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. :
- (, 2001) , ( 59 4, 1993), : ( 72 2, 2006),
( 27, 2008) .
2019 1 .


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(2013. 9.)

1.
1950 (special procurement, )

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(commitment)
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, ·
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1960 . 1950
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.

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1 , 1950(1), 158, 2002, 221.
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.
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,
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, GNP , GNP ,
. GNP 12%
, 13 , GNP 108 (13÷0.12) , 8
21 , GNP 175 (21÷0.12) 1.6 .
”(, : 3, , 1993, 158).
4 , , , 1981; , , 7 , , 1989.
5 , , 291. ‘’,
.
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·’ ,
.
7 , , 45 4, 1994.
77 1950 ‘’()
5.04%( )
6.25%( ) . 1951
12%, , 7%
6% .
(Dodge)
.
.8 1951 1 1952 4
( )
, ‘’
‘’ ‘’
.9 ()
‘’
, 1951 5 (William F. Marquat,
GHQ )
‘ ’ .10
‘ ’
.

,
.11
8 , , 4, , 1982. 9 , , 296.
10 , 1950(1), (2), (3), 158, 159, 160, 2002~2003.
11 , ‘’ :
, 13, 2012.
, “
‘’
”(275) . 1952~1955
. 3
: ’’ ( : , , 2016.)
78 22
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1952 1954
1955 , “() ()

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1952~55 , 1950
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.
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, 1950
. 1950

1950
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1950 4~5
,

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.
12 ·, , · , , , 2003, 52.
13 , : , , 14, 2018.
79 1950 ‘’()
,
.

1950 , 1950

.
[, 1954 3 ()]
() .
1952 7 1 1969 12 214
,
, ,
, .

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.
14 . 1969
, ()
() , 1969
. (,
) , ,
.
80 22
.
‘ ’ ‘
’ . ‘ ’
· ( ) ,
( )
.15 · 1950 8
25 (Japan Logistic Command, JLC) .16 ,
.
1952 10 (General Supply Administration, GSA)
(Emergency Procurement Service, EPS)17 , 1954 1
(United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, UNKRA)
. EPS
,

. UNKRA 1950 12 1 ,
,
.

.18
15 1952 4 SCAP , 1953 9
, .
16 1951 11 14 JLC (Japan Procurement Agency, JPA)
, JPA 1957 1 (Army Procurement Agency, APA) .
JPA , .
17 EPS 1956 12 FSS(Federal Supply Service) .
18 ,
‘’ ,
. 1952 4
3
81 1950 ‘’()
() ‘ ’
. 1957 1
.
.
‘ ’ (), ‘’ ‘
’ ‘()
’ .19
( ) , ,
, , ICA, UNKRA, ,
. ‘ ’ (
) .
.
.20
: (
) .
, , .
:

. ·
25
, .
558 (1 5,500 ) ,
. 1957 1
, 1960
.
19 , , (NIRA) , 26 ··(3), , 1995 . ‘
’
. .
20 , , , 1961, 83~84.
82 22
, ·

.
.
:
.
ICA :
. 1951~1953
(Mutual Security Agency, MSA) ,
1953~55 (Foreign Operations Administration, FOA)
, 1955 7 ()
(International Cooperation Administration, ICA)
. ICA 1961 (Agency of International
Development, AID) .
: .

. 1957 .
‘ ( )’ ‘ ( )’
< 1> . ‘ ’
‘ ’ ‘MSA UNKRA ’
‘ ’ ‘’ ‘ICA ’ .
‘’ ‘ ’
, ‘ICA ’
, .
, ‘ ’ .
83 1950 ‘’()
2)
( ) 1953 4 4,300 1954
2 3,700 ,
1962 1 1963 1
(< 1>). , GSA
UNKRA 3~5%
.21
57.1%, 42.9%. 1952 1954
,
, .
1952 7 , 1953 1 2,000
( 21%) 1954 1,800
21 2% , 1959 .
UNKRA 1% 1955 UNKRA
1957 . GSA UNKRA
‘ ’ .
( )
(, )

MSA

ICA

< 1> ‘ ’( ) ‘ ’( )
84 22
, 1945~1972
1955 (< 2>).

.
.
3)
(‘ ’) 1952~1953 8
, 1957 5
< 1>
(1,000) (%)
1950 127,327 64,029 191,356 66.5 33.5 100.0
1951 254,506 99,134 353,640 72.0 28.0 100.0
1952 205,373 117,149 322,522 63.7 36.3 100.0
1953 260,794 183,069 443,863 58.8 41.2 100.0
1954 104,727 132,693 237,420 44.1 55.9 100.0
1955 65,748 107,941 173,689 37.9 62.1 100.0
1956 68,757 95,743 164,500 41.8 58.2 100.0
1957 131,245 98,363 229,608 57.2 42.8 100.0
1958 67,392 76,120 143,512 47.0 53.0 100.0
1959 89,136 67,099 156,235 57.1 42.9 100.0
1960 93,340 63,822 157,162 59.4 40.6 100.0
1961 76,365 70,726 147,091 51.9 48.1 100.0
1962 67,781 48,597 116,378 58.2 41.8 100.0
1963 18,733 40,826 59,559 31.5 68.5 100.0
1964 23,035 27,079 50,114 46.0 54.0 100.0
1965 26,060 29,368 55,428 47.0 53.0 100.0
1966 60,012 47,427 107,439 55.9 44.1 100.0
1967 25,960 57,308 83,268 31.2 68.8 100.0
1968 25,519 61,175 86,694 29.4 70.6 100.0
1969 18,727 73,626 92,353 20.3 79.7 100.0
: , , No.110(1960. 12.), No. 202(1968. 12.).
1 12, 4 3 .
85 1950 ‘’()
1958 4 , 1962 3
(< 3>). 1966 ,
.
,
, 1953
1954 .

,
< 2>
(1,000 )
1950 131,511 61,062 192,573 0 0 0 131,511 61,062 192,573
1951 268,594 91,876 360,470 0 0 0 268,594 91,876 360,470
1952 161,366 71,250 232,616 20,182 40,949 61,131 181,548 112,199 293,747
1953 210,803 121,750 332,553 50,685 68,323 119,008 261,488 190,073 451,561
1954 119,702 117,430 237,132 3,229 15,131 18,360 122,931 132,561 255,492
1955 66,769 109,288 176,057 0 91 91 66,769 109,379 176,148
1956 69,260 97,202 166,462 0 26 26 69,260 97,228 166,488
(%)
1950 68.3 31.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 68.3 31.7 100.0
1951 74.5 25.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 74.5 25.5 100.0
1952 54.9 24.3 79.2 6.9 13.9 20.8 61.8 38.2 100.0
1953 46.7 27.0 73.6 11.2 15.1 26.4 57.9 42.1 100.0
1954 46.9 46.0 92.8 1.3 5.9 7.2 48.1 51.9 100.0
1955 37.9 62.0 99.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 37.9 62.1 100.0
1956 41.6 58.4 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.6 58.4 100.0
: 1950~1953 , .
1954 , No. 50(1956. 1.), No. 62(1956. 12.), No. 65(1957. 3.).
: < 1> , 1950~1953 ,
1954 .
86 22
,
87 1950 ‘’()

( No. 25, 1953. 12.).
‘ICA ’ 1955 1960
27.2% . 1961 16.6%
1962 1964
,
.
1950 ,
.

,
‘’ ‘’
.

?
,
.
, 3
, ‘
’ .

1953 (1950 6 25~1953 12)

88 22
.
13 1,100 1950~1960
51%, 23 7,400 1950~1960
39% .

ICA
.
< 4> 1953 12
. , 1(1950 7~1951 6)

, 2(1951 7~1952 6) ,
, . 3(1952 7~1953 6)
4(1953 7~12)
. ‘, , ’, ‘ ’,
3~4 ‘
’ .
< 5> 1950~1953 1,000
. , , ,
, , 1
. ‘ ’, (),
(), , ‘
’ 3 . 3~
4 , . ‘
, ’, ‘’, ‘’, ‘, ’ .
‘, ’ 3~4 .
2~3 ,
, (< 4>). 2~3
89 1950 ‘’()
< 4> (%)
1
0.2 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.7
3.5 5.3 5.1 1.9 4.5
3.2 6.5 15.8 25.5 10.2
5.1 9.8 6.8 8.8 7.3
0.8 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.7
3.4 2.9 2.7 1.9 2.9
0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.7
27.2 18.2 9.3 2.3 16.4
0.9 4.8 3.0 0.8 2.8
1 4.9 7.2 8.4 3.4 6.7
15.9 18.4 30.7 25.0 22.5
1.5 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.6
4.0 2.9 2.6 4.4 3.2
19.1 12.3 3.9 6.0 10.8
, ,
2.1 1.9 1.5 0.2 1.7
1.0 0.8 1.3 4.3 1.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(1,000) 229,997 246,164 295,230 57,181 828,570


40.0 38.0 30.3 30.1 33.8

2.1 0.8 2.0 1.2 1.6
0.5 2.3 3.2 0.4 1.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(1,000) 98,927 85,356 181,196 101,433 466,912
: , .
90 22
,

91 1950 ‘’()
, , (< 5>).

.22
3~4(1952 7~1953 12)
,
‘’ (
) . 3~4 ‘ ()’
8,000 22.6% .
1~2(1950 7~1952 6) ‘ ’ 3,100
6.5% .
1~2
,
, , , ,
, .23
2)
“
, ()
”( No. 15, 1953. 4.)
.
,
() ( ,
) ICA
22 ‘ ( ,
, )’, ‘
’ ‘ ’ [
No. 11(1953. 1.)]. 23 , , , 1964, 76.
92 22
.24
, ICA
,
.
24 ‘ ’ 1953 7 1954 12 ‘
’ . ‘
’ 3,435 ,
1,547 . ‘ ’
Chicago Procurement Office 1,056 7,000(1953 7~1954 6) (OPROK) 779 9,000 (1954 7~12)
[ No.38(1955. 1.); No.44(1955. 7.)].
< 6> ()
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
123 (0.6) 552 (2.3) 959 (4.4) 767 (5.8) 2,971 (26.4) 634 (5.4)
436 (2.1) 871 (3.6) 2,487 (11.5) 74 (0.6) 214 (1.9) 4 (0.0)

2,768 (13.6) 1,955 (8.1) 5,149 (23.8) 1,678 (12.7) 1,816 (16.1) 556 (4.7)
, 49 (0.2) 191 (0.8) 447 (2.1) 0 (0.0) 42 (0.4) 0 (0.0)
317 (1.6) 2,175 (9.0) 259 (1.2) 264 (2.0) 274 (2.4) 129 (1.1)
1,082 (5.3) 876 (3.6) 862 (4.0) 430 (3.2) 504 (4.5) 133 (1.1)
4,497 (22.1) 3,137 (12.9) 4,725 (21.9) 4,827 (36.5) 2,328 (20.7) 1,877 (15.9)

5,613 (27.6) 8,968 (37.0) 3,266 (15.1) 2,727 (20.6) 1,924 (17.1) 2,183 (18.5)
5,461 (26.8) 5,299 (21.9) 3,409 (15.8) 2,422 (18.3) 1,148 (10.2) 6,279 (53.2)
14 (0.1) 211 (0.9) 37 (0.2) 45 (0.3) 27 (0.2) 0 (0.0)
11,186 20,360 (100.0) 24,235 (100.0) 21,600 100.0 13,234 (100.0) 11,248 (100.0) 11,795 (100.0)
[10.7] [31.0] [35.2] [16.5] [19.6] [12.6] [12.6]
12,601 [12.0] 21,990 [33.4] 25,038 [36.4] 25,626 [19.5] 16,591 [24.6] 13,825 [15.5] 13,132 [14.1]

() 104,727 [100.0] 65,748 [100.0] 68,757 [100.0] 131,245 [100.0] 67,392 [100.0] 89,136 [100.0] 93,340 [100.0]
: No. 50(1956. 1.), No. 62(1656. 12.), No. 74(1957. 12.), No. 86(1958. 12.), No. 110(1960. 12.).
: ( )
[ ] () .
93 1950 ‘’()
ICA .
, < 6>
. 1955·1956 (
) 30% , 1957 10%
. 1955~1957 2,000
1958 1,300 .
, ( ), (, ),
1955 60%
, 1955·1960 90% .
ICA
20~30% (< 7>). 1956 3,000
, 1960 4,000 .
1960~1961
< 7> ICA (1,000)
1955 1956 1959 1960 1961
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
15,502 (22.1) 30,930 (25.1) 37,241 (33.4) 40,858 (27.7) 26,745 (36.2)
3,237 (4.6) 6,217 (5.0) 11,785 (10.6) 26,555 (18.0) 14,516 (19.6)
1,421 (2.0) 649
29,097 (41.5) 55,849 (45.3) 37,178 (33.4) 37,180 (25.2) 14,849 (20.1)
9,130 (7.4) 3,723 (3.3) 5,549 (3.8) 737 (1.0)
1,812 (1.5)
14,926 (21.3) 9,008 (7.3) 7,973 (7.2) 8,268 (5.6) 4,548 (6.1)
2,459 (3.5) 2,170 (1.8) 6,623 (5.9) 12,670 (8.6) 3,714 (5.0)
2,110 (3.0) 2,591 (2.1) 1,772 (1.6) 13,717 (9.3) 5,344 (7.2)
28 4,856 (3.9)
51 45
1,283 (1.8) 109 (0.1) 4,884 (4.4) 2,472 (1.7) 3,309 (4.5)
70,074 (100.0) 123,376 (100.0) 111,380 (100.0) 147,269 (100.0) 73,962 (100.0)
: No. 63(1957.1.), No. 110(1960. 12.), No. 122(1961. 12.).
: .


,
(< 8>).
1957 ICA
15% ,
“()
” (
No. 84, 1958. 10.).


. ()
,

,
.25
1954 11 ‘’ ,
. ,
.
,
1955 2 FOA ()
8
()( ) . 2
,
FOA L/com()
( No. 40, 1955. 3.).
25 , , , 1996, 3 4~5 .
96 22
‘
’ , ‘’ ‘’
. ‘’ ,
, 1951~1952
, , GHQ/SCAP
,26 ,
,
.27 ‘’
.
‘’
, 1951 5 16
,28 ()
“‘’ (John F. Dulles) (1951 1~2 -
) , , , ,
” .29
26 , , 182, 1975; ,
; , 1950(3), 2003 .
27 , 1950(), 154, 2001, 31.
28 , (), , 1957, 321. GHQ
3
.
,
,
(, (), 365).

.
(, , 293; , 1950 (3), 162).
29 , , 182, 1975, 17.
,
97 1950 ‘’()
“ ‘’ ,
‘’ 1951 7 ”30 .
,
‘’ ,


.
2)
’ .

, 1951 2 1 (Munition Board) ‘
’(Japan as a Source for Supply of U.S. Military Requirement)


.31
32 1952 3 14 ‘
, ,
(, , 25).
30 , , 296.
31 “ ,
” , “
” ( , 1950(3), 136). GHQ ,
GHQ ( Top Level ) .
32 1951 11 16 ()
, 1952 2 12
,
(, , 299~300).
GHQ ‘’ .
98 22
, 1945~1972
’ . 4 8
, , , 4 , ‘,
’ , ,
, 1952 5 3 JPA 42
528 () .33
2
1950 8.
,
.

‘’ .

. ()
“
,
”34 ,
“
,

”, “
”
.35

‘’ . , , 291; , 1950(3), 151~155; ,
‘’ , 268~269.
33 , , 76.
MSA 36
.

.
3
( ), .37
( ) 1952
5 . 1952 7~53 6
6,400 , 1951 7~1952 6
1,600 4 (< 4>). 1953
1954 1954 5
8 6,300 .
1954 53.6%
(< 9>).

. “
()
” ( No.13, 1953. 3.)
.

. 1955 1955
36 MSA (Mutual Security Act, MSA, 1951 10 ) ‘
’(Mutual Security Program, MSP) .
(Mutual Defense Assistance Program, MDAP),
(Direct Forces Support), (Defense Support), (Development Assistance),
(Technical Cooperation), ( )
. . ,
(FOA) (ICA) FOA, ICA .
37 , , 43~44.
100 22
, 1945~1972
1,000

, . 1955
800
. < 9> 1956·1957
() .
1955

. 1955 ,
“

,
.
, ,
.” .38

.


.
.

.39 ‘ ’
.
38 , , 130.
39
, ,
(, , 59).
101 1950 ‘’()
5. MSA
MSA 40
.
( )
.
.
< 9> , 1956 1957 188 1,914
, 1956 , 1957
. LM-1 27
1956(24) 1957(3)
.41 1956 188 LM-1 24
122 6,000 ( No. 59, 1956. 9.).
1957 2
(1,868 ) 1,900
( No. 69, 1957. 7.).
MSA
. 1957
1960
40 (MSA) ,
MSA . 1952 MSA 1954 3 8 . MSA , MSA: (1), (2), 40 3·40 4, 2003, 2004, .
41 , , 198.
1957 9,000( 3,300 )
3 8,000 (
1,083 ) ( No. 69, 1957. 7.). 5
,
1960 . 1958
(APA) 4,748 1,800
( No. 89, 1959. 3.), 1959 1960
4,000 1 7,000
( No. 110, 1961. 2.).
< 9> , 1955·1956
() 1954 1 2,000 6,000
, 1957 1 3,000
1954
, 1959·1960 9,000 .
1950 1
. 1959·1960
6,000 ()
50% .

. < 3> , ICA 1955
. 1954 2.8%
ICA 1955 12.7%, 1956 20.9% 1960
20% . 1956 1960 1
4~5
103 1950 ‘’()
< 9
.
ICA (< 7>),
3
. 1955·1956 ICA
40% 1960·1961
20% . ICA
, (), (), ,
(< 8>). ( )
.

. 3
“
, ()
”
, “ ( ),
3 ‘() ’
” ‘ ’
( No. 49, 1955. 12.).



. 1956
, “
, ‘
’ .


( No. 65, 1957. 3.).” ,
105 1950 ‘’()
“
”

( No. 70, 1957. 8.).
1957 “
” 1952
.
,

() 1950 ICA
.
ICA 1960
. 1960 10 3

( No. 108, 1960. 10.), 12 5
ICA 19
( No. 109, 1960. 11.), ICA
1961 1963 100
.
, ‘’
. 1951 1 (
) “ ,

106 22
” .42
,
.

.
30%
(< 10>), () ()
.

( ‘’) ,
1951 1952 ‘’
. ‘’
1952~1955 ,
.43
1953

.44
‘5’(1955 12 )
.45 ()

‘’
42 , , , 1957, 99.
43 , 1950 (), (), (), 153, 154, 156, 2001 .
44 , 1950(), 199; , MSA: (2), 303.
45 [5] , 5(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), 145·146·148·149·150, 1999~2000 .
107 1950 ‘’()
.46
1960 5 .
1955
20% , 1959 10%
(< 10>).
,
.
< 10> (100 )

(B) A/B(%)
(A)
1950 920 389 253 1,309 19.3 962 55 1,017 292 39
1951 1,405 1,003 677 2,408 28.1 1,658 185 1,843 565 -112
1952 1,168 939 801 2,107 38.0 1,790 224 2,014 93 -708
1953 1,245 917 761 2,162 35.2 2,243 232 2,475 -313 -1,074
1954 1,602 764 590 2,366 24.9 1,767 255 2,022 344 -246
1955 2,095 745 570 2,840 20.1 1,956 348 2,304 536 -34
1956 2,495 842 587 3,337 17.6 2,782 516 3,298 39 -548
1957 2,819 819 529 3,638 14.5 3,347 588 3,935 -297 -826
1958 2,728 846 489 3,574 13.7 2,488 539 3,027 547 58
1959 3,312 879 464 4,191 11.1 3,044 740 3,784 407 -57
1960 (4~9)
1,844 434 280 2,278 12.3 1,848 369 2,217 61 -219
: No.109, 1960. 11. .
: ICA 1960 () , .
108 22
, 1945~1972

, 1
5

. ,

, “
, ” . “
‘ ’ ,

”
( No. 68, 1957. 6.).
“ ”( No. 70, 1957. 8.)

1958 .
1958
ICA , “
,
”( No. 86, 1958. 12.) , “ICA ()

”( No. 89,
1959. 3.) . 1960
“AID(ICA -)
”( No. 122, 1961. 12.) AID
1963 .
1960
.
. 5
109 1950 ‘’()

.
.
7.
. 1950

.


. MSA
1950 4~5
. 1955 5

1950 4~5
.

.

.
. 1954~1955

, ‘’ .
,
110 22
.


. ‘’

.
.
,
,
.
‘ ’
.
.
. 1950
. 1960

,
.

. ·
, (
) .

, ,
111 1950 ‘’()
‘ ()’47
.
47 (New Look) ‘’
1950 , ‘ ’
‘ ’ . ‘ ’

(trade off)
. ,
,
‘’ ,
.

. ICA ,
(, , 8~9).
307
1950 ‘’()
, ‘’ :
, 13, 2012.
, 1950(1), (2), (3), 158, 159, 160, 2002~2003.
, , ,
, , 2003.
, 40 4, 2003, 2004.
, “1949~”“”(), (), 80 4, 81
1, 1987, 1988.
, , , 1981.
, , , 7, , 1989.
, , 1953.
(NIRA) , 26
(3), , 1995.
, , 1952~1969.
, , , 1961.
, , 4, , 1982.
, , , 1957.
, , , 1964.
, , , 1996.
, 1, : , 1985.
, 5 , 5, :
, 1983.
2004.
, 1, : , 1985.
, , 8,
1950.
316 22
. 1945
, .

.
,
.
() .
1950 ‘’() |
: 2019. 12. 17. | : 2019. 12. 31. | : 2020. 1. 5.
1950 .
8
.
. , 1950
4, 5 .
.

.
.
,
.
.
.
.
.
, ( )
.
: , (), , MSA ,
, 1950~1973: |
: 2019. 12. 4. | : 2019. 12. 19. | : 2020. 1. 2.
‘65 ’ . ,
. .
, . , ‘65 ’
70 .
. ‘
’ ? .
322 22
of peace with the end of the war, accompaniment of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, reorganization of territory, compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the trend of the Cold War. Based on this setting, this paper makes a macroscopic investigation on the relationship with the Northeast Asian non-signatories, such as the Soviet Union, South Korea, and China, to review their relationship with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan, which restored its sovereignty with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, restored or normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, South Korea in 1965, and China in 1972. These non-signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty already maintained historical and political relations with Japan before 1945; therefore, it was necessary to make diplomatic ties to reestablish their relationship with the reborn Japan. Though they did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, they improved relations with Japan in the form of accepting the standards of the peace treaty through normalization of diplomatic relations. In conclusion, it is a historical fact that the San Francisco Peace Treaty that ended the war up until 1945 was born during the Cold War and that it solidified the Cold War order in Northeast Asia. However, restoration and normalization of diplomatic relations between non-signatories of the peace treaty and Japan did not deviate from the standards created through the San Francisco Peace Treaty. From this perspective, the start of post-war Japan had no choice but to engage in limited diplomacy during the Cold War, the age of ideology. Yet, through diplomatic relations with the non-signatories, Japan was able to safeguard the standards of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and expand its sphere of political action. This result also led the non-signers to preserve the San Francisco Peace Treaty. • Keywords: San Francisco Peace Treaty, Cold War, Restoration of the Soviet Union-Japan,
Normalization of South Korea-Japan, Normalization of China-Japan
The Special Procurement of Japan in the 1950s and the Cold War | CHUNG Jin Sung The special procurement that emerged in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War was one of the factors defining the Japanese economy through the 1950s. The special procurement facilitated the growth of the Japanese economy by enabling the acquisition of large amounts of foreign currency worth $800 million a year during the Korean War. To ensure continued economic growth, the Japanese government sought to secure a new special procurement to replace the Korean War special procurement after the Korean War armistice. As a result, by utilizing the offshore procurement of U.S. foreign aid, Japan was able to acquire special procurement amounting to $400 million or $500 million a year in the late 1950s. In addition to acquiring foreign currency, the special procurement also served as an opportunity to revive Japan’s military industry and spearhead Japan’s economic advancement in Southeast Asia.
Japan’s economic gains from the special procurement were derived from Japan’s deep involvement in the Cold War structure in East Asia, led by the United States. During the Korean War, Japan earned a large amount of special income by faithfully implementing the role of the war’s rear supply base. In order to secure new special procurement after the end of
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the Korean War, the Japanese government and the business community responded actively to the U.S. government’s initiative to mobilize Japan’s industrial productivity for the procurement of U.S. military forces, and actively participated in the U.S. foreign aid strategy after the enforcement of the Treaty of San Francisco. Japan has secured special economic benefits by actively committing to the U.S. strategy for East Asia. The United States fostered Japan’s economic power as a rear base under the Cold War structure by providing the economic benefits of special procurement. The special procurement was at a point where the interests of Japan and the United States coincided. On the other hand, the special procurement was located at a point where the interests of Korea and Japan diverged. Not only was the Korean- War-special-procurement itself attributable to Korea’s astronomical material and human losses of the Korean War, but also Japan’s special procurement for Korean reconstruction meant Korean economy’s another subordination to the Japanese economy. • Keywords: the Cold War, special procurement, the economic cooperation between Japan and
U.S., MSA, the Korean War
The Cold War of Japan-DPRK Relations, 1950~1973: Division Structure of Korea on Postwar Process of Japan | PARK Jung Jin Japan-DPRK normalization is discussed as an alternative to overcoming the “1965 regime” between ROK and Japan. To verify this suggestion, this paper reviews the Japan-DPRK relations in light of the postwar process of Japan. The analysis covers two periods. First, the process of the formation of the “1965 regime” between ROK and Japan is reviewed, focusing on North Korean factors. Second, the detente between North Korea and Japan in the 1970s is analyzed based on the impact of the “1965 regime.” The main focus is how the Cold War's influence on Japan-DPRK relations was realized through the division structure of Korea. The purpose of this paper is to find the answer to this question: how did the inter-Korean competition over the sole political legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula affect the postwar process of Japan? The causality between inter-Korean relations and Japan-DPRK relations is also examined.
The formation of the “1965 regime” was the result of not only ROK-Japan relations but also Japan-DPRK relations. Therefore, the transformation of the “1965 regime” should be redefined from the perspective of “Korean Peninsula-Japan relations.” Will Japan-DPRK normalization end the controversy over Article II of the 1965 Treaty? The tentative conclusion made in Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration (2002) was “economic cooperation.” When it comes to Japan-DPRK normalization, Article III of the 1965 Treaty will have to be revised between ROK and Japan. This means that the political legitimacy of ROK as the only lawful government on the Korean Peninsula will be denied. Japan-DPRK normalization is essential for peaceful co-existence of the “Two Koreas”; however, this also means the institutionalization of the division of Korea. • Keywords: Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, Japan-DPRK
relations, the “1965 regime”, the postwar process of Japan, North and South Korea
competition for legitimacy