21st panzer division in combat against american troops in france and germany usa 1945

8/12/2019 21st Panzer Division in Combat Against American Troops in France and Germany USA 1945

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IVIb ir M bMD739.F6713no.A-871Fgn M S

UNCLASSIFIEDU A R MY MIL IT A i Y HISTORY INSTITU

U.S. ARMY MILITARY HISTORY INSTITUTECARLISLE BARRACKS. P A 17013 5008

ENGLISH COPY

21 st PANZER DIVISION IN COMBAT AGAINSTA M E R I C A N T R O O P S IN F R A N C E AND G E R M A N Y

This document is now unclassified as shown on thecover or title page and all other markings found on anypages are obsolete. If any photocopies are made of thisdocument all markings other than UNCLASSIFIEDon each page should be obliterated so that there is nomisunderstanding of the current classification of anyinformation derived from it.

HISTORICAL IVISIONHEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES A R M Y EUROPE

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANC

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31st Panzer Division in Combat against American Troopsin Pranceand Germany

Edgar Feuchtinger, Generalleutnant a. D

Translator: A.E. Chrigtensen.

Historical DivisionHEADQUARTERSUNITED STATES A B M Y EUBOPE

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M S A-871 UNCLASSIFIEDR e p o r t o n t h e Engagements o f t h e 2 1 s t Panzer Division

against American Troops i n France and G e r m a n y .

Although s t i l l h a v e a good knowledge o f a l l engagements o fmy d i v i s i o n m a s t initially e s t a b l i s h t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s n o t possiblef o r me t o write m y r e p o r t i n s u c h f o r m as should l i k e t o s o t h a t i nthe paragraphs i n question i t w i l l g i v e a n indisputab le picture o f t h e

daily e n g a g e m e n t s . Above a l l lack aknowledge o f t h e situatio n o f t h ee n e m y my o w n war d i a r y and t h e corresponding maps i n t h e s c a l e s1 : 5 0 . 0 0 0 1:80.000 o r 1 : 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 . Inevitable blanks and a l s o many mistakesmust be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I c o i r i p l e t e l y a v o i d therefore nami ngthe American divisions which f o u g h t opposite t o us. Due t o t h e freque ntchanges i n t h e arrangement o f t h e c h a i n o f c o n m a n d t h e numbers o f o u ro w n corps headquarters w i l l not a l l b e c o r r e c t . L i k e w i s e mistakes i nt h e dates g i v e n will o f t e n b e unavoidab le.

But h a v e made my r e p o r t according t o t h e best o f my k n o w l e d g e . S h o u l d i t n o t a l s o contribute t o t h e heroism o f a f i n e division whichhad always d o n e i t s d u t y and which was recognized by t h e e n e m y a s adivision o f fair and e x c e l l e n t f i g h t i n g qualities? S c u m a n y capture dAmerican officers and enlisted men personally told m e .

Concerning t h e historical evaluation o f t h e d i v i s i o n i t s f i g h t i n gpower -armament and e o u i p m e n t t h e following i s initially t o be s a i d :

After t h e completion o f t h e e n t i r e German campaign i n A l r i c e t h e2 1 s t Panz erDivision was t o r n t o pieces i n T u n i F , i a . T h e new

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21stPanzer Division wasconstituted i n Franceon 6 May 1943. Assignedt o i t wereformer members o f the 21stPanzer Divisionwho had been i nGermanyonaccount o f wounds o r i l l n e s s , on leave, or with the replacementunitsat the time o f the surrender ofTunisia. Altogether, about 3,000officers and enlisted men. The mobile 936thBrigadewhich originatedfrom the onl y armoredartil lerybrigade (self-propelled) was orderedto constitute the cadre o f the formation. Our own construction staffhad t o assembleall armored andunarmoreavehicles only from spare partsfound i n the salvage dumps of the campaign i n the west 1940. Only t h etanks for t h e PanzerBegiment were supplied. All weaponswereallottedfrom German s t o c k s , but weh ad t o build the installations (sel f-propelled)and the towing mediumsourselves. Even after 6 June 1944 the divisionhad no replacements for vehicles, but had t o buildup everything e v e n i nt h e most difficult situations. As the only division o r the GermanWestern Army the division had t o g o o n fightingcontinuously a t t h emost difficult points. O n the first day o f the invasion i t wasemployed at Caen as first reserve division, anda t t h e beginningo fFebruary 1945 evacuatedt o t h e Oder front.

Organization andCommanding Instances o f the Division.

Division commander: Maj Gen PeuchtingerG 3 : until the end o f August 1944 Lt ColFrhrv . Berlichingen,

thenMajor Scharnhorst.G 4 : MajorFrhr. v . Luedinghausen.

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G 2: Capt Vorster. 1: Major Heeringer.1/Lt: 1/Lt Ehode.

21st Reconnaissance Battalion.

Commander: Major Brandt.l. 2. companies armored reconnaissance companies.3. 4. reconnaissance companies.5. company heavy armored company.

125th Panzer Grenadier R e g i m e n t .

C o m m a n d e r : Lt C o l v . Luck.First B a t t a l i o n ;l . , 2 . , 3 . companies armored t r o o p carriers4 . company armored t r o o p c a r r i e r with f o u r 7 . 5 c m antitank

g u n s , s e l f - p r o p e l l e d .armored t r o o p c a r r i e r with t h r e e 2 c m f l a ttrajectory c s n n o n , s e l f - p r o p e l l e d .armored t r o o p carrier w i th f o u r heavy r o c k e tprojectors.

S e c o n d B a t t a l i o n ;5 . , 6 . , 7 . companies personnel c a r r i e r s .8 . company l i k e t h e 4 t h c o m p a n y .


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(strength andarmament o f the 1.-3. comp anies and the 5 . - 7 . companies according t o the organization of the 4 1 t h PanzerDivision,y. comp any infantry Howitzer companywith six h eavy

fiel dHowitzers 13 (cal 15 c m ) o n armoredself-propel led c a rriage.

1 0 . company four m ul t i-tarrel l ed shel l mortars with 24muzzl es e a c h , eight 14 c m mortars self-propel l edwith360 c arria ge.

11. company regimenta l headquarters companywith sapperandengineering units, signals and communicationantitank artillery, al arm and assau l t platoon.

l .,2.,3. supply comp a nies.

1921 Panzergrenadier Regiment.

C o n i a a n d e r ; Co l Seuc h.O rganizat ion l ike that of the 125 th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.

2 2 d Panzer Regiment.

Commander Col v. Oppeln-Bronikovski.FirstBattalion;l. 2. 3.4. Companies with each 7 tanks type IT , 7.5 cm cannon

(long)Second Ba tta l io n;5.,6., 7.,8. companies wit h each 12 ta nks type I T 7.5 cm cannon

(long)


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155th. Panzer Artillery Hegiment.

Commander: Col Euehne.First Battalion;1. battery with four 10 m guns2. and3. batterieswith, each four 12.2 m horse-drawn Howitzers.Second Battalion;4. 5. batteries \/ith each sixlight field Howitzerstype 18

10.5 m gun on armored self-propelled carriage.6. battery with six heavy field Howitzers type IS , 15 cmgun

on armored self-propelled carriages.Third Battalion;7. 8. 9. betteries like those of the second battalion.10. battery was a rocket-launcher battery with four rocketlaunchers

of 8 muzzles onarmored self-propelled.carriage (cal 8

200th Assault Gun Battalion.

Commander; Maj Beck er.l.,S.,3,,4. batteries with each ten armore d self-uropelled

carriag es, n a m e l y , four with 7.5 c m antitank g u n s ,and six with 10.5 c m light field Howitzers type 18 .

5 . battery a c o i r p a n y with multi-barrel led shell mortars like thoseo f the 10th company o f t h e 125 th and 192d PanzerGre nadierRegiments.


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M S # A-871 -6-200th Armored Engineer Battalion.

Commanderi Major HoegL.l. 2. companies with armored troop carriers.3. company with personnel carriers bridging-column with material

for 60 t bridge, light engineer column.800th Antitank Battalion.

Commander: Maj Frhr. r. Synker.l. 2. 3. companies with each eight 8 cm motor-drawn antitank

guns.

305th Army (Heeres) Antiaircraft Battalion.Commander: Major Ohlendorf.1 battery with twelve cm single-muzzled guns, two 3.7 cm two-

muzzled guns ana two cm four-muzzled guns (sell-propelled).2. 3. batteries with each four motor-drawn 8.8 c a n antiaircraft

guns and three 3.7 c m single-muzzled guns.Searchlight platoon, light antiaircraft column.

200th Armored Signal Battalion.Commander: Major Huehnlich.1. company: telephone company2. company: radio companyLight signal column.


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800th Armored Supply Detachment.

Commander: Haj v.Streit.1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. companies each 120 t.

200th Medical Battalion.

Conun ander: changed frequentlyDivisional Surgeon: Oberstabsarzt Dr. Altmeyer.l. 2. medical companies.l. 2. 3. motorized ambulance platoonsl. 2. first-aid stations.

Technical Services.

Commander: Divisional Engineer Major.l. 2. 3. workshop owpenie^

Service Troops.

Commander: changed frequentlyChief Supt ly Officer: Oberstabsintendant Goeris.AdministrationcompanyBakery companyButcher com pany .G 3 subordin te t o division e s c o r t c o m p a n y .ilitary Police d e t a c h m e n t .


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American Csropai^ i n I T o r a a n d y 6 Jun - 24 Jul 1S44.

The division was not engaged here, as i t wasalready employed i nthe area of Caen on t h e first day o f t h e invasion and held i t spositionhere until 5 July. As o f 8 July i t was engaged i n t h e areasouth and eest o f C a e n .

American Campaign i n Horthern _ F r a n c e 25 Jul - 14 S e p t 1 9 4 4 .

On 10 August the division had i t s first contact here with Americanforces. At t h a t time the divisionwas still involved i n engagementsi n the area o f 7ire-Conde. Information about the American advanceeast o f Rennes was very unsatisfactory. All t h e supply o f the divisioncame from the area west o f Paris. I n order t o guard the supply columnsagainst surprise the division employed the First Panzer ReconnaissanceCompany on t h e northward road, north o f S t . Mans, and was i n this v r a yconstantly aware o f t h e position o f the American armored s p e a i p o i o t s .

Only with smallunits was t h e division engaged i n fights with t h e Americans i n the pocket sout h o f Falaise. Under the leadership o f theFirst S S Corps the b u l k o f the division fought i t s way tack t o Dimontierand the T o c r u e t sector.

Subordinate t o the Second S S Corps t h e division fought betweenLisieux and Orbec from 20 August August, and o n 22 August a t about17.30 hours orders came from the Second SS Corps that the division had t o


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be employed a t o n c e w i t h o u t relief i n order t o occupy a coveringposi t i on s o u t h and e a s t o f l e l e u b o u r g , t o prevent t h e American armoredforces f r o m advancing f r o m t h e Evreux district i n t h e direction o f t h eS e i n e n e a r E l b e n f , E o u e n , BouiShevoulde. The division was s u b o r d i n a t et o t h e 8 1 s t Corps ( l i t S e n K u n t z e n ) i n t h i s mission. Command p o s t o f t h ecorps w a s placed near Molineaux on t h e S e i n e .

Due t o t h e continued engagements a s o f 6 July t h e division hadsuffered q u i t e s e r i o u s c a s u a l t i e s . Although t w o personnel r e p l a c e m e n tbattalions had c o m e t o t h e d i v i s i o n , t h e s t r e n g t h s o f t h e companies o ft h e Panzer Grenadier Regiments w e r e o n l y 4 0 - 50 men o n 6 2 A u g u s t . I nJuly t h e second battalion o f t h e Panzer Grenadier Regiment had b e e ntransferred t o t h e d r i l l ground o f Grafenwoehr f o r reconversion t oPanther tank a r m o r . The t a n k t y p e " I V " available a t t h a t t i m e had beentaken o v e r by t h e f i r s t b a t t a l i o n . The u n i t had t a k e n e i g h t tanks i n t ot n e pocket o f F a l a i s e , and returned without a s i n g l e o n e . Ko replacementswere a s s i g n e d . As o f 22 August a r t i l l e r y , assault gun u n i t s , antitankunits and anticraft units ha d l o s t 2/3 o f t h e i r weapons owing t o t h e f i r eo f t h e e n e m y . S o far n o replacements had been assigned here e i t h e r .C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e division was a b o u t 70^ below authorized s t r e n g t h , i t sstriking powe r i s t o be estimated correspondingly o r s t i l l l o w e r .

During t h e envening o f August t h i n g s t o o k a different t u r n . Aso f 19.00 t n e division hs d left i t s posi t i on s and was marching i n t o t h enew s e c t o r . Prom Brionne a l l r o a d s leading eastward w e r e blocked t o s u c ha degree t h a t i t was o n l y possible t o advance s t e t > by s t e p . W h e n I m o to red


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i n advance through la Hage du Theil t o v / a r d Foqueville I was able t oascertain t h e presence o f American tanks. Rapidly I turned t h e marchingdivision aside, and had the terrain t o t h e north o f La Hage and awood north o f i t occupied.

The task assigned t o me f e y Lt Gen Kuntzen early o n t h e morning of23 August was t o contain t h e enemy i n the area s o u t h o f Bourgthevouldeas long as possible, and t o take a l l equipment and vehicles t o t h eopposite b a n k of t h e S e i n e . On S 3 August the weather i / a s unfavorable forthe air f o r c e , but i t could not be utilized fo r t h e crossing o f t h eSeine by the numerous German infa ntry end armored divisions as no bridgeswere available, and consequently t h e crossing could only teke place byferry. The third company of my engineer battalion had orders t o builda bridge at Houen. On 24 August the bridge was finished, but t h e weatherchanged for t h e better, and t w o hours after having been s e t into workingorder t h e bridge was attacked by bombing planes and destroyed. Thedefensive actions so uth o f Sourgthevoulde vere carried o u t successfully.Until t h e 2 y August the weak forces o f the division managed t o keep theenemy away from the S e i n e . This was an enormous success for t h e Germancrossing of t h e S e i n e . Although an immense amount o f material speciallyo f the infantry divisions was taken by t h e e n e m y , owing t o t h e gaini n time i t was s t i l l possible t o t s k e a t lerst double the amount

(especiallymaterial o f t h e motorized divisions o t h e opnositebank. A successful break-through o f the American forces t o the S e i n e between Rouen and Yrille o n 24 August enormous ly i m p e d e d , i f not makingnearly impossible, the reformation of the following d i v i s i o n s , t o s u c h adegree that they vere unable t o put up any resistance a t t h e 1 / e s t w a l l :


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2. 9. 21., 116., units of the Panzer Lehrdivision, Panzer Division ofthe A r m y (Heer), 1. 2. 9. 10., 12., 17., S S Panzer Divisions, andabout nine infantry divisions of the array.

The roads were blocked beyond description especially the roadsto Rouen which led tothe Seine. The weather having changedfor thebetter some bombing raids took place; they caused heavy losses but I wassurprised that the losses were not st ll heavier considering the immensemass of material.

Yrillewas the crossing-point of the division. B y day-and especiallyby night-work the engineer battalion succeeded in taking most of thevehicles of the division to the opposite bank. The ferrying site wasnot attackedby the airforce probably because t v/as not discovered.

O n 26August the division with all units which had crossed theSeine was ordered to march to the vicinity of Creil (northof Paris fora short refreshening. O n 27 August the order previously given out forthe division to mo v e first cf all to Helms, and then to the vicinity ofVesone the same evening x r a s rescinded, anda comb t group was alsoordered to go to the Plateau of Lsngres.

O n 27 August I was ordered toEparnay, to the First Army Until thecrossing of the Seine on 28/29August the combat group or the divisionwes co m m a nde d by Lt Col v. Luck, and, corresponding to the new situationafter the crossing of the Seine, the group was led into the new areaof combat.

Onmy march t o Epernay on 2 8 August a t 01.00 I was e ngaged byAmerican armored reconnaissance vehicles a t S t . G r i l l e s south o f F i s m e s .


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I n t h e meantime t h e First Armyhad made further c h a n g e s o f p o s i t i o n ;t h e new situation made a n i m m e d i a t e change o f t h e r o u t e o f msrchn e c e s s a r y , which x a s much impeded b y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e division w a sonly a b l e t o i n a r c h i n s m a l l g r o u p s , and w as spread a l l o v e r t h e r o a d from Reims t o Rouen.

Accor ding t o a new o r d e r o f t h e Army G r o u p " G " t o which t h e divisionwas now s u b o r d i n a t e , Molsheim - S c h i r m e c k w a s c h o s e n t o s e r v e a s a new concentration a r e a . I h e moveme nts o f t h e division i n t o t h e new areawere now led through U a n c y . About t h e 6 S e p t e m b e r t h e f i r s t unitsarrived i n t h e new a r e a . T h e units which had crossed t h e S e i n e o n2 9 August a l s o arrived i n t h e area o f Molsheim b y 9 and 10 S e p t e m b e r .

A new phase o f c o m b a t s t a r t e d when t h e division c a m e t o A l s a c e . A tt h e o u t s e t i t was s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e Army G r o u p " G " ( G e n B l a s k o w i t z ) i nG e r a r d i n e r , and e . s o f 8 S e p t e m b e r t o t h e 66th C o r p s u nder Lt Gen Luchti n Bainles B a i n s . T h e f i r s t task ms t o occupy blocking positions o nt h e Moselle north o f i f l p i n a l using a combat group consisting o f : S t a f fo f t h e 192d Panzer Grenadier Regiment u nder C o l R a u c h , t h e f i r s tbattalion o f t h e 192d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, t h e s e c o n d battaliono f t h e 125th Pan zer Grenadier R e g i m e n t , 200th replacement TrainingBattalion, 2 2 0 t h Panzer Engineer Battalion and 155thPanzer ArtilleryR e g i m e n t . Comman d post o f t h e d i v i s i o n w as a t Grandriller and a s o f1 0 S e p t e m b e r a t Peuconcourt. After having arriv ed i n t h e area o f Molsheim t h e units were a s f s r a s possible equipped t h e r e , and by 1 0 S e p t marched i n t o t h e sectorwith a c o m p a n y strength o f a b o u t b O m e n . A t


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that time no other portions of t h e division could be moved forward,a s armament and equipment were missing. The fighting value o f thetroops employed can b e regardedas satisfactory.

During the night o f 1 1 September the combat group was ordered t omove t o the area west o f Epinal, and i n co-operation with the newlyconstituted 113d Panzer Brigade commanded b y Col v . Usedom, carry o u ta relief attack for the benifit o f t h e sorely pressed and almost quiteencircled 16th Infantry Division commanded b y Maj Gen Heckel i n thenorth-western vicinity o f Dompaire. AS C o l Eauch fell i l l , Lt.Colv . Luck took over the leadership of t h e combat group of the division,which o n 12 September x ^ a s subordinated t o t h e 112d Panzer Brigade.13 Augustpassed most unfavorably for the Panzer Brigade, because bothi t s Panzer battalions were attacked by fighter-bombers i n t h e areaof Hennesomt - D a r n b u s . On this occasion the Pantherbattalion lostnearly all i t s Panthers necessary for employment, while the battalionequipped with tanks type I V l o s t about 3 0 . The first battalion oft h e 192th Panzer GrenadierBegiment had also t o endure a heavy air raidand suffered considerable losses. O n . 13 and 14 September t h e thusweakenedbrigade was n o longer able t o rescue the 16th Division, becauset h e American forces were t o o strong and t h e 16th Divisionwas alreadytorn t o pieces o n 13 and 14 S e p t . The arrangement o f t h e chain o fcommand was changed on 1 4 September. As of 14 September the 112d Panzer Brigade t r a s nlaced subordinate t o the 21st Panzer Division .


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American Campaign i n t h e B h i p e l a . n d 15 S e p & March 1 9 4 5 .

As a logical conseauence o f our new missions moved DivisionalHeadquarters t o Epinal o n 15 September. Together with t h e combatgroup available for employment, ny own division was en gaged vest andnorth of Epinal, the greater part o f t h e division (about 6000 - 7000 m e n )was placed i n t h e vicinity of i H o l e h e i m andw a s not ready f or actionowing t o the lack of themost important weapons, ? . s for instance r i f l e s , machine g u n s , guns o f all s o r t s , spades e t c . The G 4 o f the divisionwas located i n the area o f Holsheim, and was ordered t o e o . u i p companyafter company and t o send off a t once t o t h e combat group equippedc o i S D a n i e s according t o t h e amount o f weapons supplied. As o f 20 S e p t new companies came u p , and on 2 8 S e p t t h e whole division v s s employedonce again. The Panzer Regiment, o f which the secondbattalion was i n Grafenwoehr for reconversion o f armament and retraining, \ - / a s with its firstbattalion, pieced i n the vicinity of Xaiserslautera, and was e t t h e Panzer strongpoin t, waiting for new tanks o f type I ? . But timepassed, and not until about 10 Oct did the b attalion come bsck t o t h edivision vith about 24 tanks o f type 17.

The llthpanzer Brigade subordinpte t o me disposed of t h e l l - r f t h PanzerGrenadier P . e g i m e n t . Both battalions o f t h e brigade nad suffered heavily.After t h e first refitting o n 1 6 September about 8 -10 Panther tanks oft h e PantherBat talionwere ready for a c t i o n , and i n t h e tank t y p e 1 7battalion about 20 tanks. I n addition, the brigadeha d one reconnaissance


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company, one engineer company, and t w o columns. lo artillery wasavailable; for its signal c o j n j a u . n i c s . t i o n s i t had a mixed company. Shecom position of the brigade was incorrect, despite i t s great number o ftanks i t \ms not able t o manage Isrge independent operation. I fthe valuable material had b e e n given t o the old division from t h e o u t s e t ,t h e leaders hip mighthave achieved quite other results. As o f 14 S e p tthe division was subordinate t o the XLVII Panzer Corps commanded b yLt G e n Frhr. v . Funck; as of 15 S e p t by Lt Gen Frhr. v . Luettwitz.Command post of the corps until 14 September was i n Bain les B a i n s , asof 15 S e p t i n Grandviller. The corps W E T S subordinate t o the 5th PanzerArmy, which arrived on 1 1 S e p t e m b e r , c o m m a n d , post Hochwald, which had

ibeen taken over b y Lt Gen v . Manteuffel. By 17 September t h e lllst and113d Panzer Brigades were transferred t o t h e 41st Panzer Corps.

Our mission west o f Epinal was t o prevent t h e enemy from advancing*

o n that place, a . n d t o establish contact with t h e portions o f t h e 16thInfantry Division which had escaped from the pocket.

Both tasks were fulfilled o n 1 5 and 16 September. he weak portionso f the 10th Division which had been withdrawn t o t h e Moselle wereattack ed from west and also from north by American troops which hadalready crossed t h e Moselle. Here I had t o employ my available reserv es,and i n c o u n t e r a t t a , c k s throw the enemy b a c k o n Tharn-Girmont. O n 1 6 Septa lateral threat from t h e woods e a s t of Begreville had t o be remov ed.

On 16/17 S e p t about 30CO men from the Luftwaf fe arrived a t Epinal.They were subordinated t o the commander (Brig Gen v . Zirchbach), who was


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later killedin action there. AS of14 September, moreover, the commandpost of the16th Infantry Division (Kaj G e n Heckel) w s in that place.

Cn 17 September the forces subordinate tome were relieved from thepositionswest of Epinpl by the troops just arrived, andduringthenight of 17/18 September m ade ready for a new task in the area southofBambervillers. On 17 Sept in the command post in Grandvillerthe corpsverbally ordered an attack on Luneville. Forthe operation thelllthand112thPanzer Brigadeswere subordinated tothe corps, and my combatgroun consisted ofportionsof my division and the llktth Panzer Brigade.

When I reported tothecorps on IS September O b O O in Bertrichrop,I was ordered to keep the combat group readyon the road RarabervillersBaccarat,withthe advance guardpoint vest of Baccarat, so that itmight follow thellltH rndllc^Panzer brigadeson theroads Baccarat -Lunevillo, or should be able to attack Luneville from south-west throughthe Montague sector. Provisionally,Baccarat was thecommand post ofthe division. A t 10.30I xm s there informed, that the 111*^ Panzer.Brigade had met with resistance on the road alonj the riverMeurthe andfrom the Hondon wood, end that the brigade had been compelled to envelopand attack nortn ol the Hondon wood. M y combat group was orderd toattack Luneville through theMontpgne sector. At 11.00I fell in, thefirst resistancei/as made at Fontenoy. From there thegroup had to fightitsway through Domptail - Hoye n Gerbiviller. Gerbivillerwas takenat about15.00, then we penetrated to the railway bridges south ofLuneville through Xerminil, and by18.00 tne combat group had taken the


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Montagne sector and the Meurthe sector south of Luneville. The f a c tt h a t the w e s t e r n p a r t of the i x i o n t a g n e sector was occupied and t h a t thee n e m y grew e v e r m o r e l i v e l y , made the situation di fficult. C onsequentlythe sector h a d t o remain o c c u p i e d i n o r d e r t o prevent t h e enemy froma d v a n c i n g eastward through the tontagne s e c t o r , and i n this w a y s p l i tt h e combat group and overpower t h e shattered portions. For t h e t a s kw h i c h they h a d t o p e r f o r m the combat group was fax too w e a k , but despite

this orders came t o continue t h e attack on t h e southern edge o f L u n e v i l l e .The resistance increased every hour, the Montagne sector w a s u n d e r he avymachine-gun and artillery f i r e , which centered e s p e c i a l l y o n thevillages end above all on Gerbeviller and X e r x e r a i n i l .

On the m o r n i n g o f the 1 9 S e p t the p o s i t i o n s of the third PanzerE n g i n e e r Ba t t a l i o n p l a c e d on the hills west o f Gerbeviller were attacked,but the attack vas repulsed. The development of t h e situation made aregrouping n e c e s s a r y . I p l a c e d t h e troops i n the following o r d e r : thefirst battalion o f the 192d Panzer Grenadier Eegiment with a fightingstrength o f about 100 m e n i n the vicinity of Xerxaminil, the 220th E n g i n e e rBa t t a l i o n w i t h a fighting strength of about 200 m e n i n the vicinity o fGerbiviller, t h e second battalion o f the 1 2 5 t h Panzer Grenadier Reginent,f i gh t i n g strength about 140 m e n , near Koyen: south o f Luneville I p l a c e dt h e 112th Panzer Brigade, the vehicles o f w h i c h \ . r e r e p l a c e d i n t h e w o o d so f Moncel. The three batteries o f the s e c o n d , battalion o f the 155thpanzer Artillery Eegiment ha d been emplaced s o rapi dly that from t h ecenter of t h e sector they could command t h e gr o u n d in all directions w i t h


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MS A-S71 -19-

i n s t a n c e o n 2 0 S e p t e m b e r . On t h e 2 0 September t h e r e were heavy f i g h t s a t t h e crossing points a t the Meurthe river and i n and around t h e woodo f W o n d o n . O n 1 8 S e p t e m b e r t h e wood had already b e e n occupied b y -American t r o o p s , which k e p t i n hiding t h e r e , and t h e f a c t caused muchtrouble i n t h e fights o f t h e 2 0 September and t h e following d a y s . T h eenemy had b e e n brought t o a s t a n d s t i l l i n t h e s e c t o r o f Glonville - Fontenoy - D o m p t a i t . Here a main l i n e o f resistance could b e b u i l tup during t h e d a y s f o l l o w i n g . A s o f 2 0 S e p t t h e divisional commendpost was piec ed i n B a c c a r a t and t h a t o f t h e 2thPanzer Brigade i nT h i e b s u r a e s s e r ( ? ) .

Practicallyn o r e s e r v e s could b e built u p , a s t h e large c o m b a t s e c t o r s end t h e s m a l l forces c l a i m e d t h e employment o f a l l availablet r o o p s .

The situation a t t h e northern f l a n k o f t h e d i v i s i o n was d i f f i c u l t ,a s t h e t w o Panzer brigades 1 1 1 end 3 had t o extend t o t h e north c , n dt h e point o f junction with t h e l l l t h Brigade x r ^ s a s f e r away a s northo f t h e Vesonze s e c t o r . Bothbrigades also suffered heavy l o s s e s . Thef e w available t a n k s wereused a s mobile antitank artillery o r P S t h ebackbone f o r c o u n t e r a t t a c k s . I n delaying actions t h e w eak f o r c e ssucceeded i n holding t h e w ood o f Mondonuntil o r d e r s were g i v e n t o t h eeffect t h a t ne w positions hod t o be occupied n o r t h o f t h e Vesonzes e c t o r , w h i c h , h o w e v e r did not t a k e pl?ceunti l a satisfactory j o i n -up a t t h e r i g h t h p d been a c h i e v e d , a s t h e 5th Panzer Grenadier Divisiona r r i v e d . T h i s t o o k place about t h e 2 2 S e p t e m b e r . Owing t o t h e s e fights


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M S A-371 -20-it was rendered po- sible to keep the enemy away from the bank oftheMeurthe north-vest of Baccarat and to consolidate positions atArerailies. On the 22 September the co>ic iend post of the HStfiBrigs.dewas moved to Chazeller(west ofBlamont).

In thewood of liondon no join-up\ts s ordered or in existence andso the division group had tofightnearly on all sides, but after thecapture of the esonze sector Domjgvin became thepointofcontact withthe15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Duringthe daysfollowing thePanzer Brigades were disbanded. The greater part of the 112t&panzerBrigade wasunitedwith the 21st Panzer Division. The units ofthebrigade \;ere assigned to the existing battalions of the 21st PanzerDivision. In .themeantime weapons had been supplied to other units inthe district of fcolsh eim and these come to the division for employment.The divisionhad tohold the following front; Domjevin St. Martinwestof Herbeviller est of Hablainville zerviller Meurthewestern edge of thewood west of Baccarat Menunnont- KossoncourtAnglemont -Bru - Legarainil Homsern Font de Rambervillers.

While the right sector acrossthe Meurthesouthof Fontenoyandt h e vicinity o f Xafervillerwere engaged from t h e o u t s e t , t h e s i t u a t i o n developedonly gradually i n t h e vicinity o f Rambervillers end i n t h e Kontagne valley south o f R a m b e r v i l l e r s , an d v ; h e n t h e positio ns w e r eoccupied a s o f 25 - 2 8 September n o c o n t a c t w f e s establishedwi t h t h eenemy U D t i l l t h e n . For t h e missiont h e divisionwas subordinated t o t h ecombat command er o f Baccarat ( L t C o l B r u e c k n e r ) and t h e combatConmrnder


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M S # A_371 ..jgi..

of Eambervillers (Col v. Streilbl). Further a security battalion noin the vicinity of Bambervillers and north of it and a combat groupvith about 15 men from aformer signal regiment (Luftwaffe), co nraandedby Col Oelker and forming part of the Ottenbacher combat group. Theseportions csrried n delaying tactics in the wood of Padoux and southof it Their withdrawal behind the Montagne resulted in the advanceon Rambervillers.

For the combat mission the division M U S organized in the followingway .

Division command post as of 23 September in Pexonne.A rm ored Reconnaissance Battalion in the Yeson sector withcommand post in St. Martin.The 125th PanzerGrenadier Begiment placed west of Herbevillerandnorth-west of Badroenil ,ommand post of theBegimentpieced vrpst of Vsrgneville.To the right the Second Battalion with command post in Vaxainville.To the left the First Battalion with command post in Badmenil.The 19ad Panzer Grenadier Begiment adjoining the 135th PanzerGrenadier Begimenttdth commandpost in St. Barbe. In thesame place was also the advanced divisional command post for theleft sector of the division.T o the right, the FirstBattalion to theleft theSecond Batt.command post in Kenarmont) (Henit)C o i i m a n d post of the security battalion in


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MS # A-871 - 22-

C o r a m a n d post o f t h e group o f O o l Oelker was located i n as a w m i l l e a s t o f Fraipernas.O f t h e 155th Panzer Artillery Regiment t h e second battalion wasplaced i n t h e Vesongesector e a s t o f Kablaiville - M e r v i l l e r ,t h e first battalion i n t h e vicinity o f Baccarat - S t . B a r b e , t h ethird " b a t t a l i o n i n t h e vicinity o f Foret d e S t . Barbe - BruF o r e t d e Rambervillers. Command post o f t h e r e g i m e n t i n Pexonne.T h e < J d Panzer Regiment had n o t yet a r r i v e d . Of t a n k s about four

" P a n t h e r s " and f i v e t y p e " I V " w e r e a v a i l a b l e . They belonged t o t h e former1 1 2&B r i g a d e and were k e p t a s a mobile reserve behind t h e r i g h t s e c t o ro f t h e d i v i s i o n . The antitank-gun equipment was v e r y d e f e c t i v e . Onlythree 8 . 8 c m antitank g u n s were a v a i l a b l e , not until October w e r e oldRussian antitank guns assigned a s r e p l a c e m e n t s , b u t t h e y were worn o u tand consequently useless.

The Panzer Engineer Battalion w a s p laced i n P e x o n n e , t h e companiesbeing distributed t o t h e regiments f o r t h e building o f barriers.

T h e point o f main e f f o r t o f t h e engagements was i n t h e northerns e c t o r o f t h e d i v i s i o n , h e r e daily attempts a t penetration hs d t o ber e p u l s e d .

H e r e , i t i s impossible for me t o c o m m e n t o n t h e daily b a t t l e s , buto n t h e basis o f further documents m a n y interesting operations might bee l u c i d a t e d . Through repeated day and n i g h t reconnaissance i n t h e w o o do f K o n d o n , partly a l s o carried o u t across t h e Meurthe r i v e r , valuablereconnaissance results w e r e procured. Through questioning o f prisoners


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MS f A-871 -23-

c a p t u r e d o n s u c h o c c a s i o n s t h e d i v i s i o n s o p p o s i t e t o o u r s c o u l d a l w a y sb e a s c e r t a i n e d ; t h e y o x t e n c h a n g e d . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f O c t o b e r t h emain p o i n t o f e f f o r t o f t h e A m e r i c a n a t t a c k s c e n t e r e d o n t h e Parroyw o o d , and i n c r e a s i n g c o m b a t a c t i v i t y b e g a n i n t h e v i c i n i t y o fl a m b e r v i l l e r s a n d s o u t h o f i t . I t would be p o s s i b l e t o c o m p i l e a ni n t e r e s t i n g a n d d e t a i l e d m o n o g r a p h o n t h e b a t t l e s t h e r e which w e r ec a r r i e d o u t with i n c r e a s i n g f e r o c i t y u p p o s i n g t h e r e was a d e m a n df o r s u c h a w o r k . T h e tattles a r e w o r t h y o f n o t i c e o n a c c o u n t o f t h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t r a t e g y practiced i n a r o c k y a n d w o o d e d t e r r a i n , i nw h i c h , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e t a n k w e a p o n played a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t .

T h e d i v i s i o n g o t i n t o a position w h i c h grew m o r e a n d m o r ed i f f i c u l t t a s k o f d e f e n s e w a s n o t o n l y i m p e d e d by t h e b r o a d n e s s o ft h e f r o n t ( a b o u t 5 2 km i n l e n g t h ) ana t h e r a p i d d e s t r u c t i o n o f u n i t sw h i c h d i d n o t belong t o t h e d i v i s i o n b u t w h o s e l o s s had t o b e t a k e n i n t oa c c o u n t ( b y higher i n s t a n c e s ) , b u t a l s o b y t n e i n t e n t i o n s , c h a n g i n gd a i l y f t h e e n e m y . I n t h e n o r t h and t h e s o u t h s e c t o r s t h e m o d e o fa t t a c h o f t h e e n e m y c h a n g e d a l m o s t e v e r y d a y . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o fO c t o b e r t h e m a i n p o i n t o f e f f o r t o f t h e A m e r i c a n a t t a c k s o b v i o u s l ymoved t o t h e s o u t h s e c t o r ; a c c o r d i n g l y , t h e c o m m a n d post o f t h e d i v i s i o nw a s moved t o E t t o n 1 E t u p e o n a b o u t t h e 5 S e p t e m b e r . After t h e s e i z u r eo f E a m b e r v i l l e r s heavy a n d c o s t l y d e f e n s i v e c o m b a t s d e v e l o p e d i n t h ed i r e c t i o n o f e a s t a n d n o r t h e a s t . I n t h e s e , w e s u c c e e d e d i n r e p u l s i n ga l l a t t e m p t s a t p e n e t r a t i o n . But t h e v a s t a n d wooaed t e r r a i n r e q u i r e dmany t r o o p s , and t h e y w e r e n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e d i v i s i o n . S h e c o m p a n i e s


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MS A-871 -24-

had a c o m b a t s t r e n g t h o f o n l y 5 0 6 0 m e n , and t h e y w e r e c o n s t a n t l y

e n g a g e d i n c o m b a t , w i t h o u t s h e l t e r , a n d t h e w e a t n e r b e c a m e m o r e andm o r e c h i l l y a n d r a i n y . T h e d i v i s i o n was put i n a v e r y d i f f i c u l ts i t u a t i o n w h e n t h e A m e r i c a n s s u c c e e d e d i n penetrating e v e r d e e p e r i n t o t h er a n k s o f t w o a d j o i n i n g d i v i s i o n s t o t h e l e f t ( 1 6 t h and 7 0 6 t h D i v i s i o n s ) .T h e r e s u l t o f t h i s , f o r t h e 2 1 s t Panzer D i v i s i o n w a s , t h a t i t g o t o r d e r s t o c o n s t i t u t e a b o u t 10 c o m p a n i e s d u r i n g t n e m o n t h o f O c t o b e r , a n d t o g i v e

t h e m up t o t h e t w o a d j o i n i n g d i v i s i o n s t o t h e l e f t a s r e i n f o r c e m e n t s ;f u r t h e r , t h e l e f t wing had t o b e e x t e n d e d e v e r m o r e , a n d t h e f e w t a n kr e s e r v e s had o f t e n t o b e d i v e r t e d t o t n e l e f t . I n t h e r o c k y a n dw o o d e d t e r r a i n t h e t a n k t y p e 1 7 w a s s t i l l m o r e i n f e r i o r t o t h e S n e r r a a n t a n k t h a n under n o r m a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . At t h e b e g i n n i n g o f O c t o b e r t h e f i r s tb a t t a l i o n o f t h e < s l s t Panzer R e g i m e n t a n d t h e r e g i m e n t a l s t a f f c a m e

b a c k t o t h e d i v i s i o n . They b r o u g h t w i t h t h e m a b o u t 2 6 t a n k s , t y p eI V , r e a d y f o r a c t i o n , b u t 1 / 3 o f t h e m w e r e a l w a y s under r e p a i r . T h e

t a n k s o f t h e f o r m e r 1 1 2 t h B r i g a d e had t o b e g i v e n up t o o t h e r u n i t s b yt h e d i v i s i o n . From t h e 200th A s s a u l t - g u n Battalion a c o m p a n y w i t ht e n g u n s had arrived b y t h e d i v i s i o n i n t h e m e a n t i m e . Theyw e r ea s s i g n e d t o t h e a n t i t a n k b a t t a l i o n , h e n c e t h e t e r m H c o m p a n y .

During t h e period o f 1 O c t o b e r - 1 1 N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 4 t h e d i v i s i o nnad a t i t s d i s p o s a l , o n an a v e r a g e e a c h d a y , i n t h e c o m b a t a r e a o f t h e V o s g e s , t h e f o l l o w i n g n u m b e r o f h e a v y w e a p o n s : 1 5 t a n k s t y p e I V ,4 5 i g h t f i e l d H o w i t z e r s w i t h s e l f - p r o p e l l e d c a r r i a g e , 9 b a t t e r i e so f 3 g u n s , among t h e m 3 b a t t e r i e s with h e a v y f i e l d h o w i t z e r s t y p e 1 8 ,


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MSf 4-871 -25-

2 b a t t e r i e s with 8 . 8 cm a n t i a i r c r a f t g u n s , a b o u t 6 8 n t i t a n k g u n s( 8 . 8 c m ) , 1 0 - a n t i t a n K g u n s ( 7 . 5 c m ) . T n e n u m b e r o f w e a p o n s was n e v e rg r e a t e r t h a n t h i s b u t o f t e n c o n s i d e r a b l y l o n g e r o w i n g t o l o s s e s . O nt h e 5 2 km-broad f r o n t e m p l o y m e n t a l w a y s h a d t o b e c a r r i e d o u t a s a tpoints o f m a i n e f f o r t . T h e l i g h t i n g powe r o x t h e i n f a n t r y g r e w e v e rs m a l l e r o n a c c o u n t o f l o s s e s ana e s p e c i a l l y o n a c c o u n t o f t h e g i v i n gup o f a o o u t ten c o m p a n i e s t o t h e l e f t . D e s p i t e o r d e r s o f t n e h i g h e rl e a d e r s h i p t h e e n g i n e e r b a t t a l i o n had t o b e e m p l o y e d a s i n f a n t r y a n d ,f u r t h e r m o r e , p e r m a n e n t a l a r m c o m p a n i e s . T h e a l a r m c o m p a n i e s g e n e r a l l yc o n s i s t e d o f p e r s o n n e l o f r a t h e r o l d e r a g e c l a s s e s , t a k e n f r o m s u p p l yt r o o p s . T h e y w e r e n o t s u p p o s e d , t o n a v e a f u l l i n f a n t r y f i g n t i n g p o w e r ,and y e t t h e y performed m u c h m o r e t h a n c o u l d be e x p e c t e d , a n d manyd e f e n s i v e s u c c e s s e s w e r e d u e t o t n e m .

A f t e r t h e c a p t u r e o f H a m b e r v i l l e r s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f O c t o b e rt h e l e f t w i n g o f t n e d i v i s i o n w a s place d i n J e o p a r d y . T n e d i v i s i o nf o r m e d a s m a l l c o m b a t g r o u p c o n s i s t i n g o f 2 ^ c o m p a n i e s o f t h e f i r s t( s e l f - p r o p e l l e d ) b a t t a l i o n o f t h e 1 2 5 t h Panzer G r e n a d i e r R e g i m e n t ,| c o m p a n y o f t h e 2 0 0 a n t i t a n k b a t t a l i o n | o f t h e t h i r d b a t t a l i o n o ft n e 1 5 5 t n P an z e r A r t i l l e r y E e g i m e n t . T n e i r t a s k w a s , f i r s t , t oprevent t h e e n e m y , w h o f t a d r e a c n e d o r e v e n passed Bra - J e a m e r i l -A u t r e y , f r o m a d v a n c i n g t u r t n e r e a s t w a r d a n a , s e c o n d , t o d e f e n d t n ewood o f R a m b e r v i l i e r s . T n e c o m b a t g r o u p was s u b o r d i n a t e d t o t h es e c t o r o f C o l O e l k e r . T h e c o m m a n d p o s t w a s placed e a s t o f P r a i p e r n a s .


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MS A-871 -26-

After t h e decrease o f engagements i n t h e wood o f P a u r o y , t h e e v e rincreasing attacks o n t h e whole f r o n t o f t h e 2 1 s t Panzer D i v i s i o n , andthe a b o v e mentioned giving u p o f t e n conpanies t o t h e l e f t adjoiningdivisions t h e sector o f t h e division o n t h e r i g h t wing ( V e s o n z ^ s e c t o r ) Was t a k e n o v e r b y the r i g h t adjoining division s o t h a t t h e r i g h t wingo f t h e 2 1 s t Panzer Division was now i n t h e vicinity o f Herbeviller.

I n t h i s way t h e 2 1 s t Reconnaissance Battalion was d i s e n g a g e d . O nthe left wing i t had t o r e l i e v e t h e f i r s t battalion o f t h e 125th PanzerGrenadier Regiment and t a k e o v e r t h e leadership o f t h e l e f t wing t r o o p sbecause t h e s t a f f o f C o l Oelker had been assigned a new mission. Howthe first battalion o f t h e 125th Panzer Grenadier R e g i m e n t again t o o k over t h e area northwest snd west o f Baccarat. T h e artillery battalionwas kept a s i t w a s e x c e p t t h a t t h e t h i r d battalion o f t h e 155th PanzerArtilleryRegiment was instructed t o co-operate with t h e 2 1 s t Reconnaissance Battalion. The i n f a n t r y fightingpower o f the 2 1 s tReconnaissance Battalionwas n o t v e r y g r e a t , a s o n l y t w o reconnaissancecompanies o f a b o u t 6 0 - 7 0 men e a c h , reinforced with a b o u t 150 men o ft h e former combatgroup o f C o l Oelkerwere available a s i n f a n t r y .

Composed and organized i n t h i s way t h e whole s e c t o r o f t h e d i v i s i o n wasattackedmore and more during t h e month o f O c t o b e r . The width o f t h esecto* and t h e weakness o f t h e forces s e e m e d t o make t h e formation o f reservesnearly i m p o s s i b l e . They w e r e , i n d e e d , formed with o n l y a few t a n k s . T h e casualties increased e v e r m o r e , surprisingly s m a l l wast h e number o f c a s e s o f i l l n e s s , t h o u g h t h e s e a s o n was a d v a n c e d , t h e


31/76

MS A 871 27~

nights already very chilly , and much rain fell, for months the fightingtroops had hadno roof over their heads and only opportunities for t h emost necessary care o f t h e tody.

Under such circumstances thr ee distinct points o f attack developedduring t h e month of October.

1 . From t h e wood of Mondon towardBadonviller - Blamont;a . from t he vicinity east o f B a r a b e r v i l l e r toward Eaon I Etupe;3 . from the Montagne sector south o f Bambervillers toward t h e

road S t . Die - Etival.The tattles i n each individua l sectorwere all equally ferocious. Wewere m u c f t surprised by the maneuvering ability o f t h e American t anks i nthe wood. Speaking generally t h e large numerical superiority whichtheyenjoyed proved very advantageous t o the American division. Bythe eastward penetration of t he enemy through the Montagne sector sou tho f t h e division i t left wingwas jeopardized and the front had t o b e extended ever more eastward. The daily tattles south o f the roadJeamleit - La Jalle later o n , t h e b a t t l e s of t his road l e A n e d ourutmost efforts confronted as we were with avery superior enemy. H i e situation was rendered extremely difficult b y the circumstance that thedivision had t o fight with its left wing unprotected. Hew makeshiftshadt o b e devised day l a y day and reserves arrived a platoon a t a t i m e .Troops o f a ll arms had constantly t o be constituted i n t o singleinfantry groups. Under s uc h circumstances t h e division was frequentlysubordinated t o new command headquarters. In t hemiddle o f October


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M S # A-871 -H 8~

t h e 4 1 s t Pan zer C o r p s w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e L o v e r E h i n e , t h e 8 9 t hC o r p s oming f r o m Holland a n d u n d e r c o m m a n d o f L t G e n v . G i l s at o o k o v e r t h e c o m m a n d , o n l y t o b e r e l i e v e d b y t h e 6 4 t h C o r p s u n d e rL t G e n f h u m m o n t h e 3 1 O c t o b e r .

I n O c t o b e r t h e r i g h t wing o f t h e b a t t a l i o n had t o e n d u r e t w oe x t r e m e l y h e a v y a t t a c k s , T h e f i r s t o n e was c l e a r l y r e v e a l e d i n t i m eby m e a n s o f t h e e n e n y s e x t e n d e d a d j u s t m e n t f i r e , i n c r e a s e d p a t r o la c t i v i t y , and a g r e a t n o i s e o f v e h i c l e s a n d v o i c e s i n t h e n i g h t a n dm e a s u r e s c o u l d b e t a k e n t s o t h a t n o s u c c e s s a t a l l v ? a s achieved^w h e r e a s t h e method s o f t h e e n e m y i n t h e s e c o n d o n e o n 3 1 O c t o b e r w e r eq u i t e d i f f e r e n t . T h e d i v i s i o n d i s p o s e d o f v e r y g o o d r e c o n n a i s s a n c ep a t r o l s w h i c h e v e r y n i g f c t r e c o n n o i t e r e d f a r i n t o t h e t e r r a i n o f t h ee n e m y , a n d t h r o u g h t h e m a n d t h e i r p r i s o n e r s t h e d i v i s i o n w a s tl e a s t t o a c e r t a i n d e g r e e a t h e r w e l l i n f o r m e d a s t o t h e i n t e n t i o n so f t h e e n e m y . O n t h e 3 1 O c t o b e r a b a b o u t 0 8 . 1 5 a n e x c e l l e n tr e c o n n a i s s a n c e . p a t r o l , w h i c h had b e e n i n t h e w o o d o f H o n d o n a n d a t t h eM e u r t h e r i v e r , r e t u r n e d a n d r e p o r t e d t h a t n o c h a n g e s had t a k e n p l a c e i n t h e e n e m y f o r c e s . A t O B . 3 0 a r t i l l e r y f i r e s t a r t e d s u r p r i s i n g l y , a n di n c r e a s e d i n i n t e n s i t y i n t h e c o u r s e o f a v e r y s h o r t t i m e . O w i n g t ot h e a r t i l l e r y f i r e n o o t h e r n o i s e s c o u l d b e n o t i c e d , T h e S e c o n d F r e eF r e n c h T a n k D i v i s i o n t o o k a d v a n t a g e o f t h e n o i s e and o c c u p i e d t h en e a r e s t j u m p - o f f p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t b e i n g h e a r d . A f t e r t h e b a r r a g eh a d d i e d d o w n t h e e n e m y moved i n c o n c e n t r a t e d a t t a c k a n d r u s h e d t h r o u g ht h e f o r e m o s t l i n e s e n t r i e s . O n l y t h e f i f t h a n d s e v e n t h c o m p a n i e s


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of t h e 135th Panzer Grenadier R e g i m e n t , with a few heavyweapons b e l o n g i n gt o t h e eighth and ninthc o m p a n i e s , were placed i n t h e attack s e c t o r andt h e headqua rters c o m p a n y whichwas employed a s r e s e r v e w ith a few t a n k s .For s u p p o r t t h e f o u r t h , f i f t h , and s i x t h b a t t e r i e s o f t h e 155thArtillery Hegiment were also i n position i n t h e s e c t o r . Apprt f r o m o n eantitank g un c a l 8 . 8 ) o n l y Bussian antiaircraft guns were available a sreplacements for antiaircraft c o m b a t t r o o p s . T h e g u n s , h o w e v e r , hada dispersion o f s e v e r a l hundreds o f m eters and were quite unsuitab le fort h e t a s k s e t . Consequently they did not put o n e s i n g l e t a n k o u t o fa c t i o n . The combi ned efforts o f t h e antitank d e f e n s e , o f t h e t a n kfighting w e a p o n s , and t h e a r t i l l e r y , i n direct edf i r e and i n additiont o t h a t , t h e fouravailab le t a n k s o f t y p e I ? h a d been s u c c e s s f u l ,h o w e v e r i n bringing t h e e n e m y attackt o a s t a n d s t i l l s h o r t l y after i th a d got s t a r t e d , knocking o u t more t h a n 40enemy t a n k s very s p e e d i l y .Th e attack did n o t pass t h e l i n e Merviller - Migneville- Ancerville.Our o w n losses were small.In t h e evening o f t h e s a m e day mo ved t h ecommandp ost o f t h e 125thPanzer Grenadier Eegiment t o F e n n e v i l l e r . T h e| c o m p a n y t o t h e west o f Baccarat was o v e r - r u n , o n t h e S I OctoberBaccarat was t&ken by American andFrench t r o o p s . O n t h e n e x t d a y andt h e dayafter 1 and 2 N o v e m b e r ) a new l i n e wasbuilt o n t h e r i g h twing. I t led through Domeore e s t o f Ancerviller - Vacgneville-Bertrichamps, S t . Barte LaBourgence - Foret d e Montagne. W e were n o tallowed t o occupy t h e Meurthe position further b a c k a s t h i s position wasn o t t o b e i m p r o v e d . Instead o f t h a t s o m e s p e c i a l o o n v i c * . field


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batta l i o n s (German soldiers) w e r e employed, they h a d , however, n o thi n gt o d o w i th t h e division. At the s a m e time a rehabilitation " b a t t a l i o nof about 300 me n w a s subordinated t o the division, on the 2 9 Octoberthey were e m p l o y e d i n t h e vi c i n i ty o f F o r e t de Montagne. Though s o m ea c hi e ve m e n ts c o u l d be credited t o t h e u n i t its total fi g hti n g p o w e rw a s very s l i g h t . A fter two o r three days the batta l i o n w a s no more t obe s e e n . On the 1 N o ve m be r I e m p l o y e d a f o r t r e s s m a c hi n e g u n batta l i o ni n the F o r e t de Bertrichamp. I t c o n s i s te d of elderly m e n , quiteinsufficiently armed. Each o f t h e three c o m p a n i e s h a d six machine g u n stype " 0 8 " . They d i d their best, but w e r e not equal t o the t a s k .O ri g i n a l l y they ha d be e n intended t o o c c u p y the West W a l l , a t a s k w hi c hw o u l d ha ve be e n m o r e suitable for t h e m . Very shortly only shatteredp o r ti o n s w e r e t o be seen of t h e battalions.

The third p o i n t o f atta c k o f the A m er i c a n s w a s a ga i n s t E a o n1 Btape. Surprisingly, American and Fr e n c h u n i ts succeeded i n takingEambervillers. As already mentioned, this w a s d u e t o the fact t h a tthe w e a k combat group o f Oelker which fought on a br o a d f r o n t southo f E a m be rvi l l e r s h a d withdrawn t o t h e eastern b a n k o f t h e Montagneriver, a n d i n this way Bambervillers was taken from the s o u t h . Thew e a k ga r r i s o n n e c o m p a n y o f t h e ? Security Battalion without he avyw e a p o n s as not able t o resist t h e A m er i c a n tank attack. The resultof the fall o f E a m be rvi l l e r s as that the security battalion, w e a ka n d completely w i tho u t combat experience, x / a s put i n a ve r y he r dpr e sse d situation i n the area o f D o n c i e n e s - Eoville - Anglemont. On


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a b o u t 3 November t h e s e c u r i t y u n i t s w e r e e x p e l l e d a n d pressedb a c k t o t h e a r e a o f N o s s o n c o u r t - H e n i l , b a t t h e a d v a n c i n g A m e r i c a n t r o o p s( F r e n c h d i v i s i o n s ) w e r e r e p e l l e d b y t h e s e c u r i t y d e t a c h m e n t s o f t h eI 9 2 d P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r R e g i m e n t e m p l o y e d i n t h i s a r e a . O n t h e f o l l o w i n gmorning t h e 192d Panzer G r e n a d i e r R e g i m e n t c a r r i e d o u t a c o u n t e r a t t a c k w i t h t w o w e a k b a t t a l i o n s ( r e i n f o r c e d , w i t n t h e 1 5 t h P a n z e rG r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n ) a n a r e c a p t u r e d t h e a r e a w e s t o f H o s s o n c o u r t o s s i b l e . I t v / a s t h eintention o f t h e higher leadership t o g a i n a s much t i m e a s possible i norder t o build u p t h e i m p o r t a n t rearward p o s i t i o n s , o f which t h eMeurthe position was t h e f i r s t i n t h i s s e c t o r , and make t h e m a s s t r o n ga s possible. I n different conferences with t h e commander o f t h e a r m yg r o u p s , t h e Commander-in-Chief o f t h e 19th Aray t o whom t h e divisionn e d . again been subordinated o n a b o u t 2 October efter t h e e x t r a c t i o n o ft h e 5 t h Panzer A r m y , and t h o s e c o r p s , t o which t h e division vass u b o r d i n a t e , I g a v e expression t o t h e main troubles o f r a y s e c t o r , t h enorthern o n e , and m y apprehensions o f new a t t a c k s through Badonviller -Element auf Zabern - S t r a s s b u r g . I pronounced my o p i n i o n t h c t i t wouldbe a dangerous mistake t o r e l i e v e t h e Panzer divisions j u s t now andemploy instead o f t h e m a n i n f a n t r y division without much c o m b a te x p e r i e n c e , and v ; h i c h , m o r e o v e r , would n o t be a b l e t o keep i t s r e s e r v e ss o mobile t h a t e v e n t h e weakest m i g h t b e employed a t different pointso f main e f f o r t , o n c r i t i c a l d a y s and a t decisive m o m e n t s . I n additiont o excellent morale i n t h e Panzergrenadiers, and artillery e a s i l ym o v e d , t h i s was o f d e c i s i v e i m p o r t a n c e f o r s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n s e i n s u c hs i t u a t i o n s .


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By higher i n s t a n c e s a n e n g i n e e r b a t t a l i o n o f t h e a r m y ( H e e r e s ) was o r d e r e d t o b e e m p l o y e d i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f R a o n 1 E t a p e a t t h e e n d o f O c t o b e r w i t h t h e m i s s i o n o f c o n s t r u c t i n g o b s t a c l e s f o r t h e M e u r t h eposition a n d b l a s t i n g t h e b r i d g e s a c r o s s t h e r i v e r . D e v a s t a t i o n a n db l a s t i n g i n E a o n 1 E t a p e c o u l d o e a v o i d e d .

I n t h e m i a o l e o f O c t o b e r t h e 1 5 t h Panzer G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n ,which w a s t h e l e f t a d j o i n i n g d i v i s i o n , w a s r e l i e v e d b y t h e 5 5 3 d D i v i s i o n .

I t w a s n o t d i f f i c u l t t o t r a n s p o r t t h e assigned s u p p l y o f a l l s o r t s t o t h e z r o n t . G 7 h e f o o d s u p p l y w a s a d e q u a t e , a m m u n i t i o n s u p p l i e sw e r e a l s o u p t o r e q u i r e m e n t s , g a s o l i n e a n d l u b r i c a n t s u p p l i e s w e r ei n s u f f i c i e n t , b u t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , e n o u g h f o r t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f a l l necessary m o v e m e n t s * s u p p l i e s o f a r m s a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y o f t a n k s w e r ev e r y poor a n d s o w e r e c l o t h i n g s u p p l i e s . H o s u p p l i e s o f v e h i c l e a ta l l w e r e a s s i g n e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n and i t had t o make b o t h e n d s m e e tby means o f i t s o w n c o n s t r u c t i o n s t a f f a n d t h e w o r k s h o p c o m p a n i e s .But t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s w a s s t i l l s u c h t h a t a l l m o v e m e n t s , e v e n f u t u r el a r g e r o n e s , c o u l d b e c a r r i e d o u t w i t h o u t a s s i s t a n c e f r o m o t h e r s .

I n O c t o b e r t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e G e r m a n and t h e A m e r i c a n a i r f o r c e swas n o t s t r o n g . B u t a s s o o n a s t h e weather permitted t h e Allieda i r f o r c e w a s o n t h e s p o t . H i e G e r m a n L u i t w a f f e w a s h a r d l y t o b es e e n i n t h e s k i e s . I n N o v e m b e r t h e a c t i v i t y 0 1 t h e A l l i e d AirF o r c ec o n s t a n t l y i n c r e a s e d .

H a t u r a l l y , i t would b e p o s s i b l e f o r m e t o g i v e m a n y d e t a i l s o ft h e b a t t l e s , and t h e s t r a t e g y e m p l o y e d i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l e n g a g e m e n t s .


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But perhaps s u c h , reports would b e o f no r e e l interest and I should notb e able t o compile such appropriately without havingat my disposal t h edocumentsnecessary for the compilation o f & retrospective diary o f this s o r t .

After t h e capture o f tneMeurthe pos i ti on t h e sector o f t h e divisiongrew considerably smaller. T h e right boundary o f t h e division t o the553d Division was north of Ancervillcr, and t h e left one to-the 716thDivision b y this time east o f Etival. On the 3 November t h e commandpost o f t h e di vision was moved t o Celles, t o the s a m e place es thoseposts of the 155thPanzer Regiment, t h e 200th S i g n a l Battali on and theSO O th Engineer Battalion. The Commandpost o f t h e 125th PanzerGrenadier Regiment v / a s i n Badonviller, and that o f the 192d PanzerGrenadier Regiment in LaTronche.

The situation was rather q u i e t the occupation o f the new positi onsoccurred without enemy action. Bear guards and reconnaissance patrolso f good f i ghting quality remained i n contact with the enemy with t h eobject o f delaying a pursui t by him. Thebridges across the Meurthehaving been blasted, ferry communicat ion had t o be establishedacrossthe r i v e r whi ch hadrisen due t o hi gh water, and even tanks weretaken t o the easternb a n k .

On the 5 Hovember t h e division got orders t h a t i t be rested forabout 14 days as o f the 12 Eovember i n the area o f Molsheim - Scnirmeck -Pfalzburg. At t h e s a m e time tne division had t o b e ready as a r r a ygroup reserve a t the line o f demarcation b e t w e e n , the 1st 8nd t h e


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1 9 t l i Armies and b e available a t a n y t i m e , particularly i n t h e a r e a , o fBadonviller - Blamont a n d P l a l z b u r g - S a a r b u r g . Preliminary reconnaissancewas t o " b e started a t o n c e . On t h e 9 November a t 12.00 t h e division g o torders t o march o n e armored g r o u p and t h e first " b a t t a l i o n o f t h e l < J 5 t hPanzer Grenadier Regiment t o t h e 13th S S C o r p s o n t h e French Hied i nt h e vicinity o f Ham s u r Nied. Partly o n t h e 9 November ana t > a r t l yduring t h e night o f t h e 9/10 November t h e g r o u p had t o be extracted anda t o n c e marched o f f .

As o f t h e 7 November t h e advanced detachments o f t h e 7 0 8 t h Divisionwhich were t o r e l i e v e t h e division had c o m e t o t h e command post o f t h ed i v i s i o n . Belief was t o t a k e place after t h e a r r i v a l o f t h e t r a n s ~portation trains of t h e division f r o m Slovakia a n d b e finished by t h e14 N o v e m b e r . Early i n t h e morning o f 10 November o r d e r s c a m e t h r o u g ht h a t t h e relief had t o b e carried o u t very s p e e d i l y , a s t h e d i v i s i o n a lheadquarters o f t h e 7 0 8 t h D i v i s i o n , which had arrived o n t h e y N o v e m b e r ,had t o t a k e overthe command o f t h e s e c t o r n o t later t h a n t h e 1 0 November end t h a t t h e 2 1 s t Panzer Division w i th i t s l e s t portions had t og i v e up i t s positions during t h e n i g h t o f t h e 1 0 November, i f t h ec o m b a t s e c t o r was much s m a l l e r and t h e 7 0 8 t h Division arrived a t f u l ls t r e n g t h t n e relief caused n o d i f f i c u l t i e s , and t h e ?08th Divisionhad t o be rapidly loaded and m o v e d . The greatest difficulty i n t h er e l i e f and d e p s . r t u r e o f t h e 2 1 s t Panzer Division was caused by t h ew e a t h e r , a s s n o w had fallen i n t h e Vosges o n t h e 9 November a n d t h eDanube Pass Ro ad was blocked by s n o v ; and i c e . But t h e a i r force o f t h e


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MS J U 8 7 1 -36.e n e m y c o u l d n o t g o i n t o a c t i o n .

According t o i n s t r u c t i o n s d e p a r t e d d a r i n g t h e n i g h t o f t h e 10 November a n d on t h e 1 1 N o v e m b e r , i n t h e m o r n i n g , r e p o r t e d t o t h e 1 3 t h S S C o r p s in M a n y , e a s t o f H a m s u r Hied T r e n c h ^ i e d ) .

T h e 1 3 t h S S C o r p s w a s c o m m a n d e d b y O b e r g r u p p e n f u e h r e r P r i e s , C h i e fofS t a f f w a s O o e r f u e h r e r v . E i n e m . T h e s i t u a t i o n , a s f o u n d i t t h e r e ,w a s a s f o l l o w s : A p a r t f r o m t h e l l t h PanzerD i v i s i o n a l l d i v i s i o n ss u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e c o r p s w e r e b a d l y m a u l e d , t h e armored s p e a r -p o i n t 8 o f t h e e n e m y had r e a c h e d M o e r c h i n g e n and p a r t o f t h e m c r o s s e dt h e Nied r i v e r ; n o r e s e r v e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e t o p r e v e n t t h e e n e m y f r o ma d v a n c i n g a c r o s s t h e H i e d a g a i n s t F a l k e n b e r g - S t . A r n o l d . T h e f i r s tA r m y , w i t h i t s c o m m a n d p o s t i n S t . A r n o l d , i t s C o m m a n d e r i n c h i e fI t O e n v . K n o b e l s d o r f f , i t s C h i e f o f S t a f f , C o l M a n t h e y , e x p e c t e d t h e a r r i v a l o f t h e d i v i s i o n a s e a r l y a s 1 0 N o v e m b e r . S h e a r m ya l s o e x p e c t e d t h e Panzerd i v i s i o n t o b e b r o u g h t u p t o s t r e n g t h and n o tj u s t s u c h s m a l l u n i t s a s t h e d i v i s i o n a l r e a d y h a d .

S h e mission o f t h e d i v i s i o n , w h i c h a r r i v e d on 1 1 N o v e m b e r , w a st o d e f e n d t h e Hied s e c t o r s o u t h o f B a z a n c o u r t -H a m s u r H i e d a n d t h e w o o d e a s t o f H i e d , a s t h e e n e m y w a s a l r e a d y a d v a n c i n g b y 1 1 Novemb e r t h r o u g h H a m , e a s t w a r d . The a d j o i n i n g d i v i s i o n s w e r e w i t h o u t s u p p o r t . T h e d i v i s i o n o n t h e r i g h t f l a n k w a s t h e 1 7 t h S S P a n z e rG r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n ; l e f t flank u n i t s w e r e c o m b a t g r o u p s o f t h e l l t hP a n z e r Divisionand s e v e r a l i n f a n t r y a l a r m u n i t s .


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make t h e main attack.Theprevious intention o f t h e army group t o defend the Nied could

not b e carried out after t h e arrival o f the division, b e c a u s e t h ee n e m y , as I have already mentioned, had crossed the Hiedat Ham andnorth o f i t . I now employed the division s o that.the left sector o fthe division, being most jeopardized, got t h e 125th Panzer GrenadierDivision, which h a d come first and t h e first b a t t a l i o n o f which could

b e employed some hours previously. The b a t t a l i o n had at once t ooccupy the western and southern edges o f t h e wood o f Hemilly. Contactt o the left x ; s s particularly difficult to maintain as the enemy advancedeastward and for the t i m e b e i n g n o n e of our own troops had contact. By

m e a n s ; o f t h e use of numerous assault troops and a few tanks t h e enemycould be deceived as t o our weakness for s o m e t i m e , until t h e divisionwas able t o extend t o t h e left.

At t h e outset t h e 193d Panzer Grenadier Beginent vas employed t othe r i g h t , as reserve, t h e reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n was assigned. Buteven o n tne 12 H o v e i a b e r I n a d t o have the 192d Panzer Grenadier Regimentextend already its left wing and i n t h e course o f t h e 12 and 13 Hovemberoccupy tne southern edge of t h e wood o f Heniltz up t o t h e railway linesouth of t h e wood. The 31st Reconnaissance Battalion and portions o ft h e 220th Engineer Battalion took over the northern s e c t o r . Southofthe railway-line connection was established with an infantry regimentwhich had been diverted from t h e 553d Division. Counterattacks o fthe 17th S3 Panzer Grenadier Division fixed for t h e 13 and 14 E o v e r o b e r


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and which w e r e t o t a k e p l a c e n o r t h o f t h e s e c t o r o f t h e d i v i s i o n w e r eu n s u c c e s s f u l .

T h e 2 1 s t Panzer D i v i s i o n s u c c e e d e d i n c o n t a i n i n g t h e e n e m y . S n a i le n e m y g r o u p s which penetrated i n t o t h e wood o f R e m i l l y w e r e r e p u l s e d .

O n t h e 1 5 N o v e m b e r t h e s i t u a t i o n o f t h e l e f t a d j a c e n t units g r e we v e r m o r e c r i t i c a l . The e n e m y had s u c c e e d e d i n a d v a n c i n g f r o m M a n ye a s t w a r d and i n t a k i n g T h i e c o u r t * M a i n v i l l e r s . A f u r t h e r e x t e n s i o no f t h e s o u t h e r n f l a n k had b e e n n e c e s s a r y . D u e t o t h i s , portions o f t h ee n g i n e e r b a t t a l i o n had t o b e e m p l o y e d a s i n f a n t r y o n t h e s o u t h w i n g .T n e p r e s s u r e o f t h e e n e m y i n c r e a s e d m o r e a n d m o r e , f h e a r t i l l e r y f i r eo f t h e e n e m y c o v e r e d t h e p o s i t i o n s a n d v i l l a g e s u n c e a s i n g l y behind t h ef r o n t . L i k e w i s e , t h e r e a r w a r d r o a a s w e r e c o n s t a n t l y u n d e r a r t i l l e r yf i r e . A s s o o n a s t h e w e a t h e r c l e a r e d u p t h e r e w a s s t r o n g f i g h t e r2b o m b e r a c t i v i t y , ou^ o w n a i r c r a f t d i d n o t a p p e a r . T h e c o m m a n d p o s to f t h e d i v i s i o n i n E l v i n g e w a s h i t by a r t i l l e r y f i r e s e v e r a l t i m e s .O n t h e 1 6 N o v e m b e r t h e p o s i t i o n s w e r e w i t h d r a w n t o V i l l e r - S t o n c o u r t -C h a n v i l l e a n d l a t e r o n t o t h e r o a d C h a n v i l l e - A r c i e n c e . The e n e m y , w h oo u t f l a n k e d b o t h o u r f l a n k s m o r e a n d m o r e a n d penetrated i n t o t h e w o o do f R e m i l l y , Aad t o b e e v a d e d o n t h e 1 7 N o v e m b e r s o t h a t a c o n n e c t e d l i n ea g a i n c o u l d b e e s t a b l i s h e d , b u t i n d o i n g s o o u r weak f o r c e s w e r e s t i l l m o r eand unnecessarily s p l i t u p . T h e plateau w e s t o f t h e G e r m a n Nied w a so c c u p i e d o n t h e 1 7 N o v e m b e r a n d i n t h i s w a y a n e w , f i r m l i n e wase s t a b l i s h e d . T h e m o v e m e n t o f t h e r e a r g u a r d s w e r e n o t c a r r i e d o u t u n t i lt h e 1 8 N o v e m b e r , t h e c h a n g e o f position o f t h e a r t i l l e r y t o t h e a r e a e a s t


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o f the German H i e d was carried o u t d u r i n g t h e night o f the 17 - 1 8 Nov e mber. On t h e 1 8 November the c o m m a n d p o s t o f t h e d ivision w a s m o v e d t othe f o r m e r c o m m a n d p o s t o f t h e corps i n the v i c i n i t y o f t h e F a l k e n b e r gmine. The i n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e corps were t o the effect that we had t ow i t h d r a w slowly t o t h e Maginot line u s i n g d e l a y i n g tacties. This w a s n o t ,however, t o be carried o u t b y t h e d ivision. On t h e 1 8 N o v e m b e r a t2 0 , 0 0 i n t h e n e w command p o s t I g o t orders t o extract t h e d ivisionimmed iately. D u r i n g the 1 9 November the d ivision was t o a r r i v e i n t h earea o f Saarlsutern - W a l l e r f a a g e n a n d w o u l d there be subordinated t othe 82d C orps (Lt Gen Hoernlein). Ac c o r d i n g t o instructions the c o m m a n dp o s t o f t h e d i v i s i o n was to be located in the palace o f V / a l l e r f a n g e n .After the relief during t h e . night o f the 1 8 Nov e m b e r the march w a scarried o u t i n t h e m o r n i n g of the 1 9 November. Despite g o o d f l y i n gw e a t h e r t h e m ?r c h was carried out w i t h o u t incident, we m a n a ge d t o takethe whole d i v i s i o n t o t h e n e w s e c t o r , ready for action by the 1 9 November i n the afternoon. O f course t h e forces grew ever w e a k e r becauseno raising t o strength ha d as y e t taken place. On t h e 20 November apersonnel replacement transfer battalion from G e r m a n y came t o thed ivision. The situation of t h e 82d Cor ps w a s s u c h that the 19thInfantry D i v i s i o n a n d t h e 2 5 t h P a n ze r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n were engagedw i t h a superior enemy i n the sector west o f H e r z i g a n d Saarlautern.The old boundary o f t h e Belch was in our h a n d s as a whole. - T h ed i v i s i o n w a s a s s i g n e d t w o missions.


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MS# A-871 -43-These unitswere employeda s o f t h e 1 6 November. T h e organization o ft h e divisionhad n o t y e t b e e n f i n i s h e d , heavy w e a p o n s , particularlya r t i l l e r y , were n o t yet c o m p l e t e . Command p o s t o f t h e division w a s i n Hilbringenwest o f M e r z i g . O n t h e 2 0 November t h e situation i n t h e25th Panzer GrenadierDivisionw a s d a n g e r o u s . O f t h e veryfewbatteries t h e division h a d , t w o had been captured byt h e e n e m y , t h e s a m e thinghappened with s o m e t a n k s t y p e Y which could not d r i v eb a c k , partlyd u e t o engine t r o u b l e s and difficult t e r r a i n , partlyt o damage caused by direct h i t s . The mission o f t h e 2 1 s t PanzerDivision w a s t o remedy t h i s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . AS o f 2 1 N o v e m b e r a t06.00 t n e new commandpost o f t h e division w a s i n M e c h e r n . O n ebattaliono f t h e 192dpanzerGrenadierHegimentandt h e 21stArtilleryBattalion stayed i n t h e c o m b a t areao f Kiedraltdorf for defensivet a s k s , t h e 125th Panzer Grenadier Regimentand the f i r s t battaliono f t h e 192d Panzer Grenadier Regimentwith t w o battalions o f t h e 155th Panzer ArtilleryHegiment were moved t o t h e new s e c t o r . On t h e 2 1 Novembera t 07.00 t h e t r o o p s were readyf o r action t h e r e . O n l y s i xtanks type I Y o f t h e 22dPanzer Segiment were a v a i l a b l e . The t a n kbattalion o f t h e 25thPanzer Grenadier Division had about s i x tanksreadyfora c t i o n . Thanks t o replacements t h e Panzer Grenadiercompanies agpd& had ac o m b a t s t r e n g t h o f about 50 men t o each c o m p a n y . T h e attack was launchedthrough Silwingen i n t o t h e wood s o u t h o fBudingenande a s t o f Waldwisse andwas s u c c e s s f u l . W e managedt o rescue t h e t w o batteriesand s o m e encircled combat g r o u p s o f t h e


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M S # A - 8 7 1 - 4 3 -2 5 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n a n d t o r e c a p t u r e t h e P a n t h e r t a n k s w h i c hh a d n o t b e e n a b l e t o m o v e . A t t h e m o m e n t o f t o w i n g o f f t h e a c c i d e n th a p p e n e d t h a t t h e P a n t h e r t a n k s o f t h e 2 5 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r R e g i m e n tw h i c h v e r e p l a c e d r e a r w a r d a b o u t 5 0 0 m s o u t h o f t h e w o o d t o t h e s o u t h o f B u d i n g e n , w e r e t a k e n f o r e n e m y t a n k s a n d f o u r o f t h e m w e r e d e s t r o y e db y o u r o w n f i r e .

T o r t h e 2 2 N o v e m b e r t h e d i v i s i o n h a d o r d e r s t o l e t t h e p o i n t o fm a i n e f f o r t r e m a i n i n t h e s e c t o r o f t h e 2 5 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n a n d t o t r y a n d g e t i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h s c a t t e r e d p o r t i o n s o f t h i s d i v i s i o ni n t h e f o r w a r d t e r r a i n . F u r t h e r , t h e a t t a c k w a s a t a l l p o i n t s t o r e a c ht h e o l d b o u n d a r y o f t h e B e l c h . F o r t h i s m i s s i o n I h a d a n a d v a n c e dc o m m a n d p o s t o f t h e d i v i s i o n l o c a t e d i n S l l w i n g e n .

T h e a d v a n c i n g c o m p a n i e s m e t w i t h s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e f r o m a r m o r e dg r o u p s . T h e y s u c c e e d e d i n o c c u p y i n g L a n n s t r o f f a n d W a l d w i e a e . I n t h e a f t e r n o o n t h e d i v i s i o n w a s i n s t r u c t e d t o c o n t i n u e t h e a t t a c k n o r t h w a r da g a i n s t W e h i n g e n - E f t a s s t r o n g e n e m y f o r c e s w e r e a d v a n c i n g o n B o r g .T o w a r d e v e n i n g o r d e r s c a m e t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e e n e m y a n d i n t h em o r n i n g o f t h e 2 3 ^ o v e m b e r t r a n s f e r t h e d i v i s i o n t o t h e O r s c h o l z o b l i q u ef r o n t f o r s u p p o r t o f t h e 4 t h D i v i s i o n . O n t h e 2 3 N o v e m b e r a s o f 0 5 . 0 0t h e d i v i s i o n m a r c h e d t h r o u g h M e r z i g - H e t t l a c h - T a b e n - B o t h i n t o t h ea r e a o f ? r e n d e n b u r g - W e i t e n - S a h a - M e n r i c h - K i s s i n g e n - H u e n s l n g e r - B e u w e n . B y t h e 2 3 N o v e m b e r a t n o o n w e a k p o r t i o n s w e r e o r d e r e d i n t o t h eW e s t W a l l p o s i t i o n s o f t h e O r s c h o l z o b l i q u e f r o n t , t h e b u l k w a s t o f o l l o w o n t h e 2 3 a n d e a r l y o n t h e 2 4 N o v e m b e r . O n t h e 2 3 N o v e m b e rt h e s i t u a t i o n o f t h e 4 1 6 t h D i v i s i o n had


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become c r i t i c a l . I n t h e vicinity o f Oberlenken - Tettingen t h eAmericans had taken s o m e f o r t s , along t h e road Borg - Muenzingen v e r yvaluable installations had been o c c u p i e d , reserves were not availableand nothing impeded t h e American t a n k s i n t h e i r advance throughMuenzingen t o S a a r b u r g . I n t h i s situation t h e division got o r d e r s o nt h e 24 November t o close t h e gap a t O r s c h o l z . She command post o f t h e416th Division was i n T r a s s e n , d i v i s i o n a l commander was Maj G - e n P f l i e g e r ,connection was immediately established witht h e command post b u t i n t h i ssituation t h e 2 1 s t Panzer Division could not exoect a n y s u p p o r t f r o m adivision which was a l r e a d y fighting \ r i t h i t s l a s t r e s e r v e s . I establishedt h e command post o f t h e division i n Meurich. Under i t s new c o r i a n d e r ,i w a j S p r e u , t h e 192d Panzer Grenadier Regiment was employed o n t h e w e s ti n t h e vicinity o f t h e road Muenzingen - Borg i n c l . , t h e 125th PanzerGrenadier Regiment was employed t o t h e l a s t . Regimental command - o o s to f t h e 192d Panzer Grenadier Eegiment was i n i - l u e n z i n g e n , t h a t o f t h e125th Panzer Grenadier Eegiment i n F a h a . 5 ? h e command post o f t h e155th Panzer Artillery Hegiment was i n t h e vicinity o f t h e division i nM e u r i c h , i n t h e s a m e p l a c e , t h e t h i r d battalion; t h e f i r s t battalionwas i n t h e vicinity o f B e u r e n , t h e second battalion north o f F a h a . Thereconnaissance company and t h e division e s c o r t company were employedi n t h e area o f Tettingen.

From t h e 24 t o t h e 2 6 November t h e r e were h e a v y engagements i nt h e s e c t o r o f t h e d i v i s i o n . W e s u c c e e d e d i n recapturing most o f t h ef o r t s a n d , l i k e w i s e , Oberlenken and Settingen. Sven t h e 10th American


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Tank Divi s i o n em ployed t o support t h e at t a c kco uld no t enable t o ga inheadway. I t w as feroci o u s h a n d t o h a n d fight invo lving casualtiesan d p r i so n ers o n b o t h s i d e s . O n t h e 2 6 N o v e m be r t h e w h ole secto r fromOberl euken t h r o u g hT e t t i n g en - N e n n i g and the Mo selle secto r up t ot h e lin e o f d em arcat i o n o f the 2 l a t o Di v i si o n was assi g ned t o thedivision. A f o r t ressm a c h in e g uncom pany em plo yed o n t h e Mosellew assubordinated t o tne divisio n. AS o f t n e 2 5 N o vem ber the 416t h Di v i s i ontook over the O rs ch o l z se ctor e a s t o f Oberlenken. Then t h e co m m and po s to f this d i v isionwas tr ansferr ed t o Taben - Ro th . A ch ange took placei n the lead ership o f the 82d C orps on the 2 5 No vember. Lt GenHa h mcame t o replace Lt Gen Hoernlein. A chang e o f t h e chief o f t h e co rpsh a d taken p l a c e sh ortly before.

The d iv ision w a s n o w reorganized. O n the 2 6 N o v ember t h e fero city o f t h e batt le dim i n i s hed an d calmed do w n s t i l l m o re o n the 2 ? No vember.The 192 d P a n ze rG r e n a di er Regimen t took over t h e sector O berlehken -Tettingen, t h e c ommand post rem ai n e d i n Muenzingen, w hile the 12 5thPa n z er Gren ed ier Regiment, reinforced b y a fortress m ac h i n e g unbattalion, took over the rest o f t h e d ivisio n a l s e c t o r . The 21stReconn ai ssance Ba t t a l i o n a n d t h e Di v ision Escort Company, d ivisio nalreserve, en d c o mm a n dpost of t h e 1 2 5 t hPa nz e r Grenadier Reg i m e n tw ereall i n Zorw ig.

A n e w c o m me n d p o s t w as es tablish e d i n Niederlenken, an dHeur i c hremained a s ad v an c e d c o m m and p os t o f t h e Or sch o l z oblique f r o n t , apo i n t o f m a i n effort. The r eorganiz at io n w as c arried o u t on the


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2 8 Movember. This being d o n e t h e division g o t instructions o f a newchange o f positions a t a b o u t 2 2 . 0 0 . T h a t s a m e n i g h t t h e s e c t o r had t ob e given up again t o t h e 4 t h D i v i s i o n . T h e 21st Division was subordinate dt o t h e 13th S S Corps i n S c h e l d t north of S a a r b r u e c k e n . The c o r p s w ascommanded by S S Obergrupp enfuehrer S i m o n . O n t h e 2 9 l ovember by 0 9 . 0 0 hrsI had t o renort t h e r e . I ordered t h e commanders o f t h e division t o r e p o r ti n Tuettlingen a t 11.00 h r s .

By t h e 13th S S C o r p s I w a s instructed t o s u p p o r t t h e t w o d i v i s i o n s( t h e 340th Division commanded by Major Gen Trierenbcrg and t h e 559thDivision commanded by L t G e n v . t i U e h l e n ) heavily engaged o n t h e hillswest o f t h e S e a r r i v e r between Voelkingen a nd Dillingen. First o f a l li t was necessary t o t a k e act ion immediately for t h e benefit o f t h edivision o f Lt Gen v . M uehlen. (Command x > o s t i n Wallerfange n).

A c c o r d i n g l y , I g a v e o r d e r s i n Tuett lingen and g o t t h e t r o o p s f i r s tarriving s t a r t e d o f f . They w e r e t h e f o l l o w i n g : t h e S e c o n d B tt sliono f t h e 1 92 d P a nz er Grenadier R e g i m e n t , t h e Third Bat t alion o f t h e1 55th Panzer Art ille r y R e g i m e n t , and s i x tanks t y p e I Y . T h e r e s t o ft h e division f o l l o w e d , t h e First Battrlion o f t h e 125th Panzer Grenad ierRegiment hgd t o s t a y for t h e t i m e being southeast o f t h e Orscholz f r o n t .When I arrived a t t h e p o s t o f t h e 559t h Division i n t h e s c h o o l buildingo f V s l l e r f a n g e n , I was confronted with e v e r y d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n( a t a b o u t 1 4 . 3 0 ) . The t e r r a i n o n t h e French Bl ed end w e s t o f i t , u n t ilt h e 2 2 November held by t h e 2 1 s t Panzer D i v i s i o n , had been l o s t ; o n t h e2 9 November America n u n it s h a d s u c c e e d e d i n pushing t h r o u g h Gisingen


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M S A 371 47

on Wallerfangen in the Valley of the Saar) and since 14.00 hrsSt. Barbara was in the possession of the Americajis. This meant thatthe en emy controlled the plateauthere and with it the Valley of theSaar in this sector. Consequently, the irst arriving combat groupof the division was launched against St. Barbara in order to repulsethe enemy there. The attack succeeded, at 16.00 hrs St. Barbara wasrecaptured. Considering the plateau on which St. Barbara is situated,this was a real success, which enabled the division to enjoy a breathingspace. After their arrival, the other portions of the division vereemployed. As the First Battalion of the 125th Panzer GrenadierBegimenthad remained in the Orscholz front, only three battalionsof an average combatstrengthof 120 - 125, men could betaken intoconsideration. The 192d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, with its regimentslcommand post in Wallerfangen, w s employed in the area of Wallerfangen -St. Barbara, and the rest of the 192d Panzer Grenadier Eegiment, withi t s command post i n F ar m Ober L o e n b e r g , was employed i n t h e v / o o d e ddistrict north o f S t . Barbara - Wallerfa ngen. The artillery w a splacede a s t o f t h e S a s . r . Divisional command p ost i n t h e pelace o fWallerfangen . Eight adj oi ni ngdivision was t h e 19th and l e f t adj oi ni ngdivision t h e 559th Division. As o f t h e 2 9 November t h e r o a d - n e t i na n d a b o u t fallerfan gen - Saarlauter n and t h e bridge Dillingen -Waller fange n were under very heavy American f i r e .


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T h . o u . g h the Vest . J e l l positions were situated east o f the S s n . r r i v e rw e had t o continue f ighting against a great superiority w i t h , w h a t s sleft o f the divi sion and i n unfavorable terrain. A p - o a r e n t l y t h epillboxes o f t h e West W a l l would b e occupied by f ortificationunitsVolkssturm andpolice troops. But as a matter o f fact alluniformi tyi n the occupation was not attained. Some pillboxes were occupied, butby no means t h e tactically i i a p o r t a n t o n e s ; generall ythe most spaciousand best constructed o n e s but most o f them were not occupied a t a l l .To us t h e whole meani ng of the c o m b e , was t o be that every day gainedwest o f the West Wall relieved t h e situation, contained t h e e n e m y andi nflicted losses onh i m a n d o n t h e occupation o f t h e , , * e s t Y / a l l ,enab led t h e divisions arriving t o t a k e i t over entirely. But t

21st panzer division in combat against american troops in france and germany usa 1945

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