand internal variations within the separate nations,the system-oriented approach tends to produce asort of "black box" or "billiard ball" concept of thenational actors.7 By discounting—or denying—the

6 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed.,New York, 1960, pp. 5-7. Obviously, his model does notpreclude the use of power as a dimension for the differenti-ation of nations.

7 The "black box" figure comes from some of thesimpler versions of S-R psychology, in which the observermore or less ignores what goes on within the individual and

differences among nations, or by positing the near-impossibility of observing many of these differencesat work within them,8 one concludes with a highlyhomogenized image of our nations in the internationalsystem. And though this may be an inadequate foun-dation upon which to base any causal statements, itoffers a reasonably adequate basis for correlativestatements. More specifically, it permits us toobserveand measure correlations between certain forces orstimuli which seem to impinge upon the nation andthe behavior patterns which are the apparent conse-quence of these stimuli. But one must stress thelimitations implied in the word "apparent": what isthought to be the consequence of a given stimulusmay only be a coincidence or artifact, and until oneinvestigates the major elements in the causal link—no matter how persuasive the deductive logic—onemay speak only of correlation, not of consequence.

Moreover, by "avoiding the multitudinous'pitfallsof intra-nation observation, one emerges with asingularly manageable model, requiring as it does littleof the methodological sophistication or onerousempiricism called for when one probes beneath thebehavioral externalities of the actor. Finally, as hasalready been suggested in the introduction, thesystemic orientation should prove to be reasonablysatisfactory as a basis for prediction, even if suchprediction is t(cTSteii3"'Eeyondtne characteristics ofthe system and attempt anticipatory statementsregarding the actors themselves; this assumes, ofcourse, that the actors are_characterized and theirbehavior predicted in relatively gross and generalterms. *"" " ' '"m*«*»*»~*>*>»>™*H*aM**concentrates upon the correlation between stimulus andresponse; these are viewed as empirically verifiable, where-as cognition, perception, and other mental processes haveto be imputed to the individual with a heavy reliance onthese assumed "intervening variables." The "billiard ball"figure seems to carry the same sort of connotation, and isbest employed by Arnold Wolfers in "The Actors in Inter-national Politics" in William T. R. Fox, ed., TheoreticalAspects of International Relations, Notre Dame, Ind., 1959,pp. 83-106. See also, in this context, Richard C. Snyder,"International Relations Theory—Continued," WorldPolitics, XIII (January 1961), pp. 300-12; and J. DavidSinger, "Theorizing About Theory in InternationalPolitics," Journal of Conflict Resolutions, IV (December1960), pp. 431-42. Both are review articles dealing with theFox anthology.

8 Morgenthau observes, for example, that it is "futile"to search for motives because they are "the most illusive ofpsychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyondrecognition, by the interests and emotions of actor andobserver alike" (op.cit., p. 6).

24 Identifying the Boundaries and Contents of the Field

These, then, are some of the more significantimplications of a model which focuses upon theinternational system as a whole. Let us turn now tothe more familiar of our two orientations, the nationalstate itself.

III. The National State as Levelof Analysis

The other level of analysis to be considered in thispaper is the national state—our primary actor ininternational relations. This is clearly the traditionalfocus among Western students, and is the one whichdominates almost all of the texts employed inEnglish-speaking colleges and universities.

Its most obvious advantage is that it permitssignificant differentiation among our actors in theinternational system. Because it does not require theattribution of great similarity to the national actors,it encourages the observer to examine them in greaterdetail. The favorable results of such intensive analy-sis cannot be overlooked, as it is only when the actorsare studied in some depth that we are able to makereally valid generalizations of a comparative nature.And though the systemic model does not necessarilypreclude comparison and contrast among the nationalsub-systems, it usually eventuates in rather grosscomparisons based on relatively crude dimensionsand characteristics. On the other hand, there is noassurance that the nation-oriented approach willproduce a sophisticated model for the comparativestudy of foreign policy; with perhaps the exceptionof the Haas and Whiting study,9 none of our majortexts makes a serious and successful effort to describeand explain national behavior in terms of most of thesignificant variables by which such behavior mightbe comparatively analyzed. But this would seem to bea function, not of the level of analysis employed, butof our general unfamiliarity with the other socialsciences (in which comparison is a major preoccu-pation) and of the retarded state of comparativegovernment and politics, a field in which mostinternational relations specialists are likely to havehad some experience.

But just as the nation-as-actor focus permits usto avoid the inaccurate homogenization which oftenflows from the systemic focus, it also may lead us into

9 Ernst B. Haas and Alien S. Whiting, Dynamics ofInternational Relations, New York, 1956.

the opposite type of distortion—a marked exaggera-tion of the differences among our sub-systemic actors.While it is evident that neither of these extremes isconducive to the development of a sophisticatedcomparison of foreign policies, and such comparisonrequires a balanced preoccupation with both similar-ity and difference, the danger seems to be greatestwhen we succumb to the tendency to overdifferen-tiate; comparison and contrast can proceed onlyfrom observed uniformities.10

One of the additional liabilities which flow inturn from the pressure to overdifferentiate is that ofPtolemaic parochialism. Thus, in over-emphasizingthe differences among the many national states, theobserver is prone to attribute many of what heconceives to be virtues to his own nation and the vicesto others, especially the adversaries of the moment.That this ethnocentrism is by no means an idle fearis borne out by perusal of the major internationalrelations texts published in the United States since1945. Not only is the world often perceived throughthe prism of the American national interest, but aninordinate degree of attention (if not spleen) isdirected toward the Soviet Union; it would hardlybe amiss to observe that most of these might qualifyequally well as studies in American foreign policy.The scientific inadequacies of this sort of "we-they"orientation hardly require elaboration, yet they re-main a potent danger in any utilization of thenational actor model.

Another significant implication of the sub-systemic orientation is that it is only within its par-ticular framework that we can expect any usefulapplication of the decision-making approach.11 Notall of us, of course, will find its inapplicability a major

10 A frequent by-product of this tendency to over-differentiate is what Waltz calls the "second-image fallacy,"in which one explains the peaceful or bellicose nature of anation's foreign policy exclusively in terms of its domesticeconomic, political, or social characteristics (op.cit., Chaps.4 and 5).

11 Its most well-known and successful statement isfound in Snyderet at., op. cit. Much of this model isutilizedin the text which Snyder wrote with Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.,American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles, andPrograms, New York, 1954. A more specific application isfound in Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United StatesDecision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Applicationof an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly,III (December 1958), pp. 341-78. For those interested inthis approach, very useful is Paul Wasserman and Fred S.Silander, Decision-Making: An Annotated Bibliography,Ithaca, N.Y., 1958.

[3] The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations 25

loss; considering the criticism which has beenleveled at the decision-making approach, and thefailure of most of us to attempt its application, onemight conclude that it is no loss at all. But theimportant thing to note here is that a system-orientedmodel would not offer a hospitable framework forsuch a detailed and comparative approach to thestudy of international relations, no matter what ourappraisal of the decision-making approach mightbe.

Another and perhaps more subtle implication ofselecting the nation as our focus or level of analysis isthat it raises the entire question of goals, motivation,and purpose in national policy.'2 Though it may wellbe a peculiarity of the Western philosophical tradi-tion, we seem to exhibit, when confronted with theneed to explain individual or collective behavior, astrong proclivity for a goal-seeking japproach. Thequestion of whether national behavior is purposiveor not seems to require discussion in two distinct(but not always exclusive) dimensions.

Firstly, there is the more obvious issue ofwhether those who act on behalf of the nation informulating and executing''foreign p'oEcycojisciouslypursue rather concrete goals. And it would be difficultto deny, foT^exainpTeV that these role-fulfilling indi-viduals envisage certain specific outcomes whichthey hope to realize by pursuing a particular strategy.In this sense, then, nations may be said to be goal;seeking organisms which exhibit purposive be-havior.

However, purposiveness may be viewed in asomewhat different light, by asking whether it is notmerely an intellectual construct that man imputes tohimself by reason of his vain addiction to the free-willdoctrine as he searches for characteristics whichdistinguish him from physical matter and the loweranimals. And having attributed this conscious goal-pursuing behavior to himself as an individual, it maybe argued that man then proceeds to project thisattribute to the social organizations of which he is amember. The question would seem to distill downto whether man and his societies pursue goals of

ainrti nnaiiiiniiMii»i¥ "**™™"ei™ai*'a"M 'rii * Kjattt

their own choosing or are moved toward those im-

12 And if the decision-making version of this model isemployed, the issue is unavoidable. See the discussion ofmotivation in Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, op. cit.,pp. 92—117;note that 25 of the 49 pages on "The Major Determinantsof Action" are devoted to motives.

posed upon them by forces which are primarilybeyond their control.13 Another way of stating theaiTemnia'^wouIdbe to ask whether we are concernedwith the ends which men and nations strive for orthe ends toward which they are impelled JBy'fflg'pastand prese£tch^r^j£nstics of theirsocial ari'd physicalmilieu. Obviously, we are using the terms "ends,""goals," and "purpose" in two rather distinct ways;one refers to those which are consciously envisagedand more or less rationally pursued, and the other tothose of which theactorTiaslittle knowledge buttoward which he is nevertheless propelled.

Taking a middle ground in what is essentially aspecific case of the free will vs. determinism debate,one can agree that nations move toward outcomes ofwhich they have little knowledge and over which theyhave less control, but that they nevertheless do prefer,and therefore select, particular outcomes" andattempt to realize them by conscious formulation of

^strategies. ~~»~~-~-- ~—Also involved in the goal-seeking problem when

we employ the nation-oriented model is the questionof how and why certain nations pursue specific sortsof goals. While the question may be ignored in thesystem-oriented model or resolved by attributingidentical goals to all national actors, the nation-as-u t j ^^^pactor approach demands that we investigate theprocesses by which national goals are selected, theinternal and external factors that irmnnge on thoseprocesses, and the institution^ jfaanjjgKgrk fromwhich they emerge. It is worthy of note that despitethe strong predilection for the nation-oriented modelin most of our texts, empirical or even deductiveanalyses of these processes are conspicuously few.14

Again, one might attribute these lacunae to themethodological and conceptual inadequacies of thegraduate training which international relations

13 A highly suggestive, but more abstract treatment ofthis ideological question is in Talcott Parsons, The Struct-ure of Social Action, 2nd ed., Glencoe, 111., 1949, especiallyin his analysis of Durkheim and Weber. It is interesting tonote that for Parsons an act implies, inter alia, "a futurestate of affairs toward which the process of action is ori-ented," and he therefore comments that "in this sense andthis sense only, the schema of action is inherently ideo-logical" (p. 44).

14 Among the exceplions are Haas and Whiting, op. cit.,Chaps. 2 and 3; and some of the chapters in Roy C. Macridis,ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1958, especially thai on Wesl Germany by KarlDeutsch and Lewis Edinger.

26 Identifying the Boundaries and Contents of the Field

specialists traditionally receive.15 But in any event,goals and motivations are both dependent and inde-pendent variables, and if we intend to explain anation's foreign policy, we cannot settle for the merepostulation of these goals; we are compelled to goback a step and inquire into their genesis and theprocess by which they become the crucial variablesthat they seem to be in the behavior of nations.

There is still another dilemma involved in ourselection of the nation-as-actor model, and thatconcerns the phenomenological issue: do we examineour actor's behavior in termsoftheobjective factorswhich alleg"cuy 'influence tEaToeTiaviorTor do wedo so in terms of the actor's perception of these"objective factors" ? Though" these two approachesare not completely exclusive of one another, theyproceed from greatly different and often incompatibleassumptions, and produce markedly divergentmodels of national behavior.16

The first of these assumptions concerns thebroad question of social causation. One view holdsthat individuals and groups respond in a quasi-deterministic fashion to the realities of physicalenvironment, the acts or power of other individualsor groups, and similar "objective" and "real" forcesor stimuli. An opposite view holds that individualsand groups are not influenced in their behavior bysuch objective forces, but by the fashion in whichthese forces- are perceived and evaluated, howeverdistorted or incomplete such perceptions may be.For adherents of this position, the only reality is thephenomenal—that which is discerned by the human

15 As early as 1934, Edith E. Ware noted that ". . . thestudy of international relations is no longer entirely a subjectfor political science or law, but that economics, history,sociology, geography—all the social sciences—are calledupon to contribute towards the understanding . . . of theinternational system." See The Study of InternationalRelations in the United States, New York, 1934, p. 172. Forsome contemporary suggestions, see Karl Deutsch, "ThePlace of Behavioral Sciences in Graduate Training inInternational Relations," Behavioral Science, III (July1958), pp. 278—84; and J. David Singer, "The Relevanceof the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of InternationalRelations," ibid., VI (October 1961), pp. 324-35.

16 The father of phenomenological philosophy isgenerally acknowledged to be Edmund Husserl (1859-1938),author of Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,New York, 1931, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson; the originalwas published in 1913 under the title Ideen zu einer reinenPhanomenologieundPhanomenologischen Philosophic. Appli-cation of this approach to social psychology has comeprimarily through the work of Koffka and Lewin.

senses; forces that are not discerned do not exist for' *'"er*flf%.3'Ci*"«***1 :,-*WWV.'-. :-.;.-lw?S;'..w^m>,»!« ---; . . . . ^ % ^

that actor, and those that do exist do so only in thefashion in which they are perceived. Though it isdifficult to accept the position that an individual, agroup, or a nation is affected by such forces as climate,distance, or a neighbor's physical power only insofaras they are recognized and appraised, one mustconcede that perceptions will car^tajnjy^jifjfct themanner in whicn sucKTorces are responded to. As^t^^^M^Mt^maaii^axaa^.-.,, •^AsOMOagua^suattMi *M*~*rff u, , .has often been pointed out, an individual will fall tothe ground when he steps out of a tenth-story windowregardless of his perception of gravitational forces,but on the other hand such perception is a majorfactor in whether or not he steps out of the windowin the first place.17 The point here is that if weembrace a phenomenological view of causation, wewill tend to utilize a phenomenological model forexplanatory purposes.

The second assumption which bears on one'spredilection for the phenomenological approach ismore restricted, and is primarily a methodologicalone. Thus, it may be argued that any description ofnational behavior in a given international situationwould be highly incomplete were it to ignore thelink between the^ external forces^ at work upon thenation and its general foreign policy behavior. Fur-thermore, if our concern extends beyond the meredescription of "what happens" to the realm ofexplanation, it could be contended that such omissionof the cognitive and the perceptual linkage would beontologically disastrous. How, it might be asked, canone speak of "causes" of a nation's policies when onehas ignored the media by which external conditionsand factors are translated into a policy decision ? Wemay observe correlations between all sorts of forcesin the international system and the behavior ofnations, but their causal relationship must remainstrictly deductive and hypothetical in the absence ofempirical investigation into the causal chain whichallegedly links the two. Therefore, even if we aresatisfied with the less-than-complete descriptivecapabilities of a non-phenomenological model, weare still drawn to it if we are to make any progress inexplanation.

17 This issue has been raised from time to time in allof the social sciences, but for an excellent discussion of it interms of the present problem, see Harold and MargaretSprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in theContext of International Politics, Princeton University,Center of International Studies, 1956, pp. 63-71.

V- '- P6 t[3] The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations 27

The contrary view would hold that the aboveargument proceeds from an erroneous comprehen-sion of the nature of explanation in social science.One is by no means required to trace every perception,transmission, and receipt between stimulus andresponse or input and output in order to explain thebehavior of the nation or any other human group.Furthermore, who is to say that empirical observa-tion—subject as it is to a host of errors—is any bettera basis of explanation than informed deduction,inference, or analogy? Isn't an polanation whichflows logically from a coherent theoretical model justasreliabTeas one based upon a misleading and elusivebody of data, most of which is susceptible to analysisonly by techniques and concepts foreign to politicalscience and history ?

This leads, in turn, to the third of the premisesrelevant to one's stand on the phenomenologicalissue: are the dimensions and characteristics of thepolicy-makers' phenomenal field empirically dis-cernible ? Or, more accurately, even if we are con-vinced that their perceptions and beliefs constitutea crucial variable in the explanation of a nation'sforeign policy, can they be observed in an accurateand systematic fashion ?18 Furthermore, are we notrequired by the phenomenological model to go be-yond a classification and description of such variables,and be drawn into the tangled web of relationshipsout of which they emerge ? If we believe that thesephenomenal variables are systematically observable,are explainable, and can be fitted into our explanationof a nation's behavior in the international system,then there is a further tendency to embrace thephenomenological approach. If not, or if we areconvinced that the gathering of such data is inefficientor uneconomical, we will tend to shy clear of it.

The fourth issue in the phenomenological dis-pute concerns the very nature of the nation as anactor in international relations. Who or what is itthat we study ? Is it a distinct social entity withwell-defined boundaries—a unity unto itself? Oris it an agglomeration of individuals, institutions,

18 This is another of the criticisms leveled at thedecision-making approach which, almost by definition,seems compelled to adopt some form of the phenomeno-logical model. For a comprehensive treatment of theelements involved in human perception, see Karl Zeneret al., eds., "Inter-relationships Between Perception andPersonality: A Symposium," Journal of Personality,XVIII (1949), pp. 1-266.

customs, and procedures ? It should be quite evidentthat those who view the nation or the state as anintegral social unit could not attach much utility tothe phenomenological approach, particularly if theyare prone to concretize or reify the abstraction. Suchabstractions are incapable of perception, cognition, fJor anticipation (unless, of course, the reification goesVso far as to anthropomorphize and assign to the jiabstraction such attributes as will, mind, or per- 'sonality). On the other hand, if the nation or state isseen as a group of individuals operating within aninstitutional framework, then it makes perfect senseto focus on the phenomenal field of those individualswho participate in the policy-making "process, in"other words, feof>1e~ are~ capably wf^experiences,images, and expectations, while institutional ab-stractions are not, except in the metaphorical sense.Thus, if our actor cannot even have a phenomenalfield, there is little point in employing a phenomeno-logical approach.19

These, then, are some of the questions aroundwhich the phenomenological issue would seem torevolve. Those of us who think of social forces as

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operative regardless of the actor's awareness,"whoV***'"!»",»--*.w,™tt,w - .j 7i- .,„ -, . . . . . " • '

believe that explanation need not include all of thesteps in a causal chain, whoareo'uBTous of the prac-^•"••"•ffiaBmjuamiimmHmwtirev •~-t..-,inH^litlriitaifllf.

ticality of gathering phenomenal data, or who visual-ize the^jjation as a distinct entity apart from itsindividual members, will tend" to" reject the pheno-menological approach.20 Logically, only those whodisagree with each of the above four assumptionswould be compelled to adopt the approach. Disagree-ment with any one would be sufficient grounds for sodoing.

The above represent some of the more signifi-cant implications and fascinating problems raisedby the adoption of our second model. They seem toindicate that this sub-systemic orientation is likely

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to produce richer description and more satisfactory(from the empiricist's point of view) explanation ofinternational relations, though its predictive powerwould appear no greater than the systemic orientation.But the descriptive and explanatory advantages are

19 Many of these issues are raised in the ongoing debateover "methodological individualism," and are discussedcogently in Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, NewYork, 1961, pp. 535-46.

20 Parenthetically, holders of these specific viewsshould also be less inclined to adopt the national or sub-systemic model in the first place.

28 Identifying the Boundaries and Contents of the Field

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IV

achieved only at the price of considerable methodo-logical complexity.

IV. Conclusion

Having discussed some of the descriptive,explanatory, and predictive capabilities of these twopossible levels of analysis, it might now be useful toassess the relative utility of the two and attempt somegeneral statement as to their prospective contribu-tions to greater theoretical growth in the study ofinternational relations.

In terms of description! we find that the §j||emiclevel produces a more comprehensive and total pic-

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ture of international relations than does the nationalor sub-systemic level. On the other hand theatomized and less coherent image produced by thelower level of analysis is somewhat balanced by itsricher detail, greater depth, and more intensive

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portrayal.21 As to explanation, there seems littledoubt that the sub-systemic or actor orientation isconsiderably more fruitful, permitting as it does amore thorough investigation of the processes bywhich foreign policies are made. Here we are enabledto go beyond the limitations imposed by the systemiclevel and to replace mere correlation with the moresignificant causation. And in terms of prediction,both orientations seem to offer a similar degree ofpromise. Here the issue is a functionorwhat we seekto predict. Thus the policy-maker will tend to preferpredictions about the way in which nation x or y willr J .n»l«l'«. ,ni ltTOJm,——16

react to a contemplated move on his own nation'spart, while the scholar will probably prefer eithergeneralized predictions regarding the behavior of agiven class of nations or those regarding the systemitseTL

Does this summary add up to an overriding casefor one or another of the two models ? It would seemnot. For a staggering variety of reasons the scholarmay be more interested in one level than another atany given time and will undoubtedly shift his orient-

21 In a review article dealing with two of the morerecent and provocative efforts toward theory (Morton A.Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, NewYork, 1957, and George Liska, International Equilibrium,Cambridge, Mass., 1957), Charles P. Kindleberger adds afurther—if not altogether persuasive—argument in favor ofthe lower, sub-systemic level of analysis: "The total systemis infinitely complex with everything interacting. One candiscuss it intelligently, therefore, only bit by bit." "Scien-tific International Politics," World Politics, XI (October1958), p. 86.

ation according to his research needs. So the problemis really not one of deciding which level is mostvaluable to the discipline as a whole and thendemanding that it be adhered to from now untoeternity.22 Rather, it is one of realizing that there isthis preliminary conceptual issue and that it must be

^iinLjijtP^ffr1"-rii]iliy **a^^* '""'' •-•***"*•*• ' - ' - ' "temporarily resolved prior to any given research^^asaW'-^^-ssrfSKsK^suaflstt^ r J &

undertaking. And it must also be stressed that wehave dealt here only with two of the more commonorientations, and that many others are available andperhaps even more fruitful potentially than either ofthose selected here. Moreover, the internationalsystem gives many indications of prospective change,and it may well be that existing institutional formswill take on new characteristics or that new ones willappear to take their place. As a matter of fact, ifincapacity to perform its functions leads to thetransformation or decay of an institution, we mayexpect a steady deterioration and even ultimatedisappearance of the national state as a significantactor in the world political system.

However, even if the case for one or another ofthe possible levels of analysis cannot be made withany certainty, one must nevertheless maintain acontinuing awareness as to their use. We may utilizeone level here and another there, but we cannotafford to sjiift^our^ orientation in the midst of a study.And when we do in fact make an original selection orreplace one with another at appropriate times, wemust do so with a full awareness of the descriptive,explanatory, and predictive implications of suchchoice.

A final point remains to be discussed. Despitethis lengthy exegesis, one might still be prone toinquire whether this is not merely a sterile exercise inverbal gymnastics. What, it might be asked, is thedifference between the two levels of analysis if theempirical referents remain essentially the same ? Or,to put it another way, is there any difference betweeninternatignaL-xelatiQns and comparative foreignH»»*j«IHUpe(*B»i*f*«w*^ w***r«jpt*vs^-' -**••-.- f..... .-"'• —r- ••"•n..1.. ,.

policy? Perhaps a few illustrations will illuminatethe subtle but important differences which emergewhen one's level of analysis shifts. One might, for

22 It should also be kept in mind that one could con-ceivably develop a theoretical model which successfullyembraces both of these levels of analysis without sacrificingconceptual clarity and internal consistency. In this writer'sview, such has not been done to date, though Kaplan'sSystem and Process in International Politics seems to comefairly close.

[3] The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations 29

example, postulate that when the international systemis characterized by political conflict between two of

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its most powerful actors, there is a strong tendencyfor the system to bipolarize. This is a systemic^

iiiii Biinrdjrtr;]oriented proposition. TA sub-systemic proposition,dealing with the same general empirical referents,would state that when a powerful actor finds itselfin political conflict with another of approximate

. B^«s -<jtertT«iI ^~i-.s^v^Atu *->«»t&i*'-;*i-:"''i':'"'1'" *""*'' * . 1parity, it will tend to exert pressure on its weakerneighbors to join its coalition. Each proposition,assuming it is true, is theoretically useful by itself,but each is verified by a different intellectual opera-tion. Moreover—and this is the crucial thing fortheoretical development—one could not add thesetwo kinds of statements together to achieve a cumula-tive growth of empirical generalizations.

To illustrate further, one could, at the systemiclevel, postulate that when the distribution of power inr" -^ r—••••.,.•.. • . •mMi*"M*''"**r1L£&*-»fcet,ts£^the international system is highly diffused, it is more

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stable than when the discernible clustering of well-defined coalitions occurs. And at the sub-systemic ornational level, the same empirical phenomena wouldproduce this sort of proposition: when a nation'sdecision-makers find it difficult to categorize MothernationsreaHily as friend or foe, they tend to behavetoward all in a more uniform Tin d moderate fashion.Now, taking these two sets of proposTtTof^T^o'wlrnuchcumulative usefulness would arise from attemptingto merge and codify the systemic proposition fromthe first illustration with the sub-systemic propositionfrom the second, or vice versa ? Representing differ-ent levels of analysis and couched in different frames

of reference, they would defy theoretical integration;one may well be a corollary of the other, but they arenot immediately combinable. A prior translationfrom one level to another must take place.

This, it is submitted, is quite crucial for thetheoretical development of our discipline. With all ofthe current emphasis on the need for more empiricaland data-gathering research as a prerequisite totheory-building, one finds little concern with therelationship among these separate and discretedata-gathering activities. Even if we were to declare amoratorium on deductive and speculative researchfor the next decade, and all of us were to labordiligently in the vineyards of historical and contem-porary data, the state of international relations theorywould probably be no more advanced at that timethan it is now, unless such empirical activity becomesfar more systematic. And "gjstematic" is used here toindicate the cumulative growth of inductive anddeductive generalizations into an impressive array ofsTatements "conceptually related to one another andflowing frornsorfie common frame of reference. What

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that frame of reference should be, or will be, cannotbe said with much certainty, but it does seem clearthat it must exist. As long as we evade some of thesecrucial a priori decisions, our empiricism willamount to little more than an ever-growing potpourriof discrete, disparate, non-comparable, and isolatedbits of information or extremely low-level generaliz-ations. And, as such, they will make little contribu-tion to the growth of a theory of internationalrelations.