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THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT March 28, 1979 Kiran Rad hak rish nan Roll No. 8 PGDISEM - X

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Most significant in the history of US commercial nuclear power

generation history Partial core meltdown of Unit 2 of Three Mile Island Nuclear

Generating Station at Dauphin County, PA

4 am on Wednesday, March 28, 1979

Operated by the General Public Utilities and its regional

subsidiary, the Metropolitan Edison Company

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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Aerial View of Three Mile Island the two reactors to the left are

the cooling towers of Unit 2 where the accident occurred

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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A Typical Nuclear Reactor with its components

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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Events leading to the accident occurred a few seconds after

4 am on March 28, 1979

ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT

Elapsed Time Event

00:00:00 Pumps feeding water to the secondary loop are shut down

This was the first of two independent system failures that led to the near

meltdown of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor.

00:00:01 Alarm sounds within the TMI control room

This alarm is disregarded by the operators.

00:00:02 Water pressure and temperature in the reactor core rises

The failure of the secondary loop pump had stopped the transfer of heat

from the Primary Loop to the Secondary Loop. The rise in temperature andpressure is considered to be part of the normal plant operations, and hence

was ignored.

00:00:03 Pressure Operated Relief valve (PORV) automatically opens

When the pressure of steam in the reactor core rises above safe limits, the

pressure relief valve is designed to automatically open, releasing the excesssteam to a containment tank.

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00:00:04 Backup pumps for the secondary loop water system automatically turn on

Four seconds into the accident, the secondary loop water pumps are

automatically turned on. This is indicated to the operators by the presenceof lights on the control panel. The operators are not aware that the pumps

have been disconnected and are not functioning.

00:00:09 Boron and Silver control rods are lowered into the reactor. PORV light goes

out, indicating valve is closed.

Lowering of the control rods into the reactor core slows down the rate of 

the reaction. The effect of which is also a reduction in the heat produced by

the reactor. When the PORV light went out, the operators incorrectly

assumed that the valve was closed. In reality the valve was not only open

but was also releasing steam and water from the core. This was now a LOCA

(Loss of Coolant Accident)00:02:00 Emergency Injection Water (EIW) is automatically activated.

The EIW is a safety device that causes water to flow into the reactor core. It

is designed to ensure that when there is a LOCA, the water in the core

remains at a safe level. In the past the EIW system has turned itself on

when there has been no leak so the operators are not unduly concerned bythis.

ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT

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ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT

00:04:30 Operators observed that the water level in the Primary System is rising

while the pressure is decreasing.

When they observe that the water level in the core was rising, theoperators shut off the EIW system.

00:04:30 Water level in the core still appeared to be rising.

In actuality the water level in the core was dropping, and turning off the

EIW increased the amount of steam being produced by the reactor core.

The combination of steam and water was still being released through the

PORV.

00:08:00 Operator noticed that the valves for the secondary loop backup pumps

were off.

8 minutes into the accident, the closed valve was noticed by an operator.

Once he turned the valves back on the Secondary Water loop is functioning

correctly.

00:45:00 Water level in primary loop continued to drop.

At this point in the accident the operators still do not suspect a LOCA. The

instrument checking the radiation has not registered an alarm, and the

gauges in the control room are wrongly indicating that the water level is up.

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ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT

01:20:00 Primary loop pumps start to shake violently.

Steam produced by the lack of cooling water in the core passes through the

primary loop pumps and causes them to shake. Assuming they are notfunctioning correctly the operators turn off two of the four pumps.

01:20:00 Remaining two pumps in the primary loop turned off.

The automatic shut down of the two remaining pumps in the primary loop

caused the water within the nuclear core to stop circulating. This in turn

caused the heated core to convert more water into steam, further reducing

the transfer of heat away from the core.

02:15:00 Water level dropped below the top of the core.

Once the top of the core is exposed the steam is converted to super heated

steam. This reacts with the control rods and produces hydrogen and other

radioactive gases.

02:15:00 Hydrogen gas is released through PORV.

Since the Pilot Operated Relief Valve is still in the open position it allows the

hydrogen gas produced to be released along with the steam.

02:20:00 Operator from next shift arrived and closes PORV backup valve.

02:20:30 Operators received first indication that the radiation levels were up.

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ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT

02:45:00 Radiation alarm sounds and a site emergency is declared.

At this point half the core is uncovered and the radiation level of the water

in the primary loop is 350 times its normal level.

03:00:00 Due to higher radiation levels a General Emergency is declared.

There is still confusion as to whether the core is uncovered or not. There

are some that feel the temperature readings may be erroneous.

07:30:00 Operators pump water into the primary loop and open the PORV backup

valve to lower the pressure

09:00:00 Hydrogen within the containment structure explodes

The explosion is recorded by the instruments in the control room. It is

dismissed as just being a spike caused by an electrical malfunction. The

sound of the explosion heard is thought by some to be a ventilator damper.

15:00:00 Primary loop pumps are turned on

By now a large portion of the core has melted and there is still hydrogen

present in the primary loop. Water from the primary loop pumps is

circulated and the core temperature is finally brought under control.

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The reactor had come very close to a meltdown, and was

damaged beyond repair. Cleanup took more than a decadewith costs of around $ 970 million.

Metropolitan Edison, the plant's owner, had assured that

everything was under control. But, there were conflicting

statements about radiation releases. Schools were closed and

residents were urged to stay indoors. Farmers were told tokeep animals under cover and on stored feed.

The State Governor advised the evacuation of pregnant women

and pre-school age children within a five-mile radius of the

Three Mile Island facility. Within days, 140,000 people had leftthe area.

ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT

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The accident was exacerbated by wrong decisions made

because the operators were overwhelmed with information,much of it irrelevant, misleading or incorrect.

Decision making under stress; over 100 alarms went off in the

control room during the first few minutes of the accident. This

added to the confusion without providing any useful

information to the operators. The inadequate training of the employees at the facility. The

training was the responsibility of Metropolitan Edison and

Babcock and Wilcox.

ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT

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Nuclear reactor operator training has been improved - a

standardized checklist to ensure that the core is receivingenough coolant under sufficient pressure.

Improvements in quality assurance, engineering, operational

surveillance and emergency planning have been instituted.

Improvements in control room habitability, "sight lines" to

instruments, ambiguous indications and even the placementof "trouble" tags were made.

Improved surveillance of critical systems, structures and

components required for cooling the plant and mitigating the

escape of radionuclides during an emergency were alsoimplemented.

Dissemination of industry information and the use of 

probabilistic safety assessment and analysis of more probable

events was also instituted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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Was Three Mile Island a `Normal Accident'?  Andrew Hopkins;J

ournal of Contingencies and Crisis Management; Volume 9, Number 2,J

une2001 (pp. 65-72)

http://www.nucleartourist.com/events/tmi.htm

Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research;http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/4570.aspx

Science Dailyhttp://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/01/070129152941.htm

BIBLIOGRAPHY