21st century chinese arms modernization and statecraft in

21st Century Chinese Arms Modernization and Statecraft in Southeast Asia*

Renato Cruz De Castro

Abstract

Using the concept of strategic culture, this article examines China’s currentarms modernization programs vis-à-vis its foreign policy of peaceful emergence.

The article observes that these military modernization programs complementBeijing’s overall policy of affecting a peaceful emergence, since both are pursued torestrain and counterbalance American power and influence in Southeast Asia.

It likewise notes that the arms modernization programs are limited and areprimarily aimed against Taiwan and any third country that might intervene in caseof a cross-Strait crisis.

In conclusion, the article asserts that the United States should not merely focuson China’s hard power but should also match its soft power diplomacy in SoutheastAsia, which might be more effective in undermining American strategic preponderanceand initiative in the region.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 113–134.

Introduction

“To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’sattack and remain unshaken, use maneuvers direct and indirect. In all fight-ing, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methodswill be needed in order to secure victory...”1

Sun Tzu

China’s “peaceful emergence” is currently raising concerns inWashington. The Bush administration thinks that as the Chinese econo-my continues to expand, Beijing will likely increase its military spend-ing. This trend will enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to pro-duce or purchase military equipment that could change the status quoin the Taiwan Strait and challenge America’s military preponderance inSoutheast Asia. In 2005, then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeldclaimed that Beijing’s military spending was threatening the delicatesecurity balance in Asia.2 In his address at a conference in Singapore,he maintained that China’s investment in missile and up-to-date mili-tary technology endangered not only Taiwanese and American inter-ests, but also those of the nations that view themselves as China’s trad-ing partners, rather than rivals. It thus follows that Secretary Rums-feld’s assertion reflects an emerging view among American defenseanalysts who see China as the principal conventional military threat toPax Americana. However, they miss the crux of China’s current geo-strategic gambit in Asia. The China challenge goes beyond the simplematter of Beijing’s military modernization or arms build-up or a pro-jected amphibious invasion of Taiwan. More significantly, it concernsChina’s efforts to set a regional agenda shaping the preferences ofmember states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).In the long-run, it is about Beijing’s skillful use of soft power to erode

114 21st Century Chinese Arms Modernization and Statecraft in Southeast Asia

* This paper was first presented at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studiesand National Bureau of Asian Research Conference on “Contending Perspectives:Southeast Asian and American Views on a Rising China,” Singapore, Aug. 22–24,2005.1 Sun Tzu, in James Clavell, ed., The Art of War (New York, NY: Delta, 1983), p. 21.2 Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Criticizes China’s Arms Growth,” International Herald

Tribune, June 6, 2005, p. 3.

American power and influence in Southeast Asia.3

This article situates China’s current arms build-up within its over-all 21st century statecraft in Southeast Asia. It explores how Chinasimultaneously undertakes a limited arms modernization, and devel-ops the necessary economic and political power to constrain, and even-tually ease out the United States as Southeast Asia’s hegemon. Essen-tially, these specific questions are addressed: 1) What is the function ofthe military capability in China’s geo-strategic gambit in the 21st Cen-tury? 2) What is the relationship of China’s military modernizationwith its overall foreign policy of peaceful emergence? and 3) How willChina’s policy of “peaceful emergence” affect the U.S. security posturein Southeast Asia?

Chinese Strategic Culture and Statecraft

As a term in Strategic Studies, strategic culture refers to the deeplyembedded concepts that affect the policy and decision-making process-es relative to national security.4 The emergence and popularization ofthis concept is an indication that defense analysts and scholars havebegun to recognize the role of ideas rooted in military doctrines andinfluence in foreign policy, even when they could not necessarily bejustified on the basis of realist logic. Strategic culture involves imagesand symbols reflective on how a polity understands it relationship withother states, its position in the international pecking order, and thenature and scope of its national external ambition. According to Alas-tair Johnson, strategic culture consists of two parts: The first includesbasic assumptions on the orderliness of the strategic environment interms of the role of conflict in human affairs, the nature of the adver-sary and the threat, and the efficacy of the use of force. The second car-ries the assumptions at a more operational level, especially on the most

Renato Cruz De Castro 115

3 For a thorough discussion of the concept of soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8–12.

4 Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca and London: CornellUniversity Press, 1994), p. 6.

efficacious strategic options in dealing with the threat environment.5

Far from being a dominant set of national beliefs determiningchoices throughout the history of a certain society, strategic cultureestablishes pervasive and long-lasting preferences by providing con-cepts on the role of military force in international politics and clothingthem in an aura of factuality, reality and efficacy. These preferences,however, are subject to changes in non-cultural variables such as tech-nology, threat, or social organization. Strategic culture molds publicperceptions and becomes institutionalized in the structure and processof decision-making as it affects how political leaders, bureaucrats, andeven military services define central roles and missions in the area ofnational security. Strategic culture shapes military policies in peace-time, as well as in times of conflict, thereby producing definite nationalstyles, differentiated by their propensities to the use of force in interna-tional affairs. It does not emerge from the permanent conditions of thestate, and certainly not from any fixed ethnic or social characteristics.Rather, it reflects self-images of relative material strength or weakness;and it changes with the specific enemy with which the comparison ismade.6

Chinese civilization has produced one of the foremost militaryphilosophers who tried to establish the principles in the proper con-duct of statecraft and war—Sun Tzu. He derived his precepts fromexperience or the study of past experiences, transmitted through histori-cal records, accounts of practitioners, and general principles on theproper conduct of war in agriculture-based ancient China.7 An activegeneral at a time when the contenders in war were feudal principalitiesfighting the equivalent of limited wars, Sun Tzu was concerned withconflicts on a large and protracted scale, or waging ruinous campaignsof attrition. To him, cost was all-important, given the restrictions onmanpower in an agricultural society, and the adverse effects in politicaland economic terms of excessive taxation.


5 See Alastair Iain Johnson, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” InternationalSecurity, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 46–47.

6 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge and Lon-don: Belknap Press, 2001), p. 118.

7 Charles Reynolds, The Politics of War: A Study of the Rationality of Violence inInterstate Relations (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), p. 60.

Sun Tzu’s work reflects the assumption that underlies the Chinesecultural approach to war. War is neither a means in the hands of policynor, and much less, an end in itself.8 It is regarded as a necessary evil, aphenomenon that a state has to confront and address in an imperfectworld. War is seen as the disturbance of the Tao (or “the way”); thus, itsconduct should be kept to the indispensable minimum. The militaryinstrument is viewed as an ill omen or a tool by which a state can ruinor strain its resources. He warned that maintaining a large military fora long time makes prices rise, and high prices drain people’s resources.It also depletes the state’s treasury. To Sun Tzu, no state benefits from along war and maintaining a big military. Whereas the West emphasizedthe maintenance of a huge military and the application of maximumforce against the enemy, Sun Tzu called for the use of diplomacy, dirtytricks, and battle maneuvers. If the military instrument is to be used, itshould be applied in a carefully measured way, which is neither morenor less than what is considered necessary. In short, it should appear assharp and calculated bursts. Sun Tzu advocated the use of stratagem toundermine the enemy’s will and the use of asymmetric tactics in war-fare. He argued that the key principle in warfare is not fighting, which,in fact, should be avoided. To fight and conquer in all your battles isnot the manifestation of supreme excellence in warfare. Supreme excel-lence means of breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. ToSun Tzu, the objective is not to impose one’s will but to undermine theenemy’s will to fight, which could be achieved through asymmetrictactics.9

Sun Tzu’s military stratagem eventually became part and parcel ofChinese strategic culture. Actually, Sun Tzu merely formalized his phi-losophy on warfare from the then existing corpus of ideas and prac-tices. In a way, The Art of War integrated traditional Chinese militaryprecepts and political theory into an intellectually coherent strategicdiscourse.10 It provides Chinese society with a “strategic cultural arti-


8 Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War; War and Military Thought (London, UnitedKingdom: Casell, 2000), p. 29.

9 Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of Mili-tary Conflict (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002),p. 129.

10 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 202.

fact” that embodies these ranked strategic preferences. His exhorta-tions—such as overcoming the enemy without actually fighting, thepreference of foiling the enemy’s plots and alliances rather than directlyattacking the enemy head-on, and conducting a siege—reflect China’scultural approach to conflict. Generally, Chinese military writings con-tain discursive concepts and techniques of clandestine activities.11 SunTzu’s gradualist and asymmetrical approach to warfare in any casewas used by succeeding Chinese dynasties whose militia-based armiesfought contingents of marauding non-Sinicized tribes along theempire’s frontier areas. His work distilled the essence of Chinese strate-gy and statecraft of not imposing one’s will on an enemy. The initialaim is to outwit or outmaneuver an enemy, and in the end, ensure thesurvival of Chinese society and civilization.

21st Century Chinese Statecraft

During its early years as an independent and revolutionary state,the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was confronted by militarilypowerful enemies. The United States—and later, the Soviet Union—posed real military threats that could undermine China’s very survival.At the time it was besieged by these threats, China was a relativelybackward country with an underdeveloped economy. Consequently,the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) adopted a passive and low-techmilitary strategy based on a doctrine known as a “people’s war.”12

From the late 1940s to the late 1970s, Chinese policymakers viewednational security primarily as a matter of preparing or using militarypower to defend China against foreign invasion and military coercion.13


11 Ralph D. Sawyer, The Tao of Spycraft: Intelligence and Practice in Traditional China(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), p. xiii.

12 Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan andthe Koreas (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), p. 72.

13 For a comprehensive discussion of China’s notion of comprehensive security,see Richard Weixing Hu, “China in Search of Comprehensive Security,” in JamesC. Hsiung, ed., Twenty-First Century World Order and the Asia Pacific: ValueChange, Exigencies, and Power Realignment (Fifth Avenue, New York: Palgrave,2001), pp. 309–25.

Traditional security concerns became the central foci of the Chinesepolitical leadership and the defense against these threats was the mostimportant component of the country’s security strategy.

This view changed during the 1980s as global developments forcedBeijing to reappraise its concept of security and to downplay its mili-tary concern, and focus on national development. Chinese leaders, rec-ognizing their country’s economic backwardness, concluded that aworld war could be averted for some time, and that the immediatesecurity environment in light of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear stalemate in the1980s could be ameliorated. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping set three prioritiesas China’s security objectives, namely, economic development, nationalunification, and opposition to hegemonism.14 Among these three goals,economic development appears complementary to national security, aswell as the major determinant in the rise and fall of great powers. Fromthe perspective of the Chinese political leadership, international rivalryhas shifted to the economic arena, and the essence of competition is thecontention for comprehensive national capabilities. More significantly,increasing China’s material resources would enable the PRC to removethe vestiges of the humiliating past, promote its position in the globalarena as a major global player, and in turn, transform the country into agreat power. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s rein-forced this notion that the country’s national security depends moreupon overall national strength, based on a solid economy, than on itmilitary capability.

Beijing sees economic growth as the key to developing its overallcomprehensive power, instead of simply relying on the military instru-ment to ensure its security. At the same time, it is aware that militarypower is necessary to defend China’s economic interests and develop-ment. Despite its focus on economic development and comprehensivesecurity, however, Beijing is wary that the United States intends to be aglobal hegemon bent on disrupting Chinese irredentist and strategicagendas in the process.15 Many Chinese political elite are convinced that


14 Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power,” inMuthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 123.

15 William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Singa-

the United States is opposed to China’s emergence, which can reduceor even displace American power and influence in East Asia.16 DengXiaoping himself concluded that China must fully and comprehensive-ly prepare for the possibility that the United States may launch militaryaggression against China, manipulate another country into starting awar, or provoke a war by fostering Taiwan’s independence movement.Faced by overwhelming American military and economic prowess, theChinese political leadership had no choice but to rely on a form ofasymmetric warfare based on its traditional statecraft that emphasizesthe use of psychological operations, covert actions, and disinformationmore than most Western works on military science and strategy.

The traditional Chinese notion of world order (and statecraft) is pri-marily based on culture, morality, and human harmony, while the Euro-pean-dominated international system focused more on hard power—military and economic strength and competition.17 Chinese strategic cul-ture and statecraft are primarily predisposed at generating what JosephNye called “soft power.” According to him, it is the ability to get whatsomeone wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.18 Itrests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. It is indirect, long-term, and works through persuasion rather than force. Soft power gener-ally grows out of the attractiveness of a culture, the political ideals of acountry, or policies that include the interest of other states.19 Despitemodernity and humiliation from the West, Chinese attitudes toward warhave survived. Chinese emphasis on indirect warfare—on mastering thehuman will and harmonizing war with the Tao—has remained, despitethe military revolution and the formation of the modern Chinese nation-state. Chinese statecraft is now being used as a guide to Beijing’s geo-strategic gambit against Washington in Southeast Asia.


pore: Green Giant Press, 2001), p. 23.16 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (New York and Lon-

don: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 289.17 Xu Guoqi, China and The Great War: China’s Pursuit of a New National Identity and

Internationalization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 23.18 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public

Affairs Books, 2004), p. x.19 Joseph Nye, “The Power of Persuasion,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 24,

No, 4 (Winter 2003), p. 2.

Joining the Battle: The PLA’s Modernization Programs

From the mid-1980s to the 1990s, Chinese military doctrine veeredaway from the Maoist-inspired “people’s war” approach focused ondeterring continental-based threats from the Soviet Union toward onethat is aimed at addressing challenges from its eastern maritime bor-ders. The PRC’s Central Military Commission concluded that theprospects of a major military conflict with any of the superpowers wereremote, while the threats of small or local wars erupting somewherealong China’s vast maritime borders had become more apparent. Thisscenario envisioned that the PLA would likely be deployed in relative-ly limited time and space, and would fight in narrowly defined regionsalong China’s periphery against foes with equal or more advancedtechnologies.20 The Chinese high command assumed that these threatswould emanate from three potential sources: a Taiwanese movementtoward independence; territorial conflicts in the South China Sea; and asea-based attack or invasion.21 Despite the focus on the acquisition ofadvanced hardware and force multipliers, the development of militarysoftware had been slow and the PLA found it necessary to adopt a poli-cy of selective modernization of weapons and other systems, which areexpensive to procure and difficult to operate.22 The modernizationprocess proceeded without any sense of urgency as China was notthreatened directly by any country and the PLA was bogged down byits commercial ventures.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996, however, brought to the fore theurgency of China’s military modernization programs. In March 1996,China tested missiles over Taiwan to intimidate the island republic dur-ing its crucial presidential election. Washington deployed two carrierbattle groups near the Taiwan Strait. This move forced China to back offfrom its provocative missile-firing exercise around the island. Despite


20 Bates Gill, “China as a Regional Military Power,” in Barry Buzan and RosemaryFoot, eds., Does China Matter? A Reassessment (New York and London: Rout-ledge, 2004), pp. 126–27.

21 Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Mili-tary (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 116.

22 Ellis Joffe, “China’s Military Keeps on Modernizing, Slowly but Surely,” Interna-tional Herald Tribune (March 15, 2002), p. 6.

Beijing’s hope for a stable external environment, Taiwan became apotentially volatile issue. The incident also led Beijing to two conclu-sions:23 One, that Taiwan’s political leadership is determined to set sailinto an unacceptable course toward independence and this will drivethe PLA to reunify the island republic with the mainland by militarymeans. And two, China’s resorting to force will definitely bring inAmerican military intervention. With the one particular regional exi-gency in mind (Taiwan), Beijing has pursued key modernization pro-grams concentrated on the following:

a) Development of a modest naval capability for interdiction—In the after-math of the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the People’s Liberation Army’sNavy (PLAN) acquired two Russian-built Sovremenny-class guidedmissile destroyers and ordered six more.24 The PLAN has alsoacquired eight Kilo-class submarines.25 The PLAN’s acquisition ofthese submarines indicates that sea-denial is becoming the center-piece of China’s ongoing modernization programs.

b) The development of an advanced air force, with longer-range interceptor/strike aircraft to provide improved air defense—During the 1990s, thePeople’s Liberation Army’s Air Force (PLAAF) made significantprogress in upgrading its air defense system. The PLAAF acquired47 advanced long-range interceptors (Su-27), and later signed anagreement with Russia for the joint production of 200 additional Su-27s. In addition, based on an agreement reached with Russia in 1999,China imported Su-30 fighter/ground-attack aircraft, and reportedlyreceived an additional 38 more from 2002 to 2003. This will enablethe PLAAF to conduct both sea-and air denial operation within 500nautical miles off China’s coastline and provide air support to anaval blockade of Taiwan.


23 See Kurt M. Campbell and Derek F. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” For-eign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 4 (July/August 2001), pp. 14–25.

24 Edward Cody, “China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington Post,April 12, 2005, p. A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45056-2005Apr11.html.

25 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Military Modernizationand Cross-Strait Balance, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,Feb. 6, 2004, p. 199, available at http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/04Reportpage15.pdf.

c) The development and deployment of a large number of accurate, solid-fuelconventional ballistic and cruise missiles with both fixed and mobile capabil-ities. Since the mid-1990s, China has invested enormous resources inthe development and deployment of conventional armed ballisticmissiles with ranges of 300 to 600 kilometers, which are clearlyintended for contingencies involving Taiwan. Aside from these bal-listic missiles, the PLA has also based a number of anti-ship andland-attack cruise missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers. Thisdeployment gives Beijing the option to use a variety of militaryactions against Taiwan, ranging from military intimidation throughvarious military exercises, to a missile “test blockage, a limited mis-sile attack and actual missile attacks, to disrupt, degrade and neutral-ize Taiwan’s military and civilian infrastructure.”

d) Development of sophisticated ISR, C4 and capabilities for electronic andinformation warfare—to support its intended asymmetric warfarestrategy against the United States and Taiwan, China has investedheavily in upgrading its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance(ISR) to enable the PLA to find targets over the horizon (OTH) atsea.26 The PLA has begun the “informatization” in the field of mili-tary operation, by focusing on command automation at all levels ofheadquarters and combat units. The PLA is also formulating newmilitary and operational theories on the military application of infor-mation technology. Finally, the PLA is prioritizing the developmentof information technology for cyber warfare as a “strategic weaponfor use outside of traditional operational boundaries.”

In contrast to its initial modernization programs in the late 1980sand early 1990s, the PLA’s current arms modernization efforts arefocused on a very specific objective—to develop its military capabilitiessolely to thwart Taiwanese pro-independence efforts and any probableU.S. intervention in a cross-Strait crisis.27 The pre-1996 modernizationprograms were directed at building the PLAN’s offshore strategic capa-bilities, which involved the acquisition or development of several guid-


26 Robert K. Ackerman, “Chinese Military Modernization Aims For Regional Pro-jection,” Signal, Vol. 58, No. 2 (October 2003), p. 40.

27 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War Over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84,No. 2 (March/April 2005), p. 53.

ed missile destroyers and possibly aircraft carriers. It could be recalledthat in the early 1990s, much speculation and media attention weredevoted to an alleged Chinese interest in acquiring the 67,500-tonVaryag, a sister ship of the Soviet carrier Kuznetsov.28 Adoption of anoffshore active defense strategy was in pursuit of Beijing’s ambition toassert itself as a regional maritime power in the Asia-Pacific, thusenhancing the PLAN’s mission, and its role as a tool of Chinese foreignpolicy.

In the mid-1990s, Beijing’s decided to postpone indefinitely plansto buy an aircraft carrier. Instead, it acquired four Russian made Kilo-class submarines and two Sovremenny-class destroyers. This impliedthat its current goal is far more limited—the development of what iscalled “an assassin’s mace” or “trump card” against Taiwan and possi-bly against the U.S. Navy. These vessels could only operate near theChinese coast, thus giving the PLA the capability to “fight and winshort-duration, high intensity conflicts along its periphery.”29 Mean-while, the purchase of two Sovremenny-class destroyers and four Kilo-Class submarines will hardly alter the strategic situation in SoutheastAsia as these ships have limited range and are vulnerable to aerialattack. China’s newly acquired naval assets, however, could complicateU.S. naval planning in any cross-Strait crisis. But the U.S. Navy couldjump on the PLA’s incipient C4, which is the most vital element ofmodern military effectiveness. Furthermore, these few Chinesedestroyers and submarines will have to contend against the U.S. 7thFleet’s two fleet carriers, Los Angeles-class attack submarines, andAegis destroyers and cruisers. The PLAN’s incipient brown-water fleetwill have to face U.S. air and naval forces that are being increased andmodernized, and are currently backed by forward-based strategicbombers, and attack or cruise missile submarines on the islands ofGuam or Diego Garcia.30


28 Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisition from Abroad: A Quest forSuperb and Secret Weapons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 61.

29 Deputy Undersecretary Richard Lawless, “Defense Official Says China Trans-forming Its Military Establishment,” U.S. Department of State, April 23, 2004,p. 1, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Jun/30-773974.html.

30 See Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations,” ForeignAffairs, Vol. 82, No. 5 (September/October 2003), pp. 96–97.

Avoiding a Lengthy Campaign

In a way, the current modernization programs expose the Achillesheel of the PLA—its defense industry. China’s defense-industrial sectoris plagued by various problems, ranging from excessive industrialover-capacity, chronic inefficiency, capital shortages, and low techno-logical standards. The country’s state-owned defense industry pro-duces some modern weapon proto-types, but it is not capable of massproduction.31 Furthermore, China’s system of a “civilian to military”process of transferring technology is still very weak.32 The country hasyet to incorporate its overall economy, science, and technology in thedevelopment and production of advanced military equipment. China’sdefense-industrial base continues to face problems, and in the nearfuture, it is unlikely to be able to provide the PLA with the kinds ofadvanced weapons that it deems necessary for its strategic needs, withthe exception of missile systems.33 Thus, the PLA must import itsequipment from other countries or copy prototypes in limited numbers.This accounts for the PLA’s short-term stopgap measure of importingexpensive weapon platforms from Russia. However, imports will notaddress China’s long-term naval objective of an offshore active defensestrategy. Imports are expensive and the quantity that China can affordto buy will not be sufficient to meet China’s defensive, much more,offensive needs.34

Beijing made sure its modernization would involve modest improve-ments in the PLA’s long-range cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, andsubmarine capability. This hopefully could slow down a U.S. responseto a rapid political fait accompli presented to Taiwan, and is not meant


31 Norman Friedman, “Chinese Military Faces Obstacles to Modernization,” UnitedStates Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128, No. 9 (September 2002), p. 2, availableat http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=203&sid=6&srchmode=1&...

32 See “China Scholar Urges More Use of Civilian Industries in Military Moderniza-tion,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, Aug. 7, 2004, p. 1.

33 Bates Gill, “China as a Regional Military Power,” in Buzan and Foot, eds., p. 141.34 David Bachman, “Military Modernization and Civil-Military Relations in China:

Toward the Year 2020,” American Asian Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall 2001), p. 6,available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb? Index=246&sid=6&srchmode=1&.

for power projection. More than a decade after the Taiwan Straits Crisisin March 1996, Beijing has more than doubled its defense spending andhas become one of the world’s biggest importers of weapons. It hasmade purchases of advanced weapons from Russia and other formerSoviet states, including fighter jets, Kilo-class submarines, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and sophisticated air defense systems. All theseweapons system are designed to make American military commanderspause before they join the fray on Taiwan’s side.35 Indeed, China isbuilding-up its military capabilities. However, it is doubtful whetherBeijing will immediately use its growing and modernizing militarycapabilities to gain broader international influence and to develop astrategic counter-balance against Tokyo and Washington. In the short-term, China will focus primarily on developing a strong military deter-rent posture against Taiwan. No less than the Pentagon’s annual reporton the PLA admits, “Since the early- to mid-1990s, China’s militarymodernization has focused on expanding options for Taiwan contin-gencies, including deterring or countering third party intervention.”36

There might be some indications that imply that China is developingcapabilities that will enable it to project its military power beyond Tai-wan. However, any form of power projection capability will still beconstrained by the PLA’s limited ability to incorporate its newlyacquired military hardware into its overall strategic posture and doc-trine; the PLA, the PLAN, and the PLAAF’s limited experience in con-ducting joint operations beyond the country’s periphery; and by inter-nal social and political problems generated by the country’s rapid eco-nomic development since the early 1990s.


35 Yun-han Chu, “Power Transition and Making of Beijing’s Policy Toward Tai-wan,” in Yun-Han Chu, Chih-cheng Lo and Ramon H. Myers, eds., The NewChinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16th Party Congress(Cambridge, U.K: Infotype Ltd., 2004), p. 214.

36 Office of the Secretary, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’sRepublic of China (Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 2006), p. 7, avail-able at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/china.html.

The Gambit of Peaceful Emergence

China’s main strategic gambit since the mid-1990s is to circumvent,not challenge, America’s well-established system of alliances and for-ward-deployed forces. Beijing’s stratagem involves stigmatizing thesealliances and powerful naval forces with a Cold War mentality alreadyobsolete in the post-Cold War era. Beijing’s offer of a new order anddirection for the region became apparent when it announced andbegan implementing its “New Security Concept (NSC)” in 1998. TheNSC is premised on cooperative and coordinate security that proposesa pattern of diplomatic-defense relationships with countries that areneither allies nor adversaries of China.37 The NSC subtly conveys theidea that American security alliances are from a previous era and areindicative of a Cold War/Realpolitik mentality.

Adopting the Indirect Approach

This new security concept provides both a vision and a direction inSoutheast Asian regional affairs in three ways. Firstly, it offers an alter-native security blueprint to the U.S.-dominated bilateral system ofalliances that has become a landmark in the regional security spheresince the 1950s. The concept envisages a new multilateral regionalsecurity framework devoid of any alliance structure.38 It indirectly criti-cizes U.S. alliances’ thinking, encourages Asian states to pursue poli-cies independent of U.S. hegemony, and emphasizes China’s newapproaches to its Southeast Asian neighbors, with rhetoric and actionsdesigned to undermine American influence. However, tacit criticism ofthe U.S. position in Southeast Asia has stopped in the aftermath of9/11.39 Secondly, it has paved the way for an unprecedented wave ofChinese diplomatic activism through economic, political, security, and


37 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (U.S.A.; Canada:RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 300.

38 Remy Davison, “China in the Asia-Pacific,” in Michael K. Connors, RemyDavison and Jorn Dosch, eds., The New Global Politics of the Asia-Pacific (NewYork: Routledge, 2004), p. 63.

39 Robert Sutter, “Asia in the Balance: America and China’s Peaceful Rise,” CurrentHistory, Vol. 103, No. 674 (September 2004), p. 285.

cultural initiatives—in Southeast Asia. Since the mid-1990s, China hasexpanded the number and extent of its bilateral relations, organizedand joined various economic and security arrangements, deepened itsparticipation in key multilateral organizations, and helped address anumber of global security issues. Chinese diplomacy has impacted onthe PRC’s relations with ASEAN. Beijing’s willingness to accommodatethe political concerns of Southeast Asian states has generated goodwillamong officials from East Asian countries.

Thirdly, to foster a new form of relationship devoid of power poli-tics in Southeast Asia, China has doubted and questioned the impor-tance of military power in international relations. Chinese officials andscholars argue that with the end of the Cold War, security concernsshould no longer focus on military defense. Rather, states must tackle amuch wider range of security challenges, such as drug trafficking, ter-rorism, organized transnational crimes, environmental degradation,civil and ethnic conflicts, and resource scarcity.

China now advocates a comprehensive national security strategyin which military security is only one component. In fact, Beijingwould prefer to rely on diplomatic and economic means to address itsinternational security concerns, rather than on less-relevant militarymeans. By emphasizing non-traditional security concerns, Beijing hassought to infuse a sense of shared growth and security community intoChina’s overall relations with neighboring states. It is also aimed to fos-ter a model of inter-state cooperation that enhances collective securityfor the participating states while not threatening any outside party. Theinclusion of and focus on these non-traditional security challenges willmake the highly militarized/realist American approach to security out-dated and will foster cooperation among Southeast Asian countries inconfronting non-military threats at the expense of U.S. influence in theregion.

The formation of the East Asian Summit (EAS) in December 2005was the culmination of China’s efforts to advance its NSC in the region.Malaysia took the initiative to form the EAS, to be held annually, but itwas done with China’s support and active encouragement. The timingof the summit seemed appropriate in light of China’s emergence as aregional power in East Asia. The United States has always regardeditself as part of East Asia. However, the EAS excludes Washington from


this 16-member regional undertaking. The EAS is also the realization ofthe concept’s vision to develop an East Asian response to dramatic chal-lenges in the post-Cold War era and shape regional developments inways that will best maintain economic dynamics, enhance regionalsecurity and preserve peace and stability among the summit members,without the ultimate arbiter and guarantor of security in the region—the United States. Furthermore, the summit aims to provide a confi-dence-building forum for the East Asian states and a venue for substan-tive regional cooperation in dealing with non-traditional security chal-lenges, such as terrorism, piracy, maritime and health security withoutany external powers (except perhaps Australia and New Zealand). TheEAS incorporates the NSC’s goals of smoothing China’s relations withits immediate neighbors by fostering confidence-building measures andimplementing a regional diplomacy designed to shape a regional securi-ty environment without the United States. Thus, it has been observedthat the EAS is an “emblem of a quiet consolidation of Chinese influ-ence in the region” at the expense of the United States.40

Holding Out Bait to Entice its Opponents

Another strategy China uses to undermine U.S. military prepon-derance is its provisions of side-payments to and fostering consultativerelations with U.S. friends and allies in Southeast Asia. The PRC dis-penses side-payments and provides institutional voice to the smallerstates in Southeast Asia through: a) its rapidly growing economy; b)the institution of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process; and c) theASEAN Regional Forum. The PRC uses its booming economy to dis-pense opportunities to ASEAN countries and to draw them into itsgrowing political orbit. In particular, the vibrant coastal areas of Chinaare projected to become an important market for the relatively highquality exports of ASEAN.41 In dispensing side-payments to the smaller


40 Roger Cohen, “Asia’s Continental Drift Changes Terrain for U.S. Globalist,”International Herald Tribune (Nov. 16, 2005), p. 2.

41 Chalongphob Sussangkarn, “The Emergence of China and ASEAN Revitaliza-tion,” Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics Europe (Brussels,Belgium, May 10–11, 2004), p. 5.

ASEAN states, China depends on the framework of the APT process.Chinese diplomats regard the APT as the “main channel of East Asianregional cooperation” which signifies its relative importance comparedwith other regional fora. Through the APT, the PRC has consolidatedits bilateral links with the ASEAN countries. Under the Chiang MaiAPT agreement, China inked a US$1.5 billion currency swap withMalaysia in 2002. Beijing has also pledged to finance some Philippineinfrastructure projects and to purchase liquefied natural gas fromIndonesia’s West Papua Province, a commercial deal valued at US$25billion. The most significant side-payment offered by China to theASEAN states is its offer of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

To foster consultation with the smaller states in the region, Chinarelies on multilateralism. China was earlier averse to multilateral insti-tutions fearing that regional groupings could be used by some coun-tries to punish and constrain the PRC. During the second half of the1990s, Beijing actively participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF). It quickly adjusted to ARF’s incremental style by using its softapproach in containing inter-state disputes. Similarly, it upgraded itsparticipation in the regional forum in 1996 in response to its deteriorat-ing relations in Northeast Asia, with the United States, as well as withASEAN over the Mischief Reef Incident in 1995. Beijing prevented theARF from being used as a means to balance and restrain China, boastedof ASEAN’s leadership role in the regional forum by constraining theUnited States and Japan, and effectively projected the image of the PRCas a good neighbor. To prove its point, Beijing has become extremelypragmatic in managing its territorial disputes with ASEAN states overthe Paracel and Spratly Islands. Though the PRC still clings to its his-toric claims over these islands, it is willing to settle these territorial dis-putes through peaceful means, based on international law. Then afterfour years of intensive negotiation, ASEAN and China signed a decla-ration of code of conduct in 2002. The declaration expresses the inten-tions of both sides to demonstrate “restraint” in the South China Sea.Significantly, the final draft included most of the text proposed byASEAN and little of what was offered by China.42


42 Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” ForeignAffairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), p. 26.

China also interacts with its Southeast Asian economic partners inseveral regional economic fora. The belief that regionalism elsewherebenefits member economies, and the fear of damage to domestic eco-nomic interests if access to foreign markets similar to that enjoyed bycompetitors is not negotiated are the primary reasons behind theSoutheast Asian enthusiasm for regional economic arrangements. Mostprominent among them are the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), ASEAN plus Three (APT), Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion (SCO), the Boao Forum for Asia, and the Tumen River Area Devel-opment Program. For China, this means that each regional forum has aslightly different political and economic dynamic. But they all serveChina’s foreign policy goals. With domestic economic growth verydependent on the regional economy, Chinese leaders see regionalism asa mechanism by which countries can work together to address thevagaries and instability of the world economy. Likewise, they viewregionalism as a way of responding to the forces of globalization. Othersalso think that support of regional groups is premised on the fact thatas a form of multilateralism, regional groupings can advance China’snational security concerns by counter-balancing U.S. financial and mili-tary power, which remains relatively unchecked since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union.

Balking the Opponent’s Plans

Subtly, the PRC also neutralizes America’s strategic power andinfluence in Asia through cooperation. Faced with a more powerfulstate with abundant resources and high-tech and far superior forward-deployed naval/air forces, China does not intend to form a counter-vailing capability. Rather, it attempts to set up a formalized cooperativesubstructure with the regional system to neutralize the more powerfultraditional hegemon in East Asia—the United States. A key element inthis tactic is the establishment of friendly ties and cooperative relation-ship with all countries including the United States. Although critical ofU.S. hegemony, Beijing believes the world will be unipolar and thatU.S. preponderance will persist for decades. It maintains that Chinacannot (and will not) challenge U.S. global domination and will acceptU.S. hegemonic power but not necessarily its behavior. China did not


threaten to exercise its veto in the U.N. Security Council on the Iraqissue, in marked contrast with France and Russia. Clearly, the “fourth-generation” Chinese leadership is cautious in handling bilateral rela-tionships with the United States. Moreover, American preoccupationwith Iraq has not fundamentally altered the Chinese view of the UnitedStates, as Chinese officials and analysts echo that Washington shouldnot view China as a challenger to America.

At the 2003 ASEAN summit, Beijing proposed the establishment ofa new security body. Under the framework of the ASEAN RegionalForum, a network will be established to increase dialogue among EastAsian armed forces. The following year, Beijing proposed to the ASEANa new security forum that will open new channels of dialogue betweenChina and the Southeast Asian countries but will exclude the UnitedStates, Japan, and the European Union.43 Specifically, Beijing proposedan increased participation of defense officials in the ARF process andthe promotion of exchanges and cooperation among the region’s armedservices. It cited the important role played by the region’s militaries infostering confidence-building and in addressing non-traditional securitychallenges such as counter-terrorism and transnational crimes. Themove is seen as China’s gambit to marginalize and eventually excludethe United States from regional security affairs. This marked a radicaldeparture from Beijing’s position in the 1990s, when it avoided anysecurity dialogue with ASEAN member states, let alone among thearmed services. No doubt East Asian countries will consider this regionalinitiative in the light of China’s growing economic and diplomatic clout.If this initiative is pushed through, Beijing can slowly erode America’spreponderant strategic influence in Southeast Asia, since Washingtonis currently preoccupied in Iraq and Afghanistan. China’s efforts arecollectively considered a sort of a “Gulliver Strategy,” aimed at limitingany assertive U.S. policy by tying it down through a multilateral frame-work and constraints.


43 Michael Vatikiotis, “A Diplomatic Offensive,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.167, No. 31 (Aug. 5, 2004), pp. 28–30.

Conclusion

Washington’s efforts to balance China’s current arms modernizationprograms and Beijing’s initiatives to affect a peaceful emergence create aclassical situation wherein one state is fighting its own way, while theother is fighting another way. Washington has continuously conveyedits serious concern over any Chinese military build-up. The UnitedStates has also strengthened and increased its forward-deployed forcesto confront China’s alleged “increasing military muscle.” Undoubtedly,Beijing has been modernizing its air and naval capabilities—primarilyto deter Taiwan from declaring formal independence, and to preemptany third-party intervention. However, China’s current arms build-up isonly one of the many ways it uses to protect and enhance its strategicinterests. Beijing uses numerous forms of inducements and soft-powerdiplomacy to isolate Taiwan from the Southeast Asian countries and toconstrain the United States from using its overwhelming military forcesin any crisis in the Taiwan Strait. China’s economic diplomacy, bilateraland multilateral security dialogues, and increased participation in mul-tilateral fora have succeeded in calming down regional concerns aboutits military build-up and modernization against Taiwan and, to a certaindegree, in the South China Sea. Its policy of peaceful emergence hasbeen effective—to the point that Southeast Asian states are now takinginto account China’s interests and concerns in their foreign policy deci-sion-making process.

To contend with U.S. strategic preponderance in Southeast Asia,China applies a sophisticated combination of moderate hard power (orSun Tzu’s tactic of direct approach) against Taiwan and the UnitedStates and soft power against the Southeast Asian states (or Sun Tzu’stactic of a flanking or indirect approach). The first approach constitutesthe military build-up across the Taiwan Strait. This is primarily aimedat sidetracking American attention and efforts. On the other hand, Bei-jing’s policy of peaceful emergence involves the application of softpower against the Southeast Asian states. This is aimed at reassuringthe Southeast Asian states of China’s long-term intentions and isolatingWashington in the region. China has succeeded in prompting many ofthese states, frustrated by Washington’s myopic focus on the war onterror and on Iraq, to readjust their relations with Beijing. Though the


United States remains the region’s most powerful military actor, itspower and influence are being gradually eroded by China’s soft powerdiplomacy. Currently, China is advancing the foreign policy notion of“harmonious world,” which articulates its intention to generate bene-fits from its relations with all countries, namely without reference totheir national constitutions or domestic political system. This foreignpolicy gambit is primarily intended to steer clear of any risky inter-linkages that might endanger its expanding global interests. This gambitinvolves establishing and forging close partnerships with the EuropeanUnion, Russia, India, Iran, Nigeria and even Mexico. This is seen asChina’s attempt to develop a series of more or less strong counter-bal-ances to the dominance of the United States by ensuring that its foreignpolicy interests and principles will also suit its bilateral partners byforging a triangular relationship vis-à-vis Washington. Unless Wash-ington develops a new national or grand strategy (not just a militarystrategy) to deal with the China challenge, America’s overwhelmingnaval superiority in Southeast Asia will be rendered useless and out-flanked by Beijing’s soft power diplomacy. The first step toward thisdirection is to reflect and appreciate Sun Tzu’s advice that “. . . just aswater retains no constant shape, so in warfare there is no constant con-dition. . . . He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent,and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.”


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