23223-governmentality current challenges and

GovernmentalityCurrent Issues and Future Challenges

Edited by Ulrich Brockling, SusanneKrasmann and Thomas Lemke

I~~~O~&t~~"~g~"PNew York London

UNMRSITY LIBRARYUNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROU"''''

AT CHAPEL Hill

Contents

First published 2011by Routledge270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Simultaneously published in the UKby Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

'L es at the College deFrom Foucault s ectur I. ,An Introductiondi f Governmenta ity:France to Stu res 0 AND THOMASLEMKE

ANNE KRASMANNULRICH BROCK LING, SUS

1

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2011 Taylor & Francis

The right of Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke to be identified asthe author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, hasbeen asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designsand Patents Act] 988.

2 G vern mentalityRelocating the Modern State: 0

and the History of Political IdeasMARTIN SAAR

Typeset in Sabon by IBT Global.

Printed and bound in the United States of America on acid-free paper by IBT Global.

It Effect: FoucaultConstituting Another Foucauon States and StatecraftBOB JESSOP

3

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilisedin any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereaf-ter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage orretrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

4 . ' f the State: Rousseau's .Govemrnentalizarion 0 . f Governmentahty

h M dern HIstory 0Contribution to rne rvroFRIEDRICH BALKETrademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trade-

marks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

U limited: The Security DispositifGovernment n 1 .

of Illiberal GovernmentahtySVENOPITZ

Library of Congress Cata!ogillg-in-Publication Data

Governmentaliry : current issues and future challenges / edited by Ulrich Brockling,Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke.

p. cm.-{Routledge studies in social and political thought; 71)Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. POlitical science-Philosophy. 2. Stare, The. 3. Foucaulr, Michel, 1926-1984-POlitical and social views. I. Brockling, Ulrich. II. Krasrnann, Susanne.III. Lemke, Thomas.JA 71.G6737 2010320.D1-de222010004575

5

6nd the Rule of LawThe Right of Government: Torture a

SUSANNE KRASMANN

7 the Birth ofFoucault and Frontiers: Notes onthe Humanitarian BorderWILLIAM WALTERS

ISBNH 978-0-415-99920_5 Ihbk)ISBN13: 978-0-203-84647_6 (ebk}

8h G vernment of LifeBeyond Foucault: From Biopolitics to teo

THOMAS LEMKE

34

56

74

93

115

138

165

VIII Contents

9 Coming Back to Life: An AnthropologicalReassessment of Biopolitics and GovernmentalityDIDIER FA$SIN

10 The Birth of Lifestyle Politics: The Biopoliri 1Mf Lif I rca anagemento I estyle Diseases in The United States and DenmarkLARS THORUP LARSEN

11 Biology, Citizenship and the Government of B' diE I' h rome tcme:xp ormg t e Concept of Biological Citizenship ,

PETER WEHLING

12 Human Economy, Human Capital:A Critique of Biopolitical EconomyULRICH BROCK LING

13 Decentering the Economy:Governmentality Studies and Beyond'URS STA.HELI .

14 The Economic Be d GTh L' . yon overnmentality:e muts of Conduct

UTE TELLMANN

15 Constructing the Socialized Self' M bili .and Control in th "A' .' a I rzanon

e cnve Socier "STEPHAN LESSENICH Y

ContributorsPersons IndexSubject Index

185

201

225

247

269

285

304

321323327

1 From Foucault's Lectures atthe College de France toStudies of GovernmentalityAn Introduction

Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmannand Thomas Lemke

1. FOUCAULT AND GOVERN MENTALITY

In Foucault's writings, the term "governmentality" (gouvernementalite)first surfaces in the College de France lectures of 1978 and 1979. The termis derived from the French adjecrive gouvememental, and already had somecurrency before Foucault made it into a central concepr in his work. In the1950s, Roland Barthes used what he referred to as this "barbarous butunavoidable neologism" (1989: 130) to denore a mechanism inverting causeand effect and presenting the government as the author of social relations:as "the Government presented by the national press as the Essence of effi-cacy" (ibid.: 130). Foucault took up this "ugly word" (2007: 115), freeingit from its semiological context. For Foucault, governmenraliry thus doesnot stand for a mythic practice of signs depoliticizing and masking rhoserelations, but rarher for a range of forms of action and fields of practiceaimed in a complex way at steering individuals and collectives (2007: 122;

2000c: 295).Foucault's interest in studying government signals a far-reaching correc-

tion and refinement of his analysis of power. Up through the publicarion ofDiscipline and Punish (1978), in order to investigate social relationships hehad used "Nietzsche's hyporhesis" (2003: 14-19) against the juridical con-cept of power, approaching power above all in terms of struggle, war, andconfrontation (see for example 1978: 26). Bur in the mid-1970s, it becameclear that in its initially conceived form the "micro-physics of power" (ibid.:26) had two serious problems. On the one hand, the analytic accent laymainly on the individual body and its disciplinary formation, and rhere wasno consideration of more comprehensive processes of subjectification. As aresult, the analysis of power could nor do jusrice to the double characrerof this process as a practice of subjugation and a form of self-constiturion.On the other hand, in the critique of state-centered approaches, focus-ing only on local practices and specific insriturions like rhe hospital and

2 Ulrich Brochling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

prison turned out to be insufficient. It was, it seemed, necessary to analyzethe state's strategic role in the historical organization of power relation-ships and the establishment of global structures of domination. What wasneeded, then, was a double expansion of the analytic apparatus, in orderto appropriately account for both processes of subjectificarion and stateformation (see Foucau It 2008: 358).

As a "guideline" (2007: 363) for Foucault's work over the coming years,the concept of government stood at the center of his new theoretical orien-tation,. With this concept, he introduced a new dimension into his poweranalysis, allowing him to examine power relations from the angle of the"conduct of conduct" (2000b: 341) in order to distance himself simultane-ously from the paradigms of law and war. In this manner, the governmen-raliry concept was introduced for the sake of a "necessary critique of thecommon conceptions of 'power" (1997a: 88). Its significance in Foucault'swork lies 10 the mediating function he ascribes to it: in the first place, itmediates between power and subjectivity, making it possible to study howtechniques of rule are tied to "technologies of the self" (Foucault 1988) andhow forms of political government have recourse to "processes by which theindividual acts upon himself" (1993: 203); in the second place, the problemof government allows systematic scrutiny of the close relationship-repeat-edly underscored by Foucault-between techniques of power and formsof knowledge, since governmental practices make use of specific types ofrationality, regimes of representation, and interpretive models., Foucault first presented his new "direction for research" (2000a: 3231~~ the framework of the above-mentioned lectures. Their subject was thegenealogy of the modern state" (2007: 354)-Foucault being less inter-

ested theoretically 10 a hi t ' I' d. IS onca reconstrucnon of the emergence antransformation of politic I h '. I a structures t an 10 the long-term processes of co-evolution of modern stareh d d d .. , 'h C II' d 00 an mo ern subjectivity, For that reason, Int;, 0 ebge e France lectures he uses the concept of govern mentality witha very road meaning" (2000b 341) ki 'h d i he ei : , ta 109 up a range of meanings"

da mtothe eighteenth century (Sellin 1984; Senellart 1995) Foucault nowrsunguis e "th I" If's e po mea orm of government" from the "problematic of

government 10 general" (2007: 89)_ The latter is concerned with leadership10 a cornprebensive sense' s If ..' . 'Id idi h . e -government, head 109 a family raistng chl-ren, gui 109 t e soul but als I d hi f '2000b. 341) W' hi '. 0 ea ers ip 0 a community or business (see

. . It 10 this framewo k Foucaulr exarni fforrnarion i I r , oucau t examines processes 0 state10 c ose connect' . h h dof subjectificari F hi Ion Wit t e evelopment and changing forms

Ion. or t 1$reason th " 'f"(2007' 109) , , d i ,e governrnentalization 0 the state. invesugate 10 the Ie t " I f hsubject" (ibid.: 184) Fo cures IS sirnu taneously a "history 0 t e

of all as a ce t 1'_ d ucault does not understand the modern state firstn ra ize structure b h . hsame political st f'.' . ur rat cr as a "tricky combination ill t e

rucrures 0 individuali: ti hni f I" nprocedures" (2000b: 332). iza IOn tee tuques and 0 rota IzatiO

An Introduction 3

In his lecture series, Foucault considers the "genesis of a political knowl-edge" (2007: 363) of governing humans from ancient Greek and Romanideas on the subject (0 early modern reason of state and "police science,"and onward to relevant liberal and neoliberal theories. In the process, heopens up the following historical argument for discussion. The modern(Western) state is the resulr of a complex linkage between "political" and"pastoral" power. Where the former is derived from the ancient polis andis organized around law, universality, the public, and so forth, the latterrepresents a Christian religious conception centered upon the comprehen-sive guidance of the individual. Pastoral power conceives the relationshipbetween the shepherd and his flock and between leaders and those they leadalong the lines of a government of souls: their individual instruction andguidance takes place in view of otherworldly salvation, pastoral authoritythus complementing the authority of moral and religious law (2007: 115-190; 2000a: 300-311). Unlike the ancient Greek and Roman approach togovernment, that of the Christian pastorate is characterized by rhe develop-ment of analytic methods, techniques of reflection and supervision intendedto secure the knowledge of the "inner truth" of the individuals. Alongsideobedience to moral and legal norms appears the authority of a pastor, whopermanently controls and cares for individuals in order to set them on rheroad to salvation (Foucault 2000b: 333; see Foucault 2007)_

Foucault observes that such pastoral guidance techniques experiencedan expansion and secularization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.The gradual dissolution of feudal structures and the development of largeterritories and colonial empires, together with the reformist and counter-reformist movements, led to a broadening of pastoral power beyond itsoriginal ecclesiastical context. Foucault's analysis of government is thusbased on the assumption that the pastoral techniques eventually producedforms of subjectification from which the modern state and capitalist societycould in turn develop. The particular quality of this specifically modernform of government-of human beings rather than "souls"-lies, to beginwith, in the need for reflection on its premises, object, and goals. "Politicalreason" represents an autonomous rationality derived neither from theo-logical-cosmological principles nor from the person of the prince. At thesame time, the earlier goals of happiness, salvation, and well-being are nowsecularized and re-articulated in the framework of the "political" problem-aric of the state. Foucault speaks here of the modern state's simultaneoustendency towards totalization and individualization, this itself constitutingboth a legal-political structure and "a new distribution, a new organizationof this kind of individualizing power," "a modern matrix of individualiza-tion, or a new form of pastoral power" (2000b: 334).

If we follow Foucault's interpretation, the innumerable treatises aboutthe arts of government emerging at the srart of rhe Early Modern periodindicate that political reflection was separating itself from the problem of

4 Ulrich Srocklil1g, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

sovereignty and diexten 109 to all conceivabl " ,Standing at the center of rh f e activities and fields of action,

e art 0 government IS

" fa sort 0 complex of men and thin Th 'concerned about [] ,ghs: e thmgs government must be

I' . .. are men 10 t err relationshi b d d

p ex Involvements with rhi lik IpS, on S, an com-mgs I e wealth reso f subsirenee, and of course rh . '. ' urces, means 0 subsis-d ' ,e ter nrory with Its bo dersv oualitir.rness., fertility, and so on. 'Thin 5' r e.rs, qu~ mes, .c1ima,te,with thmgs like custom h bi g are men 10 their relationshipsthey are men in their r~~/ It~, ways of actmg and thinking. Finally,tunes, famine, epidemics lo~sdtps

h;:Ith things like accidents, misfor-

, an eat. (Foucault 2007: 96)

Potentially, every human realm and activit ' .tary maneuvers, from guid f h y, from spiritual conflicts to mili-falls within the purview fance 0 t e family to questions of wealth now

Fo I· 0 government '

ucau t IS howe I' .1 ,ver, ess Interested in di .rea m of government as such th . id .la~nosmgan extension of theallowing an ordering of the ,an 10 I enufying the specific rationalities, h va rtous areas co db':ng t em towards its different I vere y governing and orient-governmentality'" (2007' 108)goFa s. In the framework of this "history ofme t '. " oucaulr exam' h fn In particular. reason of mes tree arms of govern-ern I ' state police and lib I'menta rationalities do n t f 'h ' I era Ism. But these gov-on the 0, or t e most pa t k hi ,f way to a continuous "10 d " r ,mar istorical stagese.rence and discontinuity bet 0 er mzatjon" of the state; rather the dif-d 'I' ween a ra ng f h 'ISCIPme, security techniq eo tec nologies of power-lawI' ues-stand at th 'Fnterestmgly, departing from the 0" e center of Foucault's analysis.oucault here no longer [uxr p srnon he took 10 his previous work

of discipli b d aposes sovereign ri h irh h 'me ut emarcates both fro" Ig t wrt t e mechanisms108). In his earlier work On di 'I m apparatuses of security" (2007'delscnbed a process through 1~~PIOhedand tlhe juridical model of power, h~va idiry and" I ' IC ISCiPmary t h ., co onized" law both wi . ec mques have accruedmech~nlsms of legal norm-setting (21~~~n t;; inrerstices and against theargue , mstall hlerarchizing se ' . -39). These techniques henlormal and abnormal, function;nagr~ylons betfween the useful and useless,a lzatlOO' In orh d way 0 a set val d '. ..' er war 5, procedu ue an Its operation-md~v~dualhs to such predetermined r::a~~ e~tab(2Iished orienting and al igning

e tec nology of securit ar s 007: 44-47· 56-57)ary sysr h y represents the ,., em: were that system presu exact opposite of the discipl in-POdint 0df secumy technology is the mes a prescrIptive norm, the startingon -Or er norm d II empIrically no II' an a OWing furthe d'ff rma, serving as a seC-reality toward a previously defined sh

rIiderbentiations. Instead of orienting

rea Ity-as defi d b ou - e val . kease b' h ne y the statistical distrib ' ue, It ta es that empiricalof s~ Irt '"alnd death, and so forth-as ubtlonhof frequency, rates of dis-

cumy 2007. 7) d a enc mark TI" h 'the forbidd b' raw no absolute line b . le mec aOisms

en, lit rather specify an . I etween the permitted andoptima med' . h'lum Wit 10 the range of

An Introduction 5

variations. For his further work, Foucault thus distinguishes analyticallybetween the legal norm, disciplinary nonnatiou, and the normalization ofsecurity technology (2007: 56-79)., As Foucault sees it, the development of security mechanisms is closelyned to the emergence of liberal governmentality in the eighteenth century.He understands liberalism not as an economic theory or political ideology,but as a specific art of government oriented toward the population as a newpolitical figure and disposing over the political economy as a technique ofintervention. Liberalism, he indicates, introduced a rationality of govern-ment unknown to either medieval notions of rule or Early Modern raisond'etat: the idea of a nature of society forming both the basis and limits ofgovernmental action. For Foucault this idea was no remainder of tradition(or premodern relic), but rather marked an important break in the historyof political thought. In the Middle Ages, a good government was part ofthe God-willed natural order: an idea that integrated and limited politicalaction within a cosmological continuum. Reason of state broke with theidea, replacing it with the artificiality of the "Leviathan," whicb earnedit the reproach of atheism. With the physiocrats and political economy,nature resurfaced as an orientation point for political action-bur another,previously unknown nature, having nothing to do with a divine plan ofcreation or cosmological principles. This nature was the outcome of alteredrelations of production and conditions of living: the "second" nature ofdeveloping bourgeois society (2007: 87-110; Meurer 1988).

Foucault sees the distinctive feature of liberal forms of government astheir replacement of external regulation by inner production. Liberalismdoes not limit itself to a simple guarantee of freedoms (market freedom, pri-vate ownership, freedom of opinion, and so forth) existing independentlyof governmental praxis; it goes beyond that, and organizes the conditionsunder which individuals can make use of these freedoms. In this sense thesubject's freedom does not stand opposed to liberal government but formsits necessary reference; it is no natural resource but an effect of governmen-tal praxis (2008: 62-64; Bonnafous-Boucher 2001).

Freedom is an indispensable instrument of tbe liberal art of government.This consists of a more or less systematized and calculated form of exercis-ing power, not directly affecring individual and collective agents and theiroptions for action, but rather intervening indirectly in order to structurefields of possibility: "it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or moredifficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less [ ... ] butit is always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue oftheir acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions"(Foucault 2000b: 341). Nevertheless, as a result of the "free play" of power,liberal government permanently endangers the same freedoms that it engen-ders, necessitating ever new "protective" or I'stabilizing" interventions toprevent power monopolization or concentration. Mechanisms of securityare both the flip side and existential precondition of liberal freedom. The

6 Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

problem of liberal government thus involves determining the "productioncosts" of freedom: to what degree does the pursuit of one's own interestspose a structural danger to the general interest?

With the extension of mechanisms of control and compulsion in responseto rhis problem, something akin to Bentham's panopticon emerges as a cen-tral element of liberal policy. But the liberal relation between freedom andsecurity is more complex than that image suggests. Liberal government notonly produces a freedom threatened by its own dynamic, but the dangeror permanent threat of "insecurity" (in the form of poverty, unemploy-ment, disease, etc.) is an existential premise and basic element of that veryfreedom. For this reason, the danger needs to be subjected to an economiccalculus that weighs its benefits against its costs: "[E]verywhere you seethis stimulation of the fear of danger which is, as it were, the condition,the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism. There isno liberalism without a culture of danger" (2008: 66-67). This culture ofsocietal danger supplies the key to the "morals" of the liberal art of govern-ment. When exposed to such danger, individuals are expected to cope withthem and their entrepreneurial activities and individual responsibility arewhat decide social ascent and descent. Consequently, social inequalities arenot the result of a mistakenly organized society but an indispensable ele-ment of its well-arranged daily functioning.

At the end of the lecture series, Foucault discusses the further devel-opment of twentieth-century liberal positions, focusing on two forms ofneoliberalism: German postwar liberalism ("ordoliberalism"'),and Ameri-can human-capital theory as associated with the Chicago School.' Bothapproaches are opposed to state intervention and direction' in the name ofeconomic freedom, both criticize an uncontrolled growth 'of bureaucraticapparatuses and the concomitant threat posed to individual liberties. Fou-cault nevertheless observes profound differences between the approaches,involving both conceptions of the social and proposals for political solu-tions. Ordohberahsm was grounded in the idea of a "social market econ-omy," which is to say of a market permanently supported by politicalregulation and necessarily framed by social intervention (currency policies,unemp~oyment and health insurance, and so forth). In contrast, the ChicagoSchool s program involves a systematic expansion of the economic sphereInto the SOCial, in order to eventually eliminate the difference between thetwo. Rational economic calculation serves here as a principle for groundingand limiting governmental ' . h . 't. . action, Wit government Itself becornmg a sorof enter prise Its task be' . I' . , . k t-lik ' Ing to umversa rze cornpetmon and Invent mar eI e systems for the actions of individuals, groups, and institutions (2008:322-324; Burchell. 1993: 274; Senellart 2007).

hThe baSIS for this strategic operation is an epistemological displacement:

t e systemanr; compreh" . Ie, '., ensrve expansion of the economy from a slIlgSOCial realm With Its 0 I d . 'II h wn aws an mstrurncnrs into a process governinga urnan behavior (2008: 222-223; ordon 1991: 43). According to the

An Introduction 7

Chicago School, what characterizes human behavior is the allocation ofscarce resources for competing goals. The central question the neohberalspose is that of the calculation that motivates people to invest their scarceresources in pursuir of one goal rather than another, a model generallygrounded in a principle of individual maximization of benefits. Crucially,the calculation applies not only to the analysis of individual and socialaction but also to governmental practices: against the standard set by themarket, these practices can be scrutinized for excess and mis~se, ~Iteredthrough the interplay of supply and demand. Where, rhen, classical libera 1-ism expects the government to respect the form of the marker, within thisconcept rhe market no longer serves as a principle of governmenral self-lim-itation but rather as a "principle turned against it: It is a sort of permanenteconomic tribunal confronting government" (Foucault 2008: 247).

Although in the context of this lecture Foucault is concerned above allwith liberal and neoliberal theories, in one passage he comments on thequestion of socialist governmentality. "Real" sociali.sm, he argues, ~asemployed many elements that liberalism and the police state used With-out being able to invent an autonomous for.m of governme~t: a pr,?ble~revealed in all its acuity by the constant posing of the questions of truesocialism and the significance of central texts (ibid.: 91-95)., .

Although Foucault's lectures on ancient and early Chflstlan-pasroraltechniques of guidance and control, reason of state, police SCience, mer-cantilism and liberal and neoliberal forms of government are undoubtedlythought-provoking, rhey leave us with a number of unresolved problems.One of the most serious of these is an indistinct and inconsistent use of cen-tral concepts-including, above all, the concept of governmentality itself,which Foucault applies in a double sense (see Lemke 1997: 188-194). Inthe first place, it has the general sense of the emergence with raison d'etatof an independent art of government. In the second place, Foucault usesthe notion of governmentality in a more limited sense to refer to the em.er-gence of liberal government in the eighteenth century. The demarcationfrom adjacent concepts also often remains unclear. ThIS IS the case, forinstance with the concept of biopower (see Foucault 1990: 135-145) assituated within the framework of govern mentality: is modern biopower oneof its aspects or elements, or is Foucault simply here using tWO words forthe same thing (Garland 1997: 193-194)?3

2. STUDIES OF GOVERNMENTALITY

Foucault was only able to carry out his ambitious project of a "historyof governmentality" in rudimentary form. The lecrures are Inherentlyprovisional and fragmentary, and were not meant for publication. In theContext of his "history of sexuality" (a project that was also only partlyrealized), Foucault focused on the genealogy of the subject of desire and the


transformations of ancient techniques of self-guidance. But an empiricalstudy of the relationship between technologies of the self and of domina-tion largely remained an unfulfilled programmatic demand. Foucault diedbefore his planned concretizing and deepening of the problems discussed inthe lectures could be realized.

There was also an editorial problem. For a long time, the only relevantmaterial Foucault authorized for publication was the talk of February 1,1978 entitled "Govern mentality" (1991) and the summaries he preparedof his findings (1997b: 67-71; 1997c: 73-9). The lecture series from 1978and 1979 at the College de France were only published in 2004; these haverecently appeared in English.

Despite this difficult publishing situation and Foucault's sketchy devel-opment of the govern mentality concept, it has inspired a great deal ofwork in history and the social sciences since the 1970s. The first such workstemmed from Foucau It's fellow researchers, much of it emerging fromresearch projects undertaken in connection with the 1978-79 College deFrance lectures and focusing on a historical period Foucault had largelyneglected in his "genealogy of the modern state" (2007: 354): the alterationof governmental technologies in the nineteenth century and the constitu-tion of the modern welfare state. Fran,ois Ewald (1996) thus reconstructedthe use of insurance technology, initially developed and tested in the pri-vate realm, for societal regulation. Focusing on the problem of industrialaccidents, he argued that the category of social risk increasingly suppressedthe principle of individual responsibility, contributing to a transformationof power relations within society and undermining the separation betweenlaw and morality constitutive for liberalism.

Daniel Deferr (1991) and Jacques Donzelot (1984) aimed to demonstratethat insurance technology was set in play against extant forms of solidar-ity within the workers' movement, leading eventually to a depoliticizing ofcollective struggles and class conflicts. Such social antagonisms were thusreplaced by a homogenization of the social field, by way of probability cal-culations, quantitative derivations, and variable risk distribution. The workof Giovanna Procacci (1991; 1993) on the origins of the social questionand Pasquale Pasquino (1991) on the rise of the idea of defending societyagainst the threat of "dangerous individuals" likewise stemmed from thecontext of the seminars that accompanied the lectures.

Foucault's interest in government was not limited to the lecture seriesof 1978 and 1979. In 1981 he delivered a series of talks at the CatholicUniversity of Louvain, and in the accompanying research seminar he ledan interdiSCiplinary study of the "genealogy of social defense in Belgium"concentratmg on the years leading up to the start of the twentieth century.The results would later appear in book form (Tulkens 1988. 1986). The"welfare state" a~d g~vernmentality in the early twentieth ~entury weremeant to be exammed "' another book project Foucault proposed to somestudents and lecturers dUring a period of teaching at Berkeley in 1983. But

An Introduction 9

. d did lans for a research center working onthe project went unrealize ,as I p K k i 1985)I pts (Gandal and rop 10 •

modern governmenta conce I" attracted a great deal ofIn the 1990s, the question of gOlv~rndmenttasl~~ciates With the founding

" b d h . Ie of Foucau t s irec associates. I"mreresr eyon t e eire k i L don in 1989 and the pub rca-of the History of the Present ~et~or 111 G~:ernmentality (Burchell, Gor-tion of The Foucault Effect: tu tes I;' marie articles the centerdon and Miller 1991), a collection °h prFogramphone to the Anglophone

.. hif d from t e rancoof research In this area site "" A I" New Zealand the USA,.. . G eat Britain ustra ia, 'world: in universities In r , b . de of Foucault's conceptd d more use was eing ma " d

and Cana a, more an b . logically-histOrically oriente ,of governrnentality. Rather than emg genea alyze processes of con-

f hi k sed Foucault's mstruments to anmost 0 t ISwor utemporary social transformation. " ounded in both theory

, 'A 1 American mteresr was gr , "ThiS growing ng 0-" I h d become increasingly dissatis-

and politics. Many radical mtellectua sd a I is In the 1970s and 1980s,M " itique an ana ySI ' dfied with orthodox arxist cn h ing from a simple base an. I" I . approac es emerg "

dogmatic po inca -econorruc ""d I ith false consciousnessh d equating I eo ogy WI " .

superstructure sc ema an Wh"1 me theorists tried to tie Marx-, . 'ower I e so , " 'were losing their persuasive p " . h derstood their Interest III. list Ideas ot ers un " dirst concepts to poststructura ,I, ' f b'ectificatlOn, and iscur-

I I pnanon forms 0 su J II dprocesses of cu tura appro '., ration (Rose O'Ma eyanflecti ost Marxist orien , " Isive patterns as re ecnng a p . - hid "ntellectual and rheoret ica

Valverde 2006: 85-89). Alongside sue a tere t~lity concept also stemmed. . F ucault's govern men , .constellations, mreresr mo. lineal upheaval starung 10

" . of dramatic po I I " hfrom the collective experience II in the United Kingdom during t ethe 1980s: the replacement, above a of (welfare) state tegula-

USA d ing the Reagan era, I fThatcher era and the un lib ral governmenta arms.. . ments by neo I e ktory models and steering mstru h h concept was now ta en up

kd e reason w Y t e "Against that bac rop, on f" I transformation mtO an eco-es 0 socia h"was that it did not force process d on critiquing ideology. In t IS

. I I t or one centere rialnomic analytlca temp a ed' olutions and entrepreneu. d " f market- nven 5 "fmanner the 111([0 uctlon 0 " . "h" g or reduction 0 state SOv-, " d not as a dlmInIS In "Patterns could be Interprete I techniques, Anentlon was

" f governmenta (fereignty but as a restructuring 0 I"' I strategies and programs orhe of new po mca "dnow directed at t e emergenc "f self-organizalJon an empow-d " f mechamsms Ot b" "".instance the intra uctlon a " " f'd ntities and su Jectlvltles.

" ) d h e articulatIOn 0 I e f h 1990setment strategies an t e r - ". I d intellectual world, rom t eIn the Anglo-American polmca an f d an independent research

talrty have onTIe "donward studies of govern men " . h . I and political sCiences an, " " I' IthlO t e SOCI3 hfield in a series of dlsclp Ines w "I a coherent researc program

Wh " t play here IS ess h" theCultural studies. at IS a work of researc ers usmgh tha n a loose net "

or a homogeneous approac h d" nt theoretical Interests.." nd wit Iverge d .. olicing"concept 111 varIOUSways a from criminology an P

The disciplinary range here exten~~ and Valverde 2006; Simon 2007)(O'Malley 1992; Smandych 1999; Du er

]0 Ulrich Brcchling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke

and education (Hunter ]994, Marshall ]996, Besley 2002; Masschelein etal. 2007; Peters er al. 2008) to organizational sociology and critical man-agement studies (Krieken ]996; Miller and O'Leary ]987; Townley ]994),postcolonial theory (Gupta 1998; Inda 2005) and historical geography(Hannah 2000), and onward to research on spatiality and the city (Rob-ins 2002). The concept has also made its way into cultural history (Shoreand Wright ]997; Rimke 2000; Branch, Packer and McCarrhy 2003) andpolitical ecology (Rutherford 1999; Luke ]999), and was drawn on in acritical study of international refugee policies (Lippert 1999); at the sametime, it is manifest in the study of the historical conditions behind the erner-gence of medical practice and its social implications (Osborne 1993; Greco1993; Nadesan 2008). Additional fields and themes have included the roleof psychology and psychiatry in both governmental steering and individualself-guidance (Rose ]989; 1996) and the establishment of empowermentstrategies in state programs for combating poverty (Cruikshank 1999).'

At the end of the 1990s the govern mentality concept began to attract agreat deal of interest outside the Anglophone world, especially in Germany,with the appearance of many books and collections (Lemke ]997; Brockling,Krasmann and Lemke 2000; 2004; Krasmann 2003; Pieper and GutierrezRodriguez 2003, Kah12004; Opitz 2004; Reichert 2004; Kess12005; Michel2005; Brbckling 2007; Krasmann and Volkmer 2007; Lemke 2007a; Gerten-bach 2007; Purtscherr, Meyer and Winter 2008) and a large number ofarticles. The disciplinary spectrum here extends from media studies (Stauff2005; Holen 2008) to political science (WiihI2003; Lessenich 2003; Periph-erie 2003), history (Finzsch 2002; Caruso 2003; Rudiger 2005; Bohlender2007), education and social work (Rieken and Rieger-Ladich 2004; Weberand Maurer 2006; Dzierzbicka 2006; Anhorn, Bettinger and Stehr 2007),theology (Ruhstorfer 200]) and organizational sociology (Turk, Lemke andBruch 2002; Weiskopf 2003; Bruch and Turk 2005).

Studies in this field have now spread to Scandinavia and to other coun-tries on the Continent such as Belgium and the Netherlands (see for instanceKoch 2002; Masschelein and Simons 2005). Even in France, where fora long time work on Foucault was extremely rare in the social sciences,increasing interest in this research perspective has been apparent in politi-cal science, sociology, and cultural anthropology Over recent years. Forexample, a working group directed by Jean-Fran,ois Bayan has studiedthe slgmficance of corporeal representation in political processes (Bayanand WarnJer 2004). Another group at the Ecole des Mines has used thegovern mentality concept for organizational theory (Pesqueux and Bon-nafous-Boucher 2000). A third group led by Didier Fassin and DominiqueMemml has worked on contemporary forms of governing bodies (Fassinand Memml 2004). In addition, the concept has made its way into analy-ses of present-day security and immigration policies (Bigo ] 998; Bigo andGuild 2005) and has been applied to questions of state theory (Lascoumes2004; Meyet 2005) and health policy (Va illy 2006).

An Introduction 1]

3. GOVERNMENTALITY AS AN ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE

Though studies of governmentality are markedby diverse disciplinarhy ~ri-

diff irical objects they are neverr e essenrarions and focus on I erent emp. ?. he "art ofinformed b a common analytic perspective. They mqurre into t

govern men;" in Foucault's broad sense of t:~r'~fn;; S:~:I~:i~~7~i~e~:I;,e:;taliry investigate mechanisms of the c

20)nd di gPfrom management of

" (F It 2007· 102 120-12 , exren ingroups oucau h'" f children and daily control practices incompany employees to t e raising o. al institutions such as the Europeanpublic spaces to govemmg trans-nahtlon in f here is on the tech nolo-

, d h U ' d Nations T e main ocusUnion an t e rute . , di ' t fields The knowl-. I" f ( If) governrnenr 111 isnnc .gies and ration a ines 0 sc - .' I ays practical knowledge.d . d . ern mental practices 15 a w

e ge Incorporate In gOY I" centered on the question. I f govemmenta rty areFor this reason, ana yse~ o. hese ractices constitute themselvesof how practices and thinking about riP . ach other

' I h they trans are into e .mutually, or more precise y: ow b th descriptive and prescrip-

The programs of (self-) govemm~nt a~e ~escribe and problematize ontive: they always presume a reality t at t ey ing to change or rransform

d ' hi h hey intervene-r-ttr ythe one hand, an In w IC t " f nted with forces removed' h h h d At the same time, con roIt-on t e ot er an. , ' d fl ' ir or neutralizing it, these pro-from their access or blocking It, eHencethe description and prescriptiongrams also consistently go astray. I d f government is always also analways involves elusion In that kno~de geAo Peter Miller and Nikolas Roseerring, inadequate, or failing know e ~e'f s ogrammer's dream. The 'real'

" h 'realization 0 aprstate: "Governing IS not teo mming; and the program-, . , h f of resistance to progra , , , d

always msists 10 t e arm . "nvention failure, cnuque an" f t nt expenment, 1, ~mer's world IS one 0 cons a . 39' Malpas and Wickham ]9%).adjustment" (MIller and Rose 2008

f· k ' wl: d nd regimes of practice of

, I I orders 0 now e ge a f 'In reconstruct1Og oca I' d onstruct the idea 0 Ul1lver-, d' f emmenta Ity ec dvarymg scope, stu les 0 gov . h f an optimized means-en _

f 0 l"zation In t e sense 0 .sal reason, or 0 ratlona I . I ror who arranges his actIonsrelation-but also rhe model of the ration a aC

t'on

Unlike Max Weber or. h I I futility maXlmlza I . " ,

accordIllg to t e ca cu us 0 , I f rm of rarionality but IIlSlSth d or assume a slI1g eo. I]urgen Habermas, t ey 0 n 'I" What is considered ration a

I, f mental ratlOna Itles. d Ion a plura Ity 0 govern . oints means an goa scan, ' ns abour starting P , b

depends on which assumptlO. f I " cy and acceptability are esta -claim plausibility; which crlterta 0, egmma f knowledge are evoked to

, h" and IIlventortes 0 , Ilished' and which aur orttles. . I Consequently, ration a _, d practices as ranona . I' k'define statements as true an R' lities are ways of r lin IIlg

d' I' al terms atlona bity is understoo III re atlon h ageable which is to say su -that render reality conceivable and t uS mGan d 1980: 248). This means

, d formation (see or on "dject to calculatIOn an trans 'f nt modes of thIllkIllg and h logICS 0 govern me , dthat rationalities an tee no . I' nee ted and co-pro uce one

forms of intervention, are inextncab Y Intereonanother (see Miller and Rose 2008: ]6).


Five methodological principles follow from this analytical perspective:First studies of govern mentality do not operate with dichotomies such

as pow~r and subjectivity, state and society, structure and actio~, id~as andpractices, but look for the systematic ties between forms of rationality andtechnologies of government. In this manner not only political programs,everyday practices, and modes of shaping the self come into view, but alsothe significance of knowledge production and its connection with rnecha-nisms of power.

Second, this analytical perspective follows the principle of an "ascend-ing analysis" (Foucault 1980: 99) starting with local patterns of rational-ity and governmental practices, Globalizing theoretical concepts suchas "risk society," "neoliberalism," and "state" do not form the open-ing but at most the endpoint of the analysis, The focus is on micro-practices whose connection, systematization, and homogenization onlyallows for a description of macro-phenomena. Hence there is no single,specific neoliberal govern mentality, but studies of govern mentality canshow for example how the role-model of the enterprising self is con-nected with theory of human capital in an elementary way, and howthis role-model is diffused and becomes hegemonic within present-dayregimes of subjectificarion.

Third, studies of govern mentality open up an epistemological-politicalfield that Foucault defined as "politics of truth." In contrast to the critiqueof ideology, they do not describe ideas or theories in terms of a true-falsedistinction and imply no opposition between power and knowledge, Rather,they investigate the discursive operations, speakers' positions, and institu-tional mechanisms through which truth claims are produced, and whichpower effects are tied to these truths, Studies of governmentality trace thecontours of this productive power, which produces a specific (and alwaysselective) knowledge and in this way generates definitions of problems andfields of governmental intervention in the first place.

Fourth, this research perspective emphasizes the technological aspect ofgovernment, The concept of technology here includes technical artifacts,strategies of social engineering, and technologies of the self; it refers to botharrangements of machines, medial networks, recording and visualizationsystems, and so forth, and to a range of procedural devices through whichindividuals and collectives shape the behavior of each other or themselves,These involve sanctioning, disciplining, normalizing, empowering, insur-ing, preventing, and so on, Studies of govern mentality do not understandsuch technologies as the expression of social relations; nor, inversely, issociety seen as a result of determinant technological factors, Rather, whatis at play here is a complex of practical processes, instruments, programs,calculations, measures, and apparatuses making it possible to form andcontrol forms of action, structures of preference, and premises for deci-sions by societal agents in view of certain goals (see M iller and Rose 2008:61-68; Inda 2005: 9-10),

An Introduction 13

I, t on an analyrics ofFifth and finally studies of governmenta tty cen er .. . h' I·· I ' I gy or political science t atthe political. In contrast to a po mea SOCIO0,. . hi h

.. . h ncern here IS With the ways In W ICpresumes Its objects as a given, t e cod. h f I e The focus is onthe realm of the political is produce m t erst p ranee between publichow divisions and distinctions are estabhbsh

led, for Idnsfined as pohtical and

' d he nri here' how pro ems are emrerests an t e prrvate sp '" h bi t are invoked as aurono-. I' prualized; ow su jec spossible so utions are conce " .' " h logies of government,

. d onsible crttzens m tec nomous, emancipate , resp "' h ally distinct fields of state,which unfold their effects straight across t e usu I' do not assume that

d h Studies of governmenta itysociety, an t e economy. ,. b olitical activities are also not reduc-everything is a political acnvlty,. ur p ,ible to the trinity of politics, policy, and pObhtdY'. t command and control.

I . arelyoperate y irecGovernmenra practices r -the exercise of con-h "1 f b dience and-even more so

Both t e pnnclp e 0 0 e I . k It seems more effective tostraint are very costly and tied to greathns

h,· f eedom " in other words

. , " d II ' "throug t elr r, ,guide individuals an co ecuves . th m positive incentives to

h themselves to give eto prompt t em to govern .h I s as free subjects. Govern-. , d nderstand t emse veact In a certain wayan u k tain forms of behavior moreing means creating lines of force that male cer f force does not mean ask-

h M ring these mes 0 I.probable than ot ers. easu , h. h Studies of governmenta rtying how people actually move Wit In t oked to move within these lines.are more interested in how people are invo e . of self-government and

, I· s between regimes IThe focus is on the mterre anon . h d ct of individuals and co _, f II· d shaping t e con u d htechnologies 0 contro ing an , d b these regimes an teen-

lecrives, not on what human beings governe ienrific policy advice, studies. d d In contrast to set .nologies actually sayan 0, . I of good governance against

I, I· no Idea norm . hof governmenta tty proc aim d I stead they investigare t e"" t to be measure . n, kwhich real practice IS mean d the arguments used to rna e

.. bli h d f od governance an h ffcnteria esta 1S e or go I est ion is thus not ow e ec-them plausible (Lemke 2007b). Thedcehntra qhUyshould be optimized, but

, . . e an ow t e f If )tive governmental acnvltles ar . k then are programs 0 (se -f d h· ff t What ISat sta e" .how they un 01 t elr e ec s'. f II t· e histories nor diagnoses

. !Ions 0 co ec IV hgovernment, neither reconstruc h" 'n terms of an image: w at., . I t re To express t IS I "fi d.of shifts m the socia struC u , d· g people in speci c Irec-

. d h the currents raW1I1 his being scrutimze ere are his be drawn or how t ey useh d· they let t emse ve , .

tions-and not t e Istance h hey try to evade them or sWimd quickly or ow t I .the currents to a vance more 'I. spective in no way resu ts II1

. H ch an ana ytiC per . kagainst them. owever, SU. "f government regimes rna esa normatively abbreviated reahty: ma,:mg ~ modes of resistance provok-visible the conflicting forces, the breac es an

ing governmental efforts. f ent that generate subjects inI, , d etices 0 governm . "

It is rationa ltIes an pra " k" d legitimizing certalIl Imagesb' . . g by mvO mg an f Ithe first place su Jectlvatln I h s addressed or examp e,, . h Peop e are t u , h

of the self while excludmg ot ers, I.' I activists concerned about t eas citizens aware of their rights, as po l!lca


societal future, or as artists who realize themselves through th.eir creativ-ity' and they also articulate themselves as citizens, activists, arnsts, and s?forth. To become a subject always means actualizing certain subjecr-posi-rions and dispensing with others; it means being addressed in a certain wayas a subject, understanding oneself as a subject, and working on oneself In

alignment with this self-understanding, Studies of governmentality aVOIdthe hypothesis of an antecedent, autonomously acting subject, employinginstead a minimalistic anthropology, They know nothing about the consti-tution of human beings going beyond the human capacity to be formed ofabout form itself (Rose 1996), But this dual capacity is what makes peoplegovernable in a fundamental way,

Subjects are not merely effects of the exercise of power, but also pos-sess self-will and agency-this is already at work conceptually in the co-presence of power and freedom in the idea of government. Terrorists beingtargeted by the security authorities, students being evaluated by professors,employees supervised by their superiors-all of them are not merely objectsof government, nor are they fully determined by technologies of control.Their manner of operating rather resembles a relay: in articulating them-selves as subjects they take part in power relations, thus reproducing andrransforming them (Foucault 2003: 29-30),

Processes of subjectification are always tied to a social a priori: subjectscan only understand themselves and act within a historical field of pos-sible experiences (see Macherey 1992: 181-182), They generate themselvesperformatively, but their performances are bound into orders of knowl-edge, lines of force, and power relations. Thus subjecrification designatesa potential for action, but always a form of adherence as well-to ideas,and to manners of articulation and recognition, Subject-positions empowerindividuals, while subjecting them at the same time (Butler 1997),

If the subject is only conceivable in terms of this double movement,then we have to dispense with the traditional opposition between libera-tion and domination-the basis for both Marxist and anarchist critiques ofrule, as well as liberal movements toward freedom, But this does not meanabandoning the telos of freedom and the claim to self-determination andself-realization; it does, however, problematize these concepts. Movementsfor freedom and emancipation are not located outside or beyond powerrelations, but themselves produce regimes of subjectification (Cruikshank1999), They not only place extant orders of truth in question but also inau-gurate counter-truths centered on the question of how liberated, emancI-pated subjects are to understand and to shape themselves and others,

Stud'es of governmentality are aimed neither at a history of ideas norat a vaflant of psychohistory or a historical-genetic psychology tracing theevolution of corporeality, emotions, conceptual worlds, cognitive schemas,and pathologies, They do not focus on individual life histories and self-images, as is the case in biographically oriented social research, Instead,what is at stake here is a "genealogy of subjectilication" (Rose 1996: 23).

An Introduction 15

Studies of govern mentality do not retrace transformations of subjectivity,but the way in which the subject has become a problem at cert~m hlSt~fl-cal moments and which solutions have been arrived at. To put r

fIS abnor er

h d t k what the subject is but which forms 0 su lectlvway' t ey 0 no as bili d' h b ' k d hich modes of knowledge have been mo I ize rotty ave een InVO e ,W I id I '

f h bi d hich procedures ai c aim to.answer the question 0 t e su jeer, an w r d h chThe reception of Foucault's concept of governmenta uy an ht e reslebar I

f bi if ' "is linked ro t e neo I eraprogram of a "genealogy 0 su [ecn cation , d i di id al free-. .. f market Orientation an m IVI Urestructuring of society m terms 0 , , If (B ock-

'II th figure of the enrerpnsmg se rdorn. In neoliberalism especia y, e ibl d dy for risk hasling 2007), defining itself as free, self-responSi e, an rea the self-caring

, , hi olitical project ro promotefigured as a protagonist in t IS Ph' vestment off . , mbers and to measure t e In

and self-provision 0 society s me h ivit lifelong learninghi d Concepts sue as creanvi y, 'state resources to t IS en . yrns for technologies

", d ment have become synonparncipauon, an empower " " d the state- the activar-bli hi I' between the CItizen an .esta IS Ing a new re anon h logies of government

' he acti d bi ct Contemporary tee noIng state, t e activate su Je ' I d t S if they are autono-d d themse ves an ac a

encourage people to un dsubi. Thanks to the market's invisible hand,mous and self-determined su jeers. , " eant to promote not

f isk d ilit maxirmzanon are mthe readiness or flS an uti I y I Ifonly the individual's happiness but also the genera we are.

4. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

d even in the work of some of the pro-In the reception of the concept, an , ' f (mis-) understood as a

, , h Ii Id mentality IS 0 tentagorusts In tee ,govern .. in this light studies of govern-, " h Wh n It IS seen In t I, "social-scientific approacn. e I" comprehensively describe

, ' h 'logy by c aiming to ,mentality compete WIt SOCIO I hi If formed each of hIS ana-

, 'I h Foucau t rrnseand explain SOCIa p enornena. h'storical objects (madness,, , ith f e to concrete 1lytic Instruments wit re erenc , h d veloping a general theory

, I' d forth) wit out e , Idelinquency, sexua ny, an so 1"" h fren served as a theoretlcafrom this; in contrast, "governmenta ItY

IadS°bJ'ects-without correction

b' rch goa s an 0 dpassepartout for ar Itrary resea h f e of such overload we neef h ept In t e acor further development 0 t e conc f' ltal'lty is not an attempt to, ' ' 0 governmel

to emphaSIze that analySiS In terms d' d ot have a distinct method-f " I h ory an It oes n , hocmulate a sweepmg socia t e , "Ii research perspective III t eI " ' d' osal It slgl1l es a "o oglCal Inventory at Its ISp. f I k'ng a specific onentatlOI1,, If' rna nner 0 00 I , "literal sense: an ang e 0 View, a, fold rheir analytIC poten-

'f mentality can un ,As such, studies 0 govern 'I h nd call theoretical certam-

, b h h SOCia t eory a drial when they at poac on, "tl'cal corrective to them an" , h h function as a cn ,ties IntO question-wen t ey , d' 'l'nary marginality, Takmg upactivate the irritative potential of theldr IScl

fPI vern mentality would need

, I' " Ise stu les 0 go hFoucault's nomma IStlC Impu, h' wn answers and from t e, I I es from t elf 0to repeatedly dIStance t lemse v


mecha~isn:s of power identified earlier. In other words: heuristic experi-menranon Instead of neat "how to" manuals, local cartography instead ofgeneral theory. Thomas Osborne (2004: 35) appeals in this sense for a useof the concept of governmentality:

An Introduction 17

the impossibility-of evading or opposing governmental strategies. Fromthis perspective, techniques of disciplining and mechanisms of sovereignpower are simply of accidental and residual character and are replaced bymore economic forms of exercising power. The history of governmentalirythen appears as an increasingly fateful correlation of mobilization and self-mobilization, optimization and self-optimization, control and self-control.This account overlooks both the persistence of violence in power strategiesand the systematic linkage between supposedly "rational" and "irrational"moments of government (Lemke 2000). In fact, separating what is rationalqua capable of truth from what is not rational qua merely subjective oraffective, and fixing the borders between the two spheres, is an elementarymove in technologies of government.Another aspect of the "rationalization problem" is that studies of gov-

ernrnenraliry frequently scrutinize programs as if these were blueprints,thereby tending to mask the breaches, dislocations, and rejections emerg-ing with their appropriation and execution. This neglect is due, in no smallmeasure, to the specific perspective of the empirical analysis: studies ofgovernmentality focus neither on the regularities and probabilities noron the non-calculable moments of individual and collective behavior, butrather on atrempts to steer and affect them. The analysis only refers toactual behavior and "real life" to the extent these are catalysts, effects orresisting elements of governmental strategies. Examining syllabuses, schooltextbooks, or the architecture of classrooms is not the same as reconstruct-ing individual learning processes. The focus is less on the "development ofreal governmental practice" than on "government's consciousness of itself"(Foucault 2008: 2), which is to say "the reasoned way of governing bestand, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing"(ibid.). To extend the school image further: studies of governmentality donot inquire into what pupils do or refrain from doing, but investigate whichinstitutions and persons (including the pupils themselves) induce them todo something and refrain from other things-and in what way and withwhat intention.The criticism that studies of governmentality simply duplicate neolib-

eral governmentality, misappropriating it in a kind of intellectual identifi-cation, points to a methodological quandary: regimes of government andself-government follow a more or less polished program, ofren documentedand supported by scholarly research, giving rise to carefully planned proce-dures. It only makes sense to speak of regimes when patterns of governingbecome manifest. Studies of govern mentality are aimed above all at suchprograms and procedures. By contrast, the forms of resistance and counter-conducts (Foucault 2007: 201) are contingent. They have to be accountedfor, but they are not calculable. There is a science of government, but therecannot be one of the art of not being governed. To take up an elementarydistinction made by Jacques Ranciere (1998): together with governmentalregimes, science belongs to the order of police, executing the division of the

"as a kind of soft, if not provocative, effective conceptual lever to de-velop new ways of thinking, leave behind familiar ways, dismantlingsome and renewmg others. Thus instead of establishing a new empire,this kind of research should very consciously remain provisional. Heresense for the untimely, for anthropological interruption, is everything:what IS at play IS speculative thi ki b . . .. In mg a out govermng our capacinesand emotions and not production of didactic statements about thefunctioning of societies in general.:"

Pa rallel to the strengthened reception and academic grounding, two tenden-cies cfan be discerned that are moving in opposite directions. Either stud-res 0 govern mentality sket h . . hi ."the hi f c .10 a sweeping istorical narrative subjecting

II dstory 0 governmentahty to a veritable evolutionary logic rnechani-

ca y a vane g . I . II' 10 10 a SOCIOogica manner from study of the Polizei to lib-era Ism and the welfare state to neoliberalism" (Osborne 2004: 35)' or inincreasingly small-format empirical studies they distill th I idenri Irational t . d e a ways I enncah hiles, strategies, an technologies of neoliberalism. In both variantst ey t rearen to become rcpetiti . h h id· h di live, Wit tel ea of where the argumentIS ea 109 present so to speak b f h diwhat one alread k Thi e ore t e rea mg. What is discovered isany possibility t: ~ows. IS'hnot least of all, protects scholars againsttheir approach ; ~ e~omena t ey are studying will force them to rethinkbecause studie; or" t IS repres~nts a paradoxical development: preciselyofthe present th governmenta iry possess high potential for a diagnosis

, ey encounter resonance' b hrun a danger of di .. hi h ' ut to t e extent they do so, theyImITIlS mg t at di . .

critique itself rather than what is blagnostlc potential by repetition. As thethe gesture of critical '1· b emg criticized becomes common sense,

I b h va ri unvei 109 ecornes obsolete.n or variants the regimes f

sure and clarity sup'pre' h 0 government are characterized by a c10-ssmg t e sirnultan ff f .

tal lines of force-effe t hi. eo us e ects 0 varIOUS govern men-cts r at Over ap With di f d nossi .each other. A homogene·t f . I..' mo I y, an possibly contradict

I yo rationa mes a d hnolocion the one hand and f f f' n tee no ogles of government, 0 orms 0 sub if . .

presumed both in the eff jecn catron on the other hand, ISort to reconstruct . I d .

ern mentality and in that t d fi a sing e mo ern history of gov-· I. . 0 e ne through an lvses of rni .Its tara lzmg contemporar f Th . a 'yses 0 micro-regimeS,the constitutive hybridir yf dorm. . e result IS an inabiliry to account for

. I yo rscursrve patte d ha ni(Reckwirz 2008). rns an mec anIsms of power

. Another problem to be noted is an im " .[10ual rationalization and '. . pilelt hnallsrn, presuming a cOO-· . . Optimization of g I .ItS critical turn this fin I· overnmenta technologies. In, a Ism suggests . .an 111creaslng difficulty-or even


sensible (Ie partage du sensible) and assigning things and people to certainpositions. Resistance to this is political, markin~ an i.nterruptlon-a dis-turbance also affecting the order of scientific classification and explanatorymodels.

In this way every study of counter-action, and hence of the phenomenonof dissent, disobedience, rebellion, denial, or more simply, of agency, facesa threefold danger. Either it seeks out rules and regularities precisely wherethey are violated and transgressed-the perspective of criminology; or Italigns heterogeneous stories, without being able to say much more aboutthem than that they exist-an ethnographic approach also present 10 broadareas of cultural studies; or it itself argues from the commander's vantagepoint, promising oppositional knowledge of government in order to leadunited forces of resistance into battle-the Leninist position, still echo 109

in the post-operaist invocations of the "multitude" (Hardt and Negri 2000;2004).

Are we left, then, with the aporia of either remaining silent about formsof resistance since speaking about them would mean making them accessibleto governmental intervention, or speaking about them since silence wouldmean playing into the hands of those hoping to keep resistance invisible?Obviously not. But how, then, are we to evade the traps of the criminologi-cal gaze, anecdotal narration, or the oxymoron of "revolutionary theory~?Surely not with critique as a kind of science of warfare, exhausting itself In

identification of the enemy, exposing his cunning, unmasking his disguisedagents while bringing its own battalions into position and trying to presentthem with marching routes and operational plans. And not with critique asa celebration of obstinacy, revolt or indifference, as a hymn to Marcuse's"great refusal" (1964) or the small "I prefer not to" in the wake of HermanMelville's Bartleby (1853/1997). Such critiques already know what theywill discover, and so simply look for additional evidence. Because they onlyknow antagonisms (or the one great antagonism) or absolute indistinction,they remain blind to ambivalence. Their protagonists are certain that thecritique's subject and object can be clearly distinguished-that in any eventthey themselves are in no way contaminated by what they abhor.

In the face of such approaches, an understanding of critique as prob-lematization would need to be strengthened. Instead of constructing eithera single history of the process of rendering something governable or manyhistories of the process's failure, the emphasis would be on making a per-formative relation visible in which governmental strategies and patterns ofresistance encounter and define each other. Both governmental and resis-tant practices have to be considered in terms of a complex of questions:how they define problems to which they respond; which subject positionsand modes of subjectification they engender; which fields of interventionthey constitute and which strategies they enact to make their interventionsplausible; and finally, which promises they articulate and which goals theyhope to achieve in this way.

An Introduction 19

t of resistance signifies very disparateIn such a context, the concep h d posed to governmental. hi it efers to w at stan s op , "

things. For one t mg, 1 r . f sistence or inaccessibility,'I ' tion a capacity or per, hefforrs-i-passive y as mac '. . frontation. For anot er

If e interrupnon or canand active y as counter arc, , .. I orders of governmenth 'between opposinonathing, it refers to t e tension tegies and tactics form-

, f ment-between st ra , hand a subversion 0 govern d practices articulating t e'I' irnes of government an , 'Iing countervai tng regrrne h' h arne of those prmcrp es,

will "not be governed like that" by t adt, Indtbemneans of such procedures,

h bi t e In min an y , .with such and suc an a lec IV h " (Foucault 1997: 28, emphasis Innot like that, not for that, not by t em. Istrategies (or strategies of

. , I' hi b tween govern menta kioriginal) The re anons ip e. di tory resistance mar ingd ' ce IS thus contra IC, .power in general) an resrstan , f government: "Resistanced riturive moment 0 . dboth a boundary an a cons I .' I that which direcrs an

ke to power, It 1Sa so .'is not merely the counrerstro , I be seen as a certain rnaru-insof sistance can a so d'shapes power. But InSO ar as re , h b seen as itself serving to irecr

festation of failure, so too can failure (Mal e nd Wickham 1995: 43), "( apasa " ifand shape the process of governing. . t the contrad,ctory sigm _

" h I drawn attention a 'f IJacques Ranciere as a so . ith the question 0 t ie. "." In connection W b h '"icance of the word reSIstanCe, h ' t nee is referred to ot 10, .' h bserves t at rests a f Iinherent resistance 10 art, eo. ' bei "and "in the sense 0 peop e

inu th eve res In ItS erng h d igthe sense of a thing t at pers , ." (2008' 9) Resistance t us esia-, . hei tuatlon .' f h .who refuse to rernarn in t err Sl "rhe persistence 0 w at IS to

, f rnulate Ranclere, hi' tonates both the gwen, to re or hi elinquished-t e calm. . haoe i nd samet Ing reun qu-»o _everything trymg to r~s ape it, a . n This signification IS always normachange and the practice of negauo . of the impulse to no longer

if . or abhotrence 'h Ftively loaded-as a justl cation, 'proposed by nelt er au-'II thIrd meamng, h 'thaccept the status quo. FIna y, a I" t play: resistance as t e WI -

.. b' choana YSis10 a entcault nor Ranc1ere1 flngs psy 1 of consciousness-governmdrawn as a force unavailable to the contra ompulsion or another formof the ~elf-but emerging as a slip, repetition c ,

of manifestation (Derrida 1998). f nted with resistances in the" nstantly con ro . hd gov-Not least because It IS co " h d and the WIt rawn,h· the relIngulS e , f thethreefold meaning of t e gIven, " t always take account a

. affaIr: It mus 'If" re-ernment is always a precanous " I h s realizes Itse as cnSls P, f vernabdlty. t t u . roducesunforeseen and Cflses 0 go . ua! reinterpretations, P

erforms cantin I This cleftvention and management, p 'f II hart of its own goa s.unintended effects, and necess~nly t s ~ n can cause regimes of govern-between the programs and their rea lZatllo

eto function as the catalyst for

thing or e s F h' asonment to collapse or come to no ) mental efforts. or t ISre ,intensified modified, or entirely neW gOfvern nd realizing a master plan but

, ts to dra tIng a .. ' lign-to govern by no means amoun, ' . n correction, CfitlCIsm, a, tatlon II1ventio , I I' f becomdemands constant expenmen 'h f Ilow the fau t- Ines a -f ment ere of' cement. The adjustments 0 go~ern I the case for forms 0 reslstan l

, ., If vldently a so h ontaneousmg governed. ThIS IS se -e , tance of a no, t e spb d the mere Insinsofar as they move eyon


moment of indignation, towards strategic or tactical io.tervention. T~eeffort to force crises and use them to transform constellations of power ISitself a precarious enterprise; counter-regimes themselves fail to attain theirgoals and produce unintended effects.. . .

Until now, studies of govcrnrnenraliry have often faded to pay sufficientattention to such singularities, ruptures, and disturbances of government.Describing the dislocations, translations, subversions, and collapses ofpower with as much meticulousness as their programs and strategic opera-tions; that is a challenge they are only now beginning to address.

5. ABOUT THIS VOLUME

An Introduction 21

. ' n of how contemporary statehood canon the one hand, with the quesno I of technologies of govern-be conceived if-as clearly IS the case-

fana yses and "globalization" is

I, . d t the borders 0 nation-states dment are not inure Oft I rationality (Larner an. f b d d s a form a govern men a ,itsel to e un erstoo a 2003) On the other hand, they exammeWalters 2004; Perry and Maurer i nar effects of power characterize athe extent to which VIOlent and exclbus 0

1y t ration of the social as by

d fi d h by a neoli era restruc upresent e ne as muc .' h name of security.. . . carried out In ( efar-reaching state mrervennon li h had an enormous, produc-

Foucault's concept of governmenlta ItYI

has with the methodological' "I ical and po mea t eory,rive resonance In SOC10 og d 1 f location For this reasonchallenges it poses still needing a great ea °lex

lP ss as a g~nealogy of gov-

d h hi f governmenta iry eMartin Saar rea s t e isrory 0 f h dern concept of the stated hi f the emergence ate mo diernment an a isror y a I' d research program nee IJ1g

hi 'I litical ana yncs an a , iththan as a new istorica -po . Foucault's analysis Witd d d ful By connecting ,

to be develope an rna e use ' , Gerhard Oestreich, Quentinsimilar, already established perspectives (e.g., h innovative potential of a

. . h K II k) Saar brings out tedSkinner Rein art osse e , . A critical underscan _"' b d and wrrt ten anew.history of the present to e rea.. d f the political future-caning of the history of political th1l1k1l1g:-:an he radical contingency, of the

f insizhr i to the historicity, tonly emerge rom insrg t 10 .

Western (late) modern self-understand1l1fg· ,. I analysis of the modern

k h h ntours 0 a cnnca .Bob Jessop s etc es t e co disti hing between varIOUS

I, lectures isnnguis dstate as laid out in Foucau t s . J' ees an Anglophone rea _ibl I' f eceptlon. essop s , ,actual and POSSI e ines 0 r I" fr" forms of exercising powerf pparenr y so t d " Ifing as tending to ocus on a , I f 'on Here free am IS use

d I' orenna or acn . I' dthat try to mobilize an exp oit p h ffects cannot be exp arneh If power w ose e "I 'understood as a tee no ogy 0 . b the state and CIVI society,

, , , d d rcatlons etween ,within the classical bor er ema, . b t which is at the same time, nd liberatIOn, u ,public and private, repression a t Jessop favors a perspective

d ' wer By conttas , , ' ich slocalizable "beyon ' state po . 'fi' of central MarXist 1l1Slg t, nd modi cation d Irendering Foucault's reception a state and present- ay ru e.

I . f the contemporary d I'erproductive for an ana YSIS 0 ernmenrality an ear Id· f the lectures on gov d' h 'Through a close rea 1l1g 0 f power beyond IC otomles

I h d· 'II a concept a statetexts by Foucau t, e ISti Stand economy,d opower or sta e d k asuch as micropower an macr F "edrich Balke un efta es

, . f F It's analyses, n d d i-US1l1g the pnsm 0 oucau J ques Rousseau-an ecI,' I h oty of Jean- ac , Th 'fresh reading of the po mca t e h' f governmentaltty. e slg-

.. h odern Isrory 0 . f . d atphers its contflbutlon to rem. . here comes IOtO ocus, an .nificance of law for society's SOCIal formI' atl~~heory of Carl Schmitr and hiSh . h f e to the po Itlca ceptiont e same time Wit re erenc . h our contemporary perstudent Ernst 'Forsthoff, Balke sheds Itg t ~~ Under present-day neoliberalf 'f" verelgn power. " displace-o a transformation 0 so , ' 'rale expenences 3

, R au's volonte gene f 'II Ilow-governmental regimes, ousse individual acts 0 WI ,aTh 'I order rests on f h If's rulemen! of meaning. e socIa nifesrations 0 t e se

., . n to become rnaing affiliation and partlclpatlo

The present volume explores the analytical potential of studies of govern-mentality in terms of three thematic focal points, each of which rakes upongoing social changes and more recenr theoretical discussions. The con-tributors discuss transformations of statehood and security regimes andthe biopolitical dimension of government, and finally critically considerthe thesis of an "economization of the social" under the sign of neoliberalgovernmentality. The volume offers a kind of interim critical assessment ofthe reception of Foucault's lectures on the history of govern mentality andof the studies of governmentality, At the same time, it is meant to open upnew perspectives and both promote and deepen a critical analysis of palm-cal and social processes.

The State and Mechanisms of Security

Critiques leveled at the concept and studies of govern menta lity have oftenpointed to the neglect of mechanisms of state rule (Curtis 1995; Frankel1997; Garland 1997; O'Malley, Weir and Shearing 1997; Brunnett andGraefe 2003; Schild 2003). With the complete publicarion of the lecturesat the latest, it became clear that Foucault's talk of "state phobia" (2008:187) was by no means a refiection of an avetsion to analyzing the state,To the contrary, Foucault indicates that "The problem of bringing understate control, of 'statification' [hatisation] is at the heart of the questions Ihave tried to address" (ibid.: 77). But he did object to the idea of develop-ing an abstract and in his view generalizing theory of the state (see 2007:144; Mitchell 1999; Lemke 2007b; Saar 2007), He rather understands thestate's existence as involving an enduring process of formation, unfoldingthrough an analysis of both forms of rationality and technologies of gov-ernment.

However, in studies of governmentality the modern nation-state hasusually been, implicitly or explicitly, the point of reference, with "sover-eign power" often standing for an archaic and repressive form of exercisingpower. In contrast, the essays in this section of the volume are concerned,


over itself. In this context Forsthoff's distinction between the social-welfarestate-Sozialstaat-and the constitutional state-Rechtsstaat-is instruc-tive: through the neoliberal subsurnption of services of general interest tothe proviso of freedom, the latter becomes a productive element of power-at the expense of freedom as a right in the face of state power.

The interplay of the apparent oppositions of freedom and subjection, ofmechanisms of activation and of intervention, of involvement in governmentand exclusion is also considered in Sven Opitz' essay. For, Opitz indicates,where studies' of govern mentality have been mainly concerned with indi-rect mechanisms of guiding the "conduct of conduct" as a characteristic ofliberal regimes, in recent years it has become clear that they are not limitedto such mechanisms, But under what condition, Opitz asks, does a liberalregime become illiberal? The contemporary perception of one form of cata-strophic risk, he argues, has brought specific mechanisms of securitizationinto play; these render visible a systematic linkage, as it were inherent rn lib-eral government, with sovereign acts of direct violence and exclusion. In .anextension of Foucault's analytic perspective, Opitz observes that early lib-eralism consolidated itself through a promotion of governmental restraint:governments could not intervene, both because they promised to respectcivil rights and because of the opacity of market mechanisms, In contrast,securitization poses an imperative of mandatory knowledge inverting theoriginal relationship: liberal governments must intervene precisely becausethey do not know about catastrophic threats and in the end are thus notable to guarantee the citizen's right to freedom,

The essay by Susanne Krasmann likewise addresses the contemporaryanalysis of securitization mechanisms, in the course of demonstrating the pro-ductive potential of Foucault's concept of state formation for understandingthe transformation of liberal democracies, Using the example of the ongoingdebate over the legalization of torture and a practice of torture that arguablyhas found its place in liberal democratic societies, Krasmann analyzes thedynamic interactions between security and law. Government in the name ofsecurity unfolds a distinctive game of truth and produces specific forms ofvisibility, rendering not only an extension of state interventions acceptable.Indeed, security mechanisms can embed themselves systematically within thelaw itself-thus undermining traditional constitutional principles,

In his study of migration control, William Walters develops an analyticsof the government of borders and frontiers, Foucault hardly touched on thetheme of state border controls in his lectures On govern mentality and bio-politics, but this issue has played a significant role in the reception of thesetexts, for example in examinations of the political logic of new forms of bor-der control at airports and the application of new technologies at inter-stateborders, But for the most part, Walters argues, such a logic is read as a spe-cific form of rationality, conceived as global and homogeneous, say of Neo-liberalism or Sovereign Power. This contrasts with his Own focus on borderregimes as hybrid, locally specific and extremely mutable configurations

An Introduction 23

b lit into forms of state control onwhose way of taking effect cannot e sp h h hand Rather inthe one hand and humanitarian engagement on t ;e~~lte~f re~ious pOliti-Walters' view, border regimes are conshlstently the border ~ Nevertheless,

fl' , h h nee of a " umaruta rran .cal con ICtS, Wit t e emerge . h of surveillance rechnol-

. f I I gal regulanons t e usestrategies 0 state control, e .'. tions together form and h t f humanitarian orgaruza Iogy, an t e engagemen 0 . lways woven into the

bl . h· h liti al rounterstratcgtes are a hassem age m w IC po I IC " I h Ie helping to diminis. I hi nee politica actors, W Icontrol strategies, n trns man ib nwillingly and in anf . haps also contri ure, Uthe suffering 0 migrants, per . d f r of controls,f hi tension an re nemeounanticipated as 100, to an ex

Biopolitics and the Government of Life . ,. f ment and of biopolltlcsI ' tons 0 governThe two central Foucau nan no I . A result studies of gov-

I· f recepnon, sa,have generated separate ines 0 ion of how the governmentd db ass the question 0 dernrnenra liry have ten e to yp , h b'ological categories an

I· . teracts Wit 1of individuals and popu anons m d di iormality and pathology,concepts of life and death, health an Ise~s:, leen questions of embodi-This section thus focuses on convergencehs e w h nd and an analytics of

f d life on t e one a ,.rnent and concepts 0 nature an . d f e the ways in which bio-h h d eekmg to en, Igovernment on the or er an ,S . of for example, socia

. h d the perception ,logical constructions have c ange .inequalities, identity, and citizenship, L mke distinguishes between

" h I=T~~s e fIn his contribution to t e vo ume, . f om Foucault's concept 0, . f tion emergIng r d b htwo Important lines 0 recep . hil ophy sociology, an ot

I, h ' home In p I os , dbiopolirics. The first me as Its . d d the question of the mo ed i nente towar dsocial and political theory, an IS0 , d what counterforces oes

. , d bi litics [unction, an f hof politics: how oes 10PO I , II nd historically rom ot er... , . diff rent analyrica y a . . ' eIt mobilize? How IS It Ie. h . rarting POint In serene

Th ond line as Its s Iepochs and political forms? e sec. h history of science, culturaand technology studies, medical SOCiology, t e the substance of life: how

.. h Its focus ISon I d banthropology, and feminist t eory. ,. life forms been a rere y. f d nterventlOO In, I . ;.have the representation 0 ,an I h be read and rewritten .. , bodi textstatcan hthe conception of living 0 res as t" yes more closely roger er-

h earch per spec I ..Lemke suggests tying ( e twO res. . Foucault's wntlngs, was, "h htle present In , . da theoretical combinatIOn tat, w d proJ"ect IS thus alme a[ a

. d h The propose ,never systematIcally explore t ere, , ,., and governmentaiity to anof blOPO Incs ,

systematic linkage of the conce~ts. manner illumina[ing [he connecuonsanalytics of biopolitics-and thiS In a I" I forms of existence, togetherbetween physical being and moral-po Itllca des of government and Ideas

b IIbera mowith [he correspondences etween

of biological self-regulation" h b th Foucault himself and, for·d' F In argues t at a \.. ecIn the next essay, 01 lef ass bl f governmenta Ity Hl conn. -

I' he pro em 0 . h Ithe most part those exp OrIng t , d' 'duals and populanons W I e, red all In IVltion with his work have concentra


neglecting the dimension of life's substance-what Fassin, in reference toboth Georges Canguilhem and Hannah Arendt, terms "life itself." Startingwith Giorgio Agarnben's distinction between bios and zoe, he differenti-ates between the "meaning" of life and its "matter," exploring the relationbetween the two on the basis of empirical research on asylum applicants inFrance and the AIDS problem in South Africa. The outcome of this discus-sion is a moral anthropology tracing the social inequalities and normativevalues steering the politics of life in contemporary societies.

An effort to bring the concepts of biopolitics and governrnenraliry intodialogue is also at the center of Lars Thorup Larsen's contribution. Larsen'sfocal point is the re-orientation of health policies in many Western statesstarting in the 1970s, with prevention playing an increasingly importantrole. Larsen compares changes in U.S. and Danish health programs overthe past three decades. His main conclusions: in these programs, "lifestyle"and "lifestyle diseases" are understood as empirical problems consciouslyaimed at influencing state policy for the sake of motivating individu-als to behave in health-promoting ways. But the concepts involved havebeen applied in different ways in the two states, while in both countriesthe specific connection between lifestyle and health-related behavior hasincreasingly receded in favor of general moralization. The theoretical link-age between biopolitics and govern mentality proposed by Larsen allowsthe contours of a "lifestyle politics" to emerge clearly: an approach goingbeyond the traditional juxtaposition of individualistic and social lifestyleconcepts, which always have to presuppose what is generated by politicaltechnologies in the first place.

Over recent years, the concept of "biological citizenship" has beenintroduced by a range of authors in order to describe a new step in thedevelopment of civil rights. As a rule, what is at issue here are claims toparticipation in social and political processes and a recognition of indi-vidual and collective identities constitutively grounded in certain biologi-cal and genetic features. Peter Wehling's essay draws attention to someproblems and blind Spots in this debate. The concept of biological citizen-ship, he indicates, is often used one-sidedly or selectively; what needs tobe observed is not only the emergence of new rights and possibilities forparticipation, but also the emergence of previously unknown normativeobligations and possibly undesired side effects or consequences. Beyondthis, Wehling makes it clear that patient and self-help groups in the healthsector, while representing an important catalyst for and articulation of bio-logical citizenship, nevertheless reveal varying structures and interests and,frequently, tense relations with biomedical research. Wehling concludes bypointing to some basic problems and ambivalent effects that can surfacewhen civil rights are tied to biological characteristics. He argues that theconcept of "biological citizenship" should not be understood normatively,but should be seen as a tool for analyzing present-day developments in thefield of biomedicine and biopolitics.

An Introduction 25

E .. f the Social and Decentering of the Economyconormzanon 0

. fa" olirical economy" as a starting pointFoucault took up the formation 0 "p f ent with studies of gov-

" " f lib Ipractices 0 governm , .for his consideration 0 I era h . hei analyses of present neolib-" d . the t erne 10 t elf "ern mentality accommo atmg d d h to neglect the question

" h di h ve ten e owever, deral reglmes. T ese stu ies a .' . nmental rationalities anf rrnanons II1 gover ,of how to relate current trans 0 " " The contributions in this

" h "the capitalist economy.technologies to c anges 111 d llels between contemporary

. " h differences an para . Isection seek to examine tel di d t wards "decenrer ing t ief " h " and efforts irecte 0

accounts ate economy d i h vernmentality literature.economy" (Walters 1999) put fotwar

d111 tbedgo between the section on the

" I . h B "" kl provi es a n ge " IIn hIS essay, U tiC roc mg " I f omization of the sOCIa.

d h fling ana yses 0 econgovernment of life an teo OWl" I' nd even more in Agam-. .., gap 111 Foucau t s a I" "

Brockling's starnng POInt IS a. I d fforts to bring about po l ll-" . f bi I'" hich ana yze eben's discussion 0 10PO ItlCS, w bi I . I entity but did not focus on

cal regulation of the population as a" 10 °lglca The contribution highlights" . I"t of biopo incs. " Ithe specific economic ration a I y . hes to an economic r leary

this dimension by studying two dlfferenthapprkoa~omie as formulated by the" fi h t of Mensc eno a . " Iof human life: rst t e concep . "R d If Goldscheld 111 t ie years

" . I hil h nd SOCIOlogist u 0 h tAustrian SOCIa p I asap er a h f human capital, w OSt mosbefore World War I and second the t eOih 0 dore W. Schultz and Gary S.famous exponents are the US economists eo

micrationalization of life by

d heid II d for an econo d "Becker. Where Gol sc ei ca e "I nned wayan increaseI . h n resources map a "the state that would cu trvate uma" "I"" and mutual protecnon,. ffective uti rzatton , k

them through preventive care, e" If I tion through the mar et," I Ies on se -regu a I "the theory of human capita re I d eiving of their actions asneurs an cone . f lifmodeling individuals as entrepre " ' I"f ans and quality 0 I e.

. their own I esp . .investments or disinvesrrnents in I" irh economic questions IS" f nrnenta ity WI fi dThe concern in studies 0 gover , . On the one hand, we n an

'd' rotkam~gurt~ "" ofchatactetized by an I iosync ion f h economic determll1lsmin d anon rom t e h dinsistence-not least m emarc . t an autonomous sp ere, an

Marxist orthodoxy-that the economy IS no d to be analyzed as a bun-/" b t rather nee scertainly represents no tota Ity," u f so that it is always seen as

d h sms 0 power, I" d" edie of truth claims an mec al1l d" of governmenta Ity lagnosh h hand stu les "Political economy. On t e ot er 'h" how contemporary regimes

" I" S OWll1g "an «economization of the SOCia, I" he demand to act III anent genera Ize t "" II hof government and self-governm U S '"heli focuses cntlca yon t IS

entrepreneurial manner. The essay by rSb~~ deconstruction and systems

. "" k' ncepts from 0 "esses andmdeclslveness. Ta mg up eo f-referentiality of econ~mlc proe . . "theory, Staheli underscores the sel "f "govermng economic life.

"k d by strategies or k" d tracethe constitutive I111sta es rna e . "f "logic of the mar et an ""f tality Ident! ya "h self-dlS-Where studies 0 govern men S ""heli pOInts to t e

tal programs, ta d h . herentits translation into govern men f If latory markets an t e In. t$ a se -reguembedding, excessive momen f h trepreneur.

. . f h fi 0 teenContradictOriness 0 t e gure


Ute Tellmann likewise critically examines a basic category in studies ofgovernmentality, demonstrating that Foucault's repeatedly cited definitionof government as the "conduct of conduct" falls short of describing thecomplexity of economic processes (and theories). Tellmann argues that Fou-cault's reinterpretation of the economic as governmental rationality and thealignment in the "conduct of conduct" formula with concepts of indirectmanagement remain within the horizon of liberal economic discourse and,in particular, are unable to adequately scrutinize the significance of money.Hence, as an alternative to simply applying that general interpretative key,she appeals for its historical localization. She argues that work on govern-mentality, like research in actor-network-theory, which is concerned withthe socio-technical arrangements through which, for instance, markets arecreated, needs to provide a historical-conceptual analysis of the technolo-gies of power constituting the economic field.In the volume's closing contribution, Stephan Lessenich examines the

"liberal paradox" of a welfare state located between an economic logicof commodification and a political logic of inclusion. On the one hand,individuals are liberated from traditional ties and mobilized for the capital-ist production process; on the other hand, they are immobilized in insti-tutions for risk protection and control organized within the nation-state.In the present transformation of the welfare state into an activating state,this paradox is displaced into that of a simultaneous self-mobilization andself-control. Policies of activation are flanked by generalized strategiesof prevention. Both are accompanied by a process rendering individualsresponsible: they are addressed, Lessenich observes, equally as active, inno-vative, and flexible market subjects, ready for risk, and as "social selves"civically engaged for the common good. Instead of concentrating, like amajority of studies in governmentality, on the "political power beyond thestate" (Miller and Rose 2008: 53), Lessenich finally calls for an analysis ofpolitical power within the (welfare) state.This book has emerged from a conference on "The State of Governmen-

tality" held in Leipzig on September 14-15,2007. It was organized by theResearch Center on Cultural Theory and Theory of the Political Imaginaryat the University of Constance, the Institute for Political Science at the Uni-versity of Leipzig, the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main,and the Institute for Criminological Research at the University of Ham-burg. Both the conference and the realization of this volume were madepossible by generous support from the Research Center on Cultural Theoryand Theory of the Political Imaginary, to which the editors express theirwarm thanks. Joel Golb translated the essays by Friedrich Balke, UlrichBr6ckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke from German, togetherwith this introduction; Gerard Holden was responsible for correcting theessays; Julia Eckert, Robert Feustel, Jonas Helbig, Ulrike Spohn, UlrikeWagner, and particularly Kristina Parzelt helped with preparing both themanuscript and the index. We extend heartfelt thanks to all of them.

An Introduction 27

NOTES

.' . I Ordo where most of the relevant1. The source of this. term iJe~ In Ithe~~u~~a Walrer'Eucken, Franz Bohm, Alex-authors were published. Wd~e m Aop 'k ere among the ordoliberals.ander Riistow and Alfred Muller- (mac W d himself with other thinkers

2. Although in his lectures Foucau~~bas%n~e~~eMises Hayek Simons, Schultzfrom among the ranks of US neo- I era h15mh Vu he of Gary s. Becker, whom heand Stigler), he focused above all on ; ~ rt ~~ement (see 2008: 269).felt to be the most radical exponent? t ~ I

b Th Lemke In this vo ume. I II3. See the chapter y omas . I . he collections edited by Bure re ,d . e the artie es In r d H· d4. For a goo overview, se b d R se 1996. Dean an III ess

Gordon and Miller 1991; Barry, O~Oo~~e~n a ;eneral d~scriprion see Dean1998· see also Dean and Henman . or1999; Rose 1999; Lemke 2000:. d sociologization of this research

5. In order to avoid an onrologization han "studies of governmentality"perspective, Osborne (20?4) pre!ers"t e terminstead of "governmenrality studies.

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2 Relocating the Modern StateGovernmentality and theHistory of Political Ideas!

Relocating the Modern State 35

very same subject, namely the history of theFchangiln ~ conOclee:rt:~~so~~~~yed I" S n this way oucau t s prWestern state an po incs. een 1 , . f I" I

' ' , f h t te or variants 0 po meaa toolbox for contemporary crrticisms 0 t e s a fi d f _' , h I b also (and maybe rst an oresociology or political ant ropo ogy, ut ith nd refutes

' ' hi ' h that competes Wit amost) a form of political isronograp f t 1" I history and the history oftraditional and more dominant forms 0 po 1[ICa 1

political ideas. iburi 0 such a discussion onid limi y contn unon tIn order to provi e a pte rrmnar d i f followed by a general" 'I h d I '11 procee in our steps,historiographica met 0 , WI , f F It's-not toO explicit-

, 'II f ' b ef su r vey 0 oucauconclusion. I WI rst give a, n. a ear in the governmental-general methodological clarificarions, aslthey PhPdological programs (2),' d I h to hIS ear rer met 0Ity lectures, an re ate t em t the methodological and' if II tty to reconstrucI will then, more speer ca y, I ' rhodox history of Western" hi I' I' ' of Foucau t s unorhistoriograp rca Imp icauons 'II I historiography of the statepolitics and political thought and esf~~:c~~I;~s historiographical practiceand statehood (3). The specificity 0 f h e established perspectivescan then be usefully compared to some 0 I'~ e mor of the history of politi-, fi h "t aditiona verston .in the same field, rst to t e r so hist icared versions of It (5)cal ideas (4) and then to more recent, more ,P rtanr not to say "hege-

. . t the most tmpo ,which might be said to consntu e f h history of political thought.monic" perspectives in the methodology 0 tde markedly different, and

h b h wn to provi e a dFoucault's approac can e s 0 f lysis of state formation an'or type 0 ana ,for some purposes even superior, ich h less shares many telling

, f h d whic nevert e ,the transformations 0 state 00 Th history of governmentalJtyf ith h g accounts, elf' Ieatures Wit t ese compeun . I f tion or replacement 0 lore-

b d radica re uta I , 6should, in sum, not e rea as a di I thodological challenge to ir ] ).lectual political history, but as a ra the me tions and ideas of the state

, , f h nd t e concep ITelling the history 0 testate a h dolo ical stakes of such an enter-"after Foucault" means to raise the met 0 gprise and to revise its very form.

Martin Saar

1. INTRODUCTION: HI5TORICIZING POLITICS

There is nothing predictable about the direction the reception of a majorthinker will take, and the huge success of the work of Michel Foucault isno exception, It would have been utterly impossible to foresee, at the timeof their publication, which of his writings would catch the attention of hisreaders for years to come and which of his projects and concepts wouldbecome major references in a variety of disciplines. The fate of the notionof governmentality is particularly instructive, It is undeniable by now thatFoucault's two lecture courses at the College de France on the overallproject that he himself called "the history of 'governrnentality" (Foucault2007: 108) have produced an enormous echo in sociology, political theory,and even in cultural anthropology,' But the challenge his suggestions poseto the historiography of politics and history of political thought has hardlybeen the object of any comparable debate, This is surprising, especiallygiven the fact that Foucault's original project at the end of the 1970s wasmainly a historical enterprise. The 1977-1978 lectures, Security, Territory,Population, and the 1978-1979 lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics, are bothdevoted to a genuinely historiographical task, namely the rewriting of thehistory of the (European, modern) state and of the arts and technologies ofgovernment.

The current debate on governmentality has, for good reasons, focusedon the diagnostic and conceptual value of Foucault's project for contem-porary social and political analysis and has therefore mainly given priorityto the relationship between government, security, and power and to theproblem of "liberalism" in its various forms, This discussion has helpedto clarify how Foucault's historical analysis might bear on the questionof how contemporary societies (and their subjects) are governed.] But Ithas overshadowed the methodological and historical presuppositions of hISapproach, 50, given that the full version of this material is now available,it might be fruitful to start again from the question of what function theproject of a "history of govern mentality" was meant to play, and how Itrelates to more established theoretical and empirical perspectives on the

2. FROM THE ANALYTIC5 OF POWER ~OTHE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTALIT

Ie have come ro read as a major5 " I ts the ecrures w 'II inueurprisingly Foucau t star is nudi that he WI conrmu

.'" k b uring hIS au renee Iturning POInt In hIS wor y ass " (Foucault 2007: 1), name y

borne years ago " h'an analysis "that we egan S han isms. As he inSists, r IS, 'I vey of power mec " 'b'd) ban analysis and hlStonca sur I h ory of power (I I ., ut"genera t e .

perspective does not amount to any d h' 'al studies of power, what Inf " al an IStone f"rather consists in a set 0 emplflc h d II dan "analytics 0 power

, H I 1 he a ca e f'"the History of Sexualzty: vO "~:~e.'. of choice or statements 0 \nrc.nr(Foucault 1978: 109), The five IndicatIOns h' g less than methodologlCal

, way not m , I(Foucault 2007: 1) he offers are, In a , h mechanisms and histoncaf h' her work on t econclusions derived rom IS ear

36 Martin Saar

forms of power. Power is, first, not to be seen as a "substance" but as anumbrella term for specific mechanisms. It is, second, not an autonomousentity but "an intrinsic part of" other social relations (Foucault 2007: 2).Power is, third, a proper object of philosophical analysis in the sense of a"politics of truth" (ibid.: 3) that is concerned with the "knowledge effects"(ibid.) of power' The analysis of power, fourth, is committed to a "tacti-cal" but not to an "imperative" (one might say "normative") implication:the study of power cannot step back to any neutral ground from which tojudge or assess power as such. And fifth and finally, undoubtedly scarredfrom a series of theoretical confrontations in the late 1960s and early 1970s,Foucault warns against the engagement in polemics within and instead oftheoretical discourses.

This rather elliptic list of opening remarks presupposes quite a lot ofknowledge on the part of Foucault's audience, because he is doing nothingless here than invoking the basic principles of his earlier research, startingwith "The Order of Discourse," his inaugural lecture at the College deFrance in ] 970. It can be argued that all of his subsequent work, from hisearly College de France lectures on the "Will to Knowledge" (1970-197]),"Penal Theories and Institutions" (]971-]972), "The Punitive Society"(I 972-] 973) or "Psychiatric Power" (1973-]974) up to Discipline and Pun-ish (1975) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (1976) followedthese basic principles and interests: an interest in a nominalist conceptionof power; a theoretical attention to the implications and interwoven nessof power with other spheres of the social; an elaboration of the intrinsicconnection between power and knowledge; a serious attempt to develop aform of historical inquiry that makes it possible to describe and criticallyanalyze the normative elements in a given discourse; the intention not tointervene polemically into the theoretical and political debate but ratherto develop perspectives that permit a redescription and transformation ofexisting self-understandings and an opening up of new ways of thinking.'To this list one might add two more elements not explicitly mentioned inFoucault's opening remarks in] 978, but implied in them: an interest in dis-continuity and historical breaks as a major heuristic orientation (Foucaulr]998a; ]998b),' and finally the deliberate use of unusual stylistic devicesand rhetorical features that allow him to produce the very effect of defamil-iarization and creative redescription, many of which can be traced back toNietzsche's genealogical writings.'

Approaching the bulk of historical material and its systematic elabora-tion in the lectures on the history of governmenrality with these principlesin mind, it will come as no surprise to see that Foucault, despite the manynew and innovative material elements he is about to elaborate, presentshis new work mainly as a continuation along the chosen path, leading toan extension and modification of the basic methodological conceptS (Saar2007b). In most of the generally rather few methodological passages,Foucault insists on his adherence to the fundamental guidelines that have


guided his research so far. Bur, of c~~rse, rhe hi~to,~ical objects are .newones. The term "apparatuses tdispositifsi of securuy ,(Foucault 2007., rnis introduced and explained in contrast to the mechanisms an~ lnDst.lt~t1I~ns

, " hi h inly elaborated In /Sop tneof sovereignty and discipline, w IC were mal S .and Punish, History of Sexuality: Volume] and the lecture c~urse OCl~t;,Must Be Defended (]975-1976). Similarly, like the notion of bin-power,

I' d I b d i the two works Immediatelywhich was also introduced an e a orate in d' h " .". used to refer to a new rna efollowing Discipline and Punish, secunt y IS , . hi' d

egularc society Wit a ogre anor historical form of power, a new way to r

effectiveness of its own.' . its th 'I f rrnularion in theEarly eighteenth-century liberalism and ItS t eorenca 0 ions of

h be the discursive expressions ascience of political economy are s own to h b ing's "freedom"

h . . ts on every uman elthis new form of power, one r at lnS1S. f coliti I authorities to actsand "naturalness" and restrains the acnons 0 p.o I[lca. . his rea-

If If regulating societies. For t is reathat respect the autonomous aws a se - ," t exacrly fundamen-

lib I . of government IS no ,son, the early 1 era conception. II and above all it is a technologytally, or primarily an Ideology. First of a h ractical texts like edicts onof power" (Foucault 2007: 49). ThiS is w

f::. h siocrats, and program-

trade and commerce, the political tracts a hI' bYst material from which. f i d economists are tee

marie statements a jurists an , f hi thinking and the newto draw conclusions about the specifics a .t is new

fthe population as the

. ib I t The prominence apractice of Ii era govern men . I b established against themain target of the new form of power can on y o~ ower" (ibid.) than rhebackground of "a completely different ec)ono~Ydre:Sage of individual bod-one centered on the law (i.e., sovereignty or t e

ies (i.e., discipline). .' d d by Foucault before theI' "IS not mrro uceThe term "governmenta iry d b hen speaking on the level

fourth session of his lectures, but alrea y Yht more or less in line withf h d I that his approac is f ha met a a ogy, one can say d d refine the results ate

what he has done before. He tries to expan an hy of the seventeenrh andhi . I I· f for the hlstonograp , 'rstor ica ana yucs 0 power . historical configuratIon In

I h h . b inrroducmg a newear y eig reent centurtes y . ge that conform to a newhi . f lirical regulation erner , I diw ich new practices a po I I . d by new theoretlca ( is-

I h· s are accompaOleogic of power. T ese practice "I ) and they relare to new. , ' (I·b I' m polltica economy, d "b'CurSive) articulatIons I era is, ' h h· rorical object, calle 10-

( . b' h I tIon) T e new is , "matenal) a Jects (t e popu a ., II d "apparatus of securityf h' I' ark IS nOW ca e d dpolitics" in some a IS ear ler w , h h' t rm is also droppe an. and t en t IS ein the first lectures of the new sefles, I.

, b I f governmenra Ity. I 'is replaced by the voca u ary a h' k that the project of a lIstory

. h Fault does not t In ,It ISeasy to see t at oue . h dological innovatlon exceptf I· d d any major met a , d'o governmenta Ity eman s . logical in relatlI1g Iscourse

Th h remains genea fa change of focus. e approac 'I Th' '5 why the history a govern-and history, the textual and the socia. I I ,isking about government. While

'. h' of polinca t lIn If'mentality IS no mere Istory h' lIectual history 0 certall1, I to rrace t e lI1teit has some symptomatIc va ue

38 Martin Saar

philosophical motives like the various theories about the "art of govern-ment" and the furious rejection of Machiavelli (d. Foucault 2007: 87-108),his main interest lies in the fact that a conception like "economy," "througha series of complex processes that are absolutely crucial for our history,"can acquire the status of "a level of reality and a field of intervention forgovernment" (ibid.: 95).

Submitting the theme of the Christian pastorate to the perspective of ahistory of power "enables us," Foucault explains, "to take up these thingsand analyze them, no longer in the form of reflection and transcription,but in the form of strategies and tactics" (Foucault 2007: 216). What thisrequires us to do is to see that intellectual and social changes are not to beseen apart from each other, as two different realms of social reality, but asparts of a conglomerate. A mere history of ideas, on the one hand, woulddecouple these two levels completely; a reductive history of ideology, on theother hand, would collapse the one into the other. Foucault's own approachtries to assess the tactical value of intellectual and theoretical moves, butdoes not reduce the discursive elements to their non-discursive "base." Itsees both spheres as sides of social reality' Such a history of power is lessconcerned with what there is in the realm of supposedly neutral historical"facts," and more interested in the processes and procedures that "make"and produce facticity and norrnativity in a given historical, epistemologicaland social field." The "history of governmentality" is therefore neither his-tory of politics (or of political institutions) nor history of political ideas (orof ideologies), but history of politics-as-reality, a historical tracing of themany ways in which what people can do effectively as political agents andwhat people can actually think about politics is shaped by institutional andepisremic conditions.


other than this unusual level of analysis. Semantically, rhe term alms at thewhole sphere that can be said to be "gouvernementa~," i.e., relating. to t~einstance and the act of government as it was conceived and exercized 10

early modern Europe. The three-fold quasi-definition Foucault offers (Foudcault 2007: 108-109) should be read cum grana salis. It is definitely an ahoc definition since it is hard to see how something can meanIngfuldly bhe

, I" d "an t esaid to be an "ensemble" of something, a tempora ten ency I· d"result of a process" at the same time, the last of these only exp aline.

b d fi d But the main Intention IS c ear.with the help of the term to e e ne . .. b . fII f h material and epistermc asis 0govern mentality structura y re ers to t e f I

state action and it historically places the specific formdo gloverlnmentaf' . if t namely the gra ua evo unon 0activity in question 10 a speci c contex , '" h b '

the administrative state in which "governing the populatdlon fOln t e asish f d ntal mo e 0 t te exerciseof new forms of knowledge became t e un ame

of political power. h d of this perspec-I· di I fl h t he sees as tea vantageFoucau t irnme rare y ags w a id " I ing the problem. I· n help aVOl overva uuve: the focus on governmenta rty ca h "state"

07 109) This is because t e very term ,of the state" (Foucault 20: . I f n assumed entity. histori I d h r" I accounts re ers to aIn most istorrca an t eore rca .' Th idea of govern-

b II d . t question e very Iand identity that is to e ca e Ino. d 'bl . first by dissolving

I· d his enti /identity In a ou e way. ,menta tty ecenters t ISentity I I . I· ity of "institutions. f h te into the mu lip ICI ,the assumed fixed entity 0 testa I I . d tactics" (ibid.:

I d fl ctions ca cu anons, anprocedures, ana yses an re e nnd b h ghly historicizing the10 h .. . . nd secon y t orou

8) t at secure ItS ac nvmes; a, , I ., hese formulations thatI id ir of the state t IS In tassumed transtempora I enti y ,', are meant to react to

it becomes most explicit that Foucault s sufggeslionhs that had emergeddorni . nts 0 state tearyand replace the then orrunant varia 960 d 70s His comment on

f M· d ring the 1 s an .Out 0 French Neo- arxisrn u d. f the relations of produc-h d . f h "the repro ucnon 0 d

t e re ucnon ate state to . . f his former teacher antion" (ibid.: 109) explicitly refers to the pos~tl~n ~.deological state appara-friend Louis Althusser and his conception 0 tel he need "to do without

) H' ted insistence on ttuses" (Althusser 1971. IS repea 76) firms this double stance:a theory of the state" (Foucault 2008:. conons_centered approach toh d h fines of the insntun ht e nee to transgress t e con iff I the questions the "r eorygovernment and the need to address di erent y

, 12

of the state" was meant to answer. f h t into the processes thatd ition 0 testa e I

The decenrering or ecornpost I har i is not a natural given, but. bili . his to see t at It I 09)constitute and sta I ize It e ps u b . n" (Foucault 2007: 1 .

" . I· d thicized a srractio . f· Ifa composite rea Ity an a my . died on the baSIS 0 IrseT ·f· was bemg eve op hhere is no "state-thing as I It 'f b taneous automatic mec a-

. .. . d··d I SlY a spon, fand Imposmg Itself on 111 IVI ua sa, ," it is "inseparable rom. h "Th state ISa praClice, .nlsm" (ibid.: 277). Rat er: e II became a way of governIng,

the set of practices by which the state achtua il h·s a radical political con-f . h· "(·b·d) One mig t ca t Ia way 0 dOing t Ings I I .. . . tive on the state.

structivism, a radical constrUCtiVIst perspec

3. DE-INSTlTUTIONALIZING THE STATE

If the preceding reconstruction is plausible, Foucault can be said to followin the "history of govern mentality" a similar path as in his historiogra-phies of the penal system, the early psychiatric institutions, or certainjuridical concepts and their administrative functions. In comparison tothese rather limited projects, however, the "history of govern mentality"seems rather broad in scope. Because in this case, Foucault not only pres-ents alternative historical accounts of the nature and functions of certatninstitutions, concepts and practices, but also offers a complete redescrip-tion of a whole field that also covers "governmental reason," as he calls it(Foucault 2007: 287).11 But this is more than a history of political ideas,because It reAects on the concrete and material form of political rule, I.e.,the acts of governing.

Foucaul~'s introduction of the neologism '~gouvernemel1talite" in ~hefourth session of Security, Territory, Population is meant to refer to nothing

40 Martin Saar

Such a constructivist account of the state treats it not as an eternal iden-tity but as an ever-changing [ormation, done and redone by the multiplic-ity of "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, andtactics" (Foucault 2007: 108). In short, it treats it as an "effect" (Foucault2008: 77) within a hisror y of multiple causes and influences. The enormousmass of historical knowledge about the ancient idea of government as pas-toral (d. Foucault 2007: 123-226) and about the early modern reconcep-tion of government as art of governing and raison d'etat (d. ibid.: 237-312)is put together by Foucault in order to give plausibility to one major his-torical claim: there is a decisive break during the sixteenth century whenthe former conception of "pastoral government," justified in a theologicalfashion, gives way to a more immanent conception of "sovereignty overmen" (ibid.: 237) that corresponds to different laws and needs.

It is only here, Foucault claims, that "the new problernatization" in theform of "the res publica, the public domain or state" (Foucault 2007: 237)can emerge. So the historical claim is twofold. The modern state of state-hood is only intelligible on the basis of its emergence out of Christian pas-toral power. But one must also grasp the radical transformation the idea ofgovernment undergoes, after this breaking away of pastoral power and newtechniques and practices of governing and of administering societies haveemerged. It is only with these new forms of governmental knowledge andpractice that the modern territorial nation state, governing its populationby means of political economy or other forms of knowledge, will becomepossible during the COurse of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thehistorian of governmentality can therefore account for the emergence ofmodern statehood itself, and must refrain from reifying the state form intosome historical invariant. This form-of-state, the state of governmental-ir y, was not the only one and it might prove not to have been the lasr. Onemight call this approach a radical political historicism, a radical historicistperspective on the state.

Compared to state history and state theory on the methodological level,Foucault's project of a "history of governmentality" therefore proves tobe an inquiry sui generis. It disassembles the assumed ideality of the stateand historicizes its form at the same time. And both procedures, dissolvingthe entity/identity of the state into practices and into historical processes,transfigure the object of political inquiry. The originality of the "historyof governmentality" therefore lies in the specific level on which it operates:neither exclusively on the level of ideas and conceptions of the state (as inintellectual history), nor on that of the mere techniques and procedures ofgovernment and the exercise of political power (as in some sort of social orpolitical Realgeschichte). For this kind of historiography, the state is firstand foremost a solution to a problem, the problem of government; or, toput it in the words of the later works of Foucault, this history is in itself thetracking of how something became a problem, it is therefore a history of a"problema ti zation."


4. THE HISTORY OF GOVERN MENTALITYV5. THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS

Having outlined the methodological profile of Foucault's approach, it;snow possible to more clearly assess its relationship to othe~ persl~e~:,~e~der~already indicated, Foucault's "history of governmentahtyhcou f the state

" ." h F nch Neo-Marxisr t eory 0stood as his critical response to t e re " kProminent in his days and intellectual context." As his manyhremardson

87 191) how he accuses t IStra mon"state phobia" (Foucault 2008: 76, 1, S I" ' db" Ilya-historical

I f I· an essenna 1St an asica c(not always correct y) 0 re ylng on ". hough historiciza-. d hi onse consists In a t or

conception of the state, an IS resp . f the (modern, liberal) state. Thistion of the assumed entity and Identity 0 I " I" it y of forms concep-

" . I I"· b ings to light a mu tiP ICI ,historica contextua izanon n hi f course brings his" . I·· f t tehood But t IS move, 0 ,uons and rnateria izanons 0 5 a.. h . rersection of pol iti-

h h I h demic discourse at t e Inapproac rat er c ose to t e aca d h "hi of political ideas" orI h d hi nly calle t e istoryca t eory an istor y commo "" similar to Foucault'S,

, I"" I" II I hi " This 15 where concerns"po mea inte ectua istory. f d Western statehood areb h d d elopment 0 mo ern ,

a out t e emergence an ev inn of h the modern conceptionon the agenda. This is where the question ~ o~ is Foucault's "historyand reality of the state emerged finds ItS p aChe. 0 ~ion of the history off I"" hi are than anot er vero governmenta ity not ing m

political ideas, and if not, why not? f h (1984' 61) call the tradi-. h f II " R ry's use ate term ., ,

One mig t, 0 owing or ." l id "doxographic": it descnbes"I ". h hi t y of polmca leas "tiona conception in t e IS or " f diff theories and conceptions

the history of the state as a history °h II erefnthought Doing the historyf h ib d thors or sc 00 sot. " " ho testate attn ute to au "h"ng more than wntmg r ef h " h f rk consists in not I

o testate 10 sue a ramewo , f h te without or only occa-hi . h' ceptlons 0 testa , .rstor y of different aut ors con I f ocial and political history.sionally asking about irs relation to the rea mi.°h sl caricatured-conceptionO he i " " for such a-S Ig t Y "ne might trace t e msprranon E" Voegelin Ernst Cassirerb k d h Leo Strauss or nc , 0 kac to such gran aut ors as I iah Berlin or Michael a e-

"" ineck B ederto Croce sara . I " hOr Fnednch Memec e, to en f the:e odfathers varies Wide y 111 t eshott; and obviously the Slgmficance 0 d Hg sher-Monk 2003)_ But thedifferent national contexts (Castiglione afn amp the academic institution-

" " " d I fe 0 Its own m """ htraditional conception has game a.. ademic sub-disClplme Witalization of the history of political Ideas as an ac

"I d of great texts. " "textbooks, curncu a an a canon, . to such an enterprIse, SInceh F caulnan reaction I " I"It is easy to construe t e ou , f·d 'n his "archaeo oglca

. " . f the history 0 I eas I d I "It is implicit in the rejection 0 I f Knowledge,14 an a so mk "I " the Archaeo ogy 0 "h· fWOr s most promment y 10 'f wer" and the Istory 0

h ' k the "analytlcs 0 po f "dis methodological remar son d" ssed The history 0 leas," h· h h Iready been ISCU· "govern mentality," w Ie ave add cuments rather than mon~-

Foucault claims, remains tOO fixate ~n 0 t for essential meaning. It ISments" (Foucault 2002: 153), and ont e f~es ourse It remains tied to thetherefore unable to grasp the mareriality 0 ISC .

42 Martin Saar

idea of continuity and development, and misses out on the discontinuityand amorphic quality of emerging fields of knowledge. It remains obsessedwith the identity-conferring categories of "work" and "author" and omitsthe other and far more formative "types and rules for discursive practices"(ibid.: 156). And, finally, the history of ideas remains within the realm ofrestitution or recovery: it seeks to "bring back, in all its purity, the distant,precarious, almost effaced light of the origin" (ibid.). It is: in other words,an ideological enterprise, powered by a desire for tradition and identity,and is unwilling to confront the heterogeneity and strangeness of history.

These general objections to the intellectual history approach as such arebolstered by Foucault's methodological remarks on the historical theory ofthe state. The whole emphasis on the state as an "effect" and "practice" asdiscussed previously, and the concern with the two sides of statehood: areright on target here. The state, Foucault claims, can be reduced to neitherits conceptual or ideological shape nor its material form, i.e., the acts, artsand techniques of government. On the contrary, it is the intertwining andintersection of these two realms that constitute the state-as-reality, discur-sive and material at the same time. The traditional history of political ideas,criticized from such a perspective, will never be able to grasp this reality,because it will never fully articulate the practical side, the material elementof the state or government. The exclusive focus on what is said and thoughtabout the state, on the discourse on the state, fails to see that the very statein question is at the same time e((ective and an e((ect of a great many pro-cesses in the political field. This discourse o( the state, as one might callit, cannot be reduced to its explicit formulation in theories, it is equallyembodied in political programmatics, administrative structures and pat-terns of very concrete governmental practices. The history of political ideasin its traditional version therefore lacks the methodological orientation toeven contribute to what Foucault's project of a "history of governmental-iry " is trying to achieve.

5. THE "NEW" HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS

It would be grossly unfair, however, to reduce the history of political ideasto the scarecrow here dismissively called its "traditional version", On thecontrary, it was precisely this sub-field of academic work that was under-going major methodological reformulations around more or less the sametime as Foucault was envisioning-and rather soon letting go again-hiSversion of a historicized account of modern statehood. One could evenargue that some of the scholars involved, working quite independently fromhis approach, were responding to the same methodological predicament:how to relate the history of the state, or how to write political history, non-doxographically and non-idealistically?


At least three tendencies, arguably the most influential and method-ologically innovative versions of a "new" history of political Ideas, shouldbe mentioned here: variants of intellectual history that are mtegranngsocial history, as practiced by political theorists and historians such asGerhard Oestreich Herfried Munkler, and Maurizio Vitali, to namebut a few' the "Cambridge School" approach to political history, mostly

d' h 'I dies and methodological texts of Quentinconnecte to t e materia stu 1

Skinner John Pocock and others; and conceptual history (in the sense, " d irh the work of Reinhartof the German Begrittsgescbicbtet, associate WI

Koselleck and his colleagues. IS , , f 'The turn from a "pure" intellectual history of politics to a formbo d,nte-

, h h h ened within the su - ISCl-grated approach IS a movement t at as app 970' I" I id ' If At least from the late 1 son,pline of the history of po inca leas itse . , I' ibl A d

II I d 'I history IS clear y VISI e. na rapprochement of inte ecrua an socra , ' I ', hernari r ns SImilar to Foucau t sit will come as no sur prise that t ernanc conee. .

h L t us take Just rwo prominentcontributed to the call for sue a move. e hidh G t In his researe on ear y rna -

examples, mainly from t e erman contex . he noti f "socialh d 0 ' h developed t e notion aern political regimes Ger a r estreic f 'I

' , d ib h then new concepts 0 socradisciplining [Sozialdisziplm]" to esen e t e hi b ' onrributedd f I,' I I tion and on r IS asis cor er and new forms 0 po inca regu a , , f I dern sover-

di d' f h ' rer nal logic 0 ear Y rnoto a ifferenr understa n ing 0 rem 'I' I ol't'lcal history, ir-al lv.Yhi tegratlng c assrca p Iergmy, Methodologically, t ISmeanr 111 d reai I developmenrsd i I hi ' h h on local an regronaan mte lectual istory WIt researc , f social his-d k by a whole generation 0

an everyday life, This was ta en uP, f arch rhat could, , d b fruitful area a rese

rona ns m the 1980s, an ecame a, I' , d olirical conceptsb' hi 'I 'on social po ines an Pcam me isrorica perspectives

alike (SachfSe and Tennsredt 1986). , he " 1 of state" (rai-S' I I f h hi ' working on r e reasorimi ar y, most 0 t e istorrans 'I e of early modern

son d'etat) doctrine fully realize rhar this cruClaTrhrop fore tracing "rea-I', I h b d d to a theory, ere ,

po inca t ought cannot e re uce h id fifteenth to the sev-, , 'I d I rs from t e nu -son of state" In historica eve opmen detecti g its effectiveness

h h cenruri also means etecnnenreent and eighteent ceneunes I f reason of state"h " bur oracri d The "e emenrs 0Were It IS not named ut practice , h I gely vanished since

h f f 'ts discourse as ar 'Iare t ere ore presenr even a rer I , ' f the new politica"h f ' ' h rural compOSItIOn at ey ound their way Into t e struc , The stud of the main con-order" (Munkler 1987: 299, my translation b)' f omYrhe concrete basis

I ' , V' I" 1992) cannot a srracr rceptua InnovatIOns ( lro I , h h them, One mighr sum-of political action that becomes rhInkableht roug I discussion as follows:

'h ' f h" ortanr IStotlca fmanze t e main theSIS a t IS Imp ., I d' se has become one 0h If polltlca Iscour ,

t e reason of state as an e ement 0 ," (Munklet 1987: 328), Itth ff' d I' 'cal "imperatives 'f 'e most e ectlve mo ern po ltl w way of justl ylngh ' h rred out as a ne 'fas become a practlcal schema e at sea . raetical orientation 0governmental action but has now become a major Pmost modern state action ,16

44 Martin Saar

This approach helps to reformulate the efficacy of discourses about thestate in a new way that is not unlike Foucault's insistence on the materialside of the state. It urges us to incorporate all the social and institutionalfactors that accompany, and sometimes produce, new discursive solutionsand new patterns of action. Seen in this way, "the state" ceases to be a his-torical given; it can now be seen as a mobile point of intersection betweenideas and practices (Chartier 1982). To fully achieve such a form of "doublevision," intellectual and social history not only have to become friendlyneighbors but must also work hand in hand (Munkler 2003).

A quite similar impulse to relate intellectual history to social and insti-tutional history might be said to be one of the aims of the many authorsworking within the tradition of the so-called "Cambridge School." Theirshared methodological imperative, the project of placing political ideas intheir historical context, has immunized them against any temptation to fol-Iowa pure or primarily textualist approach to political ideas (Pocock 1962;Tully 1993; Skinner 2002a). In their perspective, every theoretical positioncan only be adequately understood when it is situated in the field of histori-cal, political and ideological controversy. Any proper historical reconstruc-tion of a political theory will therefore presuppose a thorough assessmentof these contextual factors, many of which are the proper objects of socialand instirutional history. If this form of comprehensive historical contexte-alis~ IS stili called an approach "centered [ ... ] on the history of ideolo-gies (Skinner 1978: XI), this IS meant to indicate that "context" here isused to explain and to help make intelligible the "text" in question and notfor Its own sake.

This formof historiography is a far cry from the "traditional" approachoutlined earlier. The individual authors, as well as the individual texts, havelost their autonomy and become elements of a wider contextual historicalpicture. Political history, as it appears in the searchlight of this "new" his-tory of political thought, will be readable on different levels which intersecton the level of political struggle and conflict, fought with the sword andthe pen at the same nrne (Tully 1988; Skinner 2002b: 177; Bevir 1999). ItIS In respect of this deeply conflictual or antagonistic view of history that~,any authors belon~ing to or close to the "Cambridge School" conforma many of Foucault s historical suggestions, as some of them have openlyacknowledged (Tully 2002) F h . fh . or t em, too, as for Foucault, the reality 0

t fe stlate calnnot be a neutral given, it is in itself an element and a producta po inca struggle And thi II f di I .' . f

I. . . .' s ca s or a ra rca methodological revrsion 0

po itical histor-iography.The approach of conceptual history or Begriffsgeschichte has only

recently been recogniz d' h' . ... ,e In t e international discussion as a majormethodological Innovation (d. Richter 1995: 5; Skinner 2002b: 177-180).Or-iginally developed In th f k f Ih d hi e ramewor a material studies on conceptuac ange an istorical semantics in the early 1970s most prominently inthe handbook Ceschichtliche Crundbegriffe (Historical Keywords) and


the Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie (Historical Lexicon of Philo-sophical Concepts), Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues have searchedfor a new way to approach social reality via conceptual history and to treatlanguage as the reservoir of political and historical experiences. In his manymethodological reflections, Koselleck has convincingly argued that such anapproach cannot be reduced either to hermeneutics, with which it sharessome basic principles, or to linguistic history (Wortgeschichte)-" The realmof the concept is rather the history of meaning and self-understanding ina given historical time, one that can be traced by tracking frequency andmodifications in usage and by mapping the transformation of entire seman-tic fields. But to do so requires not only seeing concepts in their theoreticalContext or intellectual history. It also means treating the formation andmodification of abstract terms as a site of the elaboration and expression oflived historical and political experience, something that only becomes vis-ible when the extra-theoretical context is taken into account.'"

It is this convergence of social history and conceptual history (Koselleck2004a) which gives this historical methodology its distinctive form. Unsur-prisingly, it has proven its productivity for the historiography of political~oncepts (such as sovereignty, constitution, revolution, the people erc.], ItIS non-idealististic in that it never hypostatizes the reality of concepts andideas, but places them firmly on the ground of political and social history.In asking what kind of political self-understanding was madepossible andexpressible by conceptual change or innovation, conceptual history explic-itly acknowledges that political ideas (like certain doctrines about the legit-irnacy of the state) only gained their sustainability and pIauSibillty agumstthe background of certain social and institutional realilles. Processes ofconceptual innovation and transformation have in themselves a politicaldimension, and they document developments in the political realm. Politi-cal institutions are therefore not external to political theories, but their very~nvironment.Starting from this assumption about the intertwining, ~f polit-Icallanguage and political reality, conceptual historians of the political areImmune to the "state phobia" and state fetishization Foucault accused hISContemporaries (from the Left and the Right) of; for conceptual hIStorIans,the state is always already part of historical teality and expenence.And thehIStory of political terms and doctrines is, for them, the best matenal trace,the connection between the conceptual and the institutional dimension.

But none of these general similarities and convergences can overs.ha?owthe serious differences that remain between these approaches within a" " hi ..' d F I ' ception of a "history ofnew istory of political Ideas an oucau t s con . .governmentality." Of course, even the most sophISticated models of intel-lectual history open to assistance from social history remam primarilyfocused on ideas and will never travel all the way along the road leading toa history of discourses and practices, where authors .and te~ts are not theprimary referent any more. On the one hand, there stili remams a tendencyto follow a certain "heroism" and to continue to wrtte about great authors

46 Martin Saar

of great texts in difficult times. This is sometimes even accompanied by acertain urge to revitalize or recuperate the original motives of these greatthink.ers.'9 On the.~ther. hand, one can see a certain tendency to reinterpretthe history of politica l Ideas teleologically and to give the impression thatmodern statehood is best understood not as a contingent product, but asthe outcome of a quasi-rational historical process;" Both tendencies how-ever, seem utterly incompatible with Foucault's historical nominalis;" andpost-Nietzschean emphasis on historical contingency.. The emphasis on the historical and strategic-ideological context of polit-ica l theories found In authors like Skinner, Pocock and Tully should alsonot obscure the fact that for them, this does not mean retreating from theproject of a history of theories. Knowledge and data about the materialforces and administrative causes that have led to a certain type of state-hood are, for them, mostly relevant as elements of a interpretative story;the ~aJn enterprise remains an intellectual or hermeneutic approach, andthe history of the modern state remains mainly a history of an idea of thestate that can be traced back to the controversies surrounding absolutismIn ~~e seventeenth century (Skinner 1989). The "history of governmental-rry, however,. seems to be far more "materialist" on this point in takinga comprehensive perspective that includes theoretical and social develop-ments and which therefore shares many features with historiographies ofthe state inspired by Neo-Marxist theorizing (Tilly 1990). It is only theconvergence and mutual reinforcement of the theoretical discourse on thestate and the practi I d ., ive dica ,a rrurustratrve iscourse of the state that gave riseto the process of "governmentalization" (Foucault 2007: 109) that endedup In the modern, late liberal state as we know it. Foucault's strategy ofhistorical contextualization, in other words, seems to go much further thanthat of most authors from the "Cambridge School".

A Similar reservation should be made with respect to the approach ofconceptual history. While some commentators have convincingly arguedfor the comparability of Koselleck's and Foucault's methodology regardingthe historicity of discourse and meaning (Busse 1987· Akerstmm Andersen20?3; and Rosanvallon 2003), the most obvious difference remains the lat-ter s irnplicir msistence on the need to refrain from subjective (and herme-neutical) categories such' , ,. . as expenence, expectation or horizon, notions dearto practitioners of conceptual history (Koselleck 2004b). Both approachesmsist on the need to serious] k h d" '.. . y war on t e iscursive surface of a givenbein Without reducing the complexity and ambivalence of meaning that iselng circulated But whil th ' 'I' " .., , ' ,I e e simi amy consists In thoroughly histonct>

Ing n~tlons and conceptions of the political, there seems to be no obviousway, or conceptual historians to incorporate Foucault's theses about bio-politics, the role of statistics and political economy, arguments which referadr to the self-understanding of political actors but to the institutional anda rmmsrranve facts about the transformation of European societies, Thereremains a tendency on the 'd f I hi 'Sl eo conceptua isrory to remain enclosed In


a mostly archival mode of historiography, for which the dynamics of socialrealities are mere references in the process of making linguistic expressionintelligible. The "history of govern mentality," in other words, seems to dis-close and give more weight to other realms of historical reality than theones conceptual history tends to explore.

6. CONCLUSION: POLITICIZING HISTORY

The aim of this essay has been to clarify the methodological stakes of Fou-cault's "history of govern mentality." For this reason, the two College deFrance lecture courses were treated less as substantial contributions toa history of the emergence of the modern state and more as a program-matic statement and methodological promise. Foucault offers a new formof historical-political inquiry, and provides the methodological outline of aresearch agenda he himself had only started to follow. Such a methodologi-cal reading cannot, of course, explain, let alone exhaust, the potential thisperspective holds for contemporary discussions of the state and the conceptof politics, But it can shed some light on the fact that the very form of tell-ing the history of the state can vary widely, and this might motivate us toapply the governmentality framework more directly to the history of politi-cal thought than is commonly practiced.

Ihave tried to argue for the specificity and attractiveness of such a non-standard way of doing the history of the state, and Ihave suggested Imag-ining a controversy on method between this approach and various formsof the history of political ideas. Foucault's program, I have claimed, canbe seen as a crucial alternative to a traditionalist form of Intellectual his-tory. There is no reason however to overstate the differences between hisapproach and more rec~nt and m~thodologically sophisticated versions ofa "new" history of political ideas. These new forms of political intellectualhistory integrate the insights of social history, and account for the tacti-cal and ideological context of political theories and for the interrelationbetween political concepts and socio-historical realit y. Many profoun?,differences in method notwithstanding, the "hIstory of govern mentalityas well as these approaches might be said to be contributing to a highlyInnovative history of political thought and practice and therefore shouldbe taken as a major challenge for anyone interested In the future of thestudy of the history of political ideas. But still, from a strictly Foucaultlanperspective all of the three competing approaches referred to here might becriticized for remaining toO firmly in the grip of the "ideational" approachto politics that implicitly or explicitly ptesupposes some essence or essentialGestalt of the state which only has to be conceived In the fight way.

Needless to say, many open questions remain for this attempt to drawup a comprehensive historical research agenda on modern statehood andstate ideas. Two omissions are obvious and have been noted repeatedly, but

48 Martin Saar

they should not be taken to be internally linked to Foucault's approach.The absence of any perspective on the gender-specificity of political concep-tions and actions is surprising; and interestingly enough, some of the bestwork on contemporary govern mentality has highlighted exactly this aspect(Cruikshank 1999), which Foucault evidently did not consider relevant atthe time. Similarly, it seems impossible to even grasp the formation of themodern European state and its biopolitical dimension without account-ing for its colonial dimension. But this aspect also remains largely absentfrom Foucault's discussion (Stoler 1995). Once again, though, as some ofthe most interesting work in the contemporary anthropology of the statehas shown, statehood in itself can materialize in various forms and func-tions, ~nd the illt.cr.-national and inter-state distribution of power is a majorfactor 10 determining which pattern of state action will prevail (Randeria2007). There is no need to faithfully follow Foucault's own exclusive focuso.n modern European or Western governmentality. Many current discus-sions on the variety of statehood and the variability of the relationshipbetween populations, more or less sovereign political bodies and the lawhave successfully proven the point that the idea that there is just one histori-cal trajectory of political modernization is nothing more than a eurocentricfiction." But this just underlines the fact that Foucault's suggestions andhis fragmentary "history of govern mentality" are less a sacred ground thana methodologlcal point of departure, from which one can move in manydirections he himself never imagined.

While the need to diverge from Foucault's own original concerns appliesto all so;ts of projects that try to remain faithful to a certain legacy ofFoucault s work, this IS especially true for the kind of work that has beenrhe focus of my discussion here, the historiography of political ideas andpolitical practice. It is evident that Foucault, in his courses on liberalism,secunry, biopolirics and neo-liberalism never even toyed with the ambitionto be ex.haust~ve. Wha,t he was providing, however, was a perspective, aschema 10 which the history of Western politics could be told and re-toldand which might provide a novel view of the emergence of political moder-nJty. It IS only just now beginning to become clear what such a perspectivecould Imply for the narratives in which the history of Western politicalthought IScommonly told "t di II" h . I' .. .. , ra mona y or at erwise. Just how far po itt-

cal historiography guided b th . f "hi. y e perspective 0 a rstory of govern men-ralit y " can go has bee .. I '11 . . I.. n convmcing y I ustrated by the many h,stoncaworks inspired by Foucault's example. While the work of his original col-~borators 10 Paris in the 19705, scholars such as Francois Ewald, Pasquale

asqumo, Ciova nna Procacci and Jacques Oonzelot on the history of thewelfare state security 0 . h . . If' n ' f: ' r poverty as In irse Influenced a whole range aresearch projects, more recent work on the history of political ideas hasalso benefited from this perspective." Brilliant studies have roven thatthe rransmon from medie I I" I h hI'·. . va po rttca t oug t to early modern conceptionsof the political can be productively rethought with the help of Foucault's


suggestions (Senellarr 1995), and that the founding texts of liberalism andthe famous eighteenth-century debates on civil society appear in a radi-cally new light when placed in the context of new policies to govern thepoor (Bohlender 2007). One can only imagine what might be brought tolight by studies that, to use Michel Senellart's phrase, "put" other chaptersof the Western canon "to the test of governmentality" (Senellart 2001).One could imagine readings of Hobbes, Rousseau or Kant, and also of themany "minor" figures, that seriously relate their respective political theo-ries to the context of actual political regulation in their time. This wouldnot denigrate the importance of these authors, but it would contextualizethem in the political rationality of their time. Bur treating rhese theorists(and their theories) as part of a larger picture of the political conditions ofa given period, reducible neither to mere epistemic nor to mere institutionalfactors, would contribute to understanding history differently. One mighteven say that only such a reading would provide a real political view of thehistory of political thought, since it insists on the internal relation betweentheory and practice, between the ideality of concepts and the reality of thestate. Bringing governmentality as a methodological framework to bear onthe history of political thought would therefore provide a systematic wayto politicize intellectual history and to historicize the concept of politics.For all of such (past and future) studies, Foucault's main contribution liesm providing a point of departure for new and original perspectives on poli-tics and political thinking: the state (and rhe political in general) is not agiven, but the product and effect of discursive and practical negotiation.The modern state has neither a single origin nor a single fixed identiry; it isconstantly made and remade. This unsettling, dislocating gesture enablesus to gain a form of critical distance we can only have towards somethingwhich is neither natural nor necessary. Recognizing the radical historicityand radical contingency of "our" (late modern, Western) form of statehoodmay give rise to a new and critical understanding of irs future.

NOTES

1. Discussions with Mark Bevir, Thomas Biebricher, the students of a courseon govemmentaliry, the participants in the Leipzig ~orkshop ~nd, on severaloccasions, with Thomas Lemke were major inspIrations for (.hls chapter. I amalso grateful to David Owen and Frieder Vogel mann for their comments andto Ulrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke for many very

helpful written suggestions. .2. See Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996,Lemke 1997; Dean 1999; Brockling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000; Brauch,Packer and McCarrhy 2003; and lnda 2005.

3. See particularly Rose 1999 and Dean 2007. .4. On the topos of a "history of truth" see Foucault 1978: 60; Foucault 1985: intro-

duction; Lemke 1997: 327-339; Davidson 2002; and Saar 2007a: 217-220.5. For an exposition of several of these elementary methodologlca~ pflnclples,see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, for "power/knowledge" and SCience Rouse

I.

: II

50 Martin Saar

1987, for excellent discussions of Foucault on power in general Patton 1998and Nealon 2008: 24-53.

6. For more on historical nominalism and Foucault's historical metbodtsl, seeVeyne 1997; Veyne 2008; Davidson 2002; and Hacking 2002.

7. For the profound relationship between Nietzsche's and Foucaui,t's w~rk, seeMahon 1992; Visker 1995; Saar 2007a; and Saar 2008; for discussions ofFoucault's and Nietzsche's genealogical method and style, see Mahon 2002;Saar 2002; Owen 2007: 45-59; and Biebricber 2008.

8. See Lemke 1997: 134-143; Dean 1999: 98-112; and Lemke 2007a: 47-70.9. For different readings of Foucault's rejection of the orthodox version of

the Marxist theory of ideology, see Barrett 1991; Veyne 2008: 22-27; andNealon 2008.

10. For interpretations of Foucault's historiographical method along these lines,see Davidson 2002 and Veyne 2008. .

11. For discussions of the concept of "governmental reason" or "political ratio-nality", see Gordon 1991; Dean 1999: 31-32; Rose 1999: 24-28; and Brock-ling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000: 20-24.

12. See also the remarks Foucault included in the manuscript but did not read on"de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power" (Fouc~ult2007: 119-120). These correspond closely to Foucault's methodologicalstatemenr in the first two sessions of Society Must Be Defended, his lecturecourse given one year earlier (Foucault 2003: sessions of January 7 an.d 14,1976). To be clear, Foucault's pejorative reference to the critique of Ideol-ogy amounts to nothing more than a caricature. It is far from obvious thatthe more refined and non-reductivist theories of ideology put forward byAlthusser or Poulanrzas would fit his description; for discussions of Feu-cault's own indebtedness to and departure from the Marxist tradition, seeBarrett 1991 and Hoy 1994. ,

13. See Lemke 2007h; Biehricher 2007; and Jessop 2007: ch. 6. For Foucau1t srelationship to Althusser see Eribon 1994: ch. 10; and for a current versionof a critical and historical theory of the state Bartelson 200l.

14. See the section on "Archaeology and the History of Ideas" in the Archaeol-ogy of Knowledge (Foucault 2002: 151-156).

15. This list is far from complete, of course. One could also include variants ofneo-instirurionalism, historical functionalism and certain strands of Ne~·Parson ian political sociology among the important alternatives; for a classicdiscussion see Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985. The methodologi-cally most ambitious project is obviously Niklas Luhmann's program of. asociological-historical semantics, which covers many of the traditional polit-ical concepts (Luhmann 1990, 1993) and is a direct counter-project to th.eintellectual history perspective (see especially Luhmann 2008). However, Ithas so far arguably been less influential in the methodological discussions onthe concept and history of the state. For comparisons to Foucault's approach,see Akerstf0m Andersen 2003 and Staheli 2004.

16. For this discussion see Oestreich 1969; Munkler 1987; and Virali 1992. Formethodological issues and the French case, see Chartier 1982.

17. For this program, see the preface (Ritter 1971) and the entry on Begriffsge-schichte (Meier 1971) in the Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie. .

18. Melvin Richter (1995: 15) rightly points to the fact that this description IS

more accurate as a characterization of the Geschichtliche Grzmdbegrlf(ethan of the Historisches Worterbuch der Philosoph ie, in which a more philo-sophical form of conceptual history was practiced.

19. For symptOms of this "heroic" tendency, see Viroli 2002 and Munkler2003.


20 In one of the most prominent recent contributions from this sch~ol of. thought, Klaus Roth refers to Foucault's genealogical method .even.ln the

. I f hi . e book However he goes on to characterize hIS owntlt e 0 IS Impress IV • , .. . f h.project in a quasi-Hegelian, teleological as well as Idealistic as .lon a~ an"attempt to grasp and illustrate the emergence, the change a~d dl~seml~a-tion of the idea of the state as rational" or as the ':recon~tru.ctl~n 0 a rea III

of ideas [Vorste/lungswelt] that was materialized In the msnrunons of 2mod.er n states and that has reached its limits only today" (Roth 2003: 7 ,my

translation). f d i ssions in21 These and related issues have been at the center 0 recent

hISHcu d

. H d 5 tat 2001' Kro n- ansen anpolitical anthropology; see ansen an teppu ,Nustad 2005; and Steinmetz 1999. M'1l 1991

22. See their contributions In Burchell, Gordon and I er .

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Foucault, Michel. (1998a [1971]). Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, trans. D. F.Brouchard and S. Simon, pp. 369-391 in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemol-ogy: Esse~tlal Works, Volume 2, ed. J. Faubion. New York: The New Press.

Fo~cault, Michel. (1998b [1972]). Return to History, trans. R. Hurley, pp. 419-32 11l ~esthetlcs, Method. and Epistemology. Essential Works, Volume 2, ed.

]. Faubion. New York: The New Press.Foucault, Michel. (2002 [1969]). The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M.F Shendan Smith. London/New York: Routledge.

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54 Martin Saar

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3 Constituting AnotherFoucault EffectFoucault on States and Statecraft'

Constituting Another Foucault Effect 57

different readings and appropriations of the French scholar's work on gov-ern mentality in various countries (for work within this broader field, see,for example Agrawal 2006; Brockling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000; Dean1999; Krasmann and Volkmer 2007; Meyet, Naves and Ribmonr 2006;Opitz 2004; Sanyal 2007; Walters and Lamer 2004; and the many conrri-butions to Foucault Studies).

This chaprer offers another version of the Foucault effect based on closerattention to his later work on the state, statecraft, and the macro-physics ofsocial power (for a first major conrribution in this regard, see Lemke 1997;for an anticipation of some of these results, see Jessop 1990: 220-247).Such work reveals another Foucault effect in the broad field of govern-mentality studies but one that is interested in his significant contributionsto the reconstruction of state theory and not merely to its deconstruction(see, for example, Corbridge et al. 2005; Dean 1999; Frauley 2007; Lemke1997; Mitchell 1988, 1991,2002; Walters and Haahr 2004). Accordinglymy chapter first summarizes some key features of the Anglo-Foucauldianapproach and the theoretical and political conjuncture in which it formedand notes that one of its effects has been to justify rejecting Marxist polit-ical economy and, more generally, to invalidate any "state theory" thattakes the state for granred as its theoretical object. While there is some lim-ited basis for this in some of Foucaulr's work, this interpretation overlooksFoucault's continued, if often unstated, adoption of key Marxian insightsand his concern with the state as a (if not the) crucial site for the "institu-tional integration" of power relations (cf. Foucault 1979b: 96; on Foucaultand Marx, see Jessop 2007; Marsden 1999; Nigro 2008; Paolucci 2003;Scharer 2008)] I then locate this more state-theoretical Foucaulr effect Inhis work on the role of the state in different periods in the strategic codifi-cation and institutional integration of power relations and on his insightsinto the art of government considered as srarecrafr and show how they canbe integrated into critical but non-essentialist accountS of the state as asite of political practice (1980: 122; 1979b: 96; 2003b: 30-31, 88; 2008a:108-109; 2008b: passim).

Bob Jessop

In the two volumes of his lectures of 1978 and 1979, we see MichelFoucault making a major intellectual change of direction, movingaw~y ~r~m an analysis of power as the formation and production?f individuals towards an analysis of governmenraliry, a conceptInvented to denote the 'conduct of conducts' of men and womenworking thro.ugh their autonomy rather than through coercion eve~of ~ .subtle kind. Out of this concept and the extended analysis ofpolitical economy which provides the material for its elaboration,Foucault never produced a published work. [ ... ] This however didnot prev~nr this concept of governmentality from meeting with greatsuccess I~ the English-speaking world, in many ways stimulatingthere an intellectual dynamic more intense than in the case of hispublished works, which rapidly became classics and were treated assuc~ and with the deference that status entailed, but not with theexcrremenr which met the lectures on governmenrality. In 1991 [ ... ]The Foucault Effect (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991) set off thisdynamic by centring the 'effect' in question precisely on this notion ofgovernm.entality. But in France Foucault's lectures on the subject werenot published until 2004 d . h fi . .an WIt out at rsr arousmg great Interest.(Donzelot and Gordon 2008: 48)

As Jacques Donzelot, a one-time collaborator of Foucault notes the Fou-chault effect has been particularly strong in the Anglo-pho~e world. Indeedt e Impact of hIS work 0 li . . hn governmenta uy In this specific context mig tmore properly be termed the "Anglo- Foucauldian effect" in order to dis-tinguish It from the rna h .. dh. F h . ny or er ways III which the work of Foucault anIS renc assocrarss has H d h·l· h

b ha ecte p I osophy, history geography and ot er

ranc es of the arts h . . d . .' , dI A

.' urnarnties, an SOCIal scrences at many times anpaces. s such this eHe t f· . d..' c re ers to a particular mode of reception anappropriation of Foucault' k ... h . I· s wor on governmentality to generate a distinC-nve t eorettca cpisternol . 1 d ..

Idi b'· ogica , an methodological approach' to emplf1·

ca stu res oth histor: I d . d. ' . rica an contemporary of various technologies anpractices Oriented to "the d f', .

fhi .con uct 0 conduct.' Even in rega rd to rhis one

aspect 0 IS work howeve th h d·, r, ere are Ot er \'FOLlC3ult effecrs" grounde In

1. THE ANGLO-FOUCAULDIAN EFFECTAND ITS CONJUNCTURE

The self-described Foucault effect identified by Graham Burchell, ColinGordon and Peter Miller (1991 b) is associated with scholars from Aus-tralia Canada and rhe USA as well as the United Kingdom who havebeen described' as forming an "Anglo-Foucauldian school.". Nik,?las Roseand Peter Miller two of its key figures, write t har It compnses an Infor-mal thoughr co~munity that seeks to crafr some tools through whichto understand how our presenr had been assembled" (2008:. 8). ~nglo-Foucauldians do not aim to be Foucault scholars but selectively apply

58 Bob Jessop

his initial insights on governmentality to new areas. They draw on Disci-pline and Punish (Foucault 1977) and the lecture on government from his1977-1978 course at the College de France, which appeared in Englishin 1979 (Foucault 1979a; also 1991). This shared Anglophone apprecia-tion is reflected in the rise of a distinctive academic field: governmental-ity studies. The coherence of this field in the Anglophone world rests onits narrow understanding of govern mentality and resulting neglect of itsplace in Foucault's intellectual and political reflections. Elsewhere eventhis field has a somewhat broader scope.

In particular, the pioneers of the Anglo-Foucauldian effect approved ofFoucault's apparent rejection of the state as a decisive political agent andinterpreted governmentality as a decentered rather than centered process(d. O'Malley, Weir, and Shearing 1997: 501). This is reflected in Rose andMiller's claim that the governmcntaliry perspective focuses empirically on"forms of power without a centre, or rather with multiple centres, powerthat was productive of meanings, of interventions, of entities, of processes,of objects, of written traces and of lives" (2008: 9). This involves a prin-cipled refusal to equate government with the state, understood as a central-ized locus of rule, and focuses instead on how programmes and practicesof rule are applied in micro-settings, including at the level of individualsubjects. In short, government is the decent red but "calculated adminis-tration of life" (Rose and Valverde 1998). Thus adherents of the Anglo-Foucauldian approach seek to decompose power into political rationalities,governmental programmes, technologies and techniques of government(Miller and Rose 1990; O'Malley 1992; Rose 1999). This is consistentwith Foucault's critique of theoretical and political concern with the Stateas an originary, central institution in the exercise of political power (seesubsequent text) and led the Anglo-Foucauldians to call for studies of theart and techniques of governmentality (for two good overviews, see Rose,O'Malley and Valverde 2006; Rose and Miller 2008).

These concerns reflect the specific theoretical and political conjuncturein which the Anglo-Foucauldian school formed. Theoretically, this wasmarked by the general turn against the "structural Marxism" associatedwith Althusser, Balibar, Pecheux and Poulantzas: and with the srrucrura!semiotics derived from Saussure, Bakhtin and Barrhes (Rose and Miller2008: 2-4). The former was criticized for its economic reductionism, itsfunctionalist aCcount of "ideological state appararuses", its neglect of therelative autonomy of the many institutional orders and fields that shapepolitical and social life, and its neglect of the specific modalities of ideologi-cal struggle and identity formation (Rose and Miller 2008; Rose, O'Malleyand Valverde 2006). In general, then, according to their own accountS,the early Anglo-Foucauldian authors shared Foucault's disillusion with the"Marx effect", i.e., the institutions and practices associated with officialMarxism, and also explicitly rejected structural Marxism and other struC-turalist approaches (e.g., in the field of semiotics and Ideologiekritik). It


seemed to them that Marxism, if it had ever been useful, was certainlynow obsolete, because it could not address the new forms of liberal gov-ern mentality, their associated technologies of power, and new forms ofsubjectivation.!

Politically, the "Anglo-Foucauldian" conjuncture was marked by thecrisis of the post-war institutional settlement and class cOmpr?ml~ebasedon the mass-production-mass-consumption economic dynamics III ~es~-ern Europe, Canada and the USA, Australia and New Zealand. TIllS Cri-sis was associated with a proliferation of new social movements that w,ereirreducible to class politics and that engaged in struggles on ,many sires

. hosni I housi 'lark prisons umversrues racialof resistance ( ospua s, ousing, socra w, , , "segregation, nuclear power, war, and the en~i:onmellt) and, just as 111lPO~~tantly, by rhe first stirrings of nco-liberal cnnques of big government, bigunions, collectivism, bureaucracy, self-regarding profes~l?nal monop.olles,

I, d (Rose and Miller 1992) These cnuques were linkedpaterna Ism, an so on .. f 'II d i di 'd I freedom and autonomy In all spheres a SOCI-to ca s to expan In IVI ua . .' "h

ety, A Californian slogan expresses the political climate well,; get testateoff our backs out of our pockets, and away from our beds. ThlShwaUsstAhe

, ' . f Th heri 'the UK ReagaJ11sm In t e ,period that saw the nse 0 ate ensm In, . " f"R ' '" N w Zealand rhe "Common Sense Revolution a the

ogernorrucs 111 e, "0' the neo-liberal regime shift ofProgressive Conservative Party III ntarro, . ' I E Itthe Australia Labor Party, and nco-liberal turns in Contment~, . uCrope. I

II h rralized "party states In entrawas also a time of cha enge to t e cen h ' fd E E (ibid.: 172). These same trends, notably r e nse a

an astern urope I .. A led Foucaulr himself roneo-liberalism in France, Germany, and the US , , ' d its trans-refocus his 1978-1979 lecrures from biopolitics to liberalism an

formation into neo-liberalism. lib I .' e of the socialWhile Anglo-Foucauldians shared the neo- I era cnflqhu b

. f d olitical practices rhar soug t to create su -state, i.e., the state orms an P .' I 'tate that were. " al terfltona sovereign sJects with social claims on a nation d rhey rejected

f i divid I freedom an autonomy,exercised at the expense 0 III IVI ua I' d me preferred rof ish: k t fundamenta 15m an soneo-liberalism's ens IS(IC mar e .' id e of governmental

talk of "advanced liberalism" to Signify thedwt e rang

led governing the

, di b d b th marker an srare mvo vpractices exten mg eyon a 'I' A dingly they invest i-h ' I' hi . t of libera ISm. ccorablts of the peop e 111 t IS vanangated neo-liberalism in terms of

. Id ble the stare to divest itself ofthe range of techmques that wou hena si autonomous entitiesmany of its obligations, devolving t bose ro qua

fb dgets audits stan-

d b d distance Y means 0 u , ,that waul e governe ar a I . h t were borh autonomiz-dards, benchmarks, and other rechno ~tes t daValverde 2006: 91)ing and responsibilizing. (Rose, O'Ma eyan

d benefirs of those rationalitiesThey aimed to show the complex costS an h e of freedom rather

h govern H1 t e namand technologies that soug t to

60 Bob Jessop

than in the name of collective social rights to be upheld by the state'sdiscretionary authority (Rose 1999: 176; Rose 1996; Rose, O'Malley andValverde 2006: 93).

2. BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN

Foucault's analyses of disciplinary power and governrnentality representone step in an evolving intellectual project. Yet Anglo-Foucauldians tend tointerpret them as a defin itive statement of his opposition to macro-theoriza-tion and, relatedly, to any concern with how micro-powers were assembledinto bigger programmes and projects (d. Kempa and Singh 2008: 340). YetFoucault (2008b: 2) himself noted:

I have not studied and do not want to study the development of realgovernmental practice by determining the particular siruations it dealswith, the problems raised, the tactics chosen, the instruments em-ployed, forged, or remodelled, and so forth. Iwanted to study the artof governing, that is to say, the reasoned way of governing best and, atthe same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing. Thatis to say, I have tried to grasp the level of reflection in the practice ofgovernment and on the practice of government. [ ... ] to grasp the wayin which this practice that consists in governing was conceptualizedboth within and outside government, and anyway as close as possibleto governmental practice. l ' ,.]In short, we could call this the studyof the rationalization of government practice in the exercise of politicalsovereignty.

This comment from 1978 seems to indicate that Foucault was unwittinglydistancing himself in advance from governmentality studies, especially ashe also linked the emergence of governmentality or governmental prac-tices to the macroscopic organization of the state and reflection on the gov-ernment of government. He also argued for a combination of micro- andmacro-analyses, presenting his later work on liberalism as a scaling up ofhis previous micro-analytics of power to macro-level questions about thestate and political economy (2008b: 186). For good or ill, the Anglo-Fou-cauldian approach took shape in the early 1990s when many of Foucault'slater texts on govern mentality were unavailable in English, encouragingits early adherents to adopt a mare micro-focus in their development ofFoucauldian insights than might seem justified in the light of a broaderunderstanding of his work in this area.

Foucault himself explored not only the generalization of the conduct ofconduct across diverse spheres of society but also studied how specific gOV-ernmental practices and regimes were articulated into broader economicand political projects, Thus he continued to argue into the late 1970s that


capitalism had penetrated deeply into our existence, especially as it,requireddiverse techniques of power to enable capital to exploit people s bodiesand their time, transforming them into labor power and labor time respec-tively to create surplus profit (see, for example, 1977: 163-164,174-175,218-223; 1979b: 37, 120-124, 140-141; 2003b: 32-37; 2008a: 338, 347;2008b: 220-222). On this basis, one might expect Foucault to differ fromAnglo-Foucauldian work on the import of changes in governmenrality Interms of the logic of capital accumulation as well as on the nature of poliri-cal domination as exercised in and through the state. This is exactly what

_find. , I'Thus as Foucault's theoretical interests shifted from the rrucro-p 'YSICS

of the disciplinary society and its anatomo-politics of the body to the more, ificari f I lit f discourses practices technol-general strategic codi cation 0 a p ura I yo I , . '

, , ' 'I bl ound a specific governmentalogles of power, and msntunona ensem es ar . ." d ith h ' I b dy (bio-power) In a consolidatedrationality concerne Wit tne sOCIa 0 .'" f d ing up for Foucauldian analysescapitalist society, we can n a space openmg u II b

' " I h d d state power and for less we -su -of sovereignty ter ntor ia state 00 ,an Israntiared claims about their articulation to the logic of capital accu mu a-rion." As Kelly (2009: 61-62) notes:

The concept of government appears in Foucault's thoughlt as anhatd-

h hi I' nalysis of power re at Ions atempt to deal with w at IS ear rer a h ki dI er as well as the at er In sdeliberately bracketed, name y state pow , , d h

of power which can be called governmental ( . , .J Havmgremhove Ir eIf lirical thought In IS ear rerstate's status as the centra concern 0 po I . h

work Foucault now moves towards understanding the state 10 t e spe-cific role that it actually does have in networks of power,

d f reignry statehood, and stareThe scope for integrating the stu y a save, harv :f heh II Foucault's announcement t at, I

power is reinforced w en we reca 8 h would no longercould alter the title and theme of his 1977-197 chou,;she, e y of govern men-

f " I tion" but to t e istorre er to "security, terntory, popu a I rion political econ-I, "government popu a I ,

ta ity." He would concentrate on , , I not been dismantledamy" which "form a solid senes that has certain y , d t the

' . 'tory-secunty move 0even today" (2008a: 108). Thus sovereignty-tern h h he acknowledged

ins of I' h 'cal concerns even t ougrnargms 0 Foucau t s t eoreu . h nrierh century. It isthe Continued importance of this complex into t

le twlyenew and certainly

, () ment as a re anvereplaced by interest In: a govern h ereignty discipline, etc.;, d f ' ing power t an sov ,more Important mo eo exerCISI I ractices (in contrast(b) I h if bject of governmenta p

popu arion as t e speer co, ' biecr of disciplinary power);' and (c)to the body as the anatolTlo-polttlcal a J, f i iry and reference point

I, , h ching object a inqurrpo itica l economy as t e overar I' liry in the transition fromf '" h f ern menta ratlona I hOr veridicrion t at rames gOY d si rh centuries towards t eh ' h fif th an sixteen

t e administrative state In t e teen h iah enth century and beyond.If I, " I' d tate in t e erg rese - ImltlOg governmenta lze 5

62 Bob Jessop

Foucault then suggests that, while the state has been overvalued as a coldmonster and/or as a unified, singular, and rigorously functional entity,it should remain an important object of study. Accordingly, it should beapproached as a "composite reality" and "mythicized abstraction" that hassurvived into the present because it has been governmentalized. He thenelaborates this claim:

it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to thisgovern mentality that is at the same time both external and internal tothe state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continualdefinition of what should or should not fall within the state's domain,what is public and what private, what is and what is not within thestate's competence, and so 00. So, if you like, the survival and limitsof the state should be understood on the basis of the general tactics ofgovern mentality. (Foucault 2008a: 109)

Foucault's interest here and in related work is different from that imputedto him by Anglo-Foucauldian scholars. He insisted in the so-called "lec-ture on governmentality," in earlier work, such as the first volume of theHistory of Sexuality (1979b), and in the three courses that directly orindirectly address the governmentalization of the state (Society Must beDefended, Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics)(2003b; 2008a; 2008b), not only that the state apparatus had a continuingimportance as part of the general economy of power but also that its overallform, its specific organization, and its activities were shaped by the distinc-tive combination and the relative primacy of different forms of exercisingpower within and beyond the state. In this regard he argues that the intel-ligibility of a given social phenomenon does not depend on rhe search for acause but on the study of "the constitution or composition of effects." Thuswe should ask "[h]ow are overall, cumulative effects composed? [ ... ] Howis the state effect constituted on the basis of a thousand diverse processes?"(2008a: 239; d. ibid. 247-248, 287; 2003b: 45; and, on the Napoleonicstate, 1977: 169,217). In short, Foucault was concerned with the "stateeffect." He wanted to explain how the state can act as if it were unified, asif it had a head even though it is headless (Dean 1994: 156; d. Kerr 1999).

In contrast, governmentality studies tend to focus on the logic, ratio-nalities, and practices of government or governmentality in isolation fromth is broader concern with the state's role as a major site for the institu-tional integration of power relations within the more general economy ofpower (Foucault 1979b). At issue here is not the value of specific stud-ies of governmentality but their capacity to grasp the bigger picture thatguided Foucault's work when he realized the limits of his earlier concernwith disciplinary techniqucs, anatomo-politics, and the micro-analytics ofpower. In short, whereas Foucault was increasingly concerned to put thestatc in its place with in a genera I economy of power and went on to explore


how government is superimposed on preceding forms of state, includingsovereignty over territory as well as disciplinary power and biopolitics(2003b: 36-39), governmentalists have been more concerned to take It offthe agenda entirely in favor of specific questions about specific techniquesof power and, at best, their position within successive or at least, differentforms of liberalism (d. Curtis 1995; Deacon 2002; Dean 1994: 153-159;Lemke 2007; Meyer 2006). . ..

In his 1977-1978 lecture course, Foucault argues that the mvesnganonof liberalism required movement beyond the microphysics of power to more

I· hi hift i I tion to his earlier concernmacro-analyses. He exp ains t IS Sit In re a I

with power relations as follows:

What I wanted to do-and this was what was at stake in the analy-hi h Id accept that the analysissis-was to see the extent to w tc we cou .,

of micro-powers, or of procedures of governmentality, IS not confined. d . d . d by a sector of the scale,by definition to a precise orna m ererrrune . f d .

but should be considered simply as a point of View, a method 0 eCI-h hi h be valid for the whole scale, whatever IrS Size. Inp erment w IC may . f scale

other words the analysis of micro-powers is not a questl?n Of . ', f sectorv i est ion of a POint a view.and it is not a question a sector, It IS a qu

(2008b: 186)

1" d the art of governmentIn other words the srudy of governmenta uy an ld rni h' . hvsi f ver nor shall rrucrop ys-need not be confined to rhe rrucrop YSlcs 0 pm fl d hi concern

· b .. . . ., I . t in micro-powers re ecte ISICS e privileged. HIS inma mteres I . .'

id I de alternative entry points mrowith anatorno-politics and di nor exc u h . / ble and) Fit's approac IS sea aother topics (d. Gordon 2001: xxv. oucau. yf . '1 society or srare-econorn

can be applied to the stare, sratecra t, state-Cf,vI d ' th level of inter-I'· . f II h nduct 0 con uct at ere anons lust as fr uit u y as to t e co . ivid I· . . ns Thus The., ndivi ua II1StltUtlO .

personal interactions, organIzations, or I . h . isrirutional issues. .... I ed Wit macro-nBmh of Biopolitics IS marn y concern if mental practices.. h h n speer c governand questions of government rat er t a. d h general economic

Foucault traces rhe development of stateprolects anht e

theproblematic of

f nes noting owagendas of government over our centu , diff t problems at each. . hi . d and poses I eren

government shifts during t IS peno II b t rhe rationales and.. f as we as a auturn about the limits a state power F I ores for example,

f I· . . Thus oucau r n ,mechanisms of such (sel -) irmranon. . rion in the economyh . . I d to non-mtervent at, whereas political economy ea s f Ordnungspolitik, totalitarian-but strong legal intervention In the field 0 I· f the party (2008b:· h ernmenta rty 0ISm subordinates the state to t e gov . Senellar t (2008: 382)1 . h· h·f in perspectIve,06-117). Commentmg on r IS Sit , rried out in the 1978

, 't 'government caargues that "the shift from power 0 I· I f amework being calledI f h thodo oglca r ..ectures does not result rom t e me b· the state which did· .' to a new 0 Jeer, 'lOto question but from Its extenSion ."not have a pl~ce in the analysis of the disciplmes.

I

il

64 Bob Jessop

In contrast to the warm embrace by Anglo-Foucauldians of a decentredaccount of the state, Foucault proclaimed "the problem of bringing understate control, of 'statification' (etatisation} is at the heart of the questionsI have tried to address" (2008b: 77, my emphasis). In practice this trans-lated into concern with the statification of government and the govern-mentalization of the state (2008a: 109). Foucault initially argued that thestudy of power should begin from below, in the heterogeneous and dis-persed microphysics of power, explore specific forms of its exercise in dif-ferent institutional sites, and then move on to consider how, if at all, thesewere linked to produce broader and more persistent societal configurations.One should study power where it is exercised over individuals rather thanlegitimated at the centre; explore the actual practices of subjugation ratherthan the intentions that guide attempts at domination; and recognize thatpower circulates through networks rather than being applied at particularpoints (Foucault 1979b: 92-102; 2003b: 27-34). All of these microphysicalthemes are repeated by the Anglo-Foucauldian school. However, after thisinitial move, Foucault argued that, whilst starting at the bottom with themicro-diversity of power relations across a multiplicity of dispersed sites,three further interrelated issues required attention.

First, whilst he did once celebrate the infinite dispersion of scatteredresistances and micro-revolts, he later conceded the need for resistances tobe readjusted, reinforced, and transformed by global strategies of transfor-mation (Foucault 1979b: 96; d. 1980: 143, 159, 195,203; 1979c: 60). Fou·cault noted that resistances needed co-ordination in the same way that thedominant class organized its strategies to secure its political preponderancein diverse power relations (ibid.). And he criticized the French socialistsfor their failure to develop a coherent account of socialist govern mentality(2008b: 91f.).

Second, Foucault suggests that the overall unity of a system of domina-tion must be explained in terms of the strategic codification and institutionalintegration of power relations. This process is both intentional and non-subjective. It is intentional because no power is exercised without a seriesof aims and objectives, which are often highly explicit at the limited level oftheir inscription in local sites of power (Foucault 1979b: 94). He refers hereto explicit programmes for reorganizing institutions, rearranging spaces, andregulating behavior (1980: 9). But it is also non-subjective because the over'all outcome of the clash of micro-powers cannot be understood as resultingfrom the choice or decision of an individual, group, or class subject (d. Fou-cault 1979b: 94f.). Things never work out as planned because

there are different strategies which are mutually opposed, composed, andsuperposed so as to produce permanent and solid effects which can per-fectly well be understood in terms of their rationality, even though theydon't conform to the initial programming; this is what gives the resultingapparatus (disposilif) its solidity and suppleness. (Foucault 1980: 10)

Constituting Another Foucault Effecl 65

Or, as Foucault (1979b: 95) expressed it elsewhere: "the logic is perfectlyclear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one lS"thereto have invented them and few can be said to have formulated them.

And, third, Foucault will suggest that power can be exercised at differ-ent scales and that the question of whether one focuses on mlcro-po~ersor the organization of the state as a whole is a qu.esri?n of per,spec(lve.Thus The Birth of Biopolitics applies the same nominalisr ana lyrics to thesuccession of forms of state and forms of the limitation or self-limitationof state power. This course explores the import of political economy andthe emergence of the notion of homo economicus as an active entrepre-neurial subject rather than as the bearer of exchange relations (Foucault2008b: 225-294).

3. WlTH FOUCAULT BEYOND FOUCAULT

. .. d fusi ounding Foucault's analysesSome of the ambiguities an con usions surr .... h. .. . . II·f be resolved If we disringuisof power and ItS significance In SOCIa I e can . .

f I tions These are uariationthree moments in the development 0 power re a I. I· f. d h I g. es of power' se ection 0in the objects subjects, purposes, an tee no 0 I , . f

' . h h thers: and retention 0 somesome technologies and practices rat er t an 0, bl. d . b der and more sta e sn-are-of these in turn as they are Integrate into roa

· . I . I) wer These three momentsgies of state and/or class (or nanona or racia po . .. b h eive more or less attent ron atoverlap and interact in real time ut r ey rec k I . these

· . ·ff . Foucault's wOt . gnonngdifferer« times and 111 di erent texts 111 h.· t the three moments to IS

dlffetences for the moment, we can connee . iation) then on the. . d i novation (varianon),genealogical remarks on mvenuon an m. f d I· eate general

. h I gies 0 power to e inemergent convergence of various tee no 0 . litica lhave economIC or po I

conditions of domination as they are seen to d fi II the strategic'1· . b . . ( lecrion) an na y, onUtI Ity for an emerging ourgeoisie se ,) d

. of government to pro uce acodification and retention of these practIces. fi d bi . (etention andI m e a jccnve rglobal strategy oriented to a more or ess u

institutionalization) (Foucault 2003a: 270). h f ·1· orion of geneal-. . . . d es t e ami lar n

The first step 111 this trajectory 111[[0 uc h eventalization ThisI . of t e evenr or .

ogy and can also be related to t ie notion I t so that the analy-. . f h . cial deve opmenrefers to the Irruption 0 c ance 111 so ... I ) but on Erfindung· ( igin iruna source

SIS must focus not on Ursprung on 'Herkunft (provenance, descent)(Invention, innovation) and dlscontmuous I s how elements that(cf. Kelly 2009: 13f., 22). In this sense Fohucau tdnotestate often emerged

·1 f . of t e mo ernWI I prove central to the ormation of power Thus fol-. . f thecenrres .,through separate mnovations away rom I' . COllOtS of social events,I . I ., f tota Izmg acOWing his more genera rejection 0 d.' I· rechniques had a pre-F d te's ISCiPmary .oucault noted that the mo ern sta . rticular needs in dls-h· . . .' 111 response to pa ..

IStOty: they ongll1ated as Inventions ·n rhe Ancien Regimef stare power Ipetsed local sites far from the centers 0

66 Bob Jessop

and emerging sites of capitalist production and had their own distinctivedisciplinary logics (ef. 1977: 137-138,224). In this sense they could also beseen as pre-adaptive, i.e., as prior inventions that can be mobilized, instru-mentalized, extended, and intensified in response to crises, challenges, orneeds that emerge at a later date. Thus disciplinary normalization initiallyfocused on the conduct of persons who were not directly involved in capi-talist production (e.g., in asylums, prisons, schools, barracks). Such innova-tions can be seen as sources of local variation (each with its own forms ofcontestation and resistance) and would only later be selected and combinedin trial-and-error experimentation to produce more global ensembles ofpower (Foucault 1977).

The second step re-introduces social classes, capital, and the state afterthe micro-analytics of power had dismissed them as significant social forces.Foucault recognized that some technologies and practices were selected andintegrated into other sites of power. Not all new technologies succeed ininserting themselves into the network of power relations (Kelly 2009: 44).On the contrary, some techniques are "doomed to immediate failure andabandonment" (Foucault 1977: 123). As Foucault (1977: 131) asked in Dis-cipline and Punish:

The problem, then, is the following: how is it that, in the end, it wasthe third [technology of power] that was adopted? How did the coer-cive, corporal, solitary, secret model of the power to punish replace therepresentative, scenic, signifying, public, collective model? Why did thephysical exercise of punishment (which is not torture) replace, with theprison that is its institutional support, the social play of the signs ofpunishment and the prolix festival that circulated them?

Constituting Another Foucault E((ect 67

The shift of attention from variation to selection can be seen in thetransition between Discipline and Punish (1977) and the first volumeof the History o( Sexuality (1979b). Whereas the former mostly empha-sized the dispersion of power mechanisms (whilst still noting the correla-tion between forms of punishment and modes of production)," the latterbegan to explore more explicitly how different mechanisms were combinedto produce social order through a strategic codification and instirutiona lintegration that made them more coherent and complementary. In partrcu-lar, when addressing the problem of selection, Foucault notes the role ofinterest in influencing the adoption of some inventions rath~r than oth-ers. At this stage, it seems, "the interesting thing is to ascerta I~,nor wha~overall project presides over all these developments, but, how, III terms astrategy the different pieces were set in place" (1980: 62). Foucault often

, I " "Iremarks that the perceived interests of an emerging bourgeois c ass III sociacohesion or the anarchic, profit-oriented, marker-mediated logic of capitalaccumulation guide the selection of some forms of sovereign, discipli nar y,or governmental power in preference ro others, But he never regards theboutgeoisie capital or the state as pre-consrituted forces, treating them. ' , f rnulri I" crices and attempts toInstead as emergent effects 0 mu tip e projects, pra I ,institutionalize political power relations. """ . .

The third step concerns the retention and Ins(ltutlOn~IJza~lOn of some" d oroi d h ir integration Into broaderpractices programmes, an projects an t el . .

, "F I " ally rejected any a p rtortensembles of power relations. oucau t typic"" f e connected to produce anassumption that different forms a power wer "

." d d that any post hoc mte-overall pattern of class dam illation an argue. "h f " I needs of the economy orgranon cannot be derived from t e uncnona h h

I . hi But this did not mean t at eexplained in terms of forma isornorp ISm. " I f" f h I b I figurations as termma armsrejected the possibility 0 sue goa con h . kf hi k "ned unclear T us, III see -o domination. Quite how t IS war s rernai .

" "I" erges Foucault resorts ro109 to explain how a general srraregrc IDe em '." "h "" I d" . I hegemonies egernoruca wide range of terms: these IOC u e SOCIa " ,: dom ina-

. . "" ta power class omlnaeffects" "hegemony of the hou rgecrste, me - , " "( a' . . ""sur-pouvOlr ortion ," "polymorphous rechniques of subJugation, I "d so

"I I I s value) "globa strategy, anSurp us power" ana ogous to surp u , . 9 80 223. 1979c: 60).forth (l979b' 92-94' 1980: 122,156,188; 1977. 2, , '1

Th ., d h . d"cates that Foucau twas sr rug-e range of metaphors deploye ere III I. ." hi h dI" I . f what 1SoccurrlOg In t IS t ir

g Ing to find an adequate exp ananon or h I highlightedf lations He nonet e ess

stage in the development a power re " .". f I I· deed infi niresi-" h " t ultlpllcltyo oca, InIn general rerms how t e irnmanen mi' d ed inflected

I I d hni f ower are "co oruze ,us , 'rna , re ations an tee ruques 0 P b increasingly generaltransformed, displaced, extended, and so or y Jillnd above all, howmechanisms and forms of overall domination .. , d how more generalth . d db global phenomena aney are investe or annexe y h I f hese technologies ofpowers Or economic benefits can slip into t e~;I.~d08a' 239).POwer" (2003b: 30-31; ef. 1977: 223; 1980:, .

In short, why do some technologies of power, some governmental prac-tices, tend ro disappear and others get selected? This has something to dowith tactics that turn everything to account (1977: 139), ro practices thataccelerate some innovations, rescale them, and given them more preciseinstruments (ibid.: 139, 144). Thus Foucault notes that the state intervenes,directly or indirectly, to annex operations of disciplinary power rhrough"selection, normalization, hierarchicalization, and [pyramidal] centraliza-tion" (2003b: 181). He also showed how, for example, how the disciplinarytechniques first developed on the margins of the economy and the statelater came to be deployed closer to the centres of power. Thus disciplinarytechniques that were invented elsewhere were introduced in factories tocontrol the division of labor and aspects of the new anatomo-politics weredeployed to bind men to the productive appa rarus and facilitate a capitalistpolitical economy of time based on abstract lahar.' Foucault also observedthat the rise of the modern state was bound up with the problem of "popu-lation" in its relation ro territory and wealth as reflected in the new scienceof "political economy" (ef. 1980: 161; 1989: 217-219; 2008b).

68 Bob Jessop

Heterogeneous elements with their own pre-histories are therebyreworked and readjusted to produce "phenomena of coagulation, support,reciprocal reinforcement, cohesion, and integration" (2008a: 239; see also2003b: 14). For example, in the first volume of History of Sexuality and theroughly contemporary lecture course, Society Must be Defended, Foucaultlinks the retention of particular forms of disciplinary and governmentalpower explicitly to bourgeois recognition of their economic profitabilityand political utility (1979b: 114, 125, 141; 1980: 41; 2003b: 30-33). Simi-lar ideas were presented earlier in Discipline and Punish (1977: 174f., 206-207,218-223; see also Marsden 1999: 157f., 190f.).

Foucault did identify one key factor in this complex process of consoli-dation, and institutionalization. He gave a privileged role to the state asthe point of strategic codification of tbe multitude of power relations andas the apparatus in which the general line formed meta-power (e.g., 2003b:27f., 31-35; d. 1979b: 92-96; 1980: 122, 156, 189f., 199f.; 1982: 224;2008a: 238f., 338). Foucault argues, for example, it was the rise of thepopulanon-remrorv-wealth nexus in political economy and police that ere-ated the space for the revalorization and re-articulation of disciplines thathad emerged in seventeenth and eighteenth century, i.e., schools, rnanufac-tories, armies, etc. (2008a: 217-219). Likewise, in discussing the develop-ment of Ordo-liberalism, the Chicago School, and neo-liberalism, the stateonce again figures prominently both as a site of struggle for hegemony (evenincluding efforts to limit the role of the state itself vis-a-vis the market andsociety) and as the central apparatus in and through which codified prac·tices are rolled out in the wider society (2008b: passim). It is in this waythat the "state effect" is produced and in turn has its own "state effects."In short, the State invests and colonizes other power relations in a condi·tioning-condirioned relationship to generate a kind of "meta-power" thatrenders its own functioning possible (2008b: 122f.).

4. CONCLUSION

In approaching Foucault's work in these terms, we can escape the dichot·omy of micro- and macro·power, the antinomy of an analytics of micro'powers and a theory of sovereignty, and the problematic relation betweenmicro-diversity and macro-necessity in power relations (d. Jessop 1990;Kerr] 999: ] 76). This is something that Foucault himself indicated was bothpossible in principle (because micro-powers have no ontological primacy)and necessary in practice (to understand the successive but subsequentlyoverlapping arts of government in the exercise of state power beyond thestate) (2008a: 15, 109; 2008b: 186,313; cf. 2003b: 36-39, 173, 242,250),For Foucault's insistence on the complexity, diversity and relative autonom~of local, everyday relations of power overturns neither Marxist accountS athe state nor liberal theories of popular sovereignty; it only exposes them


as limited and inadequate (Deacon 2002). The challenge is to show howthey might, in some circumstances, in some contexts, and ~or sO~le p~ri-ods of time, be linked. The idea of government as strategic codificationand institutional integration of power relations provides a bridge betweenmicro-diversity and macro-necessity and, as Foucault ~rgues, a foclls, onmicro-powers is determined by one's choice of scale but Involves analyticalinsights that can be applied across all scales. It is a perspecnve, not a realitydelimited to one scale (Foucault 2008b: 186; d. 1977: 222; 2003b: 28-31).Foucault srill argued for the dispersion of powers, insisted rhat the stare,for all its omnipotence, does not occupy rhe whole field of power relations,and claimed that the state can only operate on the baSIS of other, alreadyexisting power relations. Indeed, "power relations have been progressl,velygovernmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, ratl?na~IZe?, 3?,d ~e.ntraiJzedin the form of or under the auspices of, state msntunons (ibid.: 345).This is why Ba;ret-Kriegel (1992: 192) could note that "Foucaulr,:s thoughtopened the way to a return to the study of the State and the law. ,

The difference between the Foucauldian and Anglo-Foucauldlanapproaches to the state and govemmentality can be explained In part m

" . b "th Iarionships of power as Strate-terms of Foucault's distinction etween t e re I

. .,' rh r result in the facr that someglc games between lIberties-strategic games a , "d f h d the states of domination,people try to determine the con ucr 0 or ers-an

hi h h di 'I II " (1997' 299) He adds that:W rc are w at we or marl yea power . .

f and rhe states of domina-between the two, between games 0 power , f hI h I ies ] ] The ana lysis 0 r esetion you have governmenta tee no ogles ... h '

, . . ften through such rec Illquestechniques is necessary because It IS very 0 .'" bli h d nd maintained. There arethat states of domination are esta IS ea. . f

' f t ic relations techniques 0three levels to my analysis 0 power: sua eg ,f d ' ion (Foucault 1997: 299)government, and states 0 ominanon.

A IF Idians are uninterested inIn these terms, it seems that the ng 0- oucau f d ' rion (in' d I' I" resred in states 0 ornmaInterpersonal power games an Itt e mre . I" I"

. . d . f eco norruc or po rttca inter-part because they reject essentialize notton S 0 . f menr," I I' of techlllques 0 govern ,

ests) and seem to prefer an empmca ana YSiS ib I' Th s they focus. d f ms of" era Ism. utypes of governmental practice, an or .

. I ral technologieS.more or less exclusive yon govemmen idenrif d i b the "Anglo-I hi II d F It effecr identi e m Yntis sense, the so-ca e oucau f h . ided reading of

h h h '" h oducr 0 a rat er one SlP one community of t oug r ISt e pr, ' h F It operated bur withh" . e 10 whlC DucauISwork shaped by the same conJuncrur I d d 'Y thar the Anglo·

d'ff I"' I ences 0 nor elI erent theoretical and po mca consequ . d d ' Bur there areF d ful an pro uet1ve.oucauldian paradigm has prove power h mentality This canh . F I' pproac to govern .

Ot er ways of developmg oucau t sam his arallel critiques of rhebe seen in his contributions to polItical econo Yd'h P d ction of the "stareh . f' f te power an t e pro uc angtng forms and unctions 0 sta '. f alternative Foucault

effect" (d. Dean 1994; Mitchell 1991). In argumg or an

, I,

70 Bob Jessop

effect, I do not pretend to have revealed the true essence of Foucault's interestin governmemality but to offer an alternative reading to "governrnenralisr"accounts of his work. For one can also see his work on govern mentality as acontribution to a "critical and effective history" of the state considered not asa universal or as a self-identical political formation but as the site of practicesthat produce different forms of state, each with their own historical specifici-ties, agendas and typical forms of governmental practice.

NOTES

1. This chapter has benefitted from numerous detailed comments and edito-rial inputs from Susanne Krasmann, Ulrich Brockling and Thomas Lemke.Eventually l accepted most of them and the argument is much improved as aresult. Nonetheless I remain responsible for the final form of the analysis andits claims about the Anglo-Foucauldian school and Foucault.

2. For an insider's view on the heterogeneity of the Anglo-Foucauldian school,see Donzelor and Gordon (2008: 51-52).

3. In referring to the state's role in the institutional integration of power rela-tionships, Foucault draws an analogy with the "strategic codification" ofpoints of resistance than enable a revolution to occur (1979b: 96).

4. Rose and Miller declare themselves "pickers and choosers" rather than Fou-cault scholars (2008: 8).

5. Recalling their views during the rise of the new perspective, Rose and Millernote that it was felt essential, at a minimum, to go beyond the accumula-rion and distribution of capital to explore, in addition, the accumulationand distribution of persons and their capacities (2008: 2; d. Foucault 1977:220-221, 1979b: 140-141). .

6. One source of Foucault's difficulties in linking capital and the state is hIS

tendency to reduce the economy to exchange relations in line with liberalthought: this rendered invisible the contradictions and substantive inequali-ties In the capital relation. Likewise, when he introduces the logic of capital-ism, he does not ground it in a detailed account of the social relations ofproduction as opposed to transferable techniques or technologies or both forthe conduct of conduct (Fellman 2009; d. Marsden 1999).

7. On the emergent properties of population as an object of government, seeaIso Foucau It (1979b: 24-26, 139-146; 2003b: 242-251, 255-256; 2008"67-79,109-110,352-357).

8. Cf. Foucault, 1977: 222-223; 1979b: 99-100; 2003b: 32, 32-349. Discipline was also used to control workers' bodies: "it was not just a matter

of a~propriati"ng, extracting the maximum quantity of time but also o~ con-trolling, shaping, valorizing the individual's body according to a particularsystem" (Foucault 2001: 82).

10. Initially in relation to the work of Rusche and Kirchheimer then in his ownname (Foucault 1977: 24-26, 77, 84,122-123,163-164). '

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France 1975-1976, trans. D. ~acey. ~e pop~tlation. Lectures at the CollegeFoucault, Michel. (2008a). Secllnty, Temio~Y'Basingstoke: Palgrave.

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72 Bob Jessop

Foucault, Michel. (2008b). The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collige deFrance, 1978-1979, trans. G. Burchell. Basingstoke. Palgrave.

Frauley, Jon. (2007). The Expulsion of Foucault from Governmentality Studies:Towards an Archaeological-Realist Retrieval, pp. 258-271 in Jon Frauley andFrank Pearce (eds) Critical Realism and the Social Sciences. Heterodox Elabo-rations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Gordon, Colin. (2001). Introduction, pp. xi-x!ii in James D. Faubon (ed} Power:the Essential Writings. New York: New Press.

Jessop, Bob. (1990). Poula nrzas and Foucault on Power and Strategy, pp. 220-247in State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place. Cambridge: Polity.

Jessop, Bob. (2007). State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach. Cambridge:Polity.

Kelly, Mark G.E. (2009). The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault. London:Routledge.

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Kerr, Derek (1999) Beheading the King and Enthroning rhe Marker: A Critique ofFoucauldia n Governmentality. Science and Society 63(2): 173-202.

Krasmann, Susanne and Michael Volkmer (eds). (2007). Michel Foucaults"Geschichte der Couuernementalitat" in den Sozialwissenschaften. [nterna-tionale Beitrage. Bielefeld: transcript.

Lemke, Thomas. (1997). Eine Kritik der politischen Vernunft: Foucaults Analyseder modernen Gouvernementalitat. Hamburg: Argument.

Lemke, Thomas. (2007). An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality andState Theory. Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 15: 43-64.

Marsden, Richard. (1999). The Nature of Capital: Marx after Foucault. London:Routledge.

Meyer, Sylvain. (2006). Les Trajectoires d'un Texte: La Couvernernentalire deMichel Foucault, pp. 13-36 in Sylvain Meyer, Marie-Cecile Naves and ThomasRibemonr (eds) Travailler avec Foucault. Paris: Presses de Sciences po.

Meyet, Silvain, Marie-Cecile Naves and Thomas Ribrnont (eds). (2006). Travailleravec Foucault: Ret ours sur Ie Politique. Paris: Presses de Sciences po.

M iller, Peter and Nikolas Rose. (1990). Governing Economic Life. Economy andSociety 19(1): 1-27.

Mitchell, Timonthy J. (1988). Colon ising Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-stt y Press.

Mitchell, Timothy J. (1991). The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approachesand Their Critics. American Political Science Review 85(1): 77-96. .

Mitchell, Timothy J. (2002). Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity.Berkeley: University of California Press.

Nigro, Roberto (2008) Foucault, Reader and Critic of Marx, pp. 647-662 in Sebas-tian Budgen and Stathis Kouvelakis (cds} Critical Companion to ContemporaryMarxism. Leiden: Brill.

Opitz, St~fan. (2004). Gouvernemelltalitiit im Postfordismus. Macht, Wissel1 undTecbnieen des Selbst im Feld unternehrnerischer Rationolitat. Hamburg: Argu-ment.

O'Malley, Pat. (1992). Risk, Power and Crime Prevention. Economy aNd society21 (3): 252-275.

O'Malley; Pat, Lorna Weir and Clifford Shearing. (1997). Governmel1tality, Criti-CISm, J olltlcs. Ecol/omy al/d Society 26(4): 501-517. .

Paolucci, Paul. (2003). Foucault's Encounter with Marxi.':ll11. Current PerspectIVesin Social Theory 22: 3-58.

Rose, Nikola~. (1996). The Death of the Social? Refiguring the Territory of Co v-erl1ment. Ecol/omy arid Society 25(4),327-356.


Rose, Nikolas. (1999). Powers of Freedom. Reframing Political Thought. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Rose Nikolas and Peter Miller. (2008). Governing the Present: AdministeringE~onomic Social and Personal Life. Cambridge: Polity.

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Rose Nikolas Pat O'Malley and Mariana Valverde. (2006). Covemmenralir y.A:znual Re~iew of Law and Social Sc.ieJ1~e2: 83-104. ).. . _

Sanyal, Kalyan. (2007). Rethinking Capitalist De~elopmellt. I nmnn/e Accumulation, Governmentality and Post-Colonial Capitalism, London: Routledge.

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Senellart, Michel. (2008). Course context, pp. 369-401 in Michel Foucau t ecu-rity Territory Population. Basingstoke: Palgrave. .

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Walters William P. and jens Henrik Haahr. (2004). Couerning urope: ncourse,Gov;rnmentality and European Integration. London: Routledge. li

Walters, William P. and Wendy Larner (eds). (2004). Clobal Cooernrnenta tty:Governing International Spaces. London: Routledge.

4 Governmentalization of the StateRousseau's Contribution to theModern History of Governmentality

Friedrich Balke

~n the clourse of his exploration of the concept of governmentality Micheli oucau t comes to speak of Rousseau's role-and this at an especiallymportant point, In that Foucault here poses the question of what remainsofbsoverelgnhty after the art of government has a new political subject. Thissu jeer IS t e popu lation wh id dt k f d ' ose gui ance an management is the centralas 0 mo ern power' the sort of phi - -of death b _ . _ _ ower w ose goa IS not m an impositionf Rut an inrensificarion and elevation of vital force. Foucault here

re ers to ousseau's article on "Political Economy" wher th h-I h31m t "d f . ' e e p I asap er

sa e OIng an art of government" He the .. n continues:

Then helwrites The Social Contract in which the problem is how withnotions ike those of "nat " "" ,. _ ure, contract, and "general will" one cangldve algeneral principle of government that will allow for b~th the [Ll-

rI rca principle of so - d hf

vereIgnty an t e elements rhrough which an arto government can be defi d d d ibI I I

. _ ne an escn ed. So sovereignty is abso-ute y not e irninated by rh fh d

e emergence 0 a new art of government thatas crosse the threshold f I- - I ._ _ _ _ 0 po mea Sctettce. The problem of sover-

eignty IS not eliminared: 0 th - -(F

' n e contrary, It 1$ made more acute thanever. oucault 2007: 107)

Foucault's rema rks on the - I -offering a place for both th~a:tlcu a my of Rousseau's theory-a theoryereignty-are II rt of government and the principle of sov-

a too scattered and Thexcellent sta r tin - f h cursory. ey nevertheless offer ang pornt or t e foil - ff -mine rhe fo hi . owmg e orr to more precisely deter-

rm t IS cornprorruse b - idi IPower takes I-1 I' , di erween JUri ica l and governmenta

I vousseau 5 iscourse d h -plary for the conce tua l a I _ _' an w y It can be considered exem-talit y.' To this end t -II fi nc Instltutlon".l hisrory of modern govermen-the field in hi h h WI rst move past Foucault's comments to describe

w IC t e explosion of an art of government can be observed

Governmentalization of the State 75

in Rousseau's writing, together with the conclusions he draws into therendering governable of individual subjects, as applied to the connectedpolitical field of the government of a people. In the second section, I willdiscuss what Foucaulr may have meant in arguing that in signifying "theemergence of a new sort of art of governing," Rousseau's discourse nev-ertheless not only fails to eliminate the problem of sovereignty but evenincreases its virulence. In Rousseau, Foucault indicates, the problem ofsovereignty, being no longer centered around the prince bur rather rhecollective subject, the people, "is made more acute than ever."! Finally, inthe third section 1 will scrutinize Foucault's claim that "[w]e live in rheera of a governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century" (Foucault2007: 109) against the example of what Ernst Forsrhoff has termed the"new-style social orders": those prevalent since 1945 and rowa rd s whichFoucault steers his history of governmentaliry in the framework of hispreoccupation with "model Germany." When Foucault asserts that "rhisgovernmentalization of the state" is the phenomenon that "allowed thestate to survive," govern mentality here being defined as something "atthe same time both external and internal to the state," (ibid.) what he issuggesting-and what needs to be shown-is that with Rousseau's rheoryof government, the entire ambivalence of its relationship to the sovereignuolonte generale can be described for the first time.

1. THE AMPHIBOLY OF GOVERNMENT

As Rousseau argues in the Contrat social, republics are cornpar ible withany number of forms of government because the "acts of rhe general will"to which they owe their political emergence are distinguishable in a basicway from acts of governing. The legislative power "belongs ro the peo-ple, and can belong to it alone"; but this means "that the executive powercannot belong to the generality as legislature or sovereign," "because thispower consists only of particular acts falling outside the competency ofthe law, and consequently of rhe sovereign, all of whose acts can only belaws" (Rousseau 1979a: 395-396). For Rousseau's polirical theory, what isdecisive is that the government not be confused with the sovereign, being"only its minister" (ibid.). Since sovereignty is not transferable and alwaysrests with the people, the government can only act under "contract" to thesovereign; but the sovereign nonetheless also depends on the government,because in irs absence it would be behaving like a will actually lacking rhemeans to realize itself: "When I walk towards an object, it is first necessarythat I want to move towards it; and second that my feet carry me there"(ibid.). Nothing in the body poliric can take place wirhout rhe regulared"cooperation" (concours) of "force" (force) and "will" (volonte), or "exec-utive" and "legislative." At first glance everything seems to suggest thatRousseau's polirical rheory is played out berween rhe poles of sovereignty

76 Friedrich Balke

and government, will and strength; and that everything has been said aboutthis relationship when we designate the government as the instrument ofthe sovereign or of the uolonte genera/e. But importantly, Rousseau aimsall of his suspicion at the prince, who as the bearer of executive authorityIS always Inclined to usurp the general will, always wishes "to draw forthsome absolute and independent act from himself" (ibid.: 399).

Everything depends, then, on neither the government nor the sovereign-both designated "artificial bodies"-transgressing the borders of their par-ticular spheres. The government should never be more than the "agent"of "~,ublic force"; as such it "brings into play the directives of the generalWIll. But readers of the SOCIal Contract may quickly begin to doubt thatsuch "directives" really involve directives of the general will-since, so its~ems, for the latter silence is essential, rather than pursuing representativediscourse. In the course of further argumentation Rousseau comes to theconclusion that the sovereign manifestly not only 'lacks feet but eyes, and,beyond that, language as well, hence the very "organ" allowing him toshare or promulgate his will:

Does the body politic have an organ to declare its wishes? Who willgive it the foresight necessary to formulate and announce its acts in ad-vance, or how will it announce them at the moment he needs to? How isa blind multitude, which often does not known what it wants because itrarely knows what is good for it, to carry out an enterprise as great anddifficult as a ,legislative system? On its own, the people always wantsgood, but on Its own It does not always see it. The general will is alwaysrighr, but the Judgment guiding it is not always enlightened. One needsto have It see things as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appearto It; one needs to show it the correct path it seeks, protected from theseductions of the particular will. (ibid.: 380)

The" .tv" d rid I' " f hpun y an I ea ity ate general will evidently demands sup-plementmg by authorities that Rousseau has previously banished from itssphere.' This supplementation's outcome is nothing less than the introduc-tion of a specific governmental activity that does not simply amount to thegovernment as the Simple executive authority of the will. It is clear thatRousseau models this activity in terms of pedagogic intervention; placedalongside the v~lonte generate, its role is to organize the preliminary pro-cess of the will s for marion or education-for Rousseau the indissolublereference-point of his argumentation, but at the same time an object ofunceasing problematization. Despite its sovereignty, the uolonte generaleIS subject t? educatl~mal and protective interventions whose agents Rous-;,cau has dlsa~pear m~,o the anonymity of a "one needs" (an il (aut). Thegeneral will, albeit always right,' still needs both guidance by enlight-

ened Judgment and an attentive leadership that makes use of demonstrativetechnique: the "correct path" needs to be "shown" to that will it needs to,

Governmentalization o( the State 77

be "protected" from "seduction" by the powerful particular will, the orga-nized interests of bourgeois society; but above all, it has to be brought tosee things "as they are": this because-and I will return to this point-inrespect to the sovereign's will, objects can by no means be postulated as ifthey were limitlessly plastic. Since the absolutistic politics that Rousseauopposes was grounded "within the relationship of the sovereign's will tothe subjected will of the people" (Foucault 2007: 70) democratic politicscannot simply reproduce the relation between the sovereign will and thepeople's submissiveness. Rousseau wrote the Social Contract in the histori-cal moment when "the population no longer appears as a collection of sub-jects of right, as a collection of subject wills who must obey the sovereign'swill through the intermediary of regulations, laws, edicts, and so on." Thepopulation now appears in its specific physis or in its "naturalness" (ibid.);it no longer has the status of a mere "vis-a-vis the sovereign," (ibid.: 71) forwhose actions it is by no means transparent. Consequently, presenting thegeneral will with objects "as they are" means first of all opening its eyesto its own "naturality"-for the democratic sovereign is characterized bya confluence between the legal voluntarism to which the sovereign peopleOwes its formal-legal existence (social contract) and such natura lit y on thepart of the population; this "depends on a series of variables" whose influ-ence by the sovereign is preconditioned on a break With the logic of com-mand and obedience. For "[I]f one says to a population 'do this,' there isnot only no guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply no

guarantee that it can do it" (ibid.).In the Discours sur l'economie politique, which first appeared in the

Encyclopedic in 1755 and then in 1758 as a separate text, Rousseau, accord-ing to Foucault offered his definition of a specific art of government. Inthis text we can observe a relation of mutual intensification between thegeneral will and governmentality. Rousseau here ascertains, as t~e "fir~tand most important maxim of legitimate or popular government, that It"wholly pursues the general will" (Rousseau 1979b: 247). The government,previously consistently tempted to realize a will set agamst the people, gainsunimagined power by not limiting itself to "force" that "makes everyonetremble" but disposing over means encouraging them to "ad?re" the law(ibid.. 250). Namely, the capacity to rule does not consist of admmlSter-ing laws" and certainly not of their incessant prollferatlon. The law, which

bli I' 'I I dmire can unmtentlonally berepu ican Rousseau appears to irmt ess Y a '. . " . . .transformed into a means "for eluding law or escapmg pUnishment (Ibid ..252; italics mine). The goal of "governmental" government-m contrabst

. h forci ng of Simple obedience Yto so-called executive power-IS t us not a orci .' f, , , f ' 'I ws but a modification 0Citizens, a securing of their can nrrrut y (0 Its a , " hh f

ki of them "as they are, t ew at they are or can be. Instead 0 rna ing use b "A dgovernment has to try to "form them into what one need~ them to e. . nRousseau adds: "The most absolute authority is that which penetrates 'I

nto

hf

hi '11 no less than hIS actions. tISt e person's very interior, and ef ects IS WI

78 Friedrich Balke

certain that in the long term peoples are what government makes of them"(ibid.: 251). This last statement once aga in makes clear that what is at workIn Rousseau is an amphiboly of the governmental concept: on the onehand, w~ ha~e the governme~t that is commissioned with "executing laws"and receives Its orders exclusively from a sovereign who can "limit, modify,and take back the government's power when it pleases" (Rousseau 1979a:396); on the other hand the government, which in a sense is internal to thesO,vereign,4 he~ce does ~ot stand in an instrumental relation to the generalwil l but. contributes to ItS ,production and direction. In this context, I canonly POint to the pedagogic structure of this governmental art. In order toanswer the question of how to govern a people, Rousseau first relocates itfrom the field of the body politic to that of education of the individual body.With this srrategic shift, he inserts his political theory into the history ofthe art of government-of the techniques involved in rendering individualsand collectives governable. Importantly, the field of pedagogy does not onlycover education of the individual (including privileged individuals such askings and pnnces); the collective, moral constituency, and thus a politicsno longer Identified With the state, is itself subjecr to a specific pedagogicproblernatization. Like the people in the political realm, in the pedagogicrelationship children take the position of the sovereign and can only bebrought to transfer their will to that of the educator, thus losing their ownwill, at the price of their own destruction. But as in the case of politics, theinterdiction of abandoning one's own will does not result in powerlessnesson the part of those who have to govern. The government can dispose overeverything not belonging to the will of the governed-and that is doubt-less enough to bring about circumstantial changes heading in the direc-non of modifying the relevant environment. The paradox of Rousseau'seducational enter prise becomes clear in the concept of leadership or direc-tion, playing a central role throughout the art of government. This conceptstands ,In a par.tlcu]ar, tense relationship with the law: "Young teacher, I ampreaching a difficult art to you; this is to govern without precepts and doeverything Without doing anything at all" (Rousseau 1969: 362).

2. CORSICA AND THE PROBLEM OFTHE DOUBLE "CONSTITUTION"

If the constituted political body as envisioned in the Social Contract con-stantly has to he on guard against usurpation by a government upon whoseattentive steering the uolonte generate at the same time completely depends,then at least the act of original legislation itself hence the founding of thecollective will moving towards a contract of all with all should not betroubled by any mixing with the government's singular acts. But now whatemerges IS that Rousseau qualifies the very act of constitutional legislationto an extreme degree as a singular act, and this in a double sense: not the

Covernmentalization of the State 79

people itself but only the person of the legislator is in a posirion to formu-late the articles of the constitution, which in fact makes possible the estab-lishment or founding of a people in the first place. Yet not only the subjectof legislation but its object as well is bound in a striking way to a distincrivecharacteristic making it necessary to anchor the legislative act in somethingother than the will that will emanare from it. From this perspecrive ir isno coincidence that Rousseau ties the legislative process to the existenceof exceptional individuals (the wise legislarors) and exceprional territories.One such territory is the island of Corsica, for which, as is well known,Rousseau drafted a "Project of a Constitution" in 1763, its forward declar-ing that "The Corsican people is in the happy state [heureux etat] render-ing a good institution rune bonne institution] possible," (Rousseau 1979c:902) with the happy state enjoyed by the Corsican people here specified asthe precondition for "a good institution," that term also pointing back, inFrench as in English, to the word "state."

The legislator's function goes beyond rhe sphere of legalistic voluntarismin two respects: on the one hand, in respect to religion, because a people willonly ler itself be convinced of rhe legislative work's rationality as a resulr ofthe "divine pronouncement" ro which rhe legislaror lays claim; on rhe otherhand, in respect to concrete, empirical knowledge concerning "land andpeople," which brings into play the specific dimension of a governmenralrationality that by no means only takes effecr following the people's suc-cessful institutionalization which is to say as an outcome of a constitu-tive act. It already becomes clear from the manner Rousseau formulatesthe logical paradox of the legislative work in the Social Contract rhar hisproblem is no longer rhe people, undersrood as a mass of legal subJects-as the problem was the prince and his rivals for MachiavellI-but ratherthe governability or rendering governable of a people possessll1g a specific"naturality" or "physis"? that can be differentIated 111£0 a senes o,f his-torical, geographical, c1imaric, demographic, cultural, and orher variables(Foucault 2007: 70-71). Such variables, on which the population depend~,re I . " id bl r" from "the sovereign ssu ts 1I1 Its removal "to a very consr era e exrenvoluntarist and direct action in the form of the law" (ibid.: 71). In order rosuccessfully conclude his work, the legislaror rhus has to abandon the ,~evelof I . . d ."' the people's "consttruttort-

aw 111 two respects mstea scrunruzu'f .' .T

. ' . . d rni ning ItS "constitutiveo give a people a constitution requlfeS eter I . .

P" " . f h I and If applicable when aOint, hence clarifying the question a w erner 1P I

· k h I its own Rousseau pacesopu anon is in the position to rna e r ese aws I '. ivned

the legislaror in the midst of the ambivalence of rhe rwo meamngs astgn~.the term "constitution" in the course of the seventeenth centu~y. n also

" d . " I" f laws" and begll1s ro a sop.eno ,It ceases to exclusively mean a rota iry asignify a measurable "relationship of forces":

. whicb has essentially beenAs long as in the hisrorical-Iegal literarure, " 11 ir the basich f

. ·,,·t rion" essentla y mealt at a the parliamentarians, constl u

80 Friedrich Balke

laws of the kingdom, which is to say a legal apparatus, something inthe order of a convention, it was clear that this return of the constitu-tion could only mean the in a way decisionistic reestablishment of lawsbrought into the light of day. To the contrary, from the time when theconstitution is no longer a legal scaffolding, an ensemble of laws, but arelationship of force, it is clear that this relationship cannot be reestab-lished from nothing; it can only reestablished when in any event some-thing such as a circular movement of history exists, when somethingexists permirting its return to irs srarting point. (Foucault 2003: 193)

The ambivalences of Rousseau's political discourse-this is my main argu-ment-result from an overlapping of these two understandings of "con-stitution." The title of the Social Contract situates politics in a "realm ofconvention"; but Rousseau constantly tries to reduce the arbitrariness of thefoundational act by inquiring into the conditions of its possibility, definingthis a priori as having an empirical and historical-cultural character. Peoplepass from a state of nature to a civil state because at a certain point the for-mer state becomes untenable (Rousseau 1979a: 359). The transition itself isa fundamentally ambivalent event: while under cerrain circumstances it isunavoidable, the body politic emerging from it neverrheless plunges into ahistorical movement making possible both an intensification and perfectionof forces and an "abuse" meaning that human beings are "often" broughtbeneath the "condition" at which they started (ibid.: 364). For this reason,Rousseau cannot understand the constitution or institution" simply as a"legal scaffold" or "totality of laws"; rather, he poses the quesrion of rheforces that have to be present for the laws to take hold. Jean Starobinskiignores the ambivalence of Rousseau's constitution when he argues thatthe social contract materializes "not along the evolutionary line describedin the second Discourse but in another dimension, purely normative andlocated outside historical time. A legitimate beginning is once more rhestarting point, ex nihi/o, without the quesrion being posed of the conditionsrequired to realize the political ideal" (Starobinski 1971: 45). Precisely theopposite is the case. The legislator's decisive work does not lie in compilinga constitutional text, because a constitution cannot be established upon a"bottomless foundarion." The "act through which a people is a people"(Rousseau 1979a: 359) cannot be reduced to the process of assent regardingthe constitution framed by the legislators.' It also comprises the prelimi-nary examination of the premises that are either present or absent with theexistence of the population as a pre-legal or extra-legal entity:

In the same way that before constructing a large building the architectobserves and probes the ground to see if it can bear the weight, the wiseinstructor does not begin by compiling good laws for their own sake,but rather examines whether rhe people for whom they are meant iscapable of bearing them. (Rousseau 1979a: 384f)

Gouernmentalization of the State 81

Against this backdrop we can understand why in 1764 Rousseau formulatesa "Project of a Constitution for Corsica" but, when asked by the Corsicanleader to help with "constructing the republic," retroactively gets hold ofthe information allowing him "to acquaint myself wirh the history of thepeople and the state of the counrry." The texrs he is delivered do nor renderrhe Corsican trip superfluous, since the legislator is meanr to closely study"the people that is to be instituted" (Ie peuple a instituer) in the countryitself (Rousseau 1976: 648). The legislator has to know the history of thepeople for whom he wishes ro compile laws because he needs to identi fywhar Foucault calls the "consriruting point," (Foucault 2003:192)7 whichis to say the moment in that history when a people first becomes receptiveto the rule of laws.

As conceived by Rousseau, the people owes its existence to a processthat we can describe, with Foucault, as the entry of the human race intothe "field of the definition of all living species" (Foucault 2007: 75). Thisbiopolirical anchoring of a people represents a hisrory of the evolurion-ary sort running below that of political and diplomatic events. If the bodypolitic were meant to be understood as the result of juridical genesis alone,it would be hard to understand how Rousseau can write as follows at thestart of Chapter 10, Book 2 of rhe Social Contract as follows: "A body poli-tic can be measured in two ways: namely, according to territorial extensionand according to the number of people, and berween one and rhe orher ofthese measurements there is a relationship suitable for producing the truesize of rhe stare" (Rousseau 1979a: 388). Bur how, we may ask, can a politi-cal body-which means, indeed, a moral body-in facr be measured? Thetwo fundamental variables that Rousseau introduces, size of populationand territory, are removed from the will of those who come together rofound rhe body poliric. Hence proper measure does not become manifest tothe state through the normative specifications of its formation, but throughspecific conditions that are rhe result of a development or "history." Thelegislator must become familiar with this history, because these conditionsare subject ro neither his will nor that of the individuals who decide rofound a body politic. Such a body, furnishing itself with a basic law andthus manifesting irs will ro have a single will, can only survive if it at rhesame time realizes "a maximum of force," (ibid., italics in original) whichit cannot, however, produce and guarantee for the future through the act ofconstitutional grounding. In an intrinsic manner, the probl,em of the art ofgovernment is tied to the normative mechanism of the SOCial contract, forthe two fundamental variables that need to be brought inro a "suitable rela-tionship" poinr to a number of factors and conditions, difficult to overlook,that simply cannot be transformed into constants. At first View,' the CIrcum-stances at work here indeed seem clearly laid out: "Human being make rhestate and the land nourishes human beings: consequently, this relationshipthus involves the land being sufficient ro maintain those dwelling on ir andthere being as many inhabiranrs as rhe soil can nourish" (ibid.: 389). But

82 Friedrich Balke

land and human beings are not simply objects or facts that can be placedin a stable relationship through sovereign decree; rather, they turn out toconsist of a highly complex and dynamic conglomerate of factors:

It is impossible to calculate a fixed relation berween the expanse of landand the number of mutually sufficient human beings, both on accountof the differences that are found in the quality of the land, in its degreesof fertility, in the nature of its production, in the influence of climate,and of what can be observed in the temperament of the men who dwellon them [sic] among whom some consume a small amount in a fertilecountry while others a great deal on barren soil. (ibid.)

Concerning all these matters, the legislator "must not base his judgmenton what he sees but on what he foresees" (ibid.). He has to reconstructdevelopmental processes and extrapolate them into the future. Writing thehistory of a people is anything but a peripheral activity-a diversion fromthe work of legislation: such work can only succeed when it takes accountof the people's relation to its environment, hence to all the factors and cir-cumstances that cannot be the object of contractual stipulations.

3. SOCIAL ORDERS OF A NEW SORT

When Foucault indicates that "this governmentalization of the state"-aprocess "simultaneously internal and external to the state"-was the phe-nomenon making its survival possible, it becomes clear that with Rous-seau's theory of government the entire ambivalence of its relationship tothe sovereign uolonte generate can be formulated for the first time. WithinEuropean legal theory, consideration of the phenomenon of governmental-ity has unfolded under the rubric of "measures" and in particular-Ma(5-nahmegesetze-the term that in German refers to legal measures createdfor specific occasions and singular cases. The particularity of the measure[die Ma/lnahme], states Carl Schmitt, "consists of the dependence of itsaim on the concrete situation," (Schmitt 1978: 248) so that the process itdesignates "has no legal form of its own." For Schmitt sovereignty is nolonger defined by the will to law but by a juridically unchecked "powerof disposal" (Ver(iigungsgewalt). In this way he locates his concept of the"measure" on the same level as does Foucault his concept of modern gov-ernment, which, by citing La Per riere's own definition, he defines as "theright disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end" (Fou-cault 2007: 96). This formulation in fact does without any reference to legalconcepts, replacing them with a determination of aims.

In the political situation of the European interwar period, Carl Schmittand his student Ernst Forsthoff understood the formation of a "total state"to be the result of a definitive "turn to the administrative state," annulling

Gouernmentalization o( the State 83

any legal provisos of a constitutional nature. Appearing in 1933, Forst-hoff's book on the Total State was a juridical welcoming salutation to theNazi regime; but on an analytic level, the concept encapsulated a diagnosisto the effect that a state's action was no longer reducible to punctual inter-ventions in a society but was directed at "the life" of a population in itsentirety. Forsthoff's work on administrative law merits special attentionin research on govcrnmcntaliry, because from the juridical side it confirmsFoucault's description of the development of modern biopower, its growingimportance signified in a diminished role for both the law and constitu-tional guarantees: "We have entered a phase of juridical regression in com-parison with the pre-seventeenth-century societies we are acquainted with"(Foucault1978: 144). For both Schmitt and Forsthoff, in twentieth-centuryconditions the motto of the rule of law in a constitutional state is simply, .an anachronism. Forsthoff's response to this diagnosis involved developinga new concept of productive administration-a form of administration nolonger limited to occasional societal interventions or police-work to coun-ter threats.

In his reflections on the modern administrative state, Forsthoff's openingassumption is "the fact that since roughly the start of the previous ce~l~ury,individual Daseinsfubrung [management of life or existence] had decisivelyaltered" (Forsthoff 1976a: 50). Even more than the concept of Daseins-vorsorge (provisions for existence, in the current EU cO,ntext "s~rvi~es ofgeneral economic interest"), for whose coinage and detailed applica.tlon ..toadministrative law Forsrhoff became well known, the term Daseinsfuh-rung (the German term could be translated literally as "conduct of exis-tence") used here is of special interest: it reflects an an.al~sls of pres~n.t-.d,aygovernrnentaliry as the result of an increasing exproprianon of posslbd~t1esfor managing one's own "existence," Nineteenth-century hum.an beingsemerge as persons "without a life space they control"; they are.1Il need of"organized provisions, extensive arrangements for sustenance, III order tobe able to enjoy the necessities of life" (ibid.: 51). Although the knowledge-based analysis and administrative planning of both individual and collec-tive facts of human life began long before the nineteenth century, politicalcontrol of this life was strengthened by the loss of what Forsthoff namedDaseinsreseruen "reserves for existence." Now Forsthoff's work III boththe pre-1945 period and after the war is characterized by an understand-ing of modern administration, in its status as a cO~lpreh~nslve form, ofDaseinsuorsorge, "provision for existence!".as sO,meth,ng allen to. constiru-tiona I law. Before 1945, he sees this administrative form as leading to thebreakdown of the system of constitutional limitation on the state's executiveauthority; and he understands and justifies the total state as an adequateexpression of a situation in which individuals are ever less, 11l a POSltl?11

. h . I d 8 ft 1945 a dualism of adrnin-to provide themselves Wit vita goo 5; a er " , .istrative and constitutional law, maintained aga insr all Cfltl~U~, replacesthe totalitarian monism of the administrative state. Forsrhoff msists on the

84 Friedrich Balke

essential incompatibility between an administrative law oriented aroundfacts and goals and a freedom-guaranteeing constitutional order, becausehe continues to see the latter as grounded in an idea of the legal subject asdepending primarily or even exclusively on his or her accomplishments,hence not "in need," and precisely in that way immune to what is eithergranted or imposed by public-service administration. In the theoretical dis-cussion of this approach, what has been stressed, alongside this refusal toderive administrative from constitutional law, is above all that the centralconcept of Dasemsuorsorge, however much it has meanwhile become anintegral concept in administrative law," "only has functions in legal dogmato a limited extent," rather designating a "political postulate" (Schutte2006: 81). In any case, from the perspective of an analysis of the formstaken by present-day art of government on the level of state action, takingForsthoff's reflections and terminology as a starting point would appearpotentially productive: Forsthoff's ideas regarding the relevant governmen-tal practices point to the difficulty of continuing to grasp them entirely in alegal framework. This is the case, for instance, with plans and planning asa form for administrative action; and also with the so called "physical act,"designating "non-official administrative action" (suggestions, instructions,preparatory administrative measures) that cannot be understood in termsof either contracts or planning.

With his study of The State in Industrial Society (1971), Forsthoff dem-onstrates the analytical productivity of an admittedly conservative doctrineof state, since he expressly inquires into the question of the "massive changesin human existential circumstances [Daseinsverhiiltnisse] to be expectedthrough the coming decades' technological development." As an example,Forsthoff chooses-alongside "protection of the environment from destruc-tion by industry"-the threat posed to the "integrity of the human beinghimself, after he has become an object of genetic research" (Forsthoff 1971:25). Forsthoff does not credit a state long-since developed into a comple-mentary function of industrial society with the capacity to protect us fromthese new sorts of existential risks; at the same time he excludes the pos-sibility of finding non-state actors for the task, meaning that his analysisturns out aporetic. Nevertheless the "Forsthoffian rule" (Neumann 1984:95)-a rule in debt to a certain reading of Rousseau-to the effect thatwithin corporate states the chances of an interest being realized decrease tothe extent that the number of those who share the interest increase (Forst-hoff 1971: 25) has been taken up by liberal and left-wing authors." In gen-eral, then (and this is the problem I will be discussing below), Forsthoff isconcerned with the legal-historical development of modern democracies asan increasing distancing from a conceptual matrix Rousseau laid out inexemplary fashion: a matrix within which, in the act of obedience to statedirectives, political subjects in the end only obey themselves.

From the beginning, Forsthoff's analysis of the precarious constitutionalstate stands under the sign of historical events Foucault paid great attention


in his lectures on the history of governmentality: events emerging fromGermany's zero-hour of 1945 and its overcoming "without steering andauthoritative participation by the state," (Forsthoff 1976b: 90) hence, touse Rousseau's terminology: the new foundation of a social order with cir-cumvention of the constituting power. Conformed once again in this actof paradoxical new foundation is Rousseau's insight into the differance ofthe foundational event, which-corresponding to the significance of thatterm (Latin differre) as delay or detour, (Derrida 1982: 1-27) in a certainsense is postponed until later. In a Realanalyse of West Germany publishedin 1960, Forsthoff characterizes the object of his work as a "new styleof social order" that although continuing to define itself as a state, owesneither its existence nor its stupendous success to a genuinely sovereignact of state (Forsthoff 1976c: 1). Instead of allowing themselves to be ledby experiences from the Weimar Republic, in the 1945 zero-hour situa-tion those involved in the timetable for reconstruction had to refrain fromgiving precedence to restoring the state, thus demonstrating the falsity ofa particular dogma of constitutional law: "without an orderly state, noorderly economy" (ibid.: 3). Forsthoff summarizes the phenomenon of con-stitutional deferral with words highly similar to those Foucault will use atthe end of the 1970s in his above-mentioned lectures, where he will subjectthe same phenomenon to a detailed analysis "Economic reconstruction didnot follow that of the state but took place simultaneously with it; it evenoverrook the state's reintegration" (ibid.). For Foucault as for Forsthoff,after 1945 Germany again steps unto a special path, a Sonderweg, but thistime one admired on all sides being based on the idea of the state's "realfoundation in the existence and practice of economic freedom" (Foucault2008: 85-86). Because, as Forsthoff writes, West Germany "preceded allother states in its surrender to the exigencies of economic activity," (Forst-hoff 1976d: 36) the country is a paradigmatic object of study for the histo-rian of the neo-liberal art of government.

Forsthoff sees the specific constitutional history of the German FederalRepublic as founded on a "capacity for self-direction and self-discipline;(Forsthoff 1976c: 3) the subject of this foundation is precisely not the starebut rather the entirety of the individuals and collective actors who knowhow to govern or steer "themselves." Alongside the governmental dimen-sion of this founding he also underscores the disciplinary dimension of thereconstruction, in the process reinforcing Foucault's thesis that governmen-tal practices and tactics do not replace disciplinary authority, but togetherwith it compensate for the absence of the classical state .. For Forsthoff, theeconomy's restoration "was by no means merely the fr-uit of freedom .and afree play of forces set inro motion with it, in the liberal sense; rather, It ~vassustained by new sorts of collective discipline on a gr~nd scale [n.euartlgell

kollektiven Disziplinierungen grof5en Stils!, upon which the survival of theeconomy largely depends even today" (ibid.: 4). On the level of governmen-tal techniques, Forsthoff cites the "constant cooperanon between the stare

86 Friedrich Balke

and society's arrayed forces," by which he means, alongside the parties,above all the associations; the cooperation renders itself concrete in "con-tracts, agreements to silence, understandings, recommendations, warn-ings" (ibid.: 4f.), hence, in "para-legal" speech-acts, not bound to eitherthe form or functional mode of the law, and arrangements with politicaleffect. These cooperative forms "degrade" the state to one participatingacror among others; in doing so they presage the debate about governmentand new society-wide negotiating mechanisms that will only emerge inthe academy decades later. Alongside these forms, above all new scientificmethods, developed through the "modern national economy," "make itpossible to already recognize critical aberrations at their starting points,when their regulation is still possible using limit defensive means" (ibid.:13). This explains why West Germany needs to be understood as a politythat no longer anticipates the state of exception, understood as a criticalescalation of mistaken developments leading to the collapse of a societyor conjuring up civil war-"and this not from myopia or a fear of respon-sibility" (ibid.). Conceived according to the sovereign logic of the state ofexception, the classical form of eminent political danger is replaced by theconception of a social susceptibility to risk that-as the present example ofthe financial crisis shows-brings the state onto the scene as an economicmoderator.

Forsthoff's analysis of the capacities of modern "industrial society"(lndustrie-Gesellschaft), of which West Germany is an "example", breaksoff prematurely, because he can only conceive the subject's relation to thisorder in categories of subjugation and disciplining. Although he insists,very similarly to Foucault, that "nothing would be more mistaken" than"continuing to conceive the postwar reality of modern industrial society"in the categories of the Weimar period," both his notion of Daseinsvor-sorge and the juridical instrument of the Ma(Jnahmegesetz are nonethelesscharacterized by adherence to a model entrusting the public authorities,now as before, with an ability to project itself above the totality of eco-nomic processes and prescribe their goals. Daseinsvorsorge is a conceptpointing back to the tradition of the police state as reconstructed by Fou-cault: "The police state establishes an administrative continuum that, fromthe general law to the particular measure, makes the public authorities andthe injunctions they give one and the same type of principle, according itone and the same type of coercive value" (Foucault 2008: 168f.). For Forst-hoff the state as manifest in industrial society embodies this administrativecontinuum, in that it is based on an exchange between the social demandof discipline at work in the productive sphere and the guarantees offered bythe welfare state's apparatus. Obedience in the economic sphere, to whichthe post-1945 Germa n model owes its success, is the precondition for asocial stability that until the time of the "students' revolt," which Forsthoffnnly denigrates despite its politicizing power, excluded political experi-ments: "The factors assuring stability of the social whole are distributed


between the state and industrial society but have the latter as their centerof gravity" (Forsthoff 1971: 163). Albeit only hesitatingly and with grittedteeth, Forsthoff accepts the disciplinary order of the economy as, in a sense,a formation replacing now absent sovereign authority. He thus sees the neworder as standing Ot falling with the "social redistribution that can only berealized with state means" (ibid.).

Forsthoff juxtaposes this social formation comprised of industrial soci-ety and administrative state with his ideal of a constitutional state, in theprocess fully ignoring the significance of the principle of the constitutionalstate "in the economic order," as underscored by Foucault (Foucault 2008:171). In ordoliberal conceptions of an "individual social policy," (ibid.)"which Forsthoff basically neglects, law not only comes into playas a meansfor the state to intervene in the economy or as an instrument of protectionagainst the dehumanizing effects of capitalism; its significance also lies inthe invention of ever-new rules generating and allowing the modificationof the institutional framework for economic processes. For both the stateand other participating actors, law transforms the economy into a game,a "regulated set of activities" (ibid.: 163). In contrast, Forsthoff's concep-tion of the administrative state is along the lines of a plan pursuing specificeconomic goals. According to Forsthoff the plan is the form in which thestate can still serve as an asymmetric decision-maker-albeit one actingby proxy-in the conditions imposed by an industrial society. Within eco-nomic legislation, rule of law has the sense of treating all participatingactors equally, whatever their institutional status or capacity to mobilizepower-resources, and holding them to the game's commonly shared rules.Through its goal of increasing the number of economic subjects and wid-ening their scope for play, such law also increases the possible points offriction between the actors, thus producing an intensified demand for leg-islation. "To the extent that you free economic subjects and allow themto play their game, indicates Foucault, "the more you detach them fromtheir status as virtual functionaries of a plan" (ibid.: 175). Because Forst-hoff locates the constitutional state's domain fundamentally outside theeconomic-social sphere, he ignores the extent to which this legal technol-ogy participates in transforming internal economic circumstances,and theirinstitutional implementation: a transformation irrevocably breaklI1? downthe stabilizing connection between the disciplinary order of production andreadiness for political obedience.. , .

At the same time Forsthoff's reflections confirm Foucault s thesis thatgovern mentality is "simultaneously internal and external to the state." Inrespect to Rousseau we can say that governmentality is exter~al, t~ thestate-understood as the institutional embodiment of the uolonte generale:the process through which a society becomes governable is aimed at a readi-ness to follow and in this sense at the subject's obedience, Rousseau makingclear (0 the contrary that the sovereign can never promise to obey. ~u.( t~atsuch a process does not succeed through force, subjugation, or discipline

88 Friedrich Balke

alone, that it is also "interior" to the uolonte generale, demonstrates pre-cisely the manner in which govern mentality is aimed at nothing less thanredemption of the idea of the state as a "phenomenon of will"-an ideaForsthoff sees as "anything but self-evident," but characteristic for Rous-seau (Forst hoff 1976b: 95):

The identity of those governing and the governed-the shortest formulafor describing the democratic principle-was meant to be an identityof will. With this the citizen of the state, who obeyed the will of thestate, was meant to be following his own will, which he encounteredin the will of the state, the uolonte generale. Rousseau was the first totransform the simple object-relation of those subordinated to the stateinto a subject-relation. (ibid.: 96)

It is interesting to see that Forsthoff understands this basic idea of Rous-seau-his famous-notorious identity-centered conception of democracy-exclusively in terms of constitutional law, hence can only speak of it in thepast tense. His conclusion is clear: "We find ourselves in a developmentthat is on the point of changing this constitutional order, grounded every-where in a genuine or fictitious act of will" (ibid.). And as an example, heoffers the growing importance of experts in political decision-making: suchexperts, he indicates, although exercising no executive authority and stand-ing outside the bureaucratic hierarchy, nevertheless take on a position thatin legal respects as much as in other respects can hardly be challenged.

Now recent research on govern mentality has strongly suggested that thehighly prominent position of experts in the process of political decision-making is by no means to the clear-cut detriment of the "subject's relation-ship" to the state. In accord with their pastoral origins, governing practicesare focused precisely on the steering and conducting of individuals, justas originally they were aimed at the individual's conscience and personalsalvation. When Rousseau's identity-centered vision is conceived-as oftenhappens-merely as a pre-totalitarian vision of democracy sacrificing theindividual's will to that of the generality, his theory's decisive point hasbeen missed: the uolonte de taus is here only rejected when its effectivenessoverlayers the "large number of small differences" with one "unique dif-ference" (say that between rich and poor) that, as the generator of extremesocial inequality, structurally hinders a common formation of will (Rous-seau 1979a: 371). Over recent years, research on governmentality has con-vincingly mapped out the extent to which our present art of governmenthas developed technologies through which "individuals in the most variedsocial realms are, as Althusser has put it, invoked "as active and free citi-zens, members of self-managing associations and organizations, autono-mously acting persons who are Or should be in the position to rationallycalculate their own life risks" (Brockling, Krasmann Lemke 2004: 13).Current govern mentality actually models the political relationship on the


matrix developed by Rousseau: Whatever impositions and subjugationsmay be tied to the provision of certain state or public services, individualcitizens need to consistently have the impression they are encounteringtheir own will in the bureaucratically manifest volonte generate, of whicheach of them is also a part. And for their part, governmental practicesand tactics are duty-bound, through the use of new means, to the projectbegun by Rousseau of transforming the citizen's simple object-relation tothe authorities and institutions providing public service in the welfare state,as standing before Forsthoff, into a "subject relationship." In this context,"activation," as a central concept in the new governmental technologies,refers to a "social model that tries to enforce the autonomous engagementof the population," (Kocyba 2004: 20) and is anchored in what Forsthoffterms the "problem of will." For Forsthoff, "freedom and particrpanon arethe cardinal concepts today determining the relation of the individual to thestate" (Forsrhoff 1976e: 75). Where, he argues, participation-Teilhabe-designates the state in its capacity to "offer services, lleisten[ apportion[zuteilen] deploy [verteilen], and divide [teilen[," freedom imposes limits onthe state and leaves "the individual to his social situation." A govern men-tality tying a guarantee of social services to a readiness of those receivingthem not to surrender themselves to their situation, but rather to embraceand apply measures to change it, is breaking precisely with this clear-cutdistinction between the welfare state and the constirurional state.

Hence if Forsthoff could still maintain that "In their intentions theconstitutional state and the welfare state are thoroughly different, not tosay opposites," (ibid.) then this assessment must itself be suppli:,d with ahistorical index to the extent that the welfare state renders Its guaran-tees" dependent on proof of freedom by those benefiting from it. WhatForsthoff could not foresee was the emergence of a welfare-state cultureappropriating the pathos of the constitutional state's concept of freedo,;,and transforming it into a criterion for guaranteeing services. Forsrhoff sconcern was entirely focused on a welfare state that endangered the fun-damental rights guaranteed by the constitutiona.l st.ate, relativizing theminto mere values and thus delivering them to a jumprudence relying ontechniques of interpretation directly taken from the humanities. How-ever, neo-liberal govern mentality has dislocated the ~el.atlo.n betweenboth "states" in such a way that a constitutionally or igmanng rese:veof freedom is built into the principle of Daseinsvorsorge, thus advancingfreedom from its negative, segregating function in the classical constJt~-

. II .. riry 12 Under the condi-tional state to a positive, socia y constltutlve.quan". .tions of nee-liberal govern mentality, the social order In general IS newlygrounded in "genuine or fictitious" acts of will. Both the economy and theauthorities tied to Daseinsvorsorge are called on to organize ~abor an.dthe distribution mechanism so that they together guarantee subjects tlh:freedom in that way rransforming-m the manner outlined previous ~the citizen's object-relation to the institutions of the modern preventive

90 Friedrich Balke

state into a subject relation. The danger of such a governmental arrange-ment, in which Rousseau's social contract has achieved undreamt ofeminence, lies in the unfolding on a subtle level of what Forsthoff cor-rectly defined as the conversion of social functions into functions of rule:"Whoever is cared for by the state feels dependent on it and is inclined tobow before it" (Forsthoff 1976a: 56). In our contemporary context, thisstatement can be reformulated as follows: Those cared for by the state canbow before it far more easily because they bow before themselves.

NOTES

1. For this reason the following discussion is indebted to Cassirer's observa-tion that "for us [ ... I Rousseau's doctrine is no object of mere scholar'scuriosity; no object of pure philological-historical consideration. Rather, itis manifest [ ... ] as a thoroughly contemporary and living problematic. Thequestions Rousseau posed to his century-today as well these are not at allantiquated, for us, as well, they have not been simply 'taken care of'." SeeErnst Cassirer (1989: 8).

2. Rousseau's "people" (peuple) oscillates between the two basic meanings ofthe German word Volk: on the one hand, in the framework of constitutionallaw it designates a democracy's constitutive political subject, who replacesthe monarch as the constituent authorit y; on the other hand it designates thetotality of poor and excluded "folk," members of the "lower classes," the"ordinary people" contrasting with the rich and noble and meriting "pity"by the revolutionaries, who act in their name. Hannah Arendt notes that"the very definition of the word was born out of compassion, and the termbecame the equivalent for misfortune and unhappiness-Ie peuple, les mal-heureux m'applaudissent, as Robespierre was wont to say" (Arendt 1963:65). The term Ie peuple is a key to understanding both the French Revolutionand Rousseau's political theory, which aims at transforming the immenseclass of the poor and unhappy into a new, democratic, and sovereign entity.Hence, importantly, for Rousseau le peuple does not have a national or eth-nic tenor, rather designating the political task of grounding the new politicalorder in the "general interest" of those who have been excluded from thatorder. There is no argument in Rousseau restricting affiliation to the peopleto those of an identical "national" descent.

3. It is no coincidence that Jacques Derrida uses Rousseau to exemplify the gram-marological dimension of supplementary logic, involving appendage to a thingin order to strengthen or protect it. See Derrida (1997[19671: 141-164).

4. On the "immanence of practices of government" see Foucault (2007: 93).5. See Foucault (2007: 47): "Politics has to work in the element of a reality that

the physiocrars called, precisely, [physis], when they said that economics is alphysis ... I. Only ever situating oneself in this interplay of reality with itselfis, I think, what the physiocrats, the economists, and eighteenth-centurypolitical thought understood when it said that we remain in the domain ofIIJhysisl." (Translation modified)

6. In his analysis of the theoretical "displacements" unfolding in the SocialContract, Louis Althusser already suggested that under the juridical title ofJ contract, in Rousseau's Case we are facing an extraordinary contract with aparadoxical structure: "Rousseau's contract docs not correspond to his con-cept. In fact his Social Contract is nor a contract but the act of constitution,"


through which the individuals forming the contract transform themselvesinto a body politic on the way to "alienation totale"-a total transfer ofgoods and property. That "everything" has to be invested in this contractmeans precisely that the act of forming the contract does not leave the con-tracting parties unaltered but to the contrary alters their existence in a funda-mental way. The "alienation totale" of which Althusser speaks in relation toRousseau's contract is possible "because it is purely interior to the liberty ofindividuals: it is possible because human beings give themselves completely,yet to themselves." This combination of an extreme degree of freedom andan unlimited readiness for self-renunciation or sel f-revelarion represents theparadoxical basic figure at work in Rousseau's pedagogic projecr. See LouisAlthusser (1966: 5-42). .

7. This constituting point does not belong to the realm of law and co:nventlonjRousseau shows this with the example of Peter the Great's forcible mod-ernization of the Russian Empire: Peter failed to see that his nation was notmature enough for civilized behavior (as Rousseau 'puts it, pour.fa police)(Rousseau 1979a: 386). The czar ignored the phYS1S of the RUSSianpopu-lation which he understood as "that kind of original datum, that kind ofmaterial on which the sovereign's action is to be exercised, that vis-a-vis ofthe sovereign" (Foucault 2007: 71). . .

8. See Schutte (2006: 44): "The supply of services such as .wate:, gas, el.ectflCI~Y,and transportation make his existence possi.ble, espeCially, III"the city. EXIS-tential provisions have thus become a necesstt y of human .lIfe.

9. See (ibid.: 103): "Disregarding the difficulties of endowing the concept ofDaseinsvorsorge with firm contours, it can demonstrate an extr~m.ely s~c·cessful career, hardly comparable to another term in recent administrativehistory."

10. See for example Claus Offe (1973: 368fo.. .. . .11. "In short it does not involve providing individuals With a SOCIal cover for

risks, but 'according everyone a sort of economic space within which they canrake on and confront risks" (Foucault 2008: 144).

12. "The dismantling of forms of welfare-state interv~ntion is accomp~nied by areconstruction of techniques of government that displace,s ~h.esreermg c7pac-ity of state apparatuses and authorities to 'resp~~slb}e, Circumspect, and'rational' individuals" (Lemke, Krasmann and Brockling 2000: 30).

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Lemke, Thomas, Susanne Krasrnann and Ulrich Brocklmg. (2000). Gouvernemen-taiitat, Neoliberalismus und Selbsttechnologien. Eine Einleitung, pp. 7-40 inUlrich Brockling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke (eds) Gouvernemen-talit.at der Gegenwart. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Neumann, Volker. (1984). Der harte Weg zurn sanften Ziel. Ernst ForsrhoffsRechrs- und Staarsrheorie als Paradigma konservativer Technikkritik, pp.88-99 in Alexander RolSnagel and Peter Czajka (eds) Recht und Technik irnSpannungs(eld der Kernenergiekontroverse. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Offe, Claus. (1973). Das plu ralistische System von organisierren Interessen, pp.368-371 in Heinz josef Vara in (ed): lnteressenverbande in Deutschland. Koln:Kiepenheuer und Witsch.

Rousseau, Jean-jacques (1969[1762J) Emile, ou de l'education, in Oeuvres com-pletes, Volume 4. Paris: Gallimard.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (197611782)). Les Confessions, in Oeuvres Completes,Volume 1. Paris: Gallimard.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1979a(1762]). Du Conrrat Socia I, ou, Principes du DroitPolitique, in Oeuvres Completes, Volume 3. Paris: Gallimard.

ROllsseau, Jean-Jacques. (1979b[17551). Discours sur L'Economie Politique, inOeuvres Completes, Volume 3. Paris: Gallimard.

Rousseau, jean-Jacques. (1979c[17631). Projet de Constitution pour la Corse inOeuvres Completes, Volume 3. Paris: Gallimard.

Schm itt, Ca rl. (197811921)). Die DIktatur. Von den A nfiingell des Modernen Sou-veriinitatsgedankens his zum Prolelarischen Klassenkamp(. Berlin: Duncker &Humblor.

Schtitte, Christian. (2006). Progressive Verwaltul1gswissel1schafl auf konserva-liver Grund/age. Zur Verwaltungsrechtslehre Ernst Forsthoffs. Schriften zurRechtsgeschichte, Heft 128. Berlin, Duneker & Humblor.

Sta robinski, Jean. (197]). jean-jacques Rousseau. La Transparence et L·Obstacle.Suivi de Se/Jts Essays sur Rosseau. Paris: Gallimard.

5 Government UnlimitedThe Security Dispositif ofIlliberal Governmentality

Sven Opitz

1. THE STATE OF GOVERNMENTALITY

In his lectures on govern mentality, Foucault repeatedly claims that theliberal governrnenrality that emerged at the end of the eighteenth centurystill defines the political rationalities of the present. Following Foucault,gouernmentality studies have dwelt upon this per-ststence of liberal gov-ernmental reason and the indirect, entrepreneunal forms of c?ndu~~ that. I (B·· kling 2007· Rose 1999). These (neo)libera! rationalities ofIt emp oys roc 1 , . ..conduct have been explored in areas as diverse as economlc.orgamzatlons(Miller and Rose 1990; Opitz 2004), welfare programs (Cruikshank 1999;Dean 1995), health care (Greco 1993; Lemke 2006), and criminal policy(Smandych 1999· Krasmann 2003). With a few exceptions (Dean 2001;Valverde 1996), ;overnmentality studies have thereby prirna rily focused onthe extent to which liberal practices are preoccupied with the li~l~a~~on ofdirect intervention. This contribution, 10 contrast, takes a fsiIghtdY ~,(eFrenr

. . hi' f" duct ° can uct ou-approach. Instead of invesnganng t e oglC 0 con . . .cault 1982) in a further societal domain, it focuses on ItS limlts·bMor~ pre-cisely, this text examines how liberal rationality orga~.lz~s the ou~, aTiesof the "powers of freedom" and establishes modes of illiberal rule. dHOWdoes governmentality, as a form of rule based on the logl~ of lim;t~ gov-ernmenr, allow for the unlimited and excessive ex~rclse.a power.. ow ISthe exertion of direct and physical violence strategICally mtegrated mto ~hemodern regime of governmenrality? How ~oes liberal gove~nment SWltc toan illiberal mode in its own name and on Its own grounds. _

These are the questions that guide this contnbutlon. It suggests r~work_ing and strengthening the notion ofsecutity wlthm tlide cobnetcteePrt~~o~P~~r

I· d· 10 order to provi erarus of governmenta Ity stu les, . . f f The.. f I"b I nd illiberal orms 0 power.

analyzing the intertwmlng 0 I era a I d modern politi-o' I F cault's ectures an tonotion of secunty IS centra to ou . II discussed within

I h· I b t it has not been systematlca yca t eory In genera,. u with the difficulty of explaininggovernmentalay studtes. Instead, faced I· I d· g schol-

. . I . h of governmenta ItY, ea Inthe exercise of dIrect VIO ence 10 t e age h f biopolitical racismars in the field have hitherto resorted to t e concept a

94 Suen Opitz

sketched out by Foucault in the last lecture of his course Society Must BeDefended (Foucault 2003a; d. Dean 2001; Lemke 2003). But, as will beshown, the notion and logics of security are indispensable if we wish tounderstand the contemporary forms of illiberal practices such as shoot-to-kill policies or methods of interrogation involving torture. The concept ofbio-racism alone does not render these political rationalities intelligible. Aswill be demonstrated, a careful reconstruction and discussion of securityhelps us to understand how it constitutes the decisive governmental hingethat translates between different types of intervention.

The argument proceeds in four steps. The chapter starts with an exami-nation of the public discourses surrounding contemporary illiberal prac-tices. It shows that the logics and claims of security, which undergird thesepractices, cannot be reduced to classical "reason of state" arguments (2).Hence, it seems appropriate to inquire into the governmental rationality ofthese measures. In order to elucidate this rationality, a close reading of Fou-cault's lectures will demonstrate how Foucault, while accounting for thenovel discourse on security, only sowed the seeds of an account of the log-ics of direct intervention fuelled by a liberal culture of fear (3). To furtherexplore the tipping point between the "powers of freedom" and the coerciveforms of liberalism prevalent today, this chapter suggests drawing on thesecuritization approach as developed by the Copenhagen School. Accord-ing to this approach, extraordinary and exclusionary political measures areactivated through the invocation of an existential threat. The contributionties this specific rhetoric of security to a re-inscription of sovereign logics ofpower into govern mentality as liberal practice (4). The last section showshow such liberal-cum-sovereign governmental rule leads to a prominent re-emergence of technologies of police. The example of preventive and poten-tially extra-legal interventions of police power within the logic of securitymakes it possible to show how liberal forms of rule are twisted into illiberalforms of knowledge collection, spatial regularion and de-subjectivation (5).This chapter thus argues that illiberal govern mentality is an inherent poten-tiality of liberal reason-haunting ir, corrupting it and pushing it forwardat the same time.

2. CONTEMPORARY INVOCATIONS OF SECURITY

As contemporary discourses and practices show, the notion of securityallows for the problematizing of various political and social questions inquite specific ways. In general, invocations of security promote the imple-mentation of novel measures of intervention. However, a broad rangeof cases can be identified. The following cursory overview of exemplaryappeals to the problem of security serves to illuminate the breadth andeffects of the current transformations in political discourse.

Government Unlimited 95

In December 2006 the German Minister of the Interior, WolfgangSchauble, reintroduced a legislative proposal that allowed the shooting downof passenger flights by the German Air Force" in cases where these might beused as weapons by terrorists. The killing of innocent passengers IS Justifiedin the name of national security-even though earlier that year, the Fed-eral Constitutional Court had already declared § 14 (3) of the 2005 German

A,· L w which was intended to provide the legal baSIS for such acts,vianon a , ibili fto be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, Schauble insisted on the pO.SSlI lty. aordering pre-emptive strikes against civil aircraft in case of an lmpen.dlllg"elementary attack on community assets," such as n~c1ear power station:,The Minister of the Interior's legislative proposals fit Into the government sbroader objective of deploying the armed forces within Germany. HIS pro-posals question the clear separation between the police and the armed forces,that is between the domestic or inrernationa! use of state Violence. .

Almost simultaneously, in early 2007, the US Department of the Interiorsubmitted a handbook to Congress containing rules for trials by special tri-

bunals These rules granted judges the power to recogrnze forced testuno-nies and hearsay as evidence. The handbook established the legal, gUidelinesfor the "enhanced interrogation techniques" outlined In the Military Com-missions Act. Six months earlier, Karen Greenberg, the director of the

dC~n-

ter on Law and Security at New York University, had already argue t atthe establishment of systematic "politics of torture" In the so-called w~r hanterror was a proven fact. Togerher with Joshua Drarel, she supp~rt~ erclaim with 1,200 pages of material entitled "The Torture Papers ( reen-berg and Drarel 2005). Among other things, the docum,:nts disclose ho~the politics of torture rely on "extraordinary rendmons -th

le 'p~ac.tJce.0

. h t apply torture 1 Such egmmlzatJOI1transferring prisoners to countries t a . . depriof the uses of interrogation techniques like waterboardlng, sleep epnva-tion or prolonged standing in "stress positions" in the na~e ~f secuflt~re uirements is not a phenomenon restricted to US policy, . e . lrecror. 0the German Federal Office for the Protection of the ConstitUtion, HeinzFromm has declared that information from foreign sources must be us~deven if i'twas extracted by torture. Such arguments justify torture as a te~ -nique of intelligence gathering that responds to a purportedly new secufl~y

. t They seek to establish a difference between torture m t eenvrronrnen , . h d d torture as punishment or as a meansname of security, on the one an , an L b 2006)of terrorizing people into submission on the other ( u on h .

The effects of security discourses are not limited to sue ehxtreme cafses.

I ia l sphere T ey trans armRather they disseminate into near y every SOCI . f ., d' d . centers In the name 0 secunry,

train stations, football sta rums an city , . b tanders and becomeindividuals are to abandon their stance as passive ys f ' d t k-

, "I t1y gathering In ormation an apart of a proactive commumty Vigi an . I' I. . I d ers On the American on me porta

ing measures againsr potentia ang: . forms' via the Internetd th "war on terror" assumes uireracnve roru» ,rea y.gov, e

96 Suen Opitz Government Unlimited 97

within already existing institutional settings; rather, the ~uestion is h?wthe domain and logics of the political ate shaped by invocations of security.In short: how are specific power relations and institutional forms estab-lished through mechanisms of security?

citizens are interpellated as alert participants in a "war on terror" to befought from their homes. They shall no longer be mere spectators of mediacoverage but are called upon to turn into soldiers stationed at their desks(Andrejevic 2006). The desk is not always a safe place, however, as a stu-dent at the University of California in Los Angeles experienced in 2006.He was caught using a computer in the library without his student ID, andwhen he refused to vacate the building the security forces shot him repeat-edly with a so-called "raser." In extreme cases, even the targeted killingof individuals in urban environments has become a permissible police mea-sure. Traditionally limited to classical warfare, targeted or "extra juridical"killing has been established as a "limit case" of security management (Kes-sler and Werner 2007). Thus, in the aftermath of the terrorist bombingsin London 2005, journalists discovered that the Anti-Terrorist Branch ofLondon's Metropolitan Police deployed "shoot-to-kill" tactics under thecode-name "Operation Kratos."This enumeration of instances in which security concerns currently bear

on policies could be continued. They indicate not only a quantitative pro-liferation of security discourse, but also a qualitative shift: the very notionof security starts to change meanings, episternic structures, and politicaleffects. The cases point to the erosion of distinctions such as civil/military,legal/illegal, domestic/international, private/public and-above all-inter-na lIexternal security (Bigo 2001). The difficulties that traditional disciplineslike International Relations or criminology have when trying to grasp theselogics by applying their usual categories of security are symptomatic for theimpending transformations of the meaning and implications of security. Asthe examples show, security no longer refers-as the neorealisr perspectivein International Relations assumes (e.g., Walt 1991)-exclusively to ques-tions of deterrence and the deployment and control of the armed forces ofa state. But contemporary invocations of security fit neither the crimino-logical understanding of security as obeying the law, nor controlled delin-quency. The simple breach of a law by a subject does not circumscribe theissues raised by the invocations of security today-a development which isparadoxically accompanied by the extended use of categories like "crimi-nal" and "rogue" on the international stage (Derrida 2004). Hence, thelogic of the examples mentioned previously cannot be grasped within theboundaries of the two disciplines that have defined conventional notionsof security up until now. The present calls for security reveal a simultane-ous decentralization, de-limitation and multiplication of security strategiesamongst sub-national, national and supranational players. Politics in thename of security spreads rhizomorphically, uses novel technologies andthus disperses its dynamics.Faced with such prevalent and far-reaching invocations of security in

the justification of illiberal measures, it seems worthwhile to analyze theirunderlying political rationale more closely. The question, therefore, is nothow political or non-political actors make use of the notion of security

3. RATIONALlT1ES OF SECURITY: FROMSOVERE1GNTY TO GOVERNMENTALlTY

For an understanding of the political rationalities centered ~n securi~y, it isimportant to recognize that references (0 q~est.ions o~ security .are neither aperipheral nor a recent phenomenon. Security IS not just a subject of popu-lar discourse, but poinrs us to the core of the modern political tradition.In the opening section of his seminal work, Politics of Security, MichaelDillon (1996: 12) notes: "Security [ ... ] saturates the language of modernpolitics. Our political vocabularies reek of it and our pollticalll11agmatlonis confined by it." This is an accurate statement indeed: modern politics IS

preoccupied by the question of how to provide security. The question ofwhether to provide security is not posed-It lies outside the paramerers ofthe debate. Thus, security determines the polltlcallmagmatlon of moderntimes; but, pace Dillon, it does so in a variety of ways, as the following fewparagraphs will demonstrate. " . 'Early modern rheories of sovereignty, for which Hobbes Leviathan IS

paradigmatic, place the relation between p.OiJ~1CS an~ secu~lty at cent~rstage. For Hobbes, security is a founding principle as It provides the basis

,. hi t ceo cause aim and legItimationof sovereignty. Secunty IS everyt mg a on. ,: .of the modern state. The "security of a mans person (Hobbes 1985 [1651].192) is "lastly the motive, and end" (ibid.) for the erecnon of the Levia-than rhe "Mortall God" (ibid.: 227). In this respect, securuy functionsas the lever that makes the "transcendental apparatus" (Hardt and Negri2000: 83) of sovereign power work. According to Foucault, the emergenceof governmental power in the eighteenth century cons.tltu.tes a break .111

this political order of sovereignty. While the problematlzatlon of secu nr ycontinues to define the rationality of this new form of power, I,t changesirs form' liberal security differs fundamentally from a soverelg~ s rt~atlO;'to secur·ity. In his lectures, Foucault stresses time and again It at. 1 el~a-

, " h t of governmenta rat rona it y.ism places the logic of Iimitation at t e cen er , fTaking Foucault's analyrics of liberalism seriously provokes the que;tlon orhow liberal govern mentality can selectively un-limit ItS exefClsefio p~w:sand or anize a direct, domineering and Violent gra~p all. sp.ecl. cs. ?Foucau1t provide the conceptual instruments tdot~eor~ze ~~~srt;~~I~~-t~~:~':;where the illiberal power of the sovereign IS ep oye uconditions of governmenral rationality? . I' lik its histori-

Foucault shows that liberal governmental ratl°fnadlfY'dun II e hirs for thed d the warving 0 111 IVI ua figcal predecessors, does not ernan

98 Suen Opitz

purpose of transforming an anarchic state of nature into political order.Instead, it discovers natural processes whose immanent logic generatesorder. "This sudden emergence of the 'naturalness' of the species withinrhe political artifice of a power relation" (Foucault 2007: 22) manifestsitself in the birth of population and political economy. The population isa physical entity whose immanent regularities-such as birth rates, ill-nesses or accidents-are rendered visible through statistical apparatuses.In order to increase the strength of the population, governmental activitymust not hinder these natural processes. Rather, it has to ally itself withthem: it has to take into account their inherent dynamics and allow themto become productive. In this respect, population assumes decisive featuresof economy, which in the eighteenth century appeared as a field of realityfunctioning according to "natural" laws. While population forms the gov-ernment's sphere of intervention, economy provides for the rationalizationof the exercise of power. "To exercise power in the form, and accordingto the model, of economy" (Foucault 2007: 95), hence, means more thansimply weighing costs against benefits. It means recognizing the immanentlogic of economy and bringing to bear its dynamics. A case in point is themechanism of interest: interest is nothing that has to be restrained or relin-quished. On the contrary, interest has to be given free reign for it to gener-ate order. Confidence in the liberal play of interest, rherefore, amounts toa critique of intervention and of sovereign knowledge of the whole. Indi-vidual interests act blindly towards the totality; they must unfold withinthe boundaries of selfishness to promote the common good. Consequentlyno position of sovereign transcendence, from which everything can be seen,known and reacted to, exists. Political economy is an "atheistic discipline,I .. ·1 a discipline without God" (Foucault 2008: 282). It replaces the cen-tered perspective of an economic sovereign with the "natural" market, asa mechanism of verification and falsification of governmental action (Tell-mann 2003; 2009).

But does this assumption of a self-organizing social reality offer pointsof intervention at all? Why does self-generation require a governmentalrationality? The previously mentioned points seem to indicate only a limi-tation and a critique of intervention in the name of a laisser-faire attitude.Again, how is the necessity of regulation (Foucault 2007: 47) argued for,given such an understanding of reality? According to my reading of Fou-cault's lectures, the condition of possibility for regulation is establishedby a calculation of security that organizes new forms of exercising power:problematizing the security of self-regulating spheres marks the tipping-POint that makes it possible to navigate the paradoxical relation of non-Intervention and intervention within liberal rule. It is instructive to havea closer look at this paradoxical relation and its mediation through calcu-lations of secllrity. In order to do so, it is helpful to recall how Foucaulthimself has neshed out both the intervening and non-intervening logiCSof liberal rule.


On the one hand, Foucault explains, liberal government shapes speci,~cstructures of contingency in which it acts as a manag.er of freedom: Itconsumes freedom, which means that it must produce It. It must produce" . . it" (Foucault 2008· 63) As indicated before, studies ofIt, It must organize I ". . d hgovern mentality have investigated these forms of liberal power In" ept .Seen through this lens, liberal government avoids destructive relations ofviolence and direct coercion. Instead, "it incites, it induces, It sedu~es, It

k "or more difficult" (Foucault 1982: 220). Correspondingly,ma es easier hi' "(F It 2008·security technologies are "environmental tec, n~ ?gles oucau .261) that function indirectly and ensure that individuals make use of spe-cific freedoms. On the other hand, security technologies also address prac-. d bi hi h do not fit into the play of transactional freedom.trees an su jeers w IC d d fThey focus on heterogeneous practices, forms of conduct an. 0:0 CdS0

h " f f eedom" from within. I en-being that threaten to corrupt t e powers 0 r " Idtifying these elements, technologies of government det~mlne a ~hr~hobeyond which governmental power ceases to Induce al

f'f

II1dclte, lut hraws

h d ctive use a ree am e sew ere.on compulsory measures to secure t e pro u. . .hi isnif " . "the logic of intervention manifests Itself clearlyT IS sigru cant va nation In lib I

in the historical treatment of poverty. In the nineteenth century, i era gov-ernment bracketed the continuum of poverty into vanouS .m.ora se~ments.It strove to establish subsidiary plays of freedom ~hProvldl~gt~:r~~~:ons~incentive schemes for the good, able-bodied podar. IS sefrveterests At the

f ibl h pr-oductive yn anucs 0 In .of extending as ar as POSSI e t e "d b. ., d h d identified hun as a angerous Sit -same time, It Isolate t e pauper an if d to the level of social danger"[ect: "Pauperism IS [ •.• J poverty mtensi e " . . I of calculation for(P . 1991) In this respect secunty IS the prmcrp erocacci . . ' " ucault 2008: 65). The "danger-

the cost of manufacrunng freedom (Fo d through theous subject" pays the price for not being able to be goveHrne b di the

d rion of freedom e em 0 ressimultaneous production an consurnp I '. d h"" id f 'de field of liberally governable subjects an t usconstitutive outSI e 0 a WI . .

· . di . r en authontanan treatment.reqUlres special, ISCIPmary, or ev . 1 h . calculations mediate

In order to understand more preclse.y °lw~~~~:I~liberal security, it isthe relation between these tWO operatlona I hi If does-the paradox i-. h . ethan Foucau t ImseImportant to emp aSlze-mor. . I' doxical as the securitycal and unstable character ~frhis rel~tlOn. t IS ~ara n_interv'ention: govern-dispositif justifies intervention only In terms a no . hich it must

." beca use the processes In Wmental intervennon IS necessary d A h me time intervention

· ntly rhrearene. t t e sa ,not Intervene ate permane . ossible and feasible. According toonly intends to make non-Interventlo

ln P I defers back to non-inter-

1 . terventlon a ways a rea y rgovernmenra reason, in . .' h hi paradox is not an error

· d z» The crucial POint IS t at t ISvennon an vIce versa. k f h ern mental functioning.or a flaw to be dispelled for the sa ~ 0 .sm~~tlib~~:1 govern mentality. Met-Quite the opposire, It IS the key mec famsm " tion works as a kind of

h II k" h paradox 0 (non-)lI1tervenap otica y spea lng, t e "f t I powet· it demands to" d" ",," h fabnc 0 govern men a ."generative IsqUiet tn t e

100 Sven Opitz

be reproduced time and again, without ever being dissolved. One governsalways already too much, and has to continue governing in order not togovern too much. Governmental power is therefore never fixed, but in aconstant process of calibration mediated through calculations of security.

Against this background, it is the constant problematization of securitythar transforms liberal reason into an unstable and wavering rationale ofgovernment. Calculations of security mark the tipping-point that navigatesbetween intervention and non-intervention, negotiating the conditions andsubjects of both. To specify this crucial governmental tipping-point, onemight qualify the aporia at the centre of governmental reason as a socialmechanism of immunization. As Roberto Esposito (2009) has pointedout at length, this immunization works in the same way as its biologicalmodel: it reproduces the evil from which it is supposed to protect, addinga smaller ill in order to ward off a greater danger of the same kind. Hence,via the problematization of security interventions are not simply excludedfrom the governmental scene-in this case there would be no governmentalscene at all-but they are included in order to be excluded. The phdr-makon (Derrida 1981: 61 et seq.) of security measures is induced on thebasis of a permanent calculation: which practices of freedom are desirable,despite possible negative consequences, what kind of intervention may beconducted, to what extent and with which secondary effects? What are thesources of potential dangers? In what form and to what degree can dangerbe tolerated, and how can it be neutralized? Governmentality faces the chal-lenge of securing a circulation of interests, goods, and information againstdangers without halting this circulation. But in his analysis, Esposito alsoshows that social mechanisms of immunization may develop an excessivedrive-with ruinous effects. They tend to accelerate, increasing the meansdesigned to protect against their own ends in ever shorter time-spans. Notsurprisingly, Esposito sees the contemporary security apparatus as paradig-matic for such a hypertrophic dynamic in which a heightened perceptionof insecurity goes hand in hand with the implementation of more draconicmeasures against perceived threats. Pushed forward by its own affect pro-duction of fear and anxiety (Massumi 2005), the security dispositif is liableto expand its illiberal mode and to be turned over by this expansion. Inthe last consequence, it dissolves its constitutive aporia and inverts into asovereign machine.

Foucault does not completely neglect this potential for escalation inhis analysis of the modern security dispositif. While emphasizing liberalrestraint, he realizes at the same time that governmentality-as the politi-cal rationality that limits direct intervention-does not lead to an over-all reduction in political interference. On the contrary, the calculation ofsecurity guarantees the "conditions for the creation of a formidable bodyof legislation and an incredible range of governmental interventions" (Fou-cault 2008: 64 et seq.). The liberal art of governing is not "the suppression,obliteration, abolition, or I ... IAufhebung of the raison d'Etat" but rather


constitutes the "principle for maintaining it, developing it more fully'; (ibi~ ..:28) But what explanation does he himself offer In order to account dor t dis

. . d'E't t th t exceeds bounds an ten sliberal ability to encompass raison a ad . )

towards such a hypertrophic ynarruc: F It identifies at least twoAlthou h this IS not his mam concern, oucau I "

g I limit rion The inclusion of consIderatIOnsmoments of governmenta un- urn a, . I' rovides rhe first entryof utility in the interior of the secunty calcu anon p . f inalienableoint for overnmental excess. While the legal conception 0 I . .

P . g I li . 0 the exercise of power, the cntenonhuman fights sets an ext.erllla ,~mltlt 't" the exercise of power from thef ilit has the potentia to un- rrru f h

o uti I y .. " I 2008. 43) that is freed rom t einside. A "radicalism of Util.lty (Foucau r "" e ard to its effectiveness,criterion of legiti~acy, and IS evaluatedE:~II~I~~r;Jecisive, however, is rhelooms on the horizon of governfimen~e shows that on the flipside of secu-second moment Foucault identi es. Whether in relation to publicriry calculations, a culture of dangehremerges. this stimulation of the fear

. '11 '. "everyw ere you see Iservices, I ness or crime: di . he internal psychological and

f hi h i ir ere the con mon, to danger w IC IS, as I. W : " ibid.: 66 et seq.). This culrure of dangercultural correlative of lIberalIsm If .. I d to accept external control.

. bi t . e after se -contro an dacnvates su jeers to s nv f d defines boundaries beyonSimultaneously, the determin.ation o. hanger authoritarian mode, into "a

I, t ventrons SWItc to anwhich governmenta 111 er . best i t of those who cannot act

f th t acts 111 the est mreres Imode 0 gove~nment "a 02. 48) In extreme cases, governmeotain their own Interests (Dean 20 . dr d s" (Foucault 2007: 263)

h . h be "unjust an mur eroupower bases t e rig t to h h . bl caring pastorate rums intoon the dangers it has identified. T e c anra" e(:b.d )

f selecti nd exclusion I I ..a "pastoral [ ... Jose ecnon a h. . n of "danger" Jn order to doI now want to elaborate further t ISquestI°

furitizatio·n. As the subse-

. . d ces the concept 0 sec hso the next section intro u , f to a specific moment in t e' h '11 e this concept re ers . Iquent paragrap WI argu,. 'fie discursive-rheroflca

. . f ity It deSignates a speCl .problernatization 0 secun '. f . direct regulation to a direct

h . the SWitch rom an In fstructure t at orgnruzes ..' ders rhe illiberal moment 0, . 'on SecurItizatlon ren " h.

mode of VIOlent InterventI .' d h f ctions as rhe deCISive Inge, ' . f d nant an r us unthe security dlsposltJ oml 'b' I nd sovereign modes of power.thar allows the inrersectIon of II era a

4 THE RHETORIC OF SECURITIZATION ANDTHE ILLIBERAL SECURITY DlSPOSITIF

... been developed by Ole Wxver, BarryThe concepr of seCUritizatIOn has (B Wxver and de Wilde

'Id . the 1990s uzan,Buzan and jaap de WI e Since h aradigm known as the Copel1-1998). Today it stands for a major researc dP . mostly used in srudles of

E 2006) ThiS para Igm IS .. hhagen School (C.A.S. . . I . h ttracted the attention of nelg -I· b t recent y It as a . d·international re atlons, U . ' I y and migration stu les.

f h such as cnmInO ogbouring branches 0 researe

102 Suen Opitz

It furnishes a perspective on security that departs from purely militaryand state-centered definitions of the term. Discussing phenomena such asinternational crime, financial crises and environmental pollution since the19805, the (inter-)discipline of security studies was faced with a need toadapt its notion of security. The Copenhagen School met this challenge byoffering a "nominalist approach" to security (Wxver 1995: 57). This directsattention to socially scattered acts of securitization and thus performs amethodological shift towards a genuinely sociological analysis. In orderto understand how the theory of securitization can amend an analytics ofgovernrnenraliry, the following brief outline of the approach is helpful.

The Copenhagen School effects epistemological and theoretical changesin respect to the study of security on two main levels. Most importantly, itabandons a scientifically predetermined notion of what security "really is"and which problems "really" belong to the security agenda. Security is notregarded as an objective factor, independent of context, but refers to a spe-cific discursive operation whose context-specific social applications renderproblems first and foremost into problems of security. Accordingly, securitybecomes a question of performatiue acts of securitization and their respec-tive success or failure. Epistemologically the Copenhagen School promotesa constructivist approach, informed by current theories of communication:as second-order observers-that is, as observers observing other observers(Luhmann 1993)-scholars have to map discursive operations of securiti-zation in their respective contingency.

Since a security situation does not exist a priori but is constituted throughthe discursive treatment of a theme within a "security mode," Buzan, Wreverand de Wilde find themselves confronted with the further task of definingthe act of securitization more precisely. According to these authors, the mereuse of the terminology of security is not enough to identify the discursiveoperation as securitization. In their view, the term by itself is too unspe-cific and multifaceted to transform social facts into security concerns. Onlyspeech acts which exhibit the following rhetorical structure are capable ofthis: speech acts that present an issue as an existential threat to a designatedreferent object (e.g., the state, the well-being of the population, certain con-stitutional principles) which therefore has to be protected by resorting toextraordinary means. Thus, the authors of the Copenhagen School do notfocus on security solely as a signifier-however "thick" (Huysmans 1998) or"empty" (Laclau 1996) it may be. Rather, the act of securitization is alwaysalready distinguished by a certain dramatization of the relationship betweena threat, its referent object and the measures taken. In this sense, securitiza-tion remains tied to the language of military warfare. The designation of anexistential threat postulates an urgency that tends to suspend daily routinesand pushes politics beyond normal procedures.

How can the theory of securitization contribute to an understandingof present invocations of security within the framework of governmental-ity studies' Even though the speech act theory of securitization does not


. di I fi eflect upon the historicalhave the analytical means at ItS isposar, rst, to r . ti ateconditions of possibility for securitization acts Of, second, to inves g _

. . . ff important complementary perspectheir social materialization, It a ers an II on illiberal modes oftive on how security dlsc~urse func~o~~1t~t~are-~~scribethe question ofgoverning. Importantly, this approac p practices of governmental-

~overeignty into th~ and~~~~teOd~nov:tset~~~i~:~hetransformation of sover-ity, In fact, Foucau t a I. mechanisms instead of merely. h h governmenta securrty , . .elgn power t roug . f ower-from sovereignty via disciplinemaintaining that various forms a p d d another However to all

hronolozi lly succee e one . ,to governance-c rono ogica I b t also the majority of studiesintents and purposes not only Foucau t, I u. f power simply as a foil.

. hi e the sovereign ogre aapplying IS concepts, us . f illiberal governmentality are much lessConsequently, the mechanisms a I II . f the self (Rose 1999) or con-well explored than neo-liberal tech:c~~~el~ 0 and Starkey 1998). Marianaduct In postfordisr orgamzauons

k(f Y h to the silent substitution of

007) ib t s this lac 0 researcValverde (2 attn u e" lity" in the course of Fou-" ." by the term goverllmenta I fthe term secunry . bsri . has erased connotations 0

I h iew this su sntunon ..caulr's lectures. n er VI, . I I' The concept of sec unttza-. horitari and SOCia exc USlOn.

police, aut oruanarnsrn, dvi hi It draws attention to a float-tion provides for a way of reme fYIn~tiS '. terventions which ignore theing rhetorical structure that calls or irect In to liberal rule. Under con-

d . II ereign exception .bounds of law an insra a sov. the concept targets the point at whichdirions of modern governmentalitfYI'.b I. becomes illiberal. As will beI I I· . the name a I era Ity- hi hibera regu atron-r-rm .1 . k the threshold at w lC gov-

I· d b tl in greater detai ,It mar sout me su sequen y . he classi terms of sovereign power.

I·· t culared In t e c assic .. f.ern menta uy IS rear 1 . f the liberal security dispositi In con-

Reading the Foucauldian account o. ves to be fruitful in at least. . . h t of secunnzanon proJunction With t e concep . his to understand how govern-

F· d foremost It e ps u Ithree respects. irst an , . acts of exception, name yII . If t resort to sovereign

mental rule a ows itse 0 .. tion takes over the govern-.. . n When securltlza I , h.through acts of secur mzatio . I'· f Iberal government. In t IS

. I I fleets on the rrmrs 0 I . . fmental security ca Cll us re . I ment in the prablematlzatlon a.. . marks a partlcu ar rna . I sview securItlzatIon . h far securitization a way, W underestimates ow .. .

security. However, rever . I d' ·tif. he takes seCUfltlZatiOn as'b'I' . h' the libera !SPOSI . W 'remains a POSSI I Ity Wit In .." 1995' 54 et seq.). xver sd f " al politics (Wxver. .

simply detache rom norm fl· eech actS chosen by partlcu-. f .. t" as free- oatlng sp fconception a secuntlza Ion.. d f the regime 0 governmen-.. tlon Indepen ent 0 . "(·b·d) flar actors renders securltiza b I "desecuritizatlon I I . 0

. e that an a so ute I.tality' it leads him to assum .. h pective of governmenta ,ty,, .., ·bl B t Within t e pers . h h

liberal politics IS POSSI e. u I f h I·beral dispositif that welg s t e.. . . t and parce 0 tel h" nroeotsecunUzatlOn IS par (2006' 94) has noted, t e gover .

costs of freedom. As Jef Huysmans .. h· hich practical freedom ISr . he sphere Wit In w . .blof excessive freedom de lmltS t.. . d the line that makes It POSSI e." t of securitization raw I

realized. Hence, ac s b b d governmental ru e.to exclude those considered to e eyon

104 Sven Opitz

Secondly, conjoining a Foucauldian analytics of government with theCopenhagen School sheds more light on processes of desubjectivation. Theexistential threat figured by the overheated and impassioned rhetoric of secu-ritization determines how those who are taken to be outside of the game ofliberal conduct will be treated. Securitization stages an antagonistic dramabetween a threatened object and its inimical subject. Almost anything cantake the position of the threatened object: the population, the infrastructure,even the "liberal way of life" or the "civilized world" itself. Accordingly, theposition of the threatening subject might be occupied by a variety of dangers.But more often than not it refers to a personalized enemy. Within acts ofsecuritization the inimical subject is denied the standing of a person, someonewho would be capable of acting reasonably. Securitization sets up a bound-ary between the "level of the interplay of differential normalities" (Foucault2007: 63) and the dangerous abnormal (Foucault 1978). The latter cannot benormalized and needs to be confronted illiberally. Thus the erection of a bar-rier, beyond which government can grant no latitude for freedom, correlateswith a discrimination of possible and impossible subject positions. Via theact of securitization, govern mentality effects a rupture in the continuum ofsubjecrivarion by separating the realm of intelligible subjects from the field ofimpossible, fundamentally excluded, deconsrirured, subjects.

Finally, combining an analytics of government with the concept of secu-ritization makes it possible to tie the latter to a political rationality and itstechnological apparatus. While proponents of the Copenhagen School areonly able to see isolated speech acts, the governmentality perspective tracesthese acts to their horizon of intelligibility. They treat them as belongingto a more encompassing rationalization of conduct which includes rulesof judgment, legitimate goals, and elaborate procedures for reaching rhesegoals. The means, objects and agents of intervention are thus not consid-ered as a-historical entities but refer back to an episrernic regime set up byspecific problernarizarions of security. This politico-episternic regime deter-mines the subsidiary justifications, the qualifications and the conditions ofpossibility for securitization. Moreover, situating processes of securitizationwithin governmental regimes makes it possible to understand their materialfoundation in technologies of power.' Governmental technologies assemblescientific knowledge, technical apparatuses, anthropological assumptions,and architectural forms in strategic ways to configure relations of conduct.The implementation of illiberal governmental measures depends on mate-rial devices such as passports (Torpey 2000), databases (Amoore and deGoede 2005), and checkpoints (Weizman 2007: 139 et seq.). Securitizationeither reconfigures the logic of how these devices are used, or introduces oradapts previously banned forms of intervention-the acceptance of tortureas a "technology of intelligence gathering" in the "war on terror" is a casein point (Krasmann 2007).

Hence, although acts of securitization are nor synonymous with theacrual implementation of illiberal measures and their technologies, they are


constitutively involved in their material exercise. But how are we to spe~ifythe mode of this power? Where does it fit in Foucault's menu of sovereign,disciplinary and liberal power? As the following will show, illiberal govern-mentality consists of folding these modes of power into a new constellation.

5. ILLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITYAND SOVEREIGN POWER

Securitization opens the political space for the exertion of illiberal powerwithin liberalism. But if we want to understand the specific rationales ofilliberal power, it is necessary to re-visit the notion of sovereignty as p~rtsof govern mentality. The remainder of this chapter shows how a re-arncu-lated notion of sovereignty provides the clues needed for an understandingof illiberal governrnentality.

Introducing the notion of sovereignty into the frame of governmental-ity qualifies Foucault's own accounts of sovereignty. Although sovereignpower figures prominently in Discipline and PUnish (Foucault 1977: 3 etseq.), in The History of Sexuality (Foucault 1990 (1978]: 133 et seq.), andin Society Must be Defended (Foucault 2003a: 239 et seq.), Foucaulr con-id ' hi 'II td ted form of power Ir rernams under-rbeor izedSl ers It a isronca y au a '.. din his work, compared to disciplinary power and hiopowcr (Singer anWeir 2006). To put it polemically, Foucault's analysis of sovereignty has

" f h ki The countenance of LOUISnever decapitated the Imaginary 0 t e Ing. ,XIV flickers through Foucault's characterization of sovereignty as a powerwhich emanates from a center, celebrates its greatness 111 publ.lc spect~~lesand acts through decree. This figure of rhe sovereign as a urutary so. lectwhich represents possesses, and exercises power from a unique poslt1?n

l'" 'I I dds with conremporary socrain a universally binding way IS c ear y at 0 ," f diff iaredI, d multIpItclry 0 I erennaretheory with its stress on the comp exuy an b

social logics. Therefore, Foucault's theory of decentered power al usr , ef 'power In order to ana yze ItSused against his own account a sovereign . f h

h 'II aunt for a logic 0 power t atmechanisms. How can one t eorenca y ace 0 0

, d f d ntally Without resorting to andisrupts liberal practices an norms un arne ,omnipotent subject in possession of rhar power? .

h bl 0 tion of security creates a vee-Foucault recognized that t e pro ernanza , ' 'I f lib-ism th ' lIy Violates the pnncip es a Itor at the center of liberaItsm t at potentia "d b f, h I f the irnpnsone mem ers 0erality. When Klaus Croissant, t e awyer 0 'F '1977 Fou-o f d asylum JI1 ranee JI1 ,German Red Army faction, was re use , ." t dessus

k d "D' mars la secunre es au-cault (2001a: 367) tersely remar e: esor hiM res of security

. . bove t e aw. easudes lois"-From now on, securtty IS a b .dinary measures

I I . ts out to e extractfrequently claim, Foucau rapt y porn . ' clue one mightb IT k' this statemenr as a ,that are not bound yaw. a mg I rice offegal exemp-

... . governmenta prac Is~y that securitization oorg~n1ze~ a doubt a classical prerogative oflion, And legal exemption IS, Without any ,

106 Sven Opitz

sovereignty: as Carl Schmitt (] 934) famously put it, sovereign is "he whodecides on the exception." An unorthodox interpretation of Schmitt's defi-nition can be used here to reformulate the relationship between sovereignty,the subject of power, and the law.

The characterization of sovereignty as a "Grenzbegriff" (Schmitt ]934:11) or "limit concept," emphasizes that sovereignty, while heterogeneous tothe legal norm, still refers to the law, even in transgressing it. As a relationof power, sovereignty is neither inside nor outside the legal realm-it con-fuses the boundaries of law by occupying a zone of indistinction (Agamben]998). In other words, the sovereign breaches the law by legal means. Itis essential for him to claim proto-legal authority in suspending rhe law.Otherwise, the sovereign would just be an outlaw. At the same time, the fig-ure of the sovereign subject remains remarkably undetermined in Schmitt'sfamous formula, as Friedrich Balke (2005: 77) has noted. Whoever decideson the exception is sovereign. Extrapolating this indeterminacy, one can saythat sovereignty is the governmental function of transgressing the boundsof law from within the law. In principle anyone, irrespective of qualifica-tion, can occupy this function. Therefore, sovereignty is not tied to a sin-gular subject that occupies a center of power. Instead, it is a type of powerrelation characterized by an empowerment to act beyond normal legality.The extraordinary measures instantiated through acts of securitization(torture, hyper-surveillance, "shoot-to-kill" policies) rest upon this para-legal detachment from law. And it is precisely the governmental securitycalculus that determines the threshold beyond which this sovereign detach-ment can usurp liberal forms of power at multi-various points within thesocial body. Ultimately, this means that sovereign subjects are constitutedin relation to a certain governmental rationality, just like the "desrituted"subjects who are submitted to a sovereign power. Judith Butler's (2004: 50et seq.) analysis of "indefinite detention" shows this proliferation of sover-eign acts vis-a-vis the "precarious," i.e., legally abjected life. Corroborat-ing the perspective developed here, she locates the exercise of prerogativepower within the field of modern govern mentality. She depicts the militarytribunals appointed by the US government as part of its "War on Terror"as "petty sovereigns" (ibid.: 56). As administrative agencies, they are partof a thoroughly governmental executive function that applies the law in aninstrumental and tactical fashion: "The result is a production of a paralegaluniverse that goes by the name of law" (ibid.: 61).

The transgression of legally bounded rule from within the law has beenproblematized by Walter Benjamin (] 965) as the logic of the police. Withinthe logic of modern pol ice, two forms of power coincide that liberal politicaltheory sees as separate: the power of making laws (rechtsetzende Cewalt)and the power of maintaining the law by executing it (rechtserhaltendeGewalt). While the intellectual architects of modern democracy since Mon-tcsquieu attribute these powers to different institutional branches, accord·ing to Benjamin the logic of the police criss-crosses this neat separation as


it creates law by enforcing it. Hence, the police is a limit-figure actualizin~

a sovereign relation: it is a spectral force t~at contafmlna~e/ t:~el;;~~n~~o~_dane governmental practice. Correspondingly, a orm . g I the namelows the logic of police if It transcends the ~awdbY:dP;~~~~~th t~is act, re-of public order and securtt y the law IS VIOate a, alread that theestablished. Police Science in thehseve;teenth ~:~~~:~ ~nhea~to use:ub-Iegalpolice was not an extension of ~ e lila 1C~~~~~ateinto the narrowest gaps oftechniques like decrees and edlctls t p. h olice an instrument for theh . I C tly Foucau t sees m t e pt e SOCla. onsequen , . ." I' is the direct govern men-

d . f" " states of exception. po Ice hpro ucnon 0 petty . 0 . let's say that police is t etality of the sovereign qua sovehrelgn. r ag~':~d functions in the name ofpermanent coup d'Etat [ ... ] t at ISexercise lity without having to mold

f h . . les of ItS own ratton a I ,and in terms 0 t e prmcrp .. les of i stice" (Foucault 2007:

I· If h rherwise given ru es 0 IU .or mode use on teo d d the law at the same time.339). This approach complements a~. exce~ :he present day and is basedMoreover, it has characterized the po IC~u~ 10 de 2006) First it acts as aon two structural attributes (Dubber, an a vert"ces of p'reven~ion that lie

f h f oncentratmg on prac Itechnology 0 t e uture,C ulatin the prosecution of offenders.beyond the codified criminal laws ref k I

gd e that is not legally codified

Second, it applies a kind of situanona no,,;, eAtgpresent following Giorgio

. . d .. of "discretion- , .and culminates In eCISlons . . he introduction of sovereignty000 104) e are witnessing tel . .

Agamben (2 : , w. ifests i If in an "almost constitutivef 1 li which maru ests useinto the gure 0 po ICe, . hr." The form of government that comesexchange between VIOlence and ng '. . b teen sovereignty and police

h a relati f contiguity e w binto being throug a re anon 0 h 1m of possibilities created ycan, thus, be termed illiberal. It uses t de ach d from the law to waver asacts of securitization [0 allow powers erac e"forces 01 law" (Agamben 2005: 32 et seq·)I·· -however cursorily-how

hs seek to out me iblThe following paragrap . I' night make it posS! e toI I . f sovereign po Ice I h

this legal/extra-Iega ogre 0 d. f illiberal governmentality. The tec -capture the current modus operon 10h I I stitutively rest upon the "petty

·11·b I mentality t at con .nologies of I I era govern I d i terms of three aspects: ItSf h I· ill be exp ore m d fsovereignty" 0 t e po Ice w if ·11t knowledge and its or er 0. . . f irs speci c WI 0 ,rationalization 0 space, I

subjectiuities. .. e: As recent border studies suggest,Illiberal RationalizatIOns of Spac '. . I· . g vector but also moves

.. I h·b·ts a de-termona Izm . I' b tliberalism not on y ex I I. I at enabling c"CU atlon, u. I' . It alms not on y d N Itowards re-territona IzatlOn. b·l· (f Mezzadra an el son

. d I t'ng such mo Iity C . ·b 1 halso at secunng an regu.a I ablin of circulation. LI era I~m, e2008). Foucault has descnbed the en . g f mercantilism With the

h ted economiC space 0 fib Iargues, confronts t e segmen I.' It marks "a neW type 0 g a ak t without mllts. ·b I 1idea of the world as a mar e ." I 2008: 56). LI era gove,,-

. . I ractlce (Foucau t I 2007.calculation 111 governmenta p. . I" disciplines (Foucau t .. I "centrlpeta d h sment, in contrast to the IllC uSI~e, . s ever more elements, an t u

d . radiUS lIltegrate44), constantly expan SitS l

108 Sven Opitz

appears "cenrrifuga!" (ibid.: 45). However, the liberal problernatization ofsecurity also entails substantial re-territorialization, as recent works on themechanisms of control show (Walters 2006). Foucault (2001 b: 385) pre-maturely assumed that the problem of borders in "security socieries" willdisappear over time. A theoretical understanding of sovereignty as a powerthat is inscribed into the field of govern mentality serves as a corrective here,as it directs the theoretical focus towards the production of territorial bar-riers and thresholds dedicated to the deployment of police forces.

Despite all the hollowing out of the territorial logic of the national state,national borders still serve as important regulators within the global cal-culation of (neo)liberal governrnentaliry (Andreas 2003). In addition tothis, spatial boundaries are drawn both "above" and "below" this level.The flexible multiplication of spatial thresholds multiplies the occasionsfor rhe spatial inclusion and exclusion of bodies: "Borders are no longer bydefinirion the limits between national sovereignties; rather they are erectedwherever there is a need to solve and to organize social space and politicalgovernance" (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2007: 152). The Schengen Agree-ment, as depicted by William Walters and [ens Henrik Haahr (2005: 91et seq.), is a case in point. EU borders have shifted far beyond the conti-nent of Europe toward the Mediterranean and North Africa, as well as tothe interior of the territories of the member states. The problernatizationof security goes hand in hand with the project of "rezoning sovereignty"(Perry and Maurer 2003: XIII), in which global policing follows the modelof a city whose traffic flows have to be regulated. Governmental calcula-tions of security create a continuum of inclusion and exclusion by grant-ing or denying various strata of the population access to different areas atvarious times. The detention camp, as the spatial embodiment of a state ofemergency (Agamben 1998: 166 et seq.), forms the end point of this con-tinuum. Beyond the manifold caesuras of the present security dispositif,the detention camp corresponds to a "pure" securitization, which is beingimplemented by applying policing instruments such as protective custody(Schutzhaft) or preventive detention.

Will to Knowledge: Illiberal governmentality does not only operate byparcelling out spaces of liberal and illiberal power. The problematizationof security affects governmental rationality in its entirety. An "encyclopae-dic will to knowledge" animates a boundless logic of suspicion that coversthe whole population. A good example is the Data Retention Directivepassed by the EU parliament in March 2006 (Leistert 2008). This instructsmember states to pass laws that obligate each provider of telecommunica-tion services to store the telephone and internet data of all 450 million EUcitizens for at least six months. An all-encompassing, total archive of traf-fic and location data is to be created "for the purpose of the investigation,detection, and prosecution of serious crime" (EU directive 2006/24/EC:56). This data is to be collected and reassembled irrespective of whetheran individual is under investigation. In the same way, routine practices


nk transfers can be condensed into data profilessuch as road usage and ba "T II s stems bonus programs andthat ate potentially useful for pohcflng. a Yfncti;n as parts of a modu-

II' to account 10 ormation ulaws a owing access d Eri son 2000) that connects

bl " (Haggerty an nclar "surveillant assem age . Not least it cuts across theI . ws for security reasons., d

seeming y remote purvle" d " . everal investigations have faunold division between publIc an Plnvate. hS anagement has already been

f . f sterner re anons ip m )that in orrnanon rom cu " ( Cameron 2005: 115 er seq ..d . the "war on terror e.g., .

use as a source in , a e of rho. digital code, technologies canOn the basis of the umversallangu g f t i rial capacities enhance eachbe potentially linked so that rheir m orma 10

other on an event-driven baSIS. bl ization of security shifts the empha-h ary pro emattza I . dBecause t e contempor h h e already been comnlltte

. f criminal acts t at av . ' Isis from the prosecution a " ibl f t re dangers the constItutlOna

. agamst POSSI e u u , . dto preventive measures idd I inc 'pie every citizen IS un er

f ' . overr id en n prm I'd bassumption 0 innocence IS . ibl has to be collecre a outh k owledge as POSSI e , II

suspicion. Thus, as muc ~ ive o] the past occurrence of potentia yd f them Irrespective 0 . I ' 'each an everyone 0 , "" f the epistemologlCa capacities

hi I" a reactiVatlOD 0 II - fillegal deeds. T IS resu tS In , for which the insta anon aof all-seeing and all-knowing sovereign pOI'lvedr'drones during the European

h I . remote-contra e .surveillance tee no ogy In. ' I d i nly emblematic. This process

hi 2008 In SWItzer an ISa biSoccer Champions ip 'f' lar unified sovereign su jeerh estoratlon 0 a singu , " Idoes not amount to t erR h the epistemologlca preten-

d f the term at er, h diin the early mo ern sense a .' achieved throug iverse, d II-knOWing power are I

sions of an all-seeing an a It'ple sites. Consequent y, on a. I deployed across mu I d I buttechnologic a means " no longer sun an eag e,

he si f sovereign power are di Isymbolic level, t e signs 0 d b d canners. Correspon ing y, onthe small icons of video cameras an a y s f the polIce state" (Foucaulta practicalleve!, the "unlimited Pftesum~t(loFnOu~ault1977: 213) by means of

h "d t a events hi"2008 17) is to gather t e us b'le artention evet on tea ert,, f d everywhere mo I f re"thousands a eyes poste. " (ibid.: 214). The creation a a comp -

authoring an "immense police text h' lIation of CCTV systems, andk f d r mining t e msta h' h to behensive data ban or a a , f "te computers, w IC areI- h powers or pnva bl" h thethe projected on lOe searc . 2009 seem to re-esta ISh G n government 10, d

implemented by t e erma lit urportedly replace. .logic of police that libetal governme~ra y: 5 operandi of technologies of

Order of Subiectivities: Fmally, t e mO 'h' how the organization of. f recognltlon sows b" """

control such as automatic ace , . I" k d to an ordet of su Jectlvltles.knowledge and space by the pO:lce ii~icla~c~mmunication afret the artack~According to a tecent analysIs a po, especially in the USA-was canof 9/11 the problematization of secutlty-. 'dentification technology, In, k blOrnetrlC I Iducted in such a way as to ma e I' (Gates 2006). This techno ogy

I'k propflate so Utlon , I d agamstparticular, seem I e an ap " ra hed with a camera, ISOate ."operates as follows: a face IS phot~g Pnsfonned into a digital "face ptlntthe background of the plctur~ an t;a rchived photographs. The goal IS anthat can be run through data ases a a

11 0 Suen Opitzimmediate identification that does not hinder the circulation of mobile sub-jects. Although biometric technology is also included in passports (Bonditti2004), technologies like automated face recognition promise to render thetime~consuming process of checking an identity document against its refer-ent, i.e., the "real person," unnecessary. Instead, it purports to read bodiesdirectly from a distance. In this way, the technology aims to identify threatsand r~move t~e~ from circulation in real-time, according to previouslyestablished cnten a and margins of risk. Face recognition embodies thepromi.se. of a~signing a clear identity to a new, opaque and fleeting enemy.

This Identified enemy is potentially to be excluded from the liberal order ofsubje~tivity. It is an extremely moralized, demonized enemy-or, to put it inSchrnitrcan terms, an "absolute" enemy (Prozorov 2006: 79 et seq.). Maybeth~ term "e~e~y" is even misleading in itself, because the figure at stake isn,elth,er a criminal nor an enemy in the legal sense. The process of securi-tJzat1o~ turns it into an existential threat or danger that cannot be foughtaccording to the rules of criminal law or the laws of war. Foucault's (1978)genealogy of the dangerous individual contributes to a better understandingof rhis form of subjectivity. He points to the emergence of a specific type ofc~lmJnal In mneteenth-century forensic medicine, who was convicted not forhIS deeds but for his whole mode of being which was, at least at the beginningof the century, considered to be monstrous (Foucault 2003b: 53 et seq.). Interms of subjecrivation, this monstrous figure is best characterized as boundto a paradoxical subject-position. It is forced to occupy a discursive "non-position" that captures the subject completely and, at the same time, denies itthe status of an intelligibly speaking subject. In the words of classical politicaltheory, the deconstitured subject possesses only phone, not logos. But undergovernmental rule, this de-subjectivation process also includes an economi-cally coded dimension. Whereas the subject of liberalism has to follow hisinterests by taking reasonable risks, the deconstitured, dangerous subject isportrayed as a deeply uneconomic subject. It is a subject overwhelmed by anexcess of interest that cannot be normalized. Confronted with the dangeroussubject, govern mentality encounters an interest that consumes the rationalsubject en~irely-and turns it into an irrational, unintelligible, destructive:gent o~tSlde the bounds of humanity. Consequently, the subject marked asabject cannot be governed by granting it freedom. It finds itself placed in a

governmental relation beyond the conduct of conduct.

6. EPILOGUE

In recent years, Governmentality studies have traced in detail the extentto which the elimination of freedom in liberal governmentality is notmerely tantamount to an infringement of rights, but signals a fundamen-tal Ignorance of how to govern adequately. Against this background, thischapter IS an exploration of the thresholds at which the parameters of this


adequacy get inverted. The problematization of security, which culminatesin the martial logic of securitization, is rooted in the tradition of modernpolitics. At the same time, my elaborations point to a specific mutation ofthe modern "onrotheology" (Der Derian 1995: 25) of security. One candramatize this mutation by adding a scene to a theatrical governmentalscenario found in Foucault (2007b: 282-283). In this scenario, the legalsubject says to the sovereign: "You must not, because I have rights andyou must not touch them." The economic subject, however, says to thesovereign: "You must not because you cannot. And you cannot becauseyou do not know, and you do not know because yOLIcannot know." In thefield of current security politics, the second critique has become hushed.Instead, there seems to be a readiness for an authorization: "You must,because nobody knows. You must, because air hough nobody knows, youare most likely to have the means to know and you are capable of act-ing." This authorization can be extended to the point of saying: "You area!lowed, although we have rights." At that stage the limits of liberalityhave been reached, without any doubt.

NOTES

1. In her article for New Yorker in February 2005, journalist Jane Mayer coinedthe now infamous term "Outsourcing Torture."

2. The disturbing scene can be seen on You Tube (accessed May 10, 2009):http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AyvrqcxNIFs. A "raser" belongs to agroup of supposedly non-lethal weapons that incapacitates the victim witha charge of 50,000 volts, without leaving any marks on the body. Althougha number of people have died after being shot with a "taser," these devicescontinue to be used to fill the strategic gap between a warning cry and the use

of firearms.3. For the distinction between technologies and techniques of power, see Fou-

cault (2007: 8 et seq.) and Barry (2006).

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cion: Verso.

6 The Right of GovernmentTorture and the Rule of Law

Susanne Krasmann

In the search for a liberal technology of government, it emerged thatthe juridical form was a far more effective instrument of regulationthan the wisdom or moderation of governors. l ... ] Regulation hasnot been sought in the "law" because of the supposedly natu rallegal-ism of liberalism, but because the law defines forms of general inter-vention excluding particular, individual, and exceptional measures,and because participation of the governed in drawing up the law ina parliamentary system is the most effective system of governmentaleconomy. (Foucaulr 2008, 321)

Since the Enlightenment, the legal and moral ban on torture has been partof the self-understanding of Western societies. Following World War II, theban was legally anchored in many international treaties and legislativelyupdated. Its inviolability is presently considered an international norm.'But in reality, as the literary scholar and researcher on violence Jan PhilippReemtsma has indicated (1991: 256), torture "was never abolished." Tor-ture and mistreatment surface repeatedly, both in crisis situations like theAlgerian and Northern Ireland conflicts and in constellations of "totalinstitutions" (Goffman 1961) such as police custody, the prison, and mili-tary training. Most recently, there has even been talk of torture's "return"(Beesrer moller and Brunkhorst 2006)-of that practice as something thatsince the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 has again become evidentand discussible. Photos from the Abu Ghraib prison, surfacing in 2004,thus not only presented people with the human potential for ugly behaviorbut also the functioning of a "chain of command" (Hersh 2004; Sands2008) authorizing torture and mistreatment in the name of combating ter-rorisrn (Danner 2004; Greenberg and Dratel 2005; Mayer 2008). Appar-ently unaffected by these revelations, a debate has simultaneously beenunfolding concerning the legitimacy and even legalization of torture in cer-tain circumstances. It has occupied both literary supplements and scholarlypublications and has donned an honorable cloak, articulating itself in the

name of saving lives.' .Concern about this development, equally manifest in the debate, is nor

only focused on the victims of torture; on a more abstract level the questionof the validity of the principle of rhe rule of law and the endurance of the

116 Susanne Krasmann

constitutional state itself has moved to the forefront. For an absolute ban ontorture is such a basic element in the constitutional order of liberal-demo-cratic societies that its revocation would in a sense be the same as their self-dissolution. In the words of David Luban (2006: 38): "The self-conscious aimof torture is to turn its victim into someone who is isolated, overwhelmed,terrorized, and humiliated. Torture aims, in other words, to strip away fromits victims all the qualities of human dignity that liberalism prizes." Fromsuch a perspective, any discussion of the use of torture would not only havero be forbidden but would actually be superfluous (see Levinson 2004a: 23).

How, then, are we to explain the apparent inconsistency between torture'spersistence, even its open legitimation, and a system of law that contradictsthis in an absolute sense? To answer this question, a look at "progressive"international legislation and jurisprudence reinforcing and differentiatingthe categorical prohibition of torture over recent years would be insuffi-cienr. Despite a widespread justificatory strategy, the concrete episodes atissue here have by no means been exceptional cases-the notorious rottenapples (Brown 2005). Rather, within the conceptual framework of govern-mentality, it becomes clear that torture can become a rationale of powereven against established law and in a sense make itself acceptable. In thischapter I will thus argue that in the context of certain security imperatives,torture is rationalizable and can even inscribe itself into law.

Unlike other, relatively conventional theories of state and law emergingfrom the social sciences and legal theory, the perspective of governmental-ity can account for the interplay between torture and the constitutionalstate (section 1). This can be exemplified through the ongoing debate con-cerning the legitimacy and legality of torture (section 2). Importantly, rhepromise of security evident in this debate does not take merely rhetoricalform. Rather, torture rationalizes itself performatively in the constructionof a specific security imperative (section 3).

1. THE RATIONALITY OF TORTURE

Proragonists of a legalization of torture press their claim in terms of spe-cial threats that require extraordinary measures. Here a common foun-dational figure is the so-called ticking-bomb scenario: a person in policecustody knows the hiding place of a ticking bomb that directly threatensmany lives-and remains stubbornly silent. Would you not (this is the overtmoral message) yourself torture this person if it were necessary to savethese lives?' As the argumentation has it, the emergency law implementedin such cases would in no way lead to a normalization of the exception.To the contrary: it would serve to keep the established legal system intacr.Within this reading law itself offers the mechanism for preventing a hol-lowing out of the principle of the rule of law. The democratic constitutionalstate is its own guaranree.

The Right of Government 117

According to Giorgio Agamben (1998), such assurances are doubtful.The "state of exception," he argues (his starting point being Carl Schmitt)," " al element of law It is not the response to a chaotic situationIS an Integr . If"preceding the juridical order but, conversely, the resu t 0 a ~u~pen~~nof the rule to which it remains tied-law IS abrogated thr~ug II a;"fi "~state of exception does not mark a zone beyond law but adega y e ne

d d .. vereign power Irecr access tozone where the rule is suspen e ,glvmg s~ . . ."b life." However Agamben de-histonclzes the state of exception Inde~~~n~ ~his potency 'of sovereign power as the political realm's ongmar yelement and in deciphering the .st~te sof exce~tJOn as ha~: :vere:r:r~~:l:~feature of liberal democratic soctene s. Guantan

lamfa t

lPimodernity"

II if h enon but as a resu t a a ogos aa historica y speer c p enom . "dispositi f" of power" I" " d " n power here merge Into one

BJOpo incs an soverel~ . tion-in contrast to Foucault'seventually reduced to ItS repressive func lif s a distinct historicalperspective (1978) on produ~tlve p~w;~eos~::e 10~:xceptiOn as somethingfeature. In that Agamben un er:tan ~al sis de rives itself of the possibil-like a structural element of law, h~s a Y d ~ law as a political insrru-it y of thinking in terms of social orces, an 0

ment (Huysrnans 2008). I" Ilows us to provisionallyIn contrast, the concept of governmenta It

ly a f om a logic of law-and

1 " f law and constItutiona ity rseparate an ana YSlS0 . h ralysis to the exigenciesf h " ay of relating sue an at

o t e exceptIon---:as a ,';' 07) Unlike Agamben, this perspectiveof "governmg SOCIeties (Dean. 20 f· . wer obtaining access to

cnce 0 sovereign po Idoes not see torture as a pra . f law and constitution a -" " lif h ent of the suspension a

biological I eat t e mom ivon of liberal government ope rat-itv.Rath faces in the horizon a a Iity. Rat er, torture sur d I along this path. Tortureing in the name of security-and pro uches aw mises to protect the life" " f bi I"" al power t at proIS the rationale 0 a IOpO inc """ If the right to dispose overof the population, in the process assignmg use

human life. lit perspective actually be pro-h governmenta I Y " fBut to w at extent can a h e elided the question 0

h Fit himself seems to av "ductive here w en oucau 7 h he furthermore conceIves" f h t of government, w en fViolence rom t e concep hi f govern mentality, as a type 0

" in hi I s on the istory a II dsovereignty, in IS ecture . . . I mode of law (a oweI" "" " If to binary operation a " I

juridical power irninng Itse 8 d h finally he accuses socia -I 2007" 4-6) an wen" 08vs. forbidden; see Foucau t ""' d" the state (see Foucault 20 :

f h" phobia regar lt1g b Iscientific theory a avlt1g a " lothing else but the rna Ie187), while for his part describing the statelats s:, (Foucault 2008: 77)? For

" f I" Ie governmenta I Ie " d feffect of a regime 0 mu tip Iy has a very limite array a"" h" I sis of power not on f IFoucault's CfltICS, IS ana y .' h societal significance 0 aw,

d" I f r examlOing t e " "instruments at its Isposa 0 . h· pect. Foucault, the Crltlquebut also contains distinct dangers In t IS res

f;ion of law" he lacks due

. the protective unc , Iwould have it, fails to recogOlze d "ty and finally of a rea m

f freedom an secun ,respect for law as guarantor aof the political (see Wickham 2006: 598).


This critique, though, has itself been shown to have weaknesses: forinstance, Foucault does not identify juridical power with law, but recog-nizes in it a specific, prohibitive form of power.' And with his distinctionbetween sovereignty, discipline, and govern mentality as three types ofpower, Foucault is not trying to show that law has historically lost signifi-cance but rather that it has taken on a new significance as an instrument foreffectuating norms and normalization (Foucault 1977; 2003; see Biebricher2006; Ewald 1990; Friedrich and Niehaus 1999; Rose and Valverde 1998).For Foucault (2003: 38-39; 1978: 144; see also Valverde 2003), law beginsto itself operate as a norm; it produces forms of subjection and subjecti-fication. It takes on no power-limiting function bur-s-and this will needto be clarified-functions as an instrument of government in the name ofsecurity (see Foucault 2008: 64-65). A first question that needs to be posedis thus whether, in the framework of security policies understood in thissense, law can actually guarantee constitutional principles and with themthe civilizing self-understanding of democratic societies. To this extent,under the auspices of security imperatives, torture exemplarily marks thevulnerable borders of democratic constitutionality.

"Torture is reason," declared Foucault (2003c) in an interview-butwithout any cynical undertone. His use of "reason" here was not an allusionto the German ethical concept of Vernunft, but to the traditional Westernidea of a rule of reason-and the reason of rule, in the sense that regimesand techniques of rule shaped by violence can unfold a specific rationality.In Foucault's words (2005: 49; see 1991: 79; 1981), "the most dangerousthing about violence is precisely its rationality. Naturally violence per se ishorrible. But violence receives its firm basis and endurance from the type ofrationality we insert in it. It has been said that if we lived in a rational worldwe could free ourselves of violence. That is completely false. Violence andreason are not irreconcilable." The question thus emerges of how torturecan integrate itself into a rationality of power and consequently surfacesystematically (see Foucault 1991: 75). In regards to the theme of torture inliberal democratic societies, the framework of govern mentality emerges ashelpful in relation to three topics:

1). The question of the significance of law-security stands "above thelaw" (Foucault 2003a). In the social sciences and legal theory, a norma-tive understanding prevails of the modern constitutional state as a guaran-tor of its own principles and quite often as a historically necessary figure.In contrast, Foucault presents the modern state's formation as above all acontingent and precarious process (see Jessop and Saar in this volume); theconstitutional state's way of functioning is to be understood in such termsas well.

In this manner the history of governmentality is not markedly stampedby tbe idea of a continuous movement towards eitber ever-strengtheningstatc structurcs or juridification. In fact, the contrary is the case: the


I· ' f the state" (Foucault 2007: 109) describes a pro-"governmenta izauon 0 d dh h which a broad range of apparatuses, laws, an "proce ures

cess t roug 1 if d entity the statelli . thi nking and action into a more or ess urn e '"crysta ize 111 I . d f It here becomes an mrer-thus first taking on its speCifically m~'t~:n ~;m;se of the state" (Foucaultpretive principle, and a principle of p p ld become a2007. 277) As a result the modern constitutional state cou dinorm'ative figure-not ~neexisting once and for all, but rather nee ing to

be repeatedly produced anew. , . f the start-F I (2007' 276) identifies the cnSIS of the reason 0 state as bi

. ou.cau t . ,: . " With the rise of liberalism, a new 0 jec-mg point for this reflexive event. I fi ld: the population becomes thetive domain appears In thebgovelrnmetta n~m~ of power oriented towardsorganizing principle of a IOpO inca eco ,the advancement of both life and general prospe~:r;s a continuous forma-

ithi hi di the modern state emerg ,Wlt 1O t IS rea ing, f h icencies of governing soc let-, d ioh ble in terms ate exige . h inon-process ecip era ic nif of classical concepts wit In. d I fi d a shift in the sigru cance , dres, an we a so n d d cur it y are not only conceivethe theory of the state. Hence free om an se lIy complimentary elements

, . h h by necessity mutua ,as antagonistic t oug '. ' d h lineal function of freedom IS. . nonaliry: an t e po I Iof functioning consntu I 'atber for liberal government freedomnot reduced to a legal guarantee;:1999) that for its part demands thatbecomes a power resource (Ro, I' freedom is to be secured assecurity mechanisms be brought into p aiB tl r 2008) and for the sakeboth a central value of Western sOC1:t;~\b;'a~ government has assertedof the unfolding of productive force '. governmental restraint, thenitself historically through an exhortatIon

lto f ' tervention (see Foucault

h . e Its pr mctp e 0 10 .security is at t e same urn " " for freedom and vice

8 65) S rity is consnrunve , '2007: 48-49; 200: . ecu , 1 the basis for the pol iti-

h h d freedom IS consequent y b 'versa. On t e one an , h mer hand it is the asis. ~ . h state' on teocal rights of citizens Vis-a-VIS tel' , t mentalize the law. These

ha ni that themse ves ins ru dfor security rnec arusrns h b ate but rather pro uceIts of a law t ey a rag , k

mechanisms are not e emen . cis can successively rna elaw. In the form of security laws, secur rty nee

their way into the law. he soci I contract-society does not. f ent is not t e socta "Here the basis 0 governm Ewald 1990). Instead a kind of "security con-

constitute Itself by way of law ( b. 504) that, understood in both a biopoliti-tract" takes effect (Foucault 2003. h duces a relationship between

d h f democracy t eory, pro 'cal framework an t at 0 I 2008' 63). In this way securitygovernors and the governed (see Foucau t " lode in which political

h'erarchaloperatIona m ,policy no longer represents a I f the top down. Goverl11ng

II themselves out rom finterests and state power spe ... the generation a consensusf . ts on parflClpatiOn, on . Iin the name a secuflty res. h basis of exclUSIOn:name y,

h time It operates on tedand assent; but at t e same , h' h xplains the tendency towar s

. the populatIon w IC e 'd theof dangers threatenlllg 'b d' b ders of state interventIon and hilly prescrl e or

stepping beyon t e ega d Reid 2001: 41-42; Dean 2001).use of violence (see Dillon an

120 Susanne K rasmann

Although liberal government no longer articulates itself in the languageof reason of state, it can nevertheless evoke its logic: at the moment whenprotection of individual freedom a nd the life of the population self-evidentlycalls for state intervention-and mutates into a kind of security imperative.And this represents the precise point where torture is rationalized and theconditions are present for its acceptance, a point that remains inconceivableas long as this relationality is dismissed and the constitutional state simplypostulated as a normative reference point for analysis.

2). The rationalization of government both enables and limits specificforms of visibility. Analyses of governrnenra lity do not focus on the classi-cal question of the foundations of governmental practice-that would bethe question of legitimacy, or of which means are suitable for which ends-that would amount to postulating a substantial concept of rationality inMax Weber's sense and, juridically, to normatively assessing the legitimacyof various measures according to a principle of proportionality. In contrast,the question being posed here is how objects and goals, means and ends,themselves vary within different rationalities. Analyses of goverrnenralitycenter on how ways of thinking shape the perception of problems, howappropriate definitions for solving problems are attached to their defini-tion, and how tied to this, in turn, are certain techniques and proceduresthat for their part produce entirely new objects and subjects. Rationalitiesof government mark specific forms of epistemic access to reality that ren-ders certain measures and ways of governing plausible in the first place. Inother words, they produce specific regimes of visibility and articulation.

Wirhin this perspective, what needs to be examined is not only whetherand how the illegal practice of torture is justified and legitimized, but alsowhether and how it becomes manifest in society in the first place. A centralquestion of legal sociology, that of the relationship between the law's recep-tivity and stability (Fitzpatrick and Joyce 2007), here comes into focus. Onthe one hand law, we are informed, has to be open to social changes andhence adaptable to what points beyond itself; on the other hand, it has tooffer dependability in that-speaking in terms of systems theory-it fol-lows its own procedural logic and rules of codification and thus itself deter-mines what law is. If we start with the presumption that a rigid, as it wereautistic law that blinds itself to social developments will at some point sinkinto meaninglessness (see ibid.: 69-70), then the question of the differencebetween "book law" and "real law," i.e., law as it is practiced-as if lawembodied objectivized norms for measuring reality,-turns out to be rela-tively unimportant. Rather, the salient problem becomes that of what con-stitutes "the social" forming the law. What reality, or more precisely whatkind of perceptions, constructions, and forms of reality, determine law?The thesis of rationalization in the name of security can be further con-

cretized as follows: present-day discourse on torture fits into the calcula-tion of a basically continuous development of criminal and security policies

The Right of Government 12]

in which rhe terror attacks of 911], rather than presenting themselves as anexception, mainly take on a catalyzing function. ~ence ~nmany Wes;~~lcountries over recent decades, terrorism, or orgalllzed cnrne, or the p. -lems of sexual crime and juvenile delinquency, have been served up to JUS-tifya preemption-oriented expansion of the state's capacity for Inter~ent1?n(Ericson 2007' Hornqvist 2004). Within this movement, the ongcmg dIS-course concer~ing dissolution of the constitutional state by th~ preem~t"lve

(H d R dolph 2008) marks a shift from the classical policingstate uster an u "b" kconcept of danger tied to concrete action or disturbance, to a st~acltris sand diffuse sirua;ional threats that must be counrered preemptive J. (s;eLe sius 2004: 454-455). This abstraction from concrete dangers an 111 1-P " h h inciples connccted to the rule of

vidualizable actions IS w at t rea tens pn II' " A dlaw such as determinability, proportionaliry, and not least a Justice. "n

" " h II solidation of secunty Imperativesthe same abstraction is w at a ows a con" f Th. d " II operung the way or torture. ISwithin rhe law-s-in the en potentia Y " "d d I I

h h t immediately be cons: ere ega,does not have ro mean r at rorrure as a h B h d ". I d i t" nal law and as t e us a 111111-against prevailing natrona an mterna 10 . " I

" . d d 10 It can also mean that torture IS simp yistration's legal adVISors inten e. . I " "the practice of the

in th f t ona securuy as 10implicitly accepted 10 t e name a na Ih" d states where it is assumed theyillegal delivery of terror suspects to t irwill be rortured."

"" J " actiee With his critique of state3). Canstitutianalzty IS a per/armatwe pr. I' f tate theory but for a

I Pealing for a neg ect a sphobia, Foucau t was not ap F 1 2008' 187-189' 2003" ., f h t of the state ( oucau r zuve: "differentiation ate concep histori I d locally specific ratio-lecture of January 14, 1976). Wirh the IstohflCa raanrting point his analysis

" " d hi" of government as IS s ' fnalities an tee no ogles " " hi to icit y and mutability. Ih h n of the state In IfS IS r

focuses on t e p en omena I I d ial constirution of Westernh . f n place rhe ega an SOCIt e practice a torture ca "W speak of a fundamen-d

""" hold at what point can e f hernocranc soctettes on, h "b " tr crural features 0 t esetal transformation, one that affects t e asrc 5 u

states" (Steinmetz ]999a: 8)? . "fficient to raise serious doubtsIt is the case that Isolated mCidents are mSU . uch doubts require

I lidity of the ban on torture, s dabout the ongoing genera va "" N m lIy this is first measure

f i rernatic apphcatlon. or a "an appearance a ItS sys" d f I I rinciples and then, againstjuridically in terms of a dlsregar or ~ga p ber of incidents) or strUC-this backdrop, fixed quantitativelyd(as t e nU~ished by total institutions.

II " I' h f h abling con Itlons esta "I dtura y In Ig tot e en " I dy existing norm is mls ea -" red against an a rea "But a perspective measu h legal interpretation pos-

fi I 't fails to see t at every f 1ing. In the rst p ace, I " ated and that every application 0 a ru esesses an IOstanCe when law IS cre. ' d deferral (Derrida 1990). Lawpotentially contains both a repetltlon

han al eadable as an "effect" of a

" f' Iy and IS t us on Y r d h"IS generated per ormatlVe, ] 995' 2004) that for their part-:-an t ISseries of pronouncements (Butler "h t"ces Strictly speaklllg, then,is decisive-are always bound up Wit prac I .

]22 Susanne Krasm ann

there is only "real law," and "book law" in the end consistently revealingitself as a practice meant to be examined on the surface of its historical andlocally specific emergence (Foucault 1991; Rose and Valverde 1998). Lawneeds to be enforced," becoming relevant and effective at the moment ofits societal negotiation (Hunt and Wickham 1994; Walby 2007). Henceit not only reproduces itself along its own rules of codification, but as thecase of the practice of torture suggests can be understood, inversely, as anelement of legal practice materializing in legislation and jurisprudence, andalso in actions of the executive-in brief, in interactive processes. And thiselement in turn forms and deforms the constitutional state; the (de)formingitself must be measured recursively, in relation to previously posited consti-tutional principles.

Let us now connect this governmentality-oriented reading more con-cretely to the debate over the legitimacy and legalization of torture."

2. THE ABSOLUTE BAN ON TORTUREAND LIMITLESS SECURITY

Classical, normatively focused sociology of law sees its main task as gaug-ing the difference between "book law" and "real law," and between uni-versal standards on the one hand and injustice or lack of rights on the otherhand. But in fact the difference between "book law" and "real law" is notper se a problem, the former being able to live very nicely with a mark-edly different manifestation of the latter. A look at the theory of penal lawmakes this very clear: such law exists precisely on account of the differ-ence between an interdiction and real actions, its function being to renderthe norm apparent. As already maintained by sociologists working in thetradition of Emile Durkheim and-in particular-within systems theory,law operates with a symbolic generalization of expectations, the symbolicvalidity of norms, not "real law," here being the decisive factor.

In the debate on torture, defenders of an absolute interdiction of thepractice recite this argument when they recognize the danger of a deviationfrom the interdiction. What COunts for them are thus not so much actualincidents and the factual existence of the practice as the discourse itself.They are concerned with the symbolic validity of the norms that have theirexpression in the law. But if we understand the emergence of torture inFoucault's sense, as a question of the rationalization of techniques of gov-ernment, then this normative focus is necessarily inadequate.

One of the most prominent defenders of the legalization of torture undercertain circumstances, Alan Dershowitz (20041, has in fact altered the nor-mative argument. Since torture is in any event practiced in extreme situa-tions, bringing it under control through a "torture warrant" is called for.The legal regulating promises a de facto limitation of the practice. Thephilosopher Slavoj Zizek (2002) has argued against what he terms "liberal


Dershowitz's honesty" and in favor of "apparen~ 'hypocriShY"': in afn erner-hider fight but t e use 0 torture

gency situation we should do w at we cons , ' , I' 'pie"b I d " nto a umversa prmcr .should under no circumstances e e evate " I f the

"sense of guilt t ie awareness 0O I . . di t' n preserves our , ,n y Its Inter IC 10 " Th b lie order has to remam

inadmissibility of what we have done. d hessyomf10a~ already sets in with

, Th h II . a t of norms an t u, ,intact. e 0 owmg u f ' legitimate topic for diSCUSSIOnthe acceptance of the use 0 torture as a

(ibid.: 103). h di 'softening of the ban on torture isZizek's concern about t e Iscurslve

lthe first place the foundational

understandable for two rnam reasons. dn d into the t~rrure debate, and" b . aredly mtr O uce I

ticking-born scenano repe II' both extremely suggesrive and profirsinvoked by Dershowltz as we. ~ IS I . h t scenario involves an erner-from a high degree of recognition va ~e'b~ an such a clear-cut way, bur isgency situation that is extremely ImPfro a et'her experiences and expecra-

I .' e and trans er to 0extreme y easy to lmag.m. bi uous In this manner, torture becomesrions precisely because It IS una m g . bl instrument The persuasive

ivabl . e and an accepta e I . , ,both a conceiva e pracuc . he i .nary construction's anncipa-force at work here already unfolds in ~ e ,~agl Iy proper and possible solu-tion of the desired solution as, alr~a .y, t eon res a promise of rationality

. h scena no lI1corporation. At the same time, t e . t to irs historical predecessors," I re For 111 contrasInto Its conceptua str uctu . . f onfession nor to torment,rher to orce a cin this case torture serves nei b ' R rher it is meant to produce

bi d b se human emgs. a , , 'punish, su Jugate, or e a, f knowledge legal pr-ovrsrorts. . h e as an lI1strument a '.. hinformation, ence to serv d . to the structure: "it IS a rig t-in this way being already incorporateh m { ation obtained by rort ure

..' t at tn/orm . .based [usrificat ion, which recognizes "(H Ivorsen 2009: 244; Italics

d 'denee In court a . Ican never be presente as eVI . b resented as an "erh ica, ,. hi the scenano can e p di 'in original}. For t IS reason, "11'f situations" (ibid.). In ad inon,thought-experiment" applicable ro

blrea I e x'istential: saving lives. In its

. honor a e as It IS e f 'it is guided by a rnonve as d secur: ith the promise 0 rano-, ' f lity an secunty WIlinkage of Imperaflves a mora I , borh a legirimaring tempi are

, ' b b nafiO funCtIons as , fnality the flckmg- om sce 11for it and a bluepnnr or, h h . rcumstances ca .for legalizing torture w en t e C1 Ie makes normalizatIon pos-

The exrreme examp "Ttaking concrete measures. . t of liberal government: 0. f the very lI1strumen . .

sible by becomlllg part 0 d ' I way liberalism's insIStenced para OXlca , Ispeak in a somewhat perverse an. h' rs only for instrumenta. . h t exerCise t elf powe .. _

on i1mlted governments t a ·b'I' f seeing torture as a CIVIthe POSSI I Iry 0 .and pragmatic purposes creates 'd d h r 'Irs sole purpose is preVenfing

" ctlce provl etalized not an ataVistiC, pra ,furu:e harms" (Luban 2006: 42)., b I s of the ban on rorture

h atlve a so utenesIn the second place, t e norm D showitz's suggestion, law can

also seems called for because contrary riO etras clean as the ricking-bomb, h ch IS SImp y no

never tame the practice, wid· t a license to torture meansscenario implies (McCoy 2005). Han Ing ou Irure" (Luban 2006: 48).

bl' hing a "torture cuattracting torturers and est a IS


Furthermore, inscribing torture into law for the ostensible sake of savinglives would nonetheless still involve abandonment of a basic civilizationalnorm, arguing in favor of torture thus undermining the "specific status thatthe ban on torture has struggled to establish" (Blumenrath 2007: 321); itignores the complex evaluative processes grounding the ban on torture inthe relevant normative documents, from the Declaration of Human Rightsto various authoritative national constitutions. As the constitutional spe-cialist Ernst-Wolfgang B6ckenf6rde (2006: 416) has observed, recourse "tothe pre-positive fundament" of such documents is "nothing else than a nec-essary part of an appraisal of the contents" of "positive law." Taking thelatter seriously by no means implies isolating it from "its historical-politicalcontext." In view of this reality, it would appear that the absolute interdic-tion on torture actually marks an absolute boundary-line to the discussion(WetSlau 2004).

Nonetheless, the arguments in favor of torture will not be silenced;rather, we may expect that under the sign of existential peril, it will repeat-edly beckon, moving forward a conceptual matrix of "them or us" that ren-ders the unthinkable thinkable in the name of self-defense. This is anothersource of the imaginative force of the ticking-bomb scenario, varying ahistorical figure of argumentation: if in Hobbes the violence of a state ofemergency already serves to ground the state as Leviathan, legally legiti-mizing itself through it as the guarantor of security, this highly real figureby no means limits itself to a foundational act. Rather, it became a sym-bolic element within an enduring process of state formation (see Steinmetz1999a: 9), inscribed in the history and constitution of the modern state.Carl Schmitt (1963: 32) accurately defined the state of emergency as a "realpossibility"-as a threat that is present and absent at once. Inserting thisformulation into the perspective of governmentality, we can say that secu-rity laws do not originate in a sovereign's act of decision but rather need tobe understood as the effect of a rationalization of threats-as a response tosuch threats through a body of security measures.

But the ticking-bomb scenario's performative force unfolds on morethan a symbolic level. The interplay between government and the governednot only results from rhetorical truth-games but is already interwoven intospecific forms of rationality representing and actively producing empiricalreality. This epistemic access to the world develops equally from ways ofthinking and acting that have become historical and are context-dependentand institutionally anchored; these in turn generate specific modes of vis-ibility and articulation. In this way the implementation of laws itself doesnot amount to a simple double game of staged insecurity and guaranteedsecurity, the interest-led generation of anxiety on the one hand, fearfulsubmission on the other hand (Bigo 2008b). Rather, the conditions foraccepting exceptional security measures should be examined on the episte-mological level of implicit forms of knowledge inscribed into practice andcapable of eluding political discourse.


the roblem of the state of exceptionAccording to Agamben (20105), f h P ception becoming a rule but of

. , the first pace 0 t e ex ddoes not consist In . h" I' " The norm not only oes

havi thi ng to do Wit rea uy.the norm aving no I,. S mbolic abstraction subtracted from anynot stipulate Its application. as ; y h lir but exists as it were indepen-reality it cannot be harmomze wdlt hrea I Y'se is true as well. Within the

it ] ibid . 40)-an t e rever isrence ofdenrly from It see I I .. , touched by the existence ah the ban on torture IS un

present context, ten, ice of by the ban.d I the practice a torture 0'

torture; an converse y. firmin with the legal theorist iererWe can respond to this by con, I

g, tate is an illusion"-also an

Simon (2008), that "the constltbutiOnFa sSl'mon law does not operate. " ' t Agam en. or , , himplicit argument aga ms .' I of constitutionality. Hence t ethe way it is sketched by the prm:,IPbes fliers before the legislator, " I d k decisions a out con I. .[udiciar y a rea y ma es did" The pr inciple of separationhas even noticed that they have evelo

pe. he executive by the legislative

, indi tes of contra over t , 'Iof powers Simon 111 ICa , . ." . ely an abstract prmctp e ,' b "illusion -precIs . Ibranch, has always een an d his i cial-this insight IS not a afl."-

I, (ibid 5 6) But-an t IS IScru f h elynot rea ity I I .: -. 'II' I as the opposite a t rut , narnd d the I usion ess I ' Iiog once we un ersran .' h liry in an onto ogrca sense., h contrast 109 Wit rea I , . .

as a deception, t an as . "" itself." but it exists In OUt. 'I does not exrst 10 I, .'

The corrst rt utron a state,. . h k s the state's realizatIOn pos-imagination and it is this illusion t at

lma

feh

" s if" Legal validity and, h K ian prmcrp e 0 tea . . I

sible according to t e antra bi set in play performatlve y. 109 to su jeers areperception of law as per-tam .. 2004) The difference between aand "verified" in this manner (Ranicller:, is not'overcome here-Agamben

. d "rea aw Isymbolic norm and perceive, b But only an appeal to norms

, h t this cannot e so. h tis correct in arguing t a " "F ucault 2003: 28)-to t at exren ,can allow them to become real I(10 "

1 h "rea awstrictly speaking we on y ave, (2005' 129) that "we are what weReemtsma's observation in. his essay d" has clear implications for the

h ormse never to a 'I Iydo and we are w at we pr I d the constitutlona state on, h . iah that aw an , 'debate on torture. T e mSlg t b t'on An exclUSive onenta-, . ' n of that a serva I., fexist in practice IS an extenslO f fails to see that either as part 0

tion towards the symbolic force 0 n:r:':~warts the law, the use of torturethe practice of law or as a practice t a k of the force of law. Hence as anhas to be accounted for in the fram~~~~), torture places a q~estion mark"extralegal" practice (Gross 2003, , f "outsourcing (see Mayer

, ' I te even 111 cases a I I laover the constltutlona sta, I "I where "14 as do ega regu. -. take pace e se, fl' Ith2008· 101-138) seemmg to , 'hich are in can Ict w. ", d k oSSlble practices wtions that legitimize an ma e p

international legal guidelll1es. ould need to focus not only onIn line with this reasoning, the ~fnease.

wtorture" will be incorporated

f' ce "li e-savlOg , . herthe possibiliry that, or lnstan Id b l'ttle place for a sense of ease In eltinto law. To be sure, there wou e I hat could block such efforts (Den-law or the deliberations of higher cO:::~~ing urgent would be how torture

, 2008) 15 The questions nownlOger .

•

]26 Susanne Krasmann

ever becomes a perceprible praxis, and againsr what backdrop it appearsto be rational.

In light of the images from Abu Ghraib, the American journalist MarkDanner (2004: 9) has posed the following question: "Is what has changedonly what we know, or what we are willing to accept?" Is what we seeprecisely whar we have already accepted? This could be the question under-stood within an epistemological perspective on the forms of torture'srationalization. Its acceptance would rest here less on legitimation and con-scions decision, rather being the result of inscribed and also, just so, 000-discursive procedures.

Until now, the observation that executing security measures rests, ina very essential way, on a specific form of problematization of securitymanaging without special legitimation-oriented rhetorical expenditure hasabove all been put forward in discussions by political scientists (Buzan,Wrever and Wilde 1998; Wrever 1995). With the concept of "securitiza-tion," the theory taking its name from this concept describes a processin which existential threats are intersubjectively identified, with extraordi-nary measures seeming inevitable as a consequence. Securitization tends toexclude political disagreement, since the measures appear inherently justi-fied. Events such as 9/1] can thus directly catalyze security measures; butthey can also become a horizon for the reading of a permanent threat limit-ing, as if it were self-evident, the space of political discussion. But securi-tization theory fails to appreciate that such depoliticizing mechanisms arenot only manifest in a rhetorical structure. In fact, they only reveal them-selves through a pursuit of the implicit logic-including the non-discursivelogic-playing a deciding role in security-centered government.

Such governing thus consistently mobilizes a mechanism of division. Inactualizing the implicit, historically authenticated promise of security, itestablishes a relationship between governors and the governed, in this wayalso producing an inside and an outside. It distinguishes between thosemeant to be protected and the threat Or danger meant to be banished oreradicated. Securitization is excluding, and thus exclusive.

At present a specific rationality of preemption is unfolding that renderstalk of a preventive state deceptive (Eckert 2008). For what is being debatedhere is neither prevention in the welfare-state sense of solving social prob-lems nor the management of calculable risks in the sense of an actuarialjustice that intervenes preventatively and, when needed, compensates forincurred damages (Feeley and Simon 1994). Rather, in play are threats andrisks that are incalculable and that, on account of their expected magni-tude, appear intolerable, hence the need to neutralize them in advance. Forthat reason, what is characteristic of the preemptive state is not a rational-ity of prevention but a rationality of precaution (Ewald 2002)," which canbe directly tied to mechanisms of exelusion and repression.

These mechanisms can be observed above all in present anti-terrorismstrategies, which approach international terrorism as a flexible organization

•

The Right of Government ]27

d networks with shifting national. . II affiliated or scattere 004 E k tof terrrtorra y un I" . ffiliations (Lepsius 2 ; c erbut pronouncedly ascribable re igrous a f r instance in Germany in2008). Where the earlier fight against terrokr, a " which is to say with

d ith "known un nowns,the 1970s, was concerne .":1 in s and their political aims, todayknowledge of specific political group dgOliver Kessler (2007) put it, on

d Ch . t pher Daase an I f Id' Ait is focuse ,as ns a . forrnulati f Donald Rums e s. s a" ithy orrnu anon a"unknown unknowns -a p I hi hi ctua l and highly diffuse, terror-Phenomenon that is simultaneous y fig ya I ulable and no longer insur-

h rival 0 a non-ca c fism seems to represent tear. . . b th stable empirical re erenceable catastrophe, for whose Identlfi~::~~~ (~ougen 2003). And this is thepoints and suitable Instruments are . g " comes into play, "established

. h "th logic of preemption di fPrecise pomt were t e . . as something IStlJ1Ctrom. f d ling with uncertainty, . 2007)as a new paradigm or ea I . 45. Bi a 2008b; Massumi .

quantifiable risks" (Halvorsen 2009'f

21d

'a I;gic of pressing risk that can. f pnon thus un as. . andThe paradigm a preem f lation It contains options

. f four stages a escaianon. f ebe described In terms 0 f the rationalization a tartur.imperatives for action that offer space or

3. SECURITY AND TRUTH .

h . d "[n]othing IS ah famously ernp astze ,As Francois Ewald (199]: ]99) as risk' it all depends on how one ana-. k i . If" but "anything can be a . '.. .. I) Technologies of

f1S In rtse , . t" (Italics 10 onglna.. .Iyzes the danger, considers the even f arive. In anticipating undesired

ik S' they are per arm I Iy manu-risk operate li e program,. I' h t they simu raneousd be a rea iry t a . d

events, they profess to escn are rendered apparent in thl~ wayanfacture. They define problems that d ]980' 248). At the same time, thesewhose solution they call for (see Gore ~:ch ev~nts calculable-although m atechnologies do not necessarily mak bl For the calculation of risk notcertain way they do make them mana:e;es eknowledge, identifying releva~tonly rests on knowledge but also p;o rd fields of intervention (for examp esubject areas (combating terronsmdan . of biometric passports). .

h h the Intra ucuon . h s openingsecuring borders t roug. d fields of intervention, t u hIn this way identifying risks pro udceMsnsrer 2007; O'Malley 2004). Suc I

. . f . n (Aradau an u . H the emptrtcacertain options or acno . 1 lation of risk. enceoptions objectify themselves In the ca merion with expected future events,

. that In conjun b a one-waydata-past expenence- . '. . rra l: that someone uys .offers a basis for prognoses IS Il1I~Se~rn~~s co'ntacts with Islamist g~oup~~sflight ticket, pays his rent Il1

fcas n'derstand such phenomena

has Indlcadtua1

d But I we U II I . g t e 10 IVlnot per se angerous. " isk factors p acm . "drisk when taken together they serve as f ~ourse be extended to all indivi u,;

, d . 'on Th,s can a . "h' h-nsk group,concerned un er SUSPICI . ubsumable IntO a 19.. deals engaged in such actions; tdheya

fre ISledfor-momentouS declslOdns rna 5'

k an -1 ca h ere partie.with measures then ta en. deal plans of t e suspeh re actions an rregardless of t e concre

128 Susanne Krasm ann

The justification for these measures is offered by the applied risk schemaitself, the prognosis thus manufacturing its Own evidence (Harcourt 2007;Simon 1998). In this manner, however, what is objectified is not only thesuspicion being aimed at a specific social group (see Castel 1991: 288; Bigo2008a) but the question of security itself, which is thus removed from thefield of political negotiation. Becoming an empirically receptive dimension,security loses the binding force of a norm meant to be weighed againstfreedom (see Lepsius 2004: 459).

In the framework of preemption, threat, functioning as a real possibility,is simultaneously impalpable and enormous: it can manifest itself-this isthe "ontological premise"-at any time, without notice, under an entirelynew signature (Massumi 2007); and as anticipated catastrophe, it is intoler-able. But for just this reason, it is open to explanation as an incontrovert-ible fact: existential menace defines the need for extraordinary measures asirrefutable (Buzan, W""ver and Wilde 1998). The rationality of preemptionthus circulates as a SOrt of "realism" that, in Jacques Ranciere's (1998:132) words, absorbs "all reality and all truth in the category of the onlything possible."" But law loses its delimiting function to the extent that itis characterized by uncertainty and insecurity. Inversely, security becomesthe measure for producing lnws.'"

Because the rationality of preemption dispenses with both solid empiri-cal evidence and suitable analytic instruments in identifying potential catas-trophes, it must rely On anticipation_on imagining encounters with "theworst possible" scenarios (Ewald 2002: 286). But because no certainty canbe gained in this way, an absolute will to know has to be activated. Conse-quently the shift from danger and prevention to preemption is accompaniednot only by a temporal moving forward of the threshold for intervention anda spatial extension of the fields of intervention, but also by a displacementof the object itself. The clarifying of suspicion manifest in averting dangerbecomes creation of suspicion within the rationality of preemption (Putter,Narr and Busch 2005). "Enacting catastrophe" (Collier 2008) means con-fronting this dystopic vision preemptively. What is here at work is a formof knowledge generation no longer justifying its expectation of a crimethrough concrete evidence Or moments of suspicion and that, in its basictendencies, knows no boundaries. Because the concrete threat is unknown,enormous, and intolerable, the failed search for evidence amounts to a callto COntinue the search all the mOre urgently and absolutely.

Sven Opitz (Chapter 5, this volume) has identified the transition pointat which a liheral government becomes intervenistic. Briefly put: becauseheneath the imperative of defense aga inst catastrophe, not knowing and theobligation to know are interlinked, intervention becomes an absolute rightannulling the subject's right to freedom. Ar issue here is first of all the rightto freedom of those "Other" individuals who see themselves placed undersuspicion of terrorism and identified as a menace: one that, such is thepremise, very definitely can be presumed (Cole 2002; Krasmann 2007)."


analogy here suggests itselfh I ' of torture a strange , f heIn respect to t e ogle b . recisely because in view 0 th icki ng bam scene no, p b icerthat anticipates t e tiC I - I or elf as unimpressed y any ill _

Perceived existential threat it rev:a 5.1 5 ctu red by an absolute will tohe i rogation IS stru is th I _tainty: in torture, t e inter he " h" What is decisive here IS t e res~ (

know aimed a~ forcing o~t t ~ tr~t e~t the early coercive pr~ctice lea.dln~ing statement Itself, and in rhis re P f that producing "Information.to "confession" shows little difference ro~'has to follow certain performa-In order to appear plausible, the state;;;ure produces its own truth (Rejali

. 1 A erformative pracnce 0nve ru es. sap firrni d justifying itself.2007b)-thus con rrnmg an

4. CONCLUSION: THHE:~:~E06F SECURITYGOVERNMENT IN T

, e to liberal democratic' f urse not uruqu d hThe reemergence of torture 15 0 C~ut recent events have undersc,ore owsocieties of the twenty-first centu;~ pective of governmentahty allowseasily it can find its place here. e pers

lfinto a rationality of preemption,

us to show how torture inco~porates I;~~reats it becomes a ratio no long~rand how through the identn cation a erformative schema instead. In t eneeding to justify itself, fittmg

hmlto a Preven enter into a pact with 1[. It can

ide r e awoprocess, torture can Qvern. .' onal states. ,also embed itself in democratic consutun ed shows, in Karen Greenberg s

The fact that judicial torture has retu~n ther than eradicated, that lawwords (2006a: 6), that it "was rePdreasns~e~:tween good and evil." In thde

ith ture In a dilly Instituteexists together Wit tohr d ' isrration politically an ega Th isola-wake of 9/11, the Bus a rmru or less blatant fashion. e,

' t tn a more .' Guantanamotorture and rrusrreaune» , r ticu lar detainees m .tion and public exhibition of, In pa

sureas 'well as somerhing almedda~

may be read as a disclpltnanan mBea a be sure the adrninistranon I

. er ut t , itz's arg menta-demonstrating sovereign pow.. ' With Dershowltz s ar u .not really act here like a soverelg'b' Pow~r.that "rhe act of torture requires

. 'S arry has a serve else) whereastion in mmd, Elame ~ . holl borne by somea~e , vereno caura e (the averslveness IS W ~ that some portion of th~ se ,the forfei~ of one's future liberty ~':;:~:" (2004: 283). The secunth ~O;I~

adver;it~ b~:;hd~~:i~rS:;:ti~C~~~st~matica~IY f~o:eu~::di[::e~~;~ri~g ~thercles 0 t e (2006a' 6-7), thIS s ou k do with a lawagree with Greenberg I' flected a reluctance to ma e d in casesthan a sign of uncertainty. t re nd that found for rhe accuse d the

. , g exhaustive proceedings a h' h t "the J'udiCial system anreqUirm I d from t IS t a '0 to trustof doubt. If we are to con~ u \liC will need to learn oncel;gal any eventAmerican government at ~~rtainty" (ibid.: 7), this w~u :"instrumentitself even in the face a un, Iy an appropriate po mca

II 'g' law IS onalso mean the fo OWlI1 .

under that condition.

•


As Claude Lefort's (1988: 17) famous dictum would have it, in mod-ern democracies the locus of power circumscribes "an empty place." Forunlike under the ancien regime, no one may exclusively represent andpossess power. Rather, in principle power is equally accessible to every-one, its distribution a question of political argument. If law can here beunderstood as a central instrument for keeping this democratic void freeand allowing political space to emerge (see Fitzpatrick and Joyce 2007:73), this also means only enjoying any appearance of absolute truth withcaution. "The power of the correct interpretation-something true andaccurate that torture is always waiting to grasp-that is what we need tofear," is the way the historian Rainer Maria Kiesow (2003: 108) has putit. "As long as this and that opinion holds, as long as science only pro-duces precarious truths, as long as the fixing of meaning does not govern,as long as law remains law, neither truth nor law will have become a hor-rible, violent instrument." Acknowledging this insight, in the prism of agovern mentality perspective we can understand how security imperativescan assert themselves as a truth within whose logic torture asserts itselfas a practicable, and acceptable, tool.

NOTES

l . At the same time, adhering to the ban on torrure is often shaped by sec-ondary considerations such as the political or economic advantages it offersstates in the context of international relations (Hathaway 2004).

2. On the continuity of the practice of torture into the present see for examplePeters (1985); Rejali (2007a); Robin (2005); regarding the CIA in particularMcCoy (2005); on the analysis of "the conditions for the possibility" of tor-ture see Deutsches lnsrirur fur Menschenrechte (2007).

3. See especially the collection edited by Levinson (2004); Greenberg (2006); forthe German debate see for example Beesrer moller and Brunkhorst (2006).

4. See for example Dershowitz (2002; 2004); Brugger (1996; 2000). The tick-ing-bomb scenario is itself not new, but already surfaces as an argumentativefigure in Jeremy Bentham (1973 [1777-1779]; see Morgan 2000).

5. "Not simple na turallife, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) isthe originary political element." (Agamben 1998: 55) Within the logic of themodern nation-state, sovereign power over bare life receives a biopoliticaltwist: "Declarations of rights represent the originary figure of the inscriptionof natural life in the juridico-political order of the nation-state." (ibid.: 75) Inthis way every living being is potentially bare life {ibid.: S1}.

6. According to Butler (2004: 60), "Agamben, in a different vein, argues thatcontemporary forms of sovereignty exist in a structurally inverse relation tothe rule of law, emerging precisely at that moment when the rule of law issuspended and withdrawn."

7. "A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, itbends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all pos-sibilities. Its opposite pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up againstany resistance, it has no other option but to try to minimize it. In contrasta power relationship can only he articulated on the basis of twO elementsI ... I: thor 'the other' (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly


recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that,faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions,results, and possible inventions may open up" (Fou~ault 1982: 789).

8. On the critique of an "irnperativistic legal concept" In Foucault that narro~slaw to criminal law and conceives of it in Austin's sense as an avowal of willor "order of the sovereign," resulting in negative sanctions in the case of non-adherence": Biebricher (2006: 141); Hunt (1992); Keenan (1987) ..

9. Tadros (1988), for instance, makes clear that for Fou.cault juridica l powerdenotes a specific arrangement, form, and representation .of p~wer. Not alllaw has to be "juridical," and juridical power does not manifest Itself throughlaw alone (ibid.: 76). Every form of power that uses the threa~ of.a ~an.ct.lOn(either legal or social) for the sake of preven~ing a way of ~c.tlng IS juridica](ibid.: 78), but modern law does not operate to that mode (ibid.: 80). .

10. The position of these advisors had momentous consequences: they denl~dthe applicability of the Geneva Convention in the. case .of men captured 10Afghanistan defined as members of a l Qaeda and Its allies; and th~y ~Ishedto see the definition of torture limited to extreme forms of the application ofviolence and infliction of pain (U.S. Deportment of justice, Office of LegalCouncil, memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, August 1, 2002j memoran-dum for James B. Corney, December 30, 2004). . . ." .

11. On the involvement of EU member states JO rendition on the baSISof diplo-matic assurances" see Human Rights Watch (2005), the report of the Com-mittee on Legal 'Affairs and Human Rights (2007), and that of AmnestyInternational (2008). . . .. .

12. Police action confronted with legally uncertatn situatIOnS ISnot only .mall1te-nance of the law but also creation of law, as Derrida (1990) argues 10 refer-ence to Benjamin (1996). It thus acrual.ize~ t.he violen~e of lawmaklOg.

13. In their analyses of "indefinite detention. 1I1 Guantana.mo: Ara?au (2007)and Buder (2004) argue similarly, showing ho,,:, constltutlonal.lty changesthrough administrative practices and performa~lve acts abrogating .the law.My own argument is not so much aimed at speCific ~ealms of exceptlon id at

. f h bli h d I I s stem 10 general. In my un er-the transformatlon 0 t e esta IS e ega Y f f .standing of the emergence of forms of state from a process ~, per orm~tlvegeneration, I draw on studies of the "ethnography ?f the .state f(Krohn- at-sen and Nustadr 2005; Steinmetz 1999). Whe~ discusstons 0 . torture re e~to Foucault this is usually in relation to 5urveJIler et pu.mr, with some c~n

, . liti ( M', r 2007) In order to examinesidering the concept of biopo ItICS see utime . '. d hi' a Ithe shift in significance of sovereign po~e.r. For a dlfferentlate tee no ogregenealogy drawing on Foucault see Rejali (2003; 2007a). . h

14 When it comes to "rendition," European states have thus bee.n co(nhten~,wlt· . f f b h the ban on deportatlon t e non-diplomatic assurances mace 0 at hai .' 'refoulement obligation") in the case of likely torture and aRlr~rahlslnWgeVlh"

I " hi d tates" (see Human Ig ts atCdence of the practice in re evant t Ir s ld f'2005: 16ff.; Grey 2006). In fact international law clearly ho s trans erflngstates responsible for ensuing torture. . . f h' 1a between

15 D 'd L ban (2006: 51) even concludes, 111 view 0 t ~ .I~terp.y .· ju~~:ts a~d the Bush government after 9111, rhat;IIP]ol~~~la~sn~;c::~~~=:~and if the politicians accept torture, the Judges WI\ as.\ d . s will provide aa torture culture only the naive would suppose t lat J~ ,~e

16 ~~~gt~:;)~~~~~p~fon~~, ~~~~~~li; ~~~~~~.;;~ri::~ye~~::;ext; it is ~or~~~e~· cise in that ft emphasizes the ~OI~ent of anti.cipatory.~~t~,~:~~t~~~:~\e; avoid2004) and not, like "precautlon , an assoCiation WIdanger." Nevertheless, I treat the termS as synonyms here.


17. "Ind.efinite detenti~~m," as practiced in Cua ntanarno or in incommunicadofashion elsewhere. In the world as a result of "extraordinary rendition" (seeBfftler ~005; Mutlme: 2007), has been rationalized in this way, with thosea ecre granted no right to take legal countermeasures. As late as Au ust20,08, rentago.n spoke~man Geoff Morrell emphasized that Osama bin tad-en s f~rmer drlve.r,. Salim Hamdan, who was pronounced guilty of assistingter~?rlsm by a mlhtarr, court at Guantcinamo, was to be indefinitely held asan enemy combatant after serving his sentence.

18. ~Y/ethus fi.nd consti.tutional-Iegal guidelines regarding the state's authority toIntervene In a securlt.y context regularly converted inro legal regulations with-?ut. any effort ro c1a~lfy the vague concepts in play. The measures' political aimISsimply translated Into a rhetoric of law into "1·f then" di . I I(P" ' . .. en can mona causesutter., Nan and ~usch 2.0~,5: 10).' thus being delivered to the discretionary

authority of the p~lJ~e. ThIS practice of the 'constitutionality check-up' is notla- n;uch the subml?slon of the legislative and the executive" to the law, but the.aw.: accomm~~atlon ro ~he sta~e> r~quirements and the potential undermin-Ing of the political pracncc of litigation" {Ranciere 1998: 109).

19. Ac~ordlng to Julia Eckert. (200~)~ in the present-day struggle against ter-rorism t,he focus. ?n certain religious groups is marked by a tendency to~ulturalJze, ethnicize, and thus al~o socially externalize what is consideredangerou? We can understan~ rhis as a condition for the social acceptance

or toleration o.f a .border-crosslng extension of the state's authority to inter-vene. On ~he significance of the construction of the other and a closed worldas a premise for the exercise of torture, see Crelinsten (2003).

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Mutimer, David. (2007). Sovereign Contradictions: Maher Arar and the IndefiniteFuture, pp. 159~179 in Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristiana Masters (eds) TheLogics of Biopower and the War on Terror: Living, Dying, Surviving. NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan.

0'Ma Iley, Pat. (2004). Risk, U'lcertainty and Government. London: Glasshouse.Peters, Edward. (1985). Torture. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Putter, Norbert, Wolf-Dieter Narr and Heiner Busch. (2005). Bekiimpfungsrecht

lind Rechtsstaar. Vorwartsverrechtlichung in gebremsten Bahnen? Biirgerrechte& Polizei/CI LI P 82(3): 6-15.

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ReenllSma, Ja n Philipp (ed). (1991). Zur Politischen Semantik des Begriffs Folrer, pp.239-263 in Folter. Zur Analyse cines J-Ierrschaftsmittels. Hamburg: Junius.

Recrntsrn::l, Jan Philipp. (2005). Folter im Rechtsslaat? Harnburg: HamburgerEdition. .

RciJli, lJariu:.. (2003), Modern Torture as a Civic Marker: Solving a Global Anxl~ety with" New Political Technology. journal o( /-hunan Rights 2(2): 153-171.

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d Democracy. Princeton/Oxford: PrincetonRejali, Darius. (2007a). Torture anUniversity Press. .' und die Erzwingung von lnforma-

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7 Foucault and FrontiersNotes on the Birth of theHumanitarian Border

William Walters

What I produce r Ia . ... '. re Instruments, utensils, weapons. Iwould likemy,;b~oks to be a kind of toolbox in which others could dig aroundt(~ n a rool tha~ they can use however they wish in their own area.oucault J 994: .)23; my translation)

1. INTRODUCTION

The single word "border" conceals a multiplicity and implies a constancwhere genea logical Investigation uncovers mutation and descent. Historic~re~earch reveals that dIverse political rationalities have framed the politi-~ ~eans and objectives of state frontiers and borders, just as the difficultor of making borders actual has drawn upon a great variety of rechnolo-

gIes and heterogeneous administrative practices, ranging from maps of the;ern~ry,. the creatlo~ of specialized border officials, and architectures of-eill cation to today s expenmentation with bio-digitalized forms of sur-vel hance. ThIS chapter argues that we are witnessing a novel developmentWit In this history of borders and border-making, what I want to call theemergence of the humanitarian border. While a great deal has been writtenabout the militarization, securitization and fortification of borders todaythere IS far less consideration of the humanitarianization of borders. ButIf the Investment of border regimes by biometric technologies rightly war-rants being treated as an event Within the history of the making and rerna k-Ing of borders (A moore 2006), then arguably so too does the reinvention ofthe border as a space of humanitarian government.

Under what conditions are we seeing the rise of humanitarian bor-ders) The emergence of the humanitarian border goes hand in hand withthe move which has made state frontiers into privileged symbolic andregulatory I~struments within strategies of migration control. It is partof a much Wider trend thar has been dubbed the "rebordering" of politi-cal and rerriroria l space (Andreas and Biersteker 2003). The huma nitar-Ian horder emerges once it becomes established rhat border crossing hasbecome, for th.ous~nds of migrants seeking, for a variety of reasons, toaccess the rer rrtorres of the global North, a matter of life and death. Itcrystallizes as a way of governing this novel and disturbing situation,

Foucault and Frontiers 139

and compensaring for rhe social violence embodied in the regime of

migration control.The idea of a humanitarian border might sound at first counterintuitive

or even oxymoronic. After all, we often think of conremporary humani-tarianism as a force that, operating in the name of the universal but endan-gered subject of humaniry, transcends the walled space of the internarionalsystem. This is, of course, quire valid. Yet it would be a misrake to drawany simple equation between humanitarian projects and what Deleuze andGuattari would call logics of dererritoralization. While humanitarian pro-grammes might unsettle certain norms of statehood, it is important to rec-ognize the ways in which the exercise of humanitarian power is connectedto the actualization of new spaces. Wherher by its redefinirion of certainlocales as humanitarian "zones" and crises as "emergencies" (Calhoun2004), the authority it confers on certain experts to move rapidly acrossnerworks of aid and intervention, or its will to designate those populatingrhese zones as "victims," it seems justified to follow Debrix's (1998) obser-vation that humanitarianism implies reterritorialization on rap of dererri-rorialization. Humanitarian zones can materialize in various situations-inconflict zones, amidst the relief of famine, and againsr the backdrop of statefailure. But the case that interests me in whar follows is a specific one: asiruation where the actual borders of states and gateways to the rerritorybecome themselves zones of humanirarian government. Undersranding theconsequences of this is paramount, since it has an important bearing onwhat is often termed the securitization of borders and citizenship.

The chapter offers a preliminary survey of the humanirarian border. Ifocus on two aspects in particular: the materialization of the humanitarianborder within particular regimes of knowledge, and the constitutive rolewhich politics plays in making and changing humanitarian borders. But rhechapter has a second purpose in addition to rhis mapping exercise. This isto examine more broadly the contribution which Foucauldian studies, andespecially srudies in governmenraliry, have made ro rhe critical and genea-logical invesrigarion of borders and frontiers. Here I observe that Foucaultactually had relarively little to say about the relationship of state borders tomodern regimes of power. However, this is not the case for many of thosewho have explored the possibiliries for polirical analysis that he opened up:border studies has been a significant area of interest for govern mentalitystudies. In the first part of this chapter, and as a prelude to my discussionof humanitarianization, I argue that for all its important insights, Fou-cauldian writing about borders has often stuck rather rigidly to the con-cepts which Foucault left us. Bur is this Foucauldian vocabulary of poweradequate ro rhe mapping of emergenr and unusual formations of power-Inborder studies or elsewhere? I don't rhink so. The chaprer argues It IS nota matter of dispensing with conceptS like neoliberalism, biopolitics, sov~r-eign power, and so on. But there is a need to supplement these terms withnew concepts. One challenge for future studies in governmenraltry, then, IS

140 William Walters

that of over,coming the attitude that all the tools we need are already there,m Foucault s toolbox. It IS with this aim of adding to the toolbox that I takeup the question of the humanitarian border.


But there is another explanation for the relative absence of questions offrontiers in Foucault's writing on governmentality. And here we have toacknowledge that, framed as ir is previously, this is a problematic question.For it risks the kind of retrospective fallacy which projects a set of verycontemporary issues and concerns onto Foucault's time. It is probably fairto speculate that frontiers and border security was not a political issue dur-ing the 1970s in the way that it is today in many western states. "Borders"had yet to be constituted as a sort of meta-issue, capable of condensi ng awhole complex of political fears and concerns, including globalization, theloss of sovereignty, terrorism, trafficking and unchecked immigration. Thequestion of the welfare state certainly was an issue, perhaps even a meta-issue, when Foucault was lecturing, and it is perhaps not coincidental thathe should devote so much space to the examination of pastoralism. Butnot the border. The point is not to suggest that Foucault's work evolved inclose, unmediated correspondence with shifts in the political issues of hisday. But it is to observe that any genealogy of the state will inevitably bearthe traces of its political time.

Foucault may have lacked the inclination or the political motivation tooffer anything like a systematic analysis of frontiers and their relationshipto modern rationalities and technologies of rule. Nevertheless, this has notinhibited the emergence of a sizeable body of work which has begun roponder the government of borders, and found in Foucault's work, and sub-sequent studies in governmentality, a series of concepts and analytics toadvance this theoretical project." Not the least significant accomplishmentof this work has been to advance current debates about the securitizationof borders, and the governance of migrations and mobilities more gener-ally. Securitization has typically been understood in terms of the socialconstruction of threat, and the legitimation of exceptional administrativemeasures (e.g., Buonfino 2004). Foucauldian and governmentality-inspiredresearch has opened up a different angle. It has done this largely by exam-ining the particular rationalities, technologies and strategies which cur-rently rationalize and invest the space of borders in western states.

Yet a glance over this impressive body of work reveals that its accom-plishments are somewhat uneven. There are two things in particular whichstand out. The first concerns the temporal scope of many of these investiga-tions. It is overwhelmingly the case that studies in the governmentality ofborders and bordering have trained their attention on the immediate pres-ent. While investigations of biometrics, smart cards, and detention abound,we know very little about, say, historical practices of quarantine in portS orthe techniques of partitioning that were used in the demarcation of colonialand postcolonial territories (but see Crampton 2007). Perhaps a certain"9/11" effect has been at work here, drawing research into the orbit of verycontemporary and highly visible concerns ar the expense of those that seemmore remote. But whatever the specific causes, the outcome ISthat thinkingabout borders has yet to profit from historical and genealogical framing 10

2. FOUCAULT AND FRONTIERS

It is probably fair to say that the theme of frontiers is largely absent from;,he two cours~s ~hat are today read together as Foucault's lectures on

governmentality. (Foucault .1991; 2007; 2008). This is not to suggestthat frontiers r~celve no mention at all. Within these lectures we certainlyencoun,ter pa~smg rem.ar.ks o~ the theme. For instance, Foucault speaks atone POlO: of. the administrative state, born in the territoriality of nationalboundaries 10 the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and corresponding toa society of regulation and discipline" (Foucault 1991: 104).' Elsewhere,he notes how the calculation and demarcation of new frontiers served asone of the practical elements of military-diplomatic technology, a machinehe associares With the government of Europe in the image of a balance ofpower and accord 109 to the governmental logic of raison d'etat. "Whenthe diplomats, the ambassadors who negotiated the treaty of Westphalia,received msr ructions from their government, they were explicitly advisedto ensure that the new frontiers, the distribution of states, the new relation-ships to be established between the German states and the Empire, and thezones of influence of France, Sweden, and Austria be established in terms ofa principle: to maintain a balance between the different European states"(Foucault 2007: 297).

. But these are only hints of what significance the question of frontiersmight have within the different technologies of power which Foucaultsought to analyze. They are only fragmentary reflections on the place bor-ders and frontiers might occupy within the genealogy of the modern statewhich Foucault outlines with his research into governmenralirv.'

Why was Foucault apparently not particularly interested in borderswhen he composed these lectures? One possible answer is suggested byElden's careful and important work on power-knowledge and territory.Elden takes issue with Foucault for the way in which he discusses territo-rial rule largely as a foil which allows him to provide a more fully-workedout account of govern mentality and its administration of population.Despite the fact that the term appears prominently in the title of Fou-cault's lectures, "the issue of territory continually emerges only to berepeatedly marginalized, eclipsed, and underplayed" (Elden 2007: 1).Because Foucault fails to reckon more fully with the many ways in whichthe production of territory-and most crucially its demarcation by prac-tices of frontier marking and control-serves as a precondition for thegovernment of population, it is not surprising that the question of fron-tiers occupies little space in his narrative."

142 William Walters

the way that studies in the governance of, say, poverty (Dean 1991; Pro-cacci 1991), certainly have. Of course, this obsession with the immedi-ate present IS ,hardly mconsrstent with main currents in the social sciencewhere a cert~In present ism is the norm. But it is at odds with the tenor ofmuch work In ?overnmentality studies where a commitment to historicalwork has been Important.

. Nevert~eless, it is not this point but a second criticism of Foucaul-dian studies of borders that will form the basis for the remainder of thischapter. ThIS concerns what I take to be a somewhat restricted analyticalImagination at play in this body of work. If they have been overwhelm-Ingly confined to the immediate present, these studies have also been attimes conserv.ative in the. range of concepts they have employed to makesense of practices and logics of power. To develop this point I want to turnto the quote with which I started. Here we find Foucault musing, some-what modestly perhaps, that he would prefer his work to be treated like atoolbox. Rather than a philosophical relationship where his works wouldoperate within, games of. i.nte~pretation and explication he proposes a farmore pragmatic, .even ~t"ltana~ relationship. Not concepts that might bedebated as to their precise meaning, as many would in the world of profes-sional political theory, but tools (others can use them "however they wish")to be put to work In the study of different phenomena. In a vaguely Nietz-schean sense, whatever value they might possess would follow from theirapplication and effects.

Now it could be said that the literature on borders has been quite faith-ful to Foucault in this regard. If anything, it could be accused of being toofaithful. For it has sometimes proceded as though the only tools necessaryor even available for the Job of investigating borders were already at hand.It IS as though most of the necessary concepts were already there-in thetoolbox. It is lust a matter of reaching in and taking a few. It is perhapsthis attitude which explains why so many studies have rather similar andfa~i~iar conceptual coordinates such as discipline, sovereign power, bio-politics and governmentality. This is not to say there have been no attemptsto connect Foucault with other strains of thought. Indeed, there have beencreative fusions and dialogues. The use of Agamben to make sense of theexceptional character of detentions and controls springs to mind (Butler2004; Isin and Rygiel 2006). Nevertheless, it remains the case that on thewhole this literature has proceeded as though most of the concepts neededto do the work of a genealogy of bordering were already in existence.

Given the fact that Foucault commenced the critical investigation of neo-liberalism long before it had become a theoretical concern for most leftists,it could be argued that he offers a more than passable guide to themes thatcontinue to frame our politics today. At the same time, it has to be said thatthe world we inhabit has changed in countless and profound ways from theworld that Foucault confronted up until his untimely passing. While weshould avoid the epochalist stance which posits the birth of an entirely new


order, we can nevertheless not adequately capture new forms identities andpower relationships if we work with the unexamined assu~1ption th~t allthe terms we n.e~d are ~Iready in existence. This is of course true in a gen-~ral.sen.se, but It IS particularly true in the area of borders and migration, aninstitutional domain that has undergone rapid expansion, experimenrationand complex transformations in recent years. As such, there is a strong caseto be ~ade that future research in the area of borders, territory, security,etc. might start with a question about its relationship to Foucault's toolbox.In short, we can only get so far with the contenrs of Foucault's toolbox. Itis not a matter of throwing out the toolbox, but of recognizing its limits.Since it was never assembled with the intention of being an all-purpose serof 1I1.struments, it seems prudent to consider more explicitly in what ways~nd I.nwhat circumstances it is necessary to craft new tools. With this poinrm mind I turn to the question of borders and humanitarianism.

3. HUMANITARIAN GOVERNMENT

Before I address the question of the humanitarian border, it is necessary toexplain what I understand by the humanitarian. Here my thinking has beenshaped by recent work that engages the humanitarian not as a ser of ideasand ideologies, nor simply as the activity of certain nongovernmental actorsand organizations, but as a complex domain possessing specific forms ofgovernmental reason. Fassin's work on this theme is particularly important.Fassin demonstrates that humanitarianism can be fruitfully connected tothe broader field of government which Foucault ourlined, where govern-ment is not a necessary attribute of states but a rationalized activity thatcan be carried out by all sortS of agents, in various contexts, and towardsmultiple ends. At its core, "Humanitarian government can be defined asthe administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moralprinciple which sees the preservation of life and the alleviarion of sufferingas the highest value of action" (Fassin 2007: 151). As he goes on to srress,the value of such a definition is that we do not see a particular state, or anon-state form such as a nongovernmental organization, as the necessaryagent of humanitarian action. Instead, it becomes possible to think in termsof a complex assemblage, comprising particular forms of humanitarian rea-son, specific forms of authority (medical, legal, spiritual) but also certaintechnologies of government-such as mechanisms for raising funds andtraining volunteers, administering aid and shelter, documenting injustice,and publicizing abuse. Seen from this angle humanitarianism appears as amuch more supple, protean thing. Crucially, it opens up our ability to per-ceive "a broader political and moral logic at work borh within and ourside

state forms" (ibid.).I! the humanitarian can be situated in relation to the analyrics of gov-

ernment, it can also be contextualized in relation to the biopolitical. "Not

144 William Walters

onlydid the last century see the emergence of regimes committed to thephysical destruction of populations" observes Redfield "b t If'. d ..' , u a so 0 enn-nes . evote~ to morutor mg ,and assis~ing populations in maintaining theirphysical existence, even while protesting the necessity of such an action andthe failure of a"nyone to do much more than this bare minimum" (2005:329). It IS this minimalist biopolitics," as Redfield puts it, that will be sochara~tert.stlc"of ,th,ehu~~~~tarian.And here the accent should be placed onthe .3?J.eCtive rninirnalisr If we are not to commit the kind of move whichI criticized previously, namely collapsing everything new into existing Fou-~auldJan categories. r~is important to regard contemporary humanitarian-Ism as a novel formation and a site of ambivalence and undecideability, andnot JUs~,as one more Instance of what Hardt and Negri (2000) might callglobal biopolitical production."

4. THE BIRTH OF THE HUMANITARIAN BORDER

In a press release issued on June 29, 2007, the International Organization forMigration (10M) publicized a visit which its then Director General BrunsonMcKinley, was about to make to a "reception centre for migrants" on theMediterranean island of Lampedusa (10M 2007). The Director General isquoted as saying: "Many more boats will probably arrive on Lampedusaover the summer with their desperate human cargo and we have to ensure wecan adequately respond to their immediate needs .... This is why 10M willcontinue to work closely with the Italian government, the Italian Red Cross,UNHCR and other partners to provide appropriate humanitarian responsesto irregular migrants and asylum seekers reaching the island."

The same press release observes that 10M's work with its "partners"was part of a wider effort to improve the administration of the "recep-tion" (the word "detention" is conspicuously absent) and "repatriation" of"irregular migrants" in Italy. Reception centers were being expanded, andproblems of overcrowding alleviated. The statement goes on to observe that10M had opened its office on Lampedusa in April 2006. Since that time"Forced returns from Lampedusa [had] stopped."

Lampedusa is a small Italian island located some 200 km south of Sicilyand 300 km to the north of Libya. Its geographical location provides a clueas to how it is that in 2004 this Italian outpost first entered the spotlightof European and even world public attention, becoming a potent signifierfor anxieties about an international migration crisis (Andrijasevic 2006).For it was then that this Italian holiday destination became the main pointof arrival for boats carrying migrants from Libya to Italy. That year morethan 10,000 migrants were reported to have passed through the "tempo-rary stay and assistance centre" (CPTA) the Italian state maintains on theivland. The vast majority had arrived in overcrowded, makeshift boats aftera perilous sea journey lasting up to several weeks. Usually these boats are


intercepted in Italian waters by the Italian border guards and the migrantstransferred to the holding center on the island. Following detention, whichcan last for more than a month, they are either rransferred to or her CPTAsin Sicily and southern Italy, or expelled to Libya.

A particularly notorious instance of these expulsions occurred duringthe first week of October 2004. Using military airplanes to move more than1,000 migrants from l.arnpedusa to Libya, Italy undertook what many crit-ics have labeled an illegal act of collective expulsion. This expulsion remainsone of the mosr notable fruits to be born from a bilateral readmission agree-ment signed between the Italian and Libyan governments, an accord aimedat fostering collaboration in matters of irregular migration. It came in thecontext of an improvement in political relations between Libya, Italy andEurope. It is perhaps no coincidence that, as Human Rights Watch (HRW)has reported, very shortly after the expulsion, the EU's eighteen-year longarms embargo on Libya was lifted (HRW 2007: 107).

But there is, as one might expect, another side to the story which the10M press release does not communicate. Ever since Lampedusa firstbecame a new front in the EU's "fight against illegal immigration," thepractices of the Italian government had been the subject of sustained scru-tiny and outcry from a range of NGOs, delegations and inquiries. In addi-tion to protesting the expulsions, these interventions also condemned theconditions suffered by migrants in the center and expressed alarm at thedifficulties they faced in regisrering claims for asylum. The 10M presentsits expansion of services as a matter of providing "humanitarian assistancefor many exhausted migrants who arrive after perilous journeys on unsea-worthy vessels." As such, it reproduces key elements of a humanitarianscript in which intervention is mobilized as an act of charity and protec-tion (Aradau 2004). A more politically conscious reading would see it as,at least in part, a response to negative publicity generated by the NGOs. Itwould perhaps regard the enhanced presence of the 10M, along with otherhumanitarian agencies, not simply as a gesture of care, but as an Instancewhere humanitarianism was being operationalized in an attempt to managea political crisis and neutralize some of the controversies which Europe'songoing confrontation with mass migration is now facing (Albahari 2006;Aradau 2004). One might even say that the outcome of 10M's interventIOnwas a certain normalization of this border practice.

Holding together in an uneasy alliance a politics of alienation wirh apolitics of care and a racric of abjection and one of reception, the caseof Lampedusa 'offers in microcosm a series of elements, co.ntr~dictoryprocesses and events that I am calling the birth of the humamtanan bor-der. Larnpedusa is of course not an isolated case. While it exhibits cer tatnunique features, it also contains many elements that are being repeated at

other sites and on other scales.Much has recently been written concerning the securitizatio~ of borders.

Among other things, this has highlighted their renewed function as nodes

146 William Walters

which filter and distribute (im)mobility, sorting population in terms of riskprofiles (Sparke 2006). Highlighting the extensive bureaucratic investmentswhich have been made in digital technology and surveillance, Amoore(2006) identifies such developments with the appearance of a new kindof frontier, an event she calls the biometric border. Bonditti (2004) goesfurther, suggesting that the advent of new surveillance systems, coupledWIth ~ata-shanng between national security agencies, points us away froma regime of borders based on territorial space to an order of "pixellared"borders actualtzed in digital networks. In speaking of humanitarian bor-~ers r:ny pomr IS not to rak.e iss~e with the tendencies which such argumentsidentify. On the contrary, It strikes me that biometric and other surveillancetechnologies are extremely imporrant and troubling, even if the nature ofthe relationship of this biodigiral technology to the Foucauldian idea ofbiopower requires further theoretical attention (Epstein 2007). My pointIS a different ~ne. It IS. to regisrer a note of caution. To focus only on newdevelopments in surveillance and control risks a rather linear and develop-ment~llst narrative about borders, an argument in which we go from linesto POints, from contiguous territories to distributed networks from thematerial to the immaterial, etc. If I speak of a humanitarian border it is notjust to insist on the emergence of a domain which deserves to be taken seri-ously in its own ri?ht. It is also to complicate the linear narrative; to suggestthat at the same time that borders seem to become more like this, they arealso raking other forms, materializing along other lines whose trajectory isdifficult to predict.It is for the aforementioned reasons we need to think more carefully

about the humanitarian border. With this end in mind, I want to make fourpoints which are intended to clarify my understanding of the humanitarianborder.First, the humanitarian border does not present us with a general pro-

cess that is acting to transform all borders. It is not something universalbut quite specific. The humanitarian border is materializing only in cer-tain places under quite specific circumstances. It is tempting to speculatethat geography is an important factor here. The humanitarian governmentof migration is becoming common at what Freudenstein (2000) calls theworld's "frontiers of poverty." These are the zones like the US-Mexico bor-derlands (Dory 2006), or the complex space formed by the Mediterranean,North Africa and the southern European states of the EU (Pugh 2004).These spaces can be likened to faultlines in the smooth space of globaliza-tion where it seems that the worlds designated by the terms Global Northand Global South confront one another in a very concrete, abrasive way,and where gradients of wealth and poverty, citizenship and non-citizenshipappear especially sharply. Yet it would be wrong to treat the humanitar-ian border as merely a second order phenomenon determined by this pri-mary reality because there are all sorts of other elements that are critical inaccounting for the emergence and the variation in the humanitarianization


of borders. One is, of course, the political agency of NGOs. As importantstudies are beginning to show, there is a political and a moral economyto the NGO world (Dezalay and Garth 2006; Ron, et al. 2005). Possess-ing scarce resources, NGOs have to make strategic decisions as to whichissues they will publicize, which situations of injustice they will politicize,and which experiences of human suffering they will seek to aid. For suchreas~ns it is fair to say that the humanitarian border is a complex, overde-termined phenomenon.Second, the humanitarian border is the effect of a particular gov-

ernmental strategy, but one that can only be undersrood when situatedalongside other ongoing strategies. If certain border zones are becomingspaces of humanitarian engagement, this is only because border crossinghas been made, for certain segments of the world's migrarory population,into a matter of life and death (Albahari 2006). And if border crossinghas become a matter of life and death, this is because we have a situarionwhere military tactics, advanced surveillance technology, naval patrols,armed guards and guard dogs, watchtowers, razor wire, and much else areall deemed politically necessary and legitimare elements in the "defense"of the borders of the Global Norrh faced with an "invasion" of migrantsand asylum seekers. As research in migration consistently shows (Sassen2003), it is the need to circumnavigate rhis vasr, costly and ofren brutalapparatus of control that drives migrants to risk their lives, taking theirchances with an underground economy which sells false identity, or aplace on a rickery boat.

But if humanitarian government operates on a space that appears tobe already securitized, militarized, fortified, etc., it should not be under-stood as a simple two-step process, a matter of action and response-asthough first there is securitization and then humanitarianization, whichcomes along to sweep up the human collateral damage. While such a viewis not without justification, it fails to capture the way in which tactics andcounter-tactics play themselves out at a more molecular level. For instance,there are frequently occasions on which security practices and effects mate-rialize within the institutions and practices of humanitarian government.For example, Albahari (in press) documents the way in which there wasa politics of "reception" concerning irregular migrants arriving on Italy'ssoutheastern shores from nearby Albania. The Catholic diocese of Otranroand the local branch of the charity Caritas had offered ro hosr migrantswith families in the region. However, the local police prefect of Leecerejected this offer because it implied a dispersal of the migrants. Instead,he welcomed the offer of the diocese of Leece which proposed to assemblethe migrants 011 a single site, a former seaside resort for children called the"Regina Pacis." Here it would be much easier to manage and ~ol1ltor ~hlspopulation. In this way we see that the humanitarian. ~ector IS certa.IDlynot a monolithic space but one traversed by its own politICS and ev~n .flv~l-ries. But we see also how security practices and effects can matenaltze In

148 William Walters

di~fe~enht ways-more intense here, less so there-depending on the ways inW Ie. umarntarran assistance IS structured.

Third, the humanitarian border is not a fixed borde b hihi h fl r ut somet Ingof ic ucruares. Its geography is determined in part by the shifting routeso migrants themselves. It has to be remembered that their mo. . duci . vements con-stitute an rrre ucible socra I element in making and unmaking global borders(Mezzadra and Neilson 2003: ~ 8). To return to the case of Lampedusa ifthe. hum~~ltaflan border appears here, it is in part because migrants andtheir facilitaror s have targeted this outlying fragment of Italian/El.I terri-tory not least because of ItS geographical proximity to the Libyan coast.

Bur If the ~uma.n1.tan~n bord.er is not fixed, then neither is it contiguous.Rather than ImagInIng It as a line resembling the political borders of car-tographic space, It might be more useful to liken it to the distributed spaceB~,rry has called a technological zone. One form of the technological zone isa zone of qualification." This exists when "the qualities of objects or prac-tices .are. a,~sessed In order that they meet more or less common standardsor cnrerra (Barry 2006: 240). Zones of qualification have been discussedIn relation to the governance of environmental standards and food prod-ucts circulating within, and at the margins, of a European economic space(Dunn 2005): But there is an element of the zone of qualification at stakeIn the formation. of humanitarian space, and in my case, the humanitarianborder. As we will see, one of the primary modes of action of humanitarianN~c.)s 1$ to investigate ~articular sites such as detention centers, airportwaiting zones and reception practices in order to reveal precisely the extentto which they fail to meet more or less commonly recognized, and some-times legally encoded standards and norms for the treatment of migrantsand refugees. Like other zones of qualification, it becomes apparent thatthe humanlt,aflan bord~r IS contentious for it "generates active and passiveforms of resistance to [its] construction" (Barry 2006: 241).

Finally, there is a point to be made about humanitarianism, power andorder. Those looking to locate contemporary humanitarianism within abigger picture would perhaps follow the lead of Hardt and Negri. As thesetheorists of "Empire" see things, NGOs like Amnesty International andMedecins sans Frontieres (MSF) are, contrary to their own best intentionsimplicated in global order. As agents of "moral intervention" who becausethey p~rticipate in the construction of emergency, "prefigure th~ state ofexception from below," these actors serve as the preeminent "frontline forceof imperial intervention." As such, Hardt and Negri see humanitarianismas "completely immersed in the biopolitical context of the constitution ofEmpire" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 36).

There is certainly no shortage of evidence for the view that hurnani-ta ria n ism is susceptible to co-option and captu re by official strategies ofpolicing and control. However, it would be rash to assume this is always theca vc. Here it might be better to rethink the relationship between humani-tarianism and the stare, much as earlier Foucauldian research examined the


government of the social (e.g., many of the essays in Burchell, Gordon andMiller er al. 1991). This literature revealed how social knowledges, tech-n"ques and strategies were invented across a great variety of institutionalsires-e-wherher by trade unionists, industrialists, cooperatives, amateursurveyors and moral reformers, etc.-and for multiple ends. Certainly thecrystallization of this social field would offer a set of rationalities and tech-nologies by which the state would, at the start of the last century, reinventItself as a welfare stare. But such acts of colonization and appropriation didnot exhaust the social field, if for no other reason than the fact that socialknowledges would continue to provide a standard by which the state couldbe criticized and reformed. Perhaps it would be more insighrfulto approachhumanitarianism in this way as well-as a field which exists in a perma-nent state of co-option, infiltration but also provocation with the state (butalso with other supranational and international entities as well).

5. BORDERS, HUMANITARIANISM, KNOWLEDGE

Certainly there exist a number of excellent studies exploring the idea andthe transformation of frontiers in history (Anderson 1996; Febvre 1973;Maier 2002). Yet the genealogy of the border, understood as a technol-ogy of power, remains largely unwritten. Such a genealogy would surelyaccord a central place to the study of the changing regimes of knowledge interms of which borders have been marked out and accorded particular aimsand functions, and which projects to govern (through) borders have beenpursued, For instance, it is known that what we understand as a modernfrontier-that is, "not a disputed region or a zone of control, but a line"(Hirst 2005: 37)-only became widely established in the eighteenth cen-tury. The fact that it became a common and defining feature of statehoodand modern territoriality might be attributed to the inceprion of a "West-phalian" system of international relations. But more concretely the linearfrontier was only able to emerge once states began to acquire particularforms of knowledge, and adminisrrarive capacity which allowed them tosurvey, map and mark their fronriers (Hirst 2005: 37; d. Black 1997: ch.5). Perhaps it comes as no surprise that the German geographer FriedrichRatzel was quick to claim the invention of this new kind of frontier as yetone more mark of European civilizarional superiority, made possible by itsmastery of sciences like cartography and geodesy (Cutritta 2006: 34).

Particular knowledges also play an integral and constitutive role in mak-ing up the humanitarian border. What are these knowledges? What kindof territory do they mark out and how do they populate it? What planeof reality do they help to constitute? A quick survey of the vast output ofreports and inquiries generated by human rights groupS and humanltar~anagencies offers some answers to these questions. Clearly we are dealingnot with knowledges which aim at drawing borderlines themselves, as did

150 William Walters

earlier cartographic practices. Nor are these knowledges which, as in thecase of risk management approaches, make it their aim to optimize themovement of population across borders while securing against the mobil-ity of dangerous agents. Instead, they are knowledges which problernatizethe border as a site of suffering, violence and death, and a political zone ofinjustice and oppression.

As we noted previously, Redfield uses the term "minimalist biopolitics"to describe the kind of medical humanitarianism associated with MSFoperating in disaster zones. There are certainly grounds for seeing aspectsof a similar minimalist biopolitics in operation at the humanitarian borderas well. This significantly attenuated biopolitics perhaps finds its saddestand starkest expression in those projects that make it their sober task todocument the death of each border crosser and its circumstances." It is here,in this grim reckoning of loss, rhat the theme of the border as a threshold oflife and death is given hard empirical form, borh quantitatively and qualita-tively. If certain governments now regard deportation ratios as a privilegedindex of the effectiveness of their border control strategies (Fekete 2005:66), the death rate has emerged as the number which is frequently used incriticism of such projects. As with rhe current wars of occupation in Iraqand Afghanistan one sees the counting of the nameless, the faceless, thecollateral damage of the game of security, as emergent within a politicswhich aspires to call political government to account for its actions.'

However minimalist, this biopolirics nevertheless does in fact, extendsome way beyond the grim empirics of fatality because there is also a con-certed attempt to document the medical condition of the migratory space.This is both for the purposes of rationalizing the provision of medical aid,and protesting the political regime which, whether intentionally or unin-tentionally, visits such suffering on the individual and collective migratorybody. In certain circumstances this knowledge offers clues about shiftingtactics of border transgression. For instance, there is the case of those par-ticular physicians who tend to migrants on the coastguard jetty, immedi-ately as they disembark the boats that have ferried them from North Africato Europe's shores. An International Red Cross bulletin cites the case of onesuch physician working on the island of Lampedusa who keeps a carefulrecord, and notes how he hasn't had to use an intravenous drip for months.He speculates that the absence of dehydration amongst migrants may be asign that people-smugglers are using larger vessels to cover the bulk of thedistance from Libya, then transferring migrants to smaller boats which aretoo frogile to be turned back by the Italian authorities (Red Cross 2006).

Yet it i, not only the shadowy world of people-smuggling which IS glimpsedby the medical gaze. It is not just the shifting tactics of border rransgressronwhich arc being diagnosed from the migrant body. Perhaps more S1gmficanti, the way in which the documentation of physical and psychologICal traumawill be mobilized as medical evidence of systemic Violence perpetratedagainst migrants by various agencies of border control, migrant detention,


and deportation. For instance, a recent MSF (2005) report documents rhesituation in Morocco. Focusing on "illegal sub-Saharan immigrants" whohave tended to see this country as a transit stage en route to Europe, thisreport itemizes not just the various forms of illness suffered, often resultingfrom poor living conditions and exposure during epic trans-Saharan jour-neys. Crucially it also serves as a record, including many personal testimo-nies, regarding the violence inflicted on migrants by Moroccan and Spanishsecurity forces. In the case of the former it is alleged that violence is in facr astrategic and systematic component in its policing activity.

If medical expertise provides one axis for knowing the humanitarian bor-der, a second axis is constitured by certain forms of legal know-how. Thisis manifested in the numerous ways in which the border is documented asa regime which is violating certain norms of treatment and denying certainrights to migrants; a regime where political authorities fail to exercise oreven recognize their legal and/or moral responsibilities. This might rake rheform of observations rhat parricular immigration officials and [usnces ofthe peace, responsible for authorizing expulsions, are not proper!y traine?or qualified in the relevant human righrs situation of the countries of Ori-gin/destination of certain deportees (HRW 2006: 108). Ir might rake rheform of observations that interpretation and translation services at a givenreception centre are not "in conformity with international and regionalstandards," thereby undermining the ability of migrants and asylum se~k-ers to register claims for protection (HRW 2002: 4). And it mlghr a sofind expression in the work of undercover journalism when this finds, forinstance that the phone booth in a particular detention center was fre-quently out of order; that, contrary to rhe relevant Charrer for detainedmigrants rhe authorities had failed to provide detainees with a relephonecard worth five euros every ren days; and that a clandestine market wherebysuch cards were sold ar inflated prices was operaring in the center-all ofwhich obviously hinders the detainee in her abiliry to remain in touch withrelatives and legal assisrance (Catri 2005; cited In Andrijasevic 2006: 5).

These are but a few of the ways in which the humamtanan border IS

configured as a sociolegal space, and its subjecrs governed if not as, rhen. . . f . h b . . di idua ls Two pomts should becertainly In the Image 0 fig ts- eanng In IVI .

made in this respecr. First, these few examples reveal that although human. . d hil hical issue rhey also take arights are frequently discusse as a p IOSOP I ,

f his i h b famed as a matter of eleva redgovernmentalized form. I t IS Issue as een r . h.. I fi . If around what might seem r eIdeals It will nevertheless a so con gure itse . . fi dmost :nundane details of institutional life. This governmentalJ~a[Jon n d

S

. . . of abuse and denial. I noreexpression in the meticulous anatomlzatlOn .

.. der i d .' n the sense that It movesbefore that the humamranan bar er IS ynamlc I b h

. . d .' tI er sense' one can 0 serve owgeographically. But It IS ynamlc In ana 1 . . . . . hori. f documenting facdJties, aut OrJ-knowledge spreads out across ItS sur aces, ... d h d. . terri g a certain discursive ept anties, procedures, and practices; con errmvolume to the border.

152 William Walters

Second, these few examples suggest that it would be insufficient to treatthe birth of the humanitarian border as but one more instance of an ever-widening regime of biopower. As we have seen, there certainly is a concernwith the migrant as a living subject/population. But if terms like biopoli-tics and biopower are to have any critical purchase, we should also noteall those instances where they combine with other forms of power andother specifications of the subject. Foucault once noted how the "welfarestate problem" involved the "tricky adjustment" between a pastoral powerexercised over living individuals and a political power wielded over legalsubjects (1988: 67). This tricky adjustment between different powers andsubjectivirics is not confined to the welfare state; it is also evident in thehumanitarian border. The overall thrust of humanitarian interventionis certainly towards the protection of subjects understood as vulnerablegroups. But as the seemingly minor case of the phone cards makes evident,this move is also cross-cut with the presumption of subjects who are able,or are ro be capacitated, ro mobilize for themselves. To suppose that thehumanitarian border is configured only around the identity of the victim,as some have for humanitarianism more generally, is perhaps too simple(Debri x 1998).'

In discussing the ways in which the humanitarian border is constituted asa field of knowledge, as a positive domain, I have been at pains ro stress thatwe need to avoid the reflex action that treats contemporary forms of borderregime as one more expression of a given repertoire of powers. Indeed, myuse of the term humanitarian border is designed in part to emphasize thatwe are dealing here with a singularity, something new. This is not to sug-gest that the kinds of analytics which have proven so useful in studies ofpower and governmentality have no place. Clearly they do. Instead, the taskis always one of specifying how they might combine, mutate, transform inspecific circumstances. With this point in mind, I want to raise one morepoint concerning the relationship of knowledges to borders. This concernswhat we might call its dominant modes and styles of truth production.

As we have already seen, the inscription of the humanitarian border intodiscourse involves a specific production of truth. Not unlike the produc-tion of truth in other domains, it is buttressed by various forms of modernexpertise, principally medical, legal, and social, as we have seen, but alsopsychological and spiritual.' But our case is qualitatively different fromthe production of truth concerning, say, industrial productivity or unem-ployment. For one thing, the production of humanitarian knowledge takesplace in highly-situated ways, structured by the temporality of unfoldingcrises, moving in fits and starts which shadow the shifting geography ofmigratory control strategies. This is not the systematic gaze within whichsociu l and economic fields are mapped, on the basis of permanent sratisrica]apparatuses and routinized reporting procedures. instead" it is a knowledgewhich depends much more upon the work of ad hoc rmssrons, delegations,and vivirs who," task it is ro gather data and testimony in the field. In rhis


respect, it is interesting to note how the practice of missions and visits to

places of detention, or islands and coastlines of migrant arrival, comes tobe a site of careful governance in its own right, whether in the form ofmanuals advising on methods of visiting detained refugees (Gallagher, ire-land and Muchopa 2006) or the documentation of the levels and degrees of"transparency" which surround specific border control practices."

But it is different in another sense for we are dealing here with projectswhose aims are more complex than merely expanding the realm of socialknowledge. What is at stake here is the making visible of a world thatis understood as being hidden, a "space of nonexistence" (Coutin 2003)where the very fact of opacity is deemed a constitutive and integral ele-ment in the perpetuation of injustice and suffering." It is this condition thatrequires that any attempt to know this sphere acquires a high degree of eth-icality. It entails a labor of bearing witness, and its style is typically that ofa "motivated truth" (Redfield 2006) forged in the heat of polirics.!' As oneof their epistemic strategies, humanitarian inquiries frequently incorpora~epersonal testimony and eyewitness accounts from migrants. The move IS

significant both in that it accords "voice" to subjects who are presumedto have no place as political subjects in official debates (Nyers 2003), andthat it acts as a tactic of empathy. But it could be said that humanitarianreporting of borders is also an act of testimony in its own right. As such Itcould profitably be situated in terms of the wider "witnessing fever [that]has taken hold in a variety of fields of intellectual endeavour" (Kurasawa

2007: 24).

6. HUMANITARIANISM, BORDERS, POLITICS

Foucauldian writing about borders has mirrored the wider field of govern-mentality studies in at least one respect. While it has produced some faSCI-nating and insightful accounts of contemporary strategies and technologiesof border-making and border policing, it has tended to confine ItS at~el~tion to official and often state-sanctioned projects. political dyna rrucs n

, . ' I b ' d But little atrentlon has beenpolitical acts have certain y not een Ignore . . .I, ' d ist nce operate not Just 111 an

paid to the possibility that po ItiCS an reSIS a d.. . . . TIes but within them. I! To ateexrnnsic relationship to contemporary regll, . .'il d . I' ' s as something constitutivethis literature has largely fai e to view po inc , here iand productive of border regimes and technologies. That IS to say, t

dehre IS

, ' hi h nts of OPPOSitiOn, an t oselittle appreciation of the ways In W IC moveme d ", ' h F I lis "counter con uct, canparticular kinds of reSistance whic oucau t ca f " f

f b deri but by means 0 a series 0operate not externally to modes 0 or enng

'I " (Foucault 2007: 355).exchanges" and "reCiproca supports . 1The humanitarian border is interesting because it prese~ts us wtt 1 a

, I h vern mental practices emanatedomain where it is especially c ear t at.go. t fcontestation

f ff 'I h ry but 111 contex sonot from a given centre a 0 IICI3 aut on

154 William Walters

and politicization. Political contestation and governmental invention fre-quently proceed hand in hand. It offers a promising site where the observercan follow what O'Malley has called-in a somewhat different context-"indigenous governance" (O'Malley 1996). This is to say that the policingof borders today cannot be understood solely on the basis of the studyof official schemes and inventions, be these emergent technologies likebiometrics or novel institutions like Homeland Security. For humanitar-ianism, insofar as it operates as a source of governmental innovation,has made the policing of borders a much more complex, polymorphousand heterogeneous affair. Fassin has written of a militaro-humanitarianmoment (Fassin 2007: 155), a term succinctly expressing the fact that at acertain point one sees war and humanitarian action, typically presumedto be forces opposed to one another, enter into a tense but mutually sup-portive relationship. My point is that the humanitarian border involvessimilar transactions and imbrications between official governance andcertain moves which contest it.

Let us examine a particular case. One area where this emerging imbri-cation can be studied quite clearly is in the management of detention andreception centers for migrants. The field of NGO activity is quite diverse,with different agencies specializing in different areas. In this context theJesuit Refugee Service (JRS) has made the question of the conduct of deten-tion and the condition of the detainee into one of its specialist domains.For instance, it has initiated and/or participated in a series of major cross-national research projects examining detention practices and conditions.These studies are notable for the way they combine strong criticism ofparticular national practices with highly specific recommendations forimprovement. So, in one report on detention in Belgium, the Belgian gov-ernment is taken to task for such things as the lack of transparency in itsdetention and deportation practices, and the lack of autonomy of doctorsworking in the detention system (JRS 2006). And yet the overall thrust ofJRS's intervention in this area is not to condemn the practice of detentionand deportation as such, as might be the case with radical activism. Instead,it is a more reformatory end which aspires to "provide essential services tothis population [detainees], raise awareness of their plight and lobby forimproved treatment in line with human rights standards" (JRS 2007: 1). Aseries of practical steps as to the latter are offered in one report on deten-tion in the new member states of the EU (JRS 2007). The instrument of"best practice" may have originated within business management circles,but here we see it transposed to the world of the management of humansuffering. Here we encounter the itemization of various detention "b.estpractices": these range from encouragement for monitoring and repor tmgactivities by "civil society actors" to the free provision of psychologicalcare where needed. Elsewhere, JRS is involved in training social workers tobetter equip rhcrn for work with asylum seekers and irregular migrants indcrcnrion. For instance, with funding from the EU's own European Refugee


Fund, its Reception and Detention Centre Training Project has run train-ing sessions in such places as Bucharest, London, .V.aletta and R?me. It hasalso published a specialist handbook targeted at vrstrors and SOCIalworkersin detention centers (Gallagher et al. 2006). In these and no doubt otherways, it can be said that ]RS constitutes a source of expertise on r:nigrantdetention. While it is critical of existing practices, it is at the same time notoutside the institutional matrix of the contemporary border regime. On thecontrary, insofar as it subjects the latter to critical and te.c~nical scrutin~,receives funding from the EU, and participates in the trammg of authori-ties, it is a partner, however uneasily, in this state of affairs. . .

Of course NGOs and humanitarians occupy a range of pol it ica] andethical positions. Many would refuse to take state funding, or participatein matters of day to day administrarion. With that said, many others doparticipate. As a consequence, we cannot understand conremp.or~ry bor-der regimes without recognizing their ag?oistic character. This IS partlydue to the irreducible subjectivity of the migrants themselves, as those whowrite of migration as an autonomous moven:e~t and a "struggle for theborder" rightly insist (Rodriguez 1996). But It IS also due to the presenceof the NGOs and others. Border regimes are composed not Just at the levelof strategies and technologies of control,. but also at the level of strategieswhich combine elements of protest and visibilizarion With practices of pas-toral care, aid and assistance. Politics is therefore immanent to t.he bord~r

hi hi h I mes to it from outside. Calmregime and not sorner 109 w lC mere y co . .Gordon has clarified what is at stake in Foucault's argument that liberalismis founded on "a notion of society as a 'transactional reality', a mobd~ sur-face of engagement between the practices of government and the uruversc

h . " (Donzelorof the governed which constantly tends to escape t err grasp . fand Gordon 2008: 51; see also Foucault 2008: 297). It IS Just this sense a

hi h i . h and which future explorationsa transactional reality w lC IS at Issue ere, . Iof the governmentality of borders would do well to take more serrous ~

The theme of politics is important to the srudy of rhe humamtanan ~r-der because of the fact that politics is generative and Immanent bto If.

dut

. d."t erves to define the very oun ar-politics is important 10 a secon sense. ISh "f h eded as though t e rnearu ngies of the humanitarian. Thus ar we ave proce " . f h ..

I " I I d the Identity a umamtananof humanitarianism were re anve y c ear, an . h I

hi " f f m always being t e case. n myactors relatively settled. But t IS IS ar rof h h itar-ia n border, I want to suggest

final comment on the theme ate uman. d . d by political" f h h tartan are ererrrunethat the very boundaries 0 t e umaru .." I s ah h hurnamtaflan exists on Y astruggles. We should not assume t at tel· I ssible to speak ofsettled terrain on which politics takes place. dt IhsalSOtpsOofthe humanitar-

. h d I' . h scope an t e urnpolitical struggles whic e urut t e .. h ". b f nt confliCts whic are ongomg.ian. This is evident 111 a nun: e: 0 rece n drawn in very minor and per-

The limits of the humamtarlan are ofte h auld be said to be.bl I some respects r ey c

haps barely percept: e ways. n f II' flection on the problem., k h f the a owing reset from within. Ta e t e case 0

156 William Walters

of providing aid offered in a recent International Red Cross bulletin. Itnotes that while there is an urgent need to provide humanitarian assistanceto migrants crossing the Mediterranean and the Atlantic in their quest toreach Spanish territory, "no one wants to create a 'pull factor' that attractsmore irregular migrants into making deadly voyages" (Red Cross 2006).For this reason, it observes, "National societies-especially Red CrescentSocieties in the Maghreb-have to think carefully before doing anythingbeyond providing basic humanitarian services to migrants." Humanitar-ian reason may embody a critique of the existing border regime, a critiqueit will level in the name of its commitment to protecting all human life.Yet this little remark reveals the way in which this universalist ambitionis cross-cut by a logic of liberal government. In this little expression "pullfactor," it is just possible to detect the distant echo of those older debatesabout the poor law and charity which so dominated the nineteenth cen-tury's encounter with poverty (Dean 1991; Procacci 1991): how to offer aidwithout creating a regime that would "demoralize" the poor. If humanitar-ianism practices a minimalist biopolitics, confining itself to the provisionof bare necessities, this is not solely out of expedience, or a reflection of thescarcity of resources. As the Red Cross seems to suggest, it is also out ofliberal political calculation.

In other circumstances the delimitation of the humanitarian by politics ismore visible and pronounced. Such is the situation with ongoing legal caseswhich see the captains and crews of ships being prosecuted under Italianlaw on charges of assisting illegal immigration or even human trafficking.In some cases these are vessels operating under the auspices of humanitar-ian movements like Cap Anamur (Sratewarch 2007). In others they areTunisian fishermen who picked up shipwrecked migrants and landed themin Italian harbors (No Racism 2007). While the circumstances may vary,the common thread is that the practice of humanitarian intervention isrevealed to be contestable. It is conrested under law, where the prosecutionseeks ro redefine humanitarian acrion as "trafficking." It is contested inpolitical and media realms when, for instance, reputable German newspa-pers allege that Cap Anamur's activities are not so much rescue missions aspublicity stunts undertaken to raise the organization's profile and attractdonations (K reickenbau m 2004). In the latter instance, one sees the attempttu neutralize the moral and political charge of humanitarian action: byemphasizing its immersion within the grubby world of commercial self-interest and organizational self-promotion, the humanitarian claim to beacting according to "higher moral purpose" is undermined.

A recurring theme in my discussion has been the fluidity of the humanirar-ian border. It is not fixed or given once and for all. But the aforementionedcases reveal a different aspect of this fluidity. If the humanitarian border canhe said to be an assemblage, it is J precarious one. In these instances logicsof security, policing and law seek to eclipse and neutralize its presence. Theyseek to deactivate its elements, and contest their field of operation.


My last point concerns the question of the contested identity of humani-tarian agents. If the status of particular acts as "humanitarian" is notbeyond politics then neither is the identity of parricular agents. In orherwords, there is the question of who can act in the name of the humanJtar~anand how. One place such disputes have come inro view is with the ongoingconflict between HRW and 10M. The latter is convenrionally defined asan intergovernmental organization which sp~cialize~ in the ,manageme~tof migration. Yet as we saw in earlier diSCUSSions of It~growing ~r~~le ~nLampedusa, 10M has come to describe key aspects of Its own acnvmes 10

the language of humanitarian assistance. Yet HRW has challenged suchattempts to reposition and rebrand the 10M. For mstance, it alleges rhar"10M has no formal mandate to monitor human nghrs abuses or to pro-tect the rights of migrants and other persons, even rhough literally million,;of people worldwide participate in 10M-sponsored schemes and projects(HRW 2003: 1). Not only is the 10M charged With lack 109 such a man-date, it is accused of participating in activities which actually violate thehuman rights of migrants. These range from its participation 10 the asylumdetermination process "imposed" on Haitian asylum seekers (HRW 2003:1) . f -I' - f "voluntary-assisted returns" from closed detentionto its aCI itanon 0 h h

II d b I "I rary" t an t e namecenters returns which are a ege to e ess vo unsugges;s (HRW 2003: 7). Elsewhere, 10M pressure has seen HRW move

. . , . F' e I-none report on the siruationto retract some of Irs cntIclsms. or mstanc , , .- - - krai HRW 11 d that 10M was receiving fundsfacing migrants In U rame, a ege .

from the EU to develop migrant detention centers 10 the north of the coun-try despite the weakness of Ukrainian law in rhis field (No Border 2006).But following complaints the original report was removed and a revised

- ' - I d - January 2007. In the lat-version, acknowledging certarn erro~s, re ease 111

rer the section on 10M has been eXCISed (HRW 2007). _Such controversies can no doubt have a basis in cert~ln entre~ched pat-

- . I - I B t the bigger po mt here IS that, toterns of inrer-organrzanona nva ry. u, ' .f .return to a remark made in an earlier section, like the zones of ~ua1J cation

- . b d IS a contert-which Barr (2006) has rheorized, the humarurar ran or er _ _y Id d b h manirarianism as a kind of ann-rious space. Some wou no au t see u, .' While

politics which obscures the reality of social and global mequahthd

there is no doubt whatsoever that the humanitarian .c~ystalll~~s1I11te flll?l ~t

- I- f f eurralizing polltlca can let Itof complex relations of mequa ity, ar ro~.n . ' 'should be seen as an emergent zone of polmcs 10 Irs own nght.

7. CONCLUSION

- I d hen we speak of Foucault and fron-There is a certain paradox II1VO ve W id h F Ir is one of our most, , . Id be sal t at oucau Itiers. In certarn key respects It cou _ F h I arr of one of his

_ - - I h - of bordering. or ar r e teeminent and ongma r eorrsrs _ li d P 'sb whar does one

I 0- CIP me an H11l-most widely read works-name y IS

158 William Walters

find if not the question of power and how its modalities should be studiedby focusing on practices of partitionment, segmentation, division, enclo-sure; practices that will underpin the ordering and policing of ever moreaspects of the life of populations from the nineteenth century onwards. Butwhile Foucault is interested in a range of practices which clearly pertainto the question of bordering understood in a somewhat general sense, onething the reading of his lectures on security, governmentality and biopoli-tics reveals is that he had little to say explicitly about the specific forms ofbordering associated with the government of the state. To put it differently,Foucault dealt at length with what we might call the microphysics of bor-dering, but much less with the place of borders considered at the level oftactics and strategies of governmentality.

Recent literature has begun to address this imbalance, demonstratingthat many of Foucault's concepts are useful and important for understand-ing what kinds of power relarions and governmental regimes are at stake incontemporary projects which are re-making state borders amidst renewedpolitical concerns over things like terrorism and illegal immigration. How-ever, the overarching theme of this chapter has been the need for cautionwhen linking Foucault's concepts to the study of borders and frontierstoday. While analytics like biopolitics, discipline and neoliberalism offerall manner of insights, we need to avoid the trap which sees Foucault'stoolbox as something ready-made for any given situation. The challenge ofunderstanding the emergent requires the development of new theoreticaltools, not to mention the sharpening of older, well-used implements. Withthis end in mind the chapter has proposed the idea of the humanitarianborder as a way of registering an event within the genealogy of the frontier,but also, although I have not developed it here, within the genealogy ofcitizenship.

What I have presented previously is only a very cursory overview ofcertain features of the humanitarianization of borders, most notably itsinscription within regimes of knowledge, and its constitutive relationshipto politics. In future research it would be interesting to undertake a fullermapping of the humanitarian border in relation to certain trajectories ofgovernment. While we saw how themes of biopolitical and neoliberal gov-ernment are pertinent in understanding the contemporary managementof spaces like the detention center, it would seem especially relevant toconsider the salience of pastoralism. Pastoral power has received far lessattention within studies of govern mentality than, say, discipline or lib-eral government (but see Dean 1999; Golder 2007; Hindess 1996; Lippert2004). But here again, I suspect, it will be important to revise our conceptsin the light of emergent practices and rationalities. For the ways m whichNCOs and humanitarians engage in the governance of migrants and refu-gees today have changed quite significantly from the kinds of networks ofcare self-examination and salvation which Foucault Identified With pas-toralism. For instance, and to take but one example, the pastoral care of


migrants, whether in situations of sanctuary or detention, is not organizedas a life-encompassing, permanent activity as it was for the church, or later,in a secular version, the welfare state. Instead, it is a temporary and ad hocintervention. Just as Foucault's notion of neo-liberalism was intended toregister important transformations within the genealogy of liberal govern-ment, it may prove useful to think in terms of the neo-pastoral when we tryto make better sense of the phenomenon of humanitarian government at/ofborders, and of many other situations as well.

NOTES

1. In the more recent English translation of this lecture Burchell om.irs the ref-erence to national boundaries (see Foucault 2007: 110). For std,l ano,~hertranslation of this passage, see Elden (2007: 567) who phrases It as theadministrative state, born in the frontier [de type (ron tailer] (and no longerfeudal) territoriality ... " , ,.' h

2. But see Foucault's comments on military ports In DI~clph~1e and Funis(1977: 144), which could be read as pertaining, to the disciplina r y po~er ofborders. He describes a special space characterized by the quest fo~ clrcula,:tion and the danger of "smuggling, contagion ... land] dangerous mixtures.As such, the port, and especially the military port, wO,uld become a key nod~in the development of disciplinary spaces and techniques. Not ,the leaft 0

these was the invention of the naval hospital, as at Rochefort In nort tern

France. f3. Foucault may have written little that explicitly addresses the matter 0 s,tate

frontiers and more broadly, as Elden suggests, does not explore ~uestlO,nsof rerritor y with anything like the attention he would devote to t e tacticsof governmentality and biopower. That said, F?uc~ul,tdoes offer us s0?"l~intriguing observations about the history ~f rer ritorialit y, and more SpeC\hcally the function of knowledge and expertise I,nmaking space. For examp ~~

hi k about "the technicians or engmeers of the three great vansee IS remar s " d" (Foucault 1984' 244). Theseables-territory commUOIcatlOn, and spee, ds and . d tS If'. h buil ·1 ays hridges roa s an via uc .experts are the engmeers W 0 UI t rat w, ' he ci f d ithe political drea~ of governing the sta~e i~~,~~/~tl~~e~:t g~:~~~moe~~alil:;exemplary figure 111 the architect , then t e p . J

, f irs most Important experts.was to afkfirm

hthe enlgldneeBraoso(1n;9~.12002'2006) who skillfully combines a

4 Key wor s ere InC u e Ig , ' .' dieu' 1 of. Foucauldian concern with technologies ~~secu~l.tYhWIth:i~~r t~~U;o~~;~o~nce

socio-institutiona l fields; a series of stu I'l~S W /c, kexa d regulation (Epsteinof borde.rs in terms of neoliber~l rat;fen/21~~~.oSr~~k:~006); research which2007;. Gilbert 2007; Inda 2006, Mu h as air ~rts (Salter 2007) and placesexarrunes particular sites of control sue Ph' 11 oriented work explor-of sanctuary (Lippert ~O~4); and mores g:I~Jr:~ul~i~yy~ractices(Barry 2006;ing the changing sp~n~ltty o~ bO~~ee:s2002; 2006). Mention should also beArnoore 2006; Bondirri 2004, W~ ich d itly uses the Foucauldian concep-made of Huspek's (2001) study W 11C. a rfl nventional accounts of bordertion of strategy to challenge the st3f1sm 0 co

control. 'k fUNITED for Intercultural Action,5. Amongst the most extensive IS the wkor ? t natl·onalism racism fascism and

. ·b· If "etwar agaInS " hwhich descn es Itse as an" A f 6 May 2008 it documents t e. f· d refugees. s 0In support ° migrants an

160 William Walters

srag!?eri.ng number of ~1,]05 persons (it identifies all of them as "refugees").The incidents of death Include those who commit suicide while awaiting refu-gee he~rings, those who perish .during se~ crossings, and those who die indetention due to a lack of medical attention. See http://www.uniredagain-st racism. org/pd fslactu a IJ istofdea th. pd f.

6. E.g., see hrrp:/lwww.iraqbodycount.org.7. One reason to question the assumption that the subjects of humanitarian

government are powerless victims is that such a view entirely neglects thosecircumstances and occasions when these subjects generate what Ranciere(2004) calls "dissensus", when they act as subjects "who have not the rightsthat they have and have the rights that they have not" (2004: 302). On thedissensus of refugees see Nyers (2006). r am grateful to the editors for alert-ing me to this connection to Ranciere.

8. For example, see the work of the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care ofMigrants and Itinerant People. This is the arm of the Vatican tasked with pro-viding "pastoral care to 'people on the rnove'" a constituency which embracesa wide assortment of subjects including fishermen, circus people, pilgrims andrefugees. The exercise of pastoral care within detention centers and airportwaiting zones is identified as one of its particular challenges. See http://www.va rica n. va /roma n., cu r ia/ponti fica '- cou nci ls/migra nts/index. hrm.

9. For example, note how the Jesuit Refugee Service documents the highlydiscretionary way in which Cypriot police regulate the access of NGOs todetention facilities. But note also how JRS will mobilize the principle of theEU's European Transparency Initiative as a norm to contest such practices;see JRS (2007: 168-169).

10. But see the history of governing poverty, which is marked by episodes wherethe investigation of the poor displays many of these features, whether at theend of the nineteenth century or with the "rediscovery" of poverty in themidst of the postwar boom (e.g., with the publication of Harrington's TheOther America).

11. On the place of witnessing and spectacle within humanitarian politics, seeBoltanski (1999: ch.3), Chakrabarty (2000), and Kurasawa 2007 (ch.2).

12. On the problematic place of politics within governmenrality studies, see Hin-dess (1997) and O'Malley, Weir and Shearing (1997).

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8 Beyond FoucaultFrom Biopolitics tothe Government of Life

Thomas Lemke

Only when we know what is this governmental r,e~im.e called lib-

I, 'II e be able to grasp what biopolmcs IS. (Foucaultera Ism was, WI W

2008: 22)

The conce t of biopolitics has had a remarkable career. Until recently only asmall num~er of specialists were familiar with it, but ar presentf!t ISenJofYlng

h f its uses now extends rom re ugeeever-greater resonance. T e spectrum 0 I . . ula-olicies to AIDS prevention and onward to questions regardll1g pop,

Phi Th concept has become a universal Cipher for encapsulatingnon growt. e , hni I' ( on' It, 'I kid and bio-tec mea mnova I ,the general results of biologica nowe ge I lineal challenges,designates a diffuse mix composed of erhica Cconhcernds'2POOOI4)1

, , (A d on 1987' er ar t .and economic mterests see n ers . '. well known ItThat the concept has a century-old hlstor

hy IS not sOl'nitially in org~n-

, h fi h If of the rwenner century,already surfaces In t erst a. . R b 1938) and later in Naziistic concepts of rhe state (Kjellen 1920

d, 0 er ts k 'ominent role (von

, ich th I' of life an race roo a prtexts In which t e regu anon h fi Id called "biopoli-Kohl 1933; Reiter 1939).2 In the 1960s,a nlew researc baesl'ctenet being that, 'I A ican polltlca SCience, Itstics" emerged In Ang 0- menca h rly need to be taken

bi I . I I ws ( at consequenpolitical action rests on 10 ogica a 'I ' ' For this approach the" I ' ' nd socia sCientists. 'account of by politlca sCientistS add application of knowl-

, "I and processes eman Sanalysis of politica structures , I bi I nd evolutionary theoryedge from the behavioral SCiences, soc~l' ~~f~~d'a~d Hibbing 2008).(Somit and Peterson 1998; Mastersh;~ Fo~cault proposed a relational and

In face of this naturalism, Mic I hi k the term in fact denotes" f "bi lines." n IS wor ,

histor ica! concept 0 IOPO I I . der i lirical processes and st r uc-

, , k wi h h effort to er rve po Ian explicit brea wit t e T h ntrary Foucault analyzes, 'I d 'ants 0 t e co ,tures from biologic a etermln iCh "life" emerges as the "object" ofthe historical process Within wh , riginary and timeless laws,

"I . I d of presuming 0 . Ipolitlca strategies. nstea d' r'nuity of political praxIS. nhe diagnoses a histOrical cae~ura-a IS,cfion I dern form of the exercise. 'I'" fies a speci C mo

thIS respect, blOpo !tICS SlgnI I ' 11 Foucault distinguished betweenof power. Historically and ana ytlca y'd wer' on the one hand, the

f h' "I f "onente po .two dimensions 0 [IS I e -

166 Thomas Lemke

disciplining of the individual body; on the other hand, regulation of thepopulace (1990a: 139; 141-145).

Foucault viewed the combination of these two dimensions as the essentialpremise for establishing capitalism and constituting the national state. Thatcombinatory process, he argued, allowed the creation of economically pro-ductive, militarily useful, and politically obedient bodies, a separation of the"birth of biopolitics" from the emergence of capitalism thus being impossible(Foucault 2000: 137). Within this biopolitical constellation, modern racismis of central significance. It establishes an analytic grid distinguishing "whatmust live" from "what must die," good, higher, and ascending races fromthose deemed bad, inferior, and descending, thus allowing a hierarchizationand fragmentation of the social sphere (2003: 254)-'

Foucault's concept of biopolitics is complex and has been assessed in highlyvaried ways. Very schematically, two central lines of reception can be distin-guished. The first has its home in philosophy and social and political theory;it focuses on the mode of politics. How does biopolitics function and whatcounterforces does it mobilize? How is it to be distinguished historically andanalytically from "classical" forms of political representation and articula-tion? The extreme poles of the relevant debate represent its most prominentcontributions: the writings of Giorgio Agamben on the one side, those ofMichael Hardt and Antonio Negri on the other. The second line of receptionhas its starting point in the sociology of science and technology, the history ofscience and medicine, and cultural anthropology, together with feminist the-ory and gender srudies. Its main interest is the substance of life. If as a resultof biorechnical developments the living body is now understood as a readableand rewritable text, then the question of biopolitics is posed in a new way:what is the meaning of life within such a political-technical constellation?

In the first two sections of this contribution, I will trace revisions andrefinements of the concept of biopolitics that have been formulated in thesetwo lines of reception. In the third section, I suggest tying the two researchperspectives closer together-an approach already embedded in Foucault'swork but not systematically developed. My main argument is that Foucaultpursues the question of biopolitics further within a "grid of governmental-iry" (Foucault 2008: 186). Initially, his analysis of biopolitical mechanismsin Discipline and Punish and the Will to Knowledge fell short, since itconcentrated on disciplinary processes and ways of regulating the popu-lace, thus being broadly reduced to a kind of body politics. In contrast, theconcept of government directs our attention to the relation between formsof self-direction and government by others, allowing an investigation ofmoral-political modes of existence. In total, the project outlined here isaimed at a systematic linkage between rwocentral concepts from Foucault'swork-biopol itics a nd govern menta lity-a nd an a nalytics of biopoliticswhose dimensions will be described m the last section of this article. Suchan analytics will make it possible to formulate a series of questions thatusually remain outside the pertinent academic and political discussions; it

Beyond Foucault 167

also allows an exploration of the systematic ties between liberal forms ofgovernment and biopolitical problems.

1. BARE LIFE OR LIVING MULTITUDE: WHAT IS POLITICS?

Giorgio Agamben (1998) has outlined one of the most important revisionsof the concept of biopolitics. Agamben, in fact, presumes that all Westernpolitics since antiquity should be characterized as biopolitics. In order to JUS-

tify this thesis, he takes up ideas from Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Han-nah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, and Georges Baraille, along with Foucault.According to Agamben, the main difference within the realm of the politicalis not that between friend and enemy (pace Schmitt) but that between "barelife" (zoe) and political existence (bios), natural being and a human being'slegal existence. In this light, the inclusion into a political community seemsonly possible by the sumultaneous exclusion of some human beings who arenot allowed to become full legal subjects. According to Agamben, we find atthe beginning of all politics the establishment of a borderline and the inaugu-ration of a space that is deprived of the protection of the law: "The onglllaljuridico-polirical relationship is the ban" (ibid.: 189).. .

In this manner, for Agamben the present period IS the catastrophiC end-point of a political tradition that originated in Greek antiquity and led to thedeath camps. In Homo Sacer and subsequent work, Agamben declared rhecamps to be the "biopolitical paradigm of the West" (1998: 181), since theywere the locus of a disappearance of the border between rule and exception.However his discussion of the camps is not primarily related to past horrorbut to present sites marked by the state of exception: places where law andfact rule and exception indistinguishably intermesh. Here not legal subjectsbut "bare life" can be encountered; the state of exception is p,ermanently In

play. Alongside death camp inmates, the examples Agamben introduces arestateless people, refugees, and coma rose patients. Howeve,r, Agam~en ISless. d i lif h . its "nakedness'" at the center of hIS reflections standtntereste In let an in I' .not drills and discipline, life's normalization and endowm~n~ ~Ith norms,but rather the threat of death as the establishment and matenallZlng of a bor-der. For Agamben, biopolitics is thus above all "thanatopolitlc~" (1998: 122;1999: 84-86; see Fitzpatrick 2001: 263-265; Mbembe 2003).. .

In their work, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri ar nve at entirely differ:ent conclusions. They try to give the concept of blOpolitics po~mve mean. .. h I I' movement for workers autonomy,mg tying their arguments to t e ta Ian , ' ., .. I d I I h y poststructuralist cntlquesideas from classical politlca an ega t eor , . . . Wh

. . d h bi nd the MarXISt tradmon. erecentered on Identity an t e su ject, a bi I'·

f f ·1' that modern IOpO ItlCS restsAgamben criticizes Foucault or a, ing to see d d N .on the solid foundation of a premodern sovereign power, Har tan f egn

. f h . f iled to recogmze rhe trans orrna-criticize the French thlllker or aving attion of modern into postmodern biopolitics.

168 Thomas Lemke

For Hardt and Negri, biopolitics does not involve an intermeshing ofrule and exception but rather a dissolution of the boundaries between eco-nomics and politics, reproduction and production, thus marking nothingless than a new stage of capitalism. Here, in their view, the creation of"life" is no longer something both limited to the realm of reproductionand subordinated to the labor process; to the contrary, "life" now deter-mines production itself, With biopolirics, they designate the constitution ofa political regime that in the end embraces the totality of the individual'sexistence, rhus preparing the way for a new revolutionary subject: a cre-ative and living entity, the "multitude," Hence the biopolitical order thatHardt and Negri delineate possesses the material requirements for forms ofassociative cooperation potentially going beyond the structural constraintsof capitalist production: "Empire creates a greater potential for revolutionthan did the modern regimes of power because it presents us, alongside themachine of command, with an alternative: the set of all the exploited andsubjugated, a multitude that is directly opposed to Empire, with no media-tion between them" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 392),

For these two authors, "biopolitics" stands for an entire series of frac-tures and border displacements, It signifies the transition from modernityto postmoderniry, imperialism to empire, and also marks a new rela-tion between nature and culture (ibid: 187), It signifies a "civilization ofnature," nature here meaning everything previously external to the produc-tion process, This diagnosis is the basis for the immanent perspective defin-ing the analysis of Hardt and Negri, Once economics and politics, societalproduction and ideological legitimation become more or less conflated, weno longer have an external standpoint of life or truth to be set againstEmpire, Empire creates the world in which it lives: "Biopower is a form ofpower that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it,absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effe,ctive commandover the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vitalfunction that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her ownaccord" (ibid: 23-24),

According to Hardt and Negri all of society is subsumed under capital-ism, but these authors tie this seemingly gloomy diagnosis to a revolutionarypromise, If biopower represents power over life, this very life forms the ter-rain upon which counterforces and modes of resistance are constituted. Thesame competences, affects, and forms of cooperation promoted by the neworder of production and rule undermine that order by barricading themselvesagainst cooption and exploitation, while awakening the desire for autono-mous and egalitarian forms of life, In this way biopower reacts to a livingand creative biopolitical force external to it, which it regulates and formswithout, however, being able to completely control and rule it. From this per-,peerive, biopolitie; stands opposed to biopower and points to the possibilityof new a;sociative forms emerging from the body and its own powers,'

Beyond Foucault 169

b E 'to has developed his own con-The Italian philosopherRo erto spoSlm both A amben's project and

cept of biopohtlcs at a crit ica l dlsta,nce fro I·' gd Philosophv (2008)I ' f H dt d Negri BIOS Biopo itics an I

the ana ysis 0 ar an " 'd developing ideas from the twois the last part of a trilogy taking th. an, h t is that modern Western

k 6 E 'to'S marn t esis IS talprevious boo s. SPOSI "riaradi of immunization" (2008: 45)," I hi ki . led by the para Igmpolit ica t m mg ISru, ,. I hear since Hobbes, he argues thatThrough a reconstruction of politlca t if eedom can only be properlymodern concepts of security, .proper~y, an I r·

ccharacterized by an inner

d . hi I gic of ImmUnIty: a ogi dunderstoo Wit mao I'" hich immunity preserves an

ion b life and po ItlCS In w Iconnection etween I . . ' d oductive force. At the centerI lif b I· iring Its ex pa nstve an pr . f

deve ops ley irm . d h feguarding and protection 0I·, I'd thinkmg stan s t e sa T h

of po inca action an , d d ( elf-)desrructive effects, 0 t elife: an objective that 1D ~heen ,pro. uces .rects and preserves, it negates

h hi' of im rnu ntz.attott pro .degree t at t e ogre d . th m to biological eXistenCe,

. I· f life processes re ucing e fthe singu anty 0 I, ." 008' 56) leads, Esposito argues, rom aThe "imrnumtar y dialectic (2 . 'f of protecting life, and onwardproject to preserve life, to a negative or rn

to its negation, 'II nderstanding of the opposingdi f i muruty a ows an u [1'[The para Igm 0 un , . . and development 0 I edi ' f biopolmcs-promotlOn

aspects and imensions o. h h two constitutive momentsd· d cnon on teat er, as h

on the one han ,ItS estru . . h Nazi racial program as t ebl . Esposito views t e . h [ifof a shared pro ematlc.. " ationality in whic a I e-

. I . of an "Immunatory r [ d h (most radica expression d ' . gative a politics 0 eat a., b ' verte Into ItS oe, . .centered politics ecomes 10 dAb he insists that Nazism IS"thanatopolitics"), Like Foucault an I gh

am~;'but unlike them he locates

, f modern politlca t oug , , h .part of a cootmuum 0 .' . I of sovereignty nor 111 t e pn-.' e'ther m a pflnClp e dits specific charactenstlCs n I , (2008' 137-138) un erscores

f 'Rather Esposlro, 'fi·macy of a state 0 exception. , . h ogrammatic sigOl cance It, . of NaZism t e prthe medical-therapeutic alIl:s, d' eneration and death.ascribes to the struggle agamst I~nes';, ~lg2008) see; this "thanatopolitlcs"

Esposito (2008: 3-7; see also amPdef

f Nazi Germany, but contlnu-d' . With the e eat 0 ffi .as by no means Isappeanng d I he presents an a rmauve

hAs a counter-mo e) I ding to shape t e present. . I d h ·dea of a non-comp ete ,. f ference 111CU e tel 'fi '"biopolitics'" its POlIltS a re . y efforts at UOI catIon. , ' I' e body that resists an . d

open individual and col ectIv t· I·ty of life standll1g opposef . manent norma IV , . f ffi _

and closure, and that 0 an 1m f life rocesses. This VISion a an a.. rto the project of anexternal conrr~1 0 bl Pof overturning the Nazi polmcsmative biopolitics IS meant to be capa e I'f but oflife" (2008: 11; Italics

I·· ht'snolongeroverlc . (saof death in a po mcs t a I . l 'c of immunity, It prescnin original), In place of a self-destruetlve

t~;~ognizing the individual/col-

new concept of comm~nahty-a C.O,ncep enness and finitude as the v.ery

lective body's constitutive vulnerab"lt~ ~rpenna:,ently struggling againstfoundation for the commul1Ity, lOstea.

. , ·ved threat to It.such qualttles as a percel

170 Thomas Lemke

2. MOLECULAR POLITICS, ANTHROPOPOLITICS,THANATOPOLITICS: WHAT IS LIFE?

The second line of reception tied to Foucault's concept of biopoliticsaddresses recent research in the biosciences, analyzing technological devel-opments that allow access to "life itself" (Franklin 2000). It starts withthe observation that as a result of biotechnological practices, the idea ofa natural orgin of all living beings is beginning to be replaced by the ideaof an artificial plurality of living beings that are more technical artifactsthan natural entities. Various technological innovations such as-to nameonly a few-the redefinition by molecular biology of life as a text, biomedi-cal progress involving new techniques extending from brain scans to DNAanalysis, and transplantation medicine and technologies of reproduction,have broken with the idea of an integral body. The body is increasinglyviewed not as an organic substrate but as a kind of molecular softwarethat can, as suggested, be both read and rewritten. Sarah Franklin andMargaret Lock succinctly describe this transformation of bios as follows:"Genealogical succession is to the new biology what a live orchestra is todigital recording" (Franklin and Lock 2003: 14).

Molecula rization and digitalization mark a "recombinant biopolitics"(Dillon and Reid 2001: 44; see also Dillon and Reid 2009) operating bothinside and outside the human body's boundaries. It opens a new level ofintervention within that body, at the same time allowing new combinationsof heterogeneous elements into previously unknown life forms. The art ofmolecular engineering differs in a distinct way from traditional forms ofbiological and medical intervention in that it is aimed not only at modifyingmetabolic processes but at reprogramming them as well. No longer controlof outer nature, but a transformation of inner nature stands at the center ofrhis political epistemology of life. As a consequence biology can no longerbe defined as a discovery-based science registering and documenting lifeprocesses; rather, it operates as a transformational science that creates lifeand alters living beings (Rheinberger 2000; Rabinow 2001; Clarke et al.2003; Rose 2007).

This instrumentalization of life cannot be separated from its capitaliza-tion. Instead of functioning as a supplier of raw material for production, inthe age of genetic diversity "nature" can be understood as a source and cre-ator of values. The reproduction and transformation of life processes cancreate what Catherine Waldby (2000) has called "biovalue," which formsthe basis for developing new products and services within a capitalist econ-omy. Biological knowledge and life forms can be patented and marketed. Inthat way a political economy of life emerges in whieh biological life-valueand capitalist exploitatioll estahlish an organic connection (Andrews andNelkin 2001; Sunder Rajan 2005; Cooper 2008).

When it comes to the Foucaultian concept of bioethics, these alterationsof hios suggest Ih ree lines of criticism and suggestions for improvement.

8

Beyond Foucault 171

In the first place, it is clear that the Foucaultian concept largely adheresto the idea of an integral body; Foucault's analysis of techniques of poweraimed at forming and dividing up the body itself postulates a self-con-tained and enclosable body. Today, biotechnologies allow a dismantlingand recombination of the body that Foucault could not have foreseen' Thebody no longer appears as a self-evident starting point and organic sub-strate to which technologies attach themselves In order to form rt, but asthe effect of techniques of embodiment (de Lauretis 1987; Haraway 1995;Butler 1993).10The new level of intervention established by the aforemen-tioned techno-scientific advances is located beneath the classical biOpolmcaloles of "individual" and "population." Anatomo-politics and population

p. db" I I politics" whose regard forregulation are complemente y a rna ecu ar ." .individual persons is no longer anatomical or physiological but genetic,

. hin a " 01" (Flower andand which simultaneously locates them Wit m a gene poHeath 1993; Lemke 2004).

In the second place, this expanded grip on the body has led to a new rela-. hi b lif nd death Although in his Birth of the Clinic (1973)nons lp etween I ea· d dici hFoucault treats death as an integral aspect of mo er~ me IC.lne, I.n.or ertexts he seems to see it as the outer border or other Side of blopolmcs. At

. I I d systematically mterconnectedpresent living and dying are more c ose yan d hd F hi "h man material" rranscen s t e

than Foucault assume . or one t ing, U '" II" deadliving human being. Humans who die are often no longer rea Y ,with portions of their bodies, their cells or organs, blood, marrlow, afnldfs?,

. f h h "a ity 0 I eforth, continuing to exist in the bodies 0 ot ers, W o~e "qu ,life i I d Life matenalls not subject tois thus improved or whose I e IS pro onge . d . f

h h . body-it can be store as m or-the same biological rhyr ms as t e organic .. . IImation in DNA databases and in blood banks or cultivated in potentia y

A d h d h f one person can guarantee rheimmortal stem-cell lines. n t e eat 0 I I b 2001· Franklinlife and survival of another, in a productive cyc e ( acu d d dand Lock 2003). Furthermore, death has been both broken up an ren ere

. h" d h gence of reanllnanonflexible. The definition of "brain deat an t. e erner . . _. h b lining of death mto va rrous cortechniques together With t e su sequent sp I d

, ... h allowed a development an expan-poreal regions and points 10 time, ave . b t ather

. d ici N t so much state sovereignty, u rsion of rransplantation me icme. 0 . . b I f d. hori . w make decisions a out I e anmedical-administrative aut onnes, no . . d h . d Ilife i h t begins an w en It en s. ndeath: they define what (human) I e IS, w en I f bi I··

I"" h become a parr 0 IOPO incs.an entirely new way, thanatopO ItICS. as f h "death of man" (Foucault

And finally' despite his diagnoSIS 0 t e . d· id. . . . . ted toward human 111 IVI u-1970) for Foucault biopolitlcs remains or ten h h d this

, . h results i roblems On t e one an ,als and populations, wh ic resu ts rn two Phi'· I management and

·11· h ys In whic eco ogicaapproach fails to I urmnate t e wa I . h (e) production of rhe

. I di insert themse ves mto t e renvlronmenta lscourse I d h ept of biopoliries to. ry to exten t e conchuman species. It seems necessa f h d· . ns of life in general.

k d .. ' and control 0 t e can mota e in the a ministration ." I d·d t adequately deal withAs Rutherford (1999: 45) has put It, Foucau t I no

•

172 Thomas Lemke

the way in which the political and ecological problematization of popula-tions also gave rise, in more recent times, to a similar problematization ofnature and environment." On the other hand, the reconfiguration of bodiesas texts tends to also dissolve the epistemological and normative borderlinebetween humans and non-humans. If life can be reduced to genetic struc-tures, then the differences between humans and nonhumans are gradual,not categorical. The human being aimed at by bio-medical optimizationstrategies, less frequently ill and living longer, is at the same time an ani-mal-otherwise the biological discourse about "model organisms" wouldmake no sense, since it is mice and cats, apes and other animals upon whichhuman diseases are researched and pharmaceutical substances tried our. Inthis light, being human no longer presents itself as the solid result of evo-lutionary-natural processes, but rather as the precarious product of tech-nology and the object of both social negotiation and patterns of culturalinterpretation: biopolitics as anthropopolitics (Rabinow 1996; Haraway1997; Calarco 2008)."

3. VITAL POLITICS: THE GOVERNMENT OF LIFE

This brief overview points to the various lines of reception of Foucault'sconcept of biopolitics as having been deepened and further developed inimportant respects. A new biopoliticallevel is clearly present both beyondand beneath the levels of the individual and the populace; it is groundedin an expanded knowledge of the body and biological processes. Withinthis altered representational regime, the body is less a physical substrateor anatomical machine than an informational network. At the same time,in analyzing biopolitical mechanisms a range of modes of subjectificationneed to be considered, in order to understand the impact of the controland direction of life processes on individual and collective actors, result-ing in new forms of identity. Over recent years, the Foucaultian notion ofbiopolitics has served as a starting point for a focus on the significance ofknowledge production and processes of subjecrification.

Important and necessary though such an expansion of the analyticalhorizon is, it is important to keep in mind that for the most part the twolines of reception have developed their problems independenrly and hardlytouch on each other. This leads not only to a danger of mutual blindness,but also to the risk of reproducing and renewing an outdated division oflabor. Where one side is interested in the political sphere or macro-level,formulating questions of power and resistance, subjecrification and subju-gation, the other side investigates technologies on a micro-level, often at adistance or even cut off from political questions. Here the first line tends toanalyze political processes without considering material technologies, andthe second concentrates on technological developments while often isolat-ing them from political strategies."

Beyond Foucault 173

In this light, I would now like to propose a third perspective, focus-ing neither on processes of subjectification nor on forms of knowl.edge,but rather resituating the biopolitical problematic within an a nalytics ofgovernment. Biopolitics is here meant to be understood as an "art of gov-ernment" (Foucault 2008: 1) that takes account of the relational networkof power processes, practices of knowledge, and forms of subjectification.This suggestion is tied to the project that Foucault formulated while sum-marizing his lecture of 1979 on "the birth of biopolitics" as follows:

The theme was to have been "biopolitics," by which I meant the at-tempt, starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalize ~he.problemsposed to governmental practice by phenomena characrer isnc of a setof living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, lifeexpectancy, race .... (Foucault 2008: 317)

There is a widespread view that in rhe framework of his analyrics of gov-ernment Foucault did not concern himself further With the theme of bio-politics. 'I believe this view is misraken: the theme was not abandoned butexperienced a "theoretical shift" (Foucault 1990b: 6). Foucault places thequestion of biopolitics in a more general theoretical framework meant toallow a systematic linkage between processes of power, knowledge prac-tices, and forms of subjectification compnsmg the relational network

referred to previously. .' . .' fWithin this perspective blOpohtlcs has more to do With rechniques 0

(self-)government, going beyond practices aimed at c,?rporeal dlsClphne and

I· hIe The "birth of biopolltlcs IS closely tied to theregu anng t e popu ac . ib I"emergence of liberal forms of government. Foucault understands h era IS~as a s ecific art of leading human beings which IS oriented toward the pop

p .. I fi d di sing over the pohtlcal economyulation as a new politjca gure, an ISPO 1 .' fas a technique of intervention,u Liberalism introduces a ratlonal1ty 0 ~OV-

ernment that differs from both medieval concepts of rule and earl~ rna er~raison d'etat: the idea of a "nature" of society forming both the asis an

boundaries of governmental action. d f hThe eighteenth century emergence of polirical economy, an bO It e PLoPb-

d f h tirution of modern 10 ogy. 1-ulation cannot be separate rom t e cons I d bi I . I, d f d re closely connecre to 10 ogicaeral concepts of autonomy an ree om a "I. d If gularion that came to preva i overconcepts of self-preservation an se ore f'· . the

h . I chanistic model or investigatingthe previously dominant p YSlca -me b d organizationalbody. Originating around 1800, biology was ase

fI·fon anemerging essen-

. h . ibl henomena 0 I e asprinciple understandmg t e VISI e PI' rion thus replaced. dorru wi h t plan lnterna orgamza I

rially at ran om, Wit out a se . lans of a hi her aurhority beyondan exrernal order corresponding to the p d d g ic principle equallylife, with "life" functioning as an ~bstracht an Ifynamselrvation reproduc-. . C es sue as se -pre 1

Inherent in all organisms. ategori . I'· g bodies placed ate to charactenze IVlIl ,

tion, and development now cam

174 Thomas Lemke

a greater distance from artificial creations than had been the case before(Foucault 1971).

When in the lectures of 1978 and 1979 Foucault defines "liberalism asrhe general framework of biopolirics" (2008: 22), this signals a shift ofaccent from his previous work, resulting not least from self-critical insight:to the effect that his previous analyses of forms of biopolitical power wereone-sided and unsatisfactory, since they focused mainly on processes involv-ing population regulation and corporeal disciplining.

Foucault's analytics of government forms a contrast to this, expandingbody politics with the perspective of "vital politics." This concept stemsfrom Alexander Rusrow, one of the most important representatives of post-war German liberalism, whom Foucault briefly touches on in the 1979 lee-ture (ibid.: 148; 157). By "vital politics," Riistow means a form of politics"that considers all factors upon which happiness, well-being, and satis-faction in reality depend" (1955: 70). This politics is, he indicates, by nomeans limited to action by the state, but "is politics in the broadest possiblesense ... , all social measures and experimental arrangements" (1957: 235);it relies on social ties and spiritual cohesion and reactivates moral valuesand cultural traditions, its goal being to insert an "ever more dense net andweave of living ties [Iebendiger Bindungeni into the entire social realm"(ibid.: 238). This is a task of integration and innovation needing to take inall societal elements and levels while simultaneously acknowledging theirself-directing competencies.

Foucault's ana lyrics of government takes account of these vital-politicalambitions of (neo-) liberal governmental practice, tying the analysis of phys-ical-biological being to an examination of subjectification processes andmoral-political modes of existence. Following a suggestion by Lars ThorupLarsen (2003), not only two subject forms of biopolitics-individual andpopulace-can here be distinguished, but also, taking up Agamben's owndistinction, two forms of life: zoe and bios. This analytic distinction makesit possible to scrutinize the ways the two biopolitical dimensions are inter-twined. In Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge, Foucau lr'sconcept of biopolirics remains centered on individual disciplining and regu-lation of the populace; the analysis of subjectification processes essentiallylimits itself to subjugation and corporeal dressage, hence to the dimensionof zoe, with techniques of self-constitution receiving little notice." Withthe problematic of government, the perspective broadens, with the ques-tion of moral and political existence now also emerging: the problem, then,of bios. Analysis of disciplinary and regulatory processes is now supple-mented with analysis of another form of power, a form that "categorizesthe individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his ownidentity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and othershave to recognize in him" (Foucault 2000: 331).

Beyond technologies of bodily disciplining and the regulation of the 1'01'-ularion, attention is now also focused on the self-constitution of individual

Beyond Foucault 175

Table 8.1 Different Biopolitical Technologies"

Individual CollectiveLife form

Technologies of the Body Technologies of thePopulation

Technologies of the Self Technologies of the Social

zoe(physical being)

bios(moral and political being)

and collective subjects. Accordingly, Foucault now distinguishes between"political technologies of individuals" and "technologies of the self." Thefirst of these leads us "to recognize ourselves as a society, as a parr of asocial entity, as a part of a nation or of a state" (Foucault 2000: 404). Suchtechnologies can be designated more generally, and perhaps more precisely,as "technologies of the social," a phrase here not meant to suggest here thattechnologies have social applications but rather referring to practices thatgenerate society as an imaginary totality and fictive collective body III the

first place." . "In distinction to "technologies of the social," "technologies of the self

allow individuals "to effect, by their own means, a certain number ofoperations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, th~lrown conduct, and this in a manner so as to transfo~m (hems~lves, modifythemselves, and to attain a certain state of perfe.ctiOo, happmes~, purrry,supernatural power" (Foucault 1997: 177). In this manner four Intercon-nected biopohtical dimensions can be analytically differentiated; they are

presented in the Table 8.1.

4. GOVERNMENTALITY AND BIOPOLIT1CS

The linkage of these four dimensions allows to treat the problem of bio-politics in a more complex theoretical framework. For Foucault, modernbiopolitics is a historical form of articulation of a much more general prob-lem: the linkage between pastoral and political power extendlllg back mtoChristian antiquity." With the advent of liberal government, rhis problemtook on a specific form. For one particular question first surfaces With liberalism: how are free subjects-subjects of law-governed when they ob-simultaneously understood as living beings? Foucault focuses on th~S pro -lem when he insists that the issue of blOpohtlcs cannot be separate

from the framework of political rationality within which they appearedand took on their intensity. This means "'liberalism," Since It was lJ1 re-lation to liberalism that they assumed the form of a challenge. How can

h hf " opulation" with its specific effects and problems,

t e p enomena 0 P ,

176 Thomas Lemke

be taken into account In a system concerned about respect for legalsubjects and individual free enterprise? In the name of what and ac-cording to what rules can it be managed? (Foucault 2008: 317)

Liberal government, Foucault observes, developed a specific politicalknowledge and made use of disciplines like statistics, demography, epi-demiology, and biology, analyzing life processes at the level of populationgroups in order to "govern" individuals through correcting, excluding,normalizing, disciplining, and optimizing measures. Foucault emphasizesthat in the framework of the government of living beings, nature representsno autonomous realm in principle free of intervention, but itself dependson governmental action: no material substrate upon which governmentalpractices might be applied, but rather their constant correlative. The pecu-liar subject-object status of the political figure of the "population" playsan important role here. On the one hand, that figure stands for a collectivereality essentially independent of political intervention and distinguished,as outlined previously, by its own dynamic and self-directing competency;on the other hand, this autonomy does not represent any absolute bound-ary for political intervention, but rather its privileged reference. The dis-covery of a population's "nature" (for instance through birth rates, deathrates, and rates of disease) is the precondition for the possibility of itsdeliberate direction.

But with liberal governmentality, not only does biological life emerge asan object and reference of government, but "political life" does so as well.Liberalism is ried to the constitution of a bourgeois society and a publicsphere that reflects about governmental practices, inquires into their prosand cons, and criticizes their possible excesses." For this reason Foucaultunderstands liberalism not only as a political theory or an economic doc-trine, but also as a

form of critical reflection on governmental practice ... The questionof liberalism, understood as a question of "too much government,"has been one of the constant dimensions of that recent Europeanphenomenon which seems to have emerged first of all in England,namely: "political life." It is even one of its constituent elements, if itis true that political life exists when the possible excess of governmen-tal practice is limited by the fact that it is the object of public debateregarding its "good or bad," its "too much or too little." (Foucault2008: 321-322)

Beyond Foucault, the various correctives and refinements of the concept ofhiopohtics allow us to sketch in an "analytics of biopolitics" taking accountof the interplay between power relations, knowledge practices and formsof ~lIbjcctif1cati()n. In turn, we can differentiate three dimensions of thisanalytic perspective (see also Rabinow and Rose 2006: 197-198)."

Beyond Foucault 177

First, biopolitics requires systematic knowledge of "life" and "livingbeings." Systems of knowledge provide cognitive and normative mapsthat allow an opening of biopolitical spaces in rhe first place and specifyobjects for intervention. They render rhe reality of life understandable andcalculable so thar it can be shaped and transformed. We thus firsr need tounderstand the regime of truth forming the backdrop of biopolitical prac-tice (and we need to understand the selectivity inscribed in chis regime):what knowledge of bodies and life processes is considered especially rel-evant and which alternative interpretations of reality are demoted ormarginalized? Which scientific experts and disciplines dispose over legiti-mate aurhority ro tell the truth regarding life, health, the populace, andso forth? Which cognitive and intellectual instruments and which techno-logical procedures are available for the production of truth? What propos-als and definitions of problems and objectives regarding processes of life

obtain social recognition?Second, as the problem of the truth regime cannot be separated from

that of power the question arises of how power strategies mobilize knowl-edge about life (and how power processes produce and disseminate formsof knowledge). This perspective enables us to rake Into account structuresof inequality, hierarchies of value and asymmetnesthat are (re)producedby biopolirical practices: which forms of life are considered valuable, which"unworthy of life"? Which existential plights, which forms of physicaland psychological suffering receive political, medical, SCientific, and SOCialattention and are understood as intolerable, relevant to research, and Inneed of therapy-and which are ignored or neglected? How are forms ofdomination and exclusion, and experiences of racism and sexism, inscribedin the body and how do rhey transform it (in respect to state of "health,

. d f th)' The "economy of thelife expectancy, physical appearance, an so or . . npolitics of life also comes under scrutiny: who profits from the reg ularioand optimization of life processes (through financia! ga m, polItical influ-

. .' I . nd so forth) and In what form,ence, scientific reputation, socia prestige, a .and who bears rhe cosrs and suffers as a result (through poverty, disease,premature death, and so forth)? What forms of explOltar;on and commer-cialization of human and non-human life can we observe. .

Third an analytics of biopolirics also has to take account of the varhiOus, . h bi brought to work on t em-forms of subjectificatlon-t e way su jeers are h .'

selves guided by scientific, medical, moral, religious an~other aut o~t~~;and on the basis of socially accepted arrangements of bodies and sexes.. f

I f . s by way of a cross-section aas well we can identi fy a comp ex a question . f (. di d I, Hilled on III the name 0 In IVI uathe relevant themes: ow are peop e cuueu ou, f h f '1and collective) life and healrh (one's own healrh and that are ami y,nation, "race" and so forth), in view of defined goals (health Improvement:lif . h' h r quality of life amelioration of the gene pool, populaI e extension, ig e .'. (i trerne cases evention increase and so forth) to act In a certain way 10 ~x hei I'

h b ought to expcflence t err ives asto die for such goals)' How are t ey r

178 Thomas Lemke

"worthy" or "unworthy" of living? How are they called on as members of a"higher" or "lower" "race," a "stronger" or "weaker" sex, an "ascendant"or "degenerate" people? How do subjects take over and modify scientificinterpretations of life for their own conduct and conceive of themselves for, 'Instance, as gene-steered organisms, neuro-biological machines, assembledbodies whose organic elements are in principle exchangeable? How do wecomprehend this process as an active appropriation and precisely not as oneof passive-receptive acceptance?

The reformulation of the concept of biopolitics within an analytics ofgovernment has a number of theoretical advantages. Such a perspectiveallows us, in the first place, to break with biologistic concepts and confronta still enduring tendency in the social sciences to treat bodies, biology, andnature as pre-social objects (Benton 1991; Dickens 2001). Bodies of humanbeings or the nature of the population are not external or ontological prem-ises for (political) government; to the contrary, the art of government repre-sents a "sudden emergence of the naturalness of the [human] species withinthe political artifice of a power relation" (Foucault 2007: 22).19

Beyond this, such a research perspective allows us to explore the connec-tions between physical being and moral-political existence: how do certainobjects of knowledge and corporeal experiences become a moral, political,or legal problem? This is the theme of the last volumes of Foucault's His-tory of Sexuality, at its center stands moral problematizations of physicalexperiences and forms of self-constitution (Foucault 1986; 1989), Contem-porary examples are the figure of the human being and the legal constructof human dignity, both of which are coming under increasing pressure as aresult of biotechnical innovation (Rabinow 1999: 14-17). The problem hasthus emerged, for example, of whether embryos possess human dignity andcan claim human rights, Furthermore, which biological presumptions andprejudices stamp ongoing conceptions of citizenship, in that they implicitlyor explicitly determine membership rules, premises of participation, andcriteria for entry, in this way determining who can even become a candi-date for citizen status, on the basis of what biological features-sex, ethnicorigins, "racial" affiliation, and so forth (Rose and Novas 2005)?

Finally, this perspective focuses our attention on the relation betweentechnologies and governmental practices: how do liberal forms of govern-ment make use of corporeal techniques and forms of self-guidance, howdo they form interests, needs, and structures of preference? How do pres-ent technologies model individuals as active and free citizens, as membersof self-managing communities and organizations, as autonomous actorswho arc in the position-or at least should be-to rationally calculate theirown life risks' In neoliberal theories, what is the relationship between the'concept of the responsible end rational subject and that of human life as

human capital?!"cHlCoult's writing did not so much systemetically pursue as offer prom-

i,ing ,uggestions for this anelytie perspective. He never concretized his

Beyond Foucault 179

remarks on the relation between biopolitics and liberalism-somethingmeant to stand at the center of the 1979 lecture (see 2008: 21-22; 78),Regrettably, what we have is the "intention," as Fouc~u~t concede? self-critically in the course of the lecture (ibid.: 185-186), Filling out this pro-gram, developing it, and making it useful for contemporary theoreticaldebates and political struggles, is the challenge facing current research on

the concept of biopolitics.

NOTES

1. See, for instance, the essays in the Italian Encyclopaedia of Biopolitics(Brandimarte et al. 2006). "

2 A brief survey of the concept's history can be found 10 Esposito 2008: 16-24,3: For a more detailed look at Foucault's analysis of racism see Stoler 1995j

Forti 2006. f bi4. Karia Gene! (2006) offers an instructive ccmparison of th.e concep~ ~ 10-

power in Foucault and Agamben. For an extensive analysis and critique ofAgamben's theses, see Lemke 2005, , ",

5. Such reflections can find support in Foucault's assessment of blOpolttlcs con-Hicrual field (Foucault 1990a: 172-174; 187), For a further development ofthe distinction between biopolitics and blopower laid down by Foucault, see

Lazzarato 2000, ' d h'6 S E ' 1998' 2002, On the place of Roberto Esposiro an IS concept, ee SPOSito, , h C b II 2008 and the

of biopolitics within contemporar.y P~I~OSOP y, see amp earticles in the special edition of DlQcntl~s (20?6). . . if d

7, "My term biovalue ... specifies ways In wh.,ch ~echl1\cs can mrensi yanu_multiply force and forms of vitality of ordering It as an eco~om~, a cal\lable and hierarchical system of value. Biovalue is gene~~te w ebre~ert e

, duct! fl" entities can e msrru-generative and transformatlve pro ucttvtt y a IVlOg .'mentalized along lines which make them useful for hUfmanhP~oJelcrsu-ltuS~~-

di ' 'I 0 other arenas a tee ruca c .ence industry me icme, agncu rure r f h lib ', , ive f f bi I erge rom t e ca I rationCurrently the most productive orms 0 lO.va.ue e.m . . . f, . . II' h ithin blo-lOformatlC economies 0of living entities as code; en ro I.ng t em w. "(Waldby 2000: 33j see alsovalue which converge with capital economiesWaldby and Mitchell 2006), " rnke 2007: 120-123),

8. For a m~re comprehens.,ve dIS.CUsro~l~e~ ;~d Rerd (2001: 56): "Biohistory9. See, for 1l1stance, the dJagnosl~ °d fl 01 It's concern with bodies and with

seems to have very mu~hext.en e ouc~u d inro the structure of thethe social since the life SCIences, delving eePb I b d i d " This critique, . . h t It means to e em 0 Ie .soma itself, are reconsnrutrt'B W a I I" it d his critical analysis to thepoints to a more basic problemci Foucau II Il~~v:aled respect for the logical"dubious" human S~lences an. repea~l"Y f the natural sciences (see Fou-rigor and sharp "epistemological P~~t:ou~ault underestimated the socialcault 2000: 111). The result ~as. t the natural sciences. However, Josephpower of knowledge prodUCt,lO~10

1d that the Foucaultian perspec-

~ouse (1987; 1993) has convlnclO~ Y a~~~~nditions for the emergence andtlve can also be drawn on to examl11e tacceptance of such knowledge. H (1991'163)' "No objects, spaces,

10. See also the observation of Donna araway on~nr c;n be interfaced withor bodies are sacred in themselvdeS;hany comPcode call be constructed forany other if the proper standar , t e proper ,

180 Thomas Lemke

processing signals in a common language .... The cyborg is not subject toFoucault's biopolitics; the cyborg simulates politics, a much more potent fieldof operations."

11. Gesa Lindemann (2003: 27) criticizes Foucault from the perspective of areflexive anthropology. She argues that Foucault's theoretical ami-humanismdisplays an inherent weakness: since for him the only relevant social bodiesare those of human beings, he remains "naively anthropocentric." See alsoLindemann 2002, 24-25. Referring to work of Bruno Latour, Paul Ruther-ford (2000: 2]0-213) for his part argues that Foucault remained attached tothe idea that human beings alone are endowed with the capacity for action,while objects are passive.

12. Compare the observation of Andrew Barry (2001: ]2): "Science and technol-ogy studies have tended to be dominated by the study of cases which becomethe objects of theoretical arguments about the character of the scientific andtechnical, but whose significance for the study of politics is obscure. In thisway, the connections between science, technology and politics are not inter-rogated but reproduced." For a similar critique, see Gottweis (1998: 11). Thiscritique is aimed at mainstream work; much of this work should in any casebe appreciated for its rigorous inquiry into the difference between micro- andmacro-levels, politics and technology. See in this respect the classical text ofCalion and Latour (1981).

13. Not only Foucault's concept of biopolitics changes after The Will to Knowl-edge; his view of liberalism also undergoes a shift of emphasis. Whereas ina text of 1977 he still understands political economy rather traditionally asan external limitation on power by law, in the lecture on governmentality itstands for an inner self-limitation on power (Senellart 2004).

14. Michel Pecheu x criticizes Foucault's work from this period for not beingable to "work out a coherent and consistent distinction between processes ofmaterial subjugation of human individuals and the process of domesticatinganimals," and for engaging in a "hidden biologism of Bakunin's sort" [Pech-eu x 1984,64-65; similarly McNay 1994, 100-104; Barrett 1991, 145-155;see also Lemke 1997, 112-117).

15. In this regard compare, for instance, Barbara Cruikshank's concept of"technologies of citizenship" (1994; 1999) and Benedict Anderson's work onnations as "imagined communities" (1983).

16. The table is a slightly altered version of one appearing in a published lectureby Lars Thorup Larsen (2003: 5). Larsen correctly indicates that an analyticrather than an ontological differentiation is at play here: the individual andsociety, body and population, exist as an instrument/effect of biopoliticalstrategies and are nor external [Q them.

17. "We can say that Christian pasrorship has introduced a game that neither theGreeks nor the Hebrews imagined. It is a strange game whose elements arelife, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self-identity-a game that seems tohave nothing to do with the game of the city surviving through the sacrificeof the citizens. Our societies proved to be really demonic since they happenedto combine those two games-the cir y-citizen game and the shepherd-flockg8me-in what we call the modern states" (Foucault 2000: 311). .

18. See Habcrmas' analysis of the development of a bourgeois public sphere 111

the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in The Structural Transforma-tion o( the Public Sphere (1989).

19. The following con~iderations are based on Lemke (2007: 149-151).20. With their cOllcept of a "government of bodies" (gouvernement des corps),

Didier Fassin and Dominique Mcrnmi (2004: 22) propose a similar analytICperspective: "Multiplicity of forms of both the exercise of power and places

Beyond Foucault 181

of its application, diversity of paths of production of subjects thr~)Ugh m.ul·tiple procedures of population regulatio~: these are the elements mreresungus in the heritage of the later work of M,che.1 Foucault (much more than thework generally invoked in the literature on biopower] when we speak of gov-ernment of the body."

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Rose, Nikolas and Carlos Novas (2005 . .Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Col·'ier ed:· BIOlogical Citizenship, pp. 439-463 inlies, and Ethics as AnthropologiCal P ) ~Iobal ~s~emblages. Technology, Poli-

Rouse, Joseph. (1987). Know/ed e d;o ems. x ord: Blackwell.Rouse, Joseph. (1993). Foucaulrg a~J theo~er. Ithtca:. Cornell University Press.

Cap.uta and Mark Younr (eds) Foucau atu ra SCle~~es, pp. 137-161 in John.. ver sity Park: The Pennsylvania State U~~v:n~th~ Critique of Institutions. Uni-

Rustow, Alexander. (1955) W· h f . rsit y ress.wirrschaft, pp. 53-74 in'Pat;f~~C~ t~ethlsche Probleme der sozialen Ma rkr-Marktwirtschaft.Sturtgarr/Co!o ne"'Ko~~~an (ed) Der Christ und die soziale

Rutherford, Paul. (1999). Entry of ~f·· 0 Hammer.D f h e Into tsror y pp 37 62· E· 0 .iscourses 0 t e Environment. Oxford' Bl kwe . ~ In ric a ner (ed)

Rutherford, Paul. (2000). The P bl f· ac ~eli.(PhD Th . ro em 0 Nature In Conte S· Iesis), Research School of S . IS' mporary ocia Theory

sity, Canberra. cera ctences, Australian National Univer-

Senellarr, Michel. (2004) L ., .435: 55-57. . a Question du Liberalisme. Le Magazine Litteraire

Sene.llan, Mi.chel. (2007). Course Context _'.nty, Territory, Population. Lectures ~iPh36~ 14?1 In MiChel Foucault Secu-trans. G. Burchell. Basingsroke. Palg M' e Mal liege de France, 1977-1978

S . Alb . rave ac I an 'orrut, err and Steven A. Peterson. (1998) R .' . . . ,

Three Decades-a Balance Sheet B 'ti hi· eVllew Ar,tI.c1e:Biopolirics after571. . rt IS ourna of Political Science 28: 559-

Stoler, Ann Laura. (1995). Race and the Educati .of S~xuality and the Colonial Order of~:.tlon of Desire. Foucault's Historyversny Press. mgs. Durham/London: Duke Uni-

Sunder Rajan, Kaushik. (2006). Bioca ital Th ..Durham/London' Duke Unive . Pp . e Constitution of Postgenomic LiteWI' rstty ress /' .

a dby, Catherine. (2000) The Visible H· .Posthuman Medicine L~ndon/N Y kumRanPlro/eet. lnformatic Bodies and

W Idb C h . . ew or: our edgea y, at eflneand Robert Mitchell (2006) T . .and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism 6 h : OlSskueEc.ono,,!l1es:Blood, Organs. ur am. u e Umverslty Press.

9 Coming Back to LifeAn Anthropological Reassessment ofBiopolitics and Governmentality

Didier Fassin

Forming concepts is a way of living and not a way of killing life; it isa way to live in a relative mobility and not a way to immobilize life;it is to show, among those billions of living beings that inform theirenvironment and inform themselves on the basis of it, an innovationthat can be judged as one likes, tiny or substantial: a very special typeof informarion.Tfoucault 2003: 14-15)

The idea I wish to develop here is that in putting forward the concept ofbiopolitics, Michel Foucault opened up a major area of study, founded ona brilliant intuition, but that paradoxically, he perhaps failed to addressthe core of the issue-life itself. This was not for lack of time, his ownuntimely death depriving him of the space to take it on, but through aform of avoidance-for no sooner had he opened up this arena than heturned quickly away from it to address himself to other questions and pro-duce other concepts, notably that of govern mentality. This concept formsthe substance of what we might consider his third intellectual phase, afterarchaeology and genealogy: the "government of the self and others," to citethe title of his penultimate course at the College de France (Foucault 2008).What the author of The History of Sexuality did was effectively to shift"biopolirics," in the sense that it is-literally, or at least erymologically-apolitics of life, that is to say a politics which takes existence as its object andthe living as its subject, turning it into what is in essence a politics of popu-lations, a politics which measures and regulates, constructs and produceshuman collectivities through death rates and family planning programs,health regulations and migration controls (Foucault 1979). With "anato-mopolitics," conceived as the set of disciplines practiced on the body, whichconstrain and encompass behavior, design and determine a social "order ofthings," biopolirics constitutes biopower-in other words, a normalizingpower over life, which Foucault fleetingly but decisively theorized around1976, notably in the last chapter of The Will to Knowledge.

Let us return to the text of that famous lecture, given in 1976 at the Uni-versity of Bahia, and entitled "The Meshes of Power." In this lecture, Fou-cault asserts: "Life has now become an object of power. Once, there wereonly subjects, juridical subjects from whom one could take goods, life toO,

•

186 Didier Passin

moreover. Now, there are bodies and populations" (Foucault 2007: 161).Thus life dissolves into these two objects, bodies and populations. In termsof an analysis of power, these translate into discipline and regulation, anaro-mopolitics and biopolitics. The question of life itself, as form and as value, asthat which constitutes the substance of existence and that which forms theexperience of the living-life in its scientific significance and its common-sense understanding-seems to disappear as we enter into what Foucaultstarts out by calling "normalizing power" (Foucault 1979: 144), for whichhe reserves a Marxian critique, and later transforms into the more positive"political technology" (Foucault 1988: 145) in order to encompass both thereason of state and the care of the self, the restrictive and the productiveforces of power. To some extent we could say that, rather than life qualife, Foucault's interest at this time was in the social practices operating onbodies and populations, which of course influence the course of individuallives and collective histories: in short, he was focusing on the governmentof bodies and the government of populations, rather than the governmentof life-of existence and of the living. In fact, from then on, his interest ingovern mentality even concentrated almost exclusively on populations. Hav-ing announced in his] 975-] 976 course that "one of the most fundamentalphenomena of the nineteenth century was the consideration given to life"(Foucault] 997: 213), he admitted at the beginning of his 1977-1978 coursethat he should have entitled it "a history of governmentality," by which hemeant the "set of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections whichmake it possible to exert th is specific form of power the main target of whichis the population" (Foucault 2004a: 111). He thus moved from the idea of"sraticization of the biological" (1997: 213) to the "governmentalization ofthe state" (2004a: 112). In the meantime, life had disappeared from histhinking and would never appear again. Contrary to what is often believed,governmentality is not about life but only about populations.

However, the perspective opened up on biopower and governmentalitywas certainly a fertile one for the social sciences, particularly for sociology,paving the way for investigations into medicalization (Pinell 1996, Con-rad 1992), psychologization (Castel 1981, Rose] 989), risk management(Ewald 1986, Beck 1992), the management of the poor (Donzelor 1984,Dean 1991), the control of bodies (Vigarello 1978, Tumer 1992), and prac-tices around birth and death (Memmi 2003, Lock 2002). My hypothesis isthat, amidst this great collective enterprise, we may have been letting thesubstance of life slip away. And the proposition I draw from this is that adifferent politics of life is possible (Fassin 2009). The present contributiondiscusses this hypothesis and this proposition.

J. ABSENCES

Countering the representation made of his work at the time, Foucaultoffered hi, famous statement: "It is not power, but the subject, which is the

Coming Back to Life ]87

general theme of my research" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 209). How-ever the question may be raised of a third term, present just beneath thesurface, always there but never fully addressed-that IS, life. In fact he gavethis concept sufficient importance to make it the subject of the last text hecompleted before his death-" La vie: experience et ~~ience," published 111

the Revue de metaphvsique et de morale a year later ( Life: Expenence andScience" in Foucault 1998). Admittedly, he wrote this text as a contributionto a collective homage to his teacher Georges Canguilhem, to be published111 a philosophical journal. But this article offers at least Cltcul1lstantla~evidence of an ongoing concern to which he cOlltlnu.ally returned Without ever devoting himself entirely to it. In this last ar~lCle, he recon,structSthe thought of his time around a distinction he ascnbes to}WO differentreadings of Husserlian phenomenology: on the one hand, a philosophyof experience, of sense and of subject" represented by Sart~e an? Mer-leau-Ponty; on the other, "a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality andof concept" developed by Cavai lles and Bachelard, for example (Foucault1989: 8). Although he does not say so explicitly, and despite the fact thathe openly declares his human and political affilllty With the latter ratherthan the former, Foucault's work can be read as an attempt to bnng thetwo sides together: the "archaeology of knowledge" (1972:', which lI1c1ude~life sciences falls into the rationalist tradition, wh.de the hermeneutics athe subject" (2005), which proposes an ethics of life, forms part of a sub-. ". I" The fact that he was unable to create a synthesis between[ectivrsr lI1eage. " "" bl d hthe two (which is perhaps in any case impossible) IS proba y "ue to t eintellectual-not just chronological-distance separating The Birth of theClinic (first published in 1963) from The Use of Pleasure (first published '~1984). It is nevertheless the case that throughout his work, the questl7 ~ethe constitution of the subject is indisSOCiable from his II1vestlgatlono

lth

d I hi hile one may concur Wit 1 t econstruction of knowle ge. n trus sense, wI'subtitle Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow gave to the Fren~h tr;n~ atl~nof their exegesis of Foucault's work-"Au-dela de l'objecrivite et de a Isub-

" ." d S bi ti "ty")-It must irnrne late y ejectivite" ("Beyond ObjectiVity an u jec 'VI b " I" hadded that Foucault's thought is driven by the dual concern to nng to Ig tthe technologies of both objectification and scbjecrivauon, ~ndnot just t~move be ond them. Life, being simultaneously rhe product 0 exisrence anthe expr~ssion of the living, is located on the dividing IlI1ebetwelen the two.Foucault brushes against it and moves around it rather than tr u y engaging

b h es the risks of such a course.with it, perhaps ecause esens hi If f am two philosophers whoseIn doing this, he also distances .uld be more strongly manifest in his

thought everything might sugge:~ wouf ons of personal acquaintancework-the first, Georges Cangui em, or reas h Arendt because ofand also intellectual heritage, and the ~e~~~dh~a;r~~ving infl~ence at thethe apparent closeness of their theme h itings Foucault of coursetime. On the one hand, Canguilbem. w ~se w

t:re intentionally and care-

k II . f his work that It was aus , Inew we -saylllg 0 , ' I hi tory of sciences" (Foucau rfully limited to a particular domain In t re IS

•

188 Didier Passin

1989: 7-8)~focused all his energies, particularly in The Normal and thePathological (1989) and above all in Etudes d'bistoire et de philosophie dessciences concernant les vivants et fa vie (1968), on studying what consti-tutes the materiality of life, i.e., life as biological existence, and what linksthat existence to the experience of life, i.e., life as it is lived. As Rabinow(1996) notes, Canguilhem's view is that existence (expressed in French as Ievivant, using the present participle of the verb "to live") controls experience(expressed by the past participle, Ie vticu). On the other hand Arendt, whosework Foucault must have known, but whom he never quotes (asked abouther work on one occasion, he carefully distanced himself from a theoryof power and domination that he deemed "somewhat verbal") also placedlife at the center of her work, from her typology of the three forms of the"vita activa'' in The Human Condition (1958) to her critical analysis of the"life process" in On Revolution (1962). And indeed, it was on the basisof his recognition of this unrealized encounter between the two thinkers,and their essential complementarity, that Giorgio Agamben (1998) built hisown theory of "homo saeer" and "bare life."

The absence of these two philosophers in Foucault's work is thus remark-able, given that for both life was central-in Canguilhem's case to an epis-temological reflection, in Arendt's to a moral theory. Foucault drew onneither when he constructed his concept of biopolitics, Moreover, despitethe distance between them, there are surprising convergences between Can-guilhem and Arendt. Firstly in their wording: both heighten the signifyingintensity of the word by adding a strengthening pronoun, speaking of "lifeitself" (Canguilhem 1989, Arendt 1962). Secondly in their references: bothderive the substance of their theory from Aristotle, Canguilhem in order tolink the concept to life (Canguilhem 1968), Arendt to reflect on meaningand life (Arendt 1958). Foucault barely ventures onto either of the pathsthey opened up-Canguilhem's science of existence, or Arendt's politics ofthe living. Given the crucial role that biology has played in the constructionof the human subject since the nineteenth century and the radicalization ofa form of what we could call a "biohisrory" during the twentieth century,this fact is remarkable.

But there is one exception to this amnesia: Foucault's course at the Col-lege de France entitled "Society Must Be Defended" (2002). The only phaseof his work which could be considered tragic, this cycle of lectures bringstogether the biological and the political around the theme of "race war."For a brief moment, hiopolirics as Foucault posits it acknowledges violence,eugenics and genocide, the biology of racism and the politics of Nazism, theexclusion and the extermination of others on the grounds of essenrializa-tion of their difference in both the Western and the colonial worlds; in otherwords, it addresses the inscription of the zoe at the heart of the bios. This isa di,tinction which Aristotle (1905) merely implies, but which Arendt andlater Agamben would rencler explicit and above all heuristic: zoe, the physi-cal life of the living being, whether human or animal, is opposed to bIOS,

Coming Back to Life 189

life articulated within a social space, which is the property of the human aspolitical animal. It is a shadowy path, one that is followed by MIChael Taus-sig (1987) on his journey to the Amazonian heart of darkness and by AchilieMbembe (2003) in his antonymic exploration of African necropolitics, andwhich I have myself explored (Fassin 2008a) in South African society caughtbetween the apartheid past and the present-day reality of AIDS.

However, a marked slippage very guickly saw Foucault's subseguentlectures return to the themes of government of popujat ions (and goods)-security, liberalism-and then to government of bo~:es (and souls)-:-sexu-ality, pleasure. The journey ultimately arrives at the care of the self as anethical arena in which politics becomes absorbed (Foucault 1986): indeed,when questioned about this relationship between ethics and politics, Fou-cault replied that it is the government of the self that ultimately becomes themodel for the government of others-not through a transposition of Ident;-cal procedures, but by creating the prrrna ry prerequisite for It (2005). LI eis subsumed in living ethically, as politics is subsUI11~d 10 e.thlcs, a reductionthat Foucault never moved beyond. To pur it in Aristorelian terms, we are

here in the arena of the good life.

2. POSITIONS

What I would like to return to here is that inirial tension betwe~n zte andbios between bare life and social life, that Foucault grasped m iShamous

, .' al whose politICS places 15 exts-assertion that "modern mao IS an arum ... ." (1998. 143) What we must st nve rotenee as a living be109 In quesnon ....

comprehend is the continuing relevance of rhis questloni b hi ·t·rSince Foucault himself moved away from this Issue a rer frohac mgtl. 'n

l. I' cast the terms 0 t e ques 10 .is perhaps a necessity for socra SCience to re .

For both sociology and anthro~ol~gYt~IS e:ou;~b~~a~~i~I;;~~:'r;"fi:~s~~~~~to the criticism of these SCient! c ISClP 10 d wer in our owntime that Foucault formulated it-:-that they daddresse p~ the law and in

h h . I which conflate power wit ,societies t roug a socto ogy I I· ki er to prohibition· I haveother societies via an ethnology of ru e IJ1 r'~~:n~~ olitical anthro'pologyattempted to reconstruct the trajectory 0 ~oucault strove to rep-from a similar point of view (Fassin 2008b). Judst as eproblematize biopoli-blernati I g e that today we nee to rro lernatize power, ar u .. the olitics of life-a formula

tics, or more precisely and more expliCItly, ~ b Nikolas Rose (2001),which is obviously close to that recently propose Ywho speaks of "the politics of life itself." . I what is thef har i . e here;' Or more precise y,

But what is the li e t at is at ISSU red b the term "politics of life"extent of the territory that might be cl~~~ed toY reviously, we can say thatIf we return to the dual tradition I a

f. P xamined by Canguilhem,

h·· d f am the life 0 eXIStence e .t IS terrttory exten sr.. . h the representations and practICeSas a biological and matenal given, wit

.

190 Didier Passin

associated with it, to the life of the living analyzed by Arendt, a socialand experiential reality, together with the representations and practices thisconcept generates (Fassin 2000). The field on one side is the laboratoryand bioinforrnarics, clinical immunology and genetic sequencing, medi-cally assisted reproduction and cancer treatment, as studied by Paul Rabi-now (1999), David Napier (2003), Rayna Rapp (2000) and I1ana Lowy(1996); on the other it is the housing estate and the refugee camp, asylumseekers and displaced persons, social protection and security programs,as analyzed by Giorgio Agamben (2003), Zygmunt Bauman (1998), LiisaMalkki (1995) and Didier Bigo (2007). A vast, heterogeneous landscape,which extends, in short, from zoe to bios. The identification of this distinctterritory of the politics of life is justified not by the dual etymology andthe founding ambiguity of life that it reveals, but much more directly byempirical observations which call for a theoretical formulation of the sortof politics which is involved around life.

Cleatly, the "politics of life" has been understood by most social scien-tists who have utilized the expression as being related to the "biosciences."For Nikolas Rose (2007), who significantly opens his book with a discus-sion of Canguilhem, the politics of life has to do with the discovery of DNAand the reinvention of race, the development of genomics and neurochem-istry, disputes around stem cells and the practices of eugenics. It is aboutwhat other authors have phrased in terms of biosociality (Rabinow 1996),biovalues (Waldby 2002) and biocapital (Franklin 2003). This perspectivehas opened up innovative fields of research on the new subjecrivities. Mypoint is that it is restricted to only one aspect of life, life as biology, thusneglecting another dimension-life as biography. If, as Hannah Arendtwrites, what differentiates man from other animals is not life as a phenom-enon which starts with birth and ends with death but life as a lapse of timefull of events that can be narrated, then an anthropology of the politics oflife must account not only for the former but also for the latter. And even asfar as the biological reality of life is concerned, it is not just about cells andgenes, it is also about the wearing away of bodies, which is closely linked toinequalities of living conditions. Life as matter and life as meaning is whatr will try to defend and illustrate here.

However, it is important to underline that the domains defined by thispolarization arc far from being hermetically separated-in fact, they areperhaps less so than ever. We could even say that life is never more fullygrasped than when the two aspects, existence and the living, come together.This is revealed in a range of recent writings, particularly in anthropology,constructed on the basis of shifting between the sites of biomedical scienceand the spaces of everyday life. Adriana Perryna's study of the aftermath ofthe Chernobyl disaster, significantly entitled Life Exposed (2002), reveals,through the c1ifferential social attitude towards individuals depending ontheir level of exposure (0 toxic radiation, the constitution of a "biologicalciti zens hip." JO"O Biehl's research on a marginal district of Porto Alegre,


with the equally resonant title of Vita (2005), uncovers the conditions ofdiagnosis and care for a hereditary degenerative disease between "geneexpression and social abandonment." These works, in their linking of bio-logicallife and social life, their shift berween zoe and bios, sit at the heartof contemporary politics of life, the place where it is continually being rede-fined. Both studies reveal the central role of biomedicine in the articulationof the different dimensions of life.

It is from this perspective that I have developed my own work on the man-agement of foreigners in France (Fassin 2005a), moving between restncnonson legal immigration and the development of humanitarian reason, betweencutbacks in political asylum and the demand for medical expert oprruon, andon the AIDS epidemic in South Africa (Fassin 2007a), oscillating betweenthe international polemic on the viral origins of the disease and the sufferingof victims relegated to the former homelands, between th~ battle ovc.r treat-ment and the violence of the townships, between research Into a vaccine andaccusations of genocide. Such an investigation, on the.border between .b~relife and social life existence and experience, where biology meets politics,perhaps calls for anew orientation in the exploration of biopolitics. I wouldterm this a moral orientation, not in the sense of defining norms and value.s,distinguishing good and evil, justice and injustice, t~uth .and untruth, but 1~

the sense of examining how, within a particular historical and geographi-cal context, these norms and values, these divisions between .good and eVI.I,justice and injustice, truth and untruth are constituted (Fassin 2008c). It IS

worth noting, moreover, that the project of a moral anthropology thus pro-posed remains profoundly coherent with Foucault's thinking, particularly III

the way it extends Nietzsche's critical reflection on the genealogy of morals," f he moral di f philosophy (Nietzsche 1996).movmg far away rom t e mora iscoursc a . .

But let us make no mistake: the restoration of a moral reflection does not In. .. f liti I alysis-on the contrary theany way Imply a renunCiatIOn 0 a po inca an '

former completes and enriches the latter. " . ."So what are the norms and values underlying the politics of life III con-

temporary societies? How do they inform the production and reproductionof the category of "humanity" as it was ~onst'tu~ed In the eighteenth ce.n~rury both as species (a biological collective sharing rhe same characterlStics)' and as sentiment (the political recognition of a common belongl~g tothe world)? I would like to offer elements of a response to these quesnons,a response which I believe extends Foucault's thought toward ter nrory IO

hto

d his i wecantaketewhich it seems reluctant to venture. An on t IS Journey .same two philosophers, Canguilhem and Arendt, as our compamons.

3. MATTER

I k f have taken up Canguilhem draws attention to a paradoxn a remar ew , I" " f lif "E thingwhich I think is crucial to the analysis of the po incs 0 I e: very

192 Didier Fassin

happens as if a society had 'the mortality that suits it,' the number of thedead and their distribution into different age groups expressing the impor-tance which the society does or does not give to the protraction of life. Inshort, the techniques of collective hygiene which tend to prolong humanlife, or the habits of negligence which result in shortening it, depending onthe value attached to life in a given society, are in the end a value judgmentexpressed in the abstract number which is the average human life span. Theaverage life span is not the biologically normal, but in a sense the sociallynormative, life span" (Canguilhem 1989: 161). This reflection articulatesthe essential fact that the measured quantity of life, as a demographic real-ity, indicated by life expectancy, implies and exposes an estimated qual-ity of life as social production, in other words, a quality dependent onthe choices made by society in relation to the preservation of life. Fromthis point of view, to adapt an expression-"statistique mora/e"-forgedin the nineteenth century but abandoned in the twentieth, statistics alwaysinvolves morality. From this point of view too, the question of life can neverbe considered separately from the question of inequality.

This argument was made, with the rhetorical talent and ideological posi-tion he is renowned for, by then South African president Thabo Mbeki inhis famous speech at the opening of the international AIDS conference inDurban in July 2000, when he offered this powerful image: "In the spaceof a day passengers flying from Japan to Uganda leave the country with theworld's highest life expectancy-almost 79 years-and land in one with theworld's lowest-barely 42 years. A day away by plane, but half a lifetimedifference on the ground" (Fassin 2002: 317). Such distances are apparentnot just between countries: they can be observed between different socialcategories within the same country. Thus in France, where life expectancyis one of the lowest in Western Europe, a 35-year-old unskilled laborer hason average nine years less left to live than an engineer or a teacher of thesame age. This has little to do with inadequate medical care, since Francehas one of the best-performing health care systems, but is rather the resultof the politics of social justice, France being one of the Western countrieswirh rhe widest disparity in incomes (Leclerc et al. 2000). Both on theglobal level and within a given society, the length of life of the living islargely determined by collective choices.

These choices are usually implicit, and it is rare today for a democraticgovernment to declare publicly that it has decided to allow some to live lesslong than others, or even to sacrifice some to save others. But such deci-sions are occasionally made explicit. This is increasingly the case in warsituations. As Michaellgnatieff (2000) showed in relation to the NATO-effectively US-intervention in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, in order to safe-guard the lives of the American pilots, the decision was taken to have themfly high enough to be protected from enemy anti-aircraft fire. The resultwas that the bomhing of the chosen targets was much less accurate: there


were no NATO casualries, but 500 civilians were killed. To adopr rhe mili-tary terms in use at the time, the "zero death" doctrine inevitably implied"collateral damage." During borh Gulf Wars rhe same principles-and thesame language-were put into operation, with much more serious conse-quences, although the total number of deaths was never precisely knownbecause nobody was interested in counting them. .'

It will perhaps be objected that these are extreme, and specific, situa-tions. But it would not be difficult to show rhar even m a pacified West-ern world, governing means-through a multitude of decisions, small andlarge, on employment and social securiry policy, on healrh care and educa-tion, on immigration control and humanitarian aid-mak.lOg c~oICes wh.lchcould be described as "tragic" in the sense used by SOCiologists studyingorgan transplants (Calabresi and Bobbit 1978): choices about the alloca-tion of scarce resources, the distribution of which directly or indirect lyinfluences the length and qualiry of life of individuals. Thus I have shown(Fassin 2003a) how administrative agents of the French state found rhem-selves in rhe posirion of having to evaluate nor only what they called the"minimum living expenses," the difference between resources a.nd Irreduc-ible expenses, but also the "life needs" in terms of food, heating, erc., ofunemployed people seeking emergency financial ald. Consider ing that mosrfamilies had a negative economic balance when expenses were subtracredfrom resources, the politics of life of rhe state was nothing more than a

politics of survival. h heti I. ., . I appreciation or a ypot etrca COI1-And this expression IS not a cymca .struction posited by a remote social-scientific gaze. It ISthe every~ay expe-rience lived by, or at least expressed in the discourse of, refug:es 111 Fra.nceand people with AIDS in South Africa, those who observe daily how Iltt~:value their life has for the society m which they are living. The fact rhFoucaulr who was so aware of the way in which power IS expressed mlfthe

, f I" bei d so committed hirnse mtechnologies of governance 0 IV 109 erngs, an . d h hid f h d . ated never recognIze t e r eo-social struggle to the Sl e 0 t e omlO , . . f

. f . lit to his concepruahzatlon arerical relevance of the question a mequau y . dih b hi ft -expressed desire to istancebiopolirics probably says muc a out IS a en ..'

. . I f b oader theoretical issue rs arhimself from Marxist rhink ing. n act, a r . f h I' . fstake: the introduction of materialism into the analysis 0 t e po .dav 0

. di hi h we would rarher see to ay aslife, where Foucault gives a rea mg W IC . M' that. . lism i . ply 10 the ar xran sense,constructivist. This materia Ism IS not sun , . h di-

of the structural conditions which effecrively largely derermme t e ilhe: :. '. it is also 10 Cangui em s

tions of life of the members of a given society, I' . 'I' it longevityb f xistence ItS materia ity, IS,sense that of the very su stance 0 exrsteuc-c, .' I' .

'. . . .' it To accept rhis materia ISUCand the inequalities that society Imposes on . f life i t a merely thee-

. f nu r j nvest i of the politics 0 I e IS noorientarion 0 our IIlvestlgaoon . I the matter of liferetical issue. It is also an ethical one. It recogl1lzes t tar

does matter.

194 Didier Fassin

4. MEANING

But there is another moral dimension to the politics of life, an approachwhich no longer distinguishes between lives-between the lives of the poorand rich, the dominated and the dominant, the weak and the powerful-onthe basis of quantity and quality. This approach distinguishes between thedifferent meanings of life itself. Thus Arendt (1958) emphasizes the shiftfrom life as a biological reality to life as biographical reality: "Limitedby a beginning and an end, it follows a strictly linear movement whosevery motion nevertheless is driven by the motor of biological life whichman shares with other living beings and which forever retains the cycli-cal movement of nature. The chief characteristic of this specifically humanlife, whose appearance and disappearance constitute worldly events whichultimately can be told as a story, establish a biography, it is of this life,bios as distinguished from mere zoe, that Aristotle said that it 'somehowis a kind of praxis," Therefore life as one just lives it is distinguished fromthe life one can truly say one has lived. Between the two lie both language,which is what makes the human, and the polis, the space of politics. InArendt's view, the danger of both totalitarianism and imperialism was thatthe other-the enemy, the colonized, the immigrant, the Jew-was reducedfrom bios to zoe, from social life to biological life. Camps, from the Naziextermination camps to contemporary refugee camps, would thus repre-sent the end-point of this process of reduction, not because they share thesame aims, but because they have in common that they recognize only thebare life of the individual-in one case in order to kill them, in the otherto save them.

However, in contrast to Agamben (1997: 144), who speaks of "the sepa-ration of politics and humanitarianism that we are witnessing today," Iwould argue that humanitarianism has become the supreme form of thecontemporary politics of life. Indeed, "humanitarianism" is not limitedto the field self-defined by the agents of large non-governmental organi-zations, but has become a category resting on the principle of an ethicalapproach to human life which is placed above other values and is the objectof arguments between actors who seek to appropriate the symbolic benefitsassociated with it (Fassin 2007b). The evolution of French immigrationcontrol practices is revealing in this respect. During the 19905, two con-comitant phenomena emerged: on the one hand, the number of asylumseekers awarded refugee status fell to one-sixth of its former level, owingpartly to a drop in the number of applications submitted but particularly toa reduction in the proportion granted asylum; on the other, the number offoreigners seeking residence on the grounds of serious illness which couldnot be treated in their country of origin increased sevenfold (Fassin 2001).This dual development, which is of course interdependent, since some ofthose whose applications for asylum were rejected were able to obtain resi-dence on the basis of a medical expert opinion, clearly marks a shift of


legitimacy in the politics of life. It has moved from recognition of the lifeof a citizen who has suffered the ordeal of violence, often as a result ofcampaigning activit y, to recognition of the life of a patient Sick m body-in other words, from political to biological life, from a life recounted by arefugee to attest to a history of persecution, to a life testified by a doctor todemonstrate a pathology. It is worth noting that the procedure for grantingresidence on health grounds, introduced in practice and subsequentl:, mt~the law in the last decade, was first termed "humaOitafl.an reason, anthus won the consensual support of all members of parliament, from allparties. There is no shortage of examples of this penetration of human ira ri-

anism into politics. I hThe extent to which this reconfiguration of the mora space was t e

central issue in the controversies which tore apart South Afncan /~;~~'pitting the government against actrvtsts around the question 0 'I 'has probably not been sufficiently understood (Fassin 2003b). The ViO

den~

polemic that opposed the government and the activists over a pe;lo I °hseveral years with the patients as hostages, has been seendas adslmP

Ikec aS

I' , ( ses AIDS) an me rca now -between unorthodox rheones poverty cau , d ' if'I I ' f AIDS) between heretical error an scienn cedge (the vira exp anatron 0, hil h '

truth between bad faith and good science. In reality, w let e Issfue whas, . d id I it was even more one 0 et ICS

indeed one of epistemology an I eo ogy, ions of the bestand politics. The confrontation was between two conce~tlons ~ even theapproach to life. On one side, activists, doctors, resear~ e.rs anf h '

. hi' h d h isk of transmission 0 t e viruspharmaceutical industry hig Ig. te t h r. Ie owerful idea that drugsfrom mother to child and champiOned t e simp ,p he mi ' f

, .' f b b bies. On the other, t e mimsrers 0could prevent infection 0 new orn a . I" ' blic health and socialhealth and of social development, spccra ~ts in ~u huge disparities andwork, but also dissident SCientists pomdte

fout t etheid and stressed the

inad ies j n th system inherite rom apar ,ina equacles 10 t e care . traduction of antiret-f " liry through premature mdanger 0 increasing inequa I lif d was of value in and

I he vi f the former every l e saveroviral drugs. n t e view 0 , "to make the healthof itself. For the latter, the issue wafisto endsu

fre lustlC

t~~ provide social sup-

. bl d ffi ient and rst an oremossystem equita e an e CI, . ' f d I"fe upheld by the for-f di (' ms The politiCS a sacre Iport or the nee lest VICI . I' ' f ' sr life espoused by the

h claimed The po ItlCS 0 IUmer was everyw ere ac . I ' I humanitarian reason won outlatter was largely condemned. U tlmathe y, ent had been instructed

h f ity but once t e governmover t e concern or equity, d d 1" ed to what extent accessto distribute treatment, activists an actors rea IZ I

' d difficult and unequa .to antiretroviral drugs rema me 'F d the management of AIDS

Th d " . of refugees In ranee an fe a ministration , fl I d bring into play politics 0

, S I Af ' hi h I have bne y ana yze , h bm out 1 nca, w IC ious diff b tween the nature of t e pro -life which, beyond the obVIOUS f' lerences e ral configuration, in whichI f Pa rt 0 t le sa me rno Iems and contexts, or111 , I d h manitarian reason as [le

Penor va ue an LI 'dphysical life emerges as a su . ciefy invites uS to conSI erethical ideal. Thus the study of contemporary so

196 Didier Fassin

not biopower, which is power over life, bur biolegitimacy (Fassin 2004),which would be the legitimacy of life-in other words the recognition ofbeing alive as rhe supreme good. This shifr from biopower to biolegitimacyindicates a new "problematization" of life, understood not only as the waysociety constitutes and treats the problem of life-this is the sense Fou-cault (1994: 544) gives to the word-but also as the way we may interpretand formulate it: problematization is both a social and a conceptual move.Within this new problemarizarion, the issue is not to grasp how life is fash-ioned, regulated and normalized-what governmentality is about. It is tocomprehend, through a very different and almost inverse approach, thecomplex, uncertain and ambiguous articulation of life at the heart of oursystems of values and actions, of OUf moral and political economies.

5. CONCLUSION

My intention here was to clear up what Iwould call a heuristic misunder-standing. In 1976, in the last lectures of "Society Must Be Defended" andin the final chapter of The Will to Knowledge, Foucault opens a theoreticalblack box which he names "biopower" and, as a part of it, "biopolirics." Heprophetically announces that "a society's 'threshold of modernity' has beenreached when life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies"and that "modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence asa living being in question" (1979: 143). This idea that life is linked to ourmodernity has given rise to a new field of research within the social sci-ences, mainly around life sciences and biomedicine, but also about publichealth and social engineering, both in the Western and, to a lesser degree,the Third World. However, interestingly, Foucault himself abandoned thispromising track. When one reads the summaries of his courses at the Col-lege de France (1989b), it is noticeable that the word "life" does not evenappear in the 1975-1976 lectures (as if the questions of power and warwere much more relevant for him), and that after a suspension of his teach-ing for one year he returns with a new intellectual project on govern men-tality developed in the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 lectures. Here, "life"is completely absent-even from the exhaustive thematic indexes (2004a;2004b). At the beginning of Securite, Territoire, Population (2004a) heseems to give life a last chance, in an unnecessarily modest way: "This yearI would like to begin the study of something that I have called, in an idleway, biopower." In fact, he rapidly moves toward something else: govern-mentality. Two years later, he concludes the summary of Naissance de laBiopolitique (2004b) by saying: "What should be studied now is the way inwhich the specific problems of life and population have been posed withinthe technology of government." However, in the following courses, he willnever come back to life, so to speak. Even Le Gouvernement des Vivants in1979-1980 is nOt, contrary to what the title suggests, about life and living


beings but about confession and regimes of truth. So the intellectuall~ov~from biopower to governmentality is not only a shift ~ron:~ centra IZ~

conception of power to a fragmented vision of technologies, It ISalso a shiftfrom life to populations. . d

One could thus say that a whole tradition of works on biopower anbio olitics is based if not on an erroneous, at least on a divergent readingof $oucaulr's proje~t. This is probably what is meant "by the recent changef di f "biopolitics" to "politics of life itself (Rose 2007). Under° war mg ro~ " end is toward the life sciences

this new heading, however, the mam tr ., a ds cells(Franklin 2000) and thus life as "Ie vivant,"lIl Canguilhem s w Ir -(D

. . I My point here IS that governmenta rty eanand genes, to put It simp y. ... differ-1999) could help us revisit the politics of life by Introduclnghtdwfofvery f

. What 'ISbeing done to living beings throug I erenr ormsent questions: f d i th s pro-of government? Whar sort of life is imPhlichitlytaken 0; ~;:n:~dl~mp;ies an

Th C "has to do Wit t e matter a ,cess? e nrst question d tion has to do with the mean-interrogation on inequality. The secon que~l I itirnacy Prolonging Can-ing of life, and involves an interrogation o~d ;~:sg~~y tha; the explorationsguilhem's syntactic invesnganonvone C~U(I·· b ings) on the one hand,

11 "les vivants IVlJ1g ei ,I suggest actua y concern . h h h nd Both meanings cannotand "I'etre en vie" (being alive), ~In t ~e~; (~i~e; ex~erience)-at least if webe separated from the last term: ,: vecu" (Das 2007) of the people whosedo not renounce listening to the VOiceslife we study.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

. d d version of an earlier paper published byThis text is a revised and a apte . . of Montreal as "La Biopoli-the Department of Sociology at rh~i~~I~~:i~rOgie et Societes, 2006, 38(2):rique n'esr pas une Polirique de la Otero and the editors of the journal for32-47. I am grateful to Marcelo. I irh extensive modifications,

... bli ton m this va urne, WIauthorizing Its repu rca I. di f their suggestions.and to Thomas Lemke and his co-e itors or

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10 The Birth of Lifestyle PoliticsThe Biopolitical Managementof Lifestyle Diseases in theUnited States and Denmark

Lars Thorup Larsen

From the 1970s onwards, most Western countries began to amend theirhealth care policies to give a much higher priority to preventive efforts.Although this preventive turn initially aimed to limit the need for medicaltreatment technology, whose advance was thought to have stopped, mostcountries have now developed public health policy into a parallel field ofintervention alongside the medical system. This major shift from treatmentto prevention is typically referred to as the "New Public Health" (Petersenand Lupton 1996), and includes a whole new range of targets, approaches,knowledge forms and professions involved in health care provision. Con-stant across these multiple policies and contexts, however, is the overallgoal. Practically all contemporary public health policies target the connec-tion between the rise in lifestyle diseases, primarily cancer and coronaryheart disease, and forms of human behavior, i.e., smoking, drinking, poor

diet and a lack of physical exercise.The objective in this chapter is to characterize how lifestyle diseases have

COme to be seen as a political problem, which is more than a simple reRec-tion of the underlying epidemiological phenomenon. Instead of looking atthe statistical prevalence of various diseases, the chapter focuses on thepolitical interpretation by which governments attempt to make the problemmanageable. Most countries struggle to turn the problem of lifestyle dis-eases into specific policies, and in order to document the implicit rational-ization of this process the contribution looks at how the category of lifestyleis conceptualized in the relevant policy documents. The article focuses onDenmark and the United States, because rheir health care systems are suf-ficiently different to produce an inreresting comparison in the field of publichealth. The main question is: how do Danish and American public healthprograms choose to conceptualize the essential category of lifestyle? Howdo these documents define what lifestyle is in terms of health, and how dothe different conceptions of lifestyle interact with technologies designed to

....

202 Lars Thorup Larsen

influence individual lifestyle behavior? Answering these empirical questionsshould give us an indication of what I tentatively term "lifestyle politics,"which can be defined as the strategies employed by political authorities toCOunter the rise in lifestyle diseases, including their understanding of thelifestyle category and the technologies employed.

Another reason for focusing on lifestyle conceptions is theoretical. Thecategory of lifestyle in public health policy provides a good entry into someof the essential conceptual debates surrounding the work of Michel Fou-cault, in particular regarding biopolitics and governmentality. This chapterdraws upon both concepts, and explains how they can be analyzed andunderstood today. Borh concepts are extremely broad, not only in Fou-cault's various treatments but also in the complex bodies of literature theyhave given rise to. Instead of trying to tie all the loose ends together, itis necessary to indicate their specific association with the chapter's mainargument about the political management of lifestyle.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section presents thetheoretical concepts of biopolitics and govern mentality, though it does notattempt to provide a thorough account of their historical backgrounds anddedicated bodies of literature. The question is rather how biopolitics andgovern mentality have related to the problem of managing lifestyle diseasessince the 1970s. The theoretical section ends with a shorr discussion onthe concept of lifestyle and with a few methodological rellections on whatguides the empirical study. The empirical section is broken into three suc-cessive phases, corresponding to the intervals at which the public healthprograms were published. The Danish documents date from 1977, 1989and 1999, while their American counterparts are from 1979, 1990 and2000 respectively. Both Countries reveal a similar development of a moresophisticated conception of lifestyle. As the analysis will demonstrate, thedevelopment of elaborate conceptions of lifestyle and the techniques toregulate lifestyles often come at the expense of a dedicated focus on healthmatters. In both countries, the more comprehensive lifestyle conceptions inthe later stages tend to become more and more detached from the questionof health and instead turn into moral issues around general problems con-cerning the conduct of life.

1. BlOrOLITICS, CaVERN MENTALITY AND LIFESTYLE

While they originate in the same period of Foucault's work and even in someof the same books (Foucault 2007; 2008a), the concepts of biopolitics andgovernmentality are rarely used directly together for empirical purposes.They also have slightly different functions in this contribution. Biopoliticsis a descriptive term for policies and technologies aiming to optimize thebiological life of the population, whereas govern mentality takes aim not atthe population as such but at the modes of governing including forms of

The Birth of Lifestyle Politics 203

h . lone form of biopolitics, hi ay that t ere IS on ysubjectivarion. T IS IS not to s I' but rather that even if they shareand only one type of governmenta llty, d i Foucault's 1978 and 1979 lee-

f h ' ealogy as out me In fsome parts 0 t err gen ., h 'I perspectives. One ocuses

h less distinct t eorettca rttures they are nevert e I' and the other ret leers on' h bi I ' I life of the popu anon, Ion optimizing t e iotogica .' h lth matters but in genera.

bjects not Just In ea b dthe best way to govern su , ' " d rnmentality are oun to" I I I bJOpolltJcs an gove II d " dAt the ernpmca eve" f pie the so-ca e rneo-

I ' This ISbecause, or exam, , ' Ib 'intersect at severa points. I t of both rationalltles-a eitical police" was pivotal in the deve ehensr blic health programs such

S' 'I I om pre ensive pu " Ifor different reasons. rrru ar y, c b d to contain both biopoliticaI d i this chapter are oun I' f howas those ana yze 10 I . d ental rations ities or

, , ' of life an governm h I h licystrategies of optimization rhier life. At the outset, public ea t po I

to get individuals to live a heal h nalysis will demonsrrate, ItSis mainly a biopolitical regime, but as '. e a ecred by new governmental

d d h s been Inters 'I h 'development in recent eca es a h ry little to do with hea t 111I h may ave ve htechnologies. In rhernse ves, t ese h ay the welfare state regulates t e

b ' incipally abour t e w bi I othera strict sense, eing pnn ff th responsibility of su jeers. n,behavior of individuals and a ects di e might not only refiect a biopo-words, the politicization of lifestyle ~s:;~;~s of the population, but also alitical ambition to improve the h~:~t with the way individuals govern thel~governmental technology concer k the form of critical normative reflecown lifestyle. The latter often ta e~ h racter should be governed, whichtions on how society and its m.ora ca. with the biopolitical irnpera-

. Inflict or renstonmayor may not rnvo ve a co .

tive to optimize life., ' e ulace individual lifestyles directly,It is difficult, if not Impossible, to r hg etical rension between the tWO

and this complication illustrates the t iirical disconnect between lifestylepoles. One can perhaps explaIn the em~lic by looking at the connecnondiseases and lifestyle-onented health :ernn;ental technologies. Most of thebetween biopolitical strategies and ~o 'bing how the lifestyle conceptlon~empirical section is thus dev:~~i~ ~ea~~r~rograms indicate the influence 0

in Danish and Amencan P I hnologies. ,specific biopolitical or governmentt .tec of the tWO main theoretical c~t~-

If we look at the initial formu ath"on , 'ng the political nature of pu IC. . g pOint for t eonZI b' as It wascepts, an obVIOUS startlO , f biopolitics, or IOpower

health policy is Foucault s concept 0 e t itself has now become a focusinitially termed (Foucault 199

d8

R),The2cOoOn~.tarsen 2007), not least bCeeause

b' w an ose, d by 10rgJOof some debate (Ra InO h theoretical frameworks propose d A tonioof its uneasy adoption In t e k 2005) and Michael Hardt an nAgamben (1998; d. also Lem e , '

, 2000) d bl' health policy IS notNegrI ( h' ept of biopolitics to understan pu IC ds like a definition

USing t e conc , ' 'I e t almost soun ,a big leap in itself, since the ~nJtla co~cp;esentatiOn, biopolitics des'rattsof public health. In FOLlcaults ~r;g~na f the population has been rna e t ,ethe way in which the blologlca leo

•


object of power relations, beginning in the eighteenth century, and alwayswith the objective of optimizing life in the physical or bodily sense of theterm. In COntrast to sovereignty centered on the protection of territory anddiscipline aimed at the individual body, biopolitics targets the populationof bodies at a macroscopic level and aims to optimize its biological prop-erties. Foucault sometimes also characterizes discipline as one pole of abiopolitical continuum between the individual body at the micro level andthe population or species at the macro level (1998: 139).

Foucault's main historical claim is that modern welfare states have beenpervaded by a vast array of biopolitical strategies, ranging from urbandevelopment and health care to working-class living conditions (Foucault2000a). Since the concept was originally used to characterize the popula-tion-centered power mechanisms of governmental health administrationsin the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a few qualifications will beneeded in relation to its present lise.

First, a contemporary audience might conflate the term "biological prop-erties" with more or less concrete entities such as genes, embryos or neu-rotransmitters. What defines biopolitics, however, are biological propertieson a statistical level such as fertility, mortality, demographics and sicknessrates. Second, the objective of optimizing the life of the population shouldnot only be understood in sheer quantitative terms, such as when the aimwas only to create a large army or working population. In the COurse ofthe twentieth century, the quantitative form of biopolitical optimizationbecame balanced by concerns about the quality of the population such asin the various forms of eugenics (Schmidt and Kristensen 1986).

Parallel with his interest in biopolitics Foucault also developed the con-cept of governmentality, beginning in his 1978 and 1979 lectures at theCollege de France (2007, 2008a). While aiming to decenter the stale insti-tutional categories of the period's state theories (Lemke 2007), he coinedthe term governmentality to characterize the various ways in which theprocess of governing men has been rationalized over time. In order not toconfuse this perspective with the actual institutions of government, Fou-cault defined the activity of governing as the "conduct of conduct" (2000b).This indicates a fundamental homology between the government of the selfand of others (Foucault 2008b), although both the specific ideas that haveoccupied these categories and their relative significance have varied consid-erably throughout the genealogy of governmentality.

Much has been written on the various historical stages in the long gene-alogy of modern govern mentality (Senellart 1995; Lemke 1997), but theconcept has also led to a considerable body of literature on recent changesin govern mentality, in particular in analyses of neoliberal reforms of West-ern welfare states (Foucault 2008a; Rose 1999; Dean 1999; Barry et al.1996). The most important aspect of govern mentality in this chapter is notneoliberalism, but rather the underlying crisis of govern mentality in the1970s to which neoliberals also responded. Foucault used the term "state


. .. I ttitude towards state regulation an,dphobia" to characterize the crmca

08a

. 76-78). He originally ascribed this. . h ar period (20 a. . > . h. _planning in [ e posrw . h roralitar ianism In t e rrn me

. . h ociared the state wtt h Iphobia to CfltICS w 0 ass b h h skipped forward to t e we -diare aftermath of World War II, ut

he t e:red the decades in between,

. . f the 1970s He t us ign . lIyfare state cnnque 0 . . I· f h welfare state was pracnca

h h th and ranona ity 0 t e . Iduring whic t e grow 5 hobia is nevertheless an essennaundisputed across Western Europe: tabte p . g in the 1970s, and it is not

> > f If ratIonalities egmnm > > h recharacteristic 0 we are such but designates a situation w eidentical to welfare retrenchment as I > > t or effective mode of govern-

I seen as a egmma e h ..state hierarchy is no anger. icall been framed as t e ens IS oring. In a European context, this h:seltra~e sta~e (Oonzelot 1991; 1996), buteven several different cnses of the d rnmentality is similarly appli-the underlying critique of state-basle> . gove

f Ametican po ItICS. . thiscable in the context 0 . . s ever "real" is less important InWhether the welfare state cnsis wa . h ublic health policies have. . r is to notice ow P

context because the rnam pOlO 1 tall"deas about how to govern, f h e govern menbeen influenced by some 0 t es > uments about how not to gov·as well as the by the crit.iques .mvo.l~l~~i:~~ntexrthat tensions can Decll,rern (Foucault 1996). It IS mainly I > ize life and governmental err-

I>· I' erative to optmu h f theirbetween the biopo Itlca. Imp. d overnmentality share muc 0

tiques of paternalism. BlOpolitics an g >1 in conflict with each other. Ind are not necessafl Y 1 h d en gov-genealogy, however, an h 19791ecrures Foucault said t at mo; d

fact, in both the 1978 and t e com lex interplay between> ree omernmentalities are charactenzed by ~ > ~o the problem of scarcity In theand security, which he discusse:~~ ;~;~~~:5-66). This dynamic stil! e~:~~seighteenth century (2007: 48-: ' he 1970s) but rather than scarcity, . hin the period analyzed here (since t osire problem of affluence, whic _style diseases are now related ro the op~ security a different edge. It eregives the interplay between freed:m a; -phobic affinities of contemporaryates a potential tension between It e stla e bitions of public health programs

> . d the blOPO Itlca amgovernrnentaliries an . d "\ .to regulate individuallifestylesIn eta~~nce t of lifestyle, which ISthe sub-

It is finally necessary to c1anfy the. Pan analytical term like blopolid-ddt function as h tanject of the chapter an oes no h· torical background to t e concep k

tics or governmentality. TherefISabllshealth which is also part of thhedbac -

> > h field 0 pu IC , > bl· healt ocu-its integratIOn IntO t e r festyle conceptions In pu ,Ie 1 ptground to the present focus o~:nltified the invention of the lifesty e cho::~;hYments. Although some have I of lifestyle diseases and un>wirh the epidemiological phebnom

fenodnl11classical sociological teactlons to

., 's to e oun I I by economiCbehavior, its real ongln ~ I·fe atterns are determined so e y> he birththe Marxian assertlon t at I p) ., ue of Marx on thiS pomt, t d

.. I Partly based on Veblen s cntlqb

d Weber's theory of clas.s anpOSItion. .. I! attfl ute to I ' yofof the lifestyle concept IS typlca does have an impact upon peop e s w~oustatus. Economic class POSition their belonging to a particular status g Plife, Weber argues, but so does

•


that share valorizations of honor and social esteem partly based on educa-tion. By bringing together considerations of income, occupation, educationand status, Weber formulated a holistic conception of lifestyle which waslater developed into a broader sociology of education and social status,probably most clearly in the work of Pierre Bourdieu.

After the early conceptual development in sociology, a much more indi-vidualized concept of lifestyle emerged in the 1920s in the personalitypsychology of Alfred Adler, who understood it as the subjectively deter-mined goal-directedness of a person's action. During the 1950s and 1960sboth the psychological and the sociological concepts existed alongsideeach other, with the latter being applied descriptively to characterize spe-cific social groups, as in "working-class lifestyle," "suburban lifestyle,"and so on. Common ro all these lines of development is a more or lessholistic conception of man, in the sense that the scholarly interest in life-style serves to reject a purely mechanical view in which human motivationplays no role.

It was not until the 1970s that the lifestyle concept entered the socio-medical field and became synonymous with individual risk factors suchas smoking, drinking, indulgence and a sedentary way of life. During thisrelatively brief period, the meaning of the term was transformed from itsholistic and social uses to designate instead certain forms of irresponsibleindividual behavior. Since then, the field of public health has been domi-nated by various types of individualistic conceptions of lifestyle as exempli-fied in the following analysis, but a more socially oriented counter-streamhas persisted within the subdiscipline of social medicine. This tendencycriticizes public health policies for reducing complex social patterns of life-style to an atomistic understanding of individual behavior in which every-thing is perfectly modifiable.'

It is worth specifying the added value of a Foucauldian analysis as some-thing distinct from the juxtaposition between individualistic and socialconceptions of lifestyle. Both of these camps seem to take for grantedthat lifestyle is a thing in itself which can be unambiguously defined, andthey also share the identification of lifestyle with health and prevention.Seen from the point of view of Nietzschean genealogy, however, historicalconcepts have no essence, which means that an analysis of the associa-tion between lifestyle and public health policy should focus on strategiesemployed to change lifestyles in a "healthy" direction. The dual Foucaul-dian perspective of biopolitics and govern mentality stresses the importanceof political technologies in the formation of such lifestyles, which meansthat a whole layer of health-promoting technologies need to be dissectedto extract their built-in conception of lifestyle and health. It is not only aquestion of choosing a position on a continuum between individualistic andsocial conceptions of lifestyle, but of demonstrating that the complexity oftechnologies employed to regulate lifestyle is much more informative that asimple continuum would suggest.


The ana lyrical strategy that I will employ in the foll~wing ~nalY;~ ofpublic health programs draws on the general concept

f0 ge~e: o~~uc:u~;

It 2000c) and specifically on its use in rhe history 0 sexua I y (cau, " bi h pear to have a mate-1998) Both sexuality and lifestyle are 0 jeers t at ap . . I d Irial f~undation, but as soon as you try to disse~t. the hlstor.lCa eve op-

f . b hind rhem their substance disintegrates Into a web ofment a meanings e .' h the e istemological point heresocial relation~ anhd rec~nol~711~;~s~:I:~~ health: or unhealthy, because itlS not to r~ve~ v: at a rea rhodolo ical question, then, is not If theis nor a thing In Itself. The key me g f a healthy lifestyle or how itdocuments usei ~ere revea~ rh~et:::r ~~:~r;e;resent conceptions of lifestylecan be achieve , rut mstea w N h t we should expect to find apolitics in a public health contexlt. °ht

t a e of these health documents.. I .f cept of lifesty e at t e cor . d.

smg e, urn orm con . that ublic healrh policy in this perio ISThe argument, on the contrary, lSI P d between different conceptionsbursting with inner tensions and o~s~ en .~cation of lifestyle diseases andof lifestyle, which makes the genera I enn

. I· II the more conspicuous. Ipreventive po ICy seem a ." between the lifestyle conceptions in t te

In other words, the van.atlon hi' portant because its epistemo-different policy documents IS per aps ess 1m. d dentity The same can be

.. ti lIy to reject a perceive I .logical function IS essen ra "Th idea is not to uncover

h f country companson. esaid about t e use 0 cross- h h I h f Danes and Americans, but toany deeply hidden truths about t e ea tOt ms of health care system

if tI different countnes m er I·argue that I two vas Y . . erience similar ideas of lifestyle po l-and demographical composinon e;p di t reflection of rhe actual healthtics, these policies are unlikely to .e a Ihr~cchapter focuses on the concep-. . I' th adding that since t IS iblSituation. t IS wor .f 1 h iologies it is not POSS! e to say

tions and intended function of II es~ e rec lally work in practice.anything on this baSIS abour how t eyhactu . blic health programs in

. I .ses all r e major puThe data materia compn d b th analysis mainly focuses

hast three deca es, ut e Wh Ieach country over t e p he underlying lifesryle conception. ueon passages that clearly express t " Sl'milar in the twa coun-

hli h lth programs IS verythe chronology of pu IC ea . I h The American documentsery uneven In engt .

tries, the documents are v" I their Danish counterparts,. lost ten times as ong as .

are 10 some cases am. "he following presentations.which accounts for a slight Imbalance In t

2 LIFESTYLE CHOICE AS THE ANTIDOTETO AN AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1977-1988)

k d the United States (like. .' 'd -I e 1970s, Denmar an .Beglllmng m the ml -to at h d h· first policy programs to

/ .) launc e r elf dother Western states countnes I"· such as cancer an car-. I'f I lated camp IcatlOnS . .. .counter the surge Jl1 I esty e-re ."" behind these initiatiVes

" urce of inSpiration d'diovascular diseases. A major so . the Health of Cana wns.I dAN PerspectIVe allwas the document tit e ew

208 Lars Thortlp Larsen

authored by the Canadian Health Minister, Marc Lalonde, in 1974. Thisdocument argued that because the advance of medicine had come to ahalt, governments needed to "get into the business of modifying humanbehavior" (Lalonde 1974: 36). Within the broader framework of what hecalled the "health field" approach, Lalonde urged health policy to focuson lifestyle defined as " ... the aggregation of decisions by individualswhich affect their health and over which they have more or less contro!." Atanother point in the publication, lifestyle is also associated with "destruc-tive habits" and especially the term "self-imposed risks" (Lalonde 1974:16). lifestyle is thus seen as something falling under the choice, control orat least decision-making of the individual, but other than that, the categoryin itself is pretty vague.'

The belief in the potential of individual lifestyles also has a generalfuncrion in the broader biopolitical strategy of public health policy. BothLalonde and almost all of the early public health documents from Den-mark and the US express a diminished belief in the progress of science ingeneral, and of course of medicine in particular. Instead, their hope is thatany progress in the population's health will come from the healthy choicesof individuals. They are remarkably optimistic about individual lifestyles,while at the same time they often mention how individuals lead "desrruc-tive lifestyles" in practice.

The focus on individual choice should not be seen in isolation, since itclearly has a connection to the macroscopic statistical view of the popula-tion's health. There is a general belief that individuals will be able to bringabout improvements in the nation's health, and the first American HealthyPeople program from 1979 directly praises the Lalonde report for bringingattention to the importance of individual lifestyle in that context (DHEW1979a: Ch. 1: 9-10). It is not without significance that an American publichealth program gives direct credit to its Canadian counterpart, given thatthe latter country has a universal health care system while the US does nothave an integrated national health care system for all its citizens. The politi-cal context for this homage might be that in the late 1970s, the US govern-ment was planning to introduce some version of universal health care. Forexample, the forward plans for health for the years 1976 and 1978 bothcontain major sections entitled "Preparing for National Health Insurance"and also mention that prevention is necessary for cost containment in thefuture (DHEW 1974: 1,7; 1978).

Apart from the brief associarion between prevention and the health caresystem, there are surprisingly few references to the political context in prac-tically all the documents examined. In most cases, it is argued that the pre-vention of unhealthy lifestyles is "an idea whose time has come" (DHEW1979a: Ch. 1: 5) Or something similarly vague. Much more attention is gen-erally given to the "how" of lifestyle management than to the "why," notonly on the individual but also on the population level. Like the LalonderepOrt, the American Healthy Peal' Ie program says that it is in fact not the


If b he " gation" of individual choicesindividual lifestyle choice itse , ut t e er ned ith Regulating the aggre-that ublic health policy should be concerne ,Wit . uires agatiO~ of individual lifestyle choices is not a simple gestu

lre, but req n The

' f hi' n and ItS rnter na composmc .thorough understanding ate popu auo h d d i Healthy Peoplefollowing passage indicates the general approac a ~pte I~regulation.as a way of making the lifestyles of Amencans an a lect a

, I f S h day Adventists and moving toSimply by adopting the lIfest0~ a . e':sn~o~ld ensure for their children anthe Rocky Mountain States, I' IC!tlZ~ethan half the national average, andincidence of cancer that was 1[[ e:o b b orning Mormons and migrat-they could do almost as well as: ISel Ylt ~; perfectly reasonable for us toing to Utah, or by migrating toldsra

h,' much reduction of cancer by

h f e that we cou ac ieve as hi dassume, t ere or , . di . r forebearers [sic] ac ieve. . reventlve me rcme as au ,appropnate steps in p. ' bli health And the exercise IS re-for infectious diseases by ImprovmgdPu I~ r e~vironment distinguishally to find out exactly which ingre rents in °UUth or the Jews and Arabs

h dAd tists the Mormons in a, ,the Sevent - ay ,ven I, . C lifornia ll1inois, or Pennsylvania.in Israel, from their counterparts I~ :979a' C'h. 10: 3)(DHEW 1979b: 165; d. also DHE .

, ' at ani because it establishes a general con-This quotation IS remarkable, n y di b t also because it under-

lif I nd health con mons, u I ' ,nection between I esty e a , fi 'I difiable. The popu anon slb' a Imost rn rute y rna I bl

stands lifestyles as emg, . e rated statistical matrix that pu IClifestyle appears almost like an mt g 'each individual character-

, ' analyze by extraCtIng h bhealth administrators can Thi ge does not say muc a out, , h they see fit. IS passa 'h hIStiC and then c ange as f d "simply," indicates t at sue

II d hi but the rst wor, I, hhow to actua y 0 trns, . I one could even argue r at. hi h In rbeorenca terms, ,

changes are Wit m reac . h lif I s of Americans, this concep-bi ' change tel esry e , hdespite the am ItIOn to. tal rationality saying ow to

tion of lifestyle lacks a substantial gO,vernmde:s not address the basic ques-, h h For examp e, It 0

accomplish sue c anges. I hoi f individualstion of how to govern the [ifesry e c Olce

lso. that it is not an entirely, h' tta passage IS c

Another thing to note m t ISess~n d d critique of public health pol-atomistic approach to lifestyle, as t e stba.n.ar nderstand or at least iden-

II resses the am l[lon to u d d gicy claims. It actua y ex~ S within the population~ epen Intify the lifestyles of vanous subgroup d . ['on While lifestyles are

I . d religiOUS enomllla I . I I hon geographical ocatlon an "I a healthy or an un lea t y'fi . I groupS haVing elt ler , d

identified with speC! c SOCIa h I'festyles are solely onente, loyed to c ange I 'ffway of life the strategies emp h ts [0 change dl erences

, I h People t us attemp ,towards individuals. Hea t y " d' 'd alized health promotion

. , s by usmg m IVI u , d Iin lifestyle among SOCia group h document goes IIltO more etal, A I ssage m t e same "d I I'f ties ItInstruments. ater pa d 'nfluence indlVI ua I es y .about what technology might hbe lu~e t~ las a sort of dietetic regime thatcharacterizes the desired healt y I esty e

, f I ' pie living tules:conSiSts 0 severa Slm

•


A series of studies in Alameda County, California, showed substantialincreases in the life spans of people who exercise vigorously and regu-larly, maintain normal weight, ear breakfast, do not snack betweenmeals, avoid smoking, limit alcohol consumption, and sleep at leastseven hours a night. A 45-year-old man who followed three or fewer ofthese seven health habits could, on the average, expect to live to age 67.If he followed six or seven, he could expect to live to age 78. Womenwho had such habits also lived longer than women who didn't. (DHEW1979b: 425-426)

As this passage demonstrates, the Healthy People program approaches themanagement of lifestyles in the form of simple and healthy living rules.These living rules should be seen in the context of their negative coun-terparts, i.e., the detrimental lifestyle characteristics said to have causedthe rise in lifestyle diseases. The problematization of unhealthy lifestylesis sometimes spelled out in very specific forms of behavior, in particularsmoking, drinking, overeating and a lack of physical exercise. In other con-texts, such as a passage immediately following the one quoted previously, abroader, cultural dimension is blamed. The document lists the major obsta-cles of improving one's health, and in second place comes: " ... the afflu-ent, self-indulgent, frequently violent American lifestyle" (DHEW 1979b:426). Here, the term lifestyle is clearly used in a derogatory sense to critique"American" lifestyle as such, and this type of implicit cultural critique hasalso been the target of critical remarks in the public health literature due toits reductionist approach (Coreil, Levin and Gartley Jaco 1985: 428).Although the reference to American lifestyle expands the perspective of

lifestyle management beyond the individual, it does not provide much morein terms of what governmental technology can be applied to govern suchaspects of the national lifestyle. For example, it does not really specify howthe government should get individuals to move from self-indulgence to thesimple living rules, nor for that matter does it say how individuals are sup-posed to live according to such rules.The healthy living habits advocated here might not sound particularly

demanding compared to many health philosophies that exist today and canbe much more stringent, but consider how much it would take for them tobe adopted by an entire population. For example, can any parent justifiablydemand seven hours of sleep every night or forbid their children to ever eatbetween meals when they are really hungry? Even a short list of guidelinescan be extremely difficult to uphold and monitor if everyone has to live bythem all the time, and how do you design a public policy intervention to reg-ulate sleep or snacking between meals? Apart from brief remarks about pass-ing out information, lifestyle counseling and teaching the individual what ishealthy, the lack of actual governmental technologies is quite remarkable;indeed, the public health programs of each country seem to recognize this(Sundhedsprioriteringsudvalget 1977: 30; DHEW 1979b: 431).


The Danish public health program from 1977 is even less concrete rhan.' h it comes to devising specific mmanves,Its Amencan counterpart w en I . . hPart of this is due to the limited knowledge base on preventl:n~r~~~:~deDanish document mainly recognizes what IS known I~Ot to

. .. d I t 1977· 277) Another reason IS that the programhedspnontenngsu va ge .. d f d on the overall

d f d i onse to a parliamentary man ate ocuse .was fa te In resp h lif I d revennon was. .. f h h lth care sector. Althoug I esty e an ppnonnes 0 t e ea . d h document focusesabsent from the original, parlIamentary man ate, r e k .

. . on how rhe Danish health care sector can ta e a major

~~;tt~~:sr~~t:n~l:entive approach (Sundh~dsprio;it~;;~~~::t:lgs~~;:;:~11). The shift is mainly presentedas a nbewc ~Ice 0 :hat of the :est of rheoverall biopolitical strategy IS said to e SImi ar tohealth care secror:

d I of the health care sector hasThe objective of the previous eve opment lation as much as pos-been to better the health condltlo~lof the :S°:r"aid to the individual insible and to provide the best POSSI e mefa d ed medical or techni-

. f I by means a a vanecase of illness, or examp e f hi . ion have no intention to

. Th osals 0 t IS comrrussrcal assistance. e prop di t of the means to continu-

h b ely suggest an a jusrmenchange tat, ut mer .. f h Harts of the health care sec-ously realize this natur~l objective or t e.e 4

tor. (Sundhedspriorirenngsudvalget 1977. 52)

. f lifesr Ie diseases is motivated by tWOThe shift towards the preventlonho I Y efforts in the area of preven-

. h d ent says t at prevIous . hfactors. First, t e ocum d d omewhat in contrast Wit. b h t 0 modest. Secon , an snon have een muc 0 .,,' ce" seems to suggest that nof ., I' that previous expenen hthe rsr pomt, It calms . d h h treatment technology, althougmajor health gams can be achieve t roug f (5 ndhedsprioriteringsudval-

h hi xpenence consists 0 u h I hit is unclear w at t IS e I " " that the greatest ea tTh .ssion mere Y assumes .

get 1977: 51). e cornrru f . g lifestyle diseases, but despiteb hi d by means 0 pteventm . . I .gains can e ac reve . f id ce base this pnncip e IS. . . . . t to budd on a rm eVI en , .. h

their initial com rmtrnen h t re of preventive action In t esubsequently abandoned due to t \ve:~d~:l uet 1977: 26).area of lifestyle (Sundhedsptlofltefl g gt mological problems related

. . t discusses two epls e .The comnusston repor . I di nd health polIcy 111 gen-. h to lifesty e rsea ses a

to the preventive approac . " which is that no one canh . "d ·Iemma of preventIOn, f li f Ieral. First, t ere IS a If' action in the area 0 I esry e

h efficacy 0 preventive Iever fully documenr t e 77. 265). Intervention and resu ts are(Sundhedsprioritenngsudvalget 19.. . d hether changes in health

f hat it is impossible to JlI ge w d hoften so ar apart t at I h h form of prevention. Secon ,t .estatus were actually caused by t e IC

Idos:n adox of prevention," which IS

I di s the so-ca e pardocument a so iscusse h ibilities of treatment seem to. f II ." ly when t e pOSSI I I h d .characterized as 0 ows. on. . ntion arise" (Sund e Spfl-. g Il1terest 111 preve .

have dried up does a growm d I· ·,n choosing a preemptive. . 7. 264) The para ox lesoflteflngsudvalget 197 . .

..


strategy as the very last instance, hut the alleged paradox also appears tobe in conflict with a later argument saying that" ... at all times, there hasbeen agreement that it is better to prevent than to cure" (Sundhedsprioriter-ingsudvalget 1977: 272). One thing stands out clearly from this discussion,even if the connection to individual lifestyle changes is relatively remote. Ageneral association is made between the general shift towards preventionand societal changes over time, which is also present in the contemporaryAmerican document-albeit in a slightly different fashion.

In the US, the officially stated reason for shifting health policy prioritiesfrom treatment to prevention was also the rise in lifestyle diseases. The risein lifestyle diseases is understood as a descriptive characteristic of the aver-age population's way of living after World War II. As we can see in boththe long passages from the American program (on Seventh-day Adventistsand on simple living rules), the distinction between lifestyles character-ized as healthy and those deemed unhealthy corresponds to a difference inmodernization.

The idealized subcultures are precisely the ones where the typical char-acteristics of middle-class post-industrial urban America have not yetundermined the simple life, i.e., a way of living with less convenience,affluence and self-indulgence than in the big cities and suburbia. In asimilar passage, Healthy People also says that lifestyle diseases are causedby the many "excesses" of American life ranging from overeating to driv-ing too fast (DHEW 1979a: 2-3). We saw the same idealization of simplelifestyles in the descriptive view quoted previoulsy, but now it comes witha built-in choice. This gives the impression that the development of life-style diseases in the entire population can easily be reversed by meansof a biopolitical strategy where individuals make healthy choices almostautomatically.

The focus on simple living rules is underdeveloped technologically onanother main point, because it gives the impression that a healthy lifestyleis chosen once and for all. Later and more comprehensive developments inlifestyle politics have underlined the importance of a continuous mode ofhealth education where individuals ate brought to reevaluate a lot of ele-ments in their life continuously, weigh healthy elements against unhealthyones, and make healthy choices again and again. This is only vaguely rec-ognized in the first Healthy People program, it seems, but becomes impor-tant later. One must not only live a healthy life and do so by choice, butthe choice must be the result of a conscious and rigorous process where theindividual weighs information and is able to express the healthy choices ina rational fashion. Leading a healthy lifestyle thus requires the individualto have a certain critical attitude toward his/her own actions, This passagefrom the first Danish public health program, the 1977 commission reporton new priorities in health care, indicates this aspect more clearly than itsAmerican counterpart:


It is remarkable how poorly most people are able to express rhem-

selves and recognize that what happens to the~ ~1'~"h~l:e~~e~;I~ :~~~res onse to something; [It IS likewise remar a

:re a~le to make decisions and adjust to the chang~sthat seem:~ ~~. h ros erous society. Such human qua rues ap~ear

along Wit a p p . f health (Sundhedsprioritenngsudval-decisive for the preservatIon ° 'get 1977: 275)

. din the content of a healthyWhile the ~reviousqu.ota.tlOnS fO~~;;ere:;~~~~tatiOnthat focuses on cer-lifestyle, this passage indicates a I. d f . dividual in order to achieve

h I·· een to be require 0 an Inrain uman qua ities s . I d formal conception. h I h I·f style It ISa more genera anand maintain a ea t y rrestvte. ". . nd the focus on choice,

of lifestyle than both the simplehdescrhlPtivl ehVle:da what is not. Leading a. d t tell you w at IS ea t y a d

because It Des no f f b' rivarion since it boils ownlif I involves a orm 0 su lec, .healthy I esty e now I b ith the help of this policy.. f h re or can ecorne WI . d ito a question 0 .w 0 you a t ublic health policy in this early peno IS

The main point here ISnot tha Pd. Wh t is perhaps most significantsplit between entirely separate parla 19mhs. a

rlypublic programs is how

h t of lifesry e In t ese eaabout t e managemen. he have about lifestyle and lifestyle man-few and underdeveloped Ideas t y. di the documents only contain

A h ious passages In reate,agement. s t e previ h lif le is plus a strategy to counter

I n t' ns on w at I e5ty e I , . .very few genera renee 10 , h to put these strategies into. . lif I di es Reflections on ow . ifthe rise In I esty e iseas '. d h this is the most sigm cant" l eXistent an per aps I .

practice are a most non- N . h the Danish nor the Americancharacteristic of these document'[or ~:,~rto govern the lifestyles of indi-program develop any technology f few negative Ideas about

I· bgroups Apart rom avi duals or popu anon su . b d ystern these documentsditi I treatrnent- ase s, hthe deficiencies of the tra mona . I·· l id which says that healt. ltd biopo \tIca I ea .seem to build on an una r ncu a e d I . blem of lifestyle diseases. t wi II follow once the un er ymg proIrnprovemen s . .has been identified in statistical terms.

Y AND THE LIMITS3 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITTO GOVERNING LIFESTYLE (1989-1998)

h xt set of major public health pro-If we move forward a decade to t e n~ I developed into a more com-grams the field of preventive health po IcyT,has . a clear refinement in the

, d mdICators. ere IS , bprehensive set of measures an . b h I Danish Regeringens ,are yg-

h I·f tyle m ot ne .conceptual approac to I es ... 1989) and the Amencan989 (SundhedsmlI1lstenet . ._

gelsesprogram from 1 . . 990 but they still display some mterHealthy People 2000 published m I h. ' t Ilotice first about the second

I .' s One t mg 0 I dnal tensions and comp eXltle . , h ·OU5 documents ana yzeh he build on t e previgeneration is that althoug t Y

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previously, it is not very clear what has been achieved in practice. Both sec-ond-generation documents claim that previous policies have failed and lookto correct previous mistakes, but they do not specify the failures in muchdetail (Sundhedsministeriet 1989: 8; DHHS 1990: vii). In other words, thedevelopment of a more comprehensive technology of regulating lifestyle isnot based on practical experience. It is rather a new interpretation of thelifestyle concept and its place within a regime of political regulation that isthe context of lifestyle politics at the end of the 1980s"

The American document Healthy People 2000 stresses the need for per-sonal responsibility much more emphatically than irs predecessor. It soundslike a classic Enlightenment argument, saying that the individual should useknowledge to take control of his or her own "health destiny" (DHHS 1990:v). The subsequent chapter on "shared responsibilities" in public healthemphasizes that the political management of lifestyle is the responsibilityof the individual:

The individual is both the starting point and the ultimate target of thecampaign towards Healthy People 2000 ( " . " )"The first role we mustall undertake is responsibiliry for Own personal health habits ( " " " ).Measurable decreases in risks to healrh can result from changes in diet,exercise, tobacco use, alcohol and drug use, injury prevention behavior,and sexual habits, but each of us must choose to make these changes apersonal priority"(DHHS 1990: 85)

As in the previous passage about simple living rules, this text does notclarify what should be given a lower priority in order to give first prior-ity to health, such as social relations or taking responsibility for others"There are sections on the responsibilities of family, community, profes-sionals, media and government in the same chapter of the 1990 program,but these appear to be secondary to the responsibility of the individual(DHHS 1990: 85-88). The obvious paradox is of course that this form oflifestyle management depends so strongly on individual choice, but leaveslittle or nothing for the individual to decide since it is decided in advancewhat the outcome of the choice should be. The quoted passage not onlyobliges us ro consider healthy change, it requires us to make preciselythese changes, which is in fact a very restricted definition of what consti-tures a healthy lifestyle.

Both the American Healthy People 2000 and its Danish counterpartdraw inspirarion from the 1980s debates between liberalism and commu-nitarianism, where social problems were associated with individual lack ofcommitment towards the community (cf. for example Bellah et a!. 1985)"As mentioned earlier, the overall strategy of the new public health policy isto get individuals to take more responsibility for their own health and well-being again after a period of excessive convenience and luxury" This expe-rience of loss fits perfectly with some of the communitarian critiques of


" di "dual and community, although the imbalancean imbalance between In IVI for example j the following statement:

I " derplayed or examp e In his a so sornenrnes ~n" " h l' ith each of us, it also lies wit"While the responsibility for c ch st res w ve to make responsibilityII f "(DHHS 1990: 58)" Sue statements ser d d fi

a 0 us " tion but it is also rather vague an en-a key aspect of the lifestyle concep fro h lrh matters in a strict sense"nitely removes the lifestyle category rom e~ "ncreasetheircommitment

It is not clear how individuals are sup~ose t? I itizing their own health," hil t the same time ptlor

to the community w I e a " db" ng properly committed to theunless of course the latter IS define a~l:~ be responsible for one's com-community" Since it is techIllCallYllPohssl e h lrhy habits the conception

" , t and sti ave un ea ,muruty III some respe.c ,s" t have a more specific target. In order toof lifestyle as responsibility mus h h I h lues of rhe community, therealign individual lifestyles with t e ea f Yhva ter" among the most vul-

II f "culture 0 c aracdocument thus ca s or a new Thi ld i dicate the advent of a more

f h lation IS cou In I"nerable groups 0 r e popu ""b h realization of health po ICy" entaliry ecause tedcomprehensive governm 'd d on a stricter moral can ucr"" d being epen ent upobjectives IS presenre as

of subjects. " "a way of thinking and beingThe culture of character IS defined -h .. ". d the adoption of lifestyles

[ ] nsible be avior an fthat actively promote s respo d h I h" (DHHS 1990: v). The ocusthat are maximally conducive to goo d ~a t d ncy to break down the idea

, h revIOUSdeca e s ten e "" ".on culture oontt nues t e P d I" "human qualities, i.e., toif I" eneral un er yll1g f h I hof a healthy II estyie mto g" ' h h he does in terms 0 ea t

h h son ISthan w at e or s d di dfocus more on w 0 t e per, the expense of a e reatebiecti . ntatIOn comes at Thbehavior. The su ject.rve one les will clearly illustrate. e

h I h h ever as a fewexamp lif I borientation to ea t ,ow, iorr b en culture and 1 esty e yI" the connection erwe d "lif I1990 program exp ains f "I ly pregnancy an I esty esh chool ai ure, earreferring to problems suc as s 8)

conducive to violence" (DHHS 1990:"1 " h biopolitical optimization of, .t connection to t e

While clearly 100seIllng I s I f s assigns blame to some pop-rhe population's health status , the cu ture

hocu test danger to public health"

h lif tyleposest egrea ibiliulation subgroups w ose I es the initial responsl I Ity"I d of the 1990 program, 'bl k

In the more detal e parrs I" health stagnation on ' " "" ac s,of "all of us" qUICkly turns to ~ amll~g f wer years of educarion" (DHHSblue-collar workers, and peop e wlr" e h rl"ler period ir is not exactly

594 605) As In t e ea '"" "1990: 136; cf. also pp. - . h" an enrirely individualistic or"" h" ogram for aVIng I Iyaccurate to critICize t IS pr" h hand the document c ear"f I ptlon On t e one, " I seven atomistic II estye conce . h I"f les with specific SOCia group

I of unhealt y I esty h I k likeassociates the preva ence Th solutions to w at 00 sh d fic"enr character. e h herwho allegedly ave a e I " "I individualistic, on r e at

a social problem of lifestyle are stili e~:~~~ Ythe public health communityhand, and here rhe standard cntlque

seems to apply. "revention program, it is no~ ~s elabora~eIf we look ar the 1989 Danish p d" "d" "dual responsibillry, but thiS

, t regar lllg III IVIas its American cQunterpar

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may Just reflect the briefness of the document itself. It does, however, retaina very similar communitarian argument blaming the poor state of healthon an uneven moral balance between individual and community (Sundhed-sministeriet 1989: 8).

As the document subsequently argues, prevention must proceed fromthe idea that society cannot solve health problems stemming from the life-style of the individual (Sundhedsministeriet 1989: 11). In this understand-ing, individual responsibility for one's Own lifestyle is not only a normativeobligation, but formulated as a necessity if prevention is to function. Echo-ing the American observations on responsibility, the Danish programbegins by assigning blame for governmental failure to the individual, butthen extends this into a simple principle of governmentality, albeit a nega-tive one. It simply says that since society cannot solve individual lifestyleproblems, it should refrain from even trying to do so. What makes thisprinciple interesting theoretically is not that it is fully developed, but thatit defines the reality of individual lifestyles as a barr ier to governmentalregulation. This negative principle also raises a broader question regardingthe overall purpose of the government's public health program if it neithercan nor should try to make people healthy. In this situation, one couldargue that the governmental critique of how issues like health and lifestylecan and should be governed Comes into conflict with the biopolitical ambi-tion to optimize the population's health status. If lifestyle is conceived asfalling outside the limits of governmental reach, it also sets limits to theexercise of biopolitical power and the prospects of using it to achieve ahealthier population.

As these examples demonstrate, the concept of a healthy lifestyle issomewhat more elaborated in the middle period, particularly regardingthe political function of lifestyle for integrating individual and commu-nity. Much attention is paid to the moral side of lifestyle in this period,for instance in the strong focus on promoting individual responsibility,character and a moral balance hetween individual and community. Lirrie,however, is said about the actual content of a healthy lifestyle and even lessabout the process of realizing such a healthy state.There seems to be a general tension in this period between, on the one

hand, a set of critical governmental principles urging health authorities tolet communities improve their own health and, on the other hand, a con-tinued biopolitical ambition to improve the general health status dramati-cally. It is remarkable that the documents are most concrete on the issuesof Culture and moral character, while these have only a vague relationshipwith the inirial problem of lifestyle-related diseases. In other situations,the focus on lifestyle diseases is intact, but with no clear ideas on how toimprove anything. It is as if the "what" and the "how" are never really inperfect accordance, which again boils down to a mismatch between biopo-litical ambitions and governmental techniques.

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4. GOVERNING THE DETAILS OF EVERYDAY LIFE (SINCE 1999)

. bi ste in the creation of comprehensiveThe most recent penod marks a Ig p .' that such an approach is

I 1" t least In the recogmnon .lifestyle po icies, or a ious nubli health policies have expen-needed. It also indicates that previous pu adopt a healthy lifestyle, much

I· Is' n getting citizens to a henced very Itt e succes I . I di t the population level. at or

' h rise in lifesty e "eases a Iless in countenng ted' h meantime such as a genera

h bvi sly been rna e In t e , dadjustments ave 0 VIQll ntrjes and the slow intra uc-. ass most Western cou b

rise in CIgarette taxes,ac: h ain idea is still to improve health ytion of smoking restrlctlons, but t e m

way of individual lifestyles. I 2010 (DHHS 2002 and the conternpora-Both Amencan Healthy Peop e (S dh dsministeriet 1999) maintain

neous Danish public health program, uTnhe d so however, with a much

. . di id I responsIbilIty. ey 0, . . di id Ia hard line on In IVI ua . I' f how to intervene In In IVl uaental ranona ICy or .' dmore elaborate governm . t individual motivation an

II f h se techniques rarge , "lifestyles. Almost a 0 t e health issues directly, In a srrru-

. much as they concern I fdecisiveness Just as . . . f "human qualities" and "ell ture alar fashion to the earlier dISCUSSIOn0d A key example is the ABC ofcharacter," but now In a more foc~se20~~Ydraws from the 2000 Dietarygood nutrition that Healthy People I I tical model designed to help

, It rs a simp e ana y I , IIGuidelines for Americans. . h of a lifestyle change, especra yindividuals focus on three successive ~ aseswith regard to the prevention of obesity:

d 2 vears and older should follow" ... to stay healthy, persons ag: r fit~ess Build a healthy base, andthese ABCs for good health: Aim 0 , for a healthy weight and be

ibl T '10 for fitness, aim p dChoose sensi y. 0 a, b ild h althy base let the yramlI . h day To UI a e '. II h Iphysical y active eac . . of rains daily, especia Y woe

guide food choices; choose a vanetYd

g tables daily; and keep food, ty of fruits an vege d f tgrains' choose a vane di t that is low in saturate a

, h sibly choose a ie d f dsafe ro eat. To c oose sen " l fat: choose beverages an 00 sand cholesterol and moderate I~ tota ad' prepare foods with less salt;to moderate intake of sugars; c oose and ' "(DHHS 2002: ch.19:

. I h I do so 10 mo eranonand if consuming a co 0,

3 emphasis in original).

, h f od pyramid as, . US and Denmark, use rne ro .Several countries, mcludmg th~ut the uored passage extends the pyramida general guide for nutrition, ~ s physical exercise. More irnpor-rationale ro other lifestyle factors suc ~he actual content of the pyramid,tantly, it adds a whole new dimensron rat ro ortions, etc. The model 101-

i.e., what should be consumed 10 ~:e:d p h:' comprehensive informationtially assumes that the mdlvldual ~ ~ent of this information IS subjecton health and nutrition, but since t decodn I to do something active with It.

. I et the In lVI uato change, it is essentia to g


The individual is supposed to analyze and evaluate a wide range of detailsin his or her daily nutrition, almost to the extent that a nutrition expert orcounselor would do. Governing healthy lifestyles thus involves an attemptto improve the self-governing capacities of individuals dramarically, butsince these are difficult to specify in detail, the ABC model falls back ongeneral human qualities as a proxy for a healthy lifestyle.

As in the previous programs, it is still relatively unclear how individu-als can really use this model to guide their normal daily life. Not only is itdifficult for an individual to navigate between many types of fruit colors,fats and grains, but Healthy People 2010 is not very clear on how to reachits biopolitical goal on the macro level either. Instead, it breaks everythingdown into an endless list of partial goals with corresponding monitoringdevices and indicators. It is clearly inspired by New Public Management orsimilar management instruments designed to monitor the goal-achievementof public policies, but here applied to the detailed living habits of the entirepopulation. Here are two typical examples of policy goals, of which thereare literally hundreds:

[Goal No.] 19-5. Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 years andolder who consume at least two daily servings of fruit (target: 75 percent)

[Goal No.] 19-6. Increase the proportion of persons aged 2 yearsand older who consume at least three daily servings of vegetables, withat least one-third being dark green or orange vegetables (target: 50percent). (DHHS 2002 ch.19: 18-20)

The content of these goals is not radically different from campaigns inother countries, such as the British "5 a day" or the Danish "6 om dagen",so rhe problem is not necessarily that the bar is set too high. It is just fun-damentally unclear how the government is going to affect and later monitoreach individual's daily choice of fruit color, not to mention what individualknowledge has gone into the process.

The development from the earliest descriptions of healthy lifestyle toHealthy People 2010 demonstrates the infinite possibilities for futurerefinements. Before it was less fat, more grains and all the fruit you couldear, but now you have to consider what type of fat, prepared how, whatcolor of fruit to pick and avoid, etc., and still we have not even begun toconsider the overall food intake against metabolism, or differences betweenindividuals and between groups. Does it really make sense to argue that allindividuals over the age of two have exactly rhe same needs and should besubject to identical guidelines?

Probably not, and this is rhe real problem of Healthy People 2010 interms of how to govern healthy lifestyles: that it is too general and toospecific at the same time. [t elaborates tons of specific details on both the"what" and the "how" of regulating lifestyle, bur the integration of allthese aspects seems to get lost under rhe heavy load of endless indicatorsand monitoring devices.


The Danish contemporary Regeringens fo{kesundhedsprogr~T fr~m1999 takes its point of departure from a cririque of ~x~~tIng I e~ty es:Althou h he announces that he will stop moralizing an ammg t e VIC" g dh d "" iet 1999' 110) the Minister of Health, Carsren Koch,tim (Sun e srmrnsrene I'"f I e to blame" (Sundhedsministerietopenly declares rhat " ... our I esry es ar . f D ish d1999: 5). What lifestyle is to blame for is the stagnation 0 "a~ls d me t~a:. ared with similar populations, especta y uelife expecrancy comp d I h I The Danish program takes ahigher consumption of tobacco a.n Aaco .oa·n counterpart because whereI" hid" ff oach than Its menc ,s Ig r y I erent appr if 1"' ristical detail, the former intendsthe latter tries to momror It esty deIn Iltfssta policy instrument.

h di gs of every ay I e as a newto use t e surroun In b ic id f the international comrnu-

The approach builds on two. asic I e::st

rr~~rns to the identification ofniry of health promotion expertise. iubli h Irh policies should "make thelifestyle with choice and says that pu IC

fea h WHO's Ottawa Charter

, h ' hoice " an Idea rom t e ,healrhy choice r e easier c '" h had already menrioned this(WHO 1986). The previous Dams program The second new idea is theambirion, but not really put It Idnt°

lPdrawce'd'n the international health

, h'' WI e y iscusse Iso-called "settmg approac 1998.47' Hajlund and Larsen 2001: 80).promotion literature (~arlsson ki he'alth choices easier, this involvesAn offshoot from the Idea of ma fmg k "y titurions in the individual's

, bition to re arm ey rns fa more systematic am h : I a four-track strategy ord lif T " lIy the approac mvo ves d hevery ay I e. yplCa , k I local communiries, an t e

interventions in public schools, wor paces,

healrh care sector. " I di ion ro rhe selection of precisely, ine rheorenca IgresslO hThere is an mteresnng , h settings are identical to t e

f . Apart from pnsons, t ese . d" idthese our sernngs. di "I" society," governing In IVl -f h - lied" ISClP inary sociei r, "four cornerstones 0 t e so ca h the disciplinary precautions embedded In

uals from cradle ro grave rhroug "F It 1977' Larsen 2002: 286).schools, hospitals, ciries and fact~nes (d ou~t~oucaul; in which he arguesDeleuze has become famous for IS stu y fO[lTI~d themselves into a

, ' , lations have now trans , . .thar disciplinary power re ., f ditiona] civil society msttrunons

f b d the limits 0 tra I I h dinew control arm eyon e seems to suggest t at lS-d 1995) The present cas

(Deleuze 1995; Har t .. " b r with a new purpose, because"" ."" are still irnporrant u d iveciplinary mstttutrons "I . . 1setting more con UCI

" d h indlvldua sma sOCIa . fthey are being use to reac d that the surroundmgs 0 every-ro behavioral change. One coul feven say ental rationaliry because of rhe

" b the obJ"ect 0 governm .day life have ecome ."" in Iifesryle polincs." I' d to these InstlrufIons h f lesspivotal ro e asslgne h D "sh approac ocuses

A ' counterpart (e am IContrary (0 its meflcan, f h I' h hoices such as fruit co or or

" h" I object 0 ea t y c, b d-attention on eac slngu ar . . d" "dual lifestyles are em efl . oes mto how m IVI .grain types. More re ectlon. g olic intervention. It is Important n.otded within the selected setrlngs of P Yd" 'rh the question of SOCial

h I hy surroun mgs WI " h 1999to confuse the focus on ea t I distribution mentioned 10 t eliving conditions, be~au~e the o~ ~;veantaged groupS with an "ac~umula-program is a normalization of diS "". r 1999: 21). Sometimes the

'f I" (Sundheds1Tllnlstenerion of unhealrhy Ii esryes

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critique of existing lifestyles is directed at Danish culture as such, e.g., forbeing too liberal in bringing up children, or by romanticizing about thetime when alcohol was only served on rare occasions and never directlyfrom the bottle, and women were not allowed to smoke in public (Sundhed-sministerier 1999: 110-111).

The cultural critique is only a sideshow to the general lifestyle approach,however, which focuses on a long list of healthy surroundings" , , , whosecoherence is governed by the realities of everyday life" (Sundhedsrninis-teriet 1999: 28), The category of "reality" is paradoxical here, of course,because the whole effort aims to reform and reorganize every little detailin a health-promoting direction, It is the "reality" of using the social sur-roundings of everyday life as procedure for how to govern individuals thatis at stake, and this also involves an effort to improve citizens' receptivity tofuture health knowledge, motivation and decisiveness (WHO 1986),

The lifestyle policies of the most recent period are thus characterized bya duality between the health-conducive surroundings of everyday life on theone hand, and a more traditional apparatus of social intervention to han-dle unhealthy individuals and especially parents on the other. The unifyingaspect of the Danish and American policies in this period is the rigorous andsystematic approach to rarionalizing every little detail of the individual's life,There is no guarantee human conducr will foster a healthy life in this sense,because the development of much more comprehensive governmental ratio-nalities in this period often comes at the expense of a clear focus on health, Iteasily turns into a generalized project of creating better people with the abil-iry to make healthy choices themselves, but the association with the underly-ing problem of lifestyle diseases crumbles under the attempt to prescribe anoverambitious reorganization of social life as such.

5, CONCLUSION

Ir is quite easy to demonstrate that public health policy aimed at the indi-vidual's lifestyle is not a simple response to the statistical rise in lifestylediseases. An alternative way to study this dubious association between life-style politics and lifestyle diseases would have been to examine the epide-miological research on the actual incidence of these diseases. Given themultiplicity of lifestyle conceptions, however, it is difficult to imagine whatcoherent statistical risk profile this would correspond to,

In the initial use of the term lifestyle as something related to health, itwas a descriptive term designating whatever way-of-living was typical ofeither healthy or unhealthy people and regardless of whether it was basedOn a deliberate choice, Although they often romanticize the supposedhealthiness of this imagined pre-modern life, all the documents examinedalso conceptualize lifestyle as something telated to individual choice, Thetypical critique of public health policy targets precisely this reduction of asocial problem to individual choice, and while there is some truth to these


allegations, the documents in f~ct reveal a more complex interaction of

individual and social aspects of lifestyle, "" Ie conrinThe lifestyle conceptions analyzed here do not fit mro a Sl7,tbe read a;

uum between individual and social aspects, Insr~~~~~~e:i~~o~ifferent tech-

v~rious attempts to assoClate a ~e:h~fel~~;n~~~:ments imagine a set of sim-mques to create chan~e, ~ome °of Iifestyl~ diseases, while other documentspie living rules to cur tense h selves about the way they

, indi id I eflect and express t emrequire In IVI ua s to r . h f on strengthening individualI d h ' d 'I lif Later there IS mue ocus fea t eir ai y ire. , " "I f d the problematic lifestyles 0responsibility, although It ISmain y ocuse on d d "

.. d . terms of class, race, an e ucatlon. .underprivilege groups 10 lif I oliries include a comprehensive rano-

The most recent vanations of I e~thYe p. t ies to reorganize the settings ofI, , f d life The Dams version n II hna izanon 0 every ay ure. I hil the American plan puts ate

everyday life to produce a healthy rmb t, w Ide tors and detailed recornrnen-details of individual lifestyle mto ndu,,:, ersb'llnhlcalth p'olicies include a mulrifac-

" ," th t to ay s pu IC eadations. The main point IS a id if d rationalize individual lifestyles,eted political technology of how to I ffecti y an gulating lifestyle diseases,

'I that is very e ecnve 10 re fbut not necessan y one hensive technology or gov-The gradual development of a more cohmpre ense of something else, The" lif I to be emerging ar t e exp , he i dierOlng I esty e seems. in terms of rationalizlOg t e 10 1-

histi d h techmques we see In termore sop isucate t e h lth in a strict sense. In manyif h I h seem to concern ea . 'vidual's 11e, t e ess t ese, 1reflections on motivation

I h I,· t rn mto very genera Icases public hea t po icies u" " f what it means to regu ate

, h h listie strategy or Idpsychology rat er t an a rea "0 Id ask why policies shouh b h " ' practice ne cou iblindividual healt e avror In, 'h hi obviously a ver y fiexi eh I h" . t let sense w en t IS IS I '

even concern" ea t 1I1 a s r f d ., w strategies and techno oglesI ' h ocess 0 evismg ne

term, It is on y 10 t e pr h h ception of health becomes sofor regulating healthy lifestyles t ,at; eu~~: health programs, on the otherbroad however. The success cntena hOp , ' I prevalence of lifestyle dls-

, d fi d ding to t e statIstIca Ifhand are still e ne accor the four behaviora acrors, h I t'on's performance on b

eases as well as t e popu a I 'Th dual disconnect erweenI h I d' t and exerCise, e gra , h

of smoking, a co 0, Ie, bl tic because it undermmes t eI, , d h Ith IS thus pro ema , d"lifestyle po mcs an ea h blem of lifestyle ISeases,, b" s to counter t e pro . , ddocuments own am ItlOn I h "I lens of biopolmcs an gov-

h d the dua t eoretlca " I d"This chapter as use h lex problems mvO ve 10'f and analyze t e comp I k t

ernmentality to magnl y" b" l't'cal problems, If one 00 saI techniques to 10pO I I f I h "cesassigning governmenta " d'"d I "th respect to Ii esty e c 01 ,

" of the In IVI ua WI bl fitthe different conceptions I "ndividual could reasona Y"" ' bvious that no rea I h h bfor example, It IS qUite 0 h 'me It is not so muc t at pu -

" ' t t e sa me tI ' " " I "IIinto these different categones a h" h' imagine that lI1dlVldua 5 WIlic health programs set the bar to~ Ig

h, tl;~~se individuals are expected to

become incredibly healthy, but rat lebrt la t sovereignty while being highly

I d"fi ble to retam a so u ebe infinite y rna I a , d' s at the same time.embedded in healthy everyday surro~n" In~ ve not been able to establish a

Three decades of public health P~,ICIe~ "I~struments aimed at improvingclear connection between the blopo Itlca I

•


healthy lifestyles and the underlying problem of lifestyle diseases. How-ever, the reason for the persistent mismatch between lifestyle diseases andlifestyle politics lies not only in the choice of biopolirical strategy, but per-haps even more in the government of healthy lifestyles. Although one can-not separate biopolitics from govern mentality completely, the biopoliticalambition to reduce the incidence of major lifestyle diseases seems to lack aclear idea about how to get individuals to conduct a healthy lifestyle. A pos-sible reason for the mismatch is that biopolirics was invented to counter theproblem of scarcity, although not exclusively, while considerable parts ofWestern populations are now troubled by the opposite problems of overeat-ing, overconsumption and excess convenience. On the other hand, govern-mental rationalities have developed quite substantially during the past 50years, especially in the various critiques of existing governmentaliries.

It is mainly the state-phobic characteristics of contemporary governmental-ity that become an obstacle to improving lifestyle, because they force authoritiesto always drape their biopolitical interventions in the vocabulary of individualchoice. The impact of governmental rationality on lifestyle policies appears tobe almost exclusively negative. Health programs are clearly written against thebackdrop of state-phobic critiques saying that state-based health policies haveundermined the responsibility of both individuals and communities, but thisgenerally leaves us in the dark about a positive alternative.

Returning to the broader question of governmentality, this case can beseen as testimony that state-phobic arts of government are not only foundin the neoliberal attempts to implement market-like mechanisms in pub-lic management. Common to both the neoliberal strategies and the useof governmental techniques in public health policy is a movement awayfrom seeing the state as the general vehicle for regulating individuals. It isquite paradoxical to lind such examples in what is in effect a set of highlycentralized official government programs, but again this only underlinesthe analytical strength of the govern mentality perspective; it is able to seegoverning even where governments claim not to be able to do so. The state-phobic turn of governmentalities since the 1970s makes it very diflicult tocreate a successful biopolitical government of lifestyle diseases, but perhapsit also makes it easier to hide the deficiencies of a governmental technologyin the dense undergrowth of status indicators and monitoring devices.

NOTES

I. The following argument draws on the thorough review by Coreil et al.(1985).

2. For example, the editorial of the very first issue of the Journal of PublicHealth Policy was dedicated to the "Lifestyle Approach to Prevention,"which is criticized for an ideology of blaming the victim and compared tothe scapegoating of immigrants in the nineteenth century (1980). Referencessuch as these constitute a standard critique of lifestyle conceptions in the


ublic health community, which critjciz~s ~?st publi~ health policies for

;educing lifestyle t%~~I~~:e::t~~~i~eywi~~~~~~v:d::;~7~~c~~ntroversial as he3. In the .s~n:e dPerroblaming the victim, see previous note (}ot~ntal of Public

was crtncize 0 . fl d i h policy documentsHealth Policy 1980: 6). This critique IS not re ecte In r e ,however where his ideas are presented as matters of fact.

4. Quotations from Danish policy documents translated by author.

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Geneva: World Health Organization.

11 Biology, Citizenship an~~heGovernment of BiomedicmeExploring the Conceptof Biological Citizenship

Peter Wehling

cia I scientists that the rapidly evolvingThere is little controversy among so h wer to fundamemally trans-

d bi h logies possess r e po . , ' h.biosciences an .lotec no. .. both collective and individual, WI~ 111

form social relations and Idenn.tles, .ses a number of questions.. Y t this consensus rai bi I·contemporary societies. ed' current debates on IOPO]-

. Iy answere In dwhich are being less unanimous f . ns 10 be adequately un er-. H these trans orrnauo b

tics and biopower. aware . I" I d cultural consequences e,, lik I ial po 11iCa an Istood what will their ley soc '. . of the new biotechno 0-, f' the IInplementatlOl1 .and what regimes 0 govermng . ;:l W"th regard to such questions,gies and their social impacts wIl1Iem:~~e~lm~st simultaneously, begun ~oa number of scholars have fee.eot Y'. b en bioscience and SOCiety 111

. I ships et_ .. h.conceive of the dynarn ic re allan. . hi amely biological Citizens IP. ki d of ciuzens Ip, n F'

terms of an emerging new In 05. Rose 2007a; Gibbon 2007; irzger-(Perryna 2002; Rose and Novas 20 i ht 2009' Hughes 2009) or genetic Cit:aid 2008· Flear 2008; Lora-WaInwr g d T "g 2004' Schaffer, Kuczynski, h R P an aUSSl ,izensbip (Kerr 2003; Heat, ap ric way most of these concep-and Skinner 2008). In a more or les~/:'~~~~:cialiry,'" which was introducedtual developments refer to the Idea h 1990s in order to denote new socialby Paul Rabinow (1996) during t ~ nature as culturally understoodidentities and practices refernng to umRan

b, 1999 2008; Gibbon and

bl ( also a InOW , ..and technically re-forma e see .. , enship is held to indICate new. I ' I genetiC cmz I

Novas 2008).5ince blo oglCa or well as new relationships between ayforms of activism and SOCiality as d scientific experts, It IS Importantsocial actors biomedical knowledge an lcepts might contribure to and

, d 'I how these new COl d ..to explore in greater etal ernment of biome lCwe.d· of the current gov d 'h me-develop our understan 1O? enetic citizenship are use Wit so

While the concepts of blologrca1 ordg I thors in a very broad sense rhey. b h . dlVI ua au, .. . n

what different meaOlngs Yt e I~ he articulation of claims to partlclp~t,loare to be understood In. terms 0 t h ognition of certain IIldlvldua 5 or, . I d political iIfe and to t e rec111 socIa an

226 Peter Wehling

groups' identities, expertise and specific needs based on their (supposedly)biological or genetic conditions. In particular, patient associations, mostlyunderstood as biosocialities, are highlighted as important examples of theactivities of biological and genetic citizens because they successfully chal-lenge the demarcations between experts and lay people. While the noveltyand importance of such phenomena are beyond doubt, what is surpris-ing, still, is the emphasis placed on optimism and hope for better medicaltherapies and health care as key elements of biological/genetic citizenship:According to Deborah Heath et al. (2004: 152), genetic citizenship evolves incorrespondence with an "ethics of care," whereas Nikolas Rose (2007a: 135)states that "contemporary biological citizenship operates within the field ofhope." In addition, while they generally acknowledge that biological citi-zenship' is linked with responsibilities and obligations as well, many of thecurrent accounts focus on the rights and opportunities presumably resultingfrom this new form of citizenship. However, since in this chapter I want toanalyze the emergence of biological citizenship as a new element in the cur-rent governmental regime of biomedicine, it seems indispensable to explicitlyaddress the obligations biological citizens confront (see also Kerr 2003) aswell as the social contexts in which claims for biological citizenship are madeand the potentially undesirable side-effects they might have. Thus, insteadof straightforwardly taking biological citizenship as an evolving social real-ity, in this chapter Iwould like to ask a question similar to the one posed byAlan Irwin (2001: 4) with regard to the concept of scientific citizenship: howare "biological citizens" constructed within current social struggles, politicaldebates and social science discourses? And how does the idea of biologicalcitizenship contribute to contemporary forms of government?

In what follows, I focus on two closely related aspects of these issues. Ipoint to some conceptual limitations and biases in current debates on bio-logical citizenship, biosociality and biopolitics, and Iargue that biologicalcitizenship is not just another citizenship project promoting new rights fornew categories of citizens but constitutes an arena in which both rights andobligations are negotiated and social identities reconfigured in often ratherambivalent ways. In the following section, I explore in greater detail howthe concept of biological citizenship has emerged, how it has been under-stood in recent debates, and what conceptual ambiguities can be identified.In section 2, I argue that biological citizenship and biosocialities are notsimply based on "biology itself" but on scientific definitions of certain con-ditions as biological and genetic, with such definitions at least sometimesbeing keenly contested. Thus, the question arises of what is biological aboutbiological citizenship. Given this background, I would like to demonstrate,mainly using the example of the Environmental Breast Cancer Movementin the USA, that the relations between patient groups and health movementson the one hand, and mainstream science, business firms and political insti-tutions on the other hand are shaped by tensions and conAiets to a muehgreater extent than most accounts of biological citizenship suggest (section

Biology, Citizenship and the Government of Biomedicine 227

3). Referring to recent debates around transplant medicine and orga~_ro-curement, I would like to illustrate in section 4 ~ow new respon.sl I ruesand moral duties of biological citizens emerge while at the same tune ne~institutional arrangements such as markets for h~man or?ans are .proposewithin biopolitical and bioethical discourse. It IS sometlm

f,:s claimed th~,t

bi 1"' . entering an era 0 optimiZatiOn,in the twenty-first century 10pO incs IS hi Id b This means that theor "enhancement" as it is termed III bioet rca e ates, . duse of biomedicine and biotechnologies no long~ Ste:e:: :~c~~~~~;:~t:r;-f . he therapy of diseases; IOstea , _I It ever was, to t h h h body and its capaci-. I I d . der to en ance t e umanincreasing y emp oye m or d d " mal" or "natural." In

d h hi h t has been eeme norties even beyon w at ~t er.o . . h ifc from therapy to enhance-section 5, I explore the ImpllcatlOn~ of this shi Does the latter "merely"ment for the concept of biologica t~lt:::~i~at;reatment for individuals oraim at unrestricted access to adequa d - - I de a more problem-

. f - diseases) Or oes It IOCUgroups suffenng rom certain . - - "healthy" bodiesib! oral duty-to opnrmze

atic right-and POSSI Y even am_ I ar ue that we should understandand minds as well? In my conciuslOn'l _ gsa highly ambivalent key

f h rive blOloglca CItizen a _the emergence 0 t e ac IV I . e fostering and regulatingelement in the formation of a governmen~a regunthe implementation of new biotechnologIes.

1. THE EMERGENCE AND CONTOURS OFA NEW BIOPOLITICAL CONCEPT

. sin the somewhat inAationary prolifer-In recent years we have been witnes .g 2 Among these are, for instance,ation of citizenship concepts and proklects1'995) and "flexible cirizenship"

I -' h" (Kymhc a d bi"rnulticultura citizens IP. f bi lirics biomedicine an 10-

(Ong 1999), or, closer to the ISsues ~_ ','~~~a~~e~feld 1992), "scientifictechnologies, "technological Cltlzens Ip I - - hip" (Ecks 2008), and. . ." . 2001) " harmaceutlca cinzens . . .

citizenship' (Irwin .,,' P Ido 2008). This pluralization of cinzen-"therapeutic Citizenship (Cara - I f cr that claims to social

h h ncontrOVerSla a . . hship concepts reflects t e rat er u . . f social identities bot-- I - - ti nand recogl11tlon 0 dinclusion polirica parncrpa 10. d refer to citizens' nee s

, d - f the nation-state an dtransgress the boun anes 0 f soci I heres (culture, science an- iety 0 SOCIa sp _ _ I- -and demands In a greater var d h "classic" triad of Civil, po 1f1-

I- ) beyon t e -dtechnology, health,sexua ity, erc'h

II 1950) Nevertheless, due to the raplcal and social citizenship (Mars a '. f the concept has become

- - h' I' s the meanlOg 0 h-multiplication of eltlzens Ip calm _ has recently remarked: "(C)itizens Ip"quite diffuse," as Andreas Fahrmelt h' . the nationality indicated by a

h' g and not 109. -has come to mean anyt III . bl' nd private contexts, entl-_. - - hrs in vanous pu IC a - I d

Passport partiCIpatiOn fig . lar political or SOCia or er,, . 1ttoapartiCU . "dement to benefits, COI11I11I_tmel l II agues on univerSity campuses

. a rcis one s co eeven decent behaVior tow(Fahrmeir 2007: 1).

228 Peter Wehling

Against this background, it is far from evident what the ideas of biologi-cal and genetic citizenship actually mean. Closer inspection of how and inwhat contexts these concepts have been used and defined therefore seemsjustified. According to Rose (2007a: 283-284, endnote 2), the notion ofbiological citizenship was introduced at the beginning of the twenty-firstcentury almost simultaneously but with different accentuations by theanthropologist Adriana Petryna (2002) as well as by Carlos Novas andhimself (Rose and Novas 2005). The related notion of genetic citizenshiphas been referred to by Anne Kerr (2003) in a rather critical perspective,and more systematically elaborated by Heath et aJ. (2004). One can rea-sonably assume that the emergence of these novel concepts results from thegrowing importance of biomedical and genetic categories not only in medi-cine and health care, but also with respect to social identities and relations,to rights, responsibilities and claims for recognition. However, the questionremains of how such a "biologization" and/or "geneticization" of socialcontexts is to be adequately understood and evaluated.

Petryna (2002), in her study of life politics in post-Soviet and post-Chemobyl Ukraine, understands biological citizenship in a historically,geographically and politically rather specific way. As she argues, thepostsocialist Ukrainian state used the Chernobyl disaster and its conse-quences in order to support its claims to national autonomy and interna-tional political legitimacy by devaluing the former Soviet responses to theaccident as insufficient and establishing new social welfare institutionsfor the affected population (Petryna 2002: 5). Given this background,she describes biological citizenship as "a massive demand for but selectiveaccess to a form of social welfare based on medical, scientific, and legalcriteria that both acknowledge biological injury and compensate for it"(Petryna 2002: 6). Rose and Novas (2005) and Rose (2007a), by contrast,use the term in a wider sense in order "to highlight the ways that citizen-ship has been shaped by conceptions of specific vital characteristics ofhuman beings, and has been the target of medical practices since at leastthe eighteenth century in the West" (Rose 2007a: 24).3 Given this longhistory of interrelations between politics, citizenship and biology, Roseidentifies a recent shift in the social and political construction of biologi-cal citizenship (Rose 2007a: 131), arguing that the former obsession witheugenics and health of the national population has not simply come to anend but is increasingly being replaced by a concern with individual healthand well-being within an "economy of hope" (Rose 2007a: 136). Thus weafe currently witnessing "the emergence of an innovative new ethics ofbiological citizenship and genetic responsibility. Our somatic, corporeal,neurochemical individuality now becomes a field of choice, prudence, andresponsibility" (Rose 2007a: 39-40).

Heath et al. (2004) link the emergence of genetic citizenship to the find-ings of the Human Genome Project and the subsequent "geneticization"of biomedical practices and popular perceptions. As these authors argue,


. . .' f" enetic governmentaliry" and "surely hasgenetic citizenship IS part 0 a g . t the individual level. Yet itthe potential to call forth eugemc practlcfes a knowledge and em bod-

. . f new forms a power, 'is at the same time a site 0 d ibiliti "(Heath et al.. .. I . h vel rights an responsl I Itles .' .ied discipline, a ong Wit no. .1 f the benefits of genetic cin-152). However, these authors pnman Y °dcu(Hson

thet al 158) remain rela-

. h d although mennone ea . , .. dzenship; t e angers, h .... ecisely the breaching of divi estively unexplored.' They argu~ r ~t '~'S :~r scientific, medical and politi-between the genetically disor e~e a~.~ f 'genetic citizenship'" (Heathcal allies that beckons us to deve op .h e I rh 0 elves remark the examples

F h as the aut Drs t ems ,et al. 156). urt ermore,. .. shi the give in their paper "all concernof the emergence of genetic cJtJzen

d~ (HY th er al 165) and rhe acnvi-

. I e disor ers ea " hextremely rare sing e-gen I f s on supporting researc tof h . fOUpS consequent y DCU . ..

ties 0 sue patient g h I 162). The notion of genetic ern-find "their" respective genes (Heat etha. pecific needs of a relatively

f to refer to t every szenship there ore appears d. d d" patients' and parenrs' groupssmall number of "genetically ,lsor ere . te medical treatment for allrather than to a universalist c1alm

dto appropn;s Nevertheless, Heath and

humans affecred by diseases an ImpaJ[metn en'ship for us all" (Heath er. f f "genetic CI IZ f

her colleagues argue In avor 0 h id pread and chronic diseases 0" h extent that t e WI es . b .al. 166), because to t e. . I d toed to have a genetic asis,

'advanced civilization' are increasing Y uhn ersl165-166) Heath and col-

bl f s'" (Hear et a . .we all have 'screena e uture he nri t be paid for such an exten-

d snrnate t e pnce 0 . fleagues thus seem to un. er,e hi uestionable geneticizatlon 0. hi h Id consist In a far-reac ing, qstorr, w IC wou ." 5 .

diseases, conditions and Identlt~~s4) biological citizenship is both individ-According to Rose (2007a. , h d individuals are increasmgly

ualizing and collectivizing. On the one anh, Ith and illnesses, not only

ib! f rheir own ea .expected to be responsi e or d. b r Iso to their statistical genetic

hei h . I bo ies u a . k dwith respect to r err p ysica . I .. hip is seen as closely lin e toh h d b'ologlca cmzens . Irisks. On the ot er an ,I. . . s) understood as socia. ., "( h s patient assoCiatlOn , , .

new "biOSOClahtles sue ~ .' b dna shared somatiC or genetic. . d II t've Identities ase 0 ·d . "dfeommunttles an co ec I . . I' biologization of I entity 1-

d 'bes b,osocJa Ity as a d e)status. Rabinow eSCfl . f the West (gen er, age, raeferent from the older biological caltegones °lable and re-formable" (Rabi-

., d d as inherent Y mampu . . espe-in that It IS un erstoo .' f t"ve biological CItIzens arenow 1999: 13).' What is constitutive ~:.~ ;2007a: 144-147) emphasizes,cially such forms of bioSOCiahty, as .. h·p is put on a level With

b· I ' I or genetic citizens If· eand frequently looglca db·· I community (see or Instanc. I net base 10SOCIaparticipation to an nter - . .Schaffer et al. 2008: 155). . 10 ical or genetic citizenship differ In

Although these accounrs of blO g "emphasis on rransforma-h y have In common an k . k f ster-important respects, t e K critically rernar s, [IS S 0

tion" (Kerr 2003: 44) which, as An~e errts

The crucial point is not thating a selective view of current deve.op~~~p~litiCS will simply return, butolder forms of eugenics and coerCive I

•

230 Peter Wehling

that, in line with biological citizenship and biosocialiry, a new govern-mental regime is emerging in which biological identities might be ascribedto or imposed on individuals or groups, new forms of inequality and dis-crimination might develop, and freedom of choice might subtly be trans-formed into an obligation to act as an active, responsible and prudentbiological citizen."

2. WHAT IS BIOLOGICAL ABOUT BIOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP?

Implicitly at least, the terms "biological citizenship" and "biosocia lity"suggest that citizenship claims and emerging communities are based onbiological realities shared by certain individuals or groups, However, whatoften appears to be underestimated are the implications of the fact thatsuch supposed biological or genetic realities are not uncontroversiallygiven, but defined, constructed and ascribed by the biosciences and theirspecific "styles of thought". This holds true regardless of whether or not theaffected individuals and groups themselves welcome such definitions andascriptions (for instance, because they provide them with better therapiesor exempt them from stigmatization). Of course, there are many instanceswhere the biologizarion or geneticization of specific conditions is entirelyuncontested and may have highly beneficial outcomes for those affected,An impressive example of such a process of social inclusion and recognitiondue to the specification of genetic disease causes is given by Michel Calionand Vololona Rabeharisoa (2008: 232-249), referring to the French asso-ciation of patients with muscular dystrophy.

However, there are many other cases where bioscientific claims are highlyambiguous and questionable. Consider the example of shyness. Should weunderstand it, as recent biomedical research suggests, as a biological andeven congenital condition, resulting from a chemical imbalance in the indi-vidual brain which is hardly distinguishable from psychiatric disorderssuch as Social Anxiety Disorder and preferably to be treated with anti-depressants (see for instance Bandelow 2007)? Or is shyness, by contrast,primarily a social role and identity emerging from and being negotiated insocial interactions, as social scientists have argued (McDaniel 2003; Scott2007)? Does biomedical research actually reveal the truth about shyness oris it part of a wider dynamics, driven not least by the economic interests ofpharmaceutical companies in medicalizing a widespread and normal pat~tern of human behavior (e.g., fear of speaking in public settings)? The latterview has convincingly been substantiated by Ray Moynihan and Alan Cas-sels (2005) and Christopher Lane (2007), drawing on extensive evidencefrom the history of psychiatry as well as recent advertising campaigns blur~ring the boundaries between shyness and Social Anxiety Disorder. Never~theless, there are presumably a lot of shy people who welcome and acceptbiomedical explanations because these enable them "to accOunt for their

-


behavior in terms of illness rather than social deviance, which exonerate~rhem from moral blame" (Scott 2007: 157): Others, however, oppose suea medicalization of their behavior and feel mgs. They II1SISton th~ strtc~l~social character of shyness, resist the moral pressure to overcl?,m(; t el~~oj,ness and "demand their right to be seen as dlfferenr but equa cott ,166) It would be mistaken, then, to understand shy people and s~lf~helpgrou~s straightforwardly as biosocial communities. By contr~s~,w at IS~t

issue is recisely the question of whether and to what extent It I: appropri-ate to re-define shyness in biological and medical terms, thus tacitly affirm-ing (and naturalizing) cultural norms of assertiveness and s~lf~~;j~eSss(~~I~h h b dominant in neo-libera l Societies srnce t et at ave ecomeMcDaniel 2003 for a cultural history of shyness). r

' , b de with regard to (male) homosexua tty,A similar argument can e rna d I tSC d (2007' 97-113) remarks, there are recent eveopmen ,

As Peter ,onra,' ir-h rni hr affect the demedicaliz ation ofnot least In genetic research, which m g , S' the early 1990s

hi d I f w decades ago, mce ,homosexuality ac ieve on y a e I ' f homosexuality haveI ' I d t' larly genetic exp anauons 0

bio ogica an par ICU , h retended discovery of what was termedre-emerged, c,~lmmatmg ~ ~ s:i~nrificaIlY contested, attracted broad pub-the "gay gene which, tho g k 2001) Although the geneticizanon oflie attention (Conrad and Mar ens b : le "revival" of older medicalhomosexuality would of ~oursenot de a ~l~Pto some possible dangers inand psychiatric explanations, dConr~ b~om s or genes for sexual orienta-the future: "Should a valid an vert ad e gbel

neressure in some quarters for

, be id if d h ight be cons: era e p(Jon e I enti e ,t ere m der i ed medicalization of homo-genetic testing, which could engen er~ncreasination of pregnancies or, ifsexuality. Such testing might lead toht :dtermd ", (Conrad 2007: 109),

ic th . s for C e isor erever available, genetic t erapie d I bi mmunities that comprehend

, h y gay an es Ian co . I ' IAgain, t ere are man, ir and herefore welcome bio ogica, h r n inborn t ra rt an t . I ' Itheir omosexua ity as a, f hi is that reference to bio ogica1 ' 0 f the rnam reasons or r IS I b '/

exp ananons, ne 0 I' ' h Id to underline its ullchangea I ~d . .. f homosexua ICyIS e .

an genetic ongms 0 ..' . II as resisting the conservativef 'I" I nghts claims as we ,ity, thus aCI 'tatlng CIVI bl I disorder Indeed, as opm~

I· .s a treara e menta .belief that homosexua Ity I ", h b' 10g'Icai origins of hOl11o~

, d' 'd I b lIevll1g 10 t e 10ion polls suggest, In 'VI ua s e , 'I rights claims (Conrad 2007:sexuality are more likely to support gdaYIClbVl communities there are also

'h' h yan es ,an f110).' Nonerheless, Wit In t e ga , otivated nor leasr by fears 0" b' I 'cal explanatIOns, m I 'strong objections to 10 ogl . . . of more genera Impor-

O . t these ent1es stress is .remedicalization, ne POlO, 'I' stances biological and genetic

d .n hlstonca CIrCUm, . Itanee: at least un er certal .' h foster precisely those essenna -

f h 't nd behaVior mIg t b'l' dmodels 0 uman tral sa 'd" that recent queer, disa I ny, an, , f' d fixed I entities f '1st notions a given ~n. sou ht to subvert (see, or II1stanCe,parrly also citizenship studies have g ,Butler 1991 2006; Isin and Turner 2008). 'tl'cisI11s of geneticizatlon, " gumentrocfl .

There is a famIliar c?unter-ar da has mostly overcome geneticwhich claims rhat genetic research to y

232 Peter Wehling

determinism and essentialism and increasingly accounts for complexinteractions between genetic and environmental factors. While this mightbe true on a very general level, what can be observed in more concreteinstances is rather what Adam Hedgecoe (2001) has termed the narrativeof "enlightened geneticization." Referring to the example of schizophrenia,he uses this term to describe an explanatory strategy which on the one handstresses the multifactorial causation of diseases or disorders, yet on the otherhand subtly prioritizes genetic causes over environmental ones by ascribingto the former the status of a "baseline," of the "only single necessary con-dition of causation" while non-genetic factors are considered non-specificand contingent (Hedgecoe 2001: 885)-" One consequence of this explana-tory model is to focus further research primarily on the supposed geneticcauses, particularly since these are held to be more accessible to scientificinvestigation than environmental and other factors. Thus, while conferringa central causal role to genes seems to facilitate the successful production ofpresumedly useful and exploitable knowledge (Rouvroy 2008: 41), it tacitlyand unwarrantedly transforms diseases caused by a wide range of factorsinto "genetic diseases." Or, as Hans-jorg Rheinberger and Staffan Muller-Wille (2009: 29-30) have put it, the easier epistemological accessibilityof genetic factors tends to be transformed into an ontological primacy. Atthe same time, the strategy of enlightened geneticizarion creates so-called"susceptibility genes" as well as individuals who are deemed "geneticallyat risk" and possibly faced with new responsibilities with regard to pre-vention, reproduction and life-style (Hallowell 1999; Shakespeare 2003;Lemke 2004). Making genetic citizenship claims or engaging in "biosocial"activities from such a starting point, however, seems to give too much creditto questionable biomedical explanatory models (see Lock 2008).

Obviously, there are no simple answers to the questions of what is bio-logical about biological citizenship and what is genetic about genetic citi-zenship. These questions are contested and negotiated in both scientific andpolitical arenas, and reference to biological factors may occasionally bemotivated by mainly strategic concerns, as the example of homosexualitysuggests. While explanations of certain conditions in biological and medi-cal terms may often be helpful for the affected groups, there are other casesin which, by contrast, claims to citizenship rights are based on questioningand rejecting biomedical models.

3. PATIENT GROUPS: BIOSOCIAL COMMUNITIESOR POLITICAL MOVEMENTS?

In an illuminating article, Phil Brown and colleagues have identified threetypes of health social movements: first, "Health Access Movements"which seek equitable access to health care; second, "Embodied HealthMovements," which address disease, disability, or illness experience by

d 233Biology, Citizenship and the Government of Biome icine" "I di gnosis treatment, and pre-

challenging established sC1enc~ on ~t~ °rt~ ~~vemen~s" addressing healthvention; third, "Constltuency- ase ea" ch as race ethnicity gender,

I" d " iry based on categortes su , ' Iinequa ity an inequi n et al. 2008: 522-523).'1 While alclass or sexuality differences b(BtOW

dd as claiming citizenship rights

h f merits can e un ersroot ese types 0 move. . h care it remains unclear to what extentin the realms of medicine and healt , . d whether these rather dif-

. I' b ilr on biology or genetics an . Itheir c alms are til " d in terms of emerging biosocia

equally be inrerprete I I hferent movements can . d h these different types of hea t.. 0 n assume mstea ,t at " "communities. ne ca " I" to science and biomedicine.. ather different re atlons .movements engage In r or opposing associations In

. I b died health movements, . fIn particu ar, em 0 1 , ear to be critical of the definitions 0Rabeharisoa and Calion s terms, app B onrrast health access move-. d b ainstream science Y c ,

disease promote y m .' f quently though of course not.,. / r aSSOCiatiOns) re, Iments (ot auxi iary partne . . hi blished biomedical researcnk t attention Wit In esra I d'necessarily, see to artrac d. h apies for hitherto neglected IS-paradigms, for instance by deman fil~J ;'t~:ir" genes (d. Heath er al. 2004:eases or by supporting research to

162-164). f biological citizenship and bioso-Most of the contemp?rar~tc~~u~;~l~haccess movements; yet, in order

ciality seem to focus pnman Y I. hi s between patient groups andh d h omplex re anons 'P . b dto fully com pre en t e c I look at constltuency- ase... di sable to have a c oser .

biomedicine, It IS In ispen II embodied health movements. Constltu-health movements and, above fa II' . hree characteristics (Brown et al.

f hi I ate the 0 OWing t .tive 0 t IS atter type . h biolo ical body to social movements,2008: 524): First, they Introduce t e g. of people who have the

. . f he embodied expenence . . I k Iparticularly In terms 0 t ablished scientific and biornedica now-disease; second, they challenge e;t

al(2006) and Brown (2007) have termed

edge and pr-actice or, as Brown e . d. ". nd third they often Involveid iologica! para igrn j anu, "it the "dominant epi em: .' "treatment prevention,, . ith scientists in pursumg , h

activists collaborating WI. b di d health movements seem to s ared f di 12 While em 0 Ie .' hresearch, an un mg. .' ith h health movements, It ISt e sec-

the first and third charactensticS Wit ot der h . es the terms "biologicalk hem different an t at glv .

ond aspect that rna es t fl 've and critical mean 109.citizenship" and "biosociality" a more rehex.1 haps the most significant

d b looking at w at IS pet CThis can be illustrate Y . h Environmental Breast an-

d· d h Ith movement. t e . I .example of an embo Ie ea d during recent decades, main Y 10

cer Movement (EBCM) that has emerge I 2006' Brown 2007: 43-99) .. k I 2003' Brown et a ., f Ithe USA (McCormlc et a . , . "works towards our goa s:

(2007 44) thiS movement f bAccording to Brown :, f "alenvironmental causes 0 reast1) to broaden public awarenesso potentl I causes of breast cancer;

" h IOto envlronmenracancer 2) to mcrease researc "ntal causes of breast can-, . I revent envlronme h' h3) to create policy that mig 1t p.. .. rch" Pointing to Ig er-

" " t clpanon 111 resea " heer· 4) to increase aCtlVlst par I " certain US regions sue as, . 'dence rates In ( f

than-average breast cance~ mCI nd Cape Cod, Massachusetts c .Long Island, the San FranCISCO Bay Area, a

234 Peter Wehling

McCormick er al. 2003: 551-563), the EBCM has contested the dominantbiomedical model in cancer research that focuses on "individual-level fac-tors such as diet, exercise, age at first parity, and genetic make-up" (Brown2007: 47).13 This movement explicitly challenges the priority given togenetic factors in recent cancer research (Brown 2007: 65-67), and stressesinstead the influences on human organisms of environmental factors suchas industrial chemicals or pesticides in food. The EBCM thus transformsthe ideas of genetic or biological citizenship insofar as it grounds politicalaction and demands for focused research not simply on "the biology" ofaffected women, not on assumed genetic baselines "inside" the women'sbodies, but on their "toxic exposures" (Brown 2007) to a harmful environ-ment as the primary cause of disease. We can understand such movementsas "biosocialities" only in a modified, extended way, since they link thebodily experience of disease with external social and environmental influ-ences; thus, their sociality does not result from a shared internal biologicalfactor such as the BRCA 1 or 2 genes or the "chromosome 17, locus 16,256,site 654,376 allele variant with a guanine substitution" Rabinow (1996:102) refers to in his definition of biosociality. To put it differently, citizen-ship claims as made by the EBCM and similar movements are indeed basedon the biological body and on demands for participation in research andresearch policies; yet, at the same time, they oppose and resist the domi-nant "biologizarion" and "geneticization" of both research priorities andconceptions of disease. And insofar as new individual or collective identi-ties arise out of embodied health movements, these are political rather thanbiological or genetic identities (McCormick er al. 2003).Nevertheless, in many cases, in particular with regard to supposedly sin-

gle-gene orphan diseases, it seems entirely justified that patient associationsfocus on genetics and demands for targeted research. One should not, how-ever, underestimate the problematic side-effects which such a focus mightstill have. First, even if the "gene for ... " is identified, this does not neces-sarily mean that successful prevention or therapies can be developed. Thisis the case, for instance, with the "mono-genetic" Huntington's Disease, letalone more complex diseases such as breast cancer or Alzheimer's Disease.With regard to therapies for the latter, Margaret Lock (2008: 62) sums upthe situation by saying that for the near future "no straightforward solutionis in sight," and dismisses the optimism propagated by genetic research. Insuch cases an exclusive research focus on genetics seems to be not very pro-ducrive, but simultaneously, by offering testing for "susceptibility genes,"ir expands the number of the "pre-symptomatic ill" who might be sub-ject to social discrimination. A second undesirable effect of "high-techmedicine" focusing on genetics has been pointed out by Tom Shakespeare.As he argues, "investment in genetics may not be the most cost-effectiveway to improve overall quality of life" for disabled people, particularlynot On a global level (Shakespeare 2005: 93-94). Instead, "(b)etter socialsupport, housing and education may contribute more to the quality of life


than medical rrearments" (Shakespeare 2005: 92).14 Recently: BiIl Hughes(2009) even argued that there is a bifurcation within d,s~bIlltJ ,~~[I~1Sminto what he terms "social model stalwarts" on the o~e han ,an 100gl-I ., " "bl'osocl'al groups" on the other: while the former supportca citizens or f . I d' ' , ti

the view that disability is not an iIIness but a resuhlt 0 soclla d,scre'dm'clnaal~~~b " mbrace t e specia rzc m I

and exclusion, the latter, y contra~t, e "' diti '" nd "assume that

s~ientifie" kno~ledge as~o~ia~:~o;\~e~~i~~ a~~ne~~;~~\ivea action" (Hughesbiology IS an irnporran as ",. s for ado ting a ques-2009· 679) Hughes criticizes the biological citizen di I' "

. . f f h I y and me rca SCIencetionable "optimism about rhe bene ,IS 0 rec no og (H hes 2009. 680).which is not common among all disability actlvlst~e o~;rstated H'ughes'While the opposition between the rwo ca~~se~:; between a so~ial and aargument rightly jPofindtstob.tlhe te;~~~t :s ~erween the different forms ofbiomedical mode 0 isa I ity a

activism arising from these models. eneral problemaric aspectid ' t uch upon a more g ,

These consi eranons 0 bi I ' I irizenship and biosociality: ItSwithin the current discourse on 10 ?gIC

IabcI,l

tyof human nature, or "life"

. .' of the mampu a I I ,potential overestimation . b . R for instance emphasizes

I I I genetIC asis. ose, 'in genera, on a rna eeu ar,. V' lit is understood as inhering in pre-that biology "is no longer destiny. I~a I y olecules capable of 'reversecise, describable technical relations etween m ", (Rose 2007a: 40). But

, d : "I of 're-englneerlngengineering an In ~nnclp e destin for some people, either becausewhat if biology continues to be hei y ditions are I'usr nor ones rhar can

. ies f 'I b cause t err can I I .genetic therapies ai or e I I P Against this background, claimsbe "re-engineered" on the molec~tr s~';;'uid be re-embedded within widerto biological or genetic cinzens ,P , eIl as of whar could be termedpolitical contexts of glo~al SOCIaljusnce, t::port in everyday life."health care citizenship including sOCIa P

4. RIGHTS WITHOUT OBLIGATIONS?THE CASE OF ORGAN DONATION

, say that biological citizenshipOn the basis of the previous sections, we ca~ f novel rights but rather

dear less sranc set a . fis not be understoo as a m~r d of Iinclusion and exclusion 0

d ". -I nke processes fas a set of open an inter If' ing social identities, and 0 ere-. '. "K 2003· 45) 0 re-negotlatl b dindividuals (err . '" b I new obligations. Even eyon, I orrurunes ut a so " batIng not on y new opp ho have by genetic resting, eenthe responsibilities attributed to pers~ns w n'd heighrened risks, far-identified as "carriers" of suseeptIbl I~y ~ene.s 3al obligations of biologi-

, d erhaps InStitUllOn , Ireaching moral duties an , P , d' t future. In this section,, . rhe not-toO- Isran I dcal citizens might emerge In, d I t which has in part a rea y

h ble eve opmeo. ,briefly illustrate suc a pass I donation and procurement

d t debates on organbegun, with regar to recenfor transplant medicine.

•

236 Peter Wehling

The case of organ procurement is only one part of a broader tendencyin current and future biopolirics to increasingly draw attention not onlyto the individual person and her or his "complete" body, but also to thecollection and, indeed, commodification of isolated parts and elements ofrhe human body such as cells, blood, DNA, tissues, organs, bones and soon. The human body is thus "depersonalized" (Sharp 2007) and trans-formed into what Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell (2006) havetermed "biovalue", at present, the value on the US market of all parts ofa human cadaver is an estimated $250,000 (Keller 2008: 11). Against thisbackground, individuals are confronted with an ambiguous situation androle: while, on the one hand, their health and well-being is, perhaps evenmore than ever, the aim of biomedicine, their bodies are increasingly per-ceived as a sort of "container" of scarce and valuable biological materials.This ambiguity and some of its possible consequences become sharply vis-ible when we look at recent institutional efforts to increase the numberof human organs available for transplant surgery. As is well known, thedemand for such organs (kidneys, hearts, livers etc.) by far exceeds the sup-ply. Thus, while this situation is dramatic for those in need of an organ toimprove their quality of life or even to save their lives, on the other handnobody should be forced to donate an organ, neither living nor after death,and of course nobody can claim a right to parts of another person's body.

Given this background, we can observe a remarkable shift in bioethicaldiscourse away from individual rights and choices towards emphasizing theindividuals' moral duties to collective goods and interests'S as well as vari-ous proposals for new institutional arrangements (among them regulatedmarkets) aiming at an increase in organs for transplantation. I would liketo briefly illustrate these tendencies with reference to a recent statementon organ donation by the German National Ethics Council (NationalerEthikrat). The council considered the lack of human organs for transplantmedicine a serious and urgent problem in Germany and, to remedy thissituation, it argued for a new legal arrangement according to which everycitizen would be requested to explicitly declare whether they agreed ordisagreed with organ extraction from their bodies after death. While, ofcourse, nobody would be forced to donate or deliver the requested state-ment, all those who, for whatever reasons, did not express their will, shouldin case of death be regarded and treated as if they had given theit consentto organ extraction. Strikingly, the principle of informed consent, so fara kind of "sacred cow" of medical ethics, is substantially weakened bythis proposal. Against the background of high rates of general agreementin public opinion polls with organ donation in Germany, the absence ofexplicit individual dissent is straightforwardly understood by the Councilas "presumed consent" and eventually tteated as fully equivalent to activeconsent. It is illuminating to read the rationale the Council gives for itsproposal: "In view of the possibility of helping a fellow human being inthe extreme distress of a serious illness effectively and with good prospects


cannot be a matter left entirely to theof success, refusal to donate organs _ - C '12007' 33).

f h - di id I" (German National Ethics cunei .discretion 0 t e In IVI ua _. ral dut of any individual toWhat is establIshed by such claims ISha m

h0 bYy making available to

h t tially all ot er umans,help other umans, po en _ I' - body And at least inhi d enc or even IVlOg . 1

them part~ ,of ?er or. IS ca .av ifies weakening the principle of informedthe Council S View, this duty Just h the Council's recommendationconsent. It has to be added, h~w~~;~atn atolitical actors, who argued thatwas rejected by the rnajorrty 0 . PII be interpreted as agreement.

k f di t may not automatlca Y -f -lac 0 Isagreemen at least as yet a shi t III-I' h s appears [0 express, '. .The Counci s statement t U h h - political and institutional

bi h' I discourse rat er t an In fmainstream ioet lea h . s however the principle 0- G I some or er cou ntr te , 'practices In ermany. n .d ,,- I ally establIShed.

"presume consent IS ,eg ber of bioerhicisrs argue for an even moreAn apparently growing num har " he majority of organs that would

contentious solution to the ptoblem t at \ ted" (Cohen 1995: 137),be suitable fot transplantation arke not alrve~ by the individual nation-

h . f organ mar ets regu arc hnamely t e creation 0 1995' Ta lor 2005). Proponents of sue astates (see fO,rmsta~ce ,Cohen an~ial rncentives for potential donors ormarket solution maintain that fin Id b more effective and efficient thanthe relatives of deceased persons wou e

lf h man organs." Apart from

. - - asing the supp yOualternative options 10 mere .' orally permissible or even

I - f whether or not It ISmthe fundamenta question 0 b d and to sell and buy its parts,imperative to commodify theffhuman h 0 Yard to biological citizenship and

Id b - ortant e ect Wit reg . I - fthere wou e an Imp Id b -mposed on SOCIal re anons 0. . - k t model wou e supen - I

biosociality: a mar e "sense Iin that every donor IS a so aif . M I Mauss sense I freciprocity and gl t 10 arce _ _ ddressed as potential vendors 0

- I ., ) biological CitiZens, a - k tpotentia reCipient; f d .nto participants In a mar e. kid Id be trans orme I . d I

one of the.lr I ~eys, wou d to follow an economic logic; an morawhere their choices are expecte f d - t economic freedom to sell

Id be trans or me 10 0 _ I I -or political autonomy wou I ble social groups, partlCu ar y In

I omically vu nera h -or not. As a resu t, econ f d by poverty to forego t elf- h b t d or even orcepoor countries, mig ~ e temp e ibl tonomous decision, undergo a sur-bodily integrity and, 10 an osten St IYIau

d_ al progress remains risky, and

. h' h despite a me lC ,gical interventlon w IC , es 2006)Ysell an organ (d. Scheper-Hugh . - der to demonstrate that, once

I use the example of otgan donation IOhor

. ht be followed by novel- . h b sed on biology, t ey mig b d

citizenship ng ts .are a "sim le" fact that every humal: 0 Y con-obligations resultlOg from the _ I t~at mi ht help to save the life of otherstains valuable biologICal matena s f g h -ndividual's will and chOice

- I-t of life Inso arast el Gor to improve their qua I y . . h h- obligation as the erman. b par Wit t IS , .is held to be unlikely to e on a _ t-tutional arrangements 10 gov-

C -I suspects new Ins I . d- -d I'sNational Ethics ounCI 'h- h -ther restrict the 10 IVI uad· . ht emerge w IC el -' heening human bo les mig d t") or transform It 111(0 t eh f "presu me consen h .autonomy (as in t e case 0 . . T be sure, the point ere IS

ambiguous freedom of market participants. 0

b

238 Peter Wehling

not that it is entirely unjustified or unnecessary to increase the numberof organ donations; what deserves critical scrutiny, however, is how thistask is addressed and what institutional forms and power relations will beesrablished by such efforts.

5. BIOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP IN AN ERA OF ENHANCEMENT

As Rose (2007a: 6) rightly points out, in the twenty-first century biomedi-cine and biopolirics will no longer be confined to the preservation of healthbut will increasingly address the objective of optimizing and enhancingthe human body. In a way, this tendency towards enhancement has alwaysbeen Jnheren~ In Foucault's notions of biopolitics and biopower; but in thenear future, It seems, biopolirics will be able to mobilize more powerfulscientific and technological means than ever before, such as genetics, brainresearch, neuropharmacology, nanotechnology etc., to achieve the goal ofImproving the capacities of the human body and mind. In this section, Iwould like to sketch the effects on the meaning of biological citizenship andon the rights and duties of biological citizens that the move from therapyto enhancement is likely to have. Since this shift is blurring supposedlyclear-cut demarcations between health and illness, therapy and enhance-ment, the question arises of whether the future rights (and obligations) ofbiological CItizens can be, and should be, restricted to therapeutic aims orexp.a.nded ~~ the re~!m0.£ optimization. In Rose's view, any attempts at apolitics of e~~ugh, which hopes to call a halt to the perfectioning of thehuman body. IS both histor icajiy naive and ethically wistful, yearning fora past that exists only In the imagination" (Rose 2007a: 21).

. This rather harsh verdict is itself not without problems; this applies espe-cially to ItS Inherent consequence that biological citizenship should alsoe~1tadclaims ~nd rights to the improvement of one's body that are, in prin-cip]e, unrestricted. Although the boundaries between health and illnesstherapy and optimization have, of course, never been drawn unarnbigu-ously, the question remains of whether we should completely abandon suchdemarcations even as regulative ideas, admittedly provisional and fuzzy,but helpful for discriminating between different types of biomedical inter-vennon with different legitimations and legitimacies. First there are ethicalconsiderations, in a Foucauldian sense rather than in the sense of main-stream bioethics, that oppose such a complete abandonment: would it bea t~uly promising ~uture perspective to enter an "enhancement society"which would be driven by quasi-religious, "transhurnanisr" demands forthe relentless perfectioning of human physical Or mental capacities? Sec-on~, a ,CitIzenship right to enhancement may quickly turn into a moralobligation and a more or less direct social pressure: if everybody enhancestheir performance, for instance in order to improve their employability onlabor markets, how can an individual resist and refrain from such practices


without running the risk of falling behind? And, with regard to the moralresponsibilities the individuals might confront in an enha~cemen,r sOC1,e~y,consider the following statement recently made by the prominent bioethicisrJulian Savulescu: "Once technology affords us the power to enhance ourown and out children's lives, to fail to do so would be to be responsible forthe consequences. ( ... ) To fail to improve [the children's] physical, rnusi-cal, psychological, and other capacities is to wrong them, Just as It wouldbe to harm them if we gave them a toxic substance that stunted or reducedthese capacities" (Savulescu 2007: 529). If such moral standards were tobecome generally accepted, then biological citizens' autonomy and freedomof choice would turn out to be an empty promise. A third objection to aright to enhancement comes from considerations of global social justice.Even today, health care and biomedical research appear to be focused moi eon life-style phenomena such as the pharmaceutical therapy of erectile dys-function than on providing simple cures for those dlsease~ fr?m ~hlCh,alarge number of people in poor countries die every day. This disparity willincrease in the near future, as the market for life-style medicine and profit-able enhancement technologies continues to expand in Western countnes.

Given the apparently growing support for the use of enhancement tech-nologies (sec for instance Greely et al. 2008), a more critical and reflectiveview of these issues seems appropriate (see Wehling 2008). Although It IS

true that neither enhancement nor the will to enhancement are new (Rose2007a: 20), this does not mean that they are simply a natural phenomenon;in fact both are constructed and shaped by discursive, political and tech-

. I d . . I ding the qualification of certain human conditions,mea ynamrcs, inc u " fie: " d itraits and behaviors (such as aging, shyness or sleep) as de cient :n hm

need of biomedical improvemenr.18 It is therefore lmpor:a,nt to as w atkind of society will emerge as both the result and the driving force of thecontinuous management and enhancement of one's health and capa~Jt1e~;even beyond what we have been used to consider "natural" and "sufficlen~~_Against this backdrop the question of limits to the dynamics of enhan

, . . past and It IS notment is neither naive nor simply a return to an Imaginary , , I"

. . I' b II a political one Ultimate y, It ISa purely normative question. t IS, a ave a , . " d Ih . f h ther and to what ends we should believe In an comp y

t e question 0 w e 1'£ II b h bout bywith powerful and seductive promises of a "better I e roug r amedical and pharmaceutical interventions.

6. CONCLUSION: BIOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIPAND GOVERNMENTALITY

In the revious sections, I have argued that biological citizenship is a bot~hi hi Pambivalent and flexible element within the contemporary govern_

g y hi hi' an element which Slmultanemenr of biomedicine and iotec no ogres, .' I' rs ofously encompasses individuals' rights and obhgatlons, t reir prospec

•

240 Peter Wehling

improving their quality of life and the risk that they will become subject tosocial pressure and discrimination. Constituted by heterogeneous discoursesand practices, the idea of biological citizenship is socially constructed andnegotiated in quite different, contested ways. While in many instancesmaking biological citizenship claims may have beneficial effects for previ-ously marginalized or excluded individuals or groups, in some cases thebiologization or geneticization of rights, responsibilities, conditions, socialidentities and communities may lead to undesirable consequences and newforms of stigmatization or even exclusion.

By critically reviewing the current debates on biological citizenship andbiosociality, one becomes aware that these debates have so far primarily con-centrated on health access movements and single-gene disorders. This focusseems to be closely connected with the rather optimistic hope that biomedi-cal research will not only be able to identify the genetic causes of most dis-eases, but will at the same time develop effective therapies so that biologywould indeed no longer be destiny. As Rabinow recently remarked in a rathersceptical account of the (short) history of the concept of biosociality, suchexpectations were shaped by the enthusiastic climate of the 1990s which heretrospectively terms the "Golden Age of Molecular Biosociality", "Therewas hope, there was progress, there was a reason to be urgent even strident-there were reasons to want to be biosocial" (Rabinow 2008: 190). Obviously,the hopes pinned on biomedicine and biosocialiry have only partly been real-ized; as Rabinow admits, "the hopes and hype of the genomic decade havefailed to provide adequate diagnostic or risk assessment tools or treatmentsbased on them" (Rabinow 2008: 192). Thus, some of the limits of the con-cepr of biosociality can now be seen "with more clarity" (Rabinow 2008:191). Biosociality is therefore to be understood, Rabinow argues, as a heuris-tic concept rather than as "an epochal designation meant to characterize anage or era" (Rabinow 2008: 191). The same characterization might apply tothe concepts of biological and genetic citizenship (at least in the way they areused in current debates): although coined several years later than biosociality,they still seem to be influenced by the optimistic attitudes and expectationssymptomatic of the "genomic decade."

One important conclusion to be drawn from this historization is that weshould refrain from normative understandings of biological and genetic cit-izenship as inherently emancipatory concepts. Instead, these concepts arebetter used as tools within an analytics of government. Particularly in anera of biotechnological optimization, the (self-)definition of conditions andidentities in biological terms and the active management of genetic risksand susceptibilities appear to be governmental rationalities (Dean 1999:176) more or less subtly acting on the conduct of individuals or social com-munities. It is important therefore to bear in mind that citizenship claimshave a significant political dimension insofar as they are intended to chal-lenge dominant forms and technologies of power and exclusion. In the caseof biological citizenship, to express this political dimension may frequently,


and seemingly paradoxically, imply resisting the biologization of socialproblems and identities.

NOTES

2007 136) I will use biological citizenship as1. Hereafter, following Ros~ ( 1 di a: '" itizenship and employ the latter

the more general concept inc u l.n? genetic Cl .

term only when the fOficulsdisefxI:JI.lcItIYh<?pn~;:~~~~s.see (sin and Turner 2002;2. For overviews of the e 0 cmzens I ,

Isin, Nyers and Tu.rner ~008.. . .' ose (2007a) is a modified and3. The chapter on biological citizenship ~7tt~n b Rose and Novas (200S); (

extended version of an earlier paper W R Y2007 131 154)refer prim.arily t? the m,?re r~centuve:~~~~"{(';as~sSig,~~pp a~d H~ath 2003),

4. In an earlier article on f1exlbld:ta~led account of the ambiguit.ies and con-the same authors ga~e a mo~e I d d the related practices. In rbeirtradicrions inherent In genetIC knolw efAgean. " (LPA) a self-help organiza-

. d f "L' Ie Peop e 0 menca, fethnographic stu, y a Itt I ia a form of heritable, single-gene "dwar -rion of people with achondrop has b' d mong the LPA members fears of. " T . R and Heat 0 serve a fIsm ausstg, app, h I· . tion of dwarf fetuses a rer genenc, . . ( . By of tee Imll1a I deugenic practtces especia h h h es for genetic treatment. l nsreatesting had become possible) .r~t er ~. a~ i~~his article the authors speak ofof using th~ ter~ ')e?,etlc cltl.zens ~P'2003: 66), for instance with regard to"resistant biosocialiry {TaussI? dr a . n throughout the LPA. lr wouldaspirations for having dwarfhchl!, re~ comtmboosociality"is understood by the

. I her er resistan I . diffbe interesting to earn w f . itizenship or as something I er-if sion 0 genetic CI Iauthors as a speer c expres I,

ent from or even opposed to It.. 's Disease (AD) Margaret Lock (2008:5 Referring to the example of Alzhfelmer s . I,'y" resulti~g from efforts to iden-

. . d he " ve 0 uncer tam . I64) has pointe to t e .wa . f this widespread and complex, non-sing e-tify the supposed genetic baSIS.<? enetic screening does not make muchgene disease. Un~er su~h con~1tlon~, ~ genetic citizenship with regard to ADsense and it remams qUite unc ear.w 1a re broadly in sections 2 and 3.would mean. I will address these ISSU~S~dOntl·t·lesare different from race or

., orary genetic Ie. . . d6. However, whl ~ contemp . 'on to what extent those Identities an.gender, it remall1s open for llscu~t G' en the fact that direct therapeutlctheir gen~tic .basi~ m~~ be re orm~es e~of~vrhas not succeeded and .only a fewinterve~tlon IOto individual ~e~fe so far, having a certain gene variant or notpreventive measures are aval ~ able identitymay still result in a fixed and .1l1escap h . d rh'at the norms of prudence

R h ghtly emp aSIZe7. In another paper, ose as n'd '£1 t"on of those who do not act pru~and responsibility ':enable the I hent~r~abliologicallY irresponsi?le and whodencly and responSibly, those w o. ctl·ons ranging from dIsapproval to

f b d to ceream san 8)may, there ore, e expose. result" (Rose 2007b: 14 . .disenticlement to health services as a rty was removed from the "psychl-

8. It was only in the 197?s that h~~os~x~a lociation's Diagnostic alld Statisti-atric bible," rhe American Psyc latr~cM StConrad 2007: 99-100). .cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DmeJicalizing homosexuality dunn~ [he

9. Remarkably, the first atte~ptsd~t ted against oppressive legal s~nctlo~s,nineteenth century were a so Ir.ec d of unishment. This highlight.s t 1earguing for therape~tic treat~e;1C 1~1~tt~xpla~ations, which often contributeambiguities of medical a.nd b.lo og;c. atized groups but are, nevertheless,co improving the social situation 0 sngm -

•

242 Peter Wehling

based on scientific assumptions which are highly questionable and some-times discriminating in themselves.

10. Similar objections to such "enlightened" forms of preformationist geneticessentialism have been raised, for instance, by Lock 2005, 2008; Rehmann-Sutter 2006; Grace 2008; Rouvroy 2008.

11. Using a partly similar typology, Rabeharisoa and Calion (2002, 60) bavediscerned the "auxiliary association," the "partner association," and the"opposing association." For an overview of the great variety of patientgroups and health movements, see also Epstein 2008.

12. As a result "citizen-science alliances" (McCormick, Brown and Zavestoski2003, Brown 2007) emerge, but since they are based on critical examina-tions of established biomedical models of disease, etiology and therapy, theyprimarily include non-mainstream scientists.

13. As Brown (2007: 64) argues, the biomedical model is one in which diseaseis held to be "purely a biologic phenomenon that can be understood throughpositivist, value-free research. Further, this model assumes that diseases arebest addressed through treatment and through mitigation against individual-level risk factors ( ... )."

14. Paolo Palladino has raised similar objections to Rabinow's explanation inFrench DNA (1999) of the concept of biosociality, referring to the exampleof the acitivities of the French Association against Muscular Dystrophy. AsPalladino (2002: 158, endnote 23) emphasizes, "many victims of the diseasesurvive into advanced age, and some of them have actively campaigned forthe improvement of social facilities that make their life easier, rather than forresearch to treat or even prevent the disease by selective reproduction. Suchgroups do not appear anywhere in Rabinow's narrative."

15. Two eminent bioethicists, Bartha Maria Knoppers and Ruth Chadwick(2005: 76), for instance, explicitly stated and welcomed a move away from"the paramount position of individualism and autonomy" in bioethics andargued that more emphasis should be placed on ethical principles such asreciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, citizenry and universality.

16. Although this is a highly questionable claim, I cannot go into a detailed dis-cussion in this chapter. For a critical view, see Schneider 2007.

17. In an illuminating article, Kaushik Sunder Rajan has also touched on thedark side of current global biocapitalisrn. Using the example of participantsin clinical drug testing in India, he explores the constitution of the "experi-mental subject" as an indispensable element for the emergence of globalizedbiosociality: "These experimental subjects provide the conditions of possibil-ity for the neo-liberal consumer subjects who generate surplus health, or forthe neo-liberal biosocial subjects who form social identifications in the causeof patient advocacy" (Sunder Rajan 2008, 178).

18. Simon Williams and colleagues argue that, due to pharmaceutical innova-tions such as the drug Modafinil, we might be faced with a future society "inwhich sleep is rendered optional if not (entirely) obsolete" (Williams et al.2008,852; original emphasis).

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12 Human Economy,Human CapitalA Critique of Biopolitical Economy

Ulrich Brockling

1. INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMY OF BIOPOWER

Michel Foucault's observation that we live in the age of biopolitics has nowbecome a truism. Hardly any newspaper article about stem cell resea rch,pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or therapeutic cloning fails to broach thetopic; hardly any critique of the applied life sciences fails to warn of theirbiopolitical consequences-usually to call in the next sentence for legal regu-lation, which is to say for even more biopolitics. Although in the concept'sinflationary usage its genealogy is seldom considered, Foucault's dictum thatthe modern human being is "an animal whose politics places his existenceas a living being in question" is certainly one of the most cited in his work,For Foucault, biopolitics "brought life and its mechanisms into the realm ofexplicir calculations and made knowledge-powet an agent of transformationof human life." He located the "thteshold of biological modernity" in the lateeighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the population-that collec-tive subject-surfaced as an object of political intetventions (Foucault 1978,143). Together with the historically older disciplinatY institutions, whichestablish an "anatomo-politics of the human body" and ptoduce individu-als who are as economically productive as they ate militarily and politicallyreliable, the biopolitics of population constitutes one of the tWO poles of a"life-administering power" (Foucault 1978, 136, 139).

But for Foucault, the emergence of biopolincs in no way marks the endof sovereign power. Rather, this now takes a new form, developing intostate racism. As soon as the state functions in the mode of biopower, thatis, as soon as all political action is calibrated according to the relos of amaximization of life, the sovereign right to "to take life or let live" canonly be exercised through the introduction of hierarchizing caesurae in thecontinuum of the human species. That right is transformed into "the powerto make live and to let die" (Foucault 2004: 241). State racism "justifies thedeath-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principlethat the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is amember of a race or population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary

and living plurality" (Foucault 2004: 258).

248 Ulrich Brockling

On the one hand, Foucault studies this "economy of biopower" in rela-tion to strategies of statistical registration and normalizing regulation, asfirst formulated In a systematic program in eighteenth-century GermanPolizeiwissenschaft (Foucault 1981; 1988).1 On the other hand, in his lec-tures on the history of governrnentaliry, he analyzes how with discoveryof the population "as a given, as a field of intervention, and as the end ofgovernment techniques," the economy was isolated "as a specific domain ofreality, with political economy as both a science and a technique of inter-vention in this field of reality" (Foucault 2007a: 143). Not the legitimacy ofthe exercise of power, but calculating its costs and effects, now takes centerstage. For Foucault, political economy "is a sort of general reflection on theorganization, distribution, and limitation of power in a society," offeringa guiding principle for the "self-limitation of governmental reason" (Fou-cault 2008: 13).

When it comes to the way in which the calculations of political economyare manifest in the governance of both individuals and the populace as liv-ing beings, neither Foucault's lectures on governmentality nor the rest of hiswork offers more than scattered, fragmentary remarks. Foucault did notestablish a connection to his early epistemological studies centered on thediscourse of political economy (Foucault 1970), and he did not work outthe specific biopolitical dimension of the liberal and neoliberal rationalitiesof government in his analyses of it. The title of the second part of his lecturecycle, The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault 2008), thus raises expectationsthat the lectures do not really live up to. He emphasizes the constitutiveconnection between the biopolirical regulation of life and an "economicalgovernment," that is, an art of government exercising "power in the form,and according to the model, of the economy" (Foucault 2008: 134), but henever makes this connection an object of systematic reflection.

In a further development and reinterpretation of Foucault's reflections,Giorgio Agamben has radicalized biopolitics into the essential constitu-ent of the political realm in general. The juridical-institutional order, heargues, is inconceivable without the sovereign exception that suspendsthe law, and that in the form of excommunication, produces "naked life":homines sacri reduced, because killable with impunity, to a pure biologi-cal existence. From this perspective, modernism marks no break with theOccidental tradition but simply generalizes what was already at work in itsorigins. In Agamben's view, sovereign power has always determined whatforms of human life will be excluded from the body politic as part of thesame act that makes human beings into legal subjects:

Every society sets this limit; every society-even the most modern-decides who its "sacred men" will be. It is even possible that this limit,on which the politicization and the exceplio of natural life in the juridi-cal order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself ill thehistory of the West and has now-in the new biopolitical horizon of

Human Economy, Human Capital 249

" ' t -moved inside every human life andstates with national sovereign y c. d to a particular place or a

. ' B life is no longer conulle , ,every citizen. are II' h biological body of every livingdefinite category. It now dwe s I1l t ebeing. (Agamben 1998: 81)

, I does not see any contrast between biopoli-If Agamben-unltke Foucau t- b rher wishes to reveal the for-

, 'of power ut ratics and the sove~elgn exercise he latt~r dehistoricizing it in the pro.cess,mer as the most inward core of t h 'd rands to be the foundational

. ke vi sible what e un ers fhis intention IS to rna e VI . "" anring "to put the rce-id I litics ThIS consists I1l w f' Iaporia of OCC! enta po I. in th lace-'bare Ii e -t iar, f n into play m t every P h

dom and happiness 0 me 1998' 13) With reference to Hannamarked their subjection" (Agamben ',' between the Declaration

. ively for a connection h fArendt he argues Impressive .' d I' ' tion of "life unwort y 0d h d fi non an e immaof Human Rights an tee ru . f h principle of the nation stateliving," between the global realtzatlOn 0 ~ e m this point he arrives at theand the worldlessness of stateless refugebes. ro democracy and totalitari-

, "id f . ner solldaflty etween 'I h hunsettling I ea 0 an in 'II (bio)politics direct y Wit t eanism" (Agamben 1998: 13). Connectmga I lineal relation" (Agamben

, f hi is "the ongina po I Isovereign ban, which or irn hat bio olitical programs by no means1998· 102) he has to elide the fact t P " between inclUSion and

., " ing the oppositionexhaust themselves m processl, I . I ntinuum and subjugate human

It ct a bio ogica co " I' h lyexclusion but a so cons ru , f dd d lue To put this mas Ig t. I' nve 0 a e vatue. , ' IIlife to the econOffilCa irnpera . h t biopolitics ISessentIa y a

b d not recogmze t adifferent way: Agam en oespolitical economy of popu lattou- from a double blank space: Fou-

The following reflections thus stalrtoult management of life, and Agarn-. I the hiopo inca " g ofcault's failure to ana yze h' h follows from hIS narrowm

ben's blindness to political economy, w IC fl' are meant then, as an. h These re ecoons ,".

biopolitics to sovereignty t eory. h liticization and economlZatl~ninquiry into the conjuncture between; e p~ improving and optimizing ItfeOf human life and into how the postu ate 0 'f amework. Instead of try-, "\" d' n economiC ris legitimized and operaoona Ize ~~ a of economic thought, I will presenting to offer a cross-section of the I~ory h ffort formulated in the years

, ode1s' IIrst tee , mytwo exemplary economiC m 'd' foundational human econobefore and after the Great War'f t~ l~vlS~ ~ a noW largely forgotten Aus-(Menschenokonomie) by Rudol, o. s~ ~e~ the theory of human capital,trian social philosopher and SOCiologist, t the Nobel Prize-winning Amefl-whose most prominent representatives adre

GS Becker, These tWOmodels

d W Schultz an ary. h'd II dcan economists Theo ore '. I" I overnmentality: Goldsc el ca e. f ms of blopo Iflca g E' I P ovidencerepresent opposmg or " I" through an la rf "orgamc capIta h . tS

for a socialist management, 0 ("on and social security; the t eons(Ewald 1986)-a state relymg on preven I bOt-maximizing self-entre-

h h n bel1lgs as eneu 'dof human capital approac "u;~ ical condition as an asset t,Ob~Invest~f .preneurs who even treat their 10 Ogf the systematic economlzatiOn of It e.The twO models meet as a progtam or

•


2. ECONOMY OF HUMAN BEINGS

Rudolf Goldscheid opened his programmatic work Entwicklungswerttheo-rie, Entwicklungsokonomie, Menschenokonomie (Theory of Developmen-tal Value, Developmental Economy, Economy of Human Beings), publishedin 1908, with a clarion call: "This book is a protest against the unheard-ofsquandering of human beings that is being pursued even in our day. It is anindictment of all those who represent and promulgate the delusional beliefthat the human being is an asset present in excess-an asset no one needhesitate to approach in a thrifty manner" (Gold scheid 1908: IX).

Where wastage is lamented, a call for order-or more precisely: foreconomic order-cannot be far behind, and Goldscheid in fact advocatednothing other than a systematic steering of human productive powers andconditions for reproduction. The "business of life" could only flourish mostfully if science took over the "ledger of culture" "each smallest fragment ofavailable means" thus being administered "with the care of a proper mer-chant" (Goldscheid 1911: 595). The cost-value of human beings, in otherwords the means expended on their rearing, training, and maintenance, andtheir earning-value, hence what they bring in through their working capac-ity, needed to be measured as precisely as possible and adjusted to producea maximum of added value. What was as stake was solving the problem of"how through working time of less than twenty-four hours the human beingcan eke out his life over twenty-four hours; how he is placed in the position,through less than twenty-four hours of work, where he can manage not onlyto sustain himself, his not yet working children, and parents who can no lon-ger work, but also the higher development of the human typus, the elevationof the power of the organic over nature" (Goldscheid 1908: 66).

It was Goldscheid's conviction that such a "vital optimum" (Goldscheid1911: 499) did not come about either as the result of a struggle for existence,as it were naturally, or through a eugenic radicalization of natural selee-tion, as postulated by Social Darwinists and champions of racial hygieneon the basis of the Malthusian law of population ecology. Rather, what wascalled for was an "active formation of evolutionism" (Goldscheid 1908: 89)in the sense of a rational administration of "organic capital":

Menschenokonomie is the effort ro acquire our cultural qualities withan ever smaller consumption of human material, an ever smaller wast-age of human life, the effort at a more economic exploitation, a moreeconomic exhaustion of human working capacity as well as human lifein general. ... Menschenokonomie presses towards technology of theorganic, it studies the constitution, volume, and breakdown of work-ing capacities, teaches us to economize on organic capital and how toexercise economic efficiency in our dealings with the most valuablenatural treasure a country possesses: economic viability with humanworking capacity. (GoJdscheid 1912: 22-23, emphasis in original)


o 0 • d su porter of the suffragette move-As a pacifist, hum.an rights ~CtlVlst, an ac P

afounding member of, among

ment with close ties to SOCIal OemSocr y'the German Sociological Asso-• 0 the MaOist octety, id dother organizations, 0 f VO 2 Goldscheid cons: ere

d h SOl ical Society 0 ienna, hciation, an t e OCIOog. h more important than t ef . 1 environment as muc 1the improvement a socia 0 Id h id 1911: 164). Consequent y,"primitive regulator" of selectl.on .(G?, sC

d:~eirdoctrine of degeneration

the struggle against the "selectloOistTS abn re he basically had no obiec-h . h'swrltlng 0 esu , d dtakes up muc space In I .h ff 0 g of the gifted an ecrease

f "" ease of teo spnn I "tion to the call or an mer d 0 by the completely use esso tion of repro uctton 0 I 0

in the offspnng or preven . . t "racial damage" "racia SUI-o 1 322) d warnmgs agams f I(Goldscheld 191 : ; an. f h try with immigrants 0 ow-

cide,' and a looming "floodIng 0 t e co'~:re found in his work as wellI d li n racial elements id d f t Istanding cu ture an a te. 20). Nevertheless, he consr ~re a a ,

(Goldscheid 1908: 112; 1911. 425,4 'd I arion that "preventive repro-. h selectioIllstS ec ar . h 0 e-because unecononuc- ted h 0 lack of interest in t C improv

." nacea an t elf f' " sducrive hygiene was a pa did "the idea 0 eugeOics alif 0 stances He I see 0 dment of material I e Clfcum. . " he si ificance of organic ano ff d "insight Into t e SIgn h "d Iwelcome in that It a ere 0 I" B t what he termed t e eve op-

, hnicue m genera u dinamely generative tee rnqu . . b d ced to "merely nee ing toId 0 his view not e re u d 0mental problem" cou 10 , ber of geniuses an raise

o d am both a great num 0

sort individuals In or er to g . 319). Like many of his contemporanes,the median level" (Goldscheld 1911.. , rheor of species origin to humanGoldscheid tried to transfer DarWIn So 0 y ts he called the aXiom of a

o f the SOCIal arwmls , 0 I d _society' but unltke most 0 . hasizing envlronmenta a apPitiles; "struggle for life" into questiOn, emp was itself grounded in this

°d' f 0 h n progress 0 hOtat ion instead. Goldschel s alIt I I theory and even more so m IS

. f bO I . 'deve opmenta , 0 I 0 nder-Pacification a 10 oglca 0 d that a SOCia sCIence uf . e' he was conVince h tosense of the power 0 sClenc . I omy could show t e way

d developmenta econstood as both human an 0 ement of the world.' 0 0 0 0

promotion of progress and Improv d human beings to the" mhented biO-Where the raCial hygienistS reduce h Oreconomic value (Wemgart,

Id h'd duced them to t el h h Onlogical traits Go sc el re d h could never anc or t e pn -Kroll and B;yertz 1988: 254). To that en 'h' e d at the same time he couldciple of utility maximization deeply ehno

u; h:~eclared the economic realm

o 0 h h On the one an , 0 rrectly Innever set It hlg enoug . '" the final analysts, or more co .to be the "ur- a priori." Because In d d g" were "an economiC func-

o b h life and un erstan m "am isms"the last synthesIs. .. at 0 riately be described as econ 0 0 "

tion," organisms could mos,t app~ P, of this "biological utdltanaOlsm(G Id h °d 1915: 82). In hIS denvatlon. dOom in the theory of

o sc el Id h °d antiCIpate an aXI " If(G Id hOd 1911: 102) Go sc el 0 presented a se -

o sc el '1' d it every orgamsm re h b'lautopoietic systems: as he exp alOe 0 " ggregate distinguished by tea 0 I-

. h'" "blOchemlca a . lb' functionpreservation mac me, ~ f f I stimuli promoting t 1e asK fh dOff endy In ace 0 ne I 0 "The essence aity to be ave I ~r hreatening to annu It. ,,'

we call life than JJ1 face of those tho st of its maintenance, withh "conomy In t e Imerethis system waS t us e

252 Ulrich Brochling

living defined as being of benefit to oneself (Goldscheid 1911: 96-99), thecategory of the economic thus being even older than that of the logical,although human thinking itself functioned according to the principle ofeconomizing on expenditure and optimizing returns: "A maximum of cog-nition with a minimum of contradiction, that is the goal of our thinking ascognitive will" (Goldscheid 1915: 85, 90).

On the other hand, Goldscheid elevated utility maximization to thehighest ethical maxim. Neither Kant's categorical imperative nor Christiancaritas could offer morality a secure foundation; only its "developmental-economic necessity" could do this. In his view, only "what is justified interms of developmental economy, hence not what merely serves our aims ingeneral but only what furthers our goals in the economic manner," couldbe considered "objectively ethical" (Gold scheid 1908: 127, 131). In 1914,of all years, he saw grounds for an optimistic prognosis: "As things nowstand, it cannot be very long before the recognition breaks through thatthe deepest meaning of humanity lies in its economic productivity" (Gold-scheid 1914a: 525). If the good and the useful came together, ethics wouldbe transformed into "ethotechnics," "a kind of psychological technologythat examines how human psychic machinery has to be shaped in orderfor it to function according to the postulates of developmental economy"(Gold scheid 1908: 13l).

With the category of Entwicklungswert, "developmental value," Gold-scheid was trying to determine an objective "qualitative measure of value,"which he juxtaposed with the quantitative measure of labor-value doctrineand the subjective measure of value of marginal-utility theory (Gold scheid1921: 8-9). In the framework of Entwicklungswert, the value of a goodwas measured not only in terms of the social working time needed for itsproduction, but also in terms of the "socially necessary needs" it satisfied-or railed to satisfy. For Goldscheid what was "socially necessary" was only"human wishes that are desirable in the interest of higher development,"hence those "preconditions for flourishing social development ... that needto be created and that must be taken account of if a society is to maintainand fulfill itself" (Goldscheid 1908: 23,5-6). This resulted in an ecologi-cal perspective anticipating the current emphasis on sustainability. Thereference-point at work here was not the single individual but rather the"generic subject," developmental value applying "not only to each genera-tion that momentarily represents the human species but to the human spe-cies in its total development." Developmental economy was thus "economyconsidered in view of the long term" (Gold scheid 1908: 22, 94).

Goldscheid's methodological procedure corresponded to the model ofplanning-economy rationalization, with science, especially an "exactlyfounded sociology," being granted the role of highest planning authority:

From the relationship of aUf intersubjective valuation to our objectiveenergetic position in nature, the science of sociology determines what is


to be understood as higher development in view of the pre~en\ sta~e~:, if k ledge in general. After the ideal of higher eve opt ,

scient: c now. ." nd in order for a coordlOatlOnhas been ascertamedbmntghtlhSamtaa~;~~~g\ having only a relative charac-system to come IOta erna tnai , . brer, isbclapable of functi~7yin:e;~:~~~:~~~I;~esist~~~d~(~~~tr~~:gl:c~~~:POSSl eta approxlma "" d in this way to ob-point on the basis of this coordl~atIon ?S;~:i;:Ch~id 1908: 109)rain a systematically arranged va ue sea e.

, d h an bein s themselves: forming, as work-At the head of this scale sroo urn f g eraring developmental value,

. he i di ble means or gening capacity, t e 10 Ispensa. h I in whose interest all devel-. b d ng t e one va ue Ibut at the same orne em 0 yl nd thus not only constituting a means butopmenta! values are created, a , ' 'If t that developmental econ-

I I ThIS 10 itse meanalso the developmenta goa. .'k 'For Goldscheid its "centra I

d I· . Menscheno anomie. fomy woul cu rmnate 10 di d UIJbringing of which type 0

f II . "the bree 109 an )"problem" was as 0 ows: . s of developmental economy.. ff h best return 10 term , h 'human being 0 ers t e , di I offered the answer, whic 111

(Goldscheid 1908: 154). He Imme"IT~y Werkbund has distributed theessence was quality not quantity:. It; efinement of the rnater iall-r-itlovely motto: loyalty to the matena

lan h r t be applied above all to the

must not be doubted that this posru ate as 0

h bei hi self" (Coldscheid 1914a: 528).urnan emg irn

, een fashioned expensively and solidlyThe human being who has b from the cheap human being. A sol-reveals quite different qu aj itjes h h s grown from healthy

. d h being IS one w 0 a hidly fashione uman d d b healthy fathets, and werematernal soil and been engen ere y d training upon which atthe youthful individual recelv:s care at~e case in animal breeding.least as much care has been t a en as IS(Goldscheid 1911: 495)

. G Id cheid maintained, lived longer and alsoHuman beings of quality, 0 s d h tS I'nvested in them were more

d ' I·· n the en t e cos , . fworked more pro ucnve y, I . int f Goldscheid's cnnque 0, Thi the starting potnt or

than paid back. IS was di d hich he accused of over-usage. I' ic order or isor er, w .rv b Idthe capita 1Steconomic 0 , ited h working capacity ut cou

. I' it xplOite uman . fof organic capita, Since 1 e. f d I ental needs" and creation a" . f etlan 0 eve opm .not care less about ~,"tlS a id 1908: 86-87). His accusation concern-"organic added value (Goldsche, f he proletariat was dlfected at the

. d I' . gcondltJons 0 t 'I' ding the working an IVII1 I h t the Norwegian SOCiaagist anh 'bl and the acrua t a "gulf between t e POSSl e would describe fifty years later as strUC-

peace researcher Johan" Galtun~ltun 's famous definition, thiS was p.resenttural violence." Accord 109 to G, fI g d 0 that their actual somatic and"when human beings are being In uence s I lizations" (Galtung 1969:

" b I w thelt potentia teamental realizations are eo hOngmore drastically:168). Goldscheid formulated the same t I


If a worker with work corresponding to all hygienic requirements andthose of developmental economy would be capable of healthily reach-ing the age of sixty, seventy, even eighty, instead of-as at present-dying in slow agony between thirty-five and forty-five, then it is clearthat his life, that his health, that his joy in existence is consumed withthe coal that we burn in OUf ovens; and since this is so, it is also clearthat in tolerating these circumstances, we sin in the worst possible wayagainst the highest law of the theory of developmental value and de-velopmental economy, which demands an equivalence between laborvalue and developmental value, which demands that no developmentaldamage be accepted without a counterpart being present in develop-mental advancement. (Goldscheid 1908: 86-87)

Correspondingly, he interpreted the efforts of the socialist movement andlabor unions as a struggle, albeit one not entirely conscious of its human-eco-nomic dimension, against the worker's "organic expropriation" and for thepreservation of his "developmental property, that is, for the "best possibleunfolding of his organism" (Gold scheid 1908: 158). Socialism was, for Gold-scheid, "management of workers for the sake of the workers themselves"-acomprehensive planning economy in which "the polity increasingly becomesthe trustee of organic capita)"; a state capitalism that "sees both its surest fun-dament and highest goal in the most careful, conscientious individualizingMenschenokonomie" (Goldscheid 1932: 1122-1123, emphasis in original).From a "sociologically grounded, social-biologically oriented administra-tion" rooted "in individualization and differentiation" and aimed "at aninternalizing of social regulation," he hoped for a "restocking of the nation'sentire human material" (Goldscheid 1911: 577).

As Goldscheid saw things, in the end developmental-economic reasonwould spread to the realm of international relations, setting an end to the"desolate paroxysm" of the imperial nation's quest for advantage (Gold-scheid 1911: 552), This line of historical ascent would emerge as it werenaturally, he believed, from scientific progress: "Just as the nineteenth cen-tury was the century of technology, the twentieth century will be that ofinternalized technology, and thus of organics and psychotechnology; wherefor that century nature was the starting point, for this century it will belife. In this way control over nature will be followed by control over life"(Goldscheid 1914b: 14).

The model for a universal biopolitical administration was offered bysocial security-"the modern economy's most revolutionizing moment, , . and at the same time its most conservative" (Goldscheid 1914a: 520),The historical process moved from the absolutist "rape·based state," tothe "administrative state" and onward to a "community based On mutualsolidarity" (Goldscheid 1912: 5) "in which not only the living and workingperson represents an economic value but also the dying person in the samesense that loss for the society is entered in the books just as dying and sick


cattle figure in the farmer's calcularion as a liability" (Goldscheid 1910t

217). Such a social order would subject an economy's human side, lust . I ethe roduction of goods, to a comprehensive "normallzat~on, t~plfi~atlon,

d : d di . "(Goldscheid 1932, 1122) and precisely In this wayan stan ar izanon ". bareh ' di id al's developmental rights-nghts that, to e sure,secure t e III IVI U d "

themselves standardized in line with "socially necessary nee s. ., . h hi f homan-econormc actor1m errand , inauguranng Leviar an as c re .,.

did n~t mean ~reeing individuals from their responsibility, The dedmdandfohr. ducri d reduction correspon e to r erationalization of SOCIalpro ucnon an rep

individual's self-rationalization:

Re ardin his own manner of life, every individual has to repeatedlyg hi g .. d I live in a developmental-economic way to the

Pose t IS question. 0 ff .. to. ek with the energies that are e ecnve In me,

highest degree, do I se , I I s? And regarding eachcreate the greatest possible develohPmenta hva ute

o'ask again: am I here

. ivid I' ell every our one asindivi ua action as w , , lified working capacityutilizing my life force, am I here using m~fiqua ~y' (Goldscheid 1908:with the highest possible evolutiOnIstiC e cten .202-203)4

. ' s fair! important, Goldscheid remainedRegarding one question that seem h Y -lling to follow the impera-. happen to t ose unWI .

Silent: what was meant to . h se incapable of prodUCingf h ··k iei In any event, t 0 dtive 0 Mensc eno onomiei I be treated with respect an

I . dded va ue were todevelopmenta -economic a .,. fi d this seeming altruism in eco-benevolent care-although he again )U~tIh: re roach that if he rigorouslynomic terms. He apodicricallv rejecte t Ph end he would have "to

hi M h i5konomle to r e ,thought through IS ensc en I hild all invalids indeed all helplessapprove the killing of all jncurab e c I ren, ,people," as follows:

, that refined social empathy represents aNow there can be no question The certainty of being

I f f rhe highest potency .. ' . ddevdopmenta actor o. h h an creative drive onwa r.. I b c etyspurst e urntreated apprectanve y Yso ~ bei bl to count on the assurance

di d ee Just as eing a eto an extraor mary egr .rwh rks represents a strong rno-

" b h e for w om one wo fof apprecratron y t os . h. although maintenance ab nve For r IS reason, .

tor of our urge to e ac. '. lid d old people in general IS notthose incapable of work 109, Invall s, ahn ·nd·lrecr added value coming

. I'd dded va ue tel , I halways direct y £le to ~ . ' bstantial and preCise y t eh h . teoance ISvery su , .' h

about throug t elr ma,m ,. h ws then, that maintammg t esedevelopmental-economIc ctltlque so; (Goldscheid 1908: 195)human categories is extremely Irnportan .

. to be a weak argument to the exten~ rh~tThis would 10 any case turn out . f crisis displaced faith In

h I the semantics 0 hwith the Great War at t e arest'l d.ff ent cost-benefit calculations, T e

. ther entire y 1 erprogress, opemng up a ,


more economic resources shrank (or seemed to do so), the greater becamethe readiness to cut expenditure on those who needed material support andcare and were unable to produce productive services. Despite his highlymoral economy of empathy and mutual solidarity, in trying, even to abizarre degree, to economically determine the value of life, Goldscheid wasmoving on the same terrain as those convinced that for financial reasons itwas "necessary to sacrifice life unworthy of living in order to maintain thatworthy of living" (Tandler 1924: 306).5Hence, in 1920, the psychiatrist Alfred Hoche compared German soci-

ety of rhe time with "participants in a difficult expedition for whom thegreatest possible capacity to perform on everyone's part is an indispensableprecondition for the enterprise's success, and for whom there is no placefor half, quarter, or eighth capacity" (Heche 1920: 54-55)6 In view of the"massive capital in the form of food, clothing, and heat" expended for theinstitutional care of "ballast existences," capital "taken from the nationalfortune for an unproductive goal," it seemed to him that "authorization forrhe annihilation of life unworthy of being lived"-this was the title of thenotorious book he published together with the jurisr Karl Binding-wasnot only justified but even mandatory, in order to "bring about relief forour excessive national burden" (Hoche 1920: 54-56).'Goldscheid's developmental pathos had vanished; what remained was the

furor of human-economic accounting. Whether the life of a human beingwas classified as worthy or not of living depended on the balance of his orher cost-benefit value. Those depending on permanent professional care,hence not creating economic value through their own work, were a burdenon the budget and forfeited their right to existence. Goldscheid propagatedinvestment in the "qualification of human material" (Goldscheid 1911:495); Hoche called for systematic disinvestment when inferior quality leftlittle hope for return.

3. HUMAN CAPITAL

Rising to prominence in the decades following World War II and especiallyexerting its influence (which has recently been growing again) in the realmof educational and developmental economics, the theory of human capitalis likewise concerned with investment in human beings.' As in Goldscheid'sMenschenokonomie, the main concern here is quality and qualification.And the claims being staked are equally high: "The thrust of my argu-ment is that the investment in population quality and knowledge in largeparts determines the future prospects of mankind," programmaticallydeclares the dean of human capital theory, Theodore W. Schultz (1981:XI), in the foreword to his essay collection Investing in People. And hisyounger colleague Gary S. Becker seconds this statement: "Human capitalis important because productivity in modern economies is based on the


creation, dissemination, and utilization of knowledge,:' (Becker 1993b: 50).But where Goldscheid declared his project to be a normative econom~c. "(G Idscheid 1908: 70), the theorists of human capita! mSISt on t e

SCience 0 . h Th d t mqutre mrc thepurely descriptive character of their ~esearc. ey h0, n~ dividual actionsways human beings should economically arrange t err in Iand social coopetation, but assume that they already do ond mere method-This behavioral science otlentatlon, extendmg fat bey ki Fit's

.' h least of the factors spar mg oucauological indiVidualism, was not t e b h . "(Becker 1976). It. . " . ch to human e avtormteresr in the econorruc a~proa. that he deciphered the rationale ofwas espeCially from Becker s wntmgest because most radical form, distill-neoliberal govern mentality in Its clear .' If (Brockling 2007). As was.. I h fi of the enterptlsmg semg Its nuc eus as t e gure d lib alisrn Foucault here iden-. hi k 1German or 01 er ,already the case in ISwor 01 f h to that of competition: whentifies a shift from the, paradigm 0 t~;~ua~~~ being as homo (Economicus,theory of human capital presents f I 'cal economics not as a part-. . .. hi . di ti cuon rom c aSSI ,It IS desctlbmg im, in IS m f h' If being for himself his own

· h b" ntrepreneur 0 rmserr, fner in exc ange ut as e . d b ing for himself the source 0capital, being for himself his own pro ucer, ei

[his] earnings" (Foucault 2008f:h226). 'tallies in its conceprion of con-

. . f h ry 0 uman cap:The innovanon 0 t eo . I .' It sees in the consumer not. If reneuna actiVity. ksumption as use an enrrep . ducer In this framewor ,

. f d but also an active pro .only a passive user 0 goo s , ' luding economic act; rather,

f d ervtce IS not a concthe purchase 0 a goo or s . . divid I makes use of his resources,. . f . . h ch the m IVI ua fIt IS a form 0 Input m WI. . h way that the highest degree 0especially the scarce factor of ~lme, In sue Thi economization not only of

· . I f m this as output. IS . hi hsatisfaction eaps out ro .' II' the decisive lever With W IC. . b f rrung time as we IS

working time ut 0 consu . d . the entire spectrum of human. I cceeds in rawmg .' .theory of human caplta. su individ I pears here as an ecoriomtc msn-· ..' . I SIS The In IVI ua ap d hiactrvines into ItS ana y . lik h f a company depen s on IS. d . t nee let at 0 , ,

[ution whose continue eXIS e, Id h ve been decided against or. Wh meone does cou a . kor her chOlces. atever so . For that reason It rna es

h· Ide at the same time.replaced by samet mg ~ se. ?n I take u the options assumed to corre-sense to presume that mdlvldua s T:e human being of human-capitalspond most closely to their preferences. . I decides

. II ne who unswervmg y . .theory IS above a scmeo I' d ro all human actIOn assu mes,The economic approach Becker sees aft Ie as they conceive it, whether

firstly "that individuals maXImize fwelare ochistic" (Becker 1992: 38,

, . . I I spite u or mas hthey be selfish altrUIstIc, oya, '. . human beings ere.' '.. F n analytlC perspective, .

emphaSIS m ongma\). rom a . d . II they do with allocating scarce. I reOCCllpie In a .appear as ratlOna actors, P I W' h' th'ls schema all aetlon repre-

. . f t ng goa s. It In 'means In purSUit 0 corope I . d attractive and less attrac-I t'ves perceive as ,

sents a choice between a terna, I f h' sense with the self-lOterestIf' ted m a ar-reac mg, I d h

rive and is thus se -Illteres I" t'sfaction at having he pe ot-'f . the a trulst s sa I h'also potentially roalll est 10 f d how he or she ac ,eves

ers. The question of the individual's pre erences an


them lies outside the realm of economic theory. Secondly, however, what isdecisive for Becker is the assumption that elementary preferences "such ashealth, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy" do not change overtime. His third basic assumption is related to "the existence of markets thatwith varying degrees of efficiency coordinate the actions of different par-ticipants-individuals, firms, even nations-so that their behavior becomesmutually consistent." What he is referring to here is much more than simplymonetary markets: even outside their sphere, "either directly or indirectly,each commodity has a relevant marginal 'shadow' price, namely, the timerequired to produce a unit change in that commodity" (Becker 1976: 4-6).The axiomatic principle is that supply and demand regulate how the actorsmaximize their benefits and weight their competing pteferences.

For Becker, these basic premises do not have the status of empiricalstatements about human nature. Rather, what is at work here is a heuris-tic construct-an "as-if" anthropology or methodological move aimed atreducing complexity. The assumption that people behave as if they wererational "contains no statement about reality but formulates an analyticschema guiding the generation of statements about reality" (Pies 1998: 19).Theory of human capital grasps the human being as homo ceconornicusand grasps him only to the extent that he behaves accordingly: if individu-als constantly try to maximize their benefits, their actions can be guided byraising or lowering their costs and thus altering the calculation. As some-one who constantly decides, homo ceconornicus is also "someone who iseminently governable" (Foucault 2008: 270). If there is no behavior thatcannot be described in terms of cost-benefit calculations, then people haveno other choice than to make choices in all their actions. The economicapproach addresses them from the start as the entrepreneurial market sub-jects into which they need to be transformed and to transform themselves.

Within this framework, human capital initially means nothing otherthan that knowledge and skills and the state of one's health, but also outerappearance, social prestige, working ethos, and personal habits, need tobe seen as scarce resources requiring investment to set up, maintain, andexpand. "The human agent becomes ever more a capitalist by virtue of hispersonal human capital," Schultz ohserves, "and he seeks political supportto protect the value of that capital" (Schultz 1981: 76). Even when he pos-sesses no material goods, he at least disposes over his lifespan and will useit to maximum advantage, according to his preferences. This includes, forinstance, maintaining one's health:

Gross investment in human capital entails acquisition and maintenancecosts, including child care, nutrition, clothing, housing, medical ser-vices and care of oneself. The service that health capital renders con-sists of "healthy time" or "sickness-free time" which contributes towork, consumption, and leisure activities. (Schultz 1981: 13)


Becker interprets the decision for or against marriage, for hor against c~i~~dren or for a specific number of children according to t e same rna e..

, h s "when they expect to be better off than .rwomen or men marry, e argue, , d to i h .rh . d si Ie and they divorce if that IS expecte to mcrease t ett ey remarne sing , .. I sidered

If "(B k 1992' 46). For their part children are err rer con '. .we are ec er· f . "(B k 1976· 172) which In"a source of psychic income or sat is action ec er, . , .

. h they are a life-long consumptionthe framework of economic t eory meadns

h·11itself bring in monetary

d f . s a production goo t at WI Igoo , or unction a . Id age Whether potential parentsincome and for examp~e assure c.are In a "de ends on whether thedecide on having a child or having another

do~ere ~he quality of the chil-

expected benefit outweighs the costs mcurre .dren is also meant to be considered a cost factor:

. ot only how many children it has but also theA family must determine :hether it should provide separate bedrooms,amount spent on them rivate colle es, give them dance orsend them to nursery school and p g. hildren "higher

. d f th I will call more expensive c Imusic lessons, an so or C· dill called higher quality cars than

I· hild " just as a I acs are hqua ity c I ren, . d di let me hasten to add t atI T id any rrusun erstan mg, "IChevro ets. 0 avo: II better If more is volu ntar i y

hi h I'" does not mean mora y" d" ig er qua iry h ., b se the parents obtain a -hild h n anot er It IS ecauspent on one Cit an 0ddi . rial 'expenditure and it is this additionalditional utility from the a I,~IO I· "(B k r 1976: 173)utility which we call higher qua ity, ec e

, dividuals are "abilities-machines" (Fou-As entrepreneurs of themselves, I~ . dent development, care-

8 229) d these machmes require pr u h·cault 200 : an d' t to market requirements. T IS

" d continuous a justmen k hful malOtenance, an d d d before the individual ta es t ecannot begin early enough ~n eman s, f his competencies into his own

" . d anent Improvement 0building up an perm d ther social institutions:hands, the engagement of parents an 0

f hours a mother spends with her child,We know that the number 0 '11b ery important for the forma-even when it is still in the cradle'fwi h efv tion of a human capital,

bili " chine or or t e orma ,tion of an a I ltles-ma, danrive if in fact its parents or ItSand that the child will be much more a aptlvte~ him or her. This means

d ther than less time WI f dmother spen more ra I he si pie time parents spend ee -ibl to ana yze t e SlIDthat it must be pass! e,. h ff ction as investment which caning their children, or grvmg t em

O;' ~29)

form human capital. (Foucault 20 .

f human capital corresponds to Goldscheid'sTo a great extent, the conc,ept 0 inn of Menschenokonomie saw the

. I" b h Ie the champion 0 . f h·"organic capita ; ut WI, f h" dequate accumulation 0 t ISmarket's anarchy as responsible or / e ina. g economy, for the theoristscapital and demanded the gUidance 0 a P anmn


of human capital the market not only cannot be fooled but is the best con-ceivable regulatory mechanism for increasing population quality and indi-vidual well-being. This does not, however, amount to a plea for laissez fairepolicies: Schultz and Becker themselves consider state engagement in therealm of education and health to be indispensable; but political measuresshould increase competition instead of compensating for putative marketinadequacies in social-reformist zeal. Within their logic, the market can inany event only fail when the Leviathan of the "invisible hand" places fetterson it, distorting the free play of supply and demand. For this reason, Beckerexplains, the state "should be involved in financing only a small fraction ofthe large total investment in human capita]"; "in a well-functioning marketeconomy," he continues,

the vast majority of investments in human capital would be the privateresponsibility of individuals and organizations: parents who invest intheir children, adults who gain additional training, and companies anduniversities that provide training, do research, and develop commer-cially viable technologies. (Becker 1993b: 56)

Here at the latest, Becker's analytic method-which he claims lies at theheart of his economic approach-reveals itself as a normative guiding prin-ciple; and the theorist of human capital is seen as a political economist.

Goldscheid equated calculability and humanity; he responded to criticsby insisting that human life would only be treated with care when viewed ascapital. Becker and Schultz are themselves convinced that the rising signifi-cance of human capital-a pointer to the "knowledge society"-will leadto a more humane treatment of human beings. But just as Menscbenohono-mie offered arguments both for health insurance and for the murder ofincurably ill people, the theory of human capital alternates between a gram-mar of care and one of toughness. It inverts Goldscheid's regulatory zealInto a complaint, presented in ever new variations, that there are too manyregulations. Becker thus populistically denounces especially that institutionGoldscheid viewed as essentially anticipating human-economic organiza-tion: social secunty, It encourages, he argues, "many families to count onthe. government .to provide their retirement income rather than saving fortheir old age while they are working" (Becker and Becker 1997: 96).

Becker consistently responds to moral indignation over the amoralityof his economic approach by referring to its heuristic power, and in factempirical evidence for his as-if anthropology is not lacking. His analysis offertility has thus found practical confirmation in private eugenics (or "lib-eral eugenics," as jurgen Habermas 120031 calls it), which has long been aneveryday practice. The lower the number of children per parents and thehigher the costs the parents invest in their qualification, the more impor-rant the quality of the raw producr becomes and the more probable it isthar children With prenatal diagnosable maladies Or handicaps will remain


unborn. In some countries, the embryo only needs to have the "wrong"sex for an abortion to follow or, if preimplantation genetic diagnostics isused, for implantation simply not to rake place. Individual managemenr ofquality has stepped in for rerroristic selecrion by the state. One may full,ysupport the right of a mother to decide ro abort an embryo with Down ssyndrome, but there can be no doubt that this decision is an individua leugenic choice.

For the advocates of Menschenokonomie before and afrer rlie GreatWar, the state sovereign no longer simply functioned as an ideal. total ca.pi-talist who tried to accumulare organic added value, bur also decided whichlife was ro be approved for destruction as "unworthy of being lived." Incontrast for the advocates of human-capital theory, each individual notonly becomes a capitalist but also a sovereign over himself. Wirh each of hisactions he maximizes his individual benefit, but also exercises the power, toagain take up Foucault's formulation, "to make live and t~ l~t di~.ll ..

Ar this point if not before, neoliberal governmenrality s blopolltlcaldimension, as pointed ro by Foucault, becomes apparent. Long before therelevant procedures had become operational on a ma~slve scale, ~e l~en-tified the logic of selection following from rhe coupling of genetic diag-nostics with economization of the individual: "as soon. as ~ society p~s~sitself the problem of the improvement of its human capital 111 general, It ISinevitable that the problem of the conrrol, screening, and improvement ofthe human capital of individuals, as a function of Unions and consequentreproduction, will become actual, or at any rate, called for" (Foucault

2008: 228). . . .., h h fThat with its generalized principle of urilitv maXI~lzat.l~n, t e r eory ~

human capital radicalizes political economy into b,opolmcal economy, ISevident not only in questions of family planning It also describes individu-als' approach to their own healrh as the consequence of deCISions regardll1~investment and disinvestment. "Corresponding to the economIC approa;h,.Becker explains bluntly, "most (if not all!) dearhs are ro some exrenr SUI-cides' in the sense that they could have been postponed If more .re~our~eshad been invested in prolonging life" (Becker 1976: 10, emphasis In ang-inal). Blaming the victim here rules: whoever is sick has nor adequat~lylooked afrer his health; whoever falls vicrim ro an accident or cri rne oughtto have better seen to his or her security. Whate.ver one does or allowsalways involves an encounter between tWOcompeting preferences:

G d health and a long life are important aims of most persons, but001 than a moment's reflection is necessary to convince

sure y no more h b h Ith or aan one that they are not the only aims: some'.'" at. ertcr ea.lo:ger life may be sacrificed because rhey conflict with other; In15... kTherefore, a person may be a heavy smoker or so c~m.mltte to ~vo~as to omit all exercise, not necessarily ~ecause h.e IS Ignorant 0 t e

"" rcapable" of using the Information he possesses, butconsequences or II


because the lifespan forfeited is not worth the cost to him of quittingsmoking Ot working less intensively. (Becker 1976: 9-10)

The sovereign decision over life and death here splits itself up into a mul-tiplicity of micro-decisions, through which the individual shortens orlengthens his life. Every cigarette: a small death sentence; every time you gojogging: a small stay of execution,

4. CONCLUSION: THE ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT OF LIFE

Goldscheid's Menschenokonomie and the theory of human capital can beread in parallel, not least because both analyze individual life and the popula-tion as a whole in rigorously economic terms. The starting point is the same,an identification of human life with the capability to choose, and with thenecessity of doing so: "Life means wanting and the deepest sense of wantingis to be able to choose," declares Goldscheid apodictically, thus anticipatingthe utilitarianism of the human-capital theorists, extended across all realmsof life. Becker und Schultz would most likely also agree with the secondof Goldscheid's anthropological axioms, "the characteristic quality of ournature is that we not only can choose but also must choose" (Goldscheid1921: 7, emphasis in original). The compelling outcome of the double condi-tion humaine of "freedom" and "necessity" to choose-and this conclusionis also shared by the two economic theories-is that human beings are as inneed of government as they are governable: the person who can rationallychoose and must choose will make his or her decisions dependent on thestructure of incentives. For this reason, behavior can be far more efficientlysteered by controlling the incentives than through a repressive truncation ofchoices. The governmentalization of life here has its basis. To be sure, Gold-scheid on the one hand, and Becker and Schultz on the other hand, derivevery different rationalities of government from this: where for Goldscheidscience, translating the developmental laws learnt from nature into psycho-technology and social technology, serves as the highest authority of goodgovernment, Becker and Schultz rely on the "permanent economic tribunal"of the market as a standard for governmental action (Foucault 2008: 247).

In his lectures, Foucault analyzes the theory of human capital as a vari-ant of neoliberal govern mentality. The interferences between the "eco-nomic approach to human behavior" and governmental regimes that havebecome hegemonic in most Western COuntries since the 19805 are in factevident, and have been frequently described On the basis of Foucault's read-ing of the texts of Becker and Schultz. The present essay has argued thatthe expansion of economic rationality to all realms of life necessarily radi-calizes political economy into biopolitical economy-that the neoliberalinterpellation of the entrepreneurial self also takes in a capitalizarion ofone's own life.


I' Foucault Rudolf Goldscheid's draft ofIn contrast, if we are to be ieve hi g' that does not exist: a social-

henok: ie documents somet In ,a Mensc eno onom di g German Social Democracy s

I, In an excursus ISCUSSID . 'ist governmenta ity. . di F It observes that in all as van-

f 'M rxist rra ItlOO oucau .departure rom as a '. tionaliry and that It can,. b I es an economic ra I , .ants, socialism dou tess pursu ., ' rionality But he indicates,

d d hi . a1 and adrninistrauvc ra 'l dalso be accor e istortc , I'" (Foucault 2008: 93) anit "lacks an intrinsic governmenta~/a~~e~~~~ntality, say liberal forms orhas always leaned on other forms

dg, ri police state rhe absence of

I, fa hyper-a mimstra tve 'f h hthe governmenra iry 0 b ' g compensated or t rougd . 1" t art of governance em M

an indepen enr socia IS Id I inrer pret Goldscheid's en-, f ic r xts We cou a so I .

invocation 0 canonic e " f lib I and welfare-police state setschenokonornie as such a bncolage 0 I .iali "was not something that

h ' n of "true sOCIa Ismpieces, although r e quesno h averse to any party orthodoxy.preoccupied this private scholar, t ~;as suggests anorher reading: Gold-In any case, the reconstructIOn o~ ere

he,re b th socialist and biopolitical,

I, nmentalay t at IS 0 .scheid out ines a gover li d that constructs an economicthat follows the principle of mutua ity, an lasring usage, and shared

, " f I'f on preventIve care, . . .rationalization 0 I e up d solidanty are ItS rna xrrns,f h ourees Progress an .

safeguarding 0 uman res. " bili principle. Human-economic. f ic capital Its mo I mng isrn baccumulation 0 organ di I lrernarive to capita1Jsm ut on an

socialism is not focused on a r~ tea a h II I bili ro society as a woe. , I f

expansion of ca Cll a I ity " ie a nd the theory of human capita armGoldscheid's MenschenokonomIe a f nee between which the

I, ationahtles 0 governa k dthe two camp irnenrary r "b' olitieians oscillate: mar et an

d Ii st cenrurles lOp "etwentieth an twenty- r I 'd nce or self-orgamzatlon, arplan, invisible and visible hand, c~~~~~or~~'toagovern human life economi-the poles berween which nearly a

cally are located. , ' resented here is perhaps moreAnother outcome of rhe OPPOSlrlOn

fp rnmenrality have focused on

, nalyses 0 gove f b'important: untIl now, most a, 'alities and modes 0 su Jee-f ' I echamsms ration, d h ydistilling the unetlOna m 1 d ategies, In other wor s, r e

t I programs an srr andrifieation of governmen a d I r patterns of governance .have been interested in rhe rules ahn regu a

rsof sudden change in which

f t'on- for t ose pOlO h r ofnot in the state 0 excep I. I d' to economic terms, testa efail Trans ate 10 d' s tothe routines of governance, I'ty suspended in it correspon 109

, .. s and the norma I .exception means cnst , d' and consumption.the economic equilibrium of pro ucnon I heory also operate with models

Menschenokonomie and human-capita bt tween costS and the returns ofof equilibrium. For Goldscheid a 1~~I~;~:c;nomy. For Schulrz and Becker:organic capital IS the telos of a p , rves as a heuristic principle. Goldthe assumption of market equlhbflum :~urit ro a model of developmental-scheid raises rhe muruahsm ofdSO~la~s gen:ralize self-regulation throu;heconomic justice; Schultz an. eC

ler dium of social integration. Nel.t edr

1 nd demand into a Unlversa me "and yet it is inSCribesupp yak d Schultz refer ro a cnSlS,Goldscheid nor Bec er an


into both their theories. In the crisis of the interwar period, calculating life-value in the framework of Menschenokonomie legitimized murderous selec-tion. As indicated, those whose cost-benefit balance came out negativelywere considered "ballast existences" whose right to existence had been for-feited. In the present crisis, seemingly set for the long term, the "economicimperialism" (Becker 1993a) of human-capital theory has revealed itselfas an apology for a reckless competitive struggle of all against all. If themarkets threaten to collapse, maximization of benefits becomes a zero-sumgame and homo ceconomicus "a wolf to man."

At this point, Agamben's previously discussed deconstruction of theconstitutive linkage between biopolitics and sovereignty comes togetherwith the critique of biopolitical economy offered in these pages. Agambenconnects Hobbes' homo homini lupus to the mythological figure of thewerewolf: a hybrid animal-human monster once expelled from the humancommunity, exposed in a law-free realm to every form of violence, andonly surviving through his own violence. Correspondingly, Hobbes' stateof nature is, in Agamben's view, "not so much a war of all against all as,more precisely, a condition in which everyone is bare life and a homo sacerfor everyone else" (Agamben 1998: 64). The sovereign, he suggests, has notgained his position through others having renounced their potential forviolence, but inversely through his being the only one to have retained hisnatural right to do anything to everyone.

If we follow this argumentation, the Hobbesian scenario hidden in thetheory of human capital becomes evident. If it promotes each person to asovereign, it declares him in the same breath to be homo sacer: as an actingagent, the individual disposes as he pleases over his own life and over thatof others, with legal sanctions or other consequences of his actions enteringhis calculations as opportunity costs. As the object of hath his own andexternal action, he is thrown back to the status of "bare life," his existencedepending on someone-whether ego or after-being available to invest init. If life becomes an economic function, disinvestment amounts to death.

NOTES

1. According to the definition of its most prominent spokesman, Johann Hei.nrich Gotrlob von Justi, the Po/iui comprised "all regulations and arrange-ments in the country's inner affairs through which the state's general assetsare more enduringly grounded and made more usable ro the benefit of thestate, the assets of the private person are increased and more precisely andeffectively connected to the general advantage, and the powers of the state(or furthering the happiness of all can be mOre fully activated in general."According to ]usti, the task of authorities governing according to the insightsof Po/izeiwisscuschaft was to incrc<lse both real estate and goods and chat-tels, together with the "moral state of the subjects," with the aim of "happi-ness for the entire state" (Justi 1760: 6-"10). The nature of the countryside,natural resources, roads, population, agrarian production, trade, commerce,


... hall C ual clements of a functionallyand public ad~lnIstr"atlOn were ercld be i~strumentalized by the state andcoherent whole In which a,l1part~~~~alize had a right (0 existence.only parts the state could mstru N f (2009). Fritz and Mikl-Horke

2. On Goldscheid's biography ahnd(2~~~)S~f ·s~~hacker (2000); Korner (1976);(2007); Wltrlsal (2004); As , et

and Tennies (1932/1998). diff irh Max Weber Goldscheid beingh . d h unbridgeable I erence WI , '1 ·t)

3. T. is c.onsurure t.e _ II d vaiue-iud menr controversy (WertHr~el s5.trelhis chief opponent In the so ca e J g d d i 1912 with Webers restgna-within German sociology. :rhe contro~er~y ense: ~~nigsheim 1959}.tion from the German Society for SOCIO g~ ( If-optimization public enlight-

I h man-economic se '. .4. In order to s~ur peop e to u Not the least of its goals was con~munlcatll1g

enment was In turn necessary. d I connections of SOCial phenoru-"insight into the numerically reco~d~ causasociety's self-knowledge," Gold-

d larize "stansncs as a . . I d "ena." In or er to popu . h i epresentation of stansnca ata";scheid proposed the "CIl1~mato.grap IC r"the living curve, the living chart,what her~ ~a~e inro"conslder~~\~n1;~;~ 210, 212). . . . .and the living Image (Goldsc d tor Social Democratic politician acnve

5 Julius Tandler was an Ausman .oc , . I h iene movement; he rook lip. in health issues, and protagoni~~klll the ~acla werlgas his demand for "qual ita-

Goldscheid's idea of Menschenoh

ono~~le a~ble selection of coupling humanI· licv." Althoug a senst dooi f lative popu anon po ICy. "verthe1ess from the stan pomr 0 popu -

beings" was hard to carry out, ~e . least excluding those cases of. . . d d have an mteresr In add ndtion policies we 1Il ee . h tainty that the escen ants a

reproduction in which we can s<? w~ ;:~erative transgressions" (Tandlergeneral public will have to pay 9o;8t). ~ er (1988: 86-88); Sablik (1983) ..1924· 17-18 20). See Weikert (1 , Y he i terwa r period see Faulstich. '. f i it rional costS In t e In b6. On the diSCUSSIOn 0 1l1StI U. f f Mellschenokonomie even eca me an(1998: 79-109). In 1936 thiS orm 0 h- ear upils: "A mentally ill personexercise in a math book fo~ tht:~- ~~ s~~, ~ cri~inal 3.50 R.M daily Il1sntu-causes around 4 RM, a cnpp official has at most 4 RM dally, .an em~loyeetional costs. In many cases an k hardl 2 RM for the entire famtly. a)barely 3 RM, an uneducated. war er A Yd·ng to careful estimations there

fi . phlc form ccor I . ' . IPresent these gures In gra '·1' s etc in German IOstltutlOna300000 mentally ill persons, epl eptlC , f 4 R' M'-c) How many mar-

are, llyatarateo .. )"care. b) What do they cost annlla Id b ted annually with thiS money.

. loans at 1000 RM each cou e grannage . 07 103) _(quored in FaulstICh 1998:! -- ~che's rext Agamben (2002: 14)~152)

7. In his analysis o~ BlIl.dll1g s a7d H eh exclusively on Bindin?'s /u",:ldlcalfocuses, i.n line With hiS genef~h:~ftr~~d handicapped, overlooklllg hiS eco-legitimation of the murder 0 .""

nomic definition of "life unworthy?f 1Jvlllg~ent extend back to classical eco-8. The toors of human-capital theory;n :e7h:ory see pfahler (2000, 7-45). On

nomics' for a histotlcal overview 0 ~ 'nvestment in human capnal, seethe pre~ent-day discussion of eduCatI01.l as l d Development (2001).

. Co-operation anOrganization for Economic

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oucault, Michel. (1988) Th P I·· I e Ity: UniverSity of Utah PressH H . e 01tICa Technolog fI d' ·d ... utton,.Huck Gutman and Luther y? n IVI uals,pp.145-162inPaul

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A nzengruber.Verlag. . rauen(rage und Menschenokonomie. 'Wien/Lei~zig:


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13 Decentering the EconomyGovernmentality Studies and Beyond?

Urs Staheli

Have economics and the economy always already been posrsrrucruralisr?In Foucault's lectures on governmentaliry, he introduces economics as adiscipline without a center:

[E]conomics is a discipline without God; economics is a discipline with-out totality; economics is a discipline that begins to demonstrate notonly the pointlessness, but also the impossibility of a sovereign pointof view over the totality of the state that he has to govern. (Foucault

2008: 282)

This confronts discourse analysis and governmentality studies with a prob-lem-at least if we assume that one of the aims of discourse analysis lies inshowing the heterogeneous assemblage which constitutes a totality or anabstraction such as the market.' One might ask: Why and how to decenter atotality which has never been a totality? Or, what might a critique of sover-eignty contribute to economic analysis if modern economics has never con-ceived of the economy as a sovereign realm? I want to argue that the designof a poststructuralist account of the economy depends upon the nature ofhow it understands the "decentering the economy," and that this under-standing affects the empirical analysis of governmental technologies.

1.

Foucault's description of economics is certainly quite surprising, consider-ing the strange relation between postsrructuralism and economy. Politics,law, art, and even science have become objects of deconstructive and dis-course analytical readings-only the economy has been neglected for quitea long time. While Ernesro Lac1au and Chantal Mouffe's (1985) seminalbook Hegemony and Socialist Strategy offered an outline of a compre-hensive political theory of hegemony in the 1980s, it took more than tenyears to suggest a radical rethinking of liberal and Marxist notions of the

-

270 Urs St.dbeli

economy. This rethinking is exemplified by Gibson-Graham's The End ofCapitalism (1997) and the success of governmentality studies.

This delay of a poststructuralist analysis of economic processes is nocoincidence; rather, it is due to the very success of poststructuralist politicaland social theory. Turning poststructuralism into a social analytics meantfighting against any form of economism; it was the attempt to develop apost-Marxist social theory. One of the effects of these endeavors was toidentify and criticize the economy as the place of essentialism and sub-stantialism. Thus, the economy became a no-go area. Should one-againstbetter advice-decide to visit the place of the economy, chances were highto become infected by the virus of essentialism.

The disavowal of the economy and economic practices as a legitimatesubject of poststructuralist theorizing resulted in an over-politicized theoryof society. This becomes very clear in Laclau and Mouffe's deconstruc-tion of Marxism, which tried to break with any idea of the economy asdetermining force-or, as a last instance that would eventually govern allsocial processes. Such a move was crucial for getting the necessary con-ceptual space for thinking the political construction of social identities.In that sense, the theory of hegemony turned into a deconstructive socialand political theory: now it became possible to think the contingency ofidentities, and to think precarious identities beyond any naturalized foun-dations. Thus, deconstructing Marxism created the conceptual space for adecentering of political identities. Such a poststructuralist analysis of thepolitical implied doing without any necessary link between the economyand the political. One of the more unhappy effects of such a deconstructionwas that the very concept of the economy has not really been challenged.Instead of deconstructing the economy, it was quarantined. It kept on liv-ing as a self-contained sphere, considered to be successfully and safely iso-lated from other spheres of society. The threat of economic contagion wasbelieved to be banned! However, putting the economy aside in such a waywas nothing less than a late victory of "essentialism." The economy wasnot deconsrrucred, but became the undeconstructable other-the essen-tialist evil-of poststructuralist theory. Either it was made invisible or ithaunted the analysis of identities as the spectre of a suppressed reality. Oneof the merits of govern mentality studies is to put the economy back on thescreen of pOststructuralist theorizing.

In what follows, I Want to specify how govern mentality studies try todecenter economics and the economy.' In order to do this, I will introducetwo different starting points of a poststructuralist understanding of theeconomy. This will lead me to a critique of certain versions of the ideaof governmentality, which tend to neglect the self-reference of economicoperations. My reading of govern mentality studies is not a reading from"within." During my work on financial discourses, I found it very useful tocombme tools from governmental studies with deconstructive concepts andapproaches of systems theory, in order to aCcount for boundary conflicts:

Decentering the Economy 271

- - d for drawing the boundary between thewhich techniques are being use) Thi Iso means that my reading cannoteconomic and the non-econOmic. IS a". '''3

be more than a-hopefully productive- misreading.

2. SUBSTANTIAL AND FORMAL ECONOMY

has to situate itself within exist-Any attempt at decentering the ecofnohmy h been the distinction between

I di h . One 0 t ese as . Iing conceptua IC otormes. (W-Ik 1996). NeociasSica. I id f the economy Ia formal and substantia I ea a hi h assumes a space of pure

lif h f mal account w ICthinking exemp I es t e or. di ' the economy is basically con-. - I' Within this para Igm, deconomic rationa iry, d I Thi del was originally base on

. f arket mo e. IS mo If fceived of 10 terms 0 am. _ During the second ha 0. II I lating economiC man. 3

the idea of rattona y ca cu id R . and Jack Amariglio (200 ). ' what Davl UCCIO ,the twentieth century-m , lution"-systemic ideas of market CqUI-called the second "formalist revo. as the starting point of eco-. . d h d ., g econom IC rna n flibriurn replace t e esirm h di b d economic processes rOI11. F I pproac es rsem e _nomic theory. orma 1St a k b comes a machine of abstrac-. I' . - ns-the mar et ecultural and socia insntuno 'S' the market is seen as all

. mic practices. lOce . . htion, reproducing pure econo f - ds of individual decision, t e- - gout 0 myna ,emergent phenomenon, ansm, f i n with firm boundanes.

h h fan object 0 Its ow . - - heconomy is t oug t a as di f the economy ormctzes t eb .al understan mg 0 _. - K IIn contrast, a su sranu . The classic posmon IS ar

hi ica! abstractton. Whformal model as an a isrori _ b ddi of economic processes. atI - f the dis/ern e mg h- -Polanyi's (1944) ana ysts 0 d - is now seen as a isron-

lays alrea y given,formal narratives present as, a w f h k t and its self-regulation are not

di bddngotemare .- IIcal process. The isem e I . f historical cnSIS. Eventua y,I d I b t expreSSIOns 0 a '" d f

simply universa rna e s: u. of cultural and social spheres: In,stea .0

this leads to an eCOOOffilzatlOn d i - I relations these relatlonshlps. b - embedde In socia ,

the economic system emg _ 1" (Polanyi 1944: 170).were now embedded in the economic systedn standings-a "formal" and a

- b these tWO un er 1 - -The distinction etween . I been highly contested. Stil , It IS a pow-

"substantial" model-has certain y . f the formation of econorrucfi es the terrain 0 '11erful distinction that con gur _ of the economy WI try to

li t concepnon ,discourse. Any poststructura IS d e to their different srarung. . d' - t on However, u -IIdff

overcome this dualistic rsnnc I ·od a enealogy of the economy WI . ~ erpoints a deconsrructive approach ~ g h wa poststructuralist critiqueconsid~rably. To put it differently,lt ~~~e~~t\~een a substantial and formalof the dichotomy crosses the dlStl71ct that govern mentality studies startunderstanding of the economy.! WI f a~gue del in their genealogical read mg.from a substantial understanding 0 t e mo ted in the formal side of the

h h are not Interes 'd IThis does not mean t at t ey I _ I t sk begins on the other Sl e. nh' na yttca a - hdistinction, but only that t elr a h etical attemptS at overcommg t e

- nd systems t eorcontrast, deconstructlve a f r t idea of the economy.dichotomy start off with the orma IS

--

272 Vrs Stiibeli

3. POST-SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMY

Governmentality studies try to arrive at a post-substantial understandingof the economy. They emphasize the heterogeneous network of practicesand discourses within which economic practices are formatted and gener-ated. Notably, the separation of politics and the economy is seen as politi-cal distinction: "Instead, the constitution of a conceptually and practicallydisringuished sphere (i.e., the economy, US), governed by autonomous lawsand a proper rationality is itself element of 'economic' government" (Lemke2002: 57). Any economic operation is always already embedded withinpolitical struggles and power technologies, thus not leaving intact the ideaof a pure economy. It is important to distinguish the notion of "economicgovernment" from "governing the economy" (Miller and Rose 1990). Eco-nomic government refers to the rationality of governing, e.g., the efficientusage of political resources. What is more central to my argument is what"governing the economy" entails. Since there can be no "economic sover-eignty," it is impossible to govern the economy directly: the market remainsintransparenr and inaccessible. At the same time, it is emphasized that mar-kets do not evolve naturally and that the existence of markets depends onfortunate circumstances. What Foucault has shown in his analysis of Ger-man ordo-libera lism is that the market is a precarious, formal mechanism,made possible by governmental technologies. However, these technologiesdo not directly aim at the market: One has to govern for the market (Fou-cault 2008: 121) by adapting one's devices to an imaginary market. In turn,the market becomes a measure that decides about the "quality" of govern-mental programmes and techniques. That is why Foucault speaks about the"market test" of neoliberal technologies: the market defines what is politi-cally working or not, what is seen as efficient and what is able to foster theideal market (ef. Foucault 2008: 246; Tellmann 2003). The economy con-fronts governmental rationalities with the problem of how to govern whatcannot be governed. Thus, the assumption of a self-organizing market,which cannot be governed, comes surprisingly close to Foucault's politicalinterest in ways of not being governed so much.' The success of govern-mentality studies in no small part arises from the fruitful confrontation ofpolitical sovereignty and the impossibility of economic sovereignty. Fou-cault's analysis of the "invisible hand" points precisely at this constitutivegap: It is not the "hand" which interests him, but rather the "invisibility"of this hand.' Putting emphasis on the hand would still imply maintain-ing a theological model of a control. However, control has become invis-ible and the market is constitutively intransparent-it seems that it is thisinvisibility which also affects Our understanding of the economic sphere.Strictly speaking, the economy, just as it is prefigured in economic knowl-edge, is nor able to constitute a totality of its Own. "fElconomics is a disci-pline without totality" writes Foucault, as I have quoted previously. If oneagrees with this analysis, then the idea of the economization of the social


. There is neither an economic sphere whichbecomes highly problematic: economic "super-coding" andsimply spreads to other social areas, ~.or ~n an economic logic. The reasonreconfiguring all social spheres accor ing 011 ontaminated by other dis-

h Itself IS essenna y c . .for this is that t e economy" "I bl to purify itself from ItS rrncro-

. const!tUtlve y una e "courses: the economy IS .' "Governing the economy,d" rhetic underpinnings I

political an micro-aes f bl pportunities for this strange rea m1 to create avora eo. 6

then, can on y mean , f overnmental technologies.which remains a dark contlOen~ or

fg . man governmentality stud-

I, analysis 0 economiC, f If"Following Foucau t s fi f "the entrepreneur 0 onese. k hasize the gure 0 " f theies were qutc to e~p . I This figure is paradigmatlc or

as a technology of indirect con~ro . t realm of modern economyhi h the mrransparen "" di

new forms of power w IC f di t control was translared Into the In I;requires: The impossibility 0 rrec f d m into a primary technology 0

reet "conduct of conduct"-turmng re: hOs proved ro be a very successful

f h "entrepreneur a , ccontrol. The figure 0 tel d to suffer from its excessive su -analytical tool, which, ho":ever, a so ~nt ~as not been analysed in (er~s ofcess. There is nearly no sO.Clalsphere t a nd her/his decisions, the SClen~e

"I" "be It the consumer a ibl f r his"entrepreneuna Ism: \' ho becomes responsi e 0h social-care C lent, w " Wh t hasentrepreneur or even t e f hi success lies in its uniformity: . a .

own well-being. The problem 0 t IS nderstanding of ecortormzattou ,started off as a critique of a ~~molgehneous ~neous figure of the entrepreneur,

d ith surprising y omog fi Idtends to en up Wit a I I" s to a pluraliry of e s.whose formal logic of contrO app re

4. POST-FORMAL ECONOMY "

I· "as post-substantial (note" . overnmenta ItyAfter this draft of eco,nomlc g tive I will now briefly turn to a post-the similarity to Polany i S crisrs n~rra ri )iism is interested in the precariOUSformal perspective. While post-su sftan ;:ibility of a self-regulated markelt,

" " d I I conditions 0 po " "A good examp epolitical an cu tura diff rent starting pOInL "post-formalism" proceeds from ~ ~o~x's analysis of financial speculatllon:of such a posrnon IS Jean-Josef f as the idealized market of neoc aSkThe stock market does not on y gU~~le new way of thinking: "the stocsica I theory, but also introducets akwI"ngabout this new paradigm which wars

di " What ISs n "" I ess to pos -exchange-para igrn. d f the nineteenrh century, "ISIrs c

f~se~ ", which

established at the en 0 " d mental instability 0 va ue, ,structuralist thinking: The fun a ds to an endless deferral of meamng

. di m correspon k h ge para-characterizes thiS para Ig 'G 1997: 161). The stoC exc an din poststructuralist accounts (d OU\nancial economy has alway~ alrea ~di ill, then, assumes t~at rna ern f the missing "rea!" fau.n atlon 0

7be~n decentered: PreCisely betaus; floucruating chain of price dlfferenceshestock quotes, it gener;tes ahnt:,:a~uite different modes of dec~nt~~li~~ :he

We are confronte Wit d" d center the market by em eeconomy: Governmentaltty stu ICS e

274 Urs Stabeli

invisible economy within heterogeneous networks of power; post-formal-ism, in contrast, is interested in how economic self-reference disembeddsitself. What does this mean? Governmentaliry studies assume, at least inprinciple, that the idea of a self-regulating market would be possible, pro-vided adequate control technologies have been established-in principle,because govern mentality studies circumvent the very problem of theorizingthe economy by exclusively focusing on an empirical analysis of technolo-gies for governing the economy. In doing so, govern mentality studies haveto deal with a paradox: on the one hand, they aim at radically historicizingthe economy, thus pursuing a "happy positivism"; on the other hand, thereare theoretical assumptions being made about governing of the self andimplicitly about the economy, By analysing "neo-liberal" technologies ofgovernment, this tension becomes most clear: Such technologies presupposethe idea of the economy as self-regulated social sphere, This idea is rightlyseen as a historical discursive construction-but what does this imply?

The first answer, which some positions of governmentality studies seemto cling to without spelling it out, is a redressed version of ideology critique:The construction of the self-regulated market is an ideological model, shapedby neoliberalist rationalities, for enabling new modes of government. Suchan answer is, from a discourse theoretical perspective, highly problematic,since it does not take seriously what the historical discourse of the marketdoes. The second answer is more in line with a Foucauldian perspective andemphasizes the performativity of economic discourses: discourses constructand constitute the very market they are describing (e.g., Calion 1998)-andthis construction does not content itself with being a political myth thatenables governmental practices. Taking seriously the very idea of performa-tivity means to account for how economic constructions acquire a life of theirown, It is precisely now that the need for theorizing the economy arises-notin the sense of an objectivist and a-historical notion of the economy, but as ananalyrics of the becoming self-referential of economic practices,

Such a theoretical move, however, entails loosening economic practicesfrom a supposedly privileged function for political rationalities, howeverbroadly defined, Instead, it is about focusing on the genealogy of economicpractices and the constitution of the economy as self-referential socialsphere. This is not an argument for discovering "pure" economic logics,but for looking at the discursive and cultural constitution of self-referentialmodes of the economy, It is such an argument about the performativityof economic discourses which would force govern mentality studies to gobeyond an analysis of (micro-)political. Doing so without a theoreticalunderstanding of the economy, however, makes it impossible to understandthe working and the failure of the "invisible economy." Economic failurewould always be an empirical and political failure, leaving even open thepossibility of a perfect market: If there were, hypothetically, a discoursewhich successfully institutes an "efficient market," governmentality studieswould have to cling to a historical description of such a market.


In contrast the dynamics which I have called "self-disembedding" WI ork, I' h ' t mplya neo-c assi-from within the economy. post-forma Ism, t us, IS no Sl " hi h

calor systems theoretical description of the economy; a description w IC.would accept the possibility of clearly distinguishing betwee~ afndeconotn~~system and its environment. Rather, it locates the potentia 0 Ils~~~~eirand irritation within eco~~micprocesses th::~:I:et~~;~n~~:i~l~~;onomy(micro-)political precond~tlOns'v~7~;:t~hCea~sed by an impossible economicchang~s: It ISnot so.m~c'b~~ IOwhich has been transformed into the uncer-sovereignty, but an 1l1

SVISI ~.I Y bout an "impossible economic sovereignty"

ta inty of the market. pea mg a f iant still adhering to the pos-implies a somewhat nostalgic Idea

h0 sovereIgha['(for some: unfortunately)

sibility of a political economy,t ose u~lty have given up this nostalgia-become impossible, post-forma approac es d to i I de

I d Is of the economy ten to Imp 0 'and focus on how forma mo e ch emphasize the plurality of

h f I lew does not so muThus, t e post- orma v fren i d'rectly-govern the economy, , hori ' hi ch try to-O ten in I ,

political aut orines w I 'II d R 1990) Rather it trres ro, ' ( f MI er an ose ' ,or economic organizations .c. f' . ibl economic practices. To put itlook at the internal dynamics 0 Idnvlsi he ery nature of economic self-off I h iew IS mrereste m t e v d

di erent y, sue a VI [erenti lit of the economy goes beyon ah " the self-re erenna I y ,

reference, Emp asistng , fiR ther it helps to problematlze, f I d t ding 0 c osure. a , ,classical orma un ers an ich have-often invisibly-found their waythose formal assumptions whic I' Wh Foucault emphatically points atinto the concept of governmenta .ty, f ehn ket he tends to follow toO

, If I tory nature 0 t e mar ,the precarious se -regu a .. hi h h analyzes: capitalism is seen as aclosely the ordo-liberal pOSItions w

fIC ." II produced contradictions

ossibility which does not suffer rom interna , yp iet nositions would have It. ,as, for example, Mar-xist poslfl raliy studies lie precisely In the

I " " 0 govern menThe conceptua cost~ ., nom. This status produces a con~ep-

ambiguous status of the invisible eco , O h one hand it is emphasized, h i diff It to navigate n t e , dtual aporia whic IS I cu f' , since it is always alrea yb sphere 0 ItS own .

that the economy cannot e a d F Idian analysis of "neo-hber-h ther han a oucau , 1political economy; on teo . '. l here which cannot be dIrect y

alism" has to assume that thereblsla s~clahscPh 'ISpresupposed by neoliberal

" h' " VISl I Ity WI. Igoverned since It IS t IS 111 .. I discourses is precise y'. Th' closeness to emplflca .

technologies of power. IS, " Th s the very assumption of anf "h ble" hlstoflClsm. u, .the danger 0 a urn Oft of imaginary economIc. . 'bT " resupposes some s

"ungovernable Invisl I Ity P, db olitical sovereignty.purity which is not yet con~amlOate :it~an imminent analysis of ec?-

A post-formal perspective starts d' rhe excess of self-reference, m'I' It s Intereste m bl'nomic self-referentla Ity. I ,,, of self-reference, Think of gam Ing

the augmentation and "overheating ctacle of wild contingency.I, h'ch generates a spe k

and financial specu atiOn, W I h tury were not simply strucbl' 'the seventeenr cen , h

Descriptions of gam Ing m , b b h shocking observation t atby the irrationaliry of gambling, .0;, yo; ;oney. With the introductiongambling celebrates the pure potentia Ity

276 Urs Stabeli

of paper money, money became pure representation without any intrin-sic value. Marc Shell (1999: 61) notes: "A piece of paper money is almostalways a representation, a symbol that claims to stand for something else."Financial speculation shares with gambling this fascination for the poten-tiality of the medium of money. A true speculator is not so much interestedin the instrumental value of money: it is not only greed, laziness and lustfor profit which motivate him. Rather, it is the enjoyment of the "thrill"of speculation, generated by the self-reference of financial economy, whichfascinates the speculator (cf. Sraheli 2007). A speculator resembles, asGeorg Simmel (2001 [1900]) has noted, an adventurer who enjoys the sus-pense of adventure itself-the adventure is not a means for another end, butbecomes an end itself.

Financial speculation is probably that set of economic practices whichmost clearly focuses on economic self-reference, thus becoming a second-order economy. And it is in financial speculation that the "self-disern-bedding" of self-reference becomes exemplarily visible. The excess of theeconomic finds itself within an excessive self-reference, in the enjoymentof the process of abstraction itself. It is remarkable that financial specula-tion becomes popular by literally staging the process of abstraction, the"becoming-abstract" of the economy. The excess of the economy is pro-duced by itself; one does not have to assume a pre-economic desire forprofit in order to explain these dynamics. It is this excess which becomesthe site for struggles about what is seen as the legitimate economy and whatis not.

Self-reference, then, cannor be reduced to a figure of c1osure-rarher itgenerates effects which move outside the realm of meaning. Recent discus-sions on affect and affectivity (e.g., Massumi 2002; Thrift 2008; Clougher al. 2007) emphasize the strong connection between sel f-reference andaffectivity. It is important to note the difference between affect and emo-tion. Affects are social, but they are pre-individual and non-significaroryflows. Affects circulate through social and psychic layers of meaning, with-out being meaningful themselves (Ahmed 2004). In contrast, emotions-such as anger, greed, and anxiety-are individualized and normalizedsocial constructions. Speaking about "expressing one's love" points at theindividualization of emotions; in contrast, a panic is often described ascontagious, i.e., it exists in the movement of contagion, it is intoxicating,but nobody is the origin of the panic.' Affect then also means the capacityof becoming affected, an openness to possible events.

There are two dimensions of affect which are crucial to self-reference.First, a self·referential system is an emergent system; i.e., it is impossibleto deduce the form of self-reference from pre-existing elements. For Mas-sumi, affectivity denotes precisely this ungraspable and indeterminablemoment of emergence-the moment, when something new is being cre-ated: "This is the turning point at which a physical system paradoxicallyembodies mUltiple and normally mutually exclusive potentials, only one of


. 2002· 32-33) Secondly, affect is not sur-which is 'selected'" (MaSsulm~ed fo;ms of seif-reference. It is regenerated,passed by successfully estab is 'Th loss of a foundation of the. If f oduces uncertainty. e 'II '

smce se -re erence pr d ' lerates this self-referentia ogreth of foun atlon-acce deconomy-or: a my . . d f ar (Clough er al. 2007, raw-of uncertainty, producing InsecSurllftyafn ee produces an endless deferral

f M ' and Parisi) e ore erenc ,ing rom assuml, .. \" ' h as the idea of limitless economicof value. Even political rationa mes sue The logic of economic self-disem-

h nt for this process. Whgrowt cannot accou f k g of the economy. atI· ted by the per ect wor In I

bedding is a ogre genera hi hli hrs is that external foundationsa perspective on self-reference g g ter na] to the economy, lose

d ' I· Iprogrammes ex IPoints formulate 111 po inca I h I gies Technologiesofcontro' , ' f f ern menta tee no 0 I .their onennng oree or gov lity produced by the economy.

. h pond to a tempora I IIand regulation ave to res i and CI h emphasize rhe new cha enge

. h Massumi an oug ."Affect theorists sue as P becomes "preemptive power,.' h of affect. ower h 'for conceiving t e power . f f '''. "The challenge for t eorresk b " dulation 0 uturuy: h

which wor s y a 010 , I t a politics in the present, w enh b es how to ar ncu a e d I 'of affect, ten, ecom . . lari to a preemptive rna u anon. h ent IS set 10 re anon I .

what constitutes t e pres . 72) Notably financial speeu anon wasof futurity." (Clough et al. 20~~ich institutionalized such a modulationone of the first SOCial spheres. ' If' the present stock quotes-and

h f . scribes use m d fof the future. T e urure m '. The already discounre urureI lay of uncertamty. ,introduces a comp ex p h lineal nature of "pre-emptlve ec~-

f . n Thus t e po I I I" b t saffects the urure 10 tur . ed fan-economic rationa rues, u I. " not be deduce rom n .

nomic power .can with this strange temporality. .'self-produced m the struggle hi hly contested terrain Itself-

This increased self-reference becomhes\a 'tlgof economy are fought. The

hi h gles about t e rrrn s fl sa terrain on w IC strug , li ted by self-reference overnowreason for this is that the potentia rry genedra he control technologies of the

. f economics an r f d esthe established categOries o. h of consciousness, self-re erence 0economy. Contrary to the phtlosop Y but it also becomes the placenot only protect the identity of the eCdonom;~ occur where economic logic

d unexpecte even , I I rionwhere heterogeneous an h w to distinguish financia specu a I

runs amok. The long fight about 0 There is no a priori knowledge orfrom gambling is a good POint ~~dc:~I~w one to take a definitive deCiSion.epistemic foundation which wo ed and its limits are temporatlly fixedThe horizon of economiCS IS contest, well as by technologies pollC-by competing descriptions of the economy as

ing these limits. 'f boundaries becomes thus the center ofThe ptecarious constructlOnO d f ifying the economic and for

. re beIng use or pur I h tesanalysis: which strategies a h b mes political is precise y t e con -. '" '·b·lity'" W at eco f h economygenerating Its lIlVISI I. .' of the horizon 0 t e ..

tat ion of economic limit~, the nego~;[1~~ identify in a Foucauldian veInFor doing so, it is certalllly necess ,Y f ower. But that is not t~e wholediscursive regularities and tec,hnolo

g,es °de~cribe the non-economiC, whatstory. Those imaginaries which rry to

278 Urs Stiiheli

Laclau called the "constitutive outside" of a discourse, become crucial.Which semantics and iconologies are being used for describing the non-market? Speaking about constitutive exclusions means that it is not a purelyempirical exclusion, i.e., not an accidental exclusion. Rather, this exclusionhas to be performed, in order for the market discourse to work (Mitchell2003: 245).9 However, it is only possible to conceive of such a radical exclu-sion of the non-economic, if one presupposes the-ever failing-attempt ateconomic totalization, i.e., of generating a sphere of the economy. That isalso why systems theoretical concepts are useful for a deconstructive socialtheory: the strength of systems theory lies in analysing the constitution ofa closed social sphere-however, only a "deconstrucred" systems theory isable to note the failure of closure, the undecidabilities that are generated byconstructing a pure economic space.

Let me summarize the three crucial aspects of a post-formal perspec-tive on the economy. The focus lies on the working of self-reference andprocesses of abstraction: this creates an endless deferral of value, andproduces uncertainty. Secondly, I have tried to show that increased andaccelerated self-reference creates boundary conflicts, which, in turn, callfor economic and political technologies of control. Thirdly, there is a closealliance between self-reference and affectivity: self-reference produces anexcess of possibilities and starts to oscillate, recalling a vast horizon ofpotentiality. This points to the need for grasping technologies of affect,as well as affective technologies. One aspect of such technologies is theindividualization of affects as emotions, which in turn, are at the center ofsel f-tech nologies,

5. DECONSTRUCTIVE GOVERNMENTALITY

[ want to conclude by identifying three conceptual problems whichbecome visible if one observes govern mentality studies from a post-for-mal perspective.

(1) How to Account for Failing Governmental Strategies?

Governmentality studies have produced many precise descriptions of gov-ernmental programmes and technologies. But how to account for the ambi-guities of these programmes? The very notion of programme produces anargumentative logic of its own: programmes try to formulate idealizedpractices which are translated into technologies. Such an understandingcomes quite close to a normative concept of society. Parts of governmental-ity studies are, of course, aware of this idealized and idealizing logic andtry to account for the limits of idealization: a programme does never fullysucceed, its "application" is always separated by a gap from the practicesit tries to generate. Thus, it is suggested to think of this gap as constitutive


for these technologies: knowing that one does not (yet) fully cor/"st~n~hti~

a governmental logic creates the desi:~~oabpe;I~:;i~~e~e~~:e~~~:CI~o;orofsense, the gap between programme

governmental technologies (IBr6ck~';t~;rO~:~ ;:~. is a question of empiricalHowever It rernams unc ear w .' h ther

' d heir translation into technologies, i.e., w eusage of programm;sb an h: empirical impossibility of fulfilling the govern-this gap 1Sg~nerate y ~ cis' "Programmes are never seamlessly trans-mental reqUirements an n~e . 'their rules always means tolared into individual behavior; to appropnate I·) In the process

" B .. kli 2007· 40 my trans a tron .modify them as well ( roc mg . f' d and altered through ernpir-

, h ammes are trans ormeof translation, t e progr . h h . I status of these alterations? In. I H what IS t e t eoretica .rca usage.. owever, icmt Der rid (1978) tried to distinguish betweenhis dis.cusslOn of structura.h~~"De~~e ~dea of structure: The first c~iticisJ11two different modes of cntlclzl~g b . ( g out the empirical Failure ofhighlights the limits of srructura ISm y pOlIO10 lity There are always addi-

bli hi f II fledged srructura rota I . dever esta IS 109 a u y-. b n accounted for. The secontiona I empirical data which ha~e no~yet ns~~uctive gesture. The empiricalcriticism is no longer cnncisrn, . uhta ec~ t 1scendental impossibility: the

. ·1·· placed Wit a quasi- rat f himpossibility IS now re .d 1· d programme fails because 0 t e. f t t liry or of an I ea ize .

construction 0 a 0 a id . This point raises the questionI impossibility of such an I entity. . Iconceptua impossi I I . f ental technologies not simp y

of how to account for the aponadofigovernm but as an impossibility which.. I h ings or rna I cations, .' I

as ernpmca S ortcomi irnpossihility which ISnot on y. If . hi these programmes, an I h Iinscribes itse Wit In . b b h materiality of these tee no 0-generated by individual reSistanCe, ut Y t e h . e that the very figure of

. I tality studies emp asiz Igies. Certain y, govern men . ibili of ever achieving a ful entre-. dri by the unpossi I uy b.the entrepreneur 1S nven fl ib! biecr is being created-a su [ect

. l id . Thereby a eXI e su J . I . Hpreneuna. I en~Ity.. ' rself. This is certainly a crucI~ POIOt. ~~-always reinventmg him- or he . I subject is idenr ified as emplfl-ever the impossibility of the entrepreneubrla t chllologies of impossibility,

' ·b·l· ~ t it briefly· It IS a out e . I hcal impossl I Ity. 0 pu . .. ·f these technologies. Taking serious y t ebut not about the ImposslbJlJty 0 I. ld however challenge the

f tal techno ogles wou , ' Idimpossibility 0 governmen . h' ernmenrality studies. It wou. . . f h research Wit 10 gov on

empiriCiSm 0 muc f·1 as a theorectical category, e.g.,ccount for al ure I .become necessary to a " h iterability of techno ogles.the basis of impossible totalization or as t e

f S If R latory Markets?(2) How to Account or e - egu .. d.enralit studies are primanly mrereste In

I have tried to show that governm k Y Inewhat neglecting the mecha-. of the mar et, so h . dbthe political construction .. and self-control. This is emp aSlze Y

nisms of economic self-refer~n.t1~htyossible to govern the economy. Instead,Foucault's assumption th,ar It ISIm~ favorable conditions for the market.it is about to govern society crea~l J ern mentality studies would have toBut what then, is "the" economy. ov

280 Urs Stiiheli

~~~::~I:t~U~i:~:.~~it;e~~il:~~~s::ot:ke~r:~i:egl~:e~c.a~s: tthbeeconomy is anf

the anal si h I·· I ' a ecomes part 0· y IS are t e po inca conditions and the embedding of If- Inon, but not the operation and the rechni f . se reg~ a-tion. It is this "invisibility" whi h h iques 0 economic self-organiza-nearly exclusively into the- 1~. PIlls e,s a governmental analyrics, oftenthe economy 10 T'h·s I ffcer alhn y widely defined-political aspects of

. I a so a ects "mark failThe political control paradigm ;f gOW mar et

l. ai u res" are thought of.

governmental strategies that are no overnmenta iry would P~l~t at failingevolution of complex k h t able to guarantee conditions for thehowever would remal·nmar et mec dan ISms. The logic of the market itself,

, u nconteste· I do not simply emphasise the self-r f f .IS "missing" f . e erence 0 the economy because It

rom governmenrality studies R th I .problem since man c . ~ ee, am interested in thisful tools for analy{;n;~~~rts tf gove~nmentahty studies could be very use-erentiality may become th ore erentra processes. If we accept that self-ref-then the following questi e space °df excess (be it meaningful or affective),· on IS raise . How to deal with d ibl IIt? Studying financial s ec I· .. J an POSSI y contratechnologies of "purifi~a/ a,:,on, qbuestlons like this become central: which

Ion are emg used for pt d . .operations (in contrast flo UClOgpure economic, or examp e to mere .Which discourses of fun t· I· .' , non-economic gambling)?

· C rona izanon are being d f id i ficia I speculation with a . use or provi mg nan-proper economic functio h h .of prices? In contrast to I n-suc as t e productiona systems theoretical a I· hi .

need to account for the d . f na ysrs, t IS points to the

Ipro uction a societal f . A d

a so ask which technologies f b d unctions. n one might

d I, or oun ary mainten I d fea 109 with "improper" ance are emp oye oreconomic events (such a f . .

or gambling)? What these rruest i s counter errs, corruptionf

. e questions show is that th hasis i hif drom the analysis of modes f bi ificari e emp asis IS site· 0 su jeer: cation to th ducri d I

non of an (impossible) eco . repro uctron an regu a-pany such an attempt of t -tali: IC tota Ity-and the problems which accom-

o a rzanon.

(3) Governmentality and Economi .rruzation

Governmentality studies started off . h ..cisely by pointing at the necessar ~l.t a crlt1que of economi,zation, pre-At the same time many st d· y hPOltlCal character of economic practices.

, u les s ow how t h . f .entrepreneurialism start to t ' ec mques a calculatIOn ands ructure nearly all . I h .entrepreneurialism produc h .. Socia sp eres. In this sense,

I. es a omogenlZlng eff .Inked to the same pol·,t· I . I. ect: many SOCIal fields are· Ica ratlona Ity and ··1 htlfication are used w·th· d·ff ' Simi ar tec nologies of subiec-

. I In I erent fields I d . .Ing effect it would be c . I .d . . n or er to aVOid a homogenlz-.' rUCIa to I entlfy the d·

different political rationalities and h Contra Ictory articulation ofsubJectification such as the ' . t e contradictory nature of a mode of

IenterptlSlng self Go I·t 1e strange combinati f. . vern menta Ity suffers from

on 0 minute and detal d d' .rupolitics of power ancl an a I. I e case stu les about the mlC-

ver-genera Ized f' concept a neoliberalis111 whose


key mode of subjectification is the entrepreneur." Thus, what escapes theabstract label of "neoliberalism" is the plurality of different logics in con-temporary societies, possibly even "illiberal" modes of government (Opitz2008), and their mutual articulation. In this sense, the heterogeneity ofdiscursive formations has to be accounted for not only as a celebration ofcountless micro-techniques, but also as failures of ever establishing a fullyhegemonic rationality. While this argument cautions about speaking rooeasily about "neoliberalism," the second argument points at the contradic-tory nature within the central figure of "neoliberalism": the entrepreneur.Governmentality studies introduces the enterprising self as mode of subjec-rification of indirect control: as conduct of conduct on the basis of freedom.The subject is being instituted as self-controlling self that "calculates aboutitself, and that works upon itself in order to better itself" (Rose 1989: 7f.).There is no telos of bettering, but the permanent flexibility and adaptationto new challenges. What is per-manent is the need for ever-changing modesof self-control. Empirically, there is high risk of overstressing, of not beingable to reply to these demands. In Brbckling's (2007: 125) account, theenterprising self becomes even more precarious since he emphasizes thatthe entrepreneur has to combine "strength of will and courage on the onehand, and sober calculus on the other." Thus, the enterprising self has todevelop a structure of self-control which is able to accommodate momentsof the non-economic. However, what happens if this explosive mixture getsour of control? Campbell Jones and Andrew Spicer (2006) have argued thatthe entrepreneur is far from being a well tempered self, but rather a deviantand passionate figure, often disregarding all economic probabilities andrationality. For Jones, the entrepreneur represents the excess of econom-ics, the idea of pure expenditure and waste. In a sense, the entrepreneur is,temporarily, out of control, defying the ideal of se[f-control and calculationwhich Rose highlights-and it is precisely because of these moments ofaffection that the figure becomes attractive. Such an analysis might over-emphasize "entrepreneurial excess." However, it is worthwhile to link thisdescription with that of govern mentality studies. This might open a per-spective for noting the immanent ruptures within the figure of the entrepre-neur. Assuming a position against the idea of economization, then, wou ldnecessarily imply to contaminate economic figures such as that of the entre-preneur: to show, how these modes of subjectification do not automaticallyproduce "neo-liberal" subjecrs. Rather, these subjects are confronted withan undecidability, which is inscribed within rhese technologies: a logic ofcreative responsibility and, at the same time, a logic of thrill and excess.

NOTES

1. In this sense, Mary poovey's (1998: 28) Foucauldian analysis of the markettries to undo reified abstractions such as the market.

282 Urs Stiiheli

2. bFor the mo~ent'l I will leave asi~e the question of why knowledge generatedy econonucs re ares to economic r . A . h

economic knowledge (cf. Calion 1:9~~~es'K ss~m~~~~) e ~erforrnativiry ofnot simply two distinct spheres. ,ae enzte ,t ese are certainty

3. Parts 2 and 3 draw from Sraheli (2008).4. Thl.S. uncanny closeness has stirred a somerim I' .

political positions criticize Foucault for being a ~~r~~u~~~~~;~~~~"bRa~~cal(eh~'I'Reitz 2003), others simply stare the close relation (e.g., Saras:n e~~~~)w 1 e proponents of governmentality srudi 'critical stance (e.g., Rose 1999) How v e.s are eager to d~fend Foucault'sFoucault's fascination with the ~e lib e et, I~~ouldfbe a mistake to misusecal parrisanshi -be it for _? I era CrItlq.ue 0 gov~rnment for polin-(Donzelor and ~ordon 200~1~;)wln~ yr a ne~-['beral project. Colin Gordonin Foucault's rereading f l"b ["rIg r yemp asrzes: "The seductive elementgovernment was 0 I era Ism was the thought that the art of betterliberalism forms ~~e~~~~ec~i~~~he ar of governing less, and that in this sensewhich develops and corrects ~s:lrt~overhn~ental rea.s~n: a govern mentality

5. See Tellm ~oug Its own critique."in Foucau~t~sn l~~~.8)for a more detailed reading of the "invisible economy"

6. The invisibility of the econorn . diff f .directly governing a social s ~e~: ~ erent. rom the ?enerallmpossibility ofgeneral imaginary of controfin . d overnl~g .at a distance has become therepresented as a sphere which is th~ vern sOClet.les. T

fhe econ~~~, however, is

ing. ery opposite 0 the possibility of govern-

7. With the fall of the gold standard h .Mark C. Taylor (2004.52) h. ,t e economy has lost Its foundation. ForNow, the economy tra~sfo:~s It cor~esponds to .the death of god in religion.

8. However, there are contradicto:seI:e~nJf a volatile, sel.f-re.g~lati~g.system.of panic. See Dupuy (2003) f \ ngs of the de/individualizing effectswithin a panic. or t e paradoxical status of individualization

9. Thi.s stands in contrast to Foucault's in ." ..a discussion of the function fli . t;rest In discursive regularities. ForSraheli (2004). 0 Imas In oucault, Laclau and Luhmann see

10. This creares a dynamic between a resu d f .social interventions for Ger Pd IPbPos~ ormalIsm of the market andI

. man or 0- I erallsm' "Wh .atlon takes place spontaneo I h . ereas economIC regu-tion, the social regulation o~sc~'n~i:~~g.h the for~al properties of competi-caused by some to others, and so forth Irr~gulantle~ o~ ?eh.avior, nuisancewhich has to operare as arbitration with" ca Is for a Judicial Interventionismgame." (Foucault 2008: 175) In the framework of the rules of the

11. Lawrence Grossberg points at his r bl . '. .when he criticizes the" . k Pfol em 10 hIS diSCUSSion with Toby Miller

- mlsta e 0 eap; f h .(Packer 2003). ng rom t e micro to the macro"

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14 The Economic Beyond GovernmentalityThe Limits of Conduct

Ute Tel/mann

"We have to know the historical conditions which motivate our con-ceptualization ... The second thing to check is the type of realitywith which we are dealing." (Foucault 1983: 209)

1. INTRODUCTION: NOVEL PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMY

Over the past decade, the economy has become the object of novel theoreti-cal perspectives. Scholars from diverse disciplines have begun ro unravelthe understanding of the economy as a self-standing entity, governed bysome essenrial mechanism (Barry and Slater 2002; Callan 1998; du Gayand Pryke 2002; de Goede 2005; Escobar 1995; Leyshon and Thrift 1997;Mirowski 1994; Mitchell 1998; Ruccio and Amariglio 2003; Sraheli 2007;Tellmann 2003). These scholars have elucidated the uncertain boundaries,impure constituents, cultural representations and political imaginaries atwork in the making of economy. These works propel and call forth whatArturo Escobar once termed "economics as culture," in order to indicatethat the economy is "above all a cultural production, a way 01 producinghuman subjects and social orders of a certain kind" (Escobar 1995: 59).The oeuvre of Michel Foucaulr has been an important source of inspira-

tion for this theoretical endeavor in two respects. At a very general level,Foucault's theoretical and methodological perspective makes it possibleto circumvent the "universals employed by sociological analysis, historicalanalysis, and political philosophy" (Foucault 2008: 2)-of which the notionof the economy is a paramount example (Gibson-Graham 1996). Instead oftaking monolithic accounts of economic reality at face value, scholars have usedFoucauldian notions of discourse to dissect the particular "politics of truth"inherent in apparently neutral depictions of the economy (de Goede 2005;Escobar 1995; Mitchell 2002; 2005; Millet and Rose 1990; Kalpagam 2000;Tellmann 2003). But Foucault did not only offer rools ro be used in unravel-ling the objectifications of economic discourse. More particularly, his con-cept of govern mentality provides an analytical frame for understanding themodes of power at work within the economy. Governmentality describes atype of power that "shapes the way we act" through incentives and otherindirect means (Dean 2002: JI9,121). The very economic and liberal char-acter of this type of power lies, according to Foucault, in its reliance upon

•

286 Ute Tel/mann

the freedom of the calculating and sentient "economic" subject as its relaystation. In this perspective, economic discourses and subject-positions areintegral to the exercise of power (Miller and Rose 1990; Miller and O'Leary2002; Rose 1993): economic rationalities are political rationalities, as theyelaborate modes of conduct.

The notion of govern mentality undoubtedly provides an ingenious andinstructive perspective on how relations of power and the economic inter-sect. Nevertheless, this chapter will argue that the dominant conception ofgovern mentality also contains unwitting limitations, which make it difficultto refocus OUf perception of the economic.' An important source of limita-tion lies in the prevalent understanding of the "conduct of conduct" as thedominant analytical key for decentering the economy. Is the economy not,one might ask, as much about governing money and objects as it is aboutgoverning subjects' Linking the understanding of power solely to the ratio-nality of governing the conduct of subjects lends itself to an underestima-tion of the "ontological politics" ingrained within the economic and monetaryorder of things.2 Annemarie Mol has coined this composite term in order toaddress the fabricated "conditions of possibility we live with" (Mol 1999: 75).Monetary, juridical, or spatial arrangements conjoin in defining, negotiating,and contesting the malleable forms of the economic, its temporality and itsregimes of valuation (Calion, Millo and Muniesa 2007: 3).3 They definetypes of economic reality. But employing a conceptual frame which subsumesall these ways of "world-making" in terms of "conduct of conduct" makesit more difficult to understand how and where else the economic becomesdefined. The claim being made here is not that govern mentality studies ingeneral have never transgressed the bounds of this formula of conduct. Butthe theoretical and conceptual discussion of these bounds has mostlybeen avoided, and the opportunities for pushing the perception of theeconomic onto a new terrain have thus been neglected.

The argument proceeds in three steps. The first part seeks to show thatthe formula of "conduct of conduct" actually narrows the conceptualunderstanding of the liheral security dispositi] that Foucault introducedat the outset of his lectures. The second part demonstrates how this nar-rowed focus on conduct stays within the bounds of liberal economic dis-Course without rendering them visible. The question of money serves as anexemplary case to discuss this unwitting reiteration of the liberal imaginaryof economy. Just like liberal discourse, the perspective of governmentality is10 danger of eschewing reflections about the density and politics of money.The third and concluding part argues that govern mentality studies needto engage in historical-conceptual work about "the economic" in orderto explore the "type of reality" it is dealing with (Foucault 1983: 209).Instead of using the "conduct of conduct" to characterize a general form ofpower regardless of the question at hand, it is hence necessary to revive theconceptual "art of using history" that Foucault practiced. This art consistsin the constant inflection of the conceptual and historical horizons in order to

Economy Beyond Governmentality 287

. t al tools while simultaneously unsettling them. The chap-retrieve concep u , li di s virhter concludes with a short meditation on how governmenta I.ty-stu . I~ \a newly gained sense of "the economic" could compl.em~nt, In crucia ed byh discussi of the economic and econOffilzatlOn as proposet e recent ISCUSSlon 8)

Actor-Network Theory (Calion et al. 2007; Calion 199 .

2. FROM THE SECURITY DlSPOSITIFTO THE ALLURE OF CONDUCT

. rounds as Francois Ewald and Ales-Foucault's lecture courses were t.estmg

fg F 'cault used these courses to

k : their pre ace: au .sandra Fontana remar 10 f hi ki (2007' xiv) The elaboration. f h d ways 0 t 10 109 . .explore lines 0 researc an . h on Security Territory, Popu-. f liry 10 t e courses ,of the notion 0 g~vernmen.ta I ..' exce tion in this respect. In theselotion and The BIrth of BlOpolitlcs IS no d p t nd the "birth of politics"

I· d tests how to un ers a .lectures, Foucau t rnes an . f hi I tics of power for decenrering

3) h . bility 0 IS ana y I f(Foucault2008: 31 ,t e Via ~007' 512), and the genealogy and dangers 0the state (ibid.: 186f; Foucault . I 2008' 134 312). How the economy

I·· I h on (Foucau t . ,liberalism as a po mea ariz I. fer" is therefore, arguably, a. hi " oa yncs 0 powcan be thought Wit m an a I These former interests even-

f he centra concerns. . I'side-product 0 t ese mor . h it dispositif of libera Ism:Fit peCifies t e securt Y

tually shape how oucau sid rationality of governing at a. revo ve aroun a .more and more, It comes to . . h omy in terms of the security

ibili f thinking t e econdistance. The POSSI I ity 0 . I plored as I shall show.dispositif is thus left comparative y une~ h m;dern meaning of economy as

Foucault suggests that the emergendce 0 t ed

a mere effect of a presumedI· " h Id not be un erstoo as fa "level of rea ity s ou . f ionall y coherent subsystem 0.. f h my into a unctt .differentiation 0 t e econo d f he commonly assumed quasl-ontO-

society (Foucault 2007: 95). Instea 0 t d the political horizon, Foucaultb the economy an 0 .logical difference etween t I strategies and rellectlons

k I of govern men a .assumes that an unbro en pane. h ulation of the population

ki as ItS target t e reg . .envelops both spheres, ta JOg f d 328) He sees the conceptuahzatlon(ibid.: 64, 95; Foucault 2008: 323

dan h m'utation of technologies of power

f h "episo e JO t e fof economy as part 0 t e f hi hnique of apparatuses 0 secu-. 11 ent 0 t IS tee . . "and an episode in the msta m f the tical features of modern ~OCletleSrity that seems to me to be one 0 f . y~ the proper administration of the(Foucault 2007: 34). No longer re errmg 0 means economy projects a new

. dvi b t saving on ' , d .oikos or prudential a Vice a ou . I flows naturalness an inter-. . I' lane of ClfCU aror y now>, ·1· d

socio-political onto ogy. a Pl. termeshing between a rru leu annal forces, forging a complex '::~JS:5 1~4). "It is therefore the problem ofits population (Foucault 2007. , k . this notion of milieu l ... I. Thecirculation and causality that l~ ahts~a elJOt.Ollis carried out. The milieu IS a

. I b h . whlc ClfCU a I ·fi . I· s-milieu then, wd e t at 111 h h·11 al,d a set of art! cia given, . s es I s- ..set of natural givens-flve.rs, mar f I ' etcerera. The milieu IS a certainan agglomeration of indiViduals, a louses,

288 Ute Tel/mann

number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it" (Foucault2007: 21). As rhe economy is taken to articulate the milieu of circulation, itbecomes integral to this new dispositif

The conception of economy is thus firmly positioned within the field ofgovernmental reason and technique, and thus opened up for an "analyricsof power." But what kind of relations of power does this analytic rendervisible? What kind of technologies of power does the security dispositi(depict? Foucault addresses this question by contrasting the techniquesof discipline and the technologies of security in respect to time, spaceand norms (Foucault 2007: 17, 44, 62). The space of the security dis-positi] is no longer organized within the cells and grids of discipline, itdoes not rely on a temporality of homogeneous units of time, and it doesnor impose the norms of disciplinary conduct on the individual body.Instead it assumes a given milieu of circulation, reckons with the alea-tory occurrences of events, and derives its norms from statistical regulari-ties calculated on the level of the population: "Security therefore involvesorganizing, or anyway allowing the development of ever wider circuits"(2007: 45). Foucault's analytics of this dispositi] is not comparable tothe dense and detailed descriptions he marshalled in order to understandthe dispositi( of sexuality or disciplinary arrangements (Foucault 1990;1995).4 Still, these cursory remarks are inspiring, since they invite us tofocus on the ordering of spaces of circulation, temporality, and norms asaspects of the economic and the making of economy.

Indeed, those who have used Foucault's account of governmentality forre-thinking the economy have often had recourse to notions of spatialityand norms (Barry and Slater 2002; Miller 1992; Larner and Heron 2004;Larner and Walters 2004): Peter Miller's (1992: 74) coinages of "calculablespaces" and "functional ensembles of financial flows" are telling in this respect.These phrases point beyond the subject and its conduct; they focus on the mak-ing of economic space, which allows for comparisons and differentiationsthat constitute novel economic norms. In this vein, Wendy Larner and Rich-ard Le Heron (2004) have suggested that we should understand the globaleconomy as the manufacturing of "spaces of comparison." Pointing to thispossibility, they also indicate that their suggestion remains schematic andneeds further elaboration. From a different, albeit related angle, Aihwa Ong(2006) turns towards Giorgio Agamben's notion of the sovereign exception inorder to point to the territorial strategies of zoning and gradation as waysof creating the spaces and milieus of circulation. The enumeration of theseworks signals that the notion of 'spaces of circulation' has captured the schol-arly imagination, as it seems to harbor the analytical potential to decenter theeconomy. Foucault's account of the security di5positif resonates with or eveninspires this scholarly imagination. But one has to recognize that the con-cept of govern mentality, as developed by Foucault, does not offer furtheranalytical refinement in this respect. Foucault does not engage in rethink-ing the economic in terms of temporality, valuation and space. He does


nor wonder about the role of money or objects in shaping the p~~uliar?of economic relations, and he is not disquieted by .the questl~n 0 ow t 1~

.. b thought He eschews these questions for a Simple reason.econorruc IS to e. " I 5 I deed he

hi in object of rheoretica concern. n ,the economy was not ~s~al d theor provide a good instrument"assumed "that economic history an " "y I 1983. 209) whereas

di "I' s of production (Foucau t . ,for understan 109 re anon f k ledge and the subject were lessto his mind, the intersectlons 0 power, now x licit! to unravel thewell understood (Foucault 2003). He ~ought, very ~h~s to ~oucault himselfcold monster of the state rather than t e econom\ b'een "defined as off-and many of his followers, the economy seems to avhe "" " iller and '"G d 0' L ar (2002: 91) ave put It.limits" as Peter Miller an e e y I nature of economic discourse

Foucault's explorarion of the governme~ta terests Intent on thinking thehas to be seen in the light of rhese researc Ihn acco'unt of govern mentality

. f rati alities of govermng, ISstate m terms 0 ration led interplay between aI d the economy as a govefl

be.g.ins to revo.ve aroun biect. He identifies the figure of the sentient,milieu and the inrerests of the su J . t of an "economic" technol-

d I I" bject as the main targe fwilling an ca cu anng su I" (F cault 2007: 21). The ocus

f "" t rhe level of popu anon ou " Iogy 0 power airnmg a "I d poral organization of crrcu a-on the order of things and the spatb,a kan tem

dAs Stuart Elden (2007) has

di I " t the ac groun .tion recedes accor 109 Y 10 0 b ally muted The broader" f . . lity ecomes equ .argued, the question 0 ternto~l~ I I dimly present in the subsequent

" f h "dspos/t/( are on youtlines 0 t e secunty I F It never fleshes out the sugges-. ental power: oucau " h

elaborations on governm." f hi I crure Instead of unearthing t etions he makes at the begmnlng 0 "(IS e "I . f shion to the disciplinary

f h 'disPOSltl In sirru ar a . I"anatomy" 0 t e security id if h notion of interest as the sing e

f " Foucault I enn es t e"anatomy 0 power, . f f liberal governmental power:key to understand the economic orm 0

. d in interests. The new government, theGovernment is only mtereste d I ith what I would call theI does not ea WI .new governmenta reason, I' such as individuals, things,

" h I of governmenta uy, I Ithings 10 t ernse ves . h h e things in themse ves. td I d I longer deals Wit t es hi hwealth an an. t no . . hat i to say interests, w ic

h f pohtlcs t at IS ,deals with the p enome,n~ 0 d i tak s: it deals with interests, or

. olitics an Its s ta e , d so on iprecisely constitute p . individ I h g wealth an so on In-. hi h given indivi ua ,t in , . ' Ithat respect 10 w IC a II" body of individuals. (Foucau tterests other individuals or the co ectlve2008: 45)

h . lIy Foucault describes the new" . d' " of how emp atlCa I " 1This passage IS In lCatlve . f h' . herent focus on the regu atlo!f . ntermsotelfll1 h""technologies 0 govermng I I h . lstanees corroborate t IS Impres-f . ests Severa ot er II ". "one ofor governing 0 mter. . f h individuals' interest, IS

d fi d "the pursuit 0 t e . d thesion. Desire, e ne as f the whole system" as It ren eTSthe important theoretical elements 0 chni ue (2007: 73). "Mechanisms ofpopulation accessible to govern mentahi te { inrerests" (2007: 352) are the. '" d "the law and mec anlcs 0incentives an

-

290 Ute Tellmann

words Foucault uses to describe the ne fhe maintains, still circumscribes W I?~m 10hfgo.vernmental reason which,

F I ,. our po inca on zan 6Oucau t s reartlCulation of the econo . .

thus rightly be said to culm- - h rruc as governmental rationality can_ f mate m t e contention th h If -Jeer 0 economic discourse f . at t e se -interesred sub-sr raregv. Undeniably this entunlctlons afs a point of relay for a governmentalI d ' alsaprooundandc(( I hif fnstea of being an apolitic I fi f I rca Sit 0 perspective.renders the homo oecono':· gu~e .oblpurely economic interest, Foucaultb

- tcus VISI e as "the he viasic element of the new partner, t e vis-a-vis thegovern menta I reason fa I d - 'century" (2008- 27]) Th _ rmu ate m the eighteenth

d- - e netton of govern me t I- hun ersrand economizario n a tty t us enables us to

f- - _ I n as a strategy for - h -

o responsibilizarion evaluation ditari governing trough techniquesth ,- - I ' ,accre uanon and moti . I he po mea technologies wo k b _' rvanon. t sows howid I r y putting the mo I d I I - - -

VI u~ at the center of visibilir and' .... ~,a an ca ell anng indi-as Nikolas Rose concisely def y _ :~telllglbdlty_ Advanced liberal rule,"f d id nes It, governs through th I d ho In IVI ual citizens" (Rose ]993: 285- D e regu ate c oices

neohberalism the entrep - h 'h- ean ]999)_ Under the paradigm ofb.' reneur wit IS rrn . f I - -ecome an ubiquitous form f bi _ _ peranve 0 se f-activarion has

_ I f 0 su jecttvrty which - dsocia eld (Brockling 2007) I h-' is ma etotraversethewholeII - - n ttus sense gove I--we equipped to underst d h _' rnmenta Ity IS admirablydan t e pervasive appl - f hCon ucting conduct- histo - I I_ rcanon 0 t ese strategies of

f- - nca rea rty and I - I -ecrly, In both critical and I _ I ana ynca strategy interrnesh per-

h h- ana ynca ways Wend B (20w at t IS perspective on th - y rown 03) summarizes

- h e economy as part of I-b IernIng sows: "Neo-libe I- - neo I era strategies of gov-h

" ra Ism ISa construct" " . "t e ontological givenness f h IVlSt project: It does not presumed - 0 a t oroughgoing --omams of society but rath t k _ economic rationality for all

d- - - _ er a es aSlts task the d I - - -an institutiOnalization of h . . eve opment, dissemination,

Th suc a rationalirv,"e strength of this analysis of liber ]- - _

the lIberal subJect in govern ] d a economy IS that It reclothesn -t f h- menta ress But ack I d - hUI Y 0 t IS governmental u d d- - nowe grng t e inge-u t n erstan mg of ec hs 0 presume that we have f d h k onomy s ould not leadThis would be to assume th Oun ; e ey to decentering the economy_ing of the very sub)-ect matt at we

h0 not need any further understand-

er we ope to I hone needs to see power and kid unrave: t e economic_ Just as_ _ nowe gea d- - -IntImate connection on d s IStInCt In order to think theirf ' e nee s to recognize th . "own arms of density in ord d e economic In terms of its

P" er to un erstand"t . . "power. uttlng aside the q - f I S intimate conjunction with

_ uestlon 0 how to t kl heconomic, the "conduct f d" ac e t e specificity of theI-b I - 0 con uct comes th I

1 era Imaginary of th "ra er C ose to reiterating the" . e economy wIthout .lamy_ It underwrites so to k h estranging us from its famil-ligibility which take ;h spea _' t e same modes of visibility and intel-

e economIc to be an "bto structured choices Th . attn ute that pertains solely_ _ - e next sectIon el -d homISSIon and its unCan I UCI ates t e contours of this

b I- ny c oseness to the lib I- -y C lScussing the quest- f era Imaginary of the marketIon 0 money.

Economy Beyond Governl11entality 29]

3. SILENCES OF GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE VEIL OF MONEY

It is revealing that Foucauldian scholars, who have turned towards thequestion of money and economy, have actually pushed the conceptualframe of govern mentality into the background_ Marieke de Goede (2005),for example, takes the general understanding of discourse, objectification andperformativity as her conceptual vantage points. Indeed, there is very litrleabout money in Foucault's account of the economic form of liberal govern-ment. This omission is not without consequences for how the notion ofgovern mentality depicts the economy: it implies that it is possible to definethe "economic," for example, without taking into account the forms of(monetary) mediation. It follows the classical liberal understanding thatthe essence of things economic lies in the calculations or governing of inter-est. In order to counter this understanding, this section takes money asan exemplary case for highlighting the limits of the focus on the "conductof conduct." The issue of money is taken as a paradigmatic case for a dis-cussion of the conceptualization of the economic for two reasons. Firstly,money is often taken to be a quintessential characteristic of economic issues.Symptomatically, social and economic theorists like Niklas Luhmann,Georg Simmel and John Maynard Keynes commence their reflections 011

the economic with the question of money (Luhmann ]994; Simmel 2004;Keynes 1936; ] 930)_ Even Karl Marx's substantial definition of economy interms of production uses the idea of money's power of abstraction in orderto explain how the laws of value take hold (Marx] 973: 244)_ At the sametime, money is also the most impure economic element. As Karl Polanyi putsit: "The separation of the political and economic spheres had never beencomplete, and it was precisely in the matter of currency that i~was ~ecessar-ily incomplete" (1957: ]96)_ Money ties issues of representation, discourse,politics and economic valuation together in all intricate knot (Pryke 2007,Kirshner 2003a; Carruthers and Babb 1996; de Goede 2004)_ The exampleof money therefore functions like a window revealing the impure constItu-tion of the "economic." As the following discussion will show, liberalism'saccount of money as a neutral veil closes this window and governmentalitystudies should not be so unsuspecting as to follow_David Hume's contention that money is "nothing but the representation

of labor and commodities" still holds as an accurate description of the liberalquantity-theory of money (Hume ]955: 37)_ Irving Fisher, the patriarch ofAmerican monetarism, described his opus The Purchasing Power of Moneyat the beginning of the twentieth century as "at bottom Slm~~ya restate-ment of the old 'quantity theory of money'" (Fisher ] 920: Vll, ] 96, ] 97,quoted in Kirshner 200]: 56)_7These quotations provide the first Indicationsof how classical and (neo-)Iiberal economic discourse problemame money Interms of its representational capacities vis-a.-vis the order of things (see Shell]995: 72 seq_; Goux ]990: 96 seq_)_Money is supposed to serve as a proper

292 Ute Tellmann

place-holder for exchange values. Only if operating as a representationalsign can it fulfil its most central functions: to be the medium of exchange, thestore of value and the unit of account. To a certain extent, demanding thatmoney should assume this role of representation is an uncontroversial aspi-ration: the inflationary derailment of the rnonerary sign clearly underminesmoney's functions'" But the crucial difference lies in the fact that money isonly problematized in terms of this representational function or the lackof it. By analogy, this would be like entertaining a theory of language thatfocused exclusively on the representational function of a signifier withoutapprehending the formative aspects of language (Shell 1994). Money cantherefore appear to liberal discourse as being essentially neutral-neitheradding nor taking, neither qualifying nor constituting the economic order ofthings: "The long-run money neutrality is a crucial property of the classicalmodel" (Snowdon, Vane and Wynarczyk 1994: 56).' Consequently, moneypales into insignificance compared to the realm of scarcity, calculation anddecision, or however the real sector comes to be defined. As John Stuart Millstates it in the nineteenth century, "there cannot, in short, be intrinsicallya more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money [ ... ]"(Mill 1848: 333)-" The later monetarist and more constructivist position isthat the task of an appropriate monetary policy is to make sure that moneyactually is as neutral and insignificant as it is supposed to be. Preventingthe excesses of government spending is the key to ensuring this neutrality(Hayek 1981: 58). Whereas the nineteenth century took the gold standard tobe the guarantee of this representational function of money, the monetaristposition assumes that an unhindered market mechanism will itself ensurethat only "honest money" circulates (Hayek 1986: 8-10; 1976). Recentdecades, which turned "transparency" into a "governance panacea," havedemonstrated the persistent discursive regularities that shape approaches tomoney and finance (Blyth 2003: 245). A profound family resemblance con-nects nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century neo-liberalismin this belief about money as essentially a medium of representation andtransparency. In this perspective, the question of power and politics onlyarises if money is made to deviate from its neutrality by the spending prac-tices of politica I authorities (Snowdon et al. 1994: 145). Disturbances of thismedium of representation are usually seen to be caused by Short-term panicsor excessive government spending, which results in a period of adaptationand crisis. Apart from these moments of crisis, money does not even appearas a contentious issue of political rationality. Liberal economic discourserules out, by definition, the possibility that money itself entails an "ubiqui-tous politics" (Kirshner 2003a).

The analytical ability to grasp whether and how monetary regimesindeed entail an inherent "ontological politics" depends, in contrast, ona conceptualization of money that differs from the liberal account of neu-trality. A lively debate within social theory and anthropology about thesocial nature of money offers instructive suggestions in this respect (Gilbert

E Beyond Governmentality 293canomy

K . 2004 Pryke and du Gay 2007;06 M 2005· Me em ie , b h2005; Ingham 20 ; aurer. ' ible to do Justice to this de ate ere,Thrift 2002). Although It ISImpOSSI h s in which the very concep-

hi to indicate t e way Ie"a few remarks may e p . ibili f "the economic as cu rur .f d fines rhe VISI I rty 0 h Thetualization 0 mon~y.e . . about money are of interest. ere ..

Two conceptual shifts 10 thmklOgf

a relation of credit, obliga-h d finirion a money as 2006) " Asfirst one concerns tee . oral horizon (Ingham .

tion and debt, which establishes a temp. "money is above all a subtleJohn Maynard Keynes (1936: 294) P~tS It, " The temporality of a debtdevice for linking the prese~lt to t~~ t~~~r~'recedence in the definition ofrelation, its measures and a Igatl°

fa monetary economy, Keynes c1all"~,

money. Indeed, the specific traits 0 ttles the units of account, In whichonly come into being once money S\ 930' 3) Instead of taking money torelarions of debt and credlt;re fix~dr~prese~ta;ion, this perspective PO~I1tSbe a neutral veil and a me, rum 0 . relation of a certain kind (Ing a~ltowards money as formatting ~ socI~eI2004; Gilbert 2005). Its economic2006; Bryan and Rafferty 2007, SIf';,ed through the variable conventions,character one might say, IS fashio ine monetary patterns of tempo-instrume~ts and dispositils that ~t~~:1 up this perspective, Bill Maure~rality and regimes of obl,gatl~n'h : one should problematize the financ:a_(2008, 171) has recently argue tha lineal negotiations that shape reha

. . s of t e po I I hi f ymenr eoffshore economy 10 term banks and hierarc res a pa htions of payment. Not exchange, ut r s Even these brief comments s ow

. . define these offshore space. d. f exchange and money asmamta ms, as a me iurn a . lelythar differentiating between different analytical thrust than focusing so osea relation of payment has a I e'r duct" The former enables us to pon the technologies of "conduct a cOdnefined and the latter tends to assume

f h the economiC IS ,the question 0 ow cred "

this question ;:~:~~~yo~:e: i~I~:nati~g shi~,t~:~~n,~e:;I~a~~z~n~n~~;s?;The secon . of commensurability. Y.I recently drawn

pertains to the quesGtl°lnb t (2005: 360) records, "has untld

comparable. It" Emily I er . " Money ren ersequiva en , f ocial rheorisrs. . ly given

h b Ik of the attention 0 s. . w argued, is not simp .t e u. b this capacity, as ISno. . lence-in currentand quantlfiable- ur inuous "reproduction of eqUiva 2007: 147).Rather it requtt'es the conn " (Bryan and Rafferty d d

' acrosS time and across space d that we need to un erst~nexchange, d M· h el Rafferty have argue d h commensuratiOnDick Bryan an IC a instrument that exten s suc

d. 153). According

derivatives as a rnon7~ry ncial and physical assets (Ibl ,," ce of compari-across a wide range a .na lar form of money defines a. SIP~ all forms, at

h· ent a partlcu fall caplfa , 10to t ISargum '. n "on-going measure 0 " hat was not possi-son" anew. It permits a . e" to take place, sornethlOg ~ and Raffertyall locations and across tim of derivatives (ibid.: 141£). ryan suration that

f h biqultDUS use . and com menble be are t e u. adulation of companson P ttin aside for rhedelineate a particular m 'c" in a different way. u. ~ 's valid or. r "the economl d' of derIvatIves 1 <shapes mter a 1G. f hether rheir ren enngmoment the questiOn a W

294 Ute Tel/mann

sufficient: for the question at hand, it functions as an example that orientsus toward an analysis of how monetary arrangements and financial instru-ments partake in moulding the "spaces," temporalities and media of com-parison that shift the notion of what counts as "economic."

This research perspective is somewhat akin to the recent suggestions ofActor-Network Theory (ANT) that we should be studying the "renderingof the economic" (Calion et al. 2007: 3). Indeed, ANT and govern mentalityshare theoretical sensibilities and methodological devices (Rose, O'Malleyand Valverde 2006: 92). But before merging these approaches too quickly,the conceptual tools of each-and their respective limits-need to be scru-tinized. How far a reworked Foucauldian perspective could offer valuableinsights beyond ANT's "market test" (Calion 1998) will be discussed in theconcluding section of this chapter. At this point it suffices to demonstratethat the important shift in perspective concerns the very question of theeconomic: how it comes to be defined in terms of temporality and obliga-tion, of translation and valuation (Maurer 2005; 2006; 2002).

If governmentality studies continue to neglect the question of the eco-nomic, the field deprives itself of the possibility of detecting the multiplesites at which it is fashioned. Instead, the opposite effect ensues: the regimeof visibility and intelligibility which classical and neo-liberal economic-political discourse organizes is strengthened, because the field continues toignore the disputable and historical character of the economic. The questionof money has served only as an example to pinpoint this omission, its costsand effects. In order to avoid falling unknowingly into the grid of visibilitythat liberalism organizes in respect to economy, governmentality would have toinquire about the "type of reality with which we are dealing"-as Foucault putsit. Unlocking the "conduct of conduct" from its status as a conceptual short-cutfor power is a necessary step in this process of renewing the "toolbox" of gov-ern mentality studies, as the remainder of this chapter shows.

4. THE PECULIARITY OF GOVERNING MENAND THE ART OF USING HISTORY

Foucault's historical mode of investigation never proceeded without con-stantly destabilizing and questioning his conceptual tools by relating themto a historical frame. Curiously, the concept of "conduct of conduct" seemsto be an exception in this respect: it has been turned into a general concep-tual tool that supposedly captures the essence of relations of power. Like noorher concept of Foucault's, the "conduct of conduct" enjoys a status ofconceptual refinement and closure (Allen 199J). The "conduct of conduct"is said to have effectively broken with the somewhat claustrophobic gridof disciplinary power, and is seen as a concept which enables us to thinkpower and the suhject as a conjunction of conduct and counter-conduct,in which freedom is an over-determined practice (Foucault 19~3: 220£.;


002 49f) g others has demonstrated2008:185f.)., Thon;~s Lemke (f2 ~ ct"· ;:a~~e~ Foucau'lt to bring togetherhow the nonon of conduct 0 (o~ u d the "technologies of the self" in anh " h I gles of domination an ic or mecht e tee no 0 id h itf lis of a deterministic or mec a-understanding of power that aVOi

Isht e Pllt

fa ms to articulate the "conduct

. . II I deed Foucau t imse see b drusnc account. n, I f wer and ties it to the roaf d " , t ch a genera concept 0 po ,

o can uct as JUS su , hi sense is to structure the pos-. f ment: "To govern m t IS, dmeaning 0 gov,ern . "1983.221) Government, power and can ucrsible field of action of others ( . . tl as Senellart has shown, gov-

f h b ymous Consequen y,hence ort ecome synon ,., 11 cific concept-geared to under-ern mentality mutated from a historica y spe I' d notion of "'the way in

. d positi] Into a genera izestanding the security IS -,,, (S llart 2008: 388). Thus, Fou-

die's conduct ene , hwhich one con ucrs peop hori d to treat govern mentality as t e

I hi If h parentlyaut onze uscau t irnse as ap h ddi its historical horizon.understanding of power, thereby s e ing st taking these words of Fou-

The following argument cauhtIons aglafimalization of the "analytics oft al and a istorrca n h Idcault's as a concep U f d t" and suggests that we s ou, f h "conduct 0 con ue , . h

power" In terms 0 t e . 'I h f 'nvestigarion. It tries to s ow'F I' hlstonca et os 0 I d f hiinstead revisit oucau r s , ' id ense of rhe boun sot IS

f t to cultivate a V\VI s k ithat Foucault never orgo "II d alytically. Rather than ra mg

. I' politIca yan an I fgovernmental rationa Ity- I' he wrote a genea ogy 0f d " s a conceptua given, .

the "conduct 0 con ucr a . sense of histoncal estrange-I· h dded this concept to a f

this rationa uy t at we hani I pplications of the concept 0 go v-ment More often than not, mee ~l1Ica a hi t ry Reminding oneself of

. is d hili ng turn to IS 0 . Iern mentality forget this esta I I~I, the possibility of concepruathis historical peculiarity means eepl~g opetnnce

d' h f paramount Impor a . d'innovation, an IS t us 0 . h f d n politics" occurs, accoe mg to

. f h "blrt 0 mo er 'II I'The deciSive moment or t e 'd with a quintessentla Yre I-. I . I'ty becomes lI1veste IFoucault as politIca ratlona I'd 1997.260 266): pastora power., .. 'd r' power (Hm esS . 1 . d 'gious form of mdivi ua IZlI1g f e "-its peculianty an speel-Pastoral power is a "quite specific type 0 PO~eraim (Foucault 2007: 194). It

k' h nduct of men as Its so d h "govficity lies in ta rng t e co " I h· must revolve aroun suc a -is not inevitable that a polltlca ,onzon On the contrary, this approach to

ernment of men," as Foucault pOl~rso~~~intermeshing between rhe pastoralgoverning men belongs to the questIonal'b l"sm (Foucault 2007, 184, 148).and the political that still accompanrefs ~i~r:rilzation of this political horizonF It (2007· 122) performs a de a , f I" . "lO]ne thrng clearlyQucau ~ k dersrandmg 0 po mes.by J'uxtaposing It to the Gree un h' h' that one never governs a state,

h 'ngs w IC IS I'd'emerges through all t ese meaOi Th hom one governs are peop e, III 1-

a territory, or a political structu~. 'd ose ;~overning people is certainly nor aviduals, or groups r ... J Now, t e ,1 ea 7 olirics which consists in the ve,ryGreek idea" The Greek understandrng 0 p h "~ity-state in its substantial

. I heme" targets t e Th hasis"rejection of the pastora t ,,' f he city" (2007: 123). e emp "reality, its unity" bur not r~,e m:~r~a: a curious trait of t~emodern ~ollt~~on the "conduct of conduct app unds of the histoncal formationcal horizon and clearly reveals the bo

..

296 Ute Tel/mann

belongs to. It is not just a conceptual tool, but equally a historical horizon.Does Foucault ever undo this conceptual-bistorical interrneshing?

After these lectures, as we know, Foucault shifted his focus away fromthe state, power and the "birth of modern politics." At this point in hiswriting, he boldly and confusingly claims that "not power, but the subject"is the general theme of his research (1983: 209). He explains his renewedinterest in the question of the subject by referring to the pressing actual-ity of this question. The "struggle against the forms of subjection-againstthe submission of subjectivity" is becoming, he observes, "more and moreimportant" for understanding the present (Foucault 1983: 213). The codi-fication of "the conduct of conduct" as a formula of power stems fromexactly this moment. Hence, the fact that Foucault coined "the conduct ofconduct" as a frame for understanding power needs to be related to the veryspecificity of the problematique he was interested in at that time. Power as"the conduct of conduct" aims at understanding the forms of subjectivitythat are at stake in these struggles. But it does not mean that the triangu-lation of power-knowledge-subject should be reduced to this formula: itdoes not seem fit to capture the whole "anatomy of power" that economicdispositifs entail.

What can be learnt from this moment of Foucault's thought is not the par-ticular codification Foucault used, but the ethos of investigation he laid outin the famous Afterword on "The Subject and Power": The task of analysisis to "check the type of reality, with which we are dealing," to "know thehistorical conditions which motivate OUf conceptualization." And this (00-

ceprualizarion implies, he adds, "critical thought-a constant checking"(Foucault 1983: 209). I am not claiming that this reminder of Foucault'sparticular way of using history is an original observation. Rather, in viewof the need to unearth novel perspectives on the economic, this reminderhopes to reinvigorate the methods that Foucault employed for working withina historical formation. His style of genealogical and archaeological analysisdid not offer a secure theoretical or analytical ground for writing a "historyof the present." His very theoretical stance committed him to working inbetween the historical and the conceptual register. With the words "I amin effect much more a historicist and Nietzschean," he contrasted his workwith )Urgen Habermas' project of founding a transcendental way of think-ing, hostile to any form of historicism (Foucault 2001: 1099; my transla-tion). But "happy positivism," the term he coined as a characterization ofhis mode of reading the historical record, did not imply a purely immanent

, 13 0 hperspective. n t e contrary, he always sought to produce a sense of anoutside that signalled the limits of the historical formation he was analyz-ing. To "become someone else" and to think differently were the professedalms of this exercise (Foucault 2001: 1596; Saar 2003: 167 and 172). Forthis reason, Foucault remained consistently and notoriously equivocal about howwholeheartedly he adopted a historicized concept as his own-which isan ethos of investigation very much opposed to taking a single conceptual


f I bl int for analysis." This continual destabilization betweenormu a as a uepnn . d otiate the immanencethe historical and the conceptual, u~ed inti':n:r :~r ~~~ Foucauldian merhod-of this perspectlvel~~th~s n~~:xe,:ei:aO~achine for referring concepts backology. The Foucau Ian tOO ., . nee tua l force-rather thanto rhe historical record while retainding rhe~ co m: outcomes regardless ofbeing a "cookie-cutter" that repro uces t e sa

the question at hand. I" I horizon and because the, lib I' forms our po inca ,It IS because , era ISm , f 1 of power that oned ".. d d such pervasive orn ,

"conduct of can uct IS In .ee . .' this distinction between the his-, II dili t in maintaining 'IIhas to be especia y ligen. . . re of their permanent OSCI a-

hi hile remaining awa ,torical and t e conceptua w f nralirv as a way of capruring. h ccess a govern me .tion. Otherwise, t every su f er might ironically turn Intoadequately some very dominant types f pow As this chapter has sought

, ina other Sites 0 power. d ban impediment to seeing 0 , bl' tique that is not exhausre y. tltutes a pro ema ..

to show, the econorruc cons d historical-conceptual enquinesthe logics of conducting conduct but nee sabout this "type of reality."

5. CONCLUSION: GOVERNMEN~ALITY ANDTHE ECONOMY-BEYOND ANT.

I, ' d "analyticS of power" that gov-bl ti ed the mute .'This chapter has pro ema I.Z "cond f conduct" as ItS main ana-

. ' k the con uct 0 f biernmentality delivers In ta mg as a "cultural production a su Je.ctslyrical key. To understand the econ~~y Escobar 1995: 59) means analyZingand social order of a certain kin ( h s the governing of subjects.

db' rs as muc a . Ithe dispositifs of money an 0 jec n of rhe economic as a malleable soctaWithout engaging With rhe questlo . within the limits of the lib-

t liry remainS . fform the concept of govern men a , f this. My diSCUSSIon 0, . h t being aware 0 d

eral economic discourse wit au I se showing why we nee toexemp ary ca , I' dmoney has served here as an. . hi espect Governmenta tty stu -

e In t IS resuec c. k i 'broaden the analytical p~rspec[Iv h uestion that scholars war I~gInies should therefore consider a resTeahrc q h ve recently articulated: Michel

, f A Network eory a die howthe perspective 0 ctor- d that we nee to ana yz .Calion and colleagues (2007: 3) have argue of wbat it is to be 'economIC'

" d d· "The meaning , , rhar ISthe economIC IS pro uce . f 'economizatlon, a process . h. h e of a process 0 , t'nue mig ris preCisely t e outcom . bl" The economiC, they can I ,

, . I . t and dlSputa e. , h Ily mean sav-hlstorlca contingen bT But it mig t equaimply cOl~mensurability or exc.hanlg~a I It~'economy materialize is the very. "H these artlcu atlons alIlg or ratlol1lOg. ow

'h ' I that govern-object of researc . 10mic should not Imp y ,But raising this quesrion of the eco

l, ANT Therearestill importantdlf-

'd ntlca to· . ANTmentality studies will become I ~ d how they are put into prawce. I 'ferences between these approac e~ an I t configure "economic ca1cu atlve

, h 'cal deVices t 1aatrends [0 the SOCio-tec 111

298 Ute Tel/mann

capacities" and "qualify market objects" (ibid.. 5; Calion 1998). "Marketdevices" range in this respect from shelves in supermarkets via shoppingcarts to pricing models (ibid.), The studies that are now being undertakendemonstrate the diversity of these "devices" by unfolding a multiplicity ofempirical cases. But the announced conceptual-historical question of the"economic" and its "anatomies of power" is rarely an overarching aim. Incontrast, the concept of governmentality points to the political rationali-ties and technologies that animate a particular dispositi]. Governmenralirystudies works toward understanding the forms of spatial, temporal andnormative mechanisms that delineate the "history of the present." Ratherthan focusing solely on the technical objects and their networks, govern-mentality attends to the fuzzy logics of "technologies of power." A type ofgovern mentality studies that took up the question of the economic couldoffer a distinct and valuable focus on "economics as culture." It would havethe potential to embed the particular case studies that characterize ANT ina more diagnostic perspective that dissects the "lines of force and fragility"of the present. As I have argued, such research perspectives will remainunavailable as long as govern mentality-studies lose sight of the broaderoutlines of the security disposti]. The heuristic of govern mentality shouldnot be misunderstood as a mechanical toolkit that can be employed whiledispensing with theoretical and historical work.

NOTES

]. The thoughts presented here are part of a mOre comprehensive argumentabout the invisibility of the economy within Foucault's oeuvre. The otherfacers of this argument have been developed in my arricle "Foucault and theInvisible Economy" (Tell mann 2009).

2. J would like to thank Monica Greco for reminding me of this term, whichmakes it possible to point out very precisely what is in danger of being excludedwithin the prevalent understanding of the governmental perspective.

3. The relation of governmentality to this research perspective on the economy,as recently articulated by scholars of Actor-Network Theory, will be dis-cussed later on.

4. The cursory explication of the security dispositif provided by Foucault hasgiven rise to the complaint that his analytical strategies concentrated to anundue extent on purely theoretical or textual material (O'Malley, Weir andShearing 1997).

5. For a further discussion of this point see Tellma nn (2009). Foucault concededthat relations of power, conduct, and truth intertwine with economic rela-tions, but he articulated them as distinguishable and explicitly set them aside(Foucault 2007, 196; 2003; 1983, 213). Of course, he did include economicdiscourse in his analysis of the human sciences as presentcd in the Order ofThings. His attention in this case did not revolve primarily around the ques-tion of economy, but the general shifts of the cpistemc, of which economicdiscourse proved to be one instance.

6, GovernmentJlity is sometimes chJracrerized [IS being a mode of power that isdirected towards the "<1rrangemenr of things." The textual passage in which

E Beyond Governmentality 299conomy

. . these terms stems from the lecture ~fFoucault refers to gover~~e~ta~~y In ses the genealogical emergenc~ of thisFebruary 1, 1978, i~ whic e ISCUSGiven the considerable historical gaprationality in the Sixteenth century. ce of liberal rationality proper III thebetween this period and the e~ergenh more prominent, consistent and pre-eighteenth century, as we~l as t ,e m~~ the only stakes of modern g~vcrnmen-cise focus on interest and mcennves h . ht on this textual allusion to thetaliry we should not place too rnuc wctg . , I

' hi f In ItS generarole of t mgs. , h antity theory a money h7 N· 1 Dodd (1994- 10) explains t e gu I Iy as a medium of exc ange,. ~see as follows: ':In so far ~s money ser.v~~ s~beout the theorem itself. If there~~ere is little which is contentiOUS °drsU;Ifi~:tegquantity of goods to be

fso.ld

l, thee

. ity of money an a esrion 0 ant un .is a definite quanti ds wil! be sold is an elementary q~ d h lumeprices at which those goo s:~ velocity of money's circulation an t e votic, at least once values for t" . f infla-of transactions are known. . f anomie tolerance 111. respect 0 h

8. For a discussion of the ~ar~~\~ s;r~ct policy of no inflation, see jonar anrion, which are conrraste Wit t _ conomic thoughtKirshner (2001). h the basic tenets of macro e

9 The dassical model refers ere to 94' 42). 'v-. from 1776-1936 (Snowdon et at. ~,9 '] except in the character of the CO~trl _

. s follows' [.,. . f ney does not Inter10. This passage .cont.lOue~:d labor [ .' .. ] The introductlo~ °do:'°n in the preceding

ance for sparing tlm.e f the Laws of Value laid in unalteredfere with the oP~~~I~:/:ii~~YOr commodities to 0/1: a;;~~tr~rh~,~'~uchor howchapters i·..} I I tion introduced IS to mon yh he Exchange Valueby money: the on ~ re a h for' in other words, ow t. I they will exc ange , hlitt e money . d." (ibid.) belongs to w atf itself is determine. . II gic of moneyo money I d hat the represent3t10na 0 . f exchange, in contrast

11. It should b~ note di terms of money as a rnediu m 0 be the crucial fearu reis usually discusse 111 k the unit of account to

h f noney that ra es dto a teary 0 I 006' 268). 'e in the A(terwor toof money (Ingham 2 . It articulates this stanCh. k' "Perhaps the. t1y Foucau . n of IS wor . .

12. Most promtnen 'fus' influential inter~reta[jo f he best aids for COffill1gRabinow and Drey f h term conduct IS one a ~ 'conduct' is at theequivocal nature 0 t .efi . y of power relations. ?r to f coercion which

. h the speci Cit echanlsms 0to ter~s Wit 'I d' others (according to m f b having within a .more .~rsame time t? ea ees strict) and a way.o e ower consistS III gUI ,:are to varYll1g degr .'bTt·es The exerCise of p h ssible outcomeles; open field .of POSSI d11 c\ ~nd putting in order tepa

'b'ltty of can u ..ing the POSSI I Ide in order to POSltlo.n(Foucault 1983: 2,21). 'n his Archeology of KflOtr.e 1questions about hIS

13. Fouc~ult ~oined ~IS t:d~s~ription against philo;~P21;'d). This immanent per-his hlstortcal mo eo .. ation (Foucault 19 , d' visible what has,own epistemologica~ Ifg1tl'~arize the familiar by ren

ler~~~ simply lies on the

spective intends ~o e amb~en invisible in the ~rst p ace~rs ective. The arg~-as Foucault putS It, nebver d from a slightly dlfferenht PI d by Paul Ricoeur IS

I 't can e rea .' "as mars a e .surface, w 1ere I r"cs of SUSpICIon . f h· gs in an "overView,, he "hermeneu I fi 'altty 0 t In , f nt

menr against t . d ex osing the super Cl th to be laid out 1I1 robased ~n showlI1g ~n p which allow~ ~h.e.d~p rh is resituated as anfrom higher and higher up, rofound Vlslblltty,. dep I, text, Nietzsche,of him in a more .and ~;~~~, ~s Foucault puts it In a~~~rll)ow 1983: ~07). l,~absolutely superfiClal\seI967 quoted in Dreyfu.s and

hGenealogy, History

Freud, Marx (Fau.cau t them; in his text on "NlctZSC e,is also a very domInant(Foucault 1977, 187).

300 Ute Tel/mann

14 A striking example of how Fo I f hia historical analysis of disc ucau rdr ers IS conceptual questions back to

I ourses an practices in 0 d .. heiand effects i . hi I . r er to scrunruze r elf useH 5 present In IS ecrures entitled Society Must be Defended (2003)e commences the lecrure course b drawi h ,e .

carding an "economism of ower". uYdrawing. out t e c<;>nsequences of dis-struggle he contends remaP :d n

ferstandmg power In terms of war and

.' , Ins-aSI e rom the also disca d d . f510n-a viable possibility F f door! . r e notion 0 repres-the valid conclusion of hi~ t~;o;e~:a~ opnng this understan.ding of powe~ asconclusion back to historical anal si arf~me~t, he turns this very theoreticaluse and qualify the aim of I.Y s. ~ different lectures tease and test,war and struggle. There is n~nfian~~~~~d~soclalhf.ormati~n through the notion ofture. Rather, Foucault tries t d .ICt on t IS quesnon at the end of the lee-implied. 0 erermme the effects, the strength, the politics


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15 Constructing the Socialized SelfMobilization and Controlin the" Active Society"

Stephan Lessenich

1. GOVERN MENTALITY AND THE WELFARE STATE

For almost two decades now, critical studies of the development of advancedcapitalist societies have been stimulated by what has been called the "Fou-cault effect." I According to the editors of a volume which back at thebeginning of the 1990s, set out the state of the art in the emerging field of"governmentality studies," the Foucault effect in the social sciences consistsin "the making visible, through a particular perspective in the history of thepresent, of the different ways in which an activity or arr called governmenthas been made thinkable and practicable" (Burchell Gordon and Miller.. '1991: IX). When talking of "Government" in Foucauldia n terms there ismu~~ more at ~take than the operations, rules, and procedures ~f states,political executives and public administrations. Colin Gordon argued thatwith the nse of the "govern mentality school," the analytical perspective hadbeen WIdened well beyond the classical political science notion of the con-cept: "Government" was conceptualized as an activity that could concernthe whole of social relations constituting modern "society"-"the relationbetween self ao.d self, private interpersonal relations involving some formof control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communitiesand, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty"(Gordon 1991: 2-3; emphasis added).

If government was conceptualized by govern mentality scholars as acOl~prehe~sive "social activity," with political government seen as only oneof Its possible forms (Miller and Rose 2007: 15), governmentality studiesaimed at uncoveringthe rationality of the governmental practices specificto co~temporary SOCieties, revealing the ways in which a particular set ofpractices becomes "thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners andto those upon which it [is] practised" (Gordon 1991: 3). The central ques-tion posed by a Foucauldian-style analysis, then, is how it comes abouttha~ governing individuals, relationships, collectivities and ultimately "thesocial" (Donzelot 1984) is socially effective. How are government, the con-duct of conduct, action on actions, made thinkable, sayable-and practi-cable, operable, doable? "The sense and object of governmental acts do not

Constructing the Socialized Self 305

fall from the sky or emerge ready formed from social practice. They arethings which have had to be-and which have been-invented." (Burchellet al. 1991: xl This "invention" of government and its specific rationality,in turn, is a question of power. Who is capable of conducting people inthe ways they conduct their lives? Who is enabled to take action on whoseactions, in which manner, and to what end?

In pursuing these (and related) questions, those studies in govern men-tality which have turned out to be most fruitful for the deciphering of thesocial world of our time have taken the work of the late Michel Foucaultas an instruction manual for a specific mode of analysis which, focusing onthe relations of knowledge, power, and subjectivity inherent to our society,effectively questions prevalent accounts of the present. "The study of gov-ernrnenrality studies might thus be thought of as a disruptive technologyof intellectual inquiry which can pose different kinds of questions outsidethe arc provided by commonly accepted narratives" (Dean 2007c: 9). Inthis context, contemporary narratives on the state and its public action areamong those challenged and called into question. For students of govern-mentality, the state is neither society's monopolist of political power northe epicenter of the ordering of social relations, but is thought of as beingembedded and levelled into society and its practices. In a way, when weadopt the perspective of governmentality, the state is moved away fromthe center stage of social order. The state is "no super-technique of power... taking effect behind all other power techniques" (Gehring 2007: 15),but ultimately an effect of social practices-and an effective social practiceitself, an ensemble of different governmental techniques.

The intellectual and analytical preference for practices and effectsof "Political Power beyond the State" (Rose and Miller 1992; emphasisadded) may explain why the state itself and, more specifically, the transfor-mation of state capacities and state intervention, has not been an issue ofprimary interest for governmentality studies during the last two decades.The relevance of the state's "actions on others' actions" (Gordon 1991: 5)becomes obvious in the context of the transformation of social policies weare currently witnessing in all the advanced capitalist societies of the :Vest-ern world. It comes as a surprise, then, that this fundamental change 111 theinstitutional arrangement of the Western welfare state has not been amongthe most popular themes of the governmentality approach. Even more sur-prising, however, is the fact that those analyses which actually deal wlt,hthe recent change from "welfare society" to "ac,tiv,e sOCl~ty" (Dean 19:);Walters 1997) seem to limit themselves to classifying this transformatIOnas a "neoliberal" move towards the construction of a self-relying homooeconomicus. But it can be argued that this is only half t~e. story about thereformed Western welfare state. "Activating" social policies are not. onlydirected by an economic rationality, and they amount to more than Just.apolitical project of "enterprisation" (Dean 1995: 580) of the self. In addi-tion, they are guided at least as much by a social rationality: they aim at

306 Stephan Lessenich

the construction of a "socialized self" who, in relying on and taking care ofhim/herself, is actually acting in the name and for the sake of "society."

In line with this argument, in what follows I will present an initial con-tribution to a reinterpretation of the welfare state and its current, "acti-vating" reform(s).' Starting from the assumption that the modern state'saction on people's actions amounts to a specific mode of subjectivation, thefirst central question to be clarified is what type of subjectivit-y is currentlyemerging our of the social implementation of renewed, activating welfarestate programs:

those to be governed can be [and have historically been, S.L.] conceivedof as children to be educated, members of a flock to be led, souls to besaved, Of, we can now add, social subjects to be accorded their rightsand obligations, autonomous individuals to be assisted in realising theirpotential through their own choice, or potential threats to be analysedin logics of risk and security. (Miller and Rose 2007: 7)

From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century and throughoutmost of the 20'", the institutionalization of the welfare state in West-ern democracies meant transforming individuals into citizens endowedwith social rights (Marshall 1963)-a transformation which constituteda public responsibility for individual welfare, and indeed for the consti-tution of "the social" itself. The welfare state established a "sociopoli-tics" (Ewald 1991: 210) through which society-or "the promotion ofthe social" (Donzelot 1988)-became "a permanent principle of politicalself-Justification" (Ewald 1991: 210). At the end of the twentieth centuryand the beginning of the twenty-first, however, a reformed, activatingwelfare state has been constituting itself as the new mode of politicalself-justification of society vis-a-vis its individual members constructingacti.ve .subjects as be~rers not of social rights, but of social obligations-asSOCialized selves obliged not only to be responsible for themselves, but forsociety and its welfare as a whole.

It is this new-or renewed-focus of the welfare state on "governingfrom the perspective of society" (Walters 1997: 221) which comprises theessence of Its ~o~t recent, neosocial stage of development. "Foucault saw itas a characteristic ... property of the development of the practice of gov-ernment In Western SOCIetiesto tend towards a form of political sovereignty... whose concerns would be at once to 'totalize' and to 'individualize'"(Gordon 1991: 3). In a sense, activating the self for the sake of societycan be interprered as the up-to-date version of this modern governmentalratlon,allty: the re-invcnnon of the welfare State as an activating enterprise~sta~,lJshes a social setting in which "individuals are willing to exist as sub-Jects (Gordon 199·1: 48; Maasen and Sutter 2007), in which each subjectassumes (or ISassumed to be assuming) "the idea that all have to contribute'of themselves'" (Gehring 2007: 27) to a Common good called "the social."


In the reformed welfare state of the active society, then, governing peoplemeans relocating the promotion of the social into the individual, resubmit-ting it to the individual's responsibility Of, to put it another way, subjectingthe subject to a social-or societal-logic.

If this description of the specific type of subjectivity emerging from cur-rent welfare state transformation is accurate (Lessenich 2003), the secondcentral question to be dealt with at this point relates ro rhe modus operandiof this type of subjectivation, to the specific models) of processing thesenew "sociopolitics" of the welfare state. In this respect, the argumenr tobedeveloped here holds that in the governmentality of contemporary activesociety, there reappears-in new guise-a contradlctlO.n. inherent 111 thepolitical economy of liberal society: the dilemma of mobility and control.

2. THE "LIBERAL PARADOX": THE WELFARE STATEBETWEEN MOBILIZATION AND CONTROL

The analysis of current welfare state transformation(s) ro"be presented her:rests on what in political economy has been called the. liberal paradox(Hollifield 1992,2003). The basic-and apparently trlv,al---:-'l1ltlal insightis that the welfare state of twentieth century Western socletl.es was consn-tuted and has been instituted as an (a) capitalist and (b)nat/Onal arrange-

O th one hand (a) the institutions and interventions of rhe welfaremenr. n e, ducti d fstate are functionally related to the productive and repro u~tl~e n~e s a

h . I· To be sure and to avoid any eCOnOITIIStiCmisread-t e capita isr economy. '. Iing this is by no means the only functional attribute of the modern we-far; state. But the welfare state is basically (among other characteristics) a

. I· t t (Offe 2006) in that rhe constitution of a market economycapita 1St s a e, . "(C Iand more specifically, of labor markets, the "employment society .call:

' . . f ducti logically and hisrorica y1996), and a capitalist system 0 pro ucnon, are . . _related to the welfare state social policies which systematically ~ommod fify-and situationally and selectively de_commodlfy-substantl~ parts 0

the population, which by means of welfare state Interve~;~n 1;~~.mgff:way of forming the capitalist workforce (Lenhardt and lei . ' . I

h f . di id al and co ecuve socra1984) On the other hand (b), t e set 0 In IVI u . d I .. . .. . k I an tne provl-rights the insnrurional practices of solldanstlC tIS -poo iated di I . h

, fi II f hi h are assoCiate irecr y wttsian of social services and bene ts, a 0 w '~ te have all developedthe (de-jcornmoditying function of the wei are st; ~nd are inextricablyin the context of the national polttlcal commUni y ti state (Marshalllinked to the constitution of the modern polity as a '~ /On- national in the1963; Donzelot 1984). The modern welf:~~ Stt~::'citrc~~~~~ribes irs (to thissame basic sense 1I1 which It IS capItalist? I· I . "to its (national) ciri-

. t i of "soc!a 11K uston .ex rent exclusive] programma IC . h h III irs most basic version,

I I·· II t on a par Wit t em.zens and t lose po inca y pu .. () anonuc logic-the logicthe resulting "liberal paradox" consistS 111 a an ec


of commodification-that is fundamentally (among other things: territo-rially) unlimited, being combined Of, to be more precise, being function-ally intertwined with (b) a political logic-the logic of inclusion-which isstrictly (not least: territorially) delimited in its operation.

Looking rather more closely at the liberal concomitance of capitalismand the nation-state, however, we can identify behind the dualism of an"open economy" and a "closed polity" an even more fundamental oppo-sition which, arguably, is central to the operational logic of liberal gov-ernmentality as such: the antagonism of liberry and discipline (Wagner1994), the dialectics of mobility and control. Although the two dimensionsof this dialectics ate analytically separable, ernpirically the liberal mobil-ity/control complex is operative in the economic as well as the politicaldimension. From its very beginning, the history of liberal capitalism is ahistory of mobilizing labor, of channelling it from traditional and staticforms of self-sufficient, communitary or tributary work into modern anddynamic modes of productive, profitable, wage-related employment. Thishistorical process of active (and passive) "proletarianization" (Lenhardtand Offe 1984: 92-100) of large parts of the population, escorted anddnven forward by the (avant la lettre) social policy ptograms and provi-sions of the nascent welfare state, has been (and is) of a highly ambivalentnature. Operating by means of positive and negative incentives, of rewardsand sanctions, of material and immaterial power, of money, law, and (notleast) violence, it is productive and destructive at the same time. A sig-nificant part of this ambivalence is due to the fact that throughout thesecular process of mobilizing people for commodification, and arguablyuntil today, there have been (and are) countervailing powers aiming at con-trollmg people's mobility or (to put it in a less intentional way) leading toan opposite, political dynamic of narrowing, constricting, and confiningthe very mobility unleashed in the economic realm. Activities like keepingpeople at their workplace, imposing continuous service and deferred grari-fication on them, controlling the transformation of their productive capaci-ties. I.oro day-to-day work performance, or ensuring that their economic~ctlvlty d~es notspill over into the political arena mark only part of the

business of SOCial regulation of capitalism. To be sure, people making useof given (or arising) opportunities for mobility are porentially productive-and treasured; but at the same time (and on the very same grounds of theirmobility), they are potentially dangerous-and risky. As with any highlyvalued property (in the wider sense of the word), mobilized people-and asociety In morlon-arc hazardous goods.

To put it in a nutshell, the capitalist mobilization and ensuing "move-ment of society" (Donzelor 1988: 397; 1991) has raised, right from thestart, fundamental Issues of governability-of "governing the freedom"given to Its citizens by a liberal political economy (Lemke 2007; Saar 2007).But this IS only part of the story of the inbuilt ambivalence of liberal soci-eties. To complieate the picture further, the interplay (or counter-play) of


mobility and conrrol, of mobilization and de- or im-mobilization, is notonly inherent in the process of capitalist accumulation of economic wealth.In a complex and contradictory-and historically contingent-way, thisprocess interacts with the political drift toward stare-building in the guiseof the nation-state. The modern capitalist (political) economy constitutesitself as a national affair. Producing wealth by unleashing the productiveforces of labor works as a structural incentive for further mobility, as apull factor attracring-e-rbe ambiguities of the capitalist mode of productionnotwithstanding-people across territorial, spatial, and cultural borders,making them move in order to seize the opportunity to become an integralpart of national production systems. This "wealth appeal" of (advanced,metropolitan) capitalism, however, is thwarted by the logic of limitationand control inherent to the nation-state and to the institutions of nationalcitizenship (Bornrnes 1999; Bommes and Geddes 2000). The modern stareas a nation-state is defined-and even more so to the extent to which Ithistorically develops features of a welfare state-:-by instituting an effectiveregime of external surveillance and control of ItS rerruory (Giddens 1987;Dean 2007a, b). In a way akin to but even more mrense than In the caseof the internal mobility of "risky subjects," external (or inward) mobil-ity implies severe operational problems for national systems of capitalistproduction and reproduction. Therefore, people on the move outside theborders of the national polity (and around them) are constructed neither as"citizens" nor as "workers"-or "citizen workers" (Montgomery 1993)-but at least in principle as "aliens," "foreigners," and "boarders," i.e., as

, . '. . (B 1991)potential (or actual) Intruders and, 10 a sense, as en~mles auman .'In a paradoxical manner, then, the ~~dern regime of w,elfare capital-

ism is based-in all its institutional va rtettes (Hall and Soskice2001)-onthe (economic) mobilization of people and, at the very same time, on theinternal and external (political) limitation of the IT mobility. Any va na ntor model of national welfare capitalism is builr on confining and delim-iting the social risks of people's mobiliry. lnternalty, this means msnrur-ing not only the technology of insurance agamst the risks of the capitalist

I I· (E Id 1991) but also a range of rechnologies foremp oyment re atron wa "'I' d .. ., . d feguarding society against Its mobilize citizens,

securing, assuring. an sa f ' d trolexternally it implies the establishment of a regime 0 secunry a n con hthat allow; for the systematic (and, compared TO controllingcitrzvt'>. mubc

If f . and violence Vis-a-VIS rna I e

more unrestrained) use 0 oree, coercion,,, ' " h disen-"non-nationals"-inc1uding political acts of sovereignty sue as

franchisement,. displacement, and exclusion d'. f h liberal mobility/con-A Foucauldian (or govern mentality) rea mg 0 t e blc vi 0

trol paradox outlined previously can be said to have a dou .~ vlTtue'd nthe one hand the (welfare) state, with all its functional arm. ures an 10

, . ot so much as a sovereIgn, aurono-all its regulative interventions, appears n b . ible as an insri-

f ffici of power but ecomes VISIrnous and sel -su crent source , I h logies-as atutional effect of social practices and governmenta tee no

310 Stephan Lessenicb

(pretty material) social construction, a complex co-production of institu-tional actors acting on the actions of individuals (or collectivities). On theother hand, it becomes possible to grasp the essential characteristic of thecurrent, "neoliberal" transformation of the welfare state which-as willbe argued in more detail in what follows-consists in a process of subjec-tiuation of the dialectics of mobility and control through technologies ofself-regulation and social knowledge production. In a sense, this processconstitutes a radicalization of the "liberal paradox," with people beingsocially subjectivated by individually subjecting themselves to a governingprogrammatic of self-rationalization Of, more precisely, of self-mobilizationand self-control. In this process, what we used to call "the state" emerges(or reemerges from its alleged withdrawal in the age of globalization) as apolitical "authority" torn between contradicting logics of action, selectivelyand situationally urging people to mobilize and, at the very same time, todemobilize themselves.

3. THE WELFARE STATE TRANSFORMED:(DE-)MOBILIZING PEOPLE IN THE "ACTIVE SOCIETY"

Recent social policy reforms in all advanced welfare states have revolvedaround the idea of "activation" (Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007).Their guiding principle, to quote the former president of the United StatesBill Clinton, has been "to move people from welfare to work" (Ledemel andTrickey 2001). In essence, the conventional analysis underlying the transfor-mation of public interventions in this field during the last two decades claimsthat the post-World War II welfare state was based mainly on compensatingpeople for the loss of their work or employment (i.e., their earning) capac-ity-be it due to injury or sickness, unemployment or ageing, pregnancy ormotherhood, or any other "social risk." This compensation was meant tobe made effective via transfer payments replacing (at a higher or lower rate,depending on why people were obliged to leave their workplace) the wageearner's former income. In the course of the postwar expansion of the welfarestate, this "compensatory logic" of social policies, so the story usually goes,was expanded qualitatively and quantitatively, granting ever higher benefitsto ever larger parts of the (potential) working population-gradually incor-poranng Into the "compensation community" even individuals (and groups)who had never been wage earners before or who were (held to be) perfectlycapable of work. Looking back at the old welfare state through the eyes of itsCritICS,Its main defining feature was its passiveness: all sorts of people weremade (and kept) passive by means of public transfers, giving them all sortsof opportunities to opt for exit from the labor market-or so it seems. Thewel~?re state in its golden age, commonly described as "Fordist" or "Keynes-Ian, IS thus retrospectively depicted as if it had been a perfect materializa-tion of Cesra Espmg-Andersen's famous (and obviously misleading') version


of the concept of "de-commodification": "A minimal definition must entailthat citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or gen-eral welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary"(Esping-Andersen 1990: 23).

Consequently, and in line with this interpretation, the main guiding prin-ciple of welfare stare reforms throughour the Western (OEeD) world hasbeen to activate those (allegedly) made passive: to move people into work.Clinton's (successful) crusade "to end welfare as we know it" was contin-ued (though somewhat less straightforwardly) by European-first and fore-most British-and EU policies. New Labour's "New Deals", the "EuropeanEmployment Strategy" (EES), and German labor market reforms ("HartzIV") are all, in one way or another, regulative sequels to "Clinton's law":"anyone who can go to work must go to work" (d. Caraley 2001: 527).Not only for the "undeserving poor" of our times-the non-disabled unem-ployed receiving public benefits-but for non-employed women or elderlypeople as well, activation-meaning the re-commodification of their work-ing capacity-is the public order of the day: "The active society seeks tomake us all workers" (Walters 1997: 224). _

The social philosophy of these activation policies rests on two marnpillars. Basically, "activation" means (a) a changed allocation of respon-sibility for social welfare (or "well-fare") between the individual and SOCI-ety-"society" meaning (depending on the context) the larger commurut y,the general public the national economy, the tax-payer (or Simply the stateitself). Put in its ~ost condensed form, the activat.io.nyaradlgm advancesthe well-known "Kennedy formula" regarding the division of labor betweenthe individual and the social: "Do not ask what your country can do foryou; ask what you can do for your countr.y." !n this se~se, w.elfare sta~e

. . . f d d the activation paradigm with a modi-CItizens are being con ronre un er . . .fied weighting of rights and responsibilities. IndiVidual tights and" (cor-

ibil iti I rominence "public tights andresponding) public responsi I mes ose P _' . d I- ivid I ibilitie s coming to the fore mstea . n(corresponding) indivi ua responSl I I I _ __

- - h legitimate claim against Its mern-the activation perspecuve. society as a . bli .bers to each and everyone of them individually, act In th~ pu IC Inr~re.st,

h '. d d ing the welfare of the larger collective: beneficIatlesen ancing an a vane: .hid orry about not drawing on tax-pay-

of public assistance programs s au w k bh Id - to enter the labor mar et ecause

ers' support unduly' women s au strive - - I Id' . d - _. g their human capita; 0 -ageof the investment society has ma e III rarstn . .. f h .

f . II roductlve acuviry a rer t ey retirepensioners should look or some SOCIa y p - h h-Id

dies should srrrve to ave c I ren(as late as possible)' young gra uate coup - - f

, b I' f h sian system the competitiveness 0for the sake of the via i ity ate pen '- In all these_ h II-b - of future generations.the national economy, or t ewe eing f sent or prospectivecases individual behavior is seen in the context 0 pre

social goods or public needs. hifr in social liabilities, activationOn the basis of this fundamental Sit I -' - tl ) called- I I iashing what IS (inconststen y

policies aim at (b) consistent y un e


private initiative, personal responsibility, and/or individual autonomy (Ull-rich 2005). Activation relies on-and at the same time (paradoxically) ismeant to produce-the self-arranging, pro-active behavior of individualsacting as "responsible risk takers" (Giddens 1998: 100). Anthony Giddens'(ibid.: 99-128) programmatic account of "the social investment state, oper-ating in the context of a positive welfare society" (ibid.: 117), is a prettyaccurate portrayal of the active society-s-a society in which "Governmenthas an essential role to play" (ibid.: 99). Activating social policies are meantto guide people not merely toward (more) activity, but also toward theadoption of "pro-active" behavior, understood as planned, purposive, andprudential action. Pro-active behavior means calculating and (on that basis)taking risk(s), adopting an entrepreneurial stance toward life, relying onself-management and self-control. Pro-active behavior is, at the same time,both self-centered and pro-social. "Deciding to go to work and give up ben-efirs, or taking a job in a particular industry, are risk-infused activities-butsuch risk taking is often beneficial both to the individual and to the widersociety." (ibid.: 116; emphases added). In exactly this vein, ongoing socialpolicy reforms revolve around producing such "risk-infused" activities: "amore active risk-taking attitude ... , wherever possible through incentives,but where necessary by legal obligations" (ibid.: 122).

In all Western welfare states, these policies of activation are by no meansrestricted to the core area of labor market and unemployment policies, buthave begun to spread-mainly in the context of the public discourse ondemographic change-into other fields of social policy intervention such aspublic education, health care, long-term care, and welfare provision in oldage. But beyond that diffusion process, what is analytically important isthat the obvious activation logic dominating recent social policy and welfarestate re.f?rms is being accompanied, complemented, and counterbalancedby addirional (co-)Iogics. Insofar as the national welfare state citizenry isconcerned, activation policies are being systematically supplemented by apolitics of prevention. Additionally, with regard to non-nationals seekinginclusion in the national "activation game," a second tier of the mobility!control complex is operating. This, in a paradoxical way, combines whatmay be called the technologies of exclusion and toleration. In what followsI will very briefly sketch this complex constellation, thus providing a fairlycomplete picture of the current transformations of the welfare state.

In principle, welfare state interventions aiming at prevention are per-fectly complementary to the dominant activation paradigm. Prevention isan integral part of pro-active behavior, and social policies increasingly tendto aOlm,ate people, by way of discursive persuasion and material incentives,to providently and foresightedly take care of themselves in order e.g., toaVOid diseases (through regular medical checkups), to secure the flow ofIncome 111 old age (through private savings), or to prevent the loss of produc-~"ve capacIties and human capabilities (e.g., through "life-long learning").Investing In people" means investing in their potential for (and in their


actual) pro-active behavior-and it implies that social policies (and pub-lic interventions more generally) adopt a pro-active orientation themselves:"The cultivation of human potential should as far as possible replace 'afterthe event' redistribution" (Giddens 1998: 101). In a way, with the paradigmshift from social policies which supposedly keep people passive to straight-forwardly activating ones, "Government itself assumes the discourse ofcritique, challenging the rigidities and privileges of a blocked society" (Gor-don 1991: 46)-calling society to activity, to a SOCial order of movementand mobility. However, beyond the public cultivation of ~,uman potentla~;there is another side of the activation COIn. This consists of counter-actingactivities of public frustration of human potential-in case this very pot~n-

" . I" P trial is defined as being socially unacceptable or even unsocial. reven.l.onpolicies have a productive as well as a p~ni~ive dim~l~sion, the "pLlrllt~veturn" (Garland 2001) being inherently built 1I1toposinve measures of riskprevention. The inbuilt contradiction of public prevention ~olJC1es, then,is that being oriented to the mobilization of people, they Simultaneouslyoperate through immobilization: individual. non-cOJ~pll~nc~ With th~ SOCial

. f ti behavior results In de-actlvatlllg Interventions ofrequirement 0 pro-ac rve .' hthe welfare state-ranging from cuts in benefits that effectively restrain t Ieindividual's capacity to meet the expectation of. mobility to t~e inevitab erecourse to the devices of criminal law if active cmzens eng.age Il1 unw~n~e~

.. , (S nd Sullivan 2001' Johnston and Shearing 2003). VI-acnvines tenson. a '.. _. of ublic intervention forau sly the preventive-and hence punitive bias p , '

, . I" d b by definition every-the sake of activation is potentIally un irrure , ecause, b ' . 11thing and everybody (literally: every thing and every body) can e sOCIa y

constructed as being a-or at-fISk. IfCuriously (in a way), what is highly valued with regard to we are state

. . . .., . k k g and self-actIvation, selzlI1g oppor-citizens-to show II1ltJatIVe,rts -ta III , .' h is not.. d ti e participation In t e economy-ltunities for inclusion .111 pro L1C IV . I ("aliens") exhibiting thetruly honored when It comes to non-nanona

ls k i g to be part of the

b havi F . nationals active y see Invery same e avror. oreign d wi hi' dimensional system of, I . . confronre Wit a mu [1-(nationa ) active society are fi t and repel external

, di 'I d I' g) measures to con ne, aver,(legal, JU rciar, an po ICII1 I at the level of nationalbili T ki h ofGermanyasanexampe,rna I ity. a II1gt e case . b how to mobilize internal. ics c fh ' g diSCUSSions a out fpolitics, r ere are ongom I before and instead a

resources-women, elderly people" young fPheoPh~y-qualified immigrants is. . . '. the recrUitment a Ig .

resorting to imrrugranon; , all kinds of obstacles in the way of theirpursued only reluctantly, placingal I b ability fat citizens of the

d . . limit to their stay; a or m kentry an setting a time I C I E ope is still restricted, mar et. . s in East enrra urnew EU accession cauntne . 2011' he numbers of asylum seekersliberalization being postponed unt~l, '~I st decade (and the numbershave gone down to very low levels unng f e aes who cannot be deported

, d I ven lower)' re uge h' Ibeing grante asy urn are e 'f kind (be it geograp Icad f f d m of movement a any k'are dispossesse 0 ree 0 I I "forrress Europe" is wor JI1g

or labor mobility). On the European eve,


quite smoothly and inconspicuously, with the "Frontex" agency' havingbeen established in 2004 and its "European Patrols Network" executingthe Joint Operations "Hera" (to tackle "illegal" migration flows from WestAfrica to the Canary Islands) and "Nautilus" (reinforcing border controlactivities on the shores of Malta, Lampedusa, and Sicily, cutting off NorthAfrican migration).Once again, however, the dominant logic of exclusion of external

(migrant) mobility is complemented (and, in a way, undermined) by a co-logie which is called here, in allusion to a legal concept in German resi-dence law, the logic of toleration ("Duldung"). Externally exclusive thoughwelfare state policies are, they still provide for (highly selective and alwaysprecarious) channels of mobility and inclusion. As a matter of fact, certain("high potential" or otherwise socially indispensable) groups or categoriesof people do have the opportunity to gain access-if only temporarily-tothe national labor market(s). A mechanism that seems to be more impor-tant, however, being a direct consequence of the strict and exclusive admis-sion and residence regime of national welfare states, is the one discussedunder the heading of "illegal," "irregular," or "undocumented" migration(Jordan and Duvell 2002). People overstaying their legal entitlement toreside within the national territory are forced into a whole range of "ille-gal" activities, into a world of "submerged pro-activity" where they con-stantly run the risk of being discovered, identified, and expelled from thecountry. Thus, by means of (unavoidably imperfect) exclusion and control,the welfare state and its institutions produce a para-legal world of activa-tion which is functional to the highly flexible service and knowledge econo-mies of advanced capitalist societies-and which, its coerced and repressivecharacter notwithstanding, is effectively being co-produced by those "ille-gal" migrants who try to take advantage of the possibilities of action thesubmerged economy, the changing demography, and the prosperity needsof Western societies offer them.

4_ TORN BETWEEN TWO LOGICS OR: HOWTO ACTIVATE THE HOMO SOC1ETAL1S

What does this preliminary analysis of the activating welfare state, its modeof subiectivation, and its forms of operation mean for further research onwhat is commonly called the "neoliberal" political economy of Westernsocieties? There are at least two ways of answering this central question.First of all, the ongoing transformation towards an active society drivenforward by a reformed welfare state is not sufficiently captured when it isconceptualized as a process of subordination of the social to an overwhelm-ing economic rationality. In addition to and well beyond this undeniableprocess of "economization" (Brbckling, Krasmann and Lemke 2000), a dis-tinctive feature of the Current development is what may be called a tendency


towards the subjectiuation of the social: handing over social responsibilityfrom public (collecrive) institutions to private (individual) actors. Tim ISwhat I have been addressing here and elsewhere (Lessenich 2003, 2008) asthe neosocial philosophy of the welfare stare. Generally speaking, welfarestate policies may be seen as involving "prac~l~es of "self-f~rrnatlon, prac-tices concerned to shape the attributes, capacrnes, o~len~atlons and l11ora,~conduct of individuals and to define their rights, obligations and statuses(Dean 1995: 567). Th;ough social policies of "activation," individualsareguided towards taking responsibility not only for themselves, bur for societyat lar e. Activaring social policies not only "seek ethical effectivity m theshaping of the relation of self to self" (ibid.: 575), but aim at moving peopleinto an ethical relationship to society as a whole, making themhwant to

. . f hi' e from the risk t ey poseserve society by protectlOg It rom t ernse ves, I .. , , ." "

to society if they do not act as responsible selves. Welfaredstate factlv(lfiedsIIII b d ring the can uct 0 an un er-the active society are not on y a out can uc I " I b

. b I and equally Important y-a oursocialized) homo oeconomlCUS, ut a so- . I" d hthe political construction of the subjectivity of an (over-)socla ize 01/10

soeietalis. ". h . f the social aClosely related to this "subjective turn in t e prfomotlon 0 elates to the

. ' f If e state trans ormation rsecond analytical dimension 0 we ar d . Iy between public and

. f d fini the boun anes not onongoing process 0 re e nmg he acri ciety's inner and outer

ibili b I between t e active soprivate responsi I tty, ur a so t lity of our present fun-I· th t the govern men a I

space. On the who e, It seems a t f b und aries: welfare statesdamentally revolves around the managemen °b a en "the passive" and

. I· f demarcanon etweare constantly drawing mes o. d "rh . mobile" between "good"

. "b "th obile" an t e irn ,"the active, erween t em" h are busy blurring theseand ~<bad"mobility-"a~d, at t,he~~~~i;lm~;~:~oPting the perspective ofvery boundaries. Mobility and irn y'. mobilization and control,

" people's actlons-the welfare state s actions on ," h transformation towards( d . ed) marnage in t e .

celebrate a strange an stram 0 h e hand activation IS the. . h 2006) n t e on, .an active society (LesseOlc, .". drivi ople to adopt a pro-acnve

f h d bl C pohctes nving pe d h(social) order 0 t e ay, pu I f lif f the sake of society an t ef .' iducr a I e- or .

attitude a sel -monltonng COl "Ifare state interventions, h h hand preventive wecommon good. On t e ot er f'f . t 's security-people who do not

. d bili on behal 0 SOCley . . I .selectively e-mo I Ize- . . B b d this the actlvanon ogle, . d ecnve ut eyon ,comply with the actlvatlon Ir " 'f .' 'l control that is meant to. . d· d b regime 0 tenltona . ... dIS systematically eme Y a b h . _individual InitlatlVe an

f I· the very e aVlOr hprevent, by way 0 exc USlon, ... t1y being called for. At t e. . . h' h "s otherWise II1slsten d'self-responslbllity-w IC I. further these exclu mg prac-

I" the picture even , ,," . "same time and to comp Icate "h "ubterranean aCtiVitieS

, d' h Iities of toleratmg t e stices are entangle Wit a poof illegalized non-citizens. . d blurring the lines between. I . of draWing anAt this point, the Slmu taneltY b·l· atl·Oll and conrrol, becomes

·d "b tween ]110 I IZ " . )"insiders" and "outSI ers, e h' of "us" all (activation,I· d be t e saVIOr. b' s What is proe all11e toqUite 0 VIOU, (


is being suggested to, taught to, or even imposed on some people but effec-tively denied to others. What is operating as the counter-logic to mobili-zation in some cases, control, acts (and is enacted) as the primary logicin others. What is formally being controlled as undesirable mobility isinformally promoted as a functional contribution to the mobility regime ofcapitalist economies. Thus, governing society today is not only about themanagement of boundaries, bur also-and to an even greater extent-aboutthe management of antagonisms. Quite obviously, the central antagonismof the reformed welfare state's activation regime is a revenant of the essen-tial paradox of liberal governmentality, its resuscitation in a contemporary(neoliberal) guise. The rationality of liberty, spelt out as "activity" and"mobility" today, inescapably breeds its counter-rationality of security, of"discipline" and "control". The mobilization of society inevitably creates adynamic of controlling what is considered to be a permanently unsafe pub-lic good: the (neosocial) movement of people for the sake of society.

Instead of systematically looking for government beyond the state, then,governmentality studies should take more interest in the state itself, and aFoucauldian perspective on the welfare state and its current transforma-tion should try to make sense of the structural contradictions and strategicambivalences of public policies for an "active society." Earlier analyses ofthis new societal formation suggested that, since it is geared toward the self-rna rketization of its citizens, it constitutes a turn away from the "projectof governing from the perspective of society" (Walters 1997: 221). In thelight of the analysis presented here, quite the opposite seems to be true:the active welfare state is a renewed arrangement of "governing throughsociety" (ibid.)-or, more specifically, of governing the self in the name ofsociety. Because we are badly in need of an evaluation of the social effectsof this "neosocial" constellation, studies in governmentality should re-ori-ent themselves toward a critical analysis of political power not beyond, butwithin the (welfare) state. It would not be the first time that taking a stepback means advancing.

NOTES

1. Thanks go ro Sven Opitz and to the three editors of this volume for theircritical comments on an earlier version of this chapter, which improved itsignificantly.

2. For a more systematic elaboration of the argument, see Lessenich 2008.3. Esping-Andersen's aCCount clearly relates not to a "minimal" but to a maxi~

':lal or ideal-typical~and thus, by very definition, extra-empirical-concep-IIO~ of "d~-.co~lmodlfication": it would be impossible for de-commodifyingSOCIalpolICIes III real-world (i.e., capitalist) welfare states ro match Esping-Andersen's definition.

4. The acronym "~rontex" stands for the European Agency for the Manage-ment of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the MemberStates of the European Union. According to the Fromex website (http://www.


frontex.europa.eu), its official device obeys classical liberal governruenrality:"I ibertas-secu riras-e-justitia."

5. In line with Foucault's (1991: 103) assertion that "[the] gover nmentalizationof the state is a singularly paradoxical phenomenon."

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Contributors

Friedrich Balke is Professor of Media Studies, Bauhaus-University Weimar,Germany.

Ulrich Briickling is Professor of Sociology, Martin-Luther-UniversityHalle-Wirtenberg, Germany.

Didier Fassin is a james D. Wolfensohn Professor of Social Science at theInstitute for Advanced Study in Princeton, USA, and Director of Studiesat the Ecole des Haures Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, France.

Bob jessop is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Co-Director ofthe Cultural Political Economy Research Centre, Lancaster University,

Great Britain.

Lars Thorup Larsen is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University

of Aarhus, Denmark.

Stephan Lessenich is Professor of Sociology, Friedrich-Schiller-University

jena, Germany.

Thomas Lemke is Professor of Sociology, johann_Wolfgang-Goethe-Uni-

versity Frankfurt/Main, Germany.

Susanne Krasmann is Professor of Sociology, University of Hamburg,

Germany.

Sven Opitz is Lecturer of Sociology, University of Hamburg, Germany.

Martin Saar is Assistant Professor of Political Science, johann-Wolfgang-

Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main, Germany.

Urs Sriihcli is Professor of Sociology, University of Hamburg, Germany.

322 Contributors

Ute Tellmann is Assistant Professor f Soci ,Germany. 0 Sociology, University of Hamburg,

William Walt 'P fers IS ro essor of P I" IOttawa C d 0 inca, ana a.

Sociology, Carleton U' ,ruversity,

Peter Wehling is Senior Researcher in' ,Germany. SocIOlogy, University of Augsburg,

Persons Index

AAdler, Alfred, 206Agamben, Giorgio, 24-25,106-108,

117,125,130,142,166-167,169,174,179,188,190,194,203,248-249,264-265,288

Albahari, Maurizio, 147Alrhusser, Louis, 39, 50, 58,88, 90-91Amariglio, Jack, 271, 285Anderson, Benedict, 180Aradau, Claudia, 131Arendr, Hannah, 24, 90, 167, 187-188,

190-191,194,249Aristotle, 188-189, 194

BBachelard, Gaston, 187Bakhrin, Michail, 58Balibar, Etienne, 58Balke, Friedrich, 21, 74, 106Barret-Kriegel, Blandine, 69Barry, Andrew, 101, 111, 148, 157,

180,204Barrhes, Roland, 1,58Bataille, Georges, 167Bauman, Zygmunt, 190Bayarr, jean-F mncois, 10Becker, Gary S., 25, 249, 256-263Benjamin, Walter, 106, 131, 167Bentham, Jeremy, 6, 130Berlin, Isaiah, 41Biehl, jodo, 190Bigo, Didier, 159,190Binding, Karl, 256, 265Bockenforde, Ernst- Wolfgang, 12480h111, Franz, 27Bondirti, Philippe, 146, 159Bourdieu, Pierre, ] 59,206Brockling, Ulrich, 1,25,50,247,281

Brown, Phil, 232-233Brown, Wendy, 290Bryan, Dick, 293Burchell, Graham, 57, 159Butler, Judith, 106, 130-131Buzan, Barry, ] 01-1 02

CCallan, Michel, 180, 230, 233, 242, 297Campbell, Timothy, 179Canguilhem, Georges, 24, 187-191,

193, 197Cassels, Alan, 230Cassirer, Ernsr, 41, 90Cava illes, Jean, 187Chadwick, Ruth, 242Clinton, Bill, 310-311Clough, Patricia Ticinerc, 277Conrad, Peter, 231Crelinsren, Ronald D., 132Croce, Benedeno, 41Croissant, Klaus, 105Cruikshank, Barbara, 180

oDaase, Christopher, 127Danner, Mark, J26Darwin, Charles, 25]Davidson, Arnold 1.,49-50Dean, Mirchell, 27, 50Debrix. Fran<;ois, 139Defert, Daniel, 8Deleuze, Gilles, 139,219Derrida, jacq ues, 90, 131, 279Dershowitz, Alan, 122-123, 129-130Dillon, Michael, 97, 179Dodd, Nigel, 299Donzelot, Jacques, 8,48, 56, 70Dratel, Joshua, 95

324 Persons Index

Dreyfus, Hubert L., 49, 187,299Dupuy, Jean-Pierre, 282Durkheim, Emile, 122

EEckert, Julia, 132Elden, Stuart, 140, 159,289Escobar, Arturo, 285Esping-Andersen, Gesta, 310, 316Esposito, Roberto, 100, 169, 179Eucken, Walter, 27Ewald, Francois, 8,48,127,287

FFahrrneir, Andreas, 227Passin, Didier, 10, 23-24, 143, 154,

180,185Faulstich, Heinz, 265Fisher, Irving, 291Fontana, Alessandro, 287Forsthoff, Ernst, 21-22, 75, 82-90Franklin, Sarah, 170Freudensrein, Roland, 146Fromm, Heinz, 95

GGaltung, johan, 253Genel, Karia, 179Gibson-Graham, ].K., 270Giddens, Anthony, 312Gilbert, Emily, 293Goede, Marieke de, 291Goldscheid, Rudolf, 25, 249-257, 259-

260,262-263, 265Gordon, Colin, 50, 57, 70, 149, 155,

282,304Gorrweis, Herbert, 180Goux, Jean-Joseph, 273Greenberg, Karen, 95,129-130Grossberg, Lawrence, 282Guanari, Felix, 139

HHaahr, Jens Henrik, 108Habermas, jurgen, 11, 180,260,296Hamdan, Salim, 132Haraway, Donna, 179Hardt, Michael, 144, 148,166-169,

203Heath, Deborah, 226, 228-229, 241Hedgecoe, Adam, 232Heidcgger, Martin, 167Hindess, Barry, 27, '160

Hobbes, Thomas, 49, 97,124,169,264

Hache, Alfred, 256, 265Hughes, Bill, 235Hume, David, 291Huspek, Michael, 159Husser}, Edmund, 187Huysrnans, jef, 103

[

Ignatieff, Michael, 192Irwin, Alan, 226Isin, Engin, 241

JJessop, Bob, 21, 56justi, Johann Heinrich Gotrlob von,

264

KKant, Immanuel, 49, 252Kelly, Mark G.E., 61Kerr, Anne, 228-229Kessler, Oliver, 127Keynes, John Maynard, 291, 293, 310Kiesow, Rainer Maria, 130Kirchheimer, Otto, 70Kirshner, Jonathan, 299Knoppers, Bartha Maria, 242Koch, Carsten, 219Koselleck, Reinhart, 43, 45-46Krasmann, Susanne, 1,22,49,50,70,

115

LLaclau, Ernesto, 269-270, 278, 282Lalonde, Marc, 208, 223Lane, Christopher, 230Lamer, Wendy, 288Larsen, Lars Thorup, 24, 174, 180,201Latour, Bruno, 180Lazzararo, Mauriz.io, 179Le Heron, Richard, 288Lefort, Claude, 130Lemke, Thomas, 1,23,27,49,50,70,

165, 179-180, 295Lessenich, Stephan, 26, 304, 316Lindemann, Gesa, 180Lock, Margaret, 170, 234, 241-242Louis XIV., 105Lowy, lIana, 190Luban, David, 116, ]31Luhmann, Niklas, 50, 282, 291

MMachiavelli, Niccolo, 38, 79Malkki, Liisa, 190Marcuse, Herbert, 18Marx, Karl, 58, 205, 291Massumi, Brian, 276-277Maurer, Bill, 293Mauss, Marcel, 237Mayer, Jane, 111Mbeki, Thabo, 192Mbembe, Achille, 189McKinley, Brunson, 144Meinecke, Friedrich, 41Melville, Herman, 18Memmi Dominique, 10Merlea~-Ponty, Maurice, 187Mill John Stuart, 292Mill~r, Peter, 11,57-58,70,288-289Miller, Toby, 282Mitchell, Robert, 236Mol Annernarie, 286Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secon-

dar Baron de, 106Morrell, Geoff, 132Mouffe, Chantal, 269-270Moynihan, Ray, 230Muller-Armack, Alfred, 27Muller-Wille, Staffan, 232Milnkler, Herfried, 43,50

NNapier, David, 190 8 166-169,203Negn Antonio, 144, 14 , 142Nietz;che, Friedrich, 1, 36, 46, 50, '

191,206,296,299Novas, Carlos, 228, 241Nyers, Peter, 160,241

oO'Leary, Ted, 289O'Malley, Pat, 154, 160Oakeshon, Michael, 41Oestreich, Gerhard, 43, 50Ong, Aihwa, 288Opitz, Sven, 22, 93, 128Osborne, Thomas, 16, 27

PPalladino, Paolo, 242 48Pasquino, Pasquale, 8,Patron, Paul., 50 0Pecheux, Michel, 58, 18Peter the Great, 91

Persons Index 325

Petryna, Adriana, 190,228Pfahler, Thomas, 265Pocock, John, 43, 46Polanyi, Karl, 271, 273, 291Poovey, Mary, 281Poulantzas, Nicos, 50, 58Procacci, Giovanna, 8, 48

RRabeharisoa, Vololona, 230, 233, 242Rabinow, Paul, 49, 187-188, 190, 225,

229,234,240,242,299Rafferty, Michael, 293 0Ranciere, Jacques, 17,19,128,16Rapp, Rayna, 241Rarzel, Friedrich, 149Redfield Perer, 144, 150Reem(sl~a, Jan Philipp, 115, 125Reid, Julian,179Rejali, Darius, 130, ~.31Rheinberger, Hans-Jorg, 232Ricoeur, Paul, 299. ..Robespierre, Maxirnilien, 90Ropke, Wilhelm, 27Rorry Richard, 41 0Rose 'Nikolas, 11, 27, 50, 57-58, 7 ,

, 189_190,226,228-229,235,238,241,281,290

Roth Klaus, 51, 9 179

Rouse, Joseph, 4 , 49 74-82,Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 21, ,

84-85,87-91Ruccio, David, 271, 285Rumsfeld, Donald, 127Rusche, Georg, 70 4Rustow, Alexander, 27, 17Rutherford, Paul, 171,180

~aar Martin, 21, 34,49, 50Sart;e Jean-Paul, 187Sauss~re, Ferdinand de, 58Savulescu, Julian, 239Scarry, Elaine, 129Schauble, Wolfgang29i3 106,117,Schmitt, Carl, 21, 8 ,

124,167 _ 249 256Schultz., Theodore \V., 2), , '

258 260 262-263" 29~Senellart, Michel, 49, 63, )

Shakespeare, Tom, 234Shell Marc, 276S· ' I Georg 276,291Imme, '

326 Persons Index

Sir~lOn, Dieter, 125S~~nn~r,Quentin, 43, 46Sraheh: Urs, 25, 50, 269Starobinski, Jean, 80Strauss, Leo, 41Sunder Rajan K hik, aus I , 242

V0alverde, Mariana, 103eblen, Thorstein, 205

VI fait, .Maurizio, 43Voegelin, Eric, 41

TTadros, Victor, 131Tandl~r, Julius, 265Taussig, Michael, 189Taussig, Karen-Sue 241Taylor, Mark c., 2inTellmann U 26T II J ' te, ,282 285u y, ames 46 'Turner, Brya'n, 241

WWa:ver, Ole, 101-103~aldbY, Catherine, 170 236

Wablters,William, 21-23' 108 138e er Max 11 1 ' ,Wehl" p' ,20,205-206 265. mg, erer, 24, 225 '

Wtlde, Jaap de, 101-102

ZZitek, Slavoj, 122-123

Subject Index

#9111,109,115,121,126 129 131

141 ",

AAbu Ghraib, 115 126activation, 22, 26, 89, 290, 310-316active society, 304-305, 307, 310-316actor-network-theory (ANT), 26, 287,

294,297-298advanced liberalism, 59 See also neolib-

eralismaffect, 276-278AIDS, 24, 165, 189, 191-193, 195anatornopolitics, 61-63, 66, 171, 185~

186,247Anglo-Foucauldian school 56-62 64

69-70 " ,antagonism, 8, 18,44, 104, 119, 308,

316anthropology, 10, 14, 16,23-24,34-35,

48,51,104,166,180,185,189-191,258,260,262,292

anrhropopolitics, ] 70, 172apparatus of security 4 5 20 22 97

103,1]9,287 " , , ,asylum, 24, 66, 105, 144-145, 147,

151,154,157,190-191,194,313

Bbare life, 117, 130, 167, 188-189, 191,bi 194, 248-249, 264. See also zoelocapital,190bioerhics, 170 227 236-239 242b~ohistory, "179, 188 'hiolegiriruacy, 196-197biological citizenship, 24, .190,225·

230,232.235,237-241

biologization, 228-230, 234, 240-241.See a/so geneticization

biomedicine, 24,191,196,225-227,233,236,238-240

biopolitics, 20, 22-25, 37, 46, 48,59,63,81,93,117,119,130-131,139,142-144,148,150,152,156,158,165-180,185-189,191,193,196,197,201-206,208,211_213,215-216,218,221_222,225-227,229,236,238,247-249,254,261-264

biopower, 7, 37, 61, 83, 105, 146, 152,159,168,179,181,185-186,196_197,203,225,238,247-248

bios, 24, 188-191, 194biosciences, 170, 190,225,230biosocialiry, 190, 225 -226, 229-231,

233_235,237,240-242biotechnology, 170_171,225,227,

239-240biovalue, 170, 179, 190, 236body politiC, 75-76, 78, 80-81, 91, 166,

174, 248border, 4, 21-23, 76, 107-108, 118-

119,127,132,138-159,309,314,316;

border control, 22, 150, 153, ]59,314

CCambridge School, 43-44,46camp, 108, 167, 190,194capitalism, 3, 25-26, 61, 66, 70, 87,

166,168,170,242,253-254,258,261,263,275,304-305,307_309,314,316

care of the self, 186, 189Chicago School, 6-7, 68, 256-262

328 Subject Index

commodification, 26, 236-237, 307-308,311,316

conduct of conduct, 2, 22, 26, 56, 60,63,70,93,110,204,273,281,286,290-291, 293-297, 304

constitution, 8, 22, 45, 78-81, 83-85,87-91,95,102,116-122,124-125,129,131-132

constructivism, 39-40, 102, 193, 290,292

. Copenhagen School, 94, 101-102,104crisis, 19, 59, 86, 115, 119, 144-145,

204-205,255,263-264,271,273,292

odanger, 6, 8, 16,86,95,99-101,104,

109-110,119,121-122,126_128,131-132,150,159,194-195,215,229,231,308

Daseinsvorsorge, 83-84, 86, 89, 91death, 4, 23,74,130,138,147,150,

16~ 16~ 169, 171, 176, 17~180,185-186,190,193,236,247,261-262,264,282

demography, 79, 176, 192,204,207,312,314

deterritorializarion, 107,139discipline, 1,4-5,12, ]7, 37, 43, 60-63,

65-68,70,85-87,99,103, lOS,118,129, ]40, 142, 158-159,166-167,173-174,176,186,204,219,247,288-289,294,308,316

dispositif, 37, 64, 93, 99-101,103,108,117,286-289,293,295-298

Eeconomics, 90, 168,256-257,265,

269-270,277,281-282,285,298

economiza tion, 20, 25, 249, 257, 261,271-273,280-281,287,290,297,314

economy of power, 37, 62, 1] 9education, 10, 76, 78, 193,206, 212,

215,221,234,256,260,265,306,312

Empire, 148, 168empowerment, 9-10, 12, ] 4-1 5, 106enhancement, 227, 238·239enterprising self, 12, 15,257,280-281enrrepreneurialism, 6, 9, 25, 65, 93,

257.258,262,273,279.281,312

epistemology, 170, 195,298essentialism, 41, 57, 231-232, 242, 270EU, 83, 108, 131, 145-146, 148, 154-

155,157,160,311,313eugenics, 188, 190,204,228-229, 241,

250-251,260-261everyday life, 43, 190, 217, 219-221, 235exclusion, 21-22,94,101,103,108,119,

126,167,177,188,235,240,249,278,309,312,314-315

Ffreedom,S, 6,13-15,21-22,37,59,

84-85,89,91,93-94,99-100,103-104,110,117,119-120,128,169,173,205,230,237,239,249,262,273,281,286,294, 308, 313

frontier. See border

Ggambling, 275-277, 280genealogy of morals, 191genetic citizenship. See biological citi-

zenshipgenericizarion, 228-232, 234, 240. See

also biologiza tiongenocide, 188, 191govemabiliry, 19,79,308governance, 13, 103, 108, 141-142,

148,153-154,158-159,193,248, 263, 292

government: of biomedicine, 225, 239;of bodies, 180, 186, 189; ofborders and frontiers, 22,141;of life, 23, 25, 165, 172, 186,222, 262; of migration, 146; ofothers, 189; of the self, 2, 13,17,19,25,185,189,204

governmental: practices, 2, 7, 11-13,17,42,59-61,63,66,69-70,84-85,89,105,107,120,153,173-174, 176, 178, 274, 304;rationality, 4, 11, 21, 25-26,61,79,94,97-98,106,108,203, 209 217, 219-220, 222,240,263,272,290,295,306;technology, 8, 9, 11·13, 15·17,20-21,34,69,85,89,99,104,121, 143,203,21~ 216,221·222,269,272.274,277,279,289,305,309

governmenraliry: liberal, 5, 59, 93, 97,99,108·110,159,176,308,

316-317; illiberal, 93-94, 103,105,107-108; neoliberal, 12, 17,20,25,59,85,89,108,257,261-262

governmentalization, 2, 46, 62, 64,74_75,82,119,151,186,262,317

Guanranamo, 117, 129, 131-132

Hhealth, 6,10,23-24,93,173,177,185,

192·193,195-196,201-223,226_229,232-236,238-242,253-254,258,260-261,265,312 69

hegemony, 12, 35, 67-68, 262, 2 -270,281

historicism, 40, 275, 296historiography, 34-35, 37-38, 40,

44-48, 50 264homo ceconomicus, 65 257 258

290305315homo sacer, 167, 188,264homosexuality, 231-232, 241human capital, 6, 12,25,178,24,7

249 256-265,311, 254256human economy, 247, 249, - ,

260,263,265 49 151human rights, 101, 124, 131, 1, '

154,157,178,249,251humanitarianism, 139, 143-145, 148- .

150,152.157,194-195; hurnam-tarian border, 23 138-140,143-158; humanitarian govern-menr 138_139,143,146-147,159-160; humanitaria~ In~erven-. 152 156' humanttanannon, " 195reason; 143, 156, 191, ;humanitarianization, 138-139,146-147,158 .

hvei 173 192 251 See also racialyglene, , , .hygiene

I 39 58ideological state apparatuses, ,Ideologiekritik,58 5 151,156,immigration, 10, 141, 14 ,

158,191,193,313immunization, 100, 169imperialism, 168, 194,it: 276,278,lIldlvldua!Jzatlon,2-3, ,

282 0 309insurance, 6, 8,208,26

272invisible hand, 15,260,

Subject Index 329

MMalthusian law, 250 5 39 41 46 50Marxism 9,14,21,2, , , '5'

57_59,68,167,186,193,20 ,263 269-270,275

mechanism's of security. See apparatus

of security . -250 253.Menschenokollol1lle, 25,249 ,

256,259·265 17 21,34-37,methodolop, ~2, 15

3,102 202,207,

40-00 06, 6, ,252,257-258,285,294,297

. f r 1 61 63-64,microphYSICS0 powe., 1 '

. 15810 101 141 143-147,151,mlgratlon, : 9'1 31'3-3]4; migrant,

155-108, I , 1'023 138 144-145,147-148, 0 -160,194,222, 251? 31~3~1:~9,migration control, _2,185 193-194

hili 10'7 141 146, 150,185,307-rno I try, , '6

310,312-3104 307-309,313,mobiliz;~~o_~'1~~'s;lf_~lObilizarion,17,

26,310. 70171molecular polltic;7~ 286 289-294,money, 26, 275--, ,

297 299, 308 3. d '18 68 76 167-168,19multiru e, , ' ,

LLampedusa, 144-145, 148, 150, 157,314legislative, 75-76, 79, 95, 115, 125, 132Leviathan,S, 97,124,255,260Liberalism, 3_8,14,16,22-23,25-26,

34,37,41,46,48-49,59-60,63,68_70,84-85,93-94,97-101,103-111,115-120,122-123,128_129,155-156,158-159,165,167,173-176,178-180,189,214,220,248,260,263,269 282 285·287,289-292,294'295' 297,299,307-310. Seealso gov;rnmenraliry,.liberal

life unworthy of living, 177 178 249256261 265

lifestyle, 24, 201-203, 205-223, 232239

N 38 74 80 82-83,98,nature, 5, 23'70 '17i-173 176, 178,

168,1, ~ , 257 754194,225, 235, 2)0, -, - l

258,262,264

330 Subject Index

Nazism, 83, 165, 169, 188, 194necropolirics, 189neoliberalisrn, 3, 6-7, 9,12,15-]6,

21,22,25,27,48,59,68,85,103,139,142,158-159,178,204,222,231,242,248,262,272,274-275,280-282,290,292, 294, 305, 310,314,316.See also advanced liberalism;governmentality, neoliberal

neosocial, 306, 315-316normalization,S, 66, 116, 118, 123,

145,167,185-186,219,255

ooptimization, 16-17, 172, 177, 203-

204,215,227,238,240,249,265

ordoliberalism, 6, 27, 68, 87, 257, 272,275,282

organic capital, 249-250, 253-254, 259,263

ppastoral power, 3, 7, 40, 88, 101, 141,

152,155,158-160,175,295paternalism, 59, 205patient group, 226, 229, 232-233, 242pa uperism, 99pedagog~ 76, 78, 91perforrnativity, 14, 18, 102, 116, ] 21,

124-125,127,129,131,274,282, 291

police science (Polizeiwissenscha(t), 3,7,107,248,264

political economy, 5, 25, 37, 40, 46,56-57,60-61,63,65-66,68-69,74,98,170,173,180,248-249,261-262,275,307-309,314

political technology, 24, 175, 186, 206,221,278,290

poliricization, 154, 203, 248-249politics: of care, 145; of life, 24,177,

185-186,189-191,193_195,197,228; of populations, 185;of torture, 95; of truth, 12, 36,285

population, 5, 23, 25, 37, 39-40, 48,61,66,68,70,74,77,79_81,83,89,91,98,102,104,108,117,119-120,140,144,146_147,150,152,154,158,165,168,171-178,180-181,185_186, 189, 196-197,202-204,

208-213,215-219,221-222,228,247-250,256,260,262,264-265,287-289,307-308,310

posrstrucruralism, 9, 167, 269-271, 273poverty, 6,10,48,99,142,146,156,

160,177,195,237prevention, 19, 24, 26,107,126,128,

165,201,206,208,211-212,214-217,222,232-234,249,251,312-313

problernarizarion, 18,40, 76, 78, 97,100-101,103-105,108-109,111,126,172,178,196,210

property, 91,169,254,292,308public health, 195-196,201-203,205-

217,219-223punishment, 66-67, 77, 95, 241, 313

Qquality of life, 25, 171,177,192-193,

234,236-237,240quarantine, 141, 270

Rracial hygiene, 250, 265racism, 59, 65, 93-94, 159, 166, 169,

177-179,188,247,250-251,265

reason of state (raison d'Etat), 3-5, 7,40,43,94,100-101,119-120,140, 173, 186

refugees, 10, 148, 153-154, 158-160,165,167,190,193-195,249,313

resistance, 11, 13, 17~19,59, 64, 66,70,130,148,153,168,172,279

reterritorialization, 107-108, 139risk, 8, 12-13, 15,22,26,84,86,

88,91,110,121,126-128,141,146-147,150,159,172,178, 186-187, 195,206,208,214,220,229,232,235,237,239-240,242,281,306-310,312-315

Ssecuritization, 22,94,101-]08,110-

111,126,138-139,141,145,147

security, 4-6,10, ]4,20-22,34,37,48,61,93-111,116-124,126-130,132,141,143,146-147,150-151,154,156,158-159,169,

189-190,193,205,249,254,260-261 263,286-289,295,298,306,309,315-316; socialsecurity, 193, 249, 254, 260, 263

self-constitution, 1,174,178self-control, 17,26,101,279,281,

310,312self-refereutialiry, 25, 270, 274-280self-regulation, 23, 25,173,263,271,

280,310self-help group, 24, 231shyness, 230-231, 239social contract (Contrat social), 74-8],

90,119Social Darwinism, 250-251 69Socialism 7 64 228,249,254,263,2

" , 40 43sovereignty, 4, 9, 17,20-22,37, , ,45,48,59-61,63,67-68,74-79,82,85-87,90-91,94,97-98,100-101,103,105-109,111,117_118,124,129-131,139,141-142,167,169,171,204,221,247-249,261-262,264,269,272,275,288,304,306,309 d

state: statecraft, 56, 57, 63; stateho601,

2 20-21 35 40-42,46-49, ,139 149· st~te control, 20, 23,64· ~tate ~ffect, 62, 68-69; stateph~bia, 20, 41, 45,121,205;state racism, 247; state theory,10,39,40,57,121,204; totalstate, 82-83; welfare state, 8-9,16,22,26,48,86,89,91,126,141,149,152,159,203-205,304-316 7 125

state of exception, 86, 107, 11, ,148,167,169,263 6 192 201

statistics, 4, 46, 98,152, 1~1'9 221 '204 208-209,213, - - ,229:241,248,265,288

structuralism, 58, 279

Subject Index 331

subjectification, 1-3, 9, 12, 14-16, -18,118,172-174,176-177,263,.280-281. See also subJecnvanon

subjectivation, 13,59, 94, "104, 110,187,203,213,280,306-307, .310,314-315. See also subjecri-

ficarion 109-110subjecnvuy, 2, 9,12,15,10

279'0 296 '

152,155,187,190, , ,305-307,315

Ttechnologies of control, 13-14, 109,

155 277-278. 4' 405961 63 66,68,rerrttory, , , '7 1'38 14079 81, 108, 12, . - ,143 146 148-149,156,159,189'191:204,288-289,295,308-309,314-315. 1495-96 115,121,126-

rerronsm, , 141 158 261;\\IarOIl128,132, , , 109terror, 95-96, 104, 106,

I·· 167 169-171thanatopo mcs, '106 III

22 66 94·95,104, , ,torture, , , 0127 129-132

115-118,12 -, 205. .. 63 83 88 194, ,toralnanamsm, , , ,249

h 3 12 14 17,22,25,36,124-trut " " 52 1"3 16812- 127-130 1 -), ,

17~: 177, 180, 191, 195, 197,207,220,230,285,298

U 51 262utilitarianism, 142,2 ,

VI·· 172 174

vital po n~cs; , 75.76 78,82,volonte generale, 21, '

87-89

~e,188-191, 194. See also bare life

23223-governmentality current challenges and

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