3D 2009-2010 TORTS DIGESTS

TORTS & DAMAGESAtty. Howard Calleja

Digested by:

IIID 2009-2010Beadle: Jan Porter; Compilers: Diane Lipana, Chrissie Moral, Cheska Respicio, and Tel Virtudez

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES

TABLE of C ONTENTSI. INTRODUCTION 1. Classes of Torts 2. Damage and Damages: Distinction 3. Culpa Aquiliana/Contractual/ Criminal : Distinction 1 BLTB & Armando Pon vs. IAC . 2 Aboitiz vs. CA 3 Dangwa Transport vs. CA. .. 4 Atienza vs. COMELEC .. 5 People vs. Bayotas .. 6 Elcano vs. Hill 7 DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU ... 8 Padilla et. al. vs. CA 9 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People .. 10 Manliclic vs. Calaunan 11 Air France vs. Carascoso and CA... 12 LRTA vs. Navidad. 13 Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. CA . 14 Natividad vs. Andamo Emmanuel R. Andamo vs IAC.. 15 Castro vs. People .. 16 Fabre vs. CA . 17 Calalas vs. CA 18 Padua and Padua vs. Robles and Bay Taxi Cab. 19 Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila Inc. vs. CA II. QUASI-DELICT 1. Elements 20 Vergara vs. CA .. 21 Natividad vs. Andamo Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. IAC.. 22 FGU Insurance vs. CA .. 23 Equitable Leasing Corp vs. Lucita Suyom et al .. 24 Cinco vs. Canonoy 2. No Double Recovery Rule 25 Virata vs. Ochoa ... 26 Jarantilla vs. CA 27 Atlantic Gulf vs. CA 28 Cancio Jr. v. Isip ... III. NEGLIGENCE 1. Concept of Negligence 29 Picart vs. Smith . 30 Citytrust Banking Corp. vs. IAC and Emme Herrero. 31 Metrobank vs. CA . 32 Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Querimit 33 Reyes vs. CA.. 34 Adzuara vs. CA . 35 Bayne Adjuster and Surveyor Inc v CA, 36 Samson, Jr. vs. BPI ... 37 UCPB v. Teofilo C. Ramos ... 38 FEBTC vs. Marquez . 39 Cusi v. PNR... 40 Gan vs. CA ... 41 Valenzuela vs. CA.. 42 Prudential Bank v. CA .. 2. Negligence as the Poximate Cause 43 Subido vs. Custodio... 44 Ridjo Tape and Chemical Corp. v. CA .. 45 Raynera v. Hiceta .. 46 Ermitao VS CA ... 47 BPI Express Card Corporation v Olalia 48 Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc vs. CA, 49 St. Marys Academy vs Carpitanos . 50 Adriano vs. Pangilinan ... 51 Vda. De Bataclan v. Mariano Medina ... 52 Umali v. Bacani . 53 Bacarro v Castao . 54 Phoenix Construction v IAC . 55 Smith Bell and Company v CA .. 56 Fernando v CA . 57 Austria vs. CA ... 58 Consolidated Bank vs CA.. 59 Philippine National Railway vs. CA ... 3. Proof of Negligence 60 PLDT vs. CA 61 Food Terminal Inc. vs. CA and Basic Foods.. 62 German Marine Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC . 63 Tan vs. Northwest Airlines ... 64 Collin Morris v CA, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) .. 65 Crisostomo vs. CA ... 4. Presumption of Negligence a) Res Ipsa Loquitur i 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

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3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES66 Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA . 67 F.F. Cruz vs. CA ... 68 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs CA 69 Batiquin vs. CA . 70 Reyes s.v Sisters of Mercy Hospital... 71 Ramos v CA [122999] ... 72 Ramos v CA [041102] ... 73 DMCI vs. Court of Appeal ... 74 Perla Compania Inc vs. Spouses Sarangaya ... 75 Macalinao v. Ong .. 76 Capili v. Spouses Cadana ... 77 Cantre v. Spouses Go ... b) Respondent Superior 78 City of Manila vs. IAC .. 79 Viron Transportation Co. v. Santos ... 80 Calalas vs. CA .... 81 Pestano v. Sumayang . 82 Ramos v CA .. 83 Ramos vs. CA .. 84 Castilex vs. Vasquez .. 85 Nogales vs. Capitol Medical Center ... 86 Professional Services vs. Natividad ... c) Violation of Traffic Rules 87 Mallari Sr. and Jr. v. CA and Bulletin Publishing Corp... 88 BLTB v. IAC ... 89 Manuel vs. CA ... 90 Aguilar vs. Commercial Savings Bank ... 91 US vs. Crame 92 SPS Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai ... 93 FGU Insurance vs. CA . d) Common Carrier 94 DSR-Senator Lines vs. Federal Phoenix Assurance Co., Inc... 95 Delsan Transport Lines Inc. v C&A Construction 96 Singapore Airlines vs. Fernandez ... e) Dangerous Weapon & Substances 97 Smith Bell and Company v CA .. 5. Defenses a) Contributory Negligence 98 Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.... 99 Taylor vs. Manila Electric... 100 Phoenix Construction v IAC ... 101 LBC AIR CARGO vs. CA .. 102 Jarco Marketing Corp vs. CA and Aguilars .. 103 Illusorio vs. CA 70 71 72 73 74 75 77 78 80 82 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 92 93 94 96 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 112 113 114 115 ii 104 Gan vs. CA 105 Estacion vs. Bernardo . 106 Cadiente vs. Macas .. 107 NPC v Heirs of Casionan b) Assumption of Risk 108 Afialda v. Hisole .. 109 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District ... 110 Co. v. CA 111 Erquiaga v CA . c) Last Clear Chance 112 Picart vs. Smith ... 113 Bustamante v. CA ... 114 George Mckee and Araceli Koh Mckee vs. IAC .. 115 PBCom v. CA . 116 Canlas vs. CA .. 117 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District ... 118 Anuran, et al. vs. Buno, et. Al .. 119 Phoenix Construction v IAC ... 120 Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware vs NLRC .. 121 Pantranco North Express, Inc vs Baesa ... 122 LBC Air Inc, et al v CA, et al ... 123 Raynera v. Hiceta 124 LADECO vs. Angala .. 125 Austria v. CA ... 126 Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA .. d) Prescription 127 Capuno vs. Pepsi-Cola 128 Virgilio Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines Inc. 129 Allied Bank vs. CA .. 130 Arsenio Delos Reyes et al. v. CA . 131 Ferrer vs. Ericta ... 132 Kramer, Jr. vs. CA ... e) Fortuitous Event 133 Bayacen vs. CA..... 134 NAPOCOR v. CA (1992)..... 135 NAPOCOR vs. CA.. 136 Philippine Airlines Inc. vs CA.. 137 Cipriano vs. CA.... 138 Yobido vs. CA. 139 Japan Airlines vs. CA.... 140 Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto f) Diligence 141 Walter Smith Co. v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co... 142 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District ........................................ 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 153 155 156 157

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES143 Fabre V. CA. 144 PBCom v. CA.. 145 Reyes v. CA. 146 Crisostomo vs. CA... g) Mistake and Waiver 147 Spouses Theis v CA. 148 Gatchalian vs. Delim 149 Phil Carpet vs. PMC. 150 Dapor v. Biascan.. h) Others 151 Sison vs. David 152 Malit v. People of the Philippines and Judge Ofilada 153 Proline vs. CA.. 154 Amonoy vs. Gutierrez.. 155 Rogelio Mariscal vs. CA... 156. Sycip (BP 22 case, not included in digests) 157 Spouses Lim v Uni Tan Marketing... 158 Ramos v CA. IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY 1. Vicarious Liability a) Parents and Guardians 159 Cuadra v. Monfort.... 160 Elcano vs. Hill.. 161 Libi vs. IAC.. 162 Exconde vs. Capuno 163 Salen vs. Balce.. 164 Canlas v Chan Lin Po, Remedios Diala, and LimKoo.. b) Owners and Managers of Enterprises 165 Tamargo vs. CA... 166 Heirs of Delos Santos vs. CA.. 167 St. Francis High School vs. CA 168 Go vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.... 169 PSBA v. CA. 170 Jose V. CA... 171 Castilex vs. Vasquez. c) Employers 172 Franco vs. IAC. 173 China Airlines vs. CA... 174 Go vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.... 175 Soliman vs. Tuazon.. 176 Castilex v. Vazquez... 177 Jose V. CA... 178 Victory Liner vs. Heirs of Malecdan. 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 179 Delsan Transport Lines Inc. v C&A Construction... 180 Cerezo vs. Tuazon... 181 Yambao vs. Zuniga... 182 Spouses Hernandez v Dolor. 183 Ernesto Martin vs. CA and MERALCO... 184 Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA and Kapunan... 185 Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC... 186 Metro Manila Transit Corp v CA 187 Valenzuela vs. CA 188 Filipinas Broadcasting Network Inc. vs. AMEC-BCCM... 189 Estacion v. Bernardo... 190 Mercury Drug vs. Spouses Huang d) State 191 Merrit vs. Government of the Philippine Islands.. 192 Mendoza v. De Leon.... 193 Fontanilla vs. Maliaman.... e) Teachers/Heads of Establishments 194 Palisoc vs. Brillantes. 195 Amadoras vs. CA. 196 Salvosa vs. IAC 197 Phil. School of Business Administration v CA.. 198 Mercado vs. CA.... 199 Ylarde v Aquino... 200 Joseph Saladuga vs. Far Eastern University.. 2. Primary Liability a) Possessors/Users of Aminals 201 Afialda v. Hisole... 202 Vestil vs. IAC.. b) Owners of Motor Vehicles 203 Chapman vs. Underwood. 204 First Malayan Leasing v CA.. 205 Manlangit vs. Urgel... 206 FGU Insurance vs. CA. 207 Aguilar vs. Commercial Savings Bank.. 208 Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai 209 Malayan Insurance vs CA. c) Manufacturers & Processors d) Municipal Corporations 210 University of Manila vs. IAC 211 Bernardino Jimenez vs City of Manila.. 212 Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan... 213 Torio vs. Fontanilla.. 214 Municipality of San Juan vs. CA... e) Building Proprietors iii 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 205 206 208 209 210 211 212 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 231 232 233 234 235

173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 183 185 186 187 188 189 190 192 193 194 195

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES215 De Roy vs. CA. 216 Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto f) Engineers/Architects/Contractors 217 Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. CA. 218 Juan F. Nakpil, et al. vs. CA. g) Solidary Liability 219 Gelisan vs. Alday.. 220 Cruz vs. vs. NLRC... 221 Singapore Airlines Limited vs. CA 222 De Guzman vs. NLRC. 223 GSIS v. CA.. 224 Basilio vs. Bersamira V. SPECIAL TORTS 1. Abuse of Right 225 Velayo, etc. vs Shell Co., of the Philippines, et al. .............. 226 Filinvest Credit Corporation v. CA... 227 De Guzman vs. NLRC. 228 UE Vs. Jader 229 Sea Commercial vs. CA 230 Andrade v CA.. 231 HSBC vs. Catalan. 232 NAPOCOR vs. CA.. 233 Carpio v. Valmonte.. 234 D.M. Wenceslao et al..vs. Readycon Trading 235 Llorente v Sandiganbayan. 236 Heirs of Purisima Nala vs Artemio Cabansag... 2. Contrary to Law and Morals 237 Hermosisima vs. CA 238 Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA and Marilou Gonzales. 239 Ponce vs. Legaspi. 240 Medel vs. CA.... 241 Perez vs. CA 242 Investors Finance Corporation vs. Autoworld.. 243 Silvestre vs. Ramos... 244 Wassmer vs. Velez... 245 Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA and Marilou Gonzales. 3. Unjust Enrichment 246 Pecson vs. CA.. 247 Security Bank and Trust Company vs. CA 248 Spouses Theis v CA. 249 Valarao v CA.... 250 Grepalife vs. CA... 251 EPG Construction et al v. Vigilar 236 237 238 240 241 242 243 244 255 246 252 PADCOM vs. Ortigas Center... 253 David Reyes v Jose Lim... 254 UP vs. Philab Industries, Inc. .. 255 H.L. Carlos v. Marina Properties Inc 4. Judicial Vigilance 256 People vs. Baylon. 257 Clarita Cruz vs. NLRC. 5. Thoughtless Extravagance 6. Right to Privacy 258 St Louis Realty vs CA and Aramil 259 Castro Vs. People of the Philippines 7. Disrespect for Person 260 Tenchavez vs. Ecano... 261 Concepcion vs. CA and Sps. Nicolas 262 Navarrete vs. CA.. 263 Marquez vs. Desierto.... 8. Dereliction of Duty 264 Zulueta v. Nicolas 265 Javellana V. Tayo.. 266 Phimco vs. City of Cebu... 267 Torio vs. Fontanilla.. 9. Unfair Competition 268 Spinner v. Hesslein Corporation... 269 Manila Oriental Sawmill Co. vs. NLRC 270 Habana v. Robles. 10. Violation of Civil/Political Right 271 Lim vs. Ponce De Leon.... 272 Rama vs. CA 273 Aberca vs. Ver.. 274 MHP Garments, Inc vs. CA. 275 Obra v CA... 276 German v. Barangan 277 Habana v. Robles. 278 Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco (2007). 279 Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco (2008). VI. INTERFERENCE IN CONTRACTUAL RELATION 280 Gilchrist vs. Cuddy... 281 Daywalt v. Corporacion De Los Padres Agustinos Recoletos... 282 Peoples Bank vs. Dahican Lumber.. 283 Rubio vs. CA.... 284 Laforteza vs Machuca... 285 So Ping Bun vs. CA. 286 Lagon vs. CA and Lapuz.. iv 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 304 305 306 309 310 312 313 314 315 317

247 248 249 250 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 260 261 262 263 264 265 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGESVII. CIVIL LIABILIY ARISING FROM CRIME 1. Remedies a) Civil Action with Criminal Action 287 People of the Philippines v. Relova.. 288 Manuel vs. Alfeche, Jr.. 289 Reyes Trucking vs. People 290 Bebiano M. Banez vs. Valdevilla... 291 DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal 292 Replum (Neplum, Inc.) vs. Obreso... 293 Hambon vs. CA... b) Separate Civil Action 294 Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA 295 Sarmiento Jr vs. CA. c) Independent Civil Action 296 Carandang vs.. Santiago 297 Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co... 298 Andamo vs IAC... 299 Cancio Jr. vs Isip 2. Effects a) Acquittal 300 Padilla et al. vs. CA... 301 Maximo v.Gerochi .. 302 Mansion Bicuit Co. vs. CA... 303 Heirs of Guaring vs. CA... 304 Cruz vs. CA (and Umali).. 305 Sapiera vs. CA.. 306 Manantan vs. CA. b) Extinction of Civil Liability 307 Castillo vs. CA.. 308 Bunag, Jr. vs. CA.. 309 People of the Philippines v. Relova.. 310 Llorente v Sandiganbayan. 311 People vs. Corpuz 3. Prejudicial Question 312 Falgui vs. Provincial Fiscal... 313 Isabelo Apa et al vs. Fernandez.. 314 Beltran vs. People 315 Mercado vs. Tan... 316 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis... 317 First Producers Holding Corporation v. Luis Co.. 318 Torres vs. Gatchalian... 319 People vs. Consing.. 4. Sunsidiary Liability a) Concepts and Requisites 320 Bantoto v. Bobis... 321 Dionisio Carpio v. Doroja 322 Yonaha Vs. CA 323 Basilio vs CA... 324 Catacutan vs. Kadusale et. al.. 325 International Flavors and Fragrances (Phil.), Inc. vs. Argos.. b) Diligence is not a Defense 326 Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co.. 327 Yumul vs. Juliano and Pampanga Bus Co. 328 Connel Bros. vs. Aduna... VII DAMAGES 1. Concepts/Kinds of Damages 329 Nakpil vs CA... 330 Filinvest Credit vs. IAC 331 Occena vs. Icamina.. 332 So Ping Bun vs. CA.. 333 Spouses Custodio vs. CA. 2. General Principle of Recovery 334 Air France v. CA.. 335 Ateneo De Manila University vs. CA 336 PAL V. Miano.. 337 DBP v. CA... 338 People v Roland Paraiso... 3. Actual Damages 339 Victory Liner vs. Heirs of Malecdan. 340 Refractories Copr vs. IAC 341 David v. CA. 342 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. CA 343 Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp. 344 BPI v. Leobrera.... 345 Talisay-Silay Milling Co. vs. Associacion de Agricultores.. 346 G.A. Machineries, Inc. vs. Yaptinchay.. 347 China Airlines Limited vs. CA.. 348 Consolidated Dairy Products Co. vs. CA.. a) Damnum Emergens / Lucrum Cessans 349 People v. Degoma 350 Hualam Construction and Devt Corp. v. CA... 351 Araos et. al. vs. CA (and Jovan Land, Inc.)... 352 Asuncion vs. Evangelista.. 353 Woodchild Holdings v. Roxas Electric & Construction... b) Disability/Commercial Credit 354 GSIS v. CA.. v 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363

318 319 320 322 323 324 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354

365 366 367 368 369 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 384 385 386 388 389 390 391 392 393

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES355 PNB vs. Pujol.. c) Fixed Indemnity 356 Fortune Express Inc vs CA (and Caorong)... 357 People v. Balgos... 358 People vs. Quilatan . 359 People v Willy Marquez... d) Loss of Earning Capacity 360 Pedro Davila vs PAL.... 361 People vs. Quilatan... 362 People v.Jerez... 363 Rosales vs. CA and MMTC.. 364 People vs. Mendoza. 365 People vs. Dubria. e) Interest 366 Reformina vs. Tomol... 367 Easter Shipping vs. CA and Mercantile Insurance.... 368 Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. CA.... 369 Medel vs. CA... 370 David vs. CA... 371 Ruiz vs. CA. 372 Cuaton v. Salud... 373 Commonwealth Insurance Corp vs. CA.. 374 DBP V. Perez.. 375 Landl & Company vs. Metrobank.... 376 Crismina Garments Inc.vs. CA f) Death and Permanent Incapacity 377 Manzanares v. Moreta. 378 Borromeo vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. ... 379 Villa Rey Transit, Inc v. CA. 380 Salvador vs. People of the Philippines. 4. Moral Damages a) Amount of Award 381 Lopez vs PANAM... 382 Zamboanga Transit. et al. vs. CA. 383 Asia Pacific Chartering vs. Farolan.. 384 Samson, Jr. vs. BPI.. 385 Erlinda Francisco v. Ricardo Ferrer, Jr., et al... 386 Zalamea vs. CA... 387 People vs. Senen Prades.. 388 Expertravel vs. CA.. b) Bad Faith/Fraud/Malice 389 Air France vs. Carascoso and CA 390 Tiongson v Fernandez. 391 Zalamea vs. CA... 394 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 428 430 431 432 433 434 vi 392 PAL vs. CA and Sps. Miranda. 393 Antonino vs. Valencia 394 Spouses Eng v. PanAm... 395 Erlinda Francisco v. Ricardo Ferrer, Jr. et al 396 Prudential Bank v. CA. 397 Cathay v. Spouses Vasquez... c) Malicious Prosecution 398 Lao vs. CA (1991)... 399 Lao vs. CA (1997)... 400 Lehner vs.. Martires v. Ricardo 401 Yasoa vs. De Ramos...... d) Labor Cases 402 Audion Electric Co., Inc. v NLRC... 403 NEECO vs NLRC . 404 Rutaquio vs. NLRC..... 405 Paguio vs. PLDT. 406 Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. Florendo-Flores 407 UST vs. CA. e) Corporation 408 Hemedes vs. CA.. 409 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. CA.. 5. Nominal Damages 410 PAL vs. CA. 411 Better Buildings , Inc. vs. NLRC. 412 Japan Airlines vs. CA.. 413 Cojuangco vs. CA.... 414 BPI Investment Corporation v. CA. 415 Almeda vs. Carino . 416 Northwest Airlines vs. Cuenca 417 Armovit vs CA 418 Cathay v. Spouses Vasquez... 6. Temeperate Damages 419 Precillano Necesito, Etc. vs. Natividad Paras, Et Al 420 Pleno vs. CA... 421 Consolidated Plywood Industries vs. CA 422 Metrobank vs. CA .. 423 People v. Lopez... 424 BPI vs ALS Management 425 NPC vs CA 7. Liquidated Damages 426 Jison v. CA... 427 Country Bankers Insurance Association vs. CA... 428 Pacific Mills v. CA.... 429 RCBC vs. CA . 436 438 439 440 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 456 457 458 459 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 477 478

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES430 Ligutan vs. CA 431 Arwood v. DM Consunji 432 State Investment House Inc. v CA . 8. Exemplary Damages 433 NAWASA vs. Judge Catolico . 434 Octot vs. Ybanez. 435 Patricio v. Leviste 436 Philippine Airlines v. CA.. 437 Industrial Insurance vs. Bondad.. 438 People vs. Albior. 439 Traders Royal Bank v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc... 440 Singapore Airlines v. Fernandez... 441 NPC vs CA 442 De Leon v CA. 443 People v. Cristobal.. 9. Attorneys Fees 444 PNB vs. Utility Assurance... 445 Del Rosario vs. CA.. 446 Bodiongan vs. CA and Simeon 447 Pimentel vs. CA... 448 Ibaan Rural Bank vs. CA. 449 Compania Maritima Inc. vs. CA... 450 Almeda vs. Carino 451 Concept Placement Resources, Inc. vs. Funk... 452 Cortes vs. CA.. 453 Smith Kline Beckman vs. CA.. 454 Reyes vs. CA... 10. Mitigation of Damages 455 Malaysian Airline System Bernand vs. CA.... 456 FEBTC vs. CA 457 Bricktown Devt., et al. vs. Tierra.. 458 International School vs. CA...... 459 Banas vs. Asia Pacific Finance.. 460 Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA 461 CBTC vs. CA... IX. PROCEDURAL RULES ON DAMAGES 1. Specification of Amount of Damages 462 Manchester Development vs CA. 463 Davao Light v. Dinopol.... 464 Sun Insurance vs. Asuncion. 465 Ng Soon v. Hon. Alday 466 Tacay vs RTC of Tagum.. 2. Filing Fees for Claims for Damages 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 512 513 467 Ayala Corporations vs. Honorable Madayag. 468 General v. Claravall.. 469 Original Development and Construction v. CA.... 470 Phil. Pryce Assurance Corp. vs. CA and Gegroco, Inc.. 471 Kaw vs. Anunciacion.... 472 Manuel vs. Alfeche, Jr.. 473 Alday v. FGU Insurance Corp.. 474 Go v. Tong... 475 Planters Products vs. Fertiphil Corp. 476 La Sallette College vs. Pilotin... 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528

514 515 516 517 518 vii

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES1 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company & Armando Pon v. IAC, The Heirs of Paz Vda. De Pamfilo, The Heirs Of Norma Neri, and Baylon Sales And Nena Vda. De Rosales| Paras G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988 FACTS A bus owned by petitioner BLTB and driven by petitioner Pon collided with a bus owned by Superlines, when the former tried to overtake a car just as the Superlines' Bus was coming from the opposite direction. The collision resulted in the death of Rosales, Pamfilo and Neri, as well as injuries to the wife of Rosales, and Sales. These people were passengers of the petitioner's bus. Rosales and Sales, as well as the surviving heirs of Pamfilo, Rosales and Neri instituted separate cases ih the CFI against BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers were also filed in a different CFI. CFI ruled that only BLTB and Pon should be liable, and they were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages. On appeal, the IAC affirmed the CFI's ruling. Petitioners contended that the CFI erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual, since if it were private respondents' intention to file an action based on culap contractual, they could have done so by merely impleading BLTB and Pon. Instead the respondents filed an action against all defendants based on culpa aquiliana or tort. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS WON erred in ruling that the actions of private respondents are based on culpa contractual HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the passengers was the negligence of the bus driver Pon, who recklessly overtook a car despite knowing that that the bend of highway he was negotiating on had a continuous yellow line signifying a no-overtaking zone. It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to act with diligence demanded by the circumstances. Pon should have remembered that when a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. SATURDAY ALCISO Page 1 of 528 As to the liability of the petitioners, Pon is primarily liable for his negligence in driving recklessly the truck owned by BLTB. The liability of the BLTB itself is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the deat of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its employee. The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. They are presumed to have acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extaordinary diligence. In the case at bar, the appellants acted negligently. BLTB is also solidarly liable with its driver even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi delict while that of the bus company from contract.

IAC decision affirmed. Respondents win.

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES2 Aboitiz v CA | Regalado G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989 | 179 SCRA 95 FACTS On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corp. (Aboitiz), at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10. On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation (Pioneer) took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated July 26, 1975 between the third party Pioneer and Aboitiz. The crane owned by Pioneer and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he died three (3) days thereafter, on May 15, 1975. For his hospitalization, medical, burial and other miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife, herein plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00. Anacleto Viana who was only forty (40) years old when he met said fateful accident was in good health. His average annual income as a farmer or a farm supervisor was 400 cavans of palay annually. His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death had been recipient of twenty (20) cavans of palay as support or P120.00 monthly. Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs suffered mental anguish and extreme worry or moral damages. For the filing of the instant case, they had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos. The Vianas filed a complaint for damages against ABoitiz for breach of contract of carriage. And in a decision rendered by the trial court, Aboitiz was made to pay damages incurred. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision except as to the amount of damages. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Aboitiz is liable for damages incurred the Vianas? o Petitioners Argument: Aboitiz contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto Viana disembarked from the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable and he consequently ceased to be a passenger. Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is not applicable to the case at bar. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause. Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. More particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This gives rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination, which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists.

TEL VIRTUDEZ Page 2 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES3 Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. And Theodore Lardizabal vs. CA, Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat | Regalado G.R. No. 95582, October 7, 1991| FACTS Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa Transportation. There was an accident and its passenger Cudiamat died as a consequence. There was a difference of opinion in the RTC and the CA: RTC Cudiamat was negligent for trying to board a moving bus while holding an umbrella with his other hand. However, for equity reasons, an amount of Php 10,000 was awarded to the heirs. This is also because the company earlier offered a settlement anyway, and there was a lack of diligence of the company when it left the doors open (since no one would even try to come in a moving bus with its doors closed. CA Cudiamat tried to get on the bus while it was stationary (in between bunkhouse 53 & 54). Cudiamat made a signal that he wanted to board the bus. When he was at the platform (which was wet and slippery because of a drizzle, and was closing his umbrella, the bus driver suddenly jerked forward and stepped on the accelerator, even before the victim was able to secure his seat. He was run over by the rear tires of the bus. He died after the bus did not immediately deliver him to a hospital and instead dropped off the other passengers and a refrigerator. Award of damages = Php 30k + 20k + 280k. The SC believed the version of the CA, basing on testimony and physical evidence. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the award of damages was proper? (Primary, torts related) HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI No. The damages awarded are to be reduced. With respect to the award of damages, an oversight was, however, committed by respondent Court of Appeals in computing the actual damages based on the gross income of the victim. The rule is that the amount recoverable by the heirs of a victim of a tort is not the loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and minus living and other incidental expenses. Other issues not directly related to torts, but may be asked in recitation: in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so. It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice. The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. 16 A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances

FRANK TAMARGO Page 3 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES4 Atienza v COMELEC December 20, 1994|239 SCRA 298 FACTS Antonia Sia was elected mayor of Madrilejos, Cebu in the elections of 1988 over Lou Atienza by 126 votes. Atienza filed an election protest in the RTC and it was held that Atienza was, in fact, the real winner of the elections. RTC ordered Sia to reimburse Atienza P300K representing Atienzas expenses for the election protest. Sia appealed the case to the COMELEC. COMELEC dismissed the case because the principal issue (that of the election protest itself) became moot and academic since the May 1992 synchronized elections had come. There was, however, an issue regarding the award of monetary damages. Sia alleges that the appeal could not be simply dismissed because it would amount to the affirmance of the monetary judgment without considering the merits of the appeal. COMELEC resolved the issue and reversed their decision. There is no need for Sia to pay P300K anymore. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Should Sia pay damages amounting to P300? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. For actual damages to be recovered, Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by him, it should be provided for by law or stipulation. In this case, it is impossible for a party in an election protest to recover actual or compensatory damage in the absence of a law expressly provide in for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. Most election protest cases where the monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or quasi-contract or a tortuous act or omission, the claimant must be able to point out to specific provision of law authorizing the money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party. In the earlier Election Codes, there has been a provision regarding the bonds or cash deposit required. This has been removed from the current Omnibus Election Code. Had it been retained, that would have been the basis of the actual and compensatory damages. Although there is a provision on deposit requirements for election protests in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, these are in the nature of filing fees, not damages. CHESKA RESPICIO Page 4 of 528 These filing fees refer to the expenses incurred by the COMELEC in the course of administering election cases and are species different from the bond or cash deposit required by the previous election laws.

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES5 People vs. Bayotas FACTS Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died in the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. ISSUE & ARGUMENTS Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1.) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; The legal precept contained in this Article is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870. Accordingly, SC rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced. If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Summary of Rules: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) Law (b) Contracts (c) Quasi-contracts (d) . . . (e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22 Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, SC held that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification. JOY ADRANEDA Page 5 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES6 Elcano vs. Hill | Barredo G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977| 77 SCRA 98 FACTS Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting subsistence from his father, codefendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss. Trial court ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the action for recovery of damages against Reginald and Marvin Hill is barred by res judicata. Whether there is a cause of action against Reginalds father, Marvin. Respondents: Marvin Hill is relieved as guardian of Reginald through emancipation by marriage. Hence the Elcanos could not claim against Marvin Hill. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation, which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia (73 Phil. 607). In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) Notably, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Marvin Hill vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity, the formers liability is now merely subsidiary. Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the case at bar, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing. The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Art. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do not any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. Order appealed from REVERSED. Trial court ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.

DANI BOLONG Page 6 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES7 DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU| PARDO, J. G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001 FACTS An information for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the ground that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, Trial court issued an order dismissing the case. However upon respondents motion for reconsideration, the order of dismissal was recalled On Feb. 21 1997. ISSUE Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without the necessary reservation exercised by the party HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted. Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that: TIN DIO Page 7 of 528 "(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that "After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action." However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed. Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.17 There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation. The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES8 Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Ismael Gonzalgo And Jose Farley Bedenia Vs. CA| GUTIERREZ, JR., J. G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984| 129 SCRA 558 FACTS Petitioner Padilla was the Mayor of Panganiban, CamNorte, while the other petitioners were policemen, who did a clearing operation of the public market by virtue of the order of the Mayor. In this operation, PR Antonio Vergara and his familys stall (Pub Market Bldg 3) was forcibly opened, cleared of its content and demolished by ax, crowbar and hammers. o Petitioners defense: Vergara was given (prior notice) 72 hrs to vacate. o Vergaras: Petitioners took they advantage of their positions; must be charged the with grave coercion; there was evident premeditation. RTC: Petitioners are guilty of grave coercion, to be punished 5mos &1day imprisonment, and solidarily fined 30K for moral damages, 10K actual and 10K exemplary. CA: acquitted, but solidarily liable for actual damages of P9,600. MR denied. Petitioners now appeal claiming that they are not liable for damages by virtue of the acquittal. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS ____________________________________________________________________ W/N Petitioners are liable still for civil damages despite acquittal of the CA? Defense of Petitioner: the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES. First, they were acquitted due to REASONABLE DOUBT. Grave coercion is committed if force upon the person is applied, and not force upon things as in this case. The CA held that they shouldve been charged with threats or malicious mischief. Since, these offenses were not alleged in the complaint, Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for it. HOWEVER, the clearing and demolition was not denied. As a result, Vergara indeed suffered damages pertaining to: cost of stall construction (1300), value furniture and equipment(300), value of goods seized(8K), amounting to P9600. Under the law, petitioners are liable. o RPC 100: every person criminally liable is civilly liable o 2176: damages due under quasi-delict, limited though by 2177: from recovering twice from the same act. o ROC Rule 111, Sec 2 last paragraph: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. o Art 29, NCC: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. Facts support existence of damage; the extinction of Petitioners criminal liability (acquittal) did not carry with it the extinction of their civil liability. Application of Art 29: action need not be filed in a separate civil action all the time, (as in this case) where fact of injury, its commission and result were already established in the criminal proceeding. Since by preponderance of evidence, civil liability was proven to exist, indemnity is due in favor of Vergara. A separate action will simply delay relief due to Vergara.

Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.

DIANE LIPANA Page 8 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES9 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs People of the Philippines | Panganiban, J. G.R. No. 147703, April 24, 2004 | FACTS On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages several people. The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory. Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused. Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss.6 (Citations omitted) The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability. Hence, this Petition. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.. When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows: In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees. Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads: The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner. At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. x x x xxx x x x Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.19 Page 9 of 528

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The Petition has no merit.

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGESIt is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission: 1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein. 2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action. 3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.24 What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may subject to the control of the prosecutor still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.25 This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.26 Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion including the appeal. The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled: There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. X x x.37 By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39 Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.40 Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final. As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases. Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47 To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. Page 10 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGESThe decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.49 Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50 The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment. Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches. According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee. The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

JAY DUHAYLONGSOD Page 11 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES10 Manliclic v. Calaunan | Chico-Nazario G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007| 512 SCRA 642 FACTS Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan. Because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI. According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to respondent. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS What is the effect of Manliclics acquittal to the civil case? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI SINCE THE CIVIL CASE IS ONE FOR QUASI DELICT, MANLICLICS ACQUITTAL DOES NOT AFFECT THE CASE. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

JOHN FADRIGO Page 12 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES11 Air France v. Carascoso and CA G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 FACTS On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

J.C. LERIT Page 13 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES12 LRTA v Navidad| Vitug GR 145804, 6 February 2003 FACTS On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past 7:00 p.m., Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, was coming in.Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. On 8 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, ordering Prudent Security and Escartin to jointly and severally pay Navidad (a) (1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; (2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; (3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; (b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; (c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; and (d) Costs of suit. The court also dismissed the complaint against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit, and the compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman. Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court modified the judgment ordering Roman and the LRTA solidarily liable to pay Navidad (a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and (e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees. The appellate court denied LRTAs and Romans motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. Hence, this appeal. JON LINA Page 14 of 528 ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N LRTA liable for tort arising from contract HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES. The premise for employers liability for tort (under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code) is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. Herein, such a factual matter that has not been shown. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES13 Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA | Vitug G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995 | 241 SCRA 671 FACTS In October 1986 Luis Luna applied for a FAREASTCARD with Fart East Bank. A supplemental card was also issued to his wife, Clarita On August 1988, Clarita lost her card and promptly informed the bank of its loss for which she submitted an Affidavit of Loss. The bank recorded this loss and gave the credit card account a status of Hot Card and/or Cancelled Card. Such record holds also for the principal card holder until such time that the lost card was replaced. On October 1988, Luis Luna used his card to purchase a despidida lunch for hi friend in the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant. His card was dishonored in the restaurant and he was forced to pay in cash, amounting to almost P600.00. He felt embarrassed by this incident. He then complained to Far East Bank and he found out that his account has been cancelled without informing him. Bank security policy is to tag the card as hostile when it is reported lost, however, the bank failed to inform him and an overzealous employee failed to consider that it was the cardholder himself presenting the credit card. The bank sent an apology letter to Mr. Luna and to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure that Mr Luna was a very valuable client. Spouses Luna still felt aggrieved and thus filed this case for damages against Far East Bank. Far East Bank was adjudged to pay the following: (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Far East Bank is liable for damages to the Spouses Luna amounting the above-mentioned figures? o Petitioner-Appellant: Far East contends that the amounts to be paid to the spouses are excessive. They argue that they should not be paying moral damages because there was no bad faith on their part in breaching their contract. o Respondent-Appellee: Mr. Luna contends that he was embarrassed by the situation which was caused by the banks failure to inform him of the cancellation of his card. thus, he is entitled to damages. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI SPOUSES LUNA ARE ENTITLED ONLY TO NOMINAL DAMAGES BUT NOT MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. Moral damages are awarded if the defendant is to be shown to have acted in bad faith. Article 2219 states that, Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasidelicts causing physical injuries; It is true that the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of the Bank to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could the banks negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Nominal damages were awarded because of the simple fact that the bank failed to notify Mr. Luna, thus entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: o Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

MIK MALANG Page 15 of 528

3D 2009-2010 DIGESTS TORTS & DAMAGES14 Natividad v. Andamo Emmanuel R. Andamo vs IAC| Fernan G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990| FACTS Spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners filed a criminal and a separate civil action for damages against the respondent. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the IAC erred in affirming the trial courts order dismissing the civil case as the criminal case was still unresolved o Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict o That the lower court was justified in dismissing the civil action for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case, which was instituted ahead of the civil case, was still unresolved HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11 Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.