207774632 anderson quasi autonomy in architecture

8/12/2019 207774632 Anderson Quasi Autonomy in Architecture

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MINING AUTONOMY / 31

STANFORD ANDERSON

Indeed, he editors anticipatedthe viability of an intermediateposition whenthey referenced my article "Critical Conventionalism in Architecture" hatopened the first issue of AAzemblagen 1986.1 One word from that essay,

"quasi-autonomy,"licits the position to which I shall returnhere.2In a polemicalworld, he explorationof positions awayfrom the poles is

often not welcome.Refusingto man the battlements at either pole appears,Isuppose,wimpy.But our editors have risked entering such a discourse. In theportfoliosection of this journal,K.MichaelHaysrecalls a time of polarization,around1970,where he perceiveda widespreadconcern with the instrumental-ization of architecture,a concern that in turn elicited a significant reactioninthe search for an autonomous architecture.In an aside, Haysnoted that theeditors, and even he, would not remember hat time. With that prod,let mereturn to an unpublishedessay that I presentedat the ArchitecturalAssocia-tion in Londonandagain at the ACSA Cranbrookmeetings of 1966.

"Problem-Solving nd Problem-Worrying"s a periodpiece to the extentthat the problem-solvingdiscussion illustrates the temper of the time andthe instrumentalizationto which Haysrefers.That overt content of the essaysits recognizablyin a more general sense of the malaise of architecture inthe 196os. The seeming triumphof architectural Modernism n the post-waryears had by then degeneratedto the rootless, decorative stylism of archi-tects like Philip Johnson,EdwardDurellStone,and MinoruYamasaki.Thosearchitects and theoreticians who proposed problem-solvingmethods may ormay not have troubled with criticism of this degenerative Modernism,buttheir search for a reliable,even scientific, method certainlygained attentionthroughtheir ambition for an architecture hat stemmed froma fundamentalprocessbased on empirical nformation.

My alternative of "problem-worrying"ought an alternative path, onethat was in sympathywith the reciprocitiesof form anddesign exemplifiedinthe onlyAmericanarchitecturalworkof that moment thatappeared o deservecritical acclaim- the workof Louis I.Kahn.Kahnwas as strong in rhetoricalpersuasionas in architecture,but he was not one to polarizeargumentsor his

discipline. He remains a model for the value of inquirybetween the poles.So much forthe setting of the 1966 essay.3 In its critiqueof problem-solv-

ing, it alreadyengagedthe early developments n computationand design, atleast some strains of which still seek to instrumentalizeourdiscipline.Inanycase, the essay dwells on the "between"heme that has been a constant in mythought- and the reason formy participation n Perspecta 3. Since this histori-calpiece is unpublished,and serves both as witness to a moment andgroundsfor a continuingposition,we include he essay here in abbreviated orm.PROBLEM-SOLVING AND PROBLEM-WORRYING(1966)4The notion of problem-solving, especially as architects have encoun-tered it, is imbedded in a desire for justification. In stronger instances,there may be a belief that problem-solving routines will lead to justi-fiable results; in weaker instances there may be the belief that one'sactivity can be justified merely through using powerful, if misappropri-ated, techniques.

It is imperative that we do not warp human well being just for thesake of exploiting a technique - especially when the technique is a pow-erful one. As Ishall argue in more detail, the concepts of problem-solv-ing that interest architects involve either problems of achieving definitegoals or problems of synthesizing from a body of established facts. Dueto these characteristics of either definite goal orientation or inductiv-ism, these notions of problem-solving are neither descriptive of the tradi-tional behavior of the best architects nor applicable to the current prob-lem situation of architecture. In contrast to "solving the problem,"Iwillpresent another attitude toward problems -"problem-worrying." Let meattempt to characterize the notion of "problem-worrying"with wordsof a more positive connotation: architecture is concerned with structur-ing our environment to facilitate the achievement of human purposeswhere the purposes are incompletely known at the outset and cannot beextrapolated from known purposes. Indeed, human purpose is altered


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Wng This approach can be crliticized,then, in at least two ser-ioLus ays:i e 1)the usual problem of inductivist methods is that they can never be surethe of adequate data from which to synthesize, or even adequate data to

: he . .heck against; and 2) that the process of creative design is artificiallyne. ',: : fd ii.order that it may be viewed systematically and its resultsH situ- :justified by their consistency with an initial statement.

i6} ;eXplicit Systematic problem-solving design is not, of course, the only pos-t the human sible alternative to the current, easily criticizable situation of architec-

tural design. If, then, systematic design is not the only alternative andIrises from a is itself open to serious criticism, why should the adoption of these tech-it seems, the niques seem to be imperative?serious criti- Our society certainly encourages an enthusiasm for- new tech-ects are inca- niques, but such a compulsion is especially deeply rooted explicitly andcts appear to implicitly - in the thinking of architects. This compulsion stems fromt sc- alI - .:apce an eof the nineteenth-century doctrine that architecture is

.....physicalexpression, and...erhaps the fullest expression, of the spirit|at^||gbe t httim:r. Onceius notion is accepted for past times, and once it isi he b- 5rezalied t lve in a different time, the necessity arises to discoverb^SfcHor- : ttI (? tiew jad the form that will express that spirit. Suchothatac: aid r sarch for irits and expressions can lead to various situations, butit rWblem oe compelling interpretation claims that the architect must express

:t .;X tspirri&the times throughhe use ofhe newest materials and tech-attaeshi- nIques.The irony of the topic we are discussing is this: the search for'^neve aspirit of the times is a kind of historical phrenology that distractsiiccommu- one from actual problem situations. Yet in our instance the very spirit-

r new teche- expressing technique is one of problem-solving.prf fronm he It appears that in the 1960s there is a double imperative for thetuteofArchi- - use of problem-solving techniques; first, because we have what aretostudy the perceived to be acute problems, and then because the very use of

ipessional these techniques is taken to express our times. This combination of*6m-will t inductivist and historicist ideas, open to criticism in so many ways,tfero Prince- encourages the use of problem-solving techniques as an end in itself.?eb with a If the problem-solving routines should be inadequate to handle the~ clancwe complexity of the problem and therefore generate an environment thatevelop rnore distorts human purpose, one can interpret the distortion as expressive

ring.p prior- of the times. This inadequacy must be embraced and solace found insemstat,ing, knowing that another appropriate step of destiny was fulfilled. Under

?m?solving. the historicist prejudice of modern architectural thought, what resultsrinetori tro:j- from the use of a new technique is less importanthan the claim thatproposalsQOQ use of these.means is demanded historically. In such an inflation of

solvin a there is the dhathere is the danger that a humanly important activity, providingitdefned physical envirn6ment that will facilitate the achievement of humanuttieek-DUFp. g: puvses, will be artificiallyand detrimentally simplified inorderthat it fitxed standard the available techniques.

i*a * ?W-?"yargumnlt may now be reformulated to say: There is no impera-

o^ it .- that,,wemust use any given technique. There is, however, an impera-n o, the fact tive that we attempt to better understand architectural activity, the prob-

l&^*Wtefthe lem-Uirituaton wi tr which it works, and the reasons for its often rathernioeXpoation . bad performance. Atte, i it s only through such an understandinggia,'o what- of architecture's relation to its problems that we could come to know

0 :I''. '?:' '" ew-d whereto use which new techniques.

yii^';Y a lct ic design aJeecdozed.:rcreasnthQy,vnedarchitectsare opento

Oerityfhe criticism,architE6.Systems-Orientedrchitee

eta|tleslthition ffierlysis andottnerican bti'

in.m'in?a)t-so v

-aafis

>ram,oJE

0,to-habv.,a:

bythe veryenvirof the environmEof tentativefore:actions to whiclhuman purpose?sequently.n is correy


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-

-AI0Toachieve such an understandingf thearchitecturalproblemitu-ation and of the responseof the best architects to these problem itua-tionswillbeanythingbuteasy.Ishallattempt o do thisthrouohn O,exary,

pieand then deducewhat pp,earFto-es iimmediately oncerns me is that an important'humanctivityshouldnot be artificially nd detrimentally implified n order o fit an extantmechanical routine.The dangerof such an over-simplificationtemsboth rom he enthusiasm ormechanization nd rom he impoverishedunderstandingfarchitecture ostered bymodernarchitecturalheory.Architectssee thatanysolution,any orm,has implicationsbeyondthose that were intended,ncludingmplicationsor the reformulation ftheoriginalproblem r need.Consequently, rchitects are as interestedinthe formas inthe problem;hey see a dynamicrelationof form andproblem s of theiversality of suclem hat is notsufficie rfi C,ntheisualrtsdeamaybe Claripeid*rr i tstionofcreativitzedor being anythingbutff...aortlesse i sthat he is look ingo see whetlith ;thiaibut th ate i sooking toee whoetrhW'lisaying.""We can test the adequacy f arthiteelem-solving ndhe universality of uch a problem s develofitofforpenmnd contextbyexaminingLeCorbusier'snt.rptheVisualArts atarvardniversityad discoveredthat, in its own wdsoften criticiz ed foreing anythingbut effortless.iit epeople,withts adjoiningneo-Georgianuildings,ndincehe involvementwas withabridge treetpattern.However,tis important Otto okf1i~ksolution ere,butathe rortheway in whicha problem.as do:eand leftopento continuingdevelopment.

HarvardUniversityhad discoveredthat, in its ownwo6rds, o-do'leges graduatevisualilliterates."? arvard hen decidedto,conceiyeateachingprogram hatcalled for active participationnthe visualarts.This programrequireda building; ince the involvementwas with [hevisualarts,the site chosen was near he FoggMuseum.

Teachingat the VisualArts Center has the opportunityo be themostimportantactor inHarvard's rogram f education nthe arts.Asa complement o that didacticprogram,however,LeCorbusier nd hisbuildingbrilliantlyeformulated he originalproblem.Any teaching pro-gramreachesonlya smallpartof a university ommunity, ndvery ewpeopleoutside thatcommunity. funiversitiesare to be concernedwithgeneralartistic illiteracy, hey must instruct he entirecommunity.Thebuildingtself must reach out and engage every person in such a waythat even peoplewho will never be formally nrolledat the VisualArtsCenterhave he opportunityo achieve newrealizations bout he poten-tial of architectural ormas a shaperof life.Ihad the memorable xpe-rience of observingsuch a realization.Withoutprior nstruction,webroughtsome MIT reshmen to visit the CarpenterCenter.A youngwomancompletelyuntutorednarchitecture xplored he LeCorbusierbuilding.Aftershe moved hroughhe buildingorsometime,she timidlyexplained hat when she came to the top of the ramp,she felt herselfto be all over the building t once. Onecould at least beginto analyzethe objective qualitiesof the building hat contributed o her reaction.

P. ,4 4;... r%%.A., .i,E. le

work. Secondly, the visitor and Harvard are forced toconize thata pectator sport;all of one's senses and tshewhole of one'sperceptionare engaged.One feels that the CarpenterCenters a world,a context,a

~it.Thats, Leorbusier'suil~Idingaybe seen as a complete nversion f

alprob-. s tive par-

ticipant n the problem ituati0 ater ss frame-work.Secondly,the visitorand Harvardare forced to recognize thatill teracyaboutartsnot a matterofvisionalone. nthis buidingart snota spectator sport;all of one's senses and the whole of one'sperceptionareengaged.Onefeels thathe CarpenterCenter s a world,a context,aproblem, nd we have the happyopportunityo formourselvesagainstit.That s, LeCorbusier's uildingmaybe seen as a complete nversion fthe ideaof ficti ni Italso stands insharpcontrastHarvard till has notdefined he

versalconcepts in architecturalusingfor married tudents.n,I ee the architect's pproach

::~~~I:.lem; variousformal proposals;s; successive reformulations f_ ~ ~~~~~~vselectionf a form or itsappro-

tan hiscase, one mustjudgenotg _ z*~~uchangednd one mustjudgeutIn terms of whether he fric-

tion.Does the whole reformu-Ln 0 -- mdescribing architects as they

eintsla ents of architecturalproblems,noal ificoationf elements,nospeci-kwardposition hateverything,; rchch itects can justify nothing

tin:70 ounderstanding ofarchitecture'*Ard:i ' nlyconficts with the notionofturat-Cvitiet. e strongestndmostlexible,= ~~~~~~creativeerson ree reignsub-

): u 80- A'e situation hat Imentionedear-....:~.~ dystems-oriented architectsdiPt' enWe the problemnto a rationally

unassa:ifica', n esynthesizedimntanunas-


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sailable solution.Icontend that in mostcases huminans,heiractivities,and the environmenttselfchangeover ime- thetime of the dayas wellas a moreepochalsense of time.Consequentlyhe analysisofanyprob-leminvolvingmore hanartificiallyimitedaspects of ourbeingcannotbe complete,nor can it be free of ambiguitiesand tensions. Inanalyz-ingthe problem,we cannot knowall of the bits, nor can we be sure ofthe unassailability f the bits or of ouranalytical tructure,Neithercanwe be sure of our heuristics f synthesis. Ifwe takethe problem-solvingapproach,we certainlycannot dothis haphazardly,ut fwe go throughthat process conscientiouslywe willneversucceed in even statingtheproblem,et alone solving it. But since the environmentwill still haveto be manipulated, ertainaspects of the problem-solvingystem willbe irrationallylurredoverinthe interestof achievingsome result. Notonly does this reintroduce rrationality, ut the method is then builtassumptions, personal hypotheses, and particulars developed in rela-tion to other hypotheses.The reciprocalrelationof problemand form I have advocated isindeedquitedifferent rom he conceptsof problem-solving.n defenseof the problem-solving pproach,however, ne shouldacknowledge hatthe continuing developmentof feedback systems appearsto be pro-vidingmodels that moreclosely simulatethe activityof architecturaldesign. I onlywish to express some reservationwhether even a veryrefined eedbackmechanism an competewith he humanmind nsuchan improbable,ontroversial omainas that of environmentalesignforthe facilitation of human purposes.

Thus,the call is not forartificiallyprecise problems, igorous ys-tems,friction-lesssolutions,orjustificationof one's actions, Growthof

i architecturalearningand practicerather alls for a relentless t-ational- . andsensible criticism that "worries"he problem, triving or a betterF : ; problem - especially a better problem - and then also for a relation ofproblem nd form hat is resistant o criticism.Along with ourcomplex problems, we have complex techniques and

many people with naive conjectures. We should be more systematic inrecognizing hese factors in setting up the conjectures,in criticizingthem, andthereby learningand growing.But such an approach s notsystematic inthe sense of imposinga manageablestructure;rather tseeks to discover he structure hroughan interesting ituation of mul-tiple conjecturesand criticism.Since we don't knowwhat the situation is untilwe are involved n

,:-::'.%' ^ the process, it is no use later asking if we are saying what we meant. Welearn through the process and therefore want to ask: "Do Imean whatamsaying-"

In hatpaper fthirty-six earsago, wasclearlyxercised bout instru-mentalization."utresistanceo instrumentalization,ndeven he formofmyresistances, I believe,tillpertinent.n thepaper didnot mention heotherpoleofHays' oncern, autonomy,"itheras a responseo theproblem-solvingpositionor as anotherpositionI sought o confront.Nonetheless,autonomy aspresentnthesetting.In1964,PeterEisenman,hen a youngprofessor t Princeton,nviteda groupofyoungarchitectsplus womodestly lderones,ColinRowe ndRobertVenturi) o spenda weekendin Princetondiscussing the state of archi-tecture and how they might collectivelyintervene. Out of that meeting camean organizationcalled Conferenceof Architects for the Studyof the Environ-ment (CASE).Amongthose who came to be involved(with their then affilia-tion) were Eisenman(Princeton, hen NewYork),KennethFrampton London,then Princeton),Michael Graves(Princeton),Donlyn Lyndon(UniversityofOregon),RichardMeier(in practice n NewYork),HenryMillon(M T),Gio Pas-anella,JaquelinRobertson,and RichardWeinstein(allof ColumbiaandMayorLindsay'sLowerManhattanplanning office),and myself(M T).


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MINING AUTONOMY / 35

::Thefiveyears of the effective existence of cASE .^te' was:ino ormallyrecognizedtermination),coincidedwiththe turbulenceknownasl9s68." Thatturbulence was recognizable in:the "results f;another project iiitiated byEisenman in 1966:the developmentof ideas forthe urbantansformation-ofHarlemculminatingin the "NewCities"exhibition at the Museum of ModernArt at the beginning of 1967. Fouruniversity-basedteams were involved: hearchitects just identified from Columbia;Rowe,ThomasSchumacher,JerryWells, and:FredKoetter from Corn;:Oraves and Esenman from Princeton;andAnderson,Millon,andRobertGoodman rQmM T.1"

The work of none of the "NewCi. teams.would llustrate "instrumental-ization."Onthe otherhand, at leastY'theCometi-andPrincetonprojectscouldbe characterizedas explorationstoward an autonomous architecture.Largeportions of Harlemwere eliminated in favorof abstract,often handsome exer-cises in formand/or figure/ground .anipulation12ncontrast, the MtT proj-ect began with a series of developmentalstages on the undeveloped slandsin the East River and on filled landd eEast Riveritsel: Early stages alsoinvolved nfill housing to transform he environmentalcharacterof the exist-ing large social housing projects. Onlyafteryears of thedevelopment of suchnew resources was the incremental upgrading of the Harlem fabric contem-plated.Within the membershipof the CASEgroup(not so identified for theMoMAxhibit), a split appeared:a dominant position moving towardauton-omyversus one that saw architectureas an'enterprise that did, indeed,haveits owndiscipline, but had also to subject itself to material:,ocial, andpoliti-cal criticism.13 n1969, togetherwiti M'IT tudents, I orgainized nexhibitionat MIT'SHaydenGallery thepredecessorto the List Galleq) titled "Form ndUse in Architecture."The title is enough to say that the thesis:of the exhibi-tion engaged the issues of the problem-worrying ssay. The closing event ofthe exhibition in early 1969 was onlythe second publicevent of CASE14 t wasalso the demise of CASE,as most of the memberssaw the MITexhibition assupportingboth "instrumentalization" nd (morefrom'the MoMAxperience)naivespcial. auses such as "advocayplanning." Incontra.t, oeishould thinkof these as also the years in which PeterEisenmanembraced he autonomyof

"cardboardrchitecture" nddesighis ser:es of numb`d house projects.15I considerthe MITcontribution,in both these exhibitions to havebeen

exercises in "problemworrying."Within this approach, herewas an effort torecognizethe internal demands ofthe discipline of architectureas well as the"problem." he architecturalexample.withinthe problem-worrying aperwas,after all, of LeCorbusier'sCarpenterCenter.The "Form nd Use"exhibitionfeatured: section devoted o de Stirchitecture anddesign, iriluding mate-rials on loan from TruusSchroder-Schraderwhose famous house in Utrecht(1924),by Mrs. Schrdderand ierrittieetveld, is often taken as X.eapotheosisof abstractform translated into architecturalspace.Inthe leaflet that accom-paniedthe exhibition, Idiscussed the house somewhatdifferently:WhileLeCorbusierapokeof maA and the play of primary orms in light, theDutch artistAand architectsof the de Stij groupundertook heexplorationofform in a quite different manner, Rher than peaking mawand Platonicformd, they attacked theproblemof design armedwith what they conAideredthefundamental elements of artiatkconatruction: traightineA, planea, pri-marycolors,black andwhite.Infurnitureandarchitecture,atickaofunit croA-section and planar constructions simulated the fundamentalelements. Theformalty.Atem equired hepreaervationof the integrity of the4lement- evenwhenuaedin largerconAtruct;thAi^ uac.?compihed byhavi theelementapaAsbyoneanotherwithonlytangEniacnnectio . Sucha formallyderivedrelationof part-to-part a obviou.:i'tth ; of oanalogy exemplifiedby the RichardRiemerchmid chair[in the exhibition;oronecouldthinkof fuiture byHenryva"nadeeldel.

In the SchroderHouse, spatial:and utilitarian concerns are imbedded'in the developmentof the de Stijl formalsystem. Direct experience of theSchr6derHouserevealsthe intellectual, formalprinciples that concernedthe

de Stijlg.bup; it is the embodim.nt of aset of ideas in substantial form.How-ever,unlikebuildings that embodya formal dea in whole,object-likevolumes,the de Stijl forms of the Schroder House were generatedadditively.In thiswaythe perceptualexperienceof the house and the demands of use contributeto the construction of the whole that is consistent with the formal intent butnot whollypreconceived.Visiting the house, one becomes aware of the formalsystem behind the design, and simultaneously aware of the use-implicationsof the formalorganization.

Even though the de Stijl group consciously suppressed the nature ofmaterials,they do stand as one of the fewexemplarsof a solution to the form-use pioblem.De Stijl objectsand environmentsattest to the possibility of con-ventions accommodating,even encouraging, patterns of use that are convinc-ing in both intellectual and utilitarian terms.16

Within the conceptof quasi-autonomy here is a wide rangeof contribu-tive work, some approach autonomywhile others are deeply engaged in thematerial and social conditions of the environment. I saw Eisenman'searlywork,notablythe ToyMuseumin Princeton, in the same light that I soughtto cast on the SchroderHouse.The de Stijiland early Eisenman works are offundamentalimportanceto the discipline of architecture.Theyprojectnewwaysof conceiving materialform,space, light, and,at least to mymind,impli-cations for use and meaning. Significantly,these "newways"are deployed nsuch a manneras to giveas much or moreattention to their generalized poten-tials as to the specifics they initially served. It is in this that they approachautonomyand establish newreferenceswithin the discipline.

Onereason that works such as these bythe de Stijl groupand Eisenmanremainwithin the domain of quasi-autonomy s their intimate scale. Also, aparticularuse is not defined. One s acutelyawareof one's ownbody n, and inrelationto,these environments- andwith this, also the anticipationof one'soccupation in vanious modes.,-puregeometric forms, or even conventionalar.hitectural mfoms nflated to grandiose proportions - as one may see inthe so-calledReolutionary archite.ts:ofthe late eighteenth century- crossanOter sholdhehrt".'.eSthe::thee autonomyof architecture.We arriveat an aut'no:th t dsrve? spc:e in our conceptualizationof architec-ture,but less-assuredly belongs in ourbuilt environment.

I say only":less assuredly"f we might adopt Adolf Loos's positionthat architecturerarelyente .tAe' alm of art - perhaps only in confrontingdeath.17So there may be place f a gigantic cenotaph for Newton, but,despite itssize, ths isd infinitesimal part-ofwhat we want or need in our envi-'O n'me ''i ' l:i ' al*n'ie oe ur..envi-ronment. Evenverycleverarc"hitctso not conceivetransfbrmational ormal


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36 / ANDERSON

systems everytime they pick upa pencilormouse.Rather, t is also a highcall-ing to comprehend he formalsystems availablewithin the discipline of archi-tecture and then to bringthese to bearfruitfullyon ourenvironmental needsand the materialityof building. Indeed, t is this broader ask that couldyieldthelargerarchitectural nd urban nvironments n whichwe wouldchoose to live.When we broaden our focus in this way, less austere inventions alsoemerge as significant contributions to the discipline of architecture.In LeCorbusier's enownedFivePoints,modern material andprocessesof construc-tion are imbedded within the disciplinary proposition. Despite this complic-ity in material andtime,the Five Pointsalso openedsignificant general propo-sitions about space, light, and environmentalorganization.The Five Pointsare as muchormore a contribution to the discipline of architecture as are theconceptsof de Stijl. But it is also the case that the Five Points could not havebeen conceived without the availabilityof reinforcedconcrete. Therereally snotechnological nvention n the FivePoints; heyarerathera significantarchi-tecturaldiscoverywithin a recentlyavailable echnology."8tatedthus, Le Cor-busier'sachievement nvites thecomment^ j.. .

B"*:~.:~' _:i~ linary nventions,butpersonalexperienceof the arti-

facts shows that theytoo are discoveriesof space, light,andorganization.As in the exampleof the FivePoints,the notion of quasi-autonomy s not

limited to flights of high architecture andtheory.Indeed,I haveexploredtheconcept in relation to city form(Savannah)20nd workers'housing (Krupp tEssen and the Gutehofnunshuitte t Eisenheim).2"As may be seen then, there is a significant range within the concept ofquasi-autonomy.Some instances approach he austere; hey provide hose spe-cial, rareexplorationswithin the discipline of architectureexemplified bydeStijl. Of course, the formation of the de Stijl group and its set of concernscan be convincinglyexploredwithin a particularhistoricalsetting. But its ele-mental propositions in matters of visual form do indeed have a high degreeof autonomy.Whether in Mondrian'spaintings, Rietveld'sfurniture,or theSchroderhouse, we recognizea physicaltour de force to exemplify those ele-mentalprinciples- andyet our minds can entertain the quite differentlevelsat which we areaddressed.The tactile qualitiesof Mondrian's aintingsdo notdestroytheir ideality. I think it is for the same reasons that, when we see ade Stijl work,we do think of Hollandcirca 1920,but can also grantthese prin-

iciples a generalitythat is not tied to that moment alone.i Even hese special cases become instances within a universal notion ofquasi-autonomy.Eventually they are tested and, if fortunate, given greater

House I (ToyMuseum), Princeton, NewJersey. Peter Eisenman, interior.


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effect by their performance.In speaking of a "universalnotion,"I claim thateveryenvironmentalwork(andother forms of human invention)participatesin quasi-autonomousrelationships. Nevertheless, this claim for generalitydoes not give a meaningless whitewashto allworks. We can make critical dis-tinctions. Unlike the de Stijl example,Le Corbusier'sFive Points participatesquite directlyin the material world.In contrast to the de Stijl case, there canbe arelativelyseamless relation betweenthe disciplinary potentials espousedin the FivePoints and a built workbased onthose principles.But for the samereason, the Five Points reveala (valued)potentialwithin certainmaterial con-ditions: less general,moretechnicallyappropriate,han the De Stijl example;more echnicallyandhistoricallyconstrained hanLeCorbusier cknowledged.Even a banal work can be analyzedin term of quasi-autonomybut willbe revealedas just that:banal.Myown efforts at using the argumentof quasi-autonomy o reveal a powerful example- and allow this to serve as a gauge ofcomparativeworks - is perhapsbest demonstrated n my studies of the townplan of Savannah.22 t is not special that one can analyze Savannah from theperspectiveof quasi-autonomy. t is the distinctive features andthe historicalperformanceof Savannah,revealed hroughan analysisof its quasi-autonomy,that makeit special and indeed a comparative est forothercity plans.

Finally,I want to recognize that the notion of quasi-autonomy s in noway limited to architecture or matters of the physical environment. Conven-tions, whethertouchingon social or environmental ssues (and,afterall,thesecan never be wholly separate),can be examined in terms of their quasi-auton-omous relations. An illustrative example is the social category of "teenager."Theconcept is so imbedded n our society that at first it seems the years fromthirteen to nineteen must have someunitythat is inturn characterizedbysomeinevitable traits. There are alwaysand everywherepeople of these teen years,andthey surelyhavetraits that are differentfrom hose who are eitheryoungeror older.Whatwemake of this population,however, s at least as muchor morea matter of the social construct we make forthem,andthey forthemselves.This is my simple advocacy:he fruitfulness ofrecognizingthe strengthsand the claims of, on one side, ourtheories and conventions,that should notbe held dogmatically,and, on the other, the realities, that are in some waysobdurate but often remarkablyand fascinatingly malleable. To seek to liveonlya life of the mind at one pole,or of materialityat the other,orof coercivepower from either, is to impoverish one's self, one's discipline, and one'ssmaller or greatercommunity.

NOTES1 The essay had its initial form in a lecture for the conference

"Conventions, Canons, and Criticism,"organized by theauthor for MITand held at the American Academy of Artsand Sciences in Cambridge, April 1982.

2 Actually Iwrote "semi-autonomy."Inow prefer "quasi-auton-omy,"so Iuse that form throughout this essay, even where itinvolves changing an earlier text.

3 On a different critical front, this was also the year of RobertVenturi'sComplexityand Contradiction in Architecture (NewYork:Museum of Modern Art, 1966).

4 As noted, this is an unpublished essay first presented atthe Architectural Association, London, in March 1966. Itwas repeated on 5 June 1966 at the annual teachers' confer-ence of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architec-ture, meeting at the CranbrookAcademy in Bloomfield Hills,Michigan.As produced here, the text is changed in minormatters of felicity, the elimination of such usage of the timeas "the architect ... he.," and abbreviation in accord with thecurrent editors.

5 Infact Iwas happy to pre-judge the Princeton project andwon the resources to stage an MIT onference "Inventingthe Future Environment"(1966)that explored other viewsof the situation of architecture and planning.The resultingbook was S. Anderson, ed., Planning forDiversityand Choice:Possible Futures and their Relations to the Man-ControlledEnvironment (Cambridge:The MITPress, 1968);in German asDie Zukunftder menschlichen Umwelt (Freiburgi.B.:VerlagRombach, 1971).The final report of the AlA/Princeton studywas Robert L.Geddes and Bernard P.Spring, A Study of Edu-cation forEnvironmentalDesign (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1967).

6 M.C. Beardsley, "On he Creation of Art,"Journal of Aesthet-ics andArt Criticism, xxiii, 3 (Spring 1965), p.299.

7 A.D.Trottenberg, "College Graduates Visual Illiterates,"Satur-day Review(Feb. 19, 1966),pp. 73ff.

8 A similar argument for growth through "problem-worrying"could be made for the way in which Le Corbusier, at theVAC,continued to transform the architectural problem thathe had set out in the Maison Domino in 1914.S. Anderson,

"Architectural Research Programmes in the Work of Le Cor-busier,"Design Studies (London),v (July 1984),pp. 151-158.Reprinted (without illustrations) in K. Michael Hays, ed.,Architecture Theorysince 1968(Cambridge:The MITPress,1998),pp.490-505.

9 "Sert'sConcept of Living,"ArchitecturalDesign, xxXI (August1965),p. 376.

10 For reasons of time, the next two paragraphs were not readin London.

11 The exhibition was under the guidance of Arthur Drexler,Director of the Department of Architecture and Design ofThe Museum of ModernArt. See The New City:Architectureand UrbanRenewal (New York:MoMA, 1967).

12 "Aninteresting outgrowth of the exhibition has been theestablishment, in New YorkCity,of the Institute for Archi-tecture and Urban Studies, through the joint efforts ofThe Museum of Modern Art and Cornell University.The Insti-tute will combine university, museum, and governmentalresources as they may be broughtto bear on what is nowone of the most pressing questions of our time: what isto become of our cities?" Arthur Drexler was a motivatingforce in this foundation. Colin Rowe played a role intheaffiliation of Cornell University, but the quoted paragraphgives no indication of the central role, once again, of PeterEisenman first in the foundation of IAUSand then as itsleader (with Rowe as a sidekick in the first years). A majorproject of the Institute was one on streets sponsored bythe U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development(1970-1972). Itresulted in a housing project in Brooklynanda book: S. Anderson, ed., On Streets (Cambridge:The MITPress, 1978). InSpanish as Calles. Problemas de estructuray diseno (Barcelona: Gustavo Gill,1981);and in Italian asStrade (Bari: Dedalo, 1982).

13 The MIT eam worked without internal conflict, but therewas a distinction within its members. Robert Goodman, whojoined at my invitation, was a noted figure of the time inthe political and social criticism of the architectural pro-fession. Millon and Iwere more inclined to sustain disciplin-ary inquirywhile sharing in Goodman's concerns. From thebeginning of the project there was a bond to withdraw col-lectively if MoMA resisted the politicization of our project-a possibility that was always at hand and perhaps restrainedonly by the intense general politics of the time and notablyin matters concerning Harlem. Perhaps it is of anecdotalinterest that Michael Dukakis drew up the AGMpartnershippapers. On the politics of architecture and planning of thatmoment, see: Robert Goodman, After the Planners (NewYork:Simon &Schuster, 1971).

14 CASEmeetings were private to the members and guestsexcept for a public event at the University of Oregon andthen this meeting at MIT.

15 In his 1976 editorial for Oppositions 6, Eisenman dis-missed autonomy, at least as he perceived it to havebeen represented, as a continuing humanist enterprise,in the "Architettura Razionale" exhibition at the MilanTriennale of 1973. Eisenman anticipated an achievementin architecture, belatedly, of what the "modernistsensi-bility"had properly been, a new, non-humanist culturalattitude. Ibelieve there can be important distinctionsbetween vulgar Zeitgeist arguments and the invocation(offered by Eisenman) of an episteme as conceived byFoucault.What those distinctions would be, and howthey relate to Eisenman's continuing work cannot beattempted here.

16 S. Anderson, "Formand Use inArchitecture," photocopyleaflet for an exhibition of the same name, organized byAnderson at the Hayden Gallery,MIT Jan. 28-March 2,1969),pp. 8-10.

17 Adolf Loos, "Architektur,"Trotzdem Innsbruck:Brenner-Verlag), 1931;reprint(Vienna:Georg Prachner, 1982).Here and elsewhere Loos insists on differentiating thecultural roles of various artifacts, including buildings.Buildings typically do not fall in the realm of art, whilean anonymous mound, of characteristic shape, mayenter the realm of art. See Anderson, "Architecture in aCultural Field," nTaisto H. Makela and Wallis Miller,eds.,Warsof Classification: Architecture and Modernity(NewYork:Princeton Architectural Press, 1991),pp. 9-35.

18 See note 8.19 Iwas moved to this commentary by a brief argument

of Christopher Ricks, but Ido not wish to make himresponsible for my appropriation. Ricks, "TheTragediesof Webster,Tourneurand Middleton:Symbols, Imageryand Conventions," in Ricks, ed., English Drama to 1710(London:Sphere Books, 1971),p. 307.

20 See On Streets, and "UrbanForm and Society in theGreat City:An Argument from the Quasi-Autonomy ofPhysical Form," n Luigi Mazza, ed., WorldCities andthe Futureof the Metropoles (Milan:Electa, 1988),pp.87-93; "Savannah and the Issue of Precedent: City Planas Resource," in Ralph Bennett, ed., Settlements in theAmericas: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Newark, DL:Uni-versity of Delaware Press, 1993),pp. 110-144.

21 "CriticalConventionalism: The History of Architecture,"Midgard1(University of Minnesota), I, 1 (1988),pp. 33-47.

22 See the previous note but one.


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