2nd infantry division - command report - january 1952i o f32d l-;.al al:j bat tali on (sf ) j. 7 2d...

Korean War

2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - January 1952

Headquarters

Korean War Project Record: USA-20

Folder: 050012a

Box: 05

File: 12a

National Archives and Records Administration

College Park, Maryland

Records: United States Army

Unit Name: Second Infantry Division

Record Group: RG407

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

Korean War Project 2ID-00101154


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. Sy-1@, A~:0Atellld4! : -,

ATION

~·2nd

_,_. .. .

I JAN to 31 JAN :-,.,-

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1952 . ISECIICTJ

SECURITY INFORMATIOI


RMAT'IOI ·Ul' l)IF.AI'U! lliVlS-ION . . . ' us Dlft:;


' .

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TABL8 OJ.i' CON T£]',TTS

January 1952

Section Io Command Report

.~. Narrative Summary

B.. Fersonnel (Gl)

c. Intelligence (G2)

D.. Operations (G3)

E. Logistics (G~.)

F. ;£valuation and Reco:m..."!'lendations

G. S ta.ff and RC'I' Cormnanders

:a.. Naps

Section II. Supporting Documents

' .t:!. 0 Chief of Sta.fi'

L Chief of Staff 1 s Journal

B., Personnel (Gl)

1. Gl Journal

2. Persopnel Periodic Reports

3. I·arsonnel Daily Stumnary Reports

L~. Station Lists

5.. General Orders (2d Inf Div and 8th Arrn.y)

6.. Hiscellane.ous

C.. Intelligence (G2)

1 a. G2 Journal and File (l-256) 1.:3 Jan 52

bo G2 Journal and File ( 257-489) 4-6 J<>.n

c. G2 Journal <1nd File (490'-710) 'l-9 Jan

52

52

d •. G2 Jou....-rnal and F'ilo (711-943) 10-12 JEn 52

e. G2 Journc.cl and J?ile ( 944-1172) 1 ':l l 1J _._.,..~- ... ,.,;> J<-;J:l 52

0 G2 Journal Q!ld File (1173-13813) 16-18 Jan 52

g. G2 J o 1..1r1i al and File (1389-1578) 19-21 Jan 52

h .. G2 Journal and Ri.le (1579-17?3) 22-2L; Jan 52

S--c"=- .... "l!"'. t Htl

SEC~~;tiTY INFORMATION


:L. G2 Journzl and Eile (l?44-l93C.) 25-27 Jan 52

j., G2 J m.1.rnaJ: and File (1939-2120) 28-31 Jan 52

2o };eriodic Intelligence Reports

Do Operations ( G3)

1 a. G3 Journal and Bile 1-2 Jan 52

b. G3 Journal and File 3-i+ J<:m 52

Co G3 Journc:.l and File 5-6 Jan 52

do G3 Journal and }1.1e 7-8 Jan 52

e.; G3 Jottrnal and Bile 9-10 Jan 52

f'o G3 Journal and File 11-12 Jan 52

go G3 Journal and File 13-14 Jan 52

ho GJ Journ&l and File 15-·16 Jan 52

io G3 Journal and File l'i-18 Jan 52

jo G3 Journal and }~le 19-20 Jan 52

ko G3 Jottrnal and Eile 21-22 Jan 52

lo G3 Journal .:md File 23-24 Jan 52

m. 'a3 Journal and I?ile 25-26 Jan 52

no G3 Journal and File 27-2/3 Jan 52

Oo G3 Jou!-nal snd File 29-31 Jan 52

2. Periodic Operations Heports

3o Operation Orders

4o Operation Instructions

5. Letters of' Instructions

6. Subject Letters

7 o Training Hemorc.:nda

Ji:o. Logistics ( G4)

l. G4 Journal and File 1-31 Jan 52

2. Periodic Logistics Reports

3" Armor Status Reports

F. -Staff Section Reports

l. Chemical

2o ADE


:1.

S{ ET

3 o Ordnanc.e

4. Quarterma.ster

5.. Signal

6. surgeon

8., Inspector General

9 o J:'ublic Information Officer

10 o irovost IJ[arshal

11.. Staff Judge Advocate

12. Special Services

1.3., Chaplain

14., Civil Assistance Officer

15., Division Transportation Office

. G.. }!iscella.neous (Special ,studies, Reports and }iiscellaneous Haterial)

1., 2d Division Official Newspaper 1'VJarriortt

Section III o Subordinate Unit Reports (:Annexes)*

A.. 9th Infantry Regiment

B., 23d Infantr:Jr Regiment

c. 38th Infantry Regiment

D. Headquarters 2d Divis:Lon Artillery

£., 12th Field 1\.rtil~erJ Bo.ttalion

F. 15th Field Artillery Battalion

Q., 37th Field J~tillery Battalion

Ho 38th F'ield J~.rtille:r..r Battalion

I o f32d l-;.AL Al:J Bat tali on (Sf )

J. 7 2d Tank B&.t tali on

K. 2d Cngineer (C) Battalion

*These reports forwa.rded ·under sepa.rate cover per authorization of Eighth J\rmy Circul,:;.r No., 135, 12 August 1951..


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SECURiff-~INFORMATIO~-·

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

January 19.52

Aggressiveness was the keynote of all 2d Division activities

during the month of January. During this period the Division con-

tinued to occupy cmd improve positions on line MISSOURI, conducted

reconnaissance patrols and established ambush points, Artillery

"Attacks by Fire", continued training and planning on counterattack

missions and maintained and improved reserve areas.

0752

There w&s no significant change.in the pattern of enemy activities

during this period. The enemy continued to maintain a defen~ive

attitude, improving his positions, building bunkers and digging

trenches. He reacted sharply to patrol encroachment on his outpost

lines, and harrassed friendly positions frequently. · However~ there

were no indic~tions of any large scale build-up or any preparation

for a major offensive observed.

At the beginning of the period the 2d Division occupied 21. four

regiment front approximately 22000 meters wide between .the 48 and 70

North South grid lines with the MLR generally between the 40 and 42

East West grid lines. This position placed the 2d Division deep

within the Eastern apex of the Kumwha - Chorwon - Pyonggang Triangle

common~ known as the "Iron Triangle 11 because it was formerly used

by the enemy for an assembly, supply and refitting area during preVious

actions against the United Nations ~orces. This position is also impor~

ant because it lies astride and cuts off the Kumwha - Hwachon - Chunchon -

\rJonju route and dominates the Chorwon - Uijongbu - Seoul route. Both of

these routes have been used by ~he ene~y in previous invasions and are

necessary to support a succe•sful penetration of South Korea.

l\.-n•~

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SECti?tiTY INFOf:MATIOR -1-


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Among the many activities at the newly Ofened Leaders School were tank-infantry demonstrations

••• and in2truction on the use of the liJ;)mm rec::oilbss rifle.

0753

; I


075~

~-~- ----~--------

• :.~:cl to1-c b:::rs, J~c:bled t::-::!~s to b·~ toued out the S<'me tr;ocks ,J_s·:!j to


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• 0755

I'

SECRET Facing the Division zone is rugied and varied terrain. '!he art!&

is divided into two principal defensive areas by the Hantan River which

runs generally North and South. The principal terrain feature of tbe

Eastern area is a large hill complex dominated by Hill 1062 (CT6445).

'Ihe principal terrain feature in the He stern defense area is a cir-

cular hill mass denoted as Hill 717 (CT5345). Order of Battle sources

indicated that the Eastern sector was being dei'ended by elements of

the 77th CCF Division <md the \-!estern sector by elements of the 76th

CCF Division. 1~ctual contacts had established the 226th Regiment,

76th CCF Division as being on line in the Western sector and the

Security Regiment bf the 77th CCF Division on line in the Eastern

sector. Tbere wer3 indications that these units were relieved

early in the month but, lacking confirmation, this conclusion could

only be tentatively accepted.

Both the 76th and 77th CCF Divisions were organic elements of the

26th ccr.-· Arrrry. 'IWelve enemy battalions were accepted as being in for-

ward areas and the enemy was granted the capability of reinforcing with

18 additional battalions within 48 hours.

;. t tha mement the period opened all units of the entire Eighth

P..nny were engaged in a tremendous salute by firA. t 11 heavy caliber

weapons .which~ould be brought to bear were turned on the enemy and

fired. Succes.sive barrages 1.vere fired to mark the passing of the old

year and welcome the new. This placed the enemy in the position of

being 11Volunteertt partici:t:ants in a ma.. sive United Nations de:-r..onstration

wldch stressed volume, accuracy and distribution of fire.

SECRET

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,Q756

• Hem of Compg.ny K, 9th Info.ntr:y- Regiment, climb to their posi tio:..s. • 0

• • .locct:od directly i·,J. i':·ont oi.' .:m•c:J'(T h.:::ld Hill 1062.


0757,

' St:.·CRET

'l':ne Jivision h<:;.d inaugurated a policy of aggressive patrolling

in the provious period which continued on into the month of Janu~ry.

Daylight reconnaissance patrols were dispatched dai1y by each regi-

ment for the purpose of determining enenl.~r dispositions and capturing

prisoners. At night, ambush patrols wore organized on possible enemy

patrol routes. The reconn~ssance patrols were very successful in •

securing information pertaining to dispositiona but the prisoner

capturing effort was not. too successful. The enemy displayed almost

no desire to surrender as evidenced by the fact that only one pris-

oner out of five taken was a deserter and one patrol leader reported

seeing two enemy shoot each other in what appeared to be a mutual

suicide pact in order to avoid capture.

This reluctance to surrender on the part of the enemy was sus-

pected to be caused by closar political surveillance and increased

propaganda concerning harsh treatment oi" PsW coupled with a practical

fear of friendly artillery. There was also some indication that

friendly- troops were tendinf; to open fire too early and at extreme

range::;i causing the enemy to become more wary. Night patrols and ambJlSh

points were hindered in their ef'ficiency by the extreme cold. Bulky

clothing makes stealth difficult and complete immobility for long

periods is not possible with the present equipment.

The lst Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, which had been guard-

ing prisoners at Koji-do, reverted to control of its parent unit on

3 January when it disembarked at Inchon. Moving by rail and motor,

the Battalion closed in to the RegL~ental reserve area without incident

and began training and reequipping for combat duties.

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0758

·.


0759

From 7-ll January eleme'1ts of the Divisi·on perticioated

!.,.,. ·"" "A+t c 1 ~ "'r Cj'~ro" .L .... a .._, a .[~. ...... J· J.. .. _ ·...... • This plan called for ertillsry and

0ir attaclcs on knmvo e·:Jemy installations. Larse volumes of

p la;med art :1lery fire, 1 nc ludi n=: TCT' s werF>-'t:'lac ed on Com-

mend Posts, communi~ation centsrs, troop concentration areas,

art.ille:ry positions, snpply dumps c;,':"ld lmown route:c of supply.

Fre~briafed sir strikes were launched against similar targets

beyond the bombline. Results of the "Attack by ii'ire" were

e;ood. Photo :.r.terpretation sbo'tred excslle'lt area coverage

and consider a.ble damage to in 2t alla.t iorl s, numerJu s seco':':'::l ary

explos.ions \'ler.e observed a.'1d enemy reaction 'tres slight.

Followint: the "Attack by Fire" en .Armored Reconnaissa:Jce

petrol was dispatched on 12 January. Two platoons from the

72d Ta'1k 3ettalion _psnetrated three miles into enemy territo~y

a~d returned with no loss or damage. Enemy reaction to tbe

petrol ,,;as confined to small arms and ~ome mortar fire. T'h>?

te.nks d.sstroyed 8 houses, 4 bunkers aad reported one secondary

explosion.

The "Attack by Fire 11 was aleo follov-red by increased

Psy',~ar activities. Special leafl'Et shells contai.ninz; safe

conduct passes end a. specially def'i2'ned leaflet addressed to

the 77th CCF Division were fired in co0junction with the

1:0T 1 s. Later in the period t1,.ro special voi'ce broa.dcests

were made usi~g a'female Cbinese interp~eter. PW r~ports

indicate t~e enemy would be more susceptible to the female

v~ice. Reeults were essentially ~esativ~. None of the

prisoners ta 1\:en IJ'lsre considered to be directly 2. nf1u e ~c ed

by Psywar activities. ':'he er1emy retaliated with a voice

br0edcast on 23 .. Ta'1uary heard by tl:'le 3rd Batta.lion, 9th 1'1f.:.

e'"'try Re~ime'1t. The voice c~lled upon the Americans to so

home as they had been in Korea too long.


0760

L k.r:J: of' the 38th Inf.::.>J. tr; T:m~c Compc:ny )_::ours eJhik: pho.sphorou.s 2nd hi:::;h 3Xplosi V8 s. • •

• • • o:;. =·Iill ;_:72, :C:~8l•in~ tl":; _;n8r:t;r clm,11 '''il) :: ~,,~trol brar:~.;:s out oi' ::_ tr::~'.

S•cr, ,... __ t titf


0761

SECREr The ~th Infantry Regiment continued "Operation Freezeout" during

the early part of the period. This Oferation was a bunker destroying

campaign begun in the previous period. An additional 274 enemy

bunkers were destroyed bringini the total number to 367. This

operation was considered to be highly successful.

An outstanding example of a small unit action occur~d 3 Jan-

uary when a platoon sized reco1maissance patrol was dispatched by

C Company, Netherlands Battalion, attached to the 38th Infantry

Regiment. The patrol was to reconnoiter enemy positions on Silver

Star Hill, the name given to a hill mass at CT.52.5426o The petrol

was supported by fire from the re3t of the Battalion. 'Nhen upon

being engaged by the enemy on the hill, they assaulted and drove the

enemy fnom the hi'll. 1~ flame thrower was used with excellent results.

The enemy withdrew from the hill leaving 20 counted KIA, 30 estimated

KIA and one PW. Abandoned weapons inclUded two English Bren guns,

one Japanese Carbine, one United States M-1 rifle and two Russian

Carbines. TI1e patrol then destroyed seven bunkers and returned to

friendly lines.

On 29 January the 14th Infantry Regiment reverted to control of

its parent organization, the 25th Infantry Division, pursuant to

orders issued by IX Corps. Relief of the 14th on line by organic

troops placed the 2d Division in tae position of occupying its front,

already wide, with three regiments instead of four. The attachment

of the Thailand Battalion in December and the return of the 1st

Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment in· January gave the Division the

equivalent of .three four Battalion Regiments.

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SECRET


0762

Hen of Cornp~.::1y I, 38th Infa.."l.try ::te.~iment, eliminated the ' ., ' +- b ' "ld" b k nous.m;;; sn e>r u<( ge :r ouJ. .. lDE; uru ers. • •

• • • such ccS ti":sse, ~eros;:, J:rorr, me;·:;y h3ld nstC1r Hill.!!

S r.. ·"' 7"_· .-_ ...-' •• § , J _L.unL.


0763

SECRET The relief was accomplished sin~ly enough, by lateral displace-

ment of battalions and extension of front. However, the entire

defensive plan, to include coordination of fires and counterattack

plans, had to be revised.

Loss of the 14th Infantry· Regiment did not materially weaken

the position of the Division, under the circumstance~, as the loss of

numbers in MLR positions was overba.lanced by the availability of

stronger, more unified reserves.

From the personnel standpoint the Division made substantial

gains. Losses were low, especially when compared with enemy losses.

Non-battle casualties continued to be fairly high. A large number of

rotation personnel departed but this was offset by the replacement

stream. Rest and Recuperation leaves to Japan continued, two USO

shows were enjoyed and local motion picture shows were made available

which all added to morale raising endeavors. Mail service was good,

FX se~r.ice was good and Red.Cro .. continued its excellent service.

Suppl¥ and logistical services contributed much to the morale

raising features, too. The win'T.erization program continued with

improvement of bunkers and living quarters, improving shower facil-

ities and improving methods of delivering hot food to troops on line.

Supply and logistical problems were great but not insurmountable.

Bad weather, old equipment, parts and shortages and poor roads made

operating conditions difficult. High morale, knowledge of the

situation and time to perform needed work counteracted the difficul-

ties. The opportunity.for training was present and taken advantage

of in all cases. In short, progress was being made.

SECRET

-6-


G764

•

'l~;o soldier" o~· t.:c:; N8tl~.Jrl<.:~nds Datt.slion t2k.:3 tim:J out to writ:J :::, letter "home •••

• • • 1-;:.-lile in , nearb:: bunker <-:. :::oldiur ";3'ts re:::d:J" for rot::.tion.


•

0765

To dispense as much e.s possible with cold rations c>nd nhome cooking" in the bun.'lcers. • •

o • ~mess ld tchens ~-:ere ~:;t up d:.rectly behind the front lir.es to serve hot meals.

•


0766

=~ summsry, it cen be ssld, t~e Divlsio~ rem8ined i~ a

static 90sitton during the period. however, it ca~~ot be

said that the Division rernat~ed static, 0r was i~ective.

~.:.tl:'Jer, the reverse ''c.r; true, t>-:! Division \'.'a:::: active sed

a~YrPssive under ste~ic co~ditions. ~~e sctiveness end

::'tey ''r<:re 'iTell PD"?liec3 by 11 ~he 3eca'1d to ''o'!e."

,.

•

-7-


0767

• 'I'vJo ori:;i:1c:l ideas, tlD ice clec:.to • o

• :~~':. ·. the ,~~1 ti-s::id cc:n: tcr ·:·uj_dc;, hT·.=rs used on th.,; t:-':l!:s to :m2bl3 thc;m to trfvo 1 on I :::ck:;d :C':lcu .::nd ice o

~ f'. r:. ,. . - .. vL0~ . ..:.. j


0768

• to ·3nr_~)l·J the cr8-;:7 r:l.:;r::b::;rs to direct t!:.:J c~ri v~r ~.::-l:.sn

bc·c~{inz, UI) to ~lis~bled t£r1l(s.


0769

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GEOGRAPHIC IDCATIGIS*

UNIVERSAL mAN SV'ERSE MERCAWR

Chorwon CT4434 - Kumwha CT653tl

Chuncb.on CStl994 Pyonggani CT5152

Hwachon CT8617 Seoul CS2255

Inchon BS9149 Uijongbu CS2878

Koji-do. DP7060 Wonju DS0733

*All place names are shown on the Korea 1:250,000 .AMS Ma.P Series 1552 (Sheet numbers NI 52.2, NI 52.3, NJ 52.6, NJ 52.9, and NJ 52.10). They also appear on the Korea 1:50,000 1571 Series of the same area. -


SECRE~ G770

PERSONNEL

Staff Section Report of Gl, 2d Infantry Division

for

January 1952

f,s the period opened the mission of the Division was to occupy and

defend tb.e Hissouri Line and to conduct extensive and aggressive patrolling.

The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, rejoined the Division, closing on

4 January 1952. The 14th Infantry Regiment rras relieved on line and re

leased from attachment to the Division on 29 January 1952. During the pe-

riod the Thailand Battalion replaced the French Battalion on line. As the

period closed the mission of the Division was to occupy and defend the Mis-

souri Line, organize and improve positions, and conduct extensive patrolling.

During the period the Division sustained 132 battle casualties and

417 non-battle casualties. Personnel gains amounted to 3,199, of which

2,605 were new replacements and 594 were returned to duty personnel. P.d-

ministrative losses due to rotation consisted of 205 officers and 2,614

enlisted men. At the close of the period the s-txength of the Division was

933 officers, 88 warrant officers, and 18,092 enlisted men, bringing the

aggregate total to 19,113. At this time there <ire 1,605 Negro personnel

assigned to.the Division. This represents 8o4% of the Division strength.

There was a net loss of 17 ROK personnel during the perioda This

brings the s_-txength of the ROK Soldiers (KATUSA) attached to the Division

to 785, with an.additional 119 attached to the French.Battalion and 108

attached to the Netherlands Detachment.

The number of officers and enlisted reflacements and returnees ar-

riving at the ReplacellJ3nt Company totaled 3,199. Of this figure, 206 were

officers. At this time the Division is 104.4% of authorized strength.

There were five· prisoners of war captured during the period, all of

them being Chinese Communist Forces enlisted men. In addition 341 civilians

were given medical attention when necessary and 426 civilians were evacuated

-1-


0771

through the coordinated efforts of the Civil Assistance Officer and the

Provost Marshal.

Thirty-five stragglers were apprehended by military policemen who

carry printed lists of AWOL 1 s sought. Prostitution presented a problem

requiring continuous suppression. Consumption of native liquor was not

a serious problem. Military discipline was excellent during the period

with criminal offenses being held to a minimum.

Excellent morale is enjoyed by all units of this command. The con-

tinued availability of PX gratuitous items as well as purchasable

luxury items, t.1e daily utilization of movie f""cilitltes, and the con

tinued rotati~ program contributed tO the high morale of the Div

ision. Three small Rest and ltecuperation quotas in addition to the

regular quota were weJ.+ received. Services of the American Red Cross

were continuously available to all troops. One hundred fourteen films

were shown to an estimated 187,909 troops. Two USO shows entitled

11Broadway Sound Off" and "Rhythm Revue 11 were well received.

During the month of January the following awards were approved

for presentation: 4 Distinguished Service Crosses, 67 Silver Stars,

93 Bronze Stars for Valor, 118 Bronze Stars for Meritoriou~ Service,

19 Air Hedals and 203 Co11ID1endation Ribbons. This brings the total

awards since the arrival of the Division in Korea to 10,174.

Twenty-one Field Grade Officers were lost dur,ing the period as follows:

Lt Col Joseph I Gurfein 23d Inf Regt Retated

Lt Col Joel McNair Hq, 2d Inf Div Tranafezred

Major Yjncent 1-i Bach Hq, 2d Inf Div Rotated

Major Rex Crosslin 702d Ord 1'1 Co Rotated

~~aj or .~.'Il.o.rr.as ~• Day 9th Inf Regt Rotated

Hajor Dean R Dort Hq, 2d Inf Di v Rotated

Hajor James R Duncan Y·th Inf Regt Rotated

Major John A Elledge Div Arty Rotated

11ajor D3on Falperin 2d QM Co Rotated

Hajor Herbert Harris Div Arty Rotated

Major John Hitterholzcr, Jr. Rotated


G772 SECRET

•

Hajor Carrol R 0 1NP.ill Div Arty Rotated

Hajor Harold :reterson Hq, 2d Inf Div Rotated

Hajor Robert 1 Rataczak Div Arty Rotated

Najor Harry 1:: Smith Div Lrty notated

Maj or 1oui s T Srni th 2d l'led Bn Rotated

Major John 1 Smitherman Hq, 2d Inf Div Rotated

Naj or George E Staley Hq, 2d Inf Jiv Ro~ted

Major Victor 1 Tipp 9th Inf Regt Rotated

Chaplain (Major) A S liard. 38th Inf Regt Transferred

\ EPjor Nartin J Filliams Hq, 2d Inf Div Transferred

f

-3-

SECRET


0773

INTElllCENCE

Staff Section Report of G2, 2d 'Infantry Division

for

January 1952

'Ihe mon ih of January 195 2 revealed no material change in the dispo-

sition of ihe enemy fe.c~g the 2d Infantry Division. The 26th CCF /:rmy was

still deployed defensively across the Division front. Elements of the 76th

Division, 26th CCF J,rmy, were disposed west of the Hantan River between the

CT49-58 north-south· grid lines, protecting the 717-682 circular hill mass

which controls the valley leading to tyonggang. Elements of the Security

Regiment, 26th CCI" P.rrny, were deployed east of the Hantan River between the

CT58-64 north south grid lines, covering the lowland approaches to fyong-

gang. The 77th Division was deployed farther east, between the CT64-72

north-south grid lines, in defense of the high ground covering the approaches

to Hill 1062, the most prominent terrain feature in the entire sector.

3nemy activity for the month continued in the same pattern adopted

by the enemy since the demarcation line was accepted in late November. His

activity in forward ar'eas was confined to intercepting friendly patrols,

limited reconnaissance of friendly posj_tions, and light har·assing mortar

and artillery fire on friendly positions.

The enemy's attitude was a continuation of his defensive roleo It

was characterized by continued disposition in depth of both troops and sup-

porting weapons. It was further emphasized by the improving and repairing

of existing fortii'ications arid the construction of new defensive positions.

The most noticeable among these developments was the construction of con-

necting trenches between existing installations and personnel shelters on

reverse slopes. The security of enemy forward areas was maintai.'1ed by out-

post positions. No attempt to extend these positions closer to friendly

lines was noticed.

Th3 enemy depended principally on small arms and automatic weapons

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SECRET


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U.~ ..... ~, 0774

fire to interc~pt friendly patrols, but reinforced these fires ':Iith concen-

trated 2.rtillery and mortar fire >vhenever key 'defensive outpost positions

-vrere threatened. Jm example of the enemy's intent to vigorously defend his

outpost positions was the stubborn resistance encountered by a patrol from

Company L, 38th Infantry, on 12 January. During a ::::ix-hour firefight, an

estimated·enemy company on Hill )~72 (CTi.~943) used, in .:..ddition to c. heavy

volume o1' small arms, automatic ;,reapons, and ;:;renade fire, 100 rounds of

artillery and 500 rounds of mixed calibre mortar.

The 2d Division dispatched 290 reconnaissance patrols a~ 364 ambush

poi.."lts during the month. A tot&l of B3 contacts w"i th the enemy were made

by these patrols. Thirty-two of tho contacts resulted in en::;a~ements. The

majority of the contacts and engagements were made with small enemy groups

of squad and platoon size.

;:;nemy offensive action has been limited to reconnaissance of friendly

positions by small patrols, occasional hara ssin;s of friendly positions by

sniper fire, and a few isolated instances of attacks on friendly outposts.

One such attack was that launched by an estimated enemy platoon in the vi-

cinity of CT629419 on an 0 Company, French Battalion, 23d Infantry, outpost

at 22055I Januai"'J• i'.fter a one-llour firefight, the enemy t"'ithdrew, only to

re-attack at 0220 hours with mortar support.

There was a slight decrease in the number· of enemy artillo~r pieces

observed during the period. However, the amount of artillery rounds re-

ceived did not indicate nny reduction in enemy artillery capabilitieso !cr-

tillery continued to remain deployed in depth. No artillery counterbattery

fire was received, and only two incidents of interdiction fire v-rere reportodo

J:-hoto Interpretation reports and .AOF sig;h~ngs indicate that there

was a marked build-up of enemY supply installations and antiaircraft posi-

tions. Divisional aircraft reported receiving small arms and antiaircraft

fire v.rhenever they approached these 2reas. This build-up cannot be in-

terproted to me<:~n that the enemy has cmy intention of chan;_;ing from his

defensive r.ission at the present time o

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• ,..,,- ..... -,,...... }

v\- ..... -• 0775

.~. scarcity of px'isoners o-'- war has reduced the amount of information

received about the enemyo ;..;fforts to secure prisoners through raids have

met little success. To give ths Division a better picture of the enemy in-

stallations ru1 overlay with ~ accompanying report was required from each

regiment showing all the information that they had obtained about the enemy

1-JOSitions 2.nd movaments. Tl1is overlay was to :;;ive the Division the same

picture of the enemy as was possessed by the Company Connnanders.

On 21 January 1952, Letter of Instructions Number 112, subject: l-a-

trollin;:::, vias published in order to standardize the procedure of submitting

and reporting patrols. Heretofore, each unit had been permitted to submit

patrol plans utilizing a format or' their own origin. In the future, ·the

utilization of the stz..ndard form will serve to make th~ programming and

reporting of patrol information more uniform. This will tend to increHse

the accuracy of reporting and plotting of actions.

Durine the month, eighteen articles of special interest were pub-

lished as inclosures to the Periodic Intr..::lligence Rep<;Jrts. These .:.rticles

covered such subjects as enemy armor, reorganiza-~on and conservation of

manpower in the CCF, operation of CCF transportation units, possible new

CCF weapons, CCF attack tactics, and plans for the 6th Phase Offensive.

During the month of January, t_h.e Division inflicted a ·total of 2,685

casualties on the e:qemy, distributed as follov.rs: 163 counted Kif., 1,206

estimated KIA, 1,311 estimated kJIA, <>..nd 5 frisoners of r.,;ar (one deserter).

This brings the total casualties inflicted on the enemy since re-entering

the line to h,l02, broken down a.s follows: 233 counted KIA, 1, 787 esti-

mctted KIA, 2,070 estimated ~tH, and 12 Prisoners of i:Jar (3 deserters).

The Photo Interpretation Section received 16 current air force photo

missions and 21 :t:-hoto mis.sions from 2d Division Signal during the month.

A total of 7,382 annotated prints _arid 103 mosaics of regimental sectors

were distributed to divisional units during the month. The bulk of the mo-

saics vJere reproduced by photographing the original mosaics made by the sec-

. tion. Sixteen :jhoto interpretation reports were :mblished and distributed.

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0776

-Cover tr2ces on 2,11 missions are moint<:,inod on 1:50,000 scale maps

by plotting Dll sorties received. ~hoto reconnaissance missions are re-

quested from hi';her he,?dquarters and signal co•>lpany in order to msint~n

2n accurate study of chang0s in enemy i.YJ.s t<Jllations. Concurrently, overlay

tr<:ccs arG t:J.<:tintcined on enemy defenses, roads, and bridges.

To improve tru photo-interpretation m.i.ssion of th"~ Div-ision, one

officer end one photo interpratar from the G2 Fhoto Interpretation Section

Here sent to Division Artillery to replace rotated personnel. 'lne Division

Section was brought back up to strength through newly assigned personnel.,

The sending ol· Division photo-~nterpreter pe~sonnel to Division J,xtillery

helped to increase the coordina_tion and cooperation between the t-,ro sections.

~ersonnel of the G2 Section were augmented by the addition of five

enlisted men and i'ive officers. Major Hager joined the section as a Jl."e-

placement _f'or Lieutonant Colonel Aykroyd, J:ssistant Chief of Staff, G2o

Also replaced was the Order of Battle Officer 2nd Photo InterpretC'tion Of-

ficer. Tl.fo officers and three enlisted men were rotated during the month.,

Replacements were on hand i'or other enlisted m:m and officer$ 1-rho are to

rotate in the near future. Two draftsmen were added to the section 2dding

materially to the ability of the section to keep up with posting, making

overlays, o.nd other necessary drafting oparationso

H.ecommendations for awards of 'four Bronze Star Hedals and four Com-

mendation Ribbons with }'letal Pendants were submitted for officers and en-

listed men of the section who had rotated or were about to rotate.

The Interrogation Frisoner of War Team confined their activity mostly

to training. Five prisoners of war were interrogated in addition to the

normal amount of translations. Additional winterization and improvement of

the 'Camp site was accomplished.

Cocr1terintelligence activities were r.:ther limited for the period.

Two hundred and ninety-aigh t indigenous anrployees for non-sensitive labor

assignments were screened am only 16 were found to be security risks or

undesirable. }ii ve .hundred and forty-seven records. were screcmed for granting

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G777

of security cl8aranceso T<m hundred and fifty-eight civilians and refugees

,;ere screened -with no counterintelligence interest revealed.

~~leven br.:.ckground investigc:..tions were initiated on Korea11 Nationals

durin:; the montho 'rwo Intelligence Field liile cases were closed during the

r.10nth.- .A total of lY continually pending cases, Korea-wide, remain open as

of the end of the month.

Considerable success was achieved in th~ effort to coordinate policy

for the control of indigenous perso~11el with unit S2 1 s and labor officers.

This included the encouraging of filing o~ personal history statements,

standardization of pass forms, insuring the current and continued screen-

ing of :indigenous labor, ani roquesting of bac~{ground investigations in all

cases in which it is deemed necessary o Members of the section also delivered

18 security lectures during the month.

Liaison was effected during the period with all tactical units above

company level, in a total of 97 visits o One aerial reconnaissance fli~ht 0

c.nd 11 motor reconnaissances were made to screen the area for possible sub-

versive activities. In addition, liaison was made with the 9th ROK unit on

the left flank as an effort to tighten effective control over possible line

crosserso

The assignment of two additional agents brought the detachment up to

strengtho T-wo agents were authorized to go to Japan on rest ~nd recuper-.

ation during the month.

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C778

Ol.GRATIOlJS

Staff Section Report of G3, 2d Infantry Division

for

January 1952

All three of the 2d Division Infantry Regiments and the 14th l:lCT,

25th Division, were in defensive positions on Line Missouri at the begin-

ning of the period, conducting patrolling and establishing ambush points.

Operations Order Number 39 was published o.rtlering all regiments to continue

an active defen~e of LL~e Missouri within their respective sec~ors and to

counterattack to destroy or repel enemy thrusts into the HLR or flanks., L

Division Reserve Force wa.s established, consisting of the 72d Tank Battal-

ion and Reserve Battalions from each of the 9th Infantry, 23d Infantry, and

38th Infantry Regiments. This reserve force w2.s designed for mobility, in

the various tank-infantry teams which were made up from it, and counter-

attack missions were assigned ·oo each in ~eeping with designated counter-

atta.ek plans. All of these teams were mutually supporting from assembly

positions in each regimental area. The already established counterattack

plans were rescinded by this o.rtler.

· To implement the existing program for kn.~-infantry training, a. new

training memorandum v.Jas published. It provided for advanced training to

include actual dry run exercises of counterattack plans. The program of

six days 1 duration also consisted Oi initiating a reconnaissance of routes

and assembly areas, loading of personnel, communication nets, target desig-

nation, fire, movement, employment and capabilities of the team. All co-

.ordination and supervision of tr~nins was ~onducted by the Commanding Of-

ficer, 72d Tan.~ Battalion, in his capacity as Division Armor Officer.

Communication, Security Instruction: .il ono hour conference ~vas

given to all key staff personnel of the infantry regiments and Division

i\rtillery by a team from the Signal Compc;.ny and CIC Detachment. The pur-

• pose was to increase the combat efi'iciency of the Division by decreasing the

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0779

amount of intelligence data received by the ener.rJ through improper communi-

cation procedures in tr.snsmi::;cion.

Training :Hemora.'1durn Nu."ll.ber 2 est2blished a Squad Leaders' School for

those enlisted personnel oi' the infantry regiments who displci.yed c::. potential

for becor.ri.ng outstanding squad leaders. The course consisted oi' 100 hours

instruction over a period of ten days. This progrGn was L'1itiated during

the comparative inactive period which vms b3in;:; enjoy8d by front-line units.

The first class, consisting of 1oe students, wa.s instructed by a special

staff cf selected officers .snd NCO instructors from the entirG Division in

the following subjects: Leadership--15 hours, Tactics (night and day)--26

hours, 1Jeapons--20 hours, }1iscellaneous Technical Subjects--19 hours, Confer-

ences and Seminars--20 hours. The first class graduated and had high praise

for the course. The school was established in a special area south of the

Division Command Post where the students and instructor-coordinator person-

nel were billeted.

Based on the success of ths Squad Leaders• School, Training Memoran-

dum Number 3 provided for a similar course for platoon sergeants which was

initiated 30 January 1952o 'Ihese students, numbering 36, were billeted in

the same area and were also instructed by the same staff of instructors.

The course is of ten days' duration, however, the m1bject material is more

advanced to include: Five Night Tactics Problems, Leadership--17 hours,

Squsd and Platoon Ta,ctics--43 hours, \·Jeapons--16 hours, 11iscellaneous Tech-

nical Subjects--16 hours, Conferences and Seminars--8 hours.

A Radio Operators' School for replacement operators and a cost con-

scious indoctrination for all personnel were two other training memoranda

which were publishedo

The French Batt;;;lion replacements relieved the older French personnel

on 2 January 19)2, .s.nd a two-week tr2ining program in familiarization of

various weapons was conductedo

Lnother United Nations Battalion, tfi.:J Tnailmtd Battalion Hl:oich had

joined the 2d Division on 26 December 19)1, was in turn form2lly 2ttached

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to the 9th Infa.ntry Regiment by Operation Instruction Number 135 o

The only other operation instruction of any consequence that was

published was one which ordered 2d Division Artillery to coordinate and

execute an Artillery-Air Attack by fire, between 7-10 January 1952. The

attack was made forwcrd of all regimental positions and lt.rge volumes of

planned artillery fires, including TOT 1s, were placed on enemy troop concen-

tration areas, artillery positions? command communication centers, supply

dumps, and known routes _of 5Upplyo The ai~ attack was launched on 10 Jan

uary 1952, however, the air strikes were limited to targets north of the

bombline.

Only one operation plan was published for the period., In keeping

with Letter of Instruction Ntnnber 108 that was publi$hed the month before,

Operation Plan Number 21 consolidated the regimental plans which were submitted.

Raids were conducted both at night and in daylight during the period, and

it was forcefully proven that those conducted at night against the well-

entrenched enemy in a static situation tended to be more successful than those

conducted during daylight hours when the enemy had unrestricted visibility

to direct their fires.

To· plan for the eventuality of an enemy Chemical, Biological, or

Radiological attack, Letter of Instruction Number 109 was published outlin-

ing an extensive plan to prepare to counteract this potentiality should it

occur. Training aims and requirements, responsibilities, warning procedure,

and contamination and decontamination instructions were outlined. Annexes

attached -to the letter were: Overlay of Responsible Zones, Intelligence,

Chemical, mgineer, Transportation, and Administrative.

Due to the movement of th;:;. Command Post last month, a new defense

plan for the Coii1lland }'ost proper was established by Letter of Instruction

Number llO, fully utilizing the Division Defense Ilatoon and reorganizing

the Provisional Battaliono 'Ihe battalion utilized all personnel in the Com-

mand l:·ost area and organized them into four defense companies.

Letter of Instruction Ntnnber 111--Night Combat Patrols--dated 15

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••

0781

January, required regiments to submit for approval platoon-size combat pa-

trcl plans to destroy hostile pa.trols, capture prisoners of W8r, seek enemy

defensive positions, harass and inflict maximum damage. All plans were re-

ceived and filed for future use. None of these were ordered during the month.

Operations Order Number 40, dated 21 January, was a defensive order

fJUblished to redistribute the Division Organic Forces 1-vi thin the existing

boundaries, due to the ordered loss, by IX Corps, of the U~th RCT (-). The

relief of thi::> unit, minus the 69th FJ.eld Artillery Battalion ond Company A,

21st .Mit Mif Battalion (SP), was to be accomplished prior to 1 February 1952.

The relief was completed on 29 J~nuary and the RCT (-) reverted to control

of their parent unit at 1130 hours. To provide the forces necessary to ac

complish the relief, and to allmv the regiments a sufficient force on hand

to meet current responsibilities for regimental counterattack plans, the

Division Reserve was reorganized, and all infantry battalions reverted to

the control of their parent units. Each regimental sector along the MLR

was extended in length by generally one battalion. Division Reserve now

consisted of the 72d Tank Battalion, 2d Reconnaissance Company, and the

Ivanhoe Security Force, which prior to this time has had no such formal

training. Division comterattack plans for this force were drawn up and

submitted. ·

Subject letters and memos that were published for the period included

a revision of an SOP for Liaison Officers and an SOF for Air Defense. 'fuis·

letter established an effective and expeditious method of defense against

air attack and provided for timely warning to ·all units within the Division.

Air raid alert conditions, methods of transmitting and reporting warnings,

· and defensive measures and requirements for holding practice a.lerts were

defined.

To provide for a maximum utilization of inactive hours on the ~ILR

and OFLR and to develop and maintain the highest standards of marksmanship,

a letter--Accuracy of ii1.re--established <:: front-line weapons' training pro-

gram. Inst~uctions were to firo at known or suspected enemy locations with

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&11 organic infantry >veapons an:i light artillery. Safety precautions were

enforced; firing uas strictly supzrvised a."ld those weapons found to be i..'1-

operable ilfere to be repaired or replc:.ced. In addition to firing each weapon

individually, all final protective lines were to be fired once each -vreek.

All i'irinq; was so plaiUled as to stay within the limits of the current am-

munition available supply rateo Only senior conunanders of both infantry and ',

artillery were authorized to fire artillery problems in keepillg with this

programo

l'sychological '.iarfaro increased the amount of ground and air loudspeaker

broadcasts for the period and continued to disseminate numerous leaflets by

organic light aircraft and artillery shells. In conjunction with the "Attack

by Fire 11 that was conducted by the artillery, leaflet shells were expended

containillg safe-conduct passes on targets that were hit by TO'l''s. A new

leaflet was designed by the Di\~sion, addressed to the 77th CCF Division

addinr~ a personal touch to the surrender appeal. Of special si~;"'lificance

-v;ere tuo operations >vhich were conducted using a woman Chinese interpreter.

This operation was designed tc give an additional influence to surrender by

virtue of the fact that from past prisoner of war reports, it was noted that

the enemy is more susceptable to a female voice. The SP,eech was originated

by the interpreter. However, all efforts resulted in no prisoners of war

being directly influenced.

The weather for the month was senerally cold and cloudy, vrith 12 days ., of precipitation; most of 11hich was snow fluries. Operations 'tver~~ negli-

gibly hindered.

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s

LOGISTICS

Staff Section Report of G4, 2d Infantry Division

for

January 1952

During the month of January the Division remained in position in

line and experienced ~mly one major physical changeo The 14th Infantry

Regiment with atte,ched units reverted to operational control of its parent

Division. The movement was successfully completed through the efforts of

the Division Transportation Officer who coordinated and made available

vehicles required to effect a 11 one shot11 move.. 'l'he Division Engineers re-

duced the icy, fro?ien roads to usable routes and no vehicular accidents were

encountered. The movement was accomplished on the 28th and 29th.

Generally throughout the entire month this office was engaged in ef-

forts to assist all Technical Services in their successful accomplishment

of their mission of llselling service to the troops.'! 'lhese missions in-

eluded:

a.. Reduction of deadline vehicles and equipment ..

b.. J:roduction of steam tabbs to assist the front-line troops in

serving hot meals o

c. Build-up of Reserve Battalion areas. with tropical shells, tent

kits, and cots •

d. Overall winterizing of all quarters, bunkers, offices, and ve-

hicles ..

e. Relocation of sho~rrer units to adjust for those evacuated for

repair.

f. Building of bridges to eliminate the necessity of vehicles cross-

ing through streami. This progrcnn ~as vigorously pursued because of the

adverse effect both the water and freezing weather would have on the vehicles.

All Division installations 1rrere made aware that present service areas

t " must be surveyed in vie1-v of coming spring and resulting thawso 'l'he point

-1-


stressed was that Division Engineers would be heavily engaged in the main-

tenance of roads and bridges and would not be available to improve service

area so

Efforts continued to obtain approval from higher Headquarters to move

the Division's Quartermaster Class II and IV installation from Sinnam to

Chongong-nL: The desired site is located in the adjoining I Corps sectoro

All installations -vri thin the Division were j_nspected in an all out

effort to eliminate fire hazards. Maximum assistance was rendered by all

•recimica.l Services to further the Fire Protec'tion and Fire Prevention pro-

gram throughout the Division sectoro

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!('\ - "';.. : .. ·N. --r~

L itt I

EVALUATION AND BECOMMH.'NDATIONS

COID vrEJ:THER O.rE.RATIONS; In spite of snow, ice and extreme cold, the

l:lealth and efficiency of the command has not suffered. Careful plan-

ning, specific emphasis in training and continuous command supervision

have keft cold weather casualties to a bare minimum. Issue of the new

type insulated boot tG front line Infantry units and forward observer

groups elimina.W foot inj.'uries due to cold.

Icy roads complicate logistical problems. Added emphasis must be

placed on careful driving and enforcement of speeding limits. Tire

cnains must be provided and. used properly. Plans must be revised to

allow added time factors on trips due to slower speeds and unforseen

delays. Critical areas must be sanded promptly to prevent accidento

This involves stockpiling of materials and prompt dispatcliil of c:bews te

perform the sanding.

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN STATIC SITUATION: Experience in the Division in-

dicates that the Engineer Battalion is best.employed in a general

support role rather than by attaching companies to Regiment&. In tbis

way the Battalion Sta.ff can be fully utilized to pl&.n1 allocate and

supervise the Engineer efforto It is recommended that an a.ddi tional

Corps Engineer Maintenance Com.r.-any be provided to support the Division

in a sta~ic situation, especially during winter operations.

CRATER PNAL'YSIS TRAINING: It is recommended that Infantry officers be

given a short course of two or three hours on the subject of crater

analysis. Information gained by crater analysis, specifically azimuth

an€1. calilJer estimate, when furnished to the Artillery is very valuable

in planning coUlllterfire missions.

EFFECT OF WOW ON CAMOUFLAGE: Periodic and intermittent snowfall makes

it necessary to take special camouflage precautions. White garm.ents

have proved to be very satisfactory for individuals operating in the

l open. Com~at vehicles present a greater problem in the the protective

color must be as easily removed as applied in the event of sudd~n thaws •

. Due to a shortage of water solvent paint it was necessary to improvise.'

.A. mixture of air slacf. ~~:.t ~~ztushed on with brooms, proved very effective'o \li i:J..n \ ·~~ l - l-


SPOTTING SCOPE: 1-fuere 1the enemy is excellent in his use of camouflage,

as in Korea, special spotting instruments must be used to locate tar-

gets which can then be brought under fire with conventional BC scope or

field glasses. The M-49 power Spotting Scope has proved invaluable

and it is recommended that this item be authorized in each firing

battery as well as Battalion.

DRIVER TRAINING: Drivers must be given special train.:i.!'.g to impress them

with their responsibility as individuals. Drivers are frequent~ dis-

patched on long trips to rear areas where they are not subject to close

supervision. Study of VD rates indicates many drivers take advantage of

their comparative freedom to indulge in illegal and irresponsible

civilian relations. While closer supervision is the immediate answer,

a more thorough indoctrination in driver individual resp0nsibility

would assist co~~anders at-all levels.

BUNKER DESTRUCTIONa The campaign of bunker destruction conducted dur-.

ing this static period proved highly" successful. In addition to the

harassment forced upon the enem.y it provided friendly units with the

opportunity to imProve patrol techniques and practical experience in

demolitions. It further provided p0sitive acti~n on concrete problems

which allowed friendly forces to maintain an aggressite attitude under

static conditions.

-2-


2d Infantry Division Stctff

for period

1 January 19.52 - 31 January 19.52

Commanding General ~1aj Gen Robert N Ymmg 015068 GenO

.Asst Division Commander Brig Gen Haydon L Boatner (.5-31 Jan 52) 01.5641 GenO

Artillery Officer Colonel William C Bullock 017635 Arty

Chief of Staff .Lt Col Arthur J Cornelson 051567 GS

Asst Chief of Staff, Gl Major Daniel F Hughes 01285055 GS

Asst Chief of Staff, G2 Lt Col Albert i'r Aykroyd 035o69 GS

Asst Chief of Staff, G3 Lt Col Virgil E Craven 03h824 GS

!sst Chief of Staff, G4 }Iaj or Harold B Johnson 012852h7 GS

Adjutant General Lt Col James G Basbas Ou235h AGC

Aviation Officer Major Robert L Boatright Jr 01185766 Arty

Chaplain Lt Col Henry L Gillernmters 041702 ChC

Chemical Officer Lt Col 1~illiam L Van Hoy 0292283 GmlC

Engineer Officer Lt Col Robert T:l Love 021062 CE

Finance Officer Major John L Fredericks 047721 'F'G

Headquarters Commandant 1'1ajor George E Staley 02006uOl Inf

(1-14 Jan 52)

Captain Bdward F Spross 01289986 Inf

(15-31 Jan 52)

Historian Captain Carleton F Robinson (1 Jan 52) 01031442 Inf

Hajor Thomas J Davis 0393714 Armor

( 2-31 Jan 52)

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Inspector General L t Col \..Jilliam A \ll[illiams 0403292 IG

Staff Judge Advocate Lt Col Gerard B Crook 039713 JAGC

Ordnance Officer Lt Col Gervase L Barnhill 0387901 OrdC

Provost Marshal Major ·Huston E Robison 01796698 MPC

Public Information Officer Captain Raymond E iATebb 0385322 ~rmor

Quartermaster Lt Col Homer P Harris 0311641 QMC

Signal Officer Major Claude M Perlewitz (Lt Col 15 Jan 52) 0370273 SigC

Special Services Officer Captain Bt3rnard R Nagelmann 0413632 Arty

Surgeon Lt Col Joel McNair 0$2075 MC

(1-17 Jan 52)

Major Robert M Hall (17-31 Jan 52) 064929 MC

T I & E Major Quintain B LaMonte 0389840 GS •

Transportation Officer Major Martin J Williams (1-5 Jan 52) 01946640 GS

Major Philip I Klein (6-31 Jan 52) 032113 GS

Civil Assistance Officer Major Vincent W Bach {1-19 Jan 52) 01324389 Inf

Captain Gustave R Jones (20-31 J~n 52) 01287891 lnf

REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM COMMANDERS

9th Regimental Combat Te~~ Colonel Wilbur 111!ilson 042494 Inf

· Actg 23d Regimental Commander Brig Gen Haydon L Boatner (1-4 Jan 52) 015641 GenO

23d Regimental Combat Team Colonel George C Mergens (5-31 Jan 52) 015300 Inf

38th Regimental Combat Team Lt Col Edward J Rowny 023744 Inf

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