VICTORIA REGNER VS CYNTHIA LOGARTA

537 SCRA 277 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Service of Summons – Personal Action – Real Action –

Extraterritorial Service

FACTS:

Cynthia Logarta and Teresa Tormis were the daughters of Luis

Regner in his first marriage with Anicita Regner. Victoria

Regner is the second wife of Luis.

In 1999, Victoria alleged that Cynthia and Teresa with the help

of another sibling defrauded Luis, who was then very ill and

was unable to write, into placing his thumbmark into a Deed of

Donation. In said Deed, Luis purportedly donated a Proprietary

Ownership Certificate pertaining to membership shares in the

Cebu Country Club. Victoria alleged that said Deed is void

because the placing of thumbmark by Luis was done without

the latter’s free will and voluntariness considering his physical

state; that it was done without Luis’s lawyer; that the ratification

made by Luis before he died is likewise void because of similar

circumstances.

In the same year, Victoria filed a complaint to annul said deed

with the RTC of Cebu. The sheriff could not deliver the

summonses against Cynthia and Teresa because apparently,

although they are Filipinos, they are not residing here; they are

residing in California. It was only in the year 2000 that one of

the summonses was served to one of the sisters, Teresa,

when she came back to the Philippines.

Teresa immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

that Victoria failed to prosecute her case for an unreasonable

length of time. Naturally, Victoria opposed the MTD. Teresa, in

her rejoinder, alleged that the case should be dismissed

because Cynthia, who is an indispensable party, was not

issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is

not served with summons, without her who has such an

interest in the controversy or subject matter there can be no

proper determination of the case. The trial court ruled in favor

of Teresa; this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Victoria’s complaint is

correct.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments

presented by Teresa. The Supreme Court also emphasized:

There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and

actions in personam. An action in personam is an action

against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an

action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of

against the person.

The certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property.

The action filed by Victoria is therefore a personal action. So in

order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the respondents,

summons must be served upon them. Further, the certificate is

indivisible, Cynthia’s and Teresa’s interests thereto can only be

determined if both are summoned in court.

In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the

Philippines, they may be served summons in the following

order:

1. Personal Service;

2. If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;

3. If respondent can’t be found because he is abroad but still

a resident of the Philippines, by publication with leave of

court.

In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents,

they may be served summons in the following manner:

1. Personal service through the Philippine embassy;

2. By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in

such places and for such time as the court may order, in

which case a copy of the summons and order of the court

should be sent by registered mail to the last known

address of the defendant; or

3. in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

The above must be with leave of court.

In the case at bar, Cynthia was never served any summons in

any of the manners authorized by the Rules of Court. The

summons served to Teresa cannot bind Cynthia. It is

incumbent upon Victoria to compel the court to authorize the

extraterritorial service of summons against Cynthia.  Her failure

to do so for a long period of time constitutes a failure to

prosecute on her part.

 ***What if the petition is an action in rem? What are the

applicable rules?

If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court

jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the

res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the

country, summons may be served extraterritorially in the

following instances:

1. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;

2. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is

property within the Philippines, on which the defendant

claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;

3. when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly

or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in

property located in the Philippines; and

4. when the defendant non-resident’s property has been

attached within the Philippines.

In the above instances, summons may be effected by:

1. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;

2. publication, also with leave of court; or

3. any other manner the court may deem sufficien

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS COURT OF APPEALS

297 SCRA 469 – CONFLICT OF LAWS – PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – SITUS – LOCUS ACTUS 

FACTS:

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia

Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some co-workers were

in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to

rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry

for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and

detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to

work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia

Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in

Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi

court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to

5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated

Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah

got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she

was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and

sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on

dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for

damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia

Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC

has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law

should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed

for other reliefs under the premises.

ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines’ contention is correct.

HELD: 

No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia

Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition

for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked

the court to make a determination of Saudia Airlines’s rights

hence a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case

because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is bringing

the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and

not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in

the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may

elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the

place where she resides or where the defendant resides.

Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here

because if she’ll file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very

disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil

Law is the law invoked).

Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a

case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called

“locus actus” or where an act has been done. In the case at

bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was

summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with

a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was

going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into

appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful

conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was

committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and

suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case,

the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the

tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).

BANCO DO BRASIL VS COURT OF APPEALS

333 SCRA 545 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Service of Summons in In Personam Cases

FACTS:

In 1989, Cesar Urbino, Sr. sued Poro Point Shipping Services

for damages the former incurred when one of the latter’s ship

ran aground causing losses to Urbino. Urbino impleaded

Banco Do Brasil (BDB), a foreign corporation not engaged in

business in the Philippines nor does it have any office here or

any agent. BDB was impleaded simply because it has a claim

over the sunken ship. BDB however failed to appear multiple

times. Eventually, a judgment was rendered and BDB was

adjudged to pay $300,000.00 in damages in favor of Urbino for

BDB being a nuisance defendant.

BDB assailed the said decision as it argued that there was no

valid service of summons because the summons was issued to

the ambassador of Brazil. Further, the other summons which

were made through publication is not applicable to BDB as it

alleged that the action against them is in personam.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over

Banco Do Brasil.

HELD: 

No. Banco Do Brasil is correct. Although the suit is originally in

rem as it was BDB’s claim on the sunken ship which was used

as the basis for it being impleaded, the action nevertheless

became an in personam one when Urbino asked for damages

in the said amount. As such, only a personal service of

summons would have vested the court jurisdiction over BDB.

Where the action is in personam, one brought against a person

on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the person

of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and

decide the case. When the defendant is a non-resident,

personal service of summons within the state is essential to the

acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done,

however, if the defendant is not physically present in the

country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his

person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case

against him.

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA VS MINORU KITAMURA

538 SCRA 261 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Jurisdiction – Lex Loci Celebrationis – Lex Loci Solutionis –

State of the Most Significant Relationship – Forum Non

Conveniens 

FACTS:

In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a

Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public

Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of

the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon

entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with

Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA

was entered into in Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year

(so until April 2000). In January 2000, DPWH awarded the

Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently

assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in February

2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon

informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract.

Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to

negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific

performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.

Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the

contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of

lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be

cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the

motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the

Supreme Court.

Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time

invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an

inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese

nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on

the other hand invokes the trial court’s ruling which states that

matters connected with the performance of contracts are

regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so

since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines,

courts here have jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be

dismissed.

HELD: 

No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of

it. In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint

for specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable

of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction

of the regional trial court.

Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum

non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those

provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil

case.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that

Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases,

there are three phases and each next phase commences when

one is settled, to wit:

1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court

must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties,

the issues, the property, the res. Also considers, whether

it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice

of law asks the further question whether the application of

a substantive law which will determine the merits of the

case is fair to both parties.

2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a

local court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the

local laws must automatically apply. The court must

determine which substantive law when applied to the

merits will be fair to both parties.

3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can

the resulting judgment be enforced?

This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the

RTC’s taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately

filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion

for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed

the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for

certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should

have been settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not

improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.

ASIAVEST LIMITED VS COURT OF APPEALS

295 SCRA 469 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Service of Summons to a Non Resident – Processual

Presumption 

FACTS:

In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to pay

US$1.8 million or its equivalent, with interest, to Asiavest Ltd.

Apparently, Heras guaranteed a certain loan in Hong Kong and

the debtor in said loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest,

ran after Heras. But before said judgment was issued and even

during trial, Heras already left for good Hong Kong and he

returned to the Philippines. So when in 1987, when Asiavest

filed a complaint in court seeking to enforce the foreign

judgment against Heras, the latter claim that he never received

any summons, not in Hong Kong and not in the Philippines. He

also claimed that he never received a copy of the foreign

judgment. Asiavest however contends that Heras was actually

given service of summons when a messenger from the Sycip

Salazar Law Firm served said summons by leaving a copy to

one Dionisio Lopez who was Heras’ son in law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced

against Heras in the Philippines.

HELD: 

No. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated

(Asiavest was able to adduce evidence in support thereto) and

Heras was never able to overcome the validity of it, it cannot

be enforced against Heras here in the Philippines because

Heras was not properly served summons. Hence, as far as

Philippine law is concerned, the Hong Kong court has never

acquired jurisdiction over Heras. This means then that

Philippine courts cannot act to enforce the said foreign

judgment.

The action against Heras is an action in personam and as far

as Hong Kong is concerned, Heras is a non resident. He is a

non resident because prior to the judgment, he already

abandoned Hong Kong. The Hong Kong law on service of

summons in in personam cases against non residents was

never presented in court hence processual presumption is

applied where it is now presumed that Hong Kong law in as far

as this case is concerned is the same as Philippine laws. And

under our laws, in an action in personam wherein the

defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit

himself to the authority of the court, personal service of

summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of

jurisdiction over her person.  This method of service is possible

if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is

not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his

person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case

against him. Without a personal service of summons, the Hong

Kong court never acquired jurisdiction. Needless to say, the

summons tendered to Lopez was an invalid service because

the same does not satisfy the requirement of personal service.

MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

343 SCRA 1 – Private International Law – Forum Non

Conveniens 

FACTS:

In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in

Oman. In June 1988, he was recruited by Palace Hotel in

Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed

to the hotel’s job offer and so he started working there in

November 1988. The employment contract between him and

Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In

August 1989, Palace Hotel notified Santos that he will be laid

off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was

officially terminated.

In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel

International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but

no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government

owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a

foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of

the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled

in favor of Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the

case.

HELD: 

No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following

reasons:

1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the

fact that Santos is a Filipino;

2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign

corporations – MHC cannot be held liable because it

merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the

affairs of the Palace Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction

can’t be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is

directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are

separate entities.

3. Santos’ contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered

into in the Philippines;

4. Santos’ contract was entered into without the intervention

of the POEA (had POEA intervened, NLRC still does not

have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will

hear the case);

5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the

Philippines; their agents/officers are not residents of the

Philippines;

Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all

the relevant facts pertaining to the case. It is not competent to

determine the facts because the acts complained of happened

outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is

applicable. And in case a judgment is rendered, it cannot be

enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was not

served any summons).

The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum

non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume

jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:

(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may

conveniently resort to;

(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an

intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and

(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to

enforce its decision.

None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.

FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK VS CA

252 SCRA 259 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Origin of Forum Non Conveniens

FACTS:

Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International

Bank), which has been under conservatorship since 1984, is

the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement

with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to

purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5

million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and

Janolo with the Bank’s manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later

however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida

Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it

alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an

agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale.

Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The

regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank

filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with

the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the trial court.

The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been

concluded already and the case is now pending appeal.

Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a

separate civil case against Carlos Ejercito as successor-in-

interest (assignee) of Demetria and Janolo seeking to have the

purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against

the Bank. Ejercito et al argued that the second case constitutes

forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.

HELD: 

Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of

interest and parties between the first case and the second

case. There is identity of interest because both cases sought to

have the agreement, which involves the same property, be

declared unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity

of parties even though the first case is in the name of the bank

as defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co

as plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here because Henry

Co essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to have the

bank escape liability from the agreement it entered into with

Demetria et al.

The Supreme Court also discussed that to combat forum

shopping, which originated as a concept in international law,

the principle of forum non conveniens was developed. The

doctrine of forum non conveniens provides that a court, in

conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction

where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the

parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

 **Forum Shopping: “occurs when a party attempts to have his

action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels

he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.”

MENANDRO LAUREANO VS COURT OF APPEALS

324 SCRA 414 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Proof of Foreign Law -  Applicability of Foreign Laws

FACTS:

In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the

Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In 1982 however, SAL was

hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. 

Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for

reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano

filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987,

he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for

damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL.

Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for

the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the

termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.

The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the

case raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non-applicability of

Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of

Appeals reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this

case.

HELD:

 No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the

dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court. As such, the trial

court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed

valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take

judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of

proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall

apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of

estoppel.  Under our laws, all money claims arising from

employer-employee relationships must be filed within three

years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureano’s

cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but

he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years

from 1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.

OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION

00 SCRA 213 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Proof of Foreign Law

FACTS:

In February 1993, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co.,

Ltd., through its local agent, Omanfil International Manpower

Development Corporation, engaged Eduardo Felipe to work as

a rigger in Malaysia. In June 1993, the ferry boat in which

Eduardo was assigned met an accident. His body was never

found.

A provision in the Malaysia labor law provides:

Where death has resulted from the injury, a lump sum equal

to forty five months earnings or fourteen thousand four

hundred ringgit [RM], whichever is the less;

A local labor office in Malaysia then wrote a letter to Hyundai

advising the latter of the computation it arrived at, to wit;

45 months x US $620.04 (monthly salary of Eduardo) = US

$27,902.02.

RM14,400 which is equivalent to US $5,393.29 is less than US

$27,902.02, hence, Hyundai deposited the lesser amount with

the said labor office.

The wife of Eduardo, Lora Felipe, does not agree that Hyundai

is liable for the lesser amount hence she filed a labor case

against Hyundai’s agent, Omanfil. The labor arbiter ordered

Omanfil to pay $27,902.02 to Lora. This was affirmed by the

National Labor Relations Commission. It was ruled that the

Malaysian labor law is susceptible to two interpretations

because it is vague; that in case of doubt of labor laws, it must

be construed in favor of the laborer.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Relations is correct.

HELD: 

No. The Malaysian Law in question is not vague. Clearly what

is due to Lora as death benefit (for her dead husband) is

14,400 Malaysian Ringgit since that amount is less than US

$27,902.02. Further, it appears that the Director General of

Labor of Malaysia certified that Eduardo is only entitled to a

maximum of RM14,000.00 pursuant to the labor law in

question. This certification is duly authenticated by Mr. Bayani

V. Mangibin, our Consul General in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Such authentication of the said Certification, which provides an

interpretation of said foreign labor law by none other than the

Director of Labor of Malaysia is proof of the foreign law.

Further still, this was never contested by Lora.

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. VS COURT OF APPEALS

342 SCRA 213 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Proof of Foreign Law

FACTS:In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships

passing through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to the river.

Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine

Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL),

obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot

in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River.

Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco

River while being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded

ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned

Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused

$400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make

its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of

Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred

under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la

Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1

del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the master and

owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the

ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to

check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing

while traversing the river.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable

under the said Venezuelan laws.

HELD:

 No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact

before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws were

presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public

document to be admissible, the following requisites are

mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the

records or by his deputy; and

(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of

the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular

or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of

his office.

And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of

expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published

books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country

concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual

presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the same

as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain

Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez.

PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez

to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly

accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was

engaged.

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

537 SCRA 409 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Proof of Foreign Law 

In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar

Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi Arabia,

sent to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer

specialist. Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his

monthly salary shall be $850.00. But five months into his

service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a termination letter and

right there and then was removed from his post. The

termination letter states that he was incompetent because he

does not know the ACAD system which is required in his line of

work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during his 5 month

stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient because

he failed to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then

signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing

OAB from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.

When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal

against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that the

dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the

employment contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor

laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of

Gran’s employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Gran’s

termination due to incompetence and insubordination is valid;

that Gran’s insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the

termination letter Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed

the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The

Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.

HELD: 

No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court.

EDI did not present proof as to the existence and the specific

provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption

applies and Philippine labor laws shall be used. Under our

laws, an employee like Gran shall only be terminated upon just

cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only merit a

suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven

because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the

required trade test to prove his competence. The presumption

therefore is that he is competent and that it is upon OAB and

EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his incompetence was ever

adduced in court. His alleged insubordination is likewise not

proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track

records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was

also a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to

the two notice rule whereby prior to termination he should

receive two notices. In the case at bar, he only received one

and he was immediately terminated on the same day he

received the notice.

Lastly, the quitclaim  may not also release OAB from liability.

Philippine laws is again applied here sans proof of Saudi laws.

Under Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon

and are strictly examined. In this case, based on the

circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the

quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation

pay was merely 2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00

monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD VS COURT OF APPEALS

on February 27, 2013

361 SCRA 489 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –

Foreign Judgments – How Assailed

FACTS:

In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the Philippine

National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to pay $5.1 million

to Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. This was the result

of a recovery suit filed by Asiavest against PNCC in Malaysia

for PNCC’s failure to complete a construction project there

despite due payment from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCC

failed to comply with the judgment in Malaysia hence Asiavest

filed a complaint for the enforcement of the Malaysian ruling

against PNCC in the Philippines. The case was filed with the

Pasig RTC which eventually denied the complaint. The Court

of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the

foreign judgment cannot be enforced here because of want of

jurisdiction, want of notice to PNCC, collusion and/or fraud,

and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Asiavest assailed

the arguments of PNCC on the ground that PNCC’s counsel

participated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should

be enforced against PNCC in the Philippines.

HELD:

 Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare

allegations of want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion

and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On the contrary, Asiavest

was able to present evidence as to the validity of the

proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presented

the certified and authenticated  copies of the judgment and the

order issued by the Malaysian Court. It also presented

correspondences between Asiavest’s lawyers and PNCC’s

lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCC’s allegation that

the Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCC’s

allegation of fraud is not sufficient too, further, it never invoked

the same in the Malaysian Court.

The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the

party must present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or

fact. Otherwise, the judgment enjoys the presumption of

validity so long as it was duly certified and authenticated. In

this case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. VS FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC.

Conflict of Laws – Private International Law – Foreign

Judgments – When May It Be Enforced 

FACTS:

In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation

organized under the laws of California, USA, entered into a

contract with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a

Philippine corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver

8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and so it

paid PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that

the wheels are defective and did not comply with certain US

standards. So in 1979, FASGI sued PAWI in a California court.

In 1980, a settlement was reached but PAWI failed to comply

with the terms of the agreement. A second agreement was

made but PAWI was again remiss in its obligation. The

agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return the

purchase price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall

return the wheel in installment. PAWI was only able to make

two installments (which were actually made beyond the

scheduled date). FASGI also returned the corresponding

number of wheels. Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the

enforcement of the agreement and it received a favorable

judgment from the California court. PAWI is then ordered to

pay an equivalent of P252k plus damages but FASGI was not

ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was not able to

comply with the court order in the US. So in 1983, FASGI filed

a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with

RTC-Makati. Hearings were made and in 1990, the trial judge

ruled against FASGI on the ground  that the foreign judgment

is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not ordered to return

the remaining wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWI’s

American lawyer entered into the agreements without the

consent of PAWI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed

the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced

here in the Philippines.

HELD: 

Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a

foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate

parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so

long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an

opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of

competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has

been conducted, following due citation or voluntary

appearance of the defendant and under a system of

jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of

justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in

court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud

in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to

be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a

contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of

proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California

court. PAWI’s insistence that its American lawyer colluded with

FASGI; that he entered into the compromise agreement

without PAWI’s authority is belied by the fact that PAWI initially

complied with the agreement. It did not disclaim the

agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly) but

failed to comply on the rest. It cannot now aver that the

agreement is without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for

the California court not to order FASGI to return the remaining

wheels because of PAWI’s arrears.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RECLAIM PRACTICE OF LAW OF BENJAMIN DACANAY

540 SCRA 424 – Civil Law – Private International Law –

Nationality Theory – Practice of Law is Reserved for Filipinos 

FACTS:

In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek

medical help. In order for him to take advantage of Canada’s

free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in

2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine

citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship

Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he

returned to the Philippines and he now intends to resume his

practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his

practice of law.

HELD:

 Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the

Philippines are reserved and limited only to Filipino citizens.

Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar.

So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he

ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a

citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his

Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship in

accordance with RA 9225.  Hence, when Dacanay reacquires

his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the

Philippine bar was deemed to have never been terminated.

But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his

practice of law right after reacquisition?

No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before

he can resume his practice of law, to wit:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership

dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory

continuing legal education; this is especially significant to

refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws

and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind

him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an

officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good

standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

TONGOL vs. TONGOL

 FACTS:

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Orlando Tongol alleged that Filipinas was unable to perform her duty as a wife because of Filipinas unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando’s insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as married man. Both parties underwent a psychological exam which proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological insufficiency.

ISSUE: Does the psychological problem of Mrs. Filipina Tongol enough to compel the court to nullify their marriage?

HELD:

No, as elucidated in Molina the psychological incapacity must exist during the ceremony of the marriage, the psychological incapacity must be apparent as to the extent that the other party is incapable the significance of their marriage and lastly, the malady must be incurable. The definition or manifestation of marriage must within the scope of article 36of the Family Code. As in the present case, the psychological sufficiency of Mrs Tongol is not severe that would render her incapable of recognize the sanctity of her marital contract with her husband, second, Dr. Villegas failed to prove the that the ailment is incurable. As to the facts of the psychological examination report say: the emotional malady iscused merely by rejection of Mrs. Tongol by her mother when she was young. Further, the facts of the case did not show thatMrs. Tongol did not care about the welfare of their children.And the financial issue as being cited in the facts, the courtdeemed that such phenomena is natural in evry marriage andcan be settled easily. Hence the court dismissed the petitionof the nullity of marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

GR. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

FACTS: On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his

wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree. His wife then married Innocent Stanley and is now currently living in San Gabriel, California with her child by him. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code

HELD:The petition is granted. The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of FC is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs the respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case, but insists that since his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This case satisfies all the requisites for the grant of a petition for declaratory relief. Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the USA

Congress of the PhilippinesTwelfth Congress

Third Regular Session

Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand three.

Republic Act No. 9225             August 29, 2003AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP

PERMANENT.AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT.

NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance

thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in theOfficial Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,FRANKLIN DRILON

President of the SenateJOSE DE VENECIA JR.

Speaker of the House of RepresentativesThis Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by the the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.OSCAR G. YABESSecretary of Senate

ROBERTO P. NAZARENOSecretary General

House of RepresenativesApproved: August 29, 2003

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOPresident of the Philippines

VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTONG.R. No. L-68470October 8, 1985

FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The

parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982.The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD:

Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint…

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxxYou are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid

according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property

GERBERT R. CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERALG.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments; however, when he came back he was shocked to discover that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce. The divorce decree took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.

Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence this recourse by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING: No.

Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and as such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petitions for its recognition. Even though, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the complementary statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed

by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition.

A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.

LLORENTE VS CA

 345 scra 592

Nationality Principle

FACTS:

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a

parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for

the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home.

Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the

liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife

to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was

having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US

and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they

lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on

his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia

and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters

administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of

Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia

as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired.

Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo

capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the

late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD:

 In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing

to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil

Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy

against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled

that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are

valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held

that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was

valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin

for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo’s will

and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign

law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights

and duties, status, condition and legal capacity” since he was a

foreigner.

RODOLFO SAN LUIS VS FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS-SAN LUIS

Bigamy – Void Marriage

During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfo’s dad) contracted three

marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March

17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11,

1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

FACTS:

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee

Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on

October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a

Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First

Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting

Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December

14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San

Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with

respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their

marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death

of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal

partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.

On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of

administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file

the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo

since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally

married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of

absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,

State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to

Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that

Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of

paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family

Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate

respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this

would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo is

bigamous.

HELD:

 The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which

absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested

Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition

as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show

that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the

divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of

respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines

for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It

held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is

insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution

must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a

writing or document may be proven as a public or official

record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication

or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal

custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the

Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a

certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in

the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in

which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of

his office.

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly

solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of

the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family

Law Act of California which purportedly show that their

marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated

in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of

foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for further

reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry

Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD:WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the

complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.

NO

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

REPUBLIC VS IYOY

(G.R. NO. 152577)

FACTS:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, in the same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American and had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children in which she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her new husband’s last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.

ISSUE:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

QUITA VS COURT OF APPEALS

December 22, 1998

FACTS:

Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children.

On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen.

The Trial court disregarded the respondent’s statement. The net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo void ab initio.

(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.

HELD:

No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant

to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountry’s national law.

Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the

primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 S 95Details

Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence

FACTS:

                Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York,

migrated to California where he resided and consequently was

considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to

1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a

domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the

entire period of his residence in this country, he had always

considered himself as a citizen of California.

                In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted

an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as

his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen

Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the

Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged

natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art.

16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the

matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine

law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be

increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children

under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter

Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the  Mew

Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts

must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under

California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently

a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in

absolute dominion.

ISSUE: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should

apply.

 HELD:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights

to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two

rules in California on the matter.

1.       The conflict rule which should apply to

Californian’s outside the California, and

2.       The internal Law which should apply to

California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the

California Civil code States that “if there is no law to the

contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is

deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by

the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the

law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and

case is remanded to the lower court with instructions

that partition be made as that of the Philippine law

provides.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE LANTIONGR No 139465 ,Jan 18,2000

FACTS:

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties. On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America “On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.

ISSUE: 1 Whether or not there is a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?

HELD:

1.NO.En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition

procedures also manifests this silence.In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision.

PETITION is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.

G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995

FACTS:

            On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee

Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks &

Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of

Registration No. SR 5054 for the trademark "STYLISTIC MR.

LEE" used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks, briefs, jackets,

jogging suits, dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class

25, issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of petitioner

Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation.

Private respondent averred that petitioner's trademark

"so closely resembled its own trademark, 'LEE' as previously

registered and used in the Philippines cause confusion,

mistake and deception on the part of the purchasing public as

to the origin of the goods.

On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a decision

granting private respondent's petition for cancellation and

opposition to registration. The Director of Patents, using the

test of dominancy, declared that petitioner's trademark was

confusingly similar to private respondent's mark because "it is

the word 'Lee' which draws the attention of the buyer and leads

him to conclude that the goods originated from the same

manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the

mark.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not a trademark causes confusion and is

likely to deceive the public is a question of fact which is to be

resolved by applying the "test of dominancy", meaning, if the

competing trademark contains the main or essential or

dominant features of another by reason of which confusion and

deception are likely to result.

HELD:

          The word "LEE" is the most prominent and distinctive

feature of the appellant's trademark and all of the appellee's

"LEE" trademarks. It is the mark which draws the attention of

the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods originated

from the same manufacturer. The alleged difference is too

insubstantial to be noticeable. The likelihood of confusion is

further made more probable by the fact that both parties are

engaged in the same line of business.

Although the Court decided in favor of the

respondent, the appellee has sufficiently established its right to

prior use and registration of the trademark "LEE" in

the Philippines and is thus entitled to protection from any

infringement upon the same. The dissenting opinion of Justice

Padilla is more acceptable

UNITED AIRLINES vs. UY G.R. No. 127768, November 19,1999

FACTS: 

On October 13, 1989, respondent, a passenger of United Airlines, checked in together with his luggage one piece of which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his utter humiliation, an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should have known the maximum weight allowance per bag and that he should have packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in front of the milling crowd, she told respondent to repair his things and transfer some of them to the light ones. Respondent acceded but his luggage was still overweight. Petitioner billed him overweight charges but its employee reused to honor the miscellaneous charges under MCD which he offered to pay with. Not wanting to leave without his luggage, he paid with his credit card. Upon arrival in manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen. In a letter dated October 16, 1989, he notified petitioner of his loss and requested reimbursement. Petitioner paid for his loss based on the maximum liability per pound. Respondent considered the amount grossly inadequate. He sent two more letters to petition but to no avail. On June 9, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Airline. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint invoking the provisions of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention. Respondent countered that according to par. 2 of Article 29, “the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.”

ISSUES:1) Does the Warsaw Convention preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws?2) Has the respondent’s cause of action prescribed?

HELD: 

1) No. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Convention provisions do not regulate or exclude liabilities for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefore3 beyond the limits et by said convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent

laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carriers employees is found or established.

2) No. While his 2nd cause of action (an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or goods) is well within the bounds of the Warsaw convention, his 1st cause of action (an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent’s rights as passengers) clearly is not.

The 2-yr limitation incorporated in Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum, forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. (Art. 29, par. 2 was indented only to let local laws determine whether an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint.) Since, it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the 2-yr time frame his 2nd cause of action must be barred.

However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when petitioner denied his claims but the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for damages should be filed within 2 years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airlines itself. Thus, respondent’s 2nd cause of action cannot be considered as time barred.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA,

March 9, 2000

FACTS:

Plaintiff Mendoza filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva airport when the American Airlines security officers prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for about an hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all the other passengers have boarded. Petitioner American Airlines filed a motion to dismiss the action for damages filed by the private respondent for the lack of jurisdiction under section 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. However the motion was denied. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of transportation between the private respondent and private respondent would be considered as a single operation and part of the contract of transportation entered into by the private respondent with Singapore Airlines in Manila?

RULING:

No, the contract of carriage between the private responded and Singapore Airlines although performed by different carriers under a series of airlines tickets, including that issued by the American Airlines constitutes a single operation. Members of the TATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein, they act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket sales worldwide which are inaccessible in some parts of the world.

Petitioner’s acquiescence to take place of the original designated carrier binds it under the contract of carriage entered into by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila. Therefore, findings of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. Case was ordered to be remanded for more investigation for action against damages.

SBMA V. UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF TAIWAN

September 14, 2000

FACTS:

UIG and SBMA entered into a “Lease and Development Agreement” (LDA) wherein SBMA leased to UIG the Binictan Golf Course and appurenant facilities thereto to be transforemed into a world-class 18-hole golf course/resort. The LDA contained pre-termination clauses which authorizes SBMA, after due notice to UIG, to terminate the lease and immediately take possession of the property if UIG commits a material breach of any of the contract’s conditions. SBMA wrote UIG, calling its attention to its failure to deliver its various contactual obligations. UIG imputed the delay to the default of its main contractor, FF Cruz, but committed itself to comply with its undertakibngs. The following month, SBMA declared UIG in default. Six months later, UIG still failed to satisfy its obligations so SBMA served a letter of pre-termination to UIG. Shortly thereafter, the golf course was formally closed and SBMA took possession of the subject premises.

UIG filed a complaint against SBMA for Injuction and Damages with prayer for TRO and preliminary injuction.

TC granted UIG’s prayer and ordered SBMA to restore possession of the golf course to UIG. In a subsequent order, TC denied SBMA’s motion to dismiss.

CA upheld UIG’s capacity to sue, holding that SBMA is estopped from questioning its standing. It also held that UIGDC1 and SBGCCI2 were real parties in interest because they made substantial investments in the venture and had been in possession in property when SBMA took over.

ISSUES

1. WON UIG has capacity to sue.2. WON UIGDC and SBGCCI are real parties in interest.3. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the suit.

RULING:

1. YES. As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations cannot file suits in the Philippines. A corporation has legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the SEC and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines. However, after contracting with a foreign

1 UIG International Development Corporation2 Subic Bay Gold and Country Club, Inc.

corporation, a domestic firm is estopped from denying the former’s capacity to sue.

2. YES. According to Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a real party in interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the CA made a factual finding that UIGDC and SBGCCI were in possession of the property when SBMA took over. Moreover, it also found that they had already made substantial investments in the project. The CA is correct in holding that UIGDC and SBGCCI stand to be benefitted or injured by the present suit and should be deemed real parties in interest.

3. YES. According to petitioners, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because ejectment suits are cognizable by municipal courts. However, the complaint reveals that it sought to enjoin petitioners from rescinding the contract and taking over the property. While possession was a necessary consequence of the suit, it was merely incidental. The main issue is not ejectment, but whether SBMA could rescind the LDA. Because it was a dispute that was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

4. ERIKS PTE., LTD. V. COURT OF APPEALS [February 6, 1997]Effect of Doing Business in Philippines without a License:  Barred From Access to Courts

FACTS:1.    Petitioner Eriks Pte., Ltd. is a non¬resident foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of elements used in sealing pumps, valves and pipes for industrial purposes, and PVC pipes and fittings for industrial uses.2.  Private respondent Delfin Enriquez, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Delrene EB Controls Center and/or EB Karmine Commercial, ordered and received from petitioner various elements used in sealing pumps, valves, pipes and control equipment, PVC pipes and fittings.3.    The transfer of goods were perfected in Singapore for private respondent’s account with a 90-day credit term. Subsequently, demands were made by petitioner upon private respondent to settle his account, but the latter failed/refused to do so.4.      Petitioner corporation filed with the RTC a complaint for the recovery of US$41,939.63. Private respondent responded with a Motion to Dismiss, contending that petitioner corporation had no legal capacity to sue. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioner is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license.5.    On appeal, the respondent court affirmed the RTC as it deemed the series of transactions between petitioner corporation and private respondent not to be an “isolated or casual transaction.”  Thus, respondent court found petitioner to be without legal capacity to sue.

ISSUE:    Is a foreign corporation which sold its products 16 times over a 5-month period to the same Filipino buyer without first obtaining a license to do business in the Philippines, prohibited from

maintaining an action to collect payment therefor in Philippine courts? In other words, is such foreign corporation “doing business” in the Philippines without the required license and thus barred access to our court system?

HELD:1.The Corporation Code provides:“Section 133.    Doing    business without a license — No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.” The aforementioned provision prohibits, not merely absence of the prescribed license, but it also bars a foreign corporation “doing business” in the Philippines without such license access to our courts. A foreign corporation without such license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action. A license is necessary only if it is “transacting or doing business” in the country.2.    The test to determine whether a foreign company is “doing business” in the Philippines, thus:  “x x x The true test, however, seems to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. The term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization (Mentholaturn Co., Inc. v. Mangaliman).3.    The accepted rule in jurisprudence is that each case must be judged in the light of its environmental circumstances. It should be kept in mind that the purpose of the law is to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of our courts. It is not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single or isolated acts, but to bar it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without first taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suits in the local courts.4.  Thus, we hold that the series of transactions in question could not have been isolated or casual transactions.  What is determinative of “doing business” is not really the number or the quantity of the transactions, but more importantly, the intention of an entity to continue the body of its business in the country. The number and quantity are merely evidence of such intention. The phrase “isolated transaction” has a definite and fixed meaning, i.e. a transaction or series of transactions set apart from the common business of a foreign enterprise in the sense that there is no intention to engage in a progressive pursuit of the purpose and object of the business organization. Whether a foreign corporation is “doing business” does not necessarily depend upon the frequency of its transactions, but more upon the nature and character of the transactions.5.    Accordingly, petitioner must be held to be

incapacitated to maintain the action a quo against private respondent. By this judgment, we are not foreclosing petitioner’s right to collect payment. Res judicata does not set in a case dismissed for lack of capacity to sue, because there has been no determination on the merits. Moreover, this Court has ruled that subsequent acquisition of the license will cure the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contract. By securing a license, a foreign entity would be giving assurance that it will abide by the decisions of our courts, even if adverse to it.

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al vs.CA et al.

G.R. No. 102223August 22, 1996

FACTS:Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as “Representative Agreement”. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its “exclusive representative” in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC’s products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a “License Agreement” entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name “ITEC” in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).One year into the second term of the parties’ Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITEC’s products specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC’s own, and offering them to ITEC’s former customer.

The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the principle of “forum non conveniens”. The MTD was denied.

Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of non-registration?2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience?

HELD: petition dismissed.

1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been “engaged in” or “doing business” in the Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the country.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business

here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.

In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this commonly used scheme of defaulting local companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of fiduciary arrangements between the parties.

2. YES; Petitioner’s insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiff’s standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:

1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court’s disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present forum not being the “most convenient” as a ground for the suit’s dismissal, deserves scant consideration.