21st bomber command tactical mission report 263, 267

8/6/2019 21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 263, 267

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M I S S I ON , NO .2S3 23 '1

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HE.- ' .DQU ),RTtRSX XI B OM BE R C OM lli.':JID

APO 234

T;'CTIChL MISSION REFORT

Field Order No, 98

1

J..!i.ssions No. 263 thru 2

Targets I Urban Areas of U-tst,mQmiya, Ichinoflliya, Tsurug,aand UVlajima;and the Kawasaki ?etroleum Center C

12/13 Ju.ly 1945

Table. of Gon.tents

'TaCtiCal Nartati ve. . . . ~ . . . .. . . . . . .. .j,nne:;':: b. - Operations. . . . . . ' . '

J

?artPart,PartPartrartPa r tPa r tPartPart

. . .

I - Navigation Tra,ck Chart I I - Radar ,!,;pproach Charts I II - Mean ?oint,s ot 1I1lP!3.ct. IV - Bomb ing " .' V .- Flight Engineering Chart

VI - RadaI' iii .. .,. '. .. ... iii

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VII - Gunnery. .. VIII - Jdr-Sea Rescue Ohart, .IX - Air-Sea Rescue Reports, Se~tion ;. - 58th ~,ring Report NO.5. Section B - 3l5t h :1ing Report No.1.

bnne:x:B - l~ather w Part I - '1ea ther Summary. Part II - Chart -- Forecast 'ieather ve;

Observed feat:16r ?art In - Prognostic MapPe,rt IV - Synopti~ Map. e

. . . . . . II I!

Annex e - Communications.?art I - ROM. Part Il - Ro-dio

. . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .-- III . . . , . . . . .Annex D - Intelligence e

Part I - Enemy Air Opposi tieD Part II - Enemy Antiaircraft P~rt I I1- Damage ~. s sessment.

Seotion ... - Ubs unomLya, :rUssion No. 263 Section B .. 1chinomiya. dission No. 264 Section 0 - Tsuruga. hlission No. 265 Sec t i on D . .Kauasak1 P et ro le um C en te r ,

Mission No . 26 7

A n n e xE - Consolidated Statistical Summary.

~nnex F ._ XXI Bomber CommandField Order

~nne~ G - Distribut1on.

?rspo.red By IA-a Seotion

XXI Bomb or CIlIJIIIUlII

Page No.

. .

141516

2122242S

272829

2932

3736

404142

434446

49

505154545658

60

63

73

80


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f or the clusters was chosen t o get maximum t amage on the target areaand to attain proper density for each aircraft pattern.

. _go For Mission Number 264, the 73rd \ling was~nstructed to direct a nonnal effort of 4 Grmps carrying clusterscontaining M- 69 banbs to the extent of a.vailabili ty or ~4 7 incendiaryb onba, However, the Wing had no flexibility in detennining the banbload for this mission due to the fact t1l!!!.t-"-~1td!fOs were availablef or use at this particular time. One hundred per cent use of this banbagainst a Japanese urban area had never been made and ;raB normallyconsidered impracticable, sincetbere we r e insufficient B-7 shacklesin,any lling to premit exclusive use of the T.19 cluster adapter.Elcclusive use of this b cnb with the B-IO shackle was expected to resultin excessive bang-ups and malfunctions. The banb wafj considereddesirable for use against the nixed residential and industrial areato be attacked, due to the high charge and weight ratio of the banb.The large number of appliance fires anticipated lIere expected to exactmaximum destruction of the area to be attacked. A 75 foot intervalaneterspacing was specified to get a bonb density of 2 2 5 tens per square milein the target, sufficient to achieve the destructicn desired

.1. For Missian Number 265, since the target areawas small and highly c angested, consisting chiefly of industrial andwal'eacuse areas, 3 Groups of the 3l3th.ling, a norma I effort, was to

attack" Oile Grmp was to carry M-47 banbs and 2 Grcup8 >Tere to carry500-pcund incendiary clusters. This was expected to place an averagedensity of approx;j.mately 250 tenS per square mile of the target areato obtain the maximum destruct ion. The nru:nit ioDB selected were CIl thebasis of utilization of available supplies and far the characteristicsas set forth for the other miss1cms in this series of strikes. Sincethe target was small and a high ccncentratian gas needed far destructial,an intervalaneter setting of 50 feet was sIlecified far tile M-47 bCI:1bsand 35 feet far the clusters to attain the maxmUI:ldensity as well as toinsure unif arm coverage.

l!. For Mission Nunber 266, the 4 Grcups at the314th ',hng were to participate in this normal effort t ... th 2 Grcu;pscarrying M-47 bones and 2 Grmps carrying E-46 500-pcund amableclusters ccntaining M-69 banbs. The target area waS relatively seal!consisting of typical Japanese residential and industrial area t ypestructures I and having several fire breaks. It "as planned to lilt anavarage density of 200 to 225 tons per square mle en thD target,believed to be suffio;j.ent to insure destruction r:I the area. The roaaC1:18for the selecticns of the banbs were the same as those set forth tor:the other miasiQls. Tho intervalaneter setting specified, 75 teet for:the banbs and 50 feet for the clusters, was expected to insu re IIV'TimUD!unifann den.aity fran the farce assigned, as well as to be sufficientto destroy the target area

.5 .a For each of these 4 incE>ndiary missicaa tilefirst 12 aircraft airbcrne, which vere to include the 12 best radarcrEme, vere to caITY M-47 inoendiary banbs and were to precedo themain force as pathtinders ~o mark the target areas

.2. . .Fuzing8 were to be instant&D8(uS 1lC188 or:'the .47 banbs and the clusters were Bet to open 5000 het e..boA tiI.e

"l'he i1l8tant811eQlS nose fuzing "0$ to enable tbe bade toa tp eet beneath the roofs to give me,.i.... apreaA to tho

~~~~.~~/~_!li!q:ttIlIJllilCL .... 121 c:Il"~ to increase the i. piti _ of tAe 1Dtl_bl.es, their cQltfmt". Tho olUeter tu.u. .. hIP

,~~e 01 bol;b. the el\l8ter u4 ' .. u41 MdIe .aE'I~.

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1.. FoE' Mission Number 267, all aircraft or the31..5th lVing were to carry 500-pwnd general purpose banbs, fuzed witha 1/10 see end delay nose and 1/40 & 1/100 secQnd' dol~ 111\118. Rb& SOO-poundb anb VIas seleoted since the target installations were Of both thestorage and refinery type, and the la,rge number of bcm.bhits expectedto be attained was expac t ad to eause maxirm.un damage to both manufactur-ing and storage facilities. The 1/40 and 1/100 second delay tail fuzelias selected to plJ"mit penetraticn of the banb beneath the tank tops

t a a SUfficient depth to assure det onaticn be Lon the contents Leve Land :thus causing maximum damage. This delay was also expected to bemost e.ffeative against the multi-story buildings included in the targetarea. The 1/10 sec end delay nose fuze was selected ac.ly as an assurance,fuze.

(b) Bombing Data: (For pictures of the targets andlocation of mean. paints of impact see Annex At Part III).

1. For M:!.ssi on hUmber 263, a mean po:imt ofimpact near the center of Utsunaniya was selected since a probablee ircu lar errElI' of 4000 feet included the Whole city.

~. For Mission Number 264. a mean point atimJlact was selected near the oenter of Ichinamya. A probable circularerror of 3000 feet innluded all of the important part of the city'sbuilt-up area.

3. . For Mission Number 265. the mean point atimpact selected for Tsuruga UaB near the center of the city and aprobable circular error of 3000 feet included the ent~re city.

/ J : . .For Mission Number 26b, the mean point atilllpact selected was sooth of the hill in the center of Ut7ajima and aprobable circular errar of 4000 feet included all at the city, \"liththe exoeption of the northeast extension of the area

1

.5. . For Mission Number 267, the mean point ofimpact selected \'las in the center of the Ka.7asaki Petroleum Centerand a probahle qireula:L' error of 1.500 feet included all installatials.

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6~ The missiCXlSwere similar to ethel" stl"ikesWhere 4 .flings ivere assi~ed separate cities for inCendiary night attaokusing radar methods of banbing and the 3l.5th 71ing \TaS assigned apreciSion target. Iletennl.nation of axes and altitudes of attack 17MdependeIit en the best radar and antiaircraft oCllSideratiCllS, 'ilhich'are disoussed by those specialists in this report. It t7a8 plannedto have apprOlCimately .5.50:8-29'6 take part in these miasicns and itwas anticipated that '3775 tens of baubs r1culd be placed en all targets.Important baubiZlg planning oonsideratiQlls followl

Mission Bombins Axis of leIlgth Time'iiiM Nm'2~ Al.'~tl.\9!!12 AttAQ!5 .gt BI.; of ISa 1ltW.

teet) (degrees)(miles) (minutes) (degeea)

seth 263 13iOOO toIj,aoo 286 43 91 4 right

73 rd 2 6 4 10-.000 to 1 riSht10.,800 80 42 9a

26 5 12.000 to ' 1 3 142. B o o 3 32 8 r-;i.p


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MissiQ BcrubingNUmber A~titudes

(teet) .

Axis ofAttack..(deg:r ees )

IenghtOf Run(miles)

Timeof Run Drift(minutes) (des.rees)

314th 266 10,000 to10.800 105 34 7 i 3 i left

315th 267 15.000 to

16,000 42 50 11 2 t left(2) NaV'iJ;!:ation: The 5 "dings were to use 1wo Jima en rrots

out and G'!l. return as 'Per tile XJ{I BOl!lber CQmnand Tactical Doctrine. F~an1\70 Jima to the target and return, the ro.:te l l i a n s were as 1'o11=s;

(8) Massion Ni.unbeT .263. Ut.sunamiya:

Route Reas.ons for Ohoice

3 5 4 . 5N . .llj.100E This deap, rec.koning point east of Chosi PointWas selected. to keep aircraft ou t o f the Choal.flak area. Initial point was the easily identified mouthof the Mito River on the ea.stern shore of

Honshu"A rigilt turn was to be made after the attack.

to.3623N-llj.038E (IF)

t oTargetto

364 3N -1 _ 40 4 3 E This pC'lint was designated to keep aircraft oncourse to land's end and t a avoid t lle flakareas at Hitachi.Land's t;>ad.

t o3600N-14.119E

Mi ssi on l 'fumb er264. Ic.hingmiya:

Bea .s on s f or Choice

3 3 5 3 NM 1 3 6 o B Et o3 4 5 BN - l3 .5 5 5E

landfall was t h i s jut t ing po in t ef easilyidentified l a nd a t Kinomoto .To make the turn enno the target Slllaller. thispO:inton the lower part of Biwa Ko Bay wasdesignated as a turning pOin t .The jutting point of land. on the eastern sideof Biwa KOwhich made a good rada r a rp r oacht o th e t a rge t was selected a s I ni ti al P oi nt .A right turn was to be made a f t e r the a t t ack .

t o3 51 23 0N- 13 60 70 0E ( IF )

t oTarge tt o3520N-13710 Et o3438.30N-1380400E

This point was des igna ted to avoid the flakat Nagoya.This was des igna ted as l a nd ' s e nd .

(0) Mission Number 2s5. Tsuruga z

Reasons fo r Choice. 3 3 5 4 . N - 1 3 6 0 S Eto3512N-13604E(II')

LaDdfa l l was th i s e as i l y i d en t i fi e d point onthe coas t .Okino Shima in Biwa leo was se lec ted as InitialPoint since i t was ea s i l y identified andprovided the best radar approach to the target ..A right turn was designated off the target.

Mter laDi' o S end in NaSoya Bey this easi~identified point was de s i s n a t ed .

t oTargett o34,50N-1 3636S


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Cd) Mission Numb.aT 266. Uwaiima:

Route Be.asous for Choice

3 2 42 N -1 3150Eto

3 314 3 10W .. 1314700Eto ..

33203o.N.1320100:E; (IP)

T.llis point north of Wobsoka was chosen forlandfall~This poiot east of Oita was selected for asmaller turn at the initial point... .The easily identified tip or the peninsula

jutting out from. Shikoku was selected as theini~ial point for.a good a.pproach to the target.fA r1ght turn was designated after the attackand ths.n to Land.' send.

toTarget

(e) Nlission Number 267. iKa.!'sald PtrOl!?UIn Center:

Boute Beaspns for. ChOice

Landfall was the easily identified lower poiotof the pen insu la between Tauruga and S a g a I J r iBay The easily ident ified Ka.wana.Misaki point 00the western shore of Sagami Bay that providedfor a straight run between landfall am. target.was ,selected as initial pOint"

t o.3457 N -l3909E (IF)

toTargett o352ljN-14024E This point was de,signated as land's end to

t.ake the force over the least defended areaof the peninsula"

(3) Flight Engineering ~

(8) For Missions Number 263. 264, 265 and 266 thaplanning was as t ollows :

1. Altitudes and speeds were planned for maximumfuel econolIW and safety, as well as for compression of the s'triki.o.r;forceso

~. Fuel reserve data indicated that none of theWings would req:uire bomb bay tanks and that a total fuel load of apprru::-imately 6600 gallcos would be carried, unless inclement weather wouldrequire larger fuel reserves"

.1. No maxdmum or mOllll\.U!l. bomb loads were speci-f i ed . It was an t i c i p a t ed th a t of t h e potential capac i ty of 18,000pounds per paIne for each i'ling (wi til the exception of th e 58th i1ingwhose potential capacf ty 'was 16,000 per aircraft) that loads 'f7ou}daverage approximately 15,000 pounds. The am::auni.tioo load was asUmated at .300 pounds.

(b) For Mission N..unber267 the pl8lUling was as follows r

1~ Excep t for the bombing run and the com~8siono tho fo rce . all aircraft were to fly at speeds and altitudes whichuould allow maxdmumrange and safety. Speeds to be used were to be 5ndleS ~er hour faster than recamnended speeds by XXI Bomber Commandr egu la t ions . NOassemblies were p l anned .

go It 'wae expeoted to load f'u11 \ring am oentarsection ta.nks and to carry 18,000 poUllds ot banbs.


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(4) Badar~

(a) For Mission Number 263. the planning was as follows:

w . . . ... .1 . The Radar check points en route to landfallere to be I1;,OJima. and its radar beacon and the chain of islands betweenIva Jima s;nd Choai :Foint.

,. 2. A reference turn 10 miles east of Ch:osii?oint;r~s s~lected to avoid. antiaircraft defenses in the area and the coast~l~e. ,laS expeted. to be ..-,ithin easy ra.dar ranae. Landfall and "the1nJ.hal pOint, '. the mouth of the Mito River, rrae a prominent projectionalong the smooth coasf line north of Chosl .

3." Utsunomj,jO. rTas considered a difficult inlandradar target I but the radar return shoi1ed up well ab6ve 12,000 feet andfor ~h~treason the bombing aUi tade of 13, 000 to 13,800 feet i1asspeclf1ed" The only good radar approach " ; " , a8 up~1ind and it l7ae directedthat direct radar synchronous bombing be used .

(b) YOI' Mission Number 264, the planning


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Cd) For NUssion NUmber 2 6 6 , the planning was as follows:

en route to landfall.I1;10 Jima was to be the only radar check point

.?. Landfall 1>7a.8 to be made on the distinctive,coastal point north of WObaoka. Radar navi.gation to the initial pointwas expected to be good, uith the peninsula coast line expected to givegood check points for radar fixes and wind runs. The initial point nason the most prominent point in the area, the peninsula on the ..-esterncoast of Shikoku. and ~'Iaseasily ident.ified by radar.

3,. tk/ajima '.1as considered to be a difficultradar'target, Although recoanaissance routes had been run from thenorth, south and uest, it lias decided that a run from the northi1estwould be best. The hilly terrain and the numerous islands uere expectedto give a confusing radar picture. Use Of an axis from the peninsulatip was to avoid these confusing islands, and Ku-Shima.,1a5to be usedas a- reference point for course determination. The city ,;i vee a fairradar return at lop ranges, while Ku-Shima could b e picked up at t h einitial point. Direct synchronous release \las to be used for bombing.

(e) Fo!['Mission Number267; the planning l7as as follous

\,1

10 lwo Jima was to be the first radar cheekpoint on which to use the beacon for position determination. The islamchain rras not expected to be of any assistance since the AF'Q:.7 can onlysee targets within 30 degrees of heading. The only possible islandsthat could be utilized :for checking ;'l'Quld be the Nishino Shima isl3.nds.

~. Landfall uas expected to be easily identifiedbecause it was on the southern tip of the arrOwhead-shaped peninsulasouth ot FUji San. Course for landfall to the target rras to be straight,using the prominent coastal point on the above-mentioned pen insUla asthe initial point.

1. It ilas planned t o use 2 aircraft on thismission to act as radar ;.ind ships to transmit their avera{;e nind toall other airc.raft.. This procedure was expected to set up accuratebombing data prior to landfall. By usine a straight course frow l~-fall,all operators uere expected to be able to check ~Tound speedand refine the drift. Since the target uas built on a series of squarejetties of reclaimed land on the coast in Tokyo Bay, the A.P i J : .7resolvesthese jett ies as separate targets and this l78S expected to make iteasy to pick the exact target location. Direct radar synchronousbombing WaSto be used for release.

(5) ~:

(a) For Missions Nwnber 2 6 3 through 2 6 6 , specialjamming airplanes uere not recommended since the flak usa expected tobe nea;er at these 4 urban targets. Electronic j9Jlll19rswere to beinstalled in each strike aircraft to barrage the 72-84 me~cycle and190- 210 megacycle regions. Spot jamme!"s\7era to be eq>loyed to j8Jlla ny aearchlight or gun-laying radars outside the barrage~ Rope nasto be carriGd and dispensed in accordance ~th existins regulations.Search of en~ radar from 20-,3000 megacycle uas to be oontinued anden~ oommunications uere to be recorded.

(b) For M;i..!Isibn umbe r 267. because ot the 1ateueflak expected in the target area, it uss planned that the .314t4 '.fiDg\'ICI114urnish 2 jamming airoraft to cover the 3 1 5th i 11 n asui k. duet:9 1;_ fact the latter Wing was not yet equipped nith j"""ias . qQ . l ~ "


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The speci a l jamming a i r cr a f t . .e re t o orb i t the pos i t ion 6 3530.t1-13942E with a: rad ius of 10 miles. 1 at an a l t i tude of 17, 000 fee tand 17.500 fee t for th e ot her-, The special jammina ai rcraft were t obe . 'equ lpped to b a r r a ( ; e t he 72-84 megacyc l e a nd 190 -210 megacyc l e reg ionsand to spot jam any (;,"tln-laying or searchlight ndars appea r i ng outsidet ~e b ar ra ,; ; e. Rope was t o beoarried by all strike a i rc ra ft to bed l sp e n se d when pro tec t ion was n e e d e d from radar-con t ro l l ed a n t i a i r -cI'aft ,guns and sea rch l i Jh t s .

(6) Ai r-Sea Rescue : The N a v ynas fu rn i shed ~th de t a i l sof these missions and prov ided the air-sea rescue facilities shoon Onthe chart in Annex A, Pa rt VII I , l Ih ich also includes fac i li ti es p rov id edby t h e XXI Eombe rCownand.

d . De ta i l s of Plann ing- - In t e l l i gence l

(1) E.nemy Air Opposition:

( a ) For Mi saion Number 263. it r r a s an t ic ipa ted t h a t10 t o 15 f igh t 0 rs migh t oppose the miss ion to Utsunomiya 7i th negl i gi b l eeffect 0

( b ) For Mission Numbe r 264, i t uas e st im3~ed tha t1 5 to 20 in te rcep tors migh t , o ffe r negl igi b l e to n i l opposi t i on a t!chinomiya.

\(c ) For Mission . Numb er 265 , it r zas e st i ma t ed t h a t

10 to 15 f igh te r s might o f f e r n i l to neg l ig ib le o p p o s i t i o n a t Tsur uga .

(d ) For M:ia s ion Nlmber 266, it mlS e st i ma ted t ha t5 tli) 10 f igh te r s m.ight pr~sent .nil to negligible oppoa i tion at lJ:7ajilr.9..

( e ) F o r Mi.ssion Number267, i. t i1BS e st imat ed tha t4 0 to 5 0 f ign te r s might i n t e r cep t t he st r i ke a t the Ka~asaki Pe t rc l e~Center, TI i th 10 to 12 of t he p l anes be i ng t~ in -engine n i6h t fighters.Oppos i t ion ~a s expected t o be negl igib le t o ueak.

(f) The an t ic ip a t ed con t inued -;reak: s h o ' o T i n . : : ;f theJapanese a i r foroe ~as ba sed on the fa ct th a t the enemy had c~tteda l a r ge proportion of i ts fi gh te rs to an an t i ci pa ted i nvas io : l . Anothe rcon t ro l l i ng fac to r was t h e appar en t s h o r t a ~ e of avi a t ion sasa l in e .Although the Japanese have n igh t fi gh te r s , t hey a re fe~ ~nd the i requipment i s fa r bo16TI Al l i ed s tandards . For th a t re a son n i b ht -fighter in te rcep t i on , a s a e l l a s n i gh t t i gh te r ~ay fi sh t cr comb ina t ion srema ined ".1eak. Mos t of t he in te rcep t i on aa s expoct ed to occur i l l t h et a r ge t a re a uha re t he B-29 ' s ~er e expec t ed t o be si lhoue t t ed by fi r eso r s ea re hl ig ht s. There ua s no th ing t o ind i ca te t ba t th e ]spaneseVlould emp loy nen t ac t i cs . I t vm.a assumed tnat t h e enfq1 "7ould beab l e to narn h is de fenses 3 to 5 hours pr io r t o l andfa l l by tho baI lbe rsand that i n t e rcep to r s pould mee t the B-291s approximat e l y 50 mi l es outa t sea . The divers l ty ot th . e t a rg e t s and t he an t ic ip a t ed poor oper a t ion-a l Vloa thor na s expect ed t o r educe the opposi t i on listed abOve .

I

(2) Enemy Ant ia i rc ra f t I

( a ) For Mi ss ion . I . ' \ unber263,' it va s de te rmined tha tt he Ut sunomiya de fenses in cl udod 20 heavy guns,86 me di um a ea pons aDd.a n es t ima ted 2 to 6 se a r cb l i gh t s . Th is uss a mode r a t e , but poor d e l . .. .a l J a ins t n i gh t a t t aok because no sea t ch l i gb t s had been not ed i n th e areaThe spec i f i ed ,a t t aCk a l t i tude of 13,000 fea t na s t o avo id o ther t l akareas . ,


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(b) 'F or Mi s.s i on Numb er 264, t ll er e w er e n o d efe nse sappa ren t in the i l l 1!D. .ed i a t ei c in i ty of Ich inomiya , but the a i rp l anesn er e e xp ec te d' to be i 7i t h in range of the fol lowing Nagoya de fenses l12 h ea vy gun s, 23 medium rreapcns and an es t ima ted 2 t o 15 sea rch l i sh t s .Tho route avoided fl ak a reas , r r i t h the excep t ion of the southe rn t ipo f Bi~a KO,where only moagor and inaccura t e fl ak had been encoun te redon previous miss ions . At the p lanned a l t i t ude of a t t ack, 10 ,000 f ee t ,on ly me age r and gene ra l ly inaccura t e an t i a i r cr a ft fi r e nas an t i c ipa t ed .A b re ak-w ay t o t he n or th ea st was p lanned to avoid othe r de fenses in theNagoya area . , The route to l andI send r raa p lanned to avoid de fendeda reas .

, ( c) For Miss ion Number 265, t he Tsur uga d efe nse sl .n cl ud od ( , an d p os si bl y 12 hoavy guns, 2 modium ereapons and 1 sea rch -l i gb t . Th i s meaue r de fense p resen ted no p lann ing prob lem. The routeavoided heavi ly de fended a reas and mea~cr and inaccura t e fl ak wasexpocted on tho approach th rough the BiuaKo a rea , a t Tsu and a tYokkaich i en route to l and 's end .

(d ) For Miss ion Number266, photographs of theU\7ajima area h ad p in po in te d 6 medium ' ,- ,eaponsnd ve ry meage r andinacc~a te heavy fl ak had been encoun tored on previous miss ions . ' ! 'hero~te to the t a rge~ a rea ~as p lanned to avoid the Oi t a and Saekide fenses . F l ak conside ra t ions d id not en te r in to the plann ing.

( e ) For Miss ion l~be r 267, i n the immedia t evi c in i ty of the Kauasaki Pe t ro l eum Cen te r the p lanes u~~ld be in rangeof 128 heavy guns and in add i t i on the re r r e re about 30 b 'UD. Si n t heYokos-uka . a roa ;7h ich ;muld be ui t hin range . On t he approach thep lanes would pass ove r the guns of the Hi ra t suka de fenses . :Approz-ima to ly 50 t o 10 s .e ar ch li gl 'l ts' .7o ul db e e ff el 2t iv e o n t he p la nn ed a pp ro ac h.I t vas p lanned to use rope , desynchr0Dl l e engjnes and ut i l i ze c loudunde rcas t to decrease sca rch1igh t e ffec t iveness . The routes had beende te rmined ch ie fly on the bas i s 6f the bes t r ada r approach . Topenotr a t e the I{a ,7asaki dock a rea , i t \7aS d iffi cul t t o p lan a route toavoid fl ak. The axi s of 'a t t ack aas p lanned as close ly as poss ib l eto the dO\n l \7.Lnd pproaoh . wh ich was expected to roduca the fl ak r i sk.Only fa i r lY accura t e ' f l ak was expocted a t the p lanned a l t i t ude ofa t t aok , 15 ,000 t o 16,000 fee t . On leaving tho targe t a rea , a b reak-a \7oayto the r igh t acrosa TokYo Bay uas speci fi ed . Th i s ~ould br ingthe p lanes wi th in range of 10 heav,1 guns nor th of Klsa razu! but , t h iSb reakaway uas necessa ry to avoid the l a rge fl ak concen t r a t10ns 1nTokyo.

3 E XlllC UT IO N O F T HE M I~lO NS:

a. .Tg,m-9Ct: Take . . ft ;me accompl ished in fe \7 sca t t e r ed

showers as follorls: F i r s t last

!!f.\~~OD liM hthtlnder s .ip Forge Taka-oU IaJce-qU

2 6 3 58th 11 119 1207053 l20840Z

73rd 12 118 1209O.5Z 1210lU

'13th 11 f fT U015lZ la09l5'

US


14/80

b . Rout e Out : Long r aR ge n av iga ti on 078S a ccomp l i s he d by a i r -c r a f t p r ocee d i ng in d i v i dua l l y t o t h e t a r g e t a r e a s . A f r on t al sy s t emOVe r t he coa s t l i n e made r ad a r n av iga t i on d i ff i cul t a nd ca used ove r .r un i n g of t h e i n i t i a l po i n t i n se va r a l i n s t a nce s and h in de re d c om pr es &i b i l i t yo On ly 3 a i r c r a f t h a d e xce s s i ve na v i ga t i on e r r o r s a t l aDd fa l l .

c. Over Ta rBe t s : (See C on so li da te d S ta ti st ic al Summary IAnnex E, fo r d et ai ls )o

(t) Primary ~a . rge t s : Ta r ge t a r e a n av iga t i on , , l i ndde t e rm ina t i on a nd b omb in g n ar e a cc om pl is he dby r a d a r due t o t h e poor, ' e a t h e r ceadf t i ona enccunt e r e d s Ti me con tr ol snorred an i mR"O v eme n tover o the r previous missions. The 73rd l'ring accomplished a supe r i o rjob. pu t t i ng ~9 p e r c en t o f i t s 124 a i r c r a f t OVe r its p ri ma ry t ar ge tin 70 minut e s . The 508 a ir cr af t ( i nc l ud i ng 1 ' I 1 ' e a t h e r and 1 r r i nd . - r unaircraft) t h a t bombed the primary' targets beti7een 1400Z and l74.5Z ata l t i t ude s ranging f r om 6000 to 16,700 fe e t d ropped a to t a l o f 3578 .5tons of bombs.

(2) Targe t s of: O pp or tun it y: F our te en a i r c r a f t ( inc lud ing:3 t h a t also bombed p r ima ry t a rg e t s ) bombed various t ar ge ts o f o pp or tun it ~'W ith 89 tons of bombs bet"een 1429Z and 1735Z from al titudes bet"J'een9900 and 16.000 fe e t .

(3) T hi rt y-o ne a ir cr af t n er e n on -e ffe ct iv e on th.esemissions.

d. R!!Iu;teBack e He,turns to base were cc cemplishod ns briefed.wit..l-t the exception ef 38 aircraft tho.t Landed o.t- Iwo Jimc..

e . Land in_g: Ai r c r a f t l a r n ed i n l igh t show er s a s fo11oos:

lYlis_aio;g. Wing F i r s t Landing ~st l a nd i ng

263 58 th 122136z 13005 5Z

264 73rd l22147~ 130104Z

265 313 th 1220202 1223243

2 6 6 314th 122054~ 130030~

267 3 l5th 122221Z 13QQQS !W

XXI B. C. Total 122020Z 130104Z

f . Lo ss e s : A total of 3 a i r c r a f t T78S lost. 2 to mechan i c a land aeeiden.tal factors and 1 to unknctm reasons.

g.. Op er at io na l Sum n. q. rv :

(1) Navigation: See Annex A. Part I, for track charts

of all missions.

(2) Bombin~1 (See Annex A. Part IV. tor detailedBombing results on these ~ssions "J'ere oonsidered satis-reports).

factor.r.

(3) F l i gh t Engipeeringl (See Abne.x A."Part V, forOhart. and .Annex E, Consolidated _Statistical &mm8l7. for t u e l~~ump t i o n and we i gh t aata).


15/80

(a) Narrative of Missions as FloMP

~. Crui se to Main land : Ind i vidua l c l imbsue re made ' immed ia t e ly a ft e r t ake -oft t o a l t i t udes be tue en 4000 t o8000 feet ,here the i ni t i a l cru ise was flown.. No assemblies ITeramade . Compression of t h e fo r c e s was e f f e c t ed by varying c ru i s ingaltitudes and air speeds .

z .. Bomb Run: ' B o m b i n g ' l 7 a sconduc ted by i nd iv i -dua l aircraft a t a l t i t udes be t ueen 6.000 and 16,700 f e e t .

3,. Retu rn to Base: Return to"bo.S'e wus c.onduc.~by i nd ivi dua l a ir pl an es w it hout difficulty. Minimumfuel ' l 7 a sused bya i rp l a nes cr ui s ing a t 14,000 t o 16,000 fee t and de scend ing in to thet ra ffi c p at te rn .. Sp eci fi ed m ~ x i m u m r ange spoeds gave the bes t fue lconsumpt ion .

(b) Comments:' No a ir pl an es c ar ri ed bcmb bay t anks .All 'Hings,' e%cept t he 315th Wing, c a r r i e d ful l l oads of banbs . The315th \i'ing, ca r ry ing general purpose bombs I carried an average of 84pel' cent of ful l l oad capa ci ty and landed n i th an average of 1175ga l l on s of fue l . Twen t y pe l ' cen t of th e a i r cra f t airborne by t he 58thWing l anded a t 1\70 J ima due to excess ive fue l consump t ion because of

the cold fron t s encoun te red .(4) Ftada r : (See Annex A, Pa r t VI , for r epor t on equip -

ment pe r fo rmance ) , Only 12 aircraft made visual t a rge t sightings onthose missions.

(5) G u n n e r Y: (See A n n e x A ,P a r t V I I , for report).There "HaS no imlJOrtant gunne ry activity during these missions.

(G ) Ai t-Se a Re scue : (See Annex A, Part IX for details).Twoaircraft d i t ch~d , 1 en route to t a rge t a nd 1 en route t o bascoOf' the 21 crew members I 12 'Were rescued, 2 ircr e ki l l ed aM 7 ' i7eremis s ing. Anoth e r airoraft is missing to unknoun reasons, 10 cr c' i7members aboara.

h . Wea the r : (See Annex Bt for de ta i l s) . . The uea the rencoun te red on t he so missions was approx ima te ly as forecas t and d i dn ot i nt er fe re nith t he ir p er fo rm an ce .

i. Communications:

(1) EQM: ( Se e An nex C, Part II for de ta i l s ) . 1'trenty-n ine ReMObservers t ook pa r t in these ~ssi"ns.

(2) Rad io: (See Annex C,Part I I , for detallS~.Thi r ty-nine s t r ike repor ts were t r ansmit t ed and received d ur 1Dg t he semiss ions .

j. Intelligence Summry.

(1) Eneaw Air Oppo~itiOD.' (See Annex D,. Part I, ~or. details). Air opposition was nc~l igi b lo on these miSS1ODS. onq 2attacks ba ing made by the 67 enelllY aircraft Sightod~

(2) Engmv Mtiaircraft I (See Annat D, Part; II, torde ta i lS) . F lak l78S heavy, mea~ andinaccurate, 1I' it hae bomberesustaWllS damage.


16/80

details~ .(3) Damage Assessment: (See Annex D. Part III. for

(a) Mission Number 263. Utsunomiya:' A total of .94square miles (.34.2 per cent of the built-up ar sa) i7aS destroyed. Fourunnurnbe'l"ed targets were damaged,.,

(b) i'.Ilissiol'l Number 26L.. Ichinomiya: Damage to thistarget was .01 square mile (.,8, per cent of the built-up area). Oneunn.umbered. target '1as damaged.

( c ) Mission NUmber2 6 5 . Tsur ug a : A total of .77sq;l'l.BI'e mile (6S per cent of the built-up area) nas destroyed. Twonumbe r ea targets and 1 uanumbered target uere damaged.

( d ) Mission NUmber 2 6 6 . UW a i i ma :No photo reconnai-ssance was available on th~ damage to this target by this strike.Iatnage assessl 'IlJnt to Uwajima "ill be in,cluded in the Tactical liiiissionReport for Mi.ssions 297 through 302, to be issued in the near future.

( 6' Massion NUmber 2 6 7 . Xauasaki Pqtroleum Conter:Damage t1as scattered, 'I'lith 6 pcr cent of the storage ce,paci ty beingdamaged. Thirty-seven specific units wer e damaged, including 7adjacont numbered targets.

,1 .... r: ) /;,.%tajl...; r , u- 1t~.CURTIS E. leMIT

J \ . l Jajar General. IT.S.A ,CDmmand i ng


17/80

A.

A N N E X

OP BRATI0NS .

Part I - Navigation TraCk: Chart

Part II - Radar JlpproachCharts

Part III .. :MeanPoints of Impact

Part IV .. Bomb tng

Part V .. Flight E.ngi.l1eering Chart

Part VI .. Radar

Il IP. '

Part VII .. Gupnery

"Part VIII .. A1r-Sea Rescue Chart

Part IX .. Air ...Sea Rescue Reports

Sec t ion A - 58th WingReport No. 5

Seotion B .. 315th '1ing Report No. 1

Mis-doW! No, 263. 264. 265. 266and

267

U/13 July 19~


18/80

_,t..- __ '~I"'" .,-.,r-

APRIL 1945

PART I NAVIGATION TRACK CHART SECR

< J

MISSION NO 26J~261DATE_""""-=""'"--" ..XXI BOMCOM..

\

- - 1I!I

I~~~~~-- - - - -~~~--~A-~-+~--~- -+1- - - -II

'CHICHI JIMA II..

Ir

II-.-.--+-f

If

I

. 11 '

IWO JJMA(d. LOfl

58th U!I033i! 1211481:Tlrd 12..12 a!' lfl310l3131t1 1.210532 1212411;

1210352 121!49Z12!20JZ 121232l!:

L.EDSENO LANDFALL TARGET LANO'SENO

I.t Lotl'.12.143SZ 1216S3i!121610i! 121803i!121436~ 121630i!1214262 121640i!

12 ISlai!' 121626i!

,st. Lgd I.t LClid------ 58th 121402i! 121S47! 121419i!' 121639.~-- - - - - - - - - -- - 73n1. 121S21! It 170.5i! 121553i! 12174.5 i!_- - ---- 313th 12133'l 121~221 1214001121607i!_x-X--3141'h 1213S0i! 1215412: 121413Z 121e26i!'

- _- _. --315th 1214&OZ121604i! 1?1506! 121619l

TAJCE OFF LANOIN858th 1217052 120840Z 12213e1: I300aIi7&.1 120905i! ' 121016~ let l4n 13OtQoU3131111207!S1! le01U!S! ltaoaoal2aMQ314,,. 12070~ It.oel2i!' 1200SQ~OO:SCNI51D,,, 120830112080N II . .... GOGGle

SECRET


19/80


20/80

4. Missian N'o..25t;, Uw f ! cj 1ma Uryn.n .&rEI:;:

a, ; 11 bombing was o.ccomplished by r:o.dr.r ~s the to.rget o.ret'.wns ten .. tenthB underca5t. SeverG war,thar W".5 encourrbe.r-ed ".t the t~r-get nnd many aircrCli' t bombed under instrUlIl.ent condl t10ns,

b. The greatest difi;'loultyencountcred Was 0.. wenthe~ front

lying over the target C'.rea which made it Vi)r:l difficult to Obto.1nM ...CIUe.te winds. The o.i Ten,rt dispu.tched to obt;;.ln. wind dt raction andvelocity proved tob6 very beneficial.

e. 'Nina airor;.,ft z:oportod J?o.lunction of' bOic,blng .quipment.as follows: B.-IO sho.okles., 4; :.-4 releo.S'o, 2, c.nd bombro.cks. 3.

d. Tho. ml.ssJ,Otl. w~s cons idcrod lfO 11 P l: :-:nnod from .0.. bQmQingsto.ndpoint. ThCilO:W1>r.go drift. roported was :3 degrees 16ft. Compres-sibility .for tho Tlingwa.s 133 oinutcs.

5. ~;Iiss ion No, 267, lawM.l'l'kl r ctroloUIJ Cante-I::

.c. (\:. Bot.,bing wo.s .accomplished by .rad::>.l', except for :3 aircraftthr.t be.mbod vtsun.l'ly when. th.air l'~d:,.r sots. bccrme inoporll-tivo ..

b, One nlrcraf't reported mo.1.function of bomb doors.

0.. Tbe greatest difficulty encountered Wl\S tb!! inops.rat! vero.dr.r reported by the nircr~t.

d, The o.vero.ge drift reported was 2 0 right. Coopress1bili tyfor the wing w~s 73 minutes.


21/80

. Jl' -1 ...

/~Mom,~~~:[~~;~~~~~;~~'-, ~7.. " Jw~, , , , I

!:~:_ ~. I , . " . ,: t " ' .j ,.'J~,.... . , 1 1. ; . , : , ' T., : 1 :" " ' " ... . .. .. ~ . : . .. i, .. ..... j . . . . . . '1 , ,

'{ooo . ' :: . .:: !

1"18

/1-'7/To PE J ! . > ~{)iJIJ

( c J ; "


22/80

1. Equipment Performo.nce - . :.FQ . .13I

0.. Nuu(bar of sets opero.t'i ve at t:::,ke-off: 46q (eO!%) .

Nl1mber of' sets epert\tive eve.r tr:.rgetl 431

c. Number of sets opero.tive on b.nding: 31

70 at 5000 to 10,000 it1S 6 at 10,000 to 15,100 ft

d. Number 'O f pltH'l9s using aczimuth stc-.b ilhation: 337 (77.1%)

Il'lt elr ereace was ene ountere d at t :- .rg.ect ,o.rall. IP' and 1o.nd...fo.11. This was due to the weather r.t these pOints

,verage m.o.ximum r,'.nge (i.n naut.LccI miles) 'Of targets:

;.,verc.ge 'lllt:\.Xlmumrnnge (in nautical miles) of ber..con~

120 a.t. 5000 to 10.000 rio132 ht \0, 000 to 15,000 ft


23/80

i. ;~vert:l.gemt:l.x1lll:umange of JnpaneseConst - 45 no.lltical miles.

j.. RemarKs;

(1) Brief Lng material was good with the exception tha.t the73 rd. Wing stnted. the ra.dar strip wo.s of Ii ttle value und was supplementedby 2 additionnl short range pictures f.rom thoir files.

(2) Methods of re1eo.56;

eE l ; ) Ro.\'l.ar direct non~synchro:moua

(b) ROodc.rdirect syncll.ronous.

2. Radar Bomb ing ...l~N/;.pQ.-7'

a.Numbe.,!:' of sets aper,ative c.t t:tkc-off 1 54

b. Numbr of: sets operc. t iva over trx ge t I 54

c. Nwnbe'r of sets operc.tive on rs.turnl 52

d. AVer o,ge Maximwn range (in nautical mile $) I

50 at 15,000 f t100 at 10,000 rt

r. Ooast of Japan WOos picked up at 50 nautical miles.

g. Equipment to.Bures: 2

h. Remarks:

(1) 50 in,dividual synchronous radar releo.ses; 2 visual

(2) Lt:\;ndfo.ll WaS easily identified but some operators b1ddifficulty with the ll\

(3) Briei'ing was satisfactory.

(4) J,.1in;l.ng poi !'ts wero difriou:J;t to piok-up until ."close range.

0.. Nwnber or fixes reported = 3478

~ntGnna used a n d . u s~ b l e maximum r ange rF i:5od TrAiling

(1) Groun~-1VQ.vo 475 6113

b.l?am.yd

41 0

1200 1345 1330

c . I n op e r a t i v e 8et81 16

40 . IfF.. S C R ...S95 I

Sets turned on nnd ott as per IiCIP.


24/80

b. Number of time c hecked r 3.2 times.

c. 1 Malfunction. due to burned out transmitter. no signQ,lgiven out.

5. Absolute Ai tlrnetGr .. SCR nel

n. Number of operat1 va se~s: 216.

b. Number of in9})",rlltlvo !Sets = 2.

1 " J ,R T V I .I .. G 'l1N N ERY

1- . No. of AlC firi.ng I None.

2. .Avera.~ turre t load:

lit400

~388.3

1400

LF

30 0

5. J,;v6;rage ne , IJIf round,s fired in combat !ler turret:

UFo

1:o

.Ro

.Ieo

U'a

~a. of rounds fired in combat: 0

No. ot rl'lunds IUled for test tiring:

G un s Lon de d:

513t'b !i n,

Hot

314th '}7in,

Hot

315th '1ing

C o l d58th i?TiM

.Hot,73rd Winr;

Cold

llG.1tunctlollB : c , r . c .1 ttheo.stGt out

8 . Total percentage Qf equipment O'pero.ti ve I

~. ~L. I~O 1I1G.9 9 . 9 % l O O% ,(none uled)

9,. Rematksl 'XhlilN WOoS no gunnery o.c.tivity on thea-e m.1.dons.


25/80

APRIL 1 94 5 PART 1ZIJl

. '.

,OKINAWA

. i I '

130"

o

I1

I-,--_-+1

III

e- SUBMARINE0- SURFACE VESSEL.. - NAVY DUMBO

A- SUPER DUM,BO

----. 1--'nas and surfa ell ve, ssel s werr to bedun ng entire mission.

and super dumbos wereto .eonom times indicated unlil Clilistrikesed 01"1 return. I

SECRET

'CHICHI J1MA

MISSION N0263~267DATE 12-\3 JULY '46XXI B OMCOM,. __

\_.,_-,- -35 ,

III\

- - , - -+ -- II new cr ew very re-cently reported In from the Sto.'tes. Most of the crew had had no wet

dinghy drill prior to this mission.)

8. 1.ction taleen by :!flng:

0.. B-IS Emergency Bel t8 previ.ously ordered have not arrived.Groups have been instructed to manufacture bolts locally.

b. "Jet dln~by drill for ::tl1 now c rcrre will be mo.ndatory with-in the Wing prior to new crews going on tho ir f1 rst mission.

9. Comments: This crew did n good job of ditching the o.1roraft118 e v i d e n c e d by t h e fact tho.t a.li 11 c r ew members were all~ after11lnding had been effeoted. Loes of the left gunner and tail 6~nnerappears due to 11lQk of fum11111rity with equipment and 1n8uff1oient we td1nghy traitting.


28/80

PMT IX SECT ION B -DITCHING REl ' .QE1:*

1. Yang: 315th Groupt 15th Squa~ron: 15th B-29 Aircraft No.42-501303.

2, Mi-ssion Number: 267. 12 July 1945.

3, Cause of Bailout: Three runaway propellers, engines #1. 3 0 . 1 ' 1 44.

4. Time und r o s i t1on o f Ba i l o u t : 1934[, 12 JU l y 1945 . approximately80 miles North of western tip of Orote Peninsu1o. t Gurun . . Coordinlltes tH36N - 14425E .

5. Rescue : 13 July 19~5. Two c r ew membe r s by tel 947 a t 020SI~nd 0430K; one by LeI 503 at 0746K.

6, Crew:

Pos i t ion ~ .&DK .&li L g , s t S e e n

i.O MILFORD J... B E R RY 1s t Lt 0531337 In ~rplClQep JAMES TRlVEl'TE; SR 2nd Lt 02059857 RescuedN K, W. : . RRENROLLINS 1st Lt 0738889 Bai l ing OutB R E X E .WERRING, JR. 1s t Lt 0732474 Rescuedva IRVING 'II. iJliERlNGER 2nd Lt 02068825 Bailing OutFE ~~ r t o n Finkelstein Sgt 32977132 Ba.1l1ng OutRO Robe r t E. LynCh Sgt 16135884 Bailing Outas Harold I. ~haeffGr S/Sgt 15068491 In }.irplaneLS Cla r ence N. Ne l son Sgt 13188055 RescuedTG Philip G. Tripp Sgt 31426856 Killed

7. Narrative Report:

a. History of Troub le I "l'he aircraft a c t e d prope r ly duringtolce-off (1904K) a .nd c l imb . . . t i ' t e r eveling off a.t 6200 ft Ri'M Wll.8reduced but No . 1 remained a.t 2400. The ~irplo.ne Comma.nderreduced theR?1.i of No. 1 t e 2000 with the fea.thering button. i.lmost immediately.however, i t incre~sed and -went vn1d. The .~irplo.ne Commender hit thefeat~ring button but it had no e ffec t , so he pulled the throttle back,told t h e Bomba . rd ie r t o s a . l vo t he bomb s an d banded fo r Guam. Onthe turn.No . :3 s ta rt ed b ui ld in g up and a . g a . i n t he fe o. th er in g b ut to n was IneffectIve.The hirpla.ne Comma. n d er g a vethe or~e r t o p ropa . r e to d i t c h . ~lmoBt im-mediately, No. 4 ran a w a . y and t h e order t o bailout w a s given. Thea l t i t ude w a s abou t 4500 feet, and t h e a . i r c r~ t w a s d rop pin g a . tabout1000 ft pe r minut e . The ! i lo t t ook ove r t ho p l nne While t he ~ Ir pl an eCornml lnci eras te ned his pa.rachute a.nd one ma .nlifo rnft. The Pi lo t rangthe Uarm bell and c ! l l l e d t he left SCann e r ! l l l d ta.il g \ lnDsr 011 1n te rpho_ .

b . Pr ep l l r a t ion fo r Ba i l out : Tha bombs had beenBa l v o e d andt h e doors c l o s e d . Ea ch m~n f a s t e n e d h i s p~r~ohute and hocke d on h i s0 -2 rtU't. Th e Bomb ar di er op ene dthe bomb bay door . . The p r e aeure bulk . .h e~d was op en e d by t he Rada r Ope ra t or or N~vi6~ t or . .

c . Radio Prooedure I The M.rp la .ne CCIlUMUJIler tbmpted to traasa-mi t on VHF, oho.Mel C,but it II.ppeared to be de l l d . Be then switched tocha.nnel;'. Bombardier reported that Pilot "\'III.S not gett1ng out on thiso~nnel. ~so, no word h~s been r eCe i v e d of reoeipt at ~ mo ase b~o:l1fT A1rorai't or ground .ta.t10n

'Ble4 on 315t h W1n g Ai r-Se a. Re scue Re por tNo.1.


29/80

d. Bail Out r

(1) Exit through Forward BombBay.The Navigator ~nd Radar O[,ora.tor went out f1rst (order

unknown), and their chutes were s een to op an by the Bombardier who wasJchl,rd o~t. The Radio Operator hesita.ted but left sometime between thetime the Bombardi Bl1' and Pi lot bailed out. The Pi lot Was next out undSIlW 011ec huts open just before he left the o.irp lane. 111i h the exceptionof the ,:.irplane Command e r-, the front of the airplane waS' clear when he~eft, and the altimeter indicated 500 feet. No difficulty was experiencedIn leaving thd hatch. The Bombardier and ."ilot put thai r hands along theedge of the bu Lkhe ad door and dove out in one motion.

(2) Exit through Rea.r BombBay.The Right Scanner had been briefed to bail out first

and was fw.lly geared and ready to go. The Lcft SOann.'>rmotioned him outbut he (Right Se anne r ) Itlooked blank". The Left Scanner than asked himto st~p as ide so he (Left Scannar ) could go out, thl nking that Ii 0 doingthe Rl.ght Scannetmight gll.in conf'idence. The Right Scnnnar stepped a.s.ide, s ti 11 mua, 0. nd thGl Lef t Scunner dove out t ro . pro ssurc bulkho a.ddoor. The Right Scanner wa.s never seen to loo.ve the airplane.

( 3 ) ~ltituda a n d time for Bailout: Between 1500 f t and

500 ft. Time interval approximately It minutes betoen first nod la stmo.n.

e . Survival:

(1) Lt. Trivette:

(11.) There wns no shock felt on opening of t h o chute.He hit the water almost immediately after pulling the rip cord. ht thequick release button and escaped easily from the parachute. The ~ne8Sand dinghy started to float away (the parachute had not collapsed a.ndappar~ntly the snap la.nyard had not been hooked to the life vest). B ek.i cked off his shoes a.nd SWOJn after the parccbuto ,

(b) DurIng this interval he Saw a. flash on the hori&onwhen the airplMe blew up; J.f'tsr 0. while t\10 p Icne s circled over himand he felt for the flares normally carried in t h e pocket of t h e summerflying suit. They were miSSing. (Lt. Trivotte stilted thoy lJOre placedfn the pocket, but he was not sure the pocket \'f1lS buttoned.) Thr~8 in..dividual 2 star flo.res were fired in 0. tri~ng13 ~round h i m .

(c) The sea becalDe.~ougher and began to brook over hi.heud, so he went after the dinghy which was still attached to t h e para ..chute and WIlS submerged. He ,:.o.thered the shroud lines in his hand andwent down, hand under hand Dfter the raft, rotrieving it on t h e thirdo.ttempt. Lt. Trivette looked for a wheel to turn to inflate tbs rotta nd , not finding o.ny, was somewha.tconfused, f i n a l l y pulling on a 100string. This turned out to be the rip cord of t h e lever type valve ~

t~ ro.ft inflo.ted. No d1!'floulty was experienced entering the ra!'1:. litOottempted to bail out the ro1't but Di'br working some time 19'0" it upas ~ter splashed in a s rapidly 0.8 it could bo removed.

Cd) Soon, an airplane sta.rted to circle o . D 4be lootedfor the flares in the raft. The tdrpla.ne pa.ssed betore he tOIlM tho flarebut he 'Was rea.dy and shot a fla.re the next time it CQIJIBOftI'. He r_owdt he cOopand had some dlticulty tiring the tla.re aile to l aok o t f ami l i -arity with it. Finally he felt the ring. pulled 1t and the flaro func-t1ono4 no~a1ly. He eaw a search l i g h t wi t h n green fil ter Of t tb& her!

..:53-


30/80

nnd fired another flare. Soon he saw u ship outlined on the horizonnnd fired e, flnra just as it wa-s a.bout to run him down. The ship stoodby nnd pieked hi m u p.

(oj Lt. Werring did not exp(;rience a.ny opening shock.Upon hitting the water he inflated his Mae ".'fest (no recollection of get ..ting out of the harne~s) and retrieved his dinghy. ~bout that time hesaw the airplane explode about 50-200 feet above the water in 0. wingdown attitude. He heard the NaVigator call for help and could hear- himcoughing. Lt. Werring tried to Swim in toot direction and drag his dinghywi th :um but ha~ little success. He then vrent about inflating t h e dinghyanA I l k s Lt. Tr l ve t t e l ooked fo r a wheel v a l v e . H e finally 'grabbed ahandf'u.I of string~, and inflated the r a f t . He Saw one flare (2 star-red)go off in What se-erned to be the opposite direction from where the airplo.newent down but was not certain of the direction,

(b ) Yfhile atte mpti ng to gotin the I' aft an Ili rpLanecd rc led cve r head but he couldn t t get flare:; to signal it, He took someflares from his pocket and shot one off just us the airplane passed on0. re+uz-n run. The plane turned and Lt. i'Jerring shot another flare nnd a.couple of tracers. The plane dropped 0. surface flare about 15 yards from

t.10 raft and blinked his recognition lights. ~.11 in 0.11 the pIune dropped3 surface f l a r e s . It Circled once more and then took off . (The :lirplMeorbiting above the raft had engine trouble and had to return to base.)

(c) Lt. Werring became ill, dozed off, and sometimeInter was awo,kened by 0 .. plane overhead. After two misfires he got onetr noe I' off. There Vlere qy,i te a. fa'll plane s se arching with land ing Ii ghtson, ;. small ship came by, running Vii thout lights except one small oneon the bGlw. He yelled but wo.s not heard. He then started looking forsignal equipment on the dinghy but was unde r the impression the raftsdid not contain any, so after only a short search he gave up . (E aChC-2raft contains two Mark I, Mod 0 and two M-75 distress signals or fourM-75 S igna l s if the M-l, Mod 0 is not avn i1b . b l e . ) He a.ttempted to bailout the raft but found the bailing bucket ineffective.

C d ) Some time Inter an LOI sta.rted turning in hisdirection with sear-ch lights on. Lt. Warring paddled tOW:lrdthe ship.fino.lly got in the beam nnd waS picked up,

(3) Sgt Nelsonr

( a ) The pa r a chu t e opening shock wa.s negligible ando.lmost immediately o.ftervrords Sgt. Nelson ht the wa.ter. Escape fromthe par~chute wa.s accomplished without difficulty but tho sna.p lanya.rdof the one-mocnlife rQt WaS not hooked nnd tho raft WaS irretrievablylost. His f l a r e s were lost from his pocket and the only night signa.lavailable waS tracer ~unition.

(b) During the nigbt Sgt, Nelson sa.wsevura.l aircraftcircle nearby an~ fired tracer ~unition to no apparent ave.!1. SurfQ.oe vessels were sea.rching nearby with sea.rch lights playing bl1t he wo.sWlable to attra.ct their at tent ion or get in the beam. ."t one time heea.w four t l a r e s ( 2 sta.r-red) i n 0.6 mQ. ~ d is t in ct lOCations.

(0) In the morning an a.irplo.ne retllJ'Dill! trom tho rlli4pQ3s0d OVGrhe~d nnd Sgt. Nelson b r ok e out his so~ marker dye. Anoth$r8-29 w~s seen to pass Q n d then a Dumbospotted him. The DumbodroppedQ .sea mQrke r bomb' Q n d led the LOI to Sgt. Nelson

... .. '


31/80

( 4) Th e body o f the t a i 1 gunne r wa s r e cove r e d w i t h I1n -ope ne d p a r ach ut e o . t t o . ch ed . I t i s no t kn own whe the r he ba i l e d out , buti t i s cons i de r ed un l i ke l y s i n ce h e wa s burnod a bout t h e fa ce a nd hands .

8. Sugge s t i o~s b y th e c r ew ;

n, .,SR ves s e l s ahcu l d have be t t e r se a r ch l i gh t fa c i l i t i e s anduse them con't i .nuous Iy i n the se a r -c . hur e a wh en th e e hnnce s of enemy aC-

t i v i t y ur e s l i gh t .

b . Corn e r r e fl e c t or s on th e one -mnn l i fe r a ft s mi gh t haveboon e ffe c t i ve i n l e~d in g th e sur fa oe ve s se l s t o t he r a ft .

c . Th e fl a r e s should be jud i c i ous l y use d a nd not f i r ed a t a i r -c r a ft w i t hout snv t .ng some t o Signa l s ur I 'uc a ve sse l s , More tho .n t v / ofl a r e s should b e Ca r r i ed .

d . I t s hould be SOP for p l an e s t o b l i nk th e i r l i gh t s t o sh owtho . t sur v i v 'o~s have be en s i gh t e d ,

e . . i ,SRves s e 18 shoul d h ave r ad io a i d s t o no .viga t i on , such a sLora n Equipmen t a nd Rad io Compas se s ,

9. Cemmen t s of In t e r r oga t i on Bon rd :

a , The ne ed for mor e i n t cp s i ve t r o i n i n g i s p l a i n l y i n d i ca . t ed ,t r a i n i n g t ha t will empbcs t ze r . : t f ti n f l a t i on a nd the use of va r i ous i t emsof equipmen t . Lec t uro wor k i s no t suf f i c i e n t .

h . Tl i J . empor t a nce of s ecur i ng t he eme rgen


32/80

1.,. A mo.tllre office.r axpe:r1 enoed i n J~.sRwork should be statione.o.boo.rd surface vassel invest1ga:t1ng each Ai>Rinciden't to tClke comlTto.n.d::Lt the see ne of all pl.ane's and ve'S,seI B se archi 1111; for s\:l,rv1 VOl'S ,.

10. J..ctionTaitsl') by this HoadquElrters:

a , .i.11 one-man life rufts wi 11 Co.rry only the lever typev0.1vo as soon as the Change over Can be cOln]?lctod,.

b. The proper means of cc.rrying lo.ros and emergency equip.me nt in tho s ummeT t' lyi rig BU.it to p rave nt 10 s on b Ili 1 ou t has bee Ii Btre s _sed. 1 :. pouch to ha'ng from the belt in which the equipment might beCarried i.s under dave Lcpmerrt ,

I). Wing memorandum $5-7, which lis ts the minimum training re-quired of 0.11 c re\' /s in ernergency proc,edures t ha s been reempho.shed, ''retdinghy drill :i,5 bed ng c onduc ted and, nction !ms been taken to providetro.ining in eSCape from p:uo.Ohuto hqrness.

d. Tho pe'rsono.l USe of items of erne rgency equipment has beeni: orb id de n .

G" Permiss iol'l hns b..en secured from CTF94 for the ',;[ing Ground

St::rtiGn to use 447S ICes. to c,ommu.nica; te wi th :.SR vas sa 1 1 0sea.rching fa rsurvivors 0f 3151;h Bomb Wing pla:ne.s.

f:. i. reql.1est f'oro.dd.itionu1 searchliGhts on leI's opero.tingoff Northwest Field runway has been sent to CTU 94,7.1,

g. "All aircraft new f:1ll'.ry 11:x((6) Mo.rk 5, rod I, drift sig-nols.


33/80

B

WEATHER

Part II - Ohart - Fpreoast vs ..Observed Weather

Part III .. Prognostic Map

Part n r ..Synoptie M ap

Miuions No. 263. 264. 265. 266 " 26 : 7

1 2 / 1 3 J " u l J r 1 9 4 5


34/80

PART I - '.'lEATHER SUMM..RY

PLANNING FORECAosr

Bases: 4-6 /10 low clouds, base 15DO feet, tops 6-8000 ft, VIi th fewto 20 ,000 ft. and 4-6/10 middle a nd high clouds. Occasionalmoderate shower-a during day .

Route : To 3'loN: Ba se c on di ti on s slo';/ly improv ing to average of. 5 / 10 1011 c louds , base . 2000 f't, tops 6000 ft.To cpast: 6-8/10 l ow clouds, 6-8/10 middle am high cloudsin ",arm front oriented WT-SE over vlestern Honshu.

Targets: Tokyo: 6-8/10 low clouds, bas s 1500 f t , t ops 4- .5000 ft.and S/10 middle and high clouds. increasing to overcastlayers in afternnon and evening.Rest ~ Broken to overcast multiple layers of lou, middleand high clouds except Shikoku and south Kyushu uhich u i l lbe in warm sector and have 8 /10 l ow c louds . base 1500 ft,tops 7000 f t . ui th s ca tt er ed upper c louds .

OPERAT IONAL FOREC .AS I'

Base at Broken 1m" middle and high clouds m th sca.ttered shO.lers,Take-Off: 'Roata: There uill be broken l ow, middle and high c lo ud s r ri th

scattered. light showe:ts to 2.5N. From 25N to 300N therewill be s c a t t e r ed lov, midd l e and high c l ouds . " ' : f ronta lzone be t ; 7e en 30"N and 33 N 'Wi ll give overcast 10':1',- middlea~ high clouds \7i.th mcder-ate r a in and moderate rime icing.From 33N tQ t a rge t tho re uil1 be broken l o~ clouds andseattered middle c l ouds .

Ta rge t s : Tsuruga : 8/10 cumulus . base 2000 ft. top 6000 ft; VICaltostratus at ;1 .5 ,000ft, Winds a t 12,000 ft ..-riil be28 00 at 35 knots.Uaa r ima : 5/10 cUmulus, base 2000 f t , top 5000 ft; 3/10a lt os tr at us a t 14,000 f t ; 8/10 c i r r u s at 27,000 f t . ~ ind sat 1.5 .000 ft. will be 300Q a t 35 knot s . "Uts.tnomiya: 4/ 10 c um ul us , ba se "2000 ft, top 5000 ft i3/10 a l t o s t r a t u s base 14,000 ft , top 16,000 ft. ~inds at16,000 f t . H i l l be 2700 "a t 40 knot s . "

Kai/asaki: 5/10 cumulus, base 2000f t ," t op 5000 f t i 4/10a l t os t ra tus a t 14. ,000 ft. ' Ji n ds a t 1 6, 00 0 ft. mil be280 a t 40 knots.IchinOmiya, 6/ 10 s t ra t ocUl l l ul u s, base 2000 f t , t op 5000 ft i3 / 10 midd lo clouds, base 14,000 ft, top 16,000 f t . 1indsat 10,000 ft. will be 280 0 a t 35 knots .

Base onReturn: Sca t t e red lOfT, middle and high clouds uith sca t t e red light

showers.

OBSE RV ED WEATHm

Bases onTaka-otfl

4 - 5 1 1 0 l ou clouds, ba sG 2000 f t , tops 6000 ft. with t~scattered shofTers i n a r ea and patches of m id dl o cl oud sa t 11,000 f t . and sca t t e red high clouds . Visibility un-limited except 2 miles in showers.To 200 Na as bases . .t o 240 NI . 3 -4 /10 lO fT clouds, with tops 6000 ft. and occasi-onal t ops to 15,000 ft . uitb scat tered sborrers, sca t t e redmiddle and high olouds. "to .3l oN; 2/10 low clouds , tops 4000 tt.

Route:

- 3 8 . .


35/80

CONFIDENTIA.L- - - - - - " " ' 1 " " " - - - - -

To Emp i r e ; Ov e r ca s t l ow c l o ud s w i t h t op s10 - 15 . 0 00 ft.a n d umknown amoun t s o f up p e r c l o ud . Mode r a t e t u r b u l e n c e .Cl oud t o p s d ec r e as e d and some b r e a ks a pp e a r e d n e a r Emp i r ec e a s t .Tsu ruga : 10 / 1 0 l ow c l oud s , t op s 8 - 10 , 0 00 f t . w i t h f ewt o 12 ,000 f t . an a .ov e r ca s t o f t h i n m i d d l e c l o ud i n l a ye r : sn e a r 10 . 0 00 ft. Win d s a t 12 .000 ft. we r e 2600 ' a t 40 kn o t s .Uwa J ima : 10 ! 10 m i dd l ec l o ud s a bove a nd b e l o t r f l i gh ta l t i t ud e o f 15 . 0 00 f t . Ot h e r c l oud s un ob se r v e d . Wi nd s a t15 . 000 ft. we r e 2800 a t 40 kn o t s .K aw a s a k i : 5 -10 / 10 va r i a b l e lOTI c l oud s w i t h t o p s 8000 ' f t .a n d 7 -9 /10 t h i n middl e c loud s i n l a y e r s between 14 -20 ,000ft. Winds a t 16 .000 f t w e r e 26 00 a t 40 kno t s .Utsunomiya : 10 /10 lOTI c lo ud s. t op s' lO ,OOO ft. ui th t h i n 'l a y e r S ) of middlo c l o ud s b a sa d a t 15 . 0 00 ft. Win d s a t 17 ,000ft. ~o r e 250 0 a t 32 kno t s .Ich inomiya : 10 / 1 0 l ow an d mi dd le c loud s. Win d s a t 10,000ft. wore 2600 a t 42 kno t s ,3-4/10 1011 clouds wi th scattered l ight sho \ - , e r sand s c a t t e r e dmi dd l e a n d h~gh c l oud s . Ba s e o f l ou c l o ud s 2000 ft. Vi a i -bili ty Ullrestricted except to 4 miles in light sno1'lsrs.

Targe t s :

Bases onRe t u r n~


36/80


37/80

.A

TIC I ,vt)rp. ' PALAU, .6f&,',L..o"'J ..?


38/80

'\_ . _ j

.. . CH IC

IWQ JIMA


39/80

)

c

cQMllIt1N:[CATIONS

Part I . . R O M

Part Il - Radior:

Mlsg i ons Nb . 263 . g64 . 265. 26~ & ~61

12/13 julY 1 9 l a 5


40/80

I~

- -

SECRET-- -- _...- . . . . . . .'

Part I - RCM

1. Purpose:

a. 'l'o D/Fenemy radars.

b... To Conduct a gl30eral ,search in the 20-3000 megaeyc1e

regions.

. c. To barrage jam ensmy gun-laying and searchlight radars~n the 72-8ll. megacycle and 190-210 megacycle regions and to spotJam any GL or SL ra.dar signals a.ppearingoutside the b.arrage.

d. To confuseenel l1Y radar dcfenses by the use of rope.

e. To record eneJD,Y communications

2. Method:a. T>venty-ninCl ROMObaervers participated and used the

following equipment to accomplish the search and jamming: 220 ..J \. P r . .l. 176 . :. APQ...2. 16 ~ ARQ...8, 22 ... APr-) (!(odified). 29 .. AHt-4.13 .. .&EA.-ll. 7 ... APA-24. 1 .. ARR-7.2 -APR-5 and) .. APA-6.

b Rope n-8S dispensed at the rate of ) bundlespo r

10- ,

sOCDn~$ -w!ilon" pro'traG ti on was needed f rem se o.reh11 ~htS.

e., Two special Jamming aircraft were em:ployed by the 58thWing, to circle the target area during the atr ike. Tuo specieljamming ad.rplanes were fUrnished by the 314th Wing to cover thestrike of the 315th Wing. These special jamming airplanes -:7creeg_uipped to barrage the enemy GL and SL radartrequency bards and tosppt jam any signals that appeared outside the barrag;;:.-. Add.itionalq1,l.ant;l. ies of rope \1e~e carried and dispensed to infest the area.All strike aircraft except those of the 315th Wing were equippedm ttl one or more Janu:n.ersand all carried rope.

3." Resn1 ts ;

a. On target Ut.sunomiya, 1 special janmiJlg airplane \18.5ineffective since it did not arrive at the target area until most ofthe strike aircraft had bombed. Because of the cloud cover in this

area, searchl ights Viera not effqetive.

b. Enemy voiot:! ccnmunieations were 1ntercepted and rocardedin part antha fqllowing frequencilJs t 4 *9QXc. 4420 Ke, 464

0Xc and

9612 Kc.

e. Seventy-eieJltintercepts ot enemy radar eere recordedand are li;;!ted at the end of this sGction.

4. ROSl!ll t.1 TIro aine waVe modulated signals on frequenciosof 42 and 46 megacycle \fere interoepted and t1el"O beHaved to be

early uarning ra.dars ..'l'hey uere belio..-ed to bo locatod in the

Cho~hi point area~Y_~T..2? n~p.'::61"1..

0004 0 0000 0030501 '1 1 3 5 1 5 ! : 0 7 1 3 4 5 0 1 2 . 5

2 1 121 S

0004 6 0 7 0 0 1 030251 -1 1 .35 .3OS 0713~5 0 l . 3

0 21 1 2 1 S

00068 0485 3 0 3 2 2 5 N1 . 3 9 . 5 C J r i }7 1 2 4 5 23.46 21

1 2 2 P ,!"'!' CIt!

00068 0465 3 2 323S}!"1 4 2 2 8 ' i ! 0 7 1 3 4 5 2337 21 122

P I f ' " " em :

0 0 0 6 8 0490 20 30. 3 0 H1 3 5 3 1 ) ; ; 071345 0 1 3 5

2 1 1 2 1 S ~""T ':BI

0 0 0 7 2 0475 28 . 3 4 1 3 n141303 071345 0001 2 1

122 P !if ~HI

0 0 0 7 2 0490 20 310DN1 3 5 0 0 E 0 7 1 . 3 4 5 0 1 2 0

21 121 S r- CH I

00'072 0 50 0 . 3 0 SiSON1371~ 0 7 1 ~ 4 5 0001 21 121

's S "T eIlI

04. t . . .J!!.g!!~l:


41/80

-00074 0500 35 3150]110007~\ o u o o 30 3250N00076 0495 30 3210.00076 0480 20 3200N00076 0700 05 3520N00078 2000 ee 3415\1100078 0750 08 3410N00078 1000 07 3450]1100073 0500 50 3145N00079 01~73 34 343 0N00079 0400 410 3250fl00080 0480 40 340"ffl00080 0750 08 ,25'01'100081 0485 24 .311 f5N00082 0465 34 :'- 3220N00084 1000 00 3525'1


42/80

PART II - RADIO

1. St r ike Repor t s: Thi r ty-n ine St r ike Repor t s, ne re receivedb y t he Wi ng G t-o .un dSt at io ns. F o. 11611i ngi s a t ab ul at iOnby t7i Il g'ft he st r ike repor t s r ece ived : 58th , 8; 73rd , 8 ; 313th . 4 ; 314th , 12and 315th , 7 .

2. Fo.x Transmiss ions : In add i t i on to . the usua l t7ea the r andt ime signa ls t r ansmi t t ed from the Ground Sta t ion , each ' : l ingt r ans-mi t t ed 2 and 3 "D..l.nuuy" me ssa ge s t o ai rcr aft . The 5 8t h \ 1i ng r e p or te d85.8 p eF cen t o .f a ir cra ft r ece ived b oth of t h ei r t r an sm is si on s .The 73rd Wing averaged 92.3 pe r cen t of opera tor s logging2 message8.The 313th Wing repo. r ted 75 per cen t of the i r a i r cra ft r ece ip t ed for3 "F" typo measagcs. The 314th lVing repor t ed 88 per cen t of thei rop er at or s c op ie d 2 messages from the Ground Sta t ion . Included inrea .sons for not copy! ng mess age s


43/80

b. 6615 K~s:

(1) OWbetween 0940Z and 1130Z "l'las ineffective.

(2 ) 01 '1and Me'/T alvrays came in qhen ai].' ~ound stationstarted sending and was parti.allyeffective.

(3) OWuith no identification betl1!een 1206Z and 1209Z

nas very effe~tive.

(,4.) OWwith call signs 9DI' and 71K bett1een 1230Zand 1400Z was partially effecti va.

< .s )V' IS from l1).OOZ o l1I45Zuaa vary effe ct i ve.

(6) Uninte lligible code. k.eyingl1i th no iden tif iea tionbetueen 15M3 and lGl.r5Z \188 partially effective to very effective.

A CW oz.GI'O beating signal from 21002. to 2305Z uas

insfiective.

c . 10 j0 5Kc s : Negligible.

d. 311i.5 1 C c > : This frequency uas replaced by ]160 Kes.

o . 6 0 5 5KosI

(1) Ja.p voice a t 1211 05Z 'das affective.

~.2) Pulsating tone bet~7een 1500Z ai:I : l .15302. 7mS part-

i a l1 .y e ff ec t iv e . .

(3) Uriknoun staticm sending unintellig ib1c eode at

0915Z ua,s ineffective .

f. 10880 Kcs:

( 1 ) Unidentified O Wbetweon 12143S Z ari! 121450 Z ".1a:1

eff ect iva .'(2) CW janming am. scratch note, over target nora

e ffee t ive .

(3) Enemy rn '1bet>1een 12l500Z and 121700Z uas partiallye ff e ct i ve .

-(4) Jap CW o beginning "hon ueathor aircraft trans-

mittod special weather message to ,ground station (l.430Z )j lastedapproximate l y 2 hours ua s effective.

(5) Radio teletype s igna l s . beg.tnniDs at l44.5Z amlasting until 1945Z uare partially e ffec t ive .

g. 3410

Kgs' :rap OW at 1153Z was inQf'f'oetivo.

n . 7310 K9%1 Neg l i g i b l e .

i. 11160 Kga I CWcalls at different intervals vero in-

e ffec t ive .


44/80

j,. 9990 Kes:

(1) High p.itch tone at 1035Zuas part ial ly effect ive.

(2) Buzz saw effect at 1235Zl1'aspart ie.l ly effective.

k-_ . 7 4 1 5 Kes :

(1) Keyed OWat 1420Z and 1130Z uas partially effective.

(2) Tone. motor boat effect at 2010Z 'Q'as partiallyefta ct iva Q

1. 10820 Kes: Negligible .

m. 3810 Xes:

(1) 01' Jap transmissions from 14502, to 1530Z ',Tareeffective.

(2) High speed station sending a series of dots inter-

mittently was effect ive .

n.6640 KCB and.lQ165 KCEl: N:lgligiblEb

7. Di9.tresB ; Thore were BO d.i stress meg,sages int erccptedduring these miasions on the Y1ing strike frequencios. There ;rorasome report,s of uru:"ning mussagos to tho Iuo Jima Air-Soa Rescue

Station".

8,.. E_9 ui pInont Malfunctions: AN/ART-3: 1 no sid a tom,; 1cha~el 2 inoperative; 1 inoperative on voice; 1 antenna currentmttcr inoperative; 1 osci llator put out steady tone i 1 antennaswitching rolay inoperative. Bc.-348: 5 iooperative; AN/...R.'l'...7 11 co'ntrol box shorted out; 1 noodLa hunted excessively ; 3 senseantenna broken; 1 antenna lead in broken; SCR-5 22 : 1 channel J..inOllerativ6i 1 receiver inoperative; 3 antenna broken; 3 c~letasots inoperativo. Intcrphoue: 2 amplifiers illop.Jrativo. R! . -42 j4 inopcrati VQ; 2 'I1(!)ight loss; 1 stiak;i.ng; 1 viro broken.


45/80

SECRET_,---,--

\

D

Part I - illnony .Ur Opposition

Part II ~ ,Enonw .. ..otiaircraft

Fart III Th:!nago .liSScssmont

SGction A _ Utsunomiya, Mission No. 263

Section B ... I ohinomiya , Mission No. 264

Sccti on G ... Tauru.ga. Mission No. 265

Section D ... Kawasaki ~otroleum Center,Mission No. 267

Missions No. 263. 264. 265. 266 aDd 267

12/13 julY 19lU


46/80


47/80

f:,st and the attaok we.1l made from 7 0 clock lovel. ' lb.eenemy a.i.rcrB.f' t~' . '1.th running lights on., cl.osed in to 300 yards and broke away after I'i r-:Lng 2 bur~t$. Tho tail Gunner did not fire as his guns vrere inoperatived~e to a Jammedcharger" The enemy aircraft had a red light all. each17).og.

7 . Pa.sses:

a. Ohe si ogle plana made a pass, betwoen. landfall and IP. The

unidentified enemy aircraft came in from 10 0 'clock at 15.400 fect.leve~. ~eaded for the nose of the B-29. closing in to f1ithin 100 yards,.cont 1.nUl.ng on to J 0' o10ck I7here it TIeut into a climb.

. b. i.n0thol' pass was made bct l1cen targe.t to land' send;,

Co Fifty miles out from land's end an unidentified enCIbyair-.craft came in from 7l') 'clock. levol, c Iosed in to about 100 yards. brokeaway to the right at 5 o'clock.

d. ;. series ofpassQs by twin-engine aircraft UCl'(;: carriedout against one of the B'-29's over a period of 28 minutes. Tho enemyaircraft started its pass at 7 0 I clock. fleTI"ovcr tOO'ards the B-29and turned. in. closing in to about boo yards ';Thoro it falloi7oo thoB-.29for a period of 5 minutes when it cut across past tbo tail of theB-29. turned in. again and remainod at the 5 o'clock position for about1 minute. breaking ailay tot he right. Th;:::reis a poss i bi Ii ty that theenemy aireraf't was trying to draw fire to determine tb~ cone of fil'c ofthe tail gwulQr.The nemyaircraft then follo17ed the 6-29 fo.r 7 5 miles.

e. .Ill unidentifiGd enemy aircraft CaiD.0 in from 3 0' clocl


48/80

SECBET- ' - - - -""""" '1 '

ReM a1 t'craf't orbi t ed the target area fot 80 minute s jamming' tho 75 meand 200 mc. radar banoil:s. It encountered, during this por iod , only 15bursts of J..naccurate and. h('lavy flak. One aircraft bombed Sondai as aTo'Oo and encountered intense, inaccurate, medium flak. fol;' k minute.Clouds lVore .10/10~ One aircraft bombed Taira (3704N 14_QS4.E)as a '1'.0.Flak was nil., Clouds liere 10/10.

do On withdra1'lffi.l vcry lllOagcr aId inaccurate, heavy flak was

I;)neoWl.torGd at Gnharoa (36S7N 14055 E ).

o. No aircraft \i(;Jro lost or damaged as a resut t of flak onthis mission.

targetf .' From 1 to 5 inoUoctive searchlights "1creobsarved in tho

area. and 1 beam rrae obaarved 'at !'lIito.

Mission NOD 264 - Ichinomiya Urban ~,rca;

a. Tho primary target \1813 bombed by 124 aircraft (includiD81 W'eather plane) of the 731'd 'Jing betwecm 1553z..1745Zfr,em {,000-12,200feet. AxaS" 'Ole!attack varied from 78-84. ,ieather rraa reported a s10/10 under-cast - ,-I itil 17 . 1nds of '3 7 knots from 260 0

b. Flak was nil en route to target.

c. Over tho target flak was described as meager , inaccurata,heavy and medium. ....nQ,stimated '3 to 5 searchlights wero observed intbGltarget area. They - .vere completely ine-ffact,ivQ due to solid undor..

cast.

d. Flak was nil on uithdra1781.

e. No airer,aft u6re lost or damaged as a result of fIsk: 0,11

this mission.

3. Mission No. 265 .. Tsurusa Urban "l.I"ea:

a. ThE: ! primary target rras bombed by' 9 2 aircraft of the313 th Wing between 1400z..1607'3 from 12,200-13.4 00 feet. .I.X"OS o ,r at-tack varied from 355-1. ;7eathcr consisted of 10/10 cloud cover.

b. En route to the target VGry me88cr (1 to 9 bursts) andinaccurate f,IBle ua\9 encounterod at Nagoya, Hikone and Yolckaichi. Verymoagcra,irl Lne.c cur-at o f'lal\:' was encount~red at Yokkaichi and lJeno. Oneaircraft received moderate, inaccurate, heavy flak from Uji Y8lIl8.d.a..

c. Over th0 targot flak uas doscribed as nil to. vary mcagor,inaccurate, heavy and medium. No searchlights IiIll'O observed throughtho sol id underoBat . One aircraft bombed 5hingu as a T.O. and roport-ed flak as n i l . One aircraft bombed Uji Ymnada as a T.O. and encount-ered mo.agor. inaccurato" modiwn and. heavy flak.

d. On I1ithdraU'8l flak 'l78.S nil,

Ne aircraft liere lest o.r damaged as a result of tlak ane.t hi s m is si on .

4. Missio.n No. 266 - t 1T laU:mAUrban Araa I

a. 'l'be primary targot \1BS bouibad bY' 124 81rQS'att CbcllldiDI1 fI.~ tw:L au-cra.ft) o.f tho 314th 17ing betwoon l4l.3Z-1 626S trom 10,400-16.40Q toot. . ."l,XeBof attack varied from 10,30.-1320.. .1eathGl"consistedof ~o / lOcloud cover.


49/80

b. En route to target flak was nil.

c. Ovor tho target flak \las des,crib0d as meager, inacourate.heavy and medium by 30 aircraft; the remainder roported it as nil.F r o~ I to 2 ineffective s e a r c h l i g h t s were observed trying to pierce t h "130110. undorcast in the target area.

d. Ot:!. -,vitl:}drawalcno aircraft wa S -rocked-by moderate, ac>~urate a;no.heavy flak just after lea.ving tho target area. ,.nother air-craft enecurrter-ed meager-, inaccurate and heavy flak at 3205N 13400E.

o, No aircraft 'I'Iero lost ord.eJDaged as a rosult of flak on.t h i s mission.

5. Mission No. 267 ~ Kaw,esaki Petroleum Ceoter:

a. Xho primary t argo t w ae bombed by 53 aircraft of the 315th:"fing between 1506Z-16192, f1'om 15,300-16.700 fect. l.:xcs of 3.ttack var-ied fl'OTll 380-520 ( ave r age - 44). _7oa t h c r \ 1a s r epo r t e d 8S 8/10-10/10undercast_

belombe En routo to tho target flak was oncountered as tabulated

loc.atioB .Ooord ina te s

352lN 13923 E

3445N 13903$'.

3 4 4 5N 13655E

3521N 1392lE

3531 N 13925E

3 502N 139 2 8E

3.522N 13947E

Inatori

Hirasuka

Naval Vessel

Naval Ves$e1

Meage r ' t o mode r a t e ~d inac-curate, beavy.Meagor and inaccurato. heavy.

Meager a nd i naccur at e, he avy .

M::ager and i n a c cu r a t e , heavy.

Intense and accurate, heavy.

Meager' am inaccurate to ac-curate, hc3.VY.M9agcr - and inaccurate to ae-cu r a . te , h e avy.

c. Ovor the t a rge t arOB flak IiSS doseribod as meager to mod-e r a t e . i n a ccur a t e t o accurate, and heavy . Seven in c t fe ot i vo se a r ch lights wero obsorved in tho genoraltargot arca.

d . On wi thdrawa l fl ak ",a sencountered a s tabulated below t

location Coordinates lkfflrka_

Hi tosumat61l . 3 S 2 JN14025E Mbagor to modor3toand. ill-

aocurato, heavy.

Eichi 3525N 14005.1:Meager and inaClcuratEl~ hosYy.

Heba r a 3_510N 14020B.Yeager and inaocurate. hoavy.

-

e . -No aircraft wore l o s t OJ' 4~ 88 a result at tlAt 0Jlt hi s m is si on , a l t hough 1 a i r c r a f t wa s l os t to unkDonnoauSOS .


50/80

P:\RT III- SECTION A ... UTSUNOMIY,il.- DJM~GE .\.SSE~

Destroyed.SQ.Mi.,_ PDr cent

1. .Swmuary of Damage I

Buil:t~up area; S Mi ttl 75 sq. ,0 a. -; 2. .; q. Mi. destroyed- .94Porcent destroyed .... 34.2

Percont dostroyed: ()7.1Flaned 'target area:1.4

sq. mi.

Total damage to date: .94 aqmi. Perccnt of built-up are{ll 3 4 . 2

. 9 4N o n a. 9 4

3 4 . 2N o n o3 4 . 2

Targets damaged by current strike: 0 nurllbcred;: 4 other

Note: No previous damage ..

Utsunomiya RR Station 40% destroyodTobu-Utsunomiya RH Station No apparent dat:l8gcFIBYard~ & Freight Depot 20%destroyediShimozuki Paper Mill ioos destroyedMonopoly Bureau 100% destroyedGov! t Tobacco V/arohouses N o apJlSl'cnt damage1 . . t least 2:3 small unidentified industries arc nithin the

built-up area ... 12 of these are destroyed.

3~. Damage outsids. buUt ... up areal (lJi thin 5 mile radius of center

of city).

is;; destroyed orremoved (olddamago)No apparentdama,geN o apparontdamage .. about20% romoval

90.13H2801 UtS\Ul(.miya Airfiold (ne covorago) 20%roQQVoo ardestroT od (oldcJaDBeP)

90.13 ...280

3 Utsunomiya Sou"!:h~tield No apparent damas14th Division t!qe. & apparent damag

Bevan small unidentified industrios .. 1 ot toese is destroyedReferOllOcd ~ ..;3 ~ir Objootive Folder 90.13 24 J"uly l~

B. Target Obart l'kl. 57d9 XXI bomb~ Co lmaand ....-2Inclosure I iI.nnOtatod mosaic sbon-ing damago folloWS.

,. Basad on JOtI B.C. CIUD...... Report No . 163

2.. Damage I'1ithin limi ts of bui 1 t -up area;

J\,t'eEl-damaged from current $ tri ke ; Sg .~4i.

Eu,ilt .. up area (Urban)Built-up, area (Indu,strial)Built-up 8:rea (Total)

2.75N : :m e2 . 7 5

Damage to t.argcts:

!trea damage from current strike:

Sman barracks area east of the tow

.Damageto targets;

90.1,3-1 643 Utsunamiya ~ur Training Sohool(no coverage current mission)

90.13- 2131 Nakajima Ut,sunomiya Plant


51/80


52/80

P:ffiT III - SECTION B - ICHINOMIYA. - DAMAGE.:.sSESSMENl'

1 SUlllIllau :

El. lJ?mage. to the ei ty of Icllinomiya r0sul ting . from JQ a BomberCommand Missi,on 264. 12/13 July 1945 totals tal sq. mi., which ropreaent ..about .8% of the built~up portion of' the oi ty (1.28 sq. mi. as determinedfrom reconnaissance pnotog:raphs)..Damage is scattered in the north aDd.

nortlH10st sections of the oi ty.

b 8 The text ill3s mills (reported muni tiona) in tho n.o.rth a r tdn.orthwost "parts of the city received. BO!jl.e damaGe. m .th one building,about 114,700 st;lo f't., being 100% gutted Nine small buildings 1;701'0destroycd.o

c. Damage OliItside the limits of the built-up por-tien of thecity totaled about .001sq ... mi

References! .A. Target Information Sheet .. Ichinomiya ... Target Section,A-2, XXI Bomber Oommand.

B._ . i_ .:1 .F .11' Obj{lcti.Ve Fold.er 90.20 M-ll July 1944

Inclosure.: Blow-Up ann0tated to SMil" damage follol'ls.

Based OIl XXI B.C. OItJ D... i.. B.epo1't No. 138


53/80


54/80

Planned target area ~ ..8 sg:o roi. Per coat destroyed; 96

FjRT III- SECTION C - T51JRUa.;. .. DXM.lI.OO ~...ssES9JIEI1I'*

1. Summary of Eamago.~

BUilt,-l!I.llaroal Sq. Mi. total - 1.13; Sq. N"1 i_destroyed ... 77

Porcent destroyed - 68

Total damage to date; .. 77 o Sq. mt.. Per cent of bll ,ilt -u ,p area: 68

a. .Damagam.hin limi t-s 01:' bun t-uparea: (no previous damge)Destroyed

.J;rea Damage: Sq.. Mi.. So. Mi.. Per cent

Targets damaged by current strike: 2 numbered i 1 other

Built-up aroa ('UI-ban).Built-up ar-ea (Total)

1.131.13

68sa

Damage to targetsl

1950 Tsuruga Harbor Faciliti


55/80

mage Assessmenturuga22 - Urban

XI B.C.-Mission 265

13 July 19ZJ.5.U-XXI Born .Corn . . - -

CO NF I DE

KEY-Urban Built Up ea~ Sparsely Built Up AreaIZZZlOo.rnqge


56/80

P.OO III - SEC['ION D - PETROLEUM CENI'ER.KA '. '1 .: .s .u a -DrlMn.GEASSESSMENT*

1. Summary:

a . Damage resulting f r om the above strike i s ~i de ly sca t t e r odOVe r t h e t a r ge t araa and ad jo in ing t a r ge t s . Mos t of t h e damageis i n

t he w ar eh ous eareas

ofthe

StandardVacuumOil Co.

(128.i.) and tha

RisiI lg Sun Oil 000 (128 B)

b . At t he Nippon Oil 00. ( 125 C) . t he on ly ar ea c6n ta in ingra fi qi ng l ln i t s , t he fra ct iona t i ng a re a , compre ssor bui ld ing, andc ra cki ng b ui l,d in g all appear t o have b e e n damaged.

c . o r a t o t a l oil s to ra ge c ap ac it y of 1,334,000 b a r r e l s(42USG), only 9%(117,SOO bar re l s ) ha s been damat ed . or this to ta l84.400 b ar r! ; l ls ( ca pa ci ty) i s new damage - 33.400 b ar re ls ( ca pa ci ty)had been previously damaged (unkncrm miss ion) .

d. Tho RRspur through the' Standard Vacuum. Oil Co., connec t -ing the main land wi th t h e oil bunker. ha s been b a d l y to rn up in t7Ioor three places.

e. Damage toadjaccnt targets is a s f ol lo 'Ws :

9 0 . 1 7 " " 5 1 . l . : san6Steel Go . ., (Ref. B) - largo building, probable roolingmill, gutted. , " > d o iiona l damago to other m in or b ui ld in gs .

9 0 . ) S ' - 1 3 3 Shi baura Engineering \larks (Ref . B) - 7 minor buildingsdestroyed.

9 0 0 1 7 -1343 I sh ika l1 aj im a M ot or Co. (Re f. B) - minor bu i l d i n g destroyed.9 0 . 1 7 - 203 8 ~ Oil Storage (Ref. B) - 1 large storage t ank damaged.9 0 . 1 7 - 203 81 Tokunaga Glass Co. - 2 minor buildings destroyed.9 0 . 1 7 - 2 0 38J Mi tsab ish i 'Ohe mi ca 1 E quip me nt Co. (Rof. B) - l a r ge build-

ing gu,ttoo, large hole in ro.f of second l a rg{) buildinB.9 0 .l7 - 2 0 38K N i s s h i n F lour Mal l (Ref. B) - 2 la rge bui l dL~~ compl e t e~

des t royed .

2. Surmnary o f Damagg t o Tankage:

I2:W.

1 ... .4;00 QOrig ina l Capacity - bb~s .New Damage - bblsFe r cen tOld Damage -bbls .Pe r cen t

- Total I:amago and Removal - bb l s .Per can t3. I t gmi za ti on o f Damagel

. .urnor.NO.

pESQRtfllON gr nM9lDENl'IFIC4TION

1 Office or 'Dump HOuse -

20,,00 Sq. ft..

Approx. 3; 000 SQ. :rt., dosh'OYe4

. : .pprox. 7.000 Sq. n. Sbv.18m i D o rrogt d'.'9'

2 i7wehouse 26.500 Sq, Ft.DeStr ovgd

Baa04 on x.a B.C. em' D.iL..lbport No. 157


57/80

ANNOT.NO .3 .

4.

lDENrIFlCA.TION DE SCRI Pr IO N O F DAM I!. GE .

Dane,ge,.ProbSb1e Ca,nni.ng or Packing Approx. 800 Sq,. Ft 0 Mi1:or Roo!' rsm.

4.)00 Sq. Ft.Pr'obab1e Ganning or Packing Apprax. 4.000 Sq. Ft .gestroyed.

9.800 Sq .. Ft.Oil Storage Ta.nk

C2p,. 33,000 bbls.Oil St;.rage Tank

Cap" 42)500 bbIs . .2 horizontal Fuel StoregeTanks, Cep. Approx. 4,000

ce.bbi~ AC /AS I nt el li ge nc e. Report No. F /A-33. 17 1anuary 1945.Referen B JTG 90.11-36o .5P4

1: AnIlotated enlargement sbowi218demIlge tollClil's.

B.10.11.

12.

1 4 .

19.

20.25.

27.28 .29~

31.32 . .

45.63.6 4 .67.69.73.,8 .

91.92;

94.97.

9B.100.

101.

102.

108 .

111.

112.

InelO$ure:

Warehouse 29,200 .$q. Ft.

" h

h h 14.500 Sq., Ft h 10.700 Sq. F t .

p

4.750 Sq. Ft..._

4 Oil Storage Tanks. totalcap. a Ppr' ox, 35.000 bbls.War ehouse 9.850 Sq. Ft.

n

7 Warebouses 25.760 Sq., Ft.

Pipe StillPipe Still2 Oil Storage Tanks .. Cap.

6.000bbls.Still & FUrnace

!1 '"

Treating Plant 2.580 Sq. Ft.Primary DistillationAssociated with 63.PU!l)p Rouse & 2 arrall tanksStorage Tank. Gsp~ 1040. bbls.2 St orage Tariks," 3900 ~Warehouse 34,000 Sq. Ft.

'I!arehouse 34,000 Sq. Ft.

'War ehouse 34,000 Sq. Ft..

Warehouse

Proba.b1e

15,000 Sq .8 .850 Sq.

12.500 Sq .Offices.

Ft .Ft .F t .

n

D

Probable Pump House." Canning or Packing

12 .500 Sq. Ft;.

Apprcm. 7,000 Sq. rio Minor RoofDamage.Appl"ax 3,000 Sq. Ft. Minor RootDamage.Destroyed.

ft

ApprOx. 2.500 Sq, Ft. Destroyed., B ,200 Sq. Ft. Minor Roof

Damage.Appr c o : : . 2 .500 Sq. Ft. Minor ReofDamage.3 Tanks ,esp. 27,000 bbis. Dest.

Approx. 3.300 Sq. Ft. I'lunor RoofDama:ge~ .Destroyed.1 De st ro ye d. '2 r em ov ed p ri or to

Miss ion. (11,.040 Sq.Ft.) ..

50% of area appears badly damag.ed.Entire a1'ea' ~Destroyed.

Destroyed.Approx 0 25% deatroyed or' badlydF.lm9.gea~Apparently Destroyed.60% shews minor roof damage.60%' n

2 sma l l t anks destroyed.Destroyed_

Removed or destroyed prior tomission.Removed or d.estrayed prior tomission.

Removed or destroyed prior tomission~Approx< 7.000 Sq. Ft. ~estroyed.

a 4.400 RDestroyed.Approx, 75 Decstroyed, 25% MinarRoof Dall!8ge.Destroyed.Apprax. 10.000 Sq. Ft. Destroyed.

ft 2.500 Sq. Ft ~ Minar Roof

Sh0lV8 holes in roof. previ ous dam.

Destroyed.

Des t royed .

- 61

g_21 !~ l I 2 . 1 l ! I ! ! .


58/80


59/80

SECRET-""=!"'----

E

yqs s ions NO. 2 6 3 . 2 6 4 . 265, g66 & 2 6 7

l 2 / l 3 July 1 9 4 5


60/80

~~

.~ .~ ~>. ~~ i

d d d . . . . ::I0 . . .(\J 0

ena) IE

C" I ~~

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zC" I M i'

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III . . . H C

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t-o

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. ~ ~ . -11ft

'~ ~ E

a : : :~ a 0 0 a ~

.0 J;> .... ..-1 III

LL J0 k H '" I-;.~ ..! .r-:I -... 0'


61/80

s~ I~~~9 0 l I \f) , 4" * I ...0 I f ...0 1 rle:-o '.-t rl

-< ~.; ~ I! i ::1.:I ~ (\I'" ..-I

3N ~ N l';] t.:i t'I

~-.0 ~ N 0' C I I . - I . . - I 0..-1-; . - i 0.-1 ( ' - . . - i ~~-! 0..-1 >.!) . - I -::f . . .


65/80

H

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CO :> -re~t.o e- . ,r.11 I

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a C\l s (l) ~ I'- o~I

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66/80

C'-'\J)..::;t

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67/80

MISSIONS 263 - 267

DATE l2 July 1945

F L1GHT DATA& FUEL CONSUMPT ION

M IS SIO N l'IUMB ER # 2 6 3 # 2 6 4 # 2 6 5 # 2 6 & #2fitU N I T 58TH V lG

7 3 R Dw e 3 13 TI I W G 3UTH w e 3 1 5 T H WA IR CRAF T CON Sm E;R .E ;D 93 121 89 118 53 1A V E RA G E F L Y I N G T IM E 1 5 : 0 6 1 3 : 3 3 1 3 : 2 6 14:39 14:19

I

F UEL CONS UMED :

Av e r a g e 5 8 7 6 5 7 1 2 5814 5 9 3 7 5 4 5 3aximum 6 4 5 0 6 2 2 8 6 2 5 0 6 3 4 7 6215

Minimum 5 4 0 0 5 0 5 6 5 4 2 0 5 5 2 0 5 0 7 6

FUEL REMA IN ING:

Av e r a g e 6 6 4 873 220 7 0 0 1175Maximum 1 1 7 5 1444 1 2 9 0 1099 1660Minimum 1 0 0 27 9 342 2 6 9 ~?O

AVG. GALS. USED 'PER HOUR 389.1 421.5 432.9 405.3 .38G.8

TOTAL USED ON AIRBORNE A/e 7 5 2 0 9 3 7 4 2 4 5 8 5 6 4 4 9 7 7 6 9 0 6 2 3165'n

WE I GH TDATA

NO . AIRCRAFT AIRBO RNE 130 131 9 8 1) 0 60

AVG. BASIC WT. OF AIRCRAFT 7 4 9 0 1 75048 74765 75601 7 l J ? 8

AVE RA GE US E F UL LO AD 5 9 3 1 3 5 7 7 6 8 6 0 3 9 1 5 9 9 6 3 6.3298

AVG. NO. OFBOMBS LOADED Mixed Load Mixed Load Mixed Load lIiloed Lood 34.1

AVO. WT . OF BOM BSLOADUl 14700 12769 15567 15026 l 8226

AVERAGE FUELWADED 6 5 4 6 6 5 9 8 6 6 2 7 6638 6 6 . 3 0

AVG. WT. OF FUELLOADED 39276 39588 J976il 39828 J9?80

AV ERAGE IU SC. W EIGH T 5337 54ll 5062 ,1095 2 9 2

AVG. GROSS PIT. ATTAKE OFF 1J4214 1J2816 1 3 5 1 5 6 1 3 5 5 6 4 1)46"16

BombW&ights.; M-47-A2 - '10 Ibs .E-46 - 425 Ibs.M-46 - 52 1 bs.M-64 (!Nl'l - S 3 S lba ..

11..11.1


68/80


69/80


70/80

F . O . # ' 9 8

(2) Route:

BaseIwo Jiroa3353N - 1360gB.34 5,gN - 13 55 5E3512.30N - 13607E (IF)

Tar~st35;IlN - 1371GE343830N - 1J804Elwo Jir:aBase.

(a) Etlroute to t a

21st bomber command tactical mission report 263, 267

Documents